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# THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

## A REVISED TEXT

*WITH INTRODUCTION ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY*

  
BY

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\*

BOOKS I.—V.

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## PREFACE.

IN the work, of which this volume is an instalment, I have undertaken to reproduce in an English dress Professor Susemihl's edition of the *Politics* in Greek and German as issued by him, with notes explanatory of the subject-matter, in 1879. It is not, however, a simple reproduction, but a minute and scrupulous revision, the translation having been dropped and the plan of the work sensibly modified to adapt it to the wants of English students. Some changes have been made in the Introduction, to which a section has been added, though naturally the materials of this section are by no means new. The text (for which Professor Susemihl is solely responsible) has been corrected in some hundreds of places, mostly to bring it into agreement with his later edition in the Teubner series, of which a *nova impressio correctior* was issued in 1894, only a few months ago. The great majority of the changes which distinguish the *impressio* of 1894 from that of 1883 have, however, to be sought in the Corrigenda. By the simple device of a change of type it has been found possible to exhibit to the eye the effect of the numerous transpositions here recommended, and yet to retain the received order of the text for facility of reference. In the notes explanatory of the subject-matter bearing his signature Professor Susemihl has introduced comprehensive changes. No one therefore should be surprised if these notes fail to correspond in substance (as they correspond in appended number) to those of the German edition.

Where it seemed expedient, they have been supplemented from my own collections. It can be said with truth that difficulties have never been shirked, numerous as they undoubtedly are. Wherever a note grew to an inordinate length or threatened to digress from the context, it has been relegated to an excursus.

In compiling additional notes I have received the greatest stimulus and advantage from the writings and correspondence of my collaborator, whose patience and forbearance have not been exhausted in the long interval preceding publication. He has always been willing to lavish upon me every assistance from the stores of his erudition, and to aid me with the latest results of his experience and ripened judgment. Indeed, it is not too much to say that not only primarily, but in the additions of date subsequent to 1879 indirectly, this volume, and the *Politics* as a whole, owes far more to him than to all other sources put together. Next to him I am most indebted to Dr Henry Jackson, who has never failed to give me encouragement and assistance, and in 1880 most kindly placed at my disposal a selection of valuable notes, critical and exegetical, which are published in the course of the volume with his signature. Moreover, as in private duty bound, I acknowledge that it is to the stimulus of his inspiring lectures that I, like Dr Postgate and Mr Welldon, owe my first interest in Aristotelian studies. I have naturally endeavoured to profit by the publications of recent years, so far as they bore upon my author, and I may especially mention the contributions to the *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society* and *Journal of Philology* by Dr Jackson, Professor Ridgeway, Dr Postgate and Professor J. Cook Wilson. I have taken the liberty of consulting any materials to which I had access, such as the marginalia of the late Richard Shilleto in the Cambridge University Library, and of the late Edward Meredith Cope in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge. In common with the publishers I deplore and apologise for the long delay between the announcement and the publication of this work, although this delay has enabled me to secure a collation of the oldest extant source of the text, the fragments of the Vatican palimpsest, and to incorporate in the Addenda the most import-

ant of the references to the recently discovered *Constitution of Athens*. Thus supplemented the commentary will, it is hoped, be found more adequate than any of its predecessors to our existing materials and means of information.

Some will be surprised that more attention has not been bestowed upon the superb Introduction or the full and lucid commentary upon Books I and II published by Mr W. L. Newman in 1887. The truth is that, at the time of its appearance the earlier part of this volume had been printed off, and the publishers did not see their way either to issue this part (pp. 1—460) separately, as I personally should have preferred, or to incur the heavy expense of cancelling the printed sheets. Some valuable annotations of Mr Newman's, however, which I should have been glad to incorporate in the proper place, receive a brief recognition in the Addenda.

I have further to add that I began to print before Professor Susemihl had collected into a permanent form his first set of *Quaestiones Aristotelicae* I—VII, and that for greater clearness I refer to the invaluable pamphlet issued by him in 1886, in which the main results of the seven *Quaestiones* are combined, as *Quaestiones criticae collectae*, although the last word *collectae* forms no part of the title proper.

My best thanks are here duly tendered to my friends Mr William Wyse, late Professor of Greek in University College, London, for valuable suggestions and criticisms, and numerous additional references, particularly in all that bears upon Greek Antiquities; Miss Alice Zimmern, author of *Home Life of the Greeks*, Mr Hartmann W. Just, sometime scholar of C. C. C., Oxford, and Mr H. J. Wolstenholme, for timely assistance in the laborious task of translating from the German; further, to my brother-in-law, Mr T. L. Heath, formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who read most of the earlier proof-sheets. Occasional notes of his and one by Mr H. W. Just bear the authors' initials. To guard against all misapprehension I should add that the excursus on Greek Music was already printed off before the Provost of Oriel's recent work on that subject reached me.

The want of an index, which renders this instalment of the work much less useful than it might otherwise have been, will be remedied when the remaining three books are published.

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*Oct.* 15, 1894.

## ON REFERENCES TO THE *POLITICS* BY BOOKS, CHAPTERS, SECTIONS, PAGES.

THE text of this edition with its double numbering of certain books, its double system of chapters and sections, and of marginal pages, may well perplex an unfamiliar reader unless a word or two be added as to the origin of this aggravated confusion and the various methods by which any given passage may be cited.

The manuscripts exhibit the eight books in the old order, viz. A B Γ Δ E Z H Θ according to the left heading of each page (not in the order of this edition which is A B Γ H Θ Δ Z E). There is no subdivision of the books in the Aldines and other early printed editions, any more than in the MSS. The Latin translations had been subdivided before this into chapters and sections, a division almost inevitable when the continuity of the text is disturbed by paraphrase and commentary. Thus the second edition of Victorius (Florence 1576) presents the text in a series of short sections, although these are never numbered or otherwise utilized for purposes of reference.

The system of chapters here adopted, as cited in the head lines and on the left hand of the pages of this volume, is that most widely known through its adoption by Immanuel Bekker in the great edition of the Berlin Academy (quarto 1831), and by Hermann Bonitz in the *Index Aristotelicus* to the same edition (1870). It may be traced back to the editions of Zwinger (1582), Sylburg (1587), Casaubon (1590). It seems that Zwinger merely modified another arrangement into chapters, derived from the Latin Aristotle (e.g. the edition of Bagolinus), and found in the third Basel edition (1550) of Conrad Gesner, also in Giphanius (1608). Sylburg (1587) and Conring (1656) give both schemes, calling Gesner's "vulgo." In this now obsolete arrangement Book I. made eight chapters, not thirteen, Book II., ten, not twelve, Book III., twelve, not eighteen.

The sections into which Bekker's chapters are divided are taken from the Oxford reprint of Bekker in ten octavo volumes (1837), in which unfortunately Bekker's pages and lines are wholly ignored. These sections have been retained in this volume because Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon, and some other authorities, cite the *Politics* by them. They are numbered on the left side of the page with § prefixed.

The chapters (in Roman figures) and sections on the right side of the page are these introduced by J. Gottlob Schneider in his valuable edition of 1809. Schneider broke with all his predecessors by adopting longer chapters and fewer of them, e.g. 5 in Book I., 9 in Book II. He was followed amongst subsequent editors by Gotting

(1824), Adolf Stahr (1839), Susemihl (1879) : Grote in his history always cites the *Politics* by Schneider's edition.

But the tendency in modern times has been not to employ for citation either the sections of Bekker or the chapters and sections of Schneider, but rather the **chapter, page, column, and line** of the quarto of the Berlin Academy above mentioned. In this edition of all Aristotle the *Politics* occupies pages 1252—1342. The quarto volume is printed in double columns, cited as column a, column b. For example, 1252 a 18, 1276 b 4 (or in the *Index Aristotelicus* 1252<sup>a</sup>18, 1276<sup>b</sup>4) are used to denote, the one, line 18 of the left column of page 1252, the other, line 4 of the right column of page 1276. The closer definition which this method of citation by lines secures is a great recommendation, but it is balanced by one drawback, viz. that to be quite sure of finding a passage the Berlin Aristotle is required, and after sixty years the supremacy of even this edition no longer remains unquestioned. In the present volume the pages and lines of Bekker's quarto are cited on the **left** hand side of the page, while in the heading over the right hand page the whole extent of the text on both left and right pages is recorded : (e.g. 1263 b 23—1264 a 4 for the text upon pp. 238 and 239 of this volume).

Lastly, there are a few writers, Bernays and Oncken among them, who prefer to quote passages by the page and line, *not* of the Berlin quarto, but of the octavo reprint of it issued a little later, of which a third edition came out in 1855 and a fourth edition in 1878. For comparison, this system of pages has been recorded on the **right** hand margin, the reference being enclosed in a bracket, thus : (p. 31).

For an example of these rival methods of citation take the sentence *δεῖ δὲ μὴδὲ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι χρὴ προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ* upon p. 239 of this edition. The reference (i) in the *Index Aristotelicus* would be Πβ5, 1264 a 1 sq.; we prefer to cite it as (ii) Book II, c. 5 § 16 (or II. 5. 16) by Bekker's chapters and sections : or dropping the book and chapter (which are really superfluous) as (iii) 1264 a 1, 2 by Bekker's pages, columns and lines. No references in this English edition are given by Schneider's chapters and sections, which were followed in Susemihl's German edition of 1879 : but on that method the passage could be cited as (iv) Book II c. ii § 10. Lastly, Bernays or Oncken would refer to it as (v) p. 31, 1 f.

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## CORRIGENDA.

Page 8, line 2 : for **M.** read **Isaac**

P. 18, note 7, line 5 : for πολιτικων read πολιτικῶν.

P. 56, line 14 : for Stageira read Stagira (cp. Meisterhans<sup>2</sup> p. 43, n. 373)

P. 69, note 2, line 3 : for νόμον read νόμων

Ib. line 4 : for πολιτειων read πολιτειῶν

P. 82, line 2 : for ἀπορίαν read εὐπορίαν (cp. below p. 312)

P. 144, text, 1252 b 16, 17 : for μάλιστα δ' εἶκε κατὰ φύσιν  
read μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶκε

Ib. commentary, right column, last line : for coediche read coediche

P. 146, critical notes, line 3 : after 28 insert ἤδη]

P. 147, text, 1253 a 3 : omit ἐστὶ

Ib. critical notes, line 6 : transpose

ὁ omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Bk

to precede 3 ἐστὶ M<sup>2</sup>

That is, the ὁ omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Bk is in 1253 a 2 before ἄνθρωπος. Stehr reads  
ἄνθρωπος : cp. Addenda p. 663

P. 150, crit. notes, line 5 : for *Quaest. Cr.* III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. read *Quaest. crit. coll.*  
(Lips. 1886) p. 334 ff

Ib. line 8 : *dele* Ar.

P. 151, crit. notes, line 8 : after *Quaest. Cr.* II. 5 f., IV. 5 f. insert *Quaest. crit.*  
*coll.* p. 336 ff

P. 153, crit. notes, line 4 : after *Quaest. Cr.* II. 7 ff. insert *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 339 f

P. 156, text, 1254 a 8, right margin : for (p. read (p. 6)

P. 157, text, 1254 a 27 : for ἀπὸ read ἐπὶ

Ib. crit. notes, line 3 : for Dittographia read Dittography

crit. notes, line 9 : after ἀπὸ read I<sup>II</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> Sussem.<sup>1-2</sup>

P. 160, text, 1254 b 14 : omit καὶ

P. 161, crit. notes, line 1 : after 18 insert ἐστὶν]

P. 176, crit. notes, line 9 : after *Quaest. Cr.* III. 5 ff. insert *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 352 f

P. 178, comm. left column, line 9 : for κέκρησθαι read κενήσθαι

P. 180, crit. notes, line 3 : for ηε read ηε

P. 182, text, 1257 a 38 : for καὶ εἰ read καὶ εἰ

P. 183, comm. left col. line 8 : for 5, read see

Ib. line 9 : for μετατιθεμένων read μεταθεμένων

P. 190, comm. left col. line 7 from below : after telling insert and

P. 195, comm. right col. line 17: *after* citizens *insert a comma*

P. 197, text, 1259 b 32: *for* [καί] *read* καί

P. 200, text, 1260 a 30, right margin: *remove* 9 *from line 30 to line 31*

Ib. comm. left col. line 5 *from below: for* μέρος *read* μέρος

P. 201, text, 1260 a 35, right margin: *remove* 10 *from line 35 to line 36*

P. 209, *To Excursus II. also belong remarks on B. I. c. 6 in Addenda p. 672*

P. 213, text, 1260 b 31: *for* καὶ εἰ *read* καὶν εἰ

P. 216, comm. right col. line 14: *for* III. 8 § 4, 16 § 2, *read* III. 16 § 2,

#### IV (VII). 8 § 4,

P. 231, crit. notes, line 3: *for* Bk. *read* Bk.<sup>1</sup>

P. 232, text, 1263 a 2: *for* ἔχει, πᾶσι *read* ἔχει πᾶσι,

P. 233, comm. right col. line 26: *for* I. 126 *read* I. 141 § 3

P. 234, comm. left col. line 19: *for* I. 9. 9 *read* I. 7. 2, 1255 b 24 f

P. 235, text, 1263 a 29: *for* προσεδρεύοντες *read* προσεδρεύοντος

P. 265, text, 1267 a 11: *for* δύναιτο *read* βούλουντο

P. 273, comm. left col. line 6: *for* II. § 9 *read* c. 11 § 9

P. 279, crit. notes, last line: *after* Ephesus *insert* op. c. fol. 186<sup>a</sup> p. 610, 16 ff.

#### ed. Hayduck

P. 281, comm. left col. line 5: *for* evidences *read* evidence

P. 282, text, 1269 b 18: *for* δεῖ νομίζειν εἶναι *read* εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν

P. 284, comm. right col. line 12: *read* διασώζεται

P. 287, comm. left col. line 21: *for* 8 § 6 *read* 7 § 6

P. 297, comm. left col. line 13: *for* p. 9 *read* p. 20

P. 300, comm. left col. last line: *for* Ottfried *read* Otfried

P. 301, comm. left col. line 4: *for* πολεμίων *read* πόλεων

P. 305, text, 1272 b 9: *for* δυναστῶν *read* δυνατῶν

Ib. crit. notes, line 7: *after* Schneider || *add* δυναστῶν II<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> ||

P. 306, text, 1272 b 13: *for* τι *read* τι

Ib. text, 1272 b 23: *for* τοσαυθ' ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω *read* εἰρήσθω τοσαυθ' ἡμῖν

P. 312, text, 1273 b 6 (*bis*, line 4 and line 18): *for* ἀπορίαν *read* εὐπορίαν

Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *for* 6 εὐπορίαν P<sup>1</sup>II<sup>2</sup>Ar. *read*

6 ἀπορίαν ΓM<sup>s</sup>Ald. Bk. Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

P. 314, text, 1273 b 25, left margin: *dele* (12)

P. 317, comm. left col. line 16: *dele* Aristides

P. 326, line 9: *for* IV. 130 *read* IV. 180

P. 331, heading, line 13: *for* II. 7. 1 *read* II. 8. 1

P. 356, comm. left col. line 11: *for* βολαῖαι *read* βόλαιαι

P. 359, text, 1275 b 17, left margin: *dele* (2)

P. 362, text, 1276 a 5: *for* φάμεν *read* ἔφαμεν

Ib. text, 1276 a 10: *read* δημοκρατία (τότε γὰρ

P. 363, text, 1276 a 13: *dele* \* \*

*and read* συμφέρον)· εἴπερ οὖν

*The parenthesis extends from* 1276 a 10 (τότε γὰρ *to* 1276 a 13 συμφέρον)·

Ib. text, 1276 a 14: *for* καὶ *read* [καὶ]

Ib. text, 1276 a 15: *omit* <οὐ>

Ib. text, 1276 a 16: *for* τυραννίδος. *read* τυραννίδος;

Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *after* 14 *read* [καὶ] Niemeyer (untranslated by William)

Ib. crit. notes, line 4: *dele* incorrect

Ib. crit. notes, line 5: *after* Hayduck *add* Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

P. 364, text, 1276 a 26: *for τὴν read [τὴν]*

Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *before 27 add [τὴν] Schneider Niemeyer Jahrb. f. Phil.*

CXLIII. 1891, p. 414

P. 367, text, 1276 b 30: *for διόπερ read διδ*

P. 370, comm. left col. last line: *for δυνανται read δύνανται*

P. 380, text, 1278 b 8: *for καὶ εἰ read καὶ εἰ*

P. 382, crit. notes, line 2: *after (corrector) add a semicolon*

P. 389, comm. right col. line 18: *for VII(V) read VIII(V)*

P. 396, text, 1281 a 16: *with change of punctuation read ἐστιν (ἴδοξε γὰρ...δικαίως)*

P. 397, text, 1281 a 35, 36: *transpose φαῦλον to precede ἔχοντα and read*  
*φαῦλον ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαλόντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον.*

P. 430, comm. left col. line 21: *for αρχεω read ἀρχεω*

Ib. line 23: *for ἐπιθυμία read ἐπιθυμία*

Ib. line 26: *for ὁ read ὁ*

P. 431, text, 1287 a 39: *for πιστευθέντας read πεισθέντας*

Ib. crit. notes, line 10: *after right insert a comma and read πιστευθέντας II fr.*

Pl. Susem. 1-2

P. 434, comm. right col. line 7: *for εν read εὖ*

P. 438, comm. left col. line 1: *after turn out insert anyhow," i.e. "*

P. 441, text, 1287 a 39: *for πιστευθέντας read πεισθέντας*

P. 444, crit. notes, line 11: *for dittographia read dittography*

P. 464, line 44: *for 24 read 23*

P. 467, line 5 ff.: *dele the sentence Again, one might have imagined...πολιτεία.*

Not so.

P. 475, text, 1323 b 18: *for καὶ read [καὶ]*

P. 497, text, 1327 a 23: *for πρὸς read [πρὸς]*

Ib. crit. notes, line 2: *for ὑπάρχοντα read ἐπάρχοντα*

P. 503, text, 1328 a 16: *for οἱ δὲ read οἷδε*

P. 521, text, 1330 b 30: *for πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν read μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν*

P. 529, text, 1332 a 13: *omit καὶ before ἀναγκαῖαι*

P. 534, comm. left col. line 14: *for 1284 read 1254*

P. 535, text, 1332 b 31: *for τούτων πάντων read πάντων τούτων*

P. 537, text, 1333 a 26: *transpose διηγήσθαι to precede καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος*

Ib. comm. right col. line 17: *for correlation read correlative*

P. 540, comm. right col. line 18 f.: *for VIII(V). § 10, 7 § 2 read VIII(V). 1 § 10, 7 § 4*

P. 541, text, 1334 a 8: *for ἀνίσω read ἀφῆδον*

P. 545, head line: *for 1333 a 40 read 1334 a 40*

P. 546, text, 1334 b 24: *for πέφυκεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι read ἐγγίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν*

P. 549, text, 1335 a 27: *for χρόνοι ὠρισμένοι read ὠρισμένοι χρόνοι*

P. 559, text, 1336 b 34: *for ὅσα αὐτῶν read αὐτῶν ὅσα*



## INTRODUCTION.

### I. MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS OF *THE POLITICS*.

ARISTOTLE'S *Politics* has come down to us in manuscripts for the most part of the fifteenth century; there are indeed two, P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (Bekker's I<sup>b</sup>), which date from the fourteenth century, but none earlier. There is the Latin version by Lionardo Bruni of Arezzo (Leonardus Aretinus), made from the first manuscript brought into Italy from Greece in the fifteenth century, a manuscript now lost, which was probably older than the fifteenth century<sup>1</sup>. There is further an older translation, word for word into barbarous Latin, made in the thirteenth century, before A.D. 1274<sup>2</sup>, by the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke. Its lost original was a Greek codex<sup>3</sup> which we will call F; written, at the latest, in the early part of the thirteenth or latter part of the twelfth century, and probably of not much older date<sup>4</sup>. This translation<sup>5</sup> primarily, together with four of the existing Greek manuscripts, three at Paris P<sup>1</sup>, 2, 3, one at Milan M<sup>1</sup>, is now the critical basis for the text. All that the remaining manuscripts or the translation of Aretinus can claim is to supply confirmatory evidence in isolated passages: Aretinus, in particular, is much too free and arbitrary in his rendering, so that it is often impossible to infer, at least with any certainty, the reading of his Greek codex; hence many peculiarities of his translation must be passed over or regarded as merely his own conjectures.

<sup>1</sup> Very likely Francesco Filelfo brought it from Constantinople in 1439 at the request of Palla Strozzi: see the evidence for this in Oncken, *Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles* (Leipzig 1870. 8vo) vol. 1. p. 78. Compare my large critical edition, *Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo cum vetusta translatione Gulielmi de Moerbeke* (Leipzig 1873. 8vo) p. XV.

<sup>2</sup> See Sussemlil *op. cit.* p. VI. with note 4. [Von Hertling places it about 1160, *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIX. 1884. p. 457.

Thomas Aquinas twice quotes it in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, writing probably A.D. 1261--1265. TR.]

<sup>3</sup> The best manuscript of this 'Old Translation' expressly states it. See Sussemlil *op. cit.* XXXIV. See also below p. 49 n. 2, p. 71 ff.

<sup>4</sup> On the date see Sussemlil *op. cit.* 811.

<sup>5</sup> With the text restored from manuscripts and old printed editions in my edition above mentioned.

All these sources of the text fall into two families or recensions. One of them, on the whole the better, but often the worse in particular points, seems to be derived from a codex of the sixth or seventh century<sup>1</sup>, although in the quotations of single passages in Julian and even as early as Alexander of Aphrodisias the readings peculiar to this recension are partially, but only partially, found. Besides T the only manuscripts which belong, in the main, to this family are the following two :

M<sup>s</sup> = Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105<sup>2</sup> (in the Ambrosian Library at Milan), of the second half of the fifteenth century, much corrected by the copyist himself and in a few passages by a later hand ; collated by R. Schöll and Studemund :

P<sup>1</sup> = Parisinus 2023 (in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), written by Demetrios Chalkondylas at the end of the fifteenth century, and then much corrected with a paler ink from a manuscript of the other family. Corrections of this sort are hereafter denoted by p<sup>1</sup>, those made in the same black ink as the original text by (corr.<sup>1</sup>), corrections which do not belong to either of these classes, or at all events are not with certainty to be reckoned with one or the other, are quoted simply as (corr.). In regard to this and all the other manuscripts, it is distinctly stated when any correction stands in the margin. P<sup>1</sup> was last collated by Dahms and Patzig.

Just as in P<sup>1</sup> the two families are blended<sup>3</sup>, so conversely traces of the better recension are met with even in some manuscripts which belong, in the main, to the other family. This is true of many corrections and most of the glosses which are found in P<sup>2</sup>, the principal manuscript of this second family<sup>4</sup>; still more frequently of the readings, corrections, and variants in P<sup>4</sup>; so also of Aretinus' translation and especially of P<sup>5</sup>; to a less extent of the corrections by a later hand in some other manuscripts, and hardly ever of their original readings. The few excerpts from

<sup>1</sup> On the one hand the commentary of the Neo-Platonic philosopher Proclus (died 485) upon Plato's *Republic* is quoted in a gloss on VIII (v). 12. 8, which in all probability (see note<sup>4</sup>) proceeds from this archetype : on the other, certain corruptions common to all the sources derived from this family point to the conclusion that the archetype was written in uncials (particularly III. 14 §§ 12, 13 οὐσιῶν and οὐσται for θουσιῶν and θυσται). Now uncial writing ceased generally in the eighth century. Cp. Susemihl *op. c.* XIV f., XLVI f.

<sup>2</sup> Ordinis superioris.

<sup>3</sup> Or in its archetype, if Demetrios found the corrections which betray the second recension—in the few cases where they are written with the same ink as his original text—already made.

<sup>4</sup> For the same glosses which in P<sup>1</sup> can be shown to be derived from the first recension meet us again in P<sup>2</sup>, and a similar origin may be proved for others in P<sup>2</sup> in another way. On the other hand P<sup>2</sup> has few glosses in common with P<sup>3</sup>, and the number in P<sup>3</sup> is but scanty, so that the second recension appears to have had only a few glosses altogether. See Susemihl *op. c.* VIII f., XVIII f.

Aristotle's *Politics* in Codex Paris. 963, of the sixteenth century, are also derived from the better recension.

Subject to these exceptions, all other manuscripts but those above-mentioned are to be reckoned with the second family, the text of which may be called the vulgate. They may be further subdivided into two classes, a better and a worse, and the latter again into three different groups: an intermediate position between the two is taken up by the translation of Aretinus and in a different way by C<sup>4</sup>. A more precise statement is afforded by the following summary.

### I. Better class: II<sup>2</sup>.

P<sup>2</sup> = Coislin. 161 (brought originally from Athos: now with the rest of the Coislinian collection in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), of the 14th century; Bekker's I<sup>3</sup>; last collated by Susemihl. The corrections and variants are written partly (1) in the same ink as the original text, partly (2) in darker ink, partly (3) in paler, yellower, partly (4) in red ink: these are indicated hereafter by (corr.<sup>1</sup>), (corr.<sup>2</sup>), (corr.<sup>3</sup>) and p<sup>2</sup> respectively: where the ink appears to be wholly different, or cannot be brought with certainty under any of these classes, the sign will be (corr.<sup>4</sup>). But all without exception, and the glosses as well, are in the same handwriting as the codex.

P<sup>3</sup> = Paris. 2026 of the beginning of the 14th century, for the greater part written by the same scribe, but finished by another hand; the oldest manuscript that we have, but not so good as P<sup>2</sup>, especially in its original form before it had been corrected by a third and later hand and thereby made still more like P<sup>2</sup> than it was at first. It is true that most of these later corrections were subsequently scratched out again or wiped off, yet even then they remain legible enough. P<sup>3</sup>, like P<sup>2</sup>, was last collated by Susemihl.

### II. Worse class: II<sup>3</sup>.

#### 1. First group.

P<sup>4</sup> = Paris. 2025 of the 15th century, much corrected but, with the exception of a single passage, only by the scribe himself, with various readings in the margin; last collated by Susemihl.

P<sup>5</sup> = Paris. 1857, written in the year 1492 in Rome by Johannes Rhosos, a priest from Crete; last collated by Patzig for the first four chapters of Book I. Statements as to the readings of this manuscript in other single passages come from Bekker, from Barthelémy St Hilaire, and in particular from Patzig.

Q = Marcianus Venetus 200 (in the library of St Mark at Venice), also written by Johannes Rhosos, but as early as 1457: collated by Bekker for Book I, and since then afresh for the first four chapters of that book, as above, by R. Schöll and E. Rohde.

M<sup>a</sup> = Marcianus Venetus 213, of the beginning of the 15th century, collated by Bekker for i. c. 1—c. 6 § 8 and again by Rohde for i. cc. 1—4.

U<sup>b</sup> = Marcianus Venetus, append. iv. 3, written in Rome in the year 1494, collated by Bekker for ii. cc. 1—7; iii. 2 § 3 (1275 b 32—34), 14 §§ 2—10; vi (iv). 3 § 8—4 § 3, 7 § 2—8 § 4; viii (v). 3 § 5—4 § 10, and by Rohde for i. cc. 1—4.

L<sup>s</sup> = Lipsiensis (bibliothecae Paulinae) 1335, in the University library at Leipzig, of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century, most closely related to U<sup>b</sup>, collated by Patzig for i. 1—4 and other single passages. We have information about readings in other parts of Books i. ii. and v (viii). from Stahr and Schneider.

C<sup>c</sup> denotes the codex used by Camerarius.

Ar. = Aretinus, who must have used for his translation a codex of a very peculiar kind in which the two recensions were blended. For the translation is often in remarkable agreement with the manuscripts of this group; though often, too, with the better class. Not seldom again it agrees with the first family: lastly, it here and there shows peculiarities belonging exclusively to itself which can hardly be all set down to mere conjecture or arbitrariness on the part of the translator.

## 2. Second group.

C<sup>4</sup> = Florentinus Castiglionensis (in the Laurentian library at Florence) iv. (Acquisti nuovo), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for i. 1—4; ii. 1—2 § 3; vi (iv). 1: in the opening chapters it is more in agreement with the better class.

Q<sup>b</sup> = Laurentianus 81, 5 (in the Laurentian library at Florence), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for i. 1—4 and single passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books ii. iii. vi (iv).

R<sup>b</sup> = Laurentianus 81, 6, written by Johannes Thetталos in the year 1494 at Florence, collated by Schöll for the same opening part and for isolated passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books vii (vi). viii (v). It bears a great resemblance to Q<sup>b</sup>, particularly to the corrections of Q<sup>b</sup> in a later hand: but it has some peculiarities of its own.

S<sup>b</sup> = Laurentianus 81, 21, of the fifteenth century, written more probably before than after Q<sup>b</sup>, to which it bears an extraordinary resem-

blance; collated by Bekker for Books I. IV (VII). V (VIII), and again by Schöll for the first four chapters of Bk. I, and for single passages elsewhere.

*T<sup>b</sup>* = Urbinas 46 (transferred from Urbino to the Vatican library at Rome), of the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for the first three books and for Bk. V (VIII), then again by Hinck for Bk. I. 1—4 and for detached passages by Schöll. It seems to be more nearly related to *V<sup>b</sup>* than to *Q<sup>b</sup>*, *R<sup>b</sup>*, *S<sup>b</sup>*.

*V<sup>b</sup>* = Vaticano-Palatinus 160 (transferred from the Palatine library to the Vatican), also written by Johannes Thettalos in the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for Bks. IV (VII). VI (IV). VIII (V), by Hinck for Bk. I. 1—4, and by Schöll for several single passages. The corrections by a later hand in the opening paragraph (Bk. I. 1—4) are in striking agreement with *C<sup>4</sup>*.

3. Third group, more nearly related to the first group, in particular to *U<sup>b</sup> I<sup>5</sup>*, than to the second.

*W<sup>b</sup>* = Reginensis 125 (*Christinae reginae*—in the Vatican library), collated by Bekker for Bk. VIII (VI), by Hinck for Bk. I. 1—4, by Schöll for several single passages. This manuscript will have to be wholly neglected for the future, because, as I learn from communications made to me by Von Wilanowitz-Möllendorff, it is no earlier than the sixteenth or perhaps the seventeenth century, and was undoubtedly copied from the Aldine edition.

*Ald.* = Aldina, the first edition of Aristotle published by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1498, last collated for Bk. I. 1—4 and for numerous single passages by Susemihl.

Lastly an unique position amongst the manuscripts is taken by *P<sup>3</sup>* = Paris. 1858 or Colbert. 2401, dating from the sixteenth century. On the one hand this codex must be one of the worse manuscripts of the second family, although it cannot be exclusively assigned to any one of the three groups into which they fall<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand it frequently agrees with the first family, and not seldom alone of all the manuscripts that have come down to us it agrees with the old translation of William of Moerbeke: here and there it presents single readings, good or at least deserving of attention, which are to be found nowhere else, although it may very well be that they are not derived from earlier sources, but are, wholly or in part, mere conjectures of the scribe himself or of other scholars of that time. The

<sup>1</sup> Nor is *P<sup>3</sup>* now quoted under *II<sup>1</sup>* *II<sup>2</sup>* or *II<sup>3</sup>* in the critical notes of this edition.

manuscript now contains only Bk. VIII (v). from c. 6 § 9 onwards, Bk. VII (vi). Bk. IV (vii). and Bk. V (viii), the preceding part having been torn away; the corrections are all by the scribe himself, except a few which are divided between two later hands. It was last collated by Susemihl<sup>1</sup>.

From all this it may be seen that, leaving out detached passages, the manuscripts collated, besides  $\Gamma$   $M^s$   $P^{1.2.3.4}$  Ar., are :

for I. 1—4:	$P^6 C^4 Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b W^b L^s$ Ald.	
I. 4—6 § 8:	$Q M^b S^b T^b$ .	for VI (IV). 1: $C^4 Q^b V^b$ .
I. 6 § 9—13 § 16 (end):	$Q S^b T^b$ .	VI (IV). 2—3 § 7: $Q^b V^b$ .
II. 1, 2:	$C^4 Q^b T^b U^b$ .	VI (IV). 3 § 8—4 § 4: $Q^b U^b V^b$ .
II. 3—7 § 21:	$Q^b T^b U^b$ .	VI (IV). 4 § 4—7 § 1: $Q^b V^b$ .
II. 8—III. 2 § 3:	$Q^b T^b$ .	VI (IV). 7 § 2—8 § 6: $Q^b U^b V^b$ .
III. 2 § 3:	$Q^b T^b U^b$ .	VI (IV). 8 § 6—16 § 8 (end): $Q^b V^b$ .
III. 2 § 3—14 § 1:	$Q^b T^b$ .	VII (VI): $P^5 R^b W^b$ .
III. 14 §§ 2—10:	$Q^b T^b U^b$ .	VIII (v). 1—3 § 5: $R^b V^b$ .
III. 14 § 10—18 § 2 (end):	$Q^b T^b$ .	VIII (v). 3 § 5—4 § 10: $R^b U^b V^b$ .
IV (VII):	$P^5 S^b V^b$ .	VIII (v). 4 § 11—6 § 8: $R^b V^b$ .
V (VIII):	$P^5 S^b T^b$ .	VIII (v). 6 § 9—12 § 18 (end): $P^5 R^b V^b$ .

In addition some readings of three late and bad Paris manuscripts, 2041, 2042, 2043, containing only fragments of the work, have been made known by Barthélemy St Hilaire.

$\Pi$  denotes the agreement of all the manuscripts we have,

$\Pi^1$  that of all the manuscripts of the first family (or at least their first hand), including  $\Gamma$ ,

$\Pi^2$  that of all the manuscripts of the second family (and the Aldine edition), excluding  $P^5$ ,

$\Pi^3$  that of all the worse manuscripts of this second family (*i.e.* all the mss. known *except*  $\Gamma$   $M^s$   $P^1$   $P^2$   $P^3$   $P^5$ ), so far as they have been collated, and the Aldine edition.

Bas.<sup>1.2.3</sup> denotes the three Basel editions of the years 1531, 1539, 1550, the first complete editions of Aristotle published after the Aldine. Only the third is important, since in it the first use was made of the old Latin translation, and a great number of mistakes of preceding printed editions thereby corrected. The text so formed remained essentially,

<sup>1</sup> For more precise information on all these manuscripts see Susemihl *l.c.* pp. v—xxviii.

though of course with numerous alterations, the basis for succeeding editors (who consulted new manuscripts but sparingly and, if at all, for single passages only), until Götting's time. He first used collations, but very insufficient ones, of P<sup>1.2.3.4.5</sup> and of a few leaves of M<sup>1</sup>, which had been made by Haezel and Bekker, while completely ignoring P<sup>1.4</sup> M<sup>1</sup> and almost completely P<sup>1.3</sup>, founded his edition with undue arbitrary eclecticism either upon P<sup>2</sup> (Bekker's I<sup>1</sup>) or upon that text which preceding editions had made the *textus receptus*. There was no collection of critical apparatus at once sufficiently complete and trustworthy before my critical edition, which rests so far as possible upon II<sup>1</sup>, the consensus of the *ms.* of the first family, viz. P. M<sup>1</sup>. P<sup>1</sup>: failing that, upon P<sup>2.3</sup>. There is less need then in a work, where the basis is the same, to give more than a mere selection of the most important and valuable readings. I shall, however, quote in full those which are found in Stobaeus' extract (*Ecl. eth.* II. p. 322 foll.), and in the few citations of single passages in ancient writers, as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Julian, Pseudo-Plutarch *περὶ εὐγενείας*, etc.<sup>1</sup>

But however methodically we turn to account all these authorities we only obtain a text abounding in errors and defects of every kind. Accordingly a long series of editors, translators, and commentators from Sepulveda onwards have not failed to suggest numerous emendations and attempts at emendation, of which all the more important will be found recorded in the present edition. The following is a list in chronological order of the scholars to whose conjectures an improved text is due.

**Sepulveda.** Latin translation; first published at Paris, 1548. 4to.

**Camot.** The fourth complete edition of Aristotle, Aldina minor or Camotiana; Venice, 1552. 8vo.

**Vettori** (Victorius). First edition of the *Politics*; Florence, 1552. 4: a second edition with commentary; Florence, 1576 fol. In the copy of the first edition now belonging to the Munich Library, there are marginal notes in Vettori's own handwriting, which have been used by me. Where necessary the two editions are distinguished as Vettori<sup>1</sup>, Vettori<sup>2</sup>.

**Morel.** Edition, Paris, 1556. 4; closely following the first edition of Vettori.

**Lambin.** Latin translation; first edition, Paris, 1567. 4.

**Camerarius.** *Politiarum et Oeconomiarum Aristotelis interpretationes et explicationes*; Frankfurt, 1581. 4.

**Zwinger.** Edition of the *Politics*; Basel 1582 fol.; closely following Vettori's 2nd ed.

<sup>1</sup> Further particulars in Susemihl's larger edition as quoted above, p. XLV ff.

References to these citations will be found in Clarendon type in the critical notes.

- Sylburg.** Edition of the whole of Aristotle; Frankfurt, 1587. 4.
- M. Casaubon.** Edition of the whole of Aristotle; Lyon, 1590. fol.
- Montecatino.** Latin translation and commentary on the first three books of the *Politics*; Ferrara, 1587 (Bk. I), 1594 (Bk. II), 1598 (Bk. III), fol. (3 vols.). See Schneider's edition, II. p. v.
- Ramus** (Pierre de la Ramée). Edition and Latin translation of the *Politics*; Frankfurt, 1601. 8.
- Giphanius** (Van Giffen). *Commentarii in politicum opus Aristotelis*; Frankfurt, 1608. 8. A posthumous work; wanting the whole of Bk. v (VIII). and Bk. IV (VII). from c. 7 § 5 to the end.
- Scaliger.** See *Scaligerana* published by Oncken in *Eos* I. 1864. 410 ff.
- Piccart.** *In Politicos Aristotelis libros commentarius*; Leipzig, 1615. 8.
- D. Heinsius.** Edition of the *Politics*; Leyden, 1621. 8.
- Conring.** Edition, Helmstädt, 1656. 4.
- Reiske and Gurlitt.** In the *addenda* to Schneider's edition, II. 471 ff.
- Reiz.** Edition of IV (VII). 17 and the whole of V (VIII), *περὶ τῆς πόλεως μακαρίας κτλ*, Leipzig, 1776. 8.
- J. G. Schlosser.** German translation of the *Politics* and *Oeconomics*; Lübeck and Leipzig, 1798. 8 (3 vols.). The notes appended are in every respect of great interest for the reader even now, and have proved especially valuable. The memory of this excellent man should ever be cherished in Germany.
- Garve.** A German translation of the *Politics* edited by Fülleborn; Leipzig, 1799. 1802. 8 (2 vols.).
- J. G. Schneider.** Edition of the *Politics*; Frankfurt on the Oder, 1809. 8 (2 vols.).
- Koraes.** Edition, Paris, 1821. 8.
- F. Thurot.** French translation of the *Ethics* and *Politics*; Paris, 1823. 8.
- Göttling.** Edition of the *Politics*; Jena, 1824. 8. To this must be added the short dissertations: *Commentariolum de Arist. Politicorum loco* (II. 6. 20); Jena, 1855. 4. *De machaera Delphica quae est ap. Arist.* (I. 2. 3); Jena, 1858. 4. *De loco quodam Arist.* (I. 2. 9); Jena, 1858. 4. (In his collected writings *Opusc. acad.* ed. Cuno Fischer, Jena, 1869. 8. 274 ff.)
- Barthélemy St Hilaire.** Edition of the *Politics* with French translation; Paris, 1837. 8. A second edition of the translation appeared, Paris, 1848. 8.
- A. Stahr.** Edition with German translation; Leipzig, 1839. 4. To this should be added the German trans. by C. Stahr and A. Stahr; Stuttgart, 1860. 16.
- Lindau.** German translation (Oels, 1843. 8), unfortunately not accessible to me for my critical edition.
- Spengel.** *Ueber die Politik des Aristoteles*, in the *phil. Abhandl. der Münchner Akad.* v. I ff. *Aristotelische Studien III.* (ib. XI. 55 ff.); Munich, 1868. 4. Compare *Arist. Stud. II.* (ib. X. 626 ff.); Munich, 1865. 4. 44 ff.

- Bojesen.** *Bidrag til Fortolkningen om Aristoteles's Bøger om Staten*; Copenhagen, 1844. 1845. 8 (Two Sorøer Programmes).
- Nickes.** *De Aristotelis Politicorum libri*; Bonn, 1851. 8 (Degree dissertation).
- Eaton.** Edition of the *Politics*; Oxford, 1855. 8.
- Congreve.** Ed. of *Politics*; London, 1855. 8. A second edition (unaltered), London, 1874. 8.
- Engelhardt.** *Loci Platonici, quorum Aristoteles in conscribendis Politicis videtur memor fuisse*; Danzig, 1858. 4. 24 p. (In a collection of essays celebrating the jubilee of the Danzig Gymnasium).
- Rassow.** Short Gymnasium-Programmes: *Observationes criticae in Aristotelem*, Berlin, 1858. 4. *Bemerkungen über einige Stellen der Politik*; Weimar, 1864. 4. Comp. also his *Emendationes Aristoteleae*, Weimar, 1861. 4 (p. 10); and *Beiträge zur Nikom. Ethik*, Weimar, 1862. 4.
- C. Thurot.** *Observationes criticae in Arist. politicos libros*, an article in *Jahrbücher für Philologie*, LXXXI. 1860. 749—759; and especially *Études sur Aristote*, Paris, 1860. 8.
- Schütz.** Gymn.-Programmes: *De fundamentis reipublicae, quae primo Politicorum libro ab Aristotele posita sunt*, I. II.; Potsdam, 1860. 4. 18 p., III. Potsdam, 1860. 4. 12 p.
- Oncken.** Degree dissertation: *Emendationum in Arist. Eth. Nic. et Polit. specimen*; Heidelberg, 1861. 8; and the large work in two volumes *Staatslehre des Aristoteles*; Leipzig, 1870, 1875. 8.
- Bonitz.** *Aristotelische Studien II. III.*; Vienna, 1863. 8. *Zur Aristot. Pol.* II. 3. 1262 a 7, an article in *Hermes*, VII. 1872. 102—108.
- Bernays.** *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*; Berlin, 1863. 8. A German translation of the first three books, Berlin, 1872. 8. *Zu Aristoteles und Simonides*, an article in *Hermes*, V. 1870. 301, 302; *Aristoteles über den Mittelstand* in *Hermes*, VI. 1871. 118—124.
- Hampke.** Gymn.-Programme: *Bemerkungen über das erste Buch der Polit.*, Lyck, 1863. 4; and four articles in *Philologus*, on *Arist. Pol.* IV (VII). cc. 2, 3 in vol. XIX. 1863. 614—622, on II. 5, XXI. 1864. 541—543, on Book I. XXIV. 1866. 170—175, *Zur Politik* XXV. 1867. 162—166.
- Schnitzer.** *Zu Arist. Pol.*, an article in *Eos*; I. 1864. 499—515. His German translation was published in the series of Osiander and Schwab at Stuttgart, 1856. 16.
- Böcker.** Degree dissertation, *De quibusdam Pol. Arist. locis*; Greifswald, 1867. 8. 45 p.
- Susmihl.** Three editions, see *Preface*: articles in *Rheinisches Museum*, XX. 1865. 504—517, XXI. 1866. 551—571; in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCIII. 1866. 327—333, CIII. 1871. 790—792; in *Philologus*, XXV. 1867. 385—415, XXIX. 1870. 97—119; in *Hermes* XIX. 1884. 576—595; and *Indices Scholarum, De Polit. Arist. quaestionum criticarum part.* I—VII.; Greifswald 1867—9. 1871-2-3-5. 4.
- Buchsenschütz.** An article on I. cc. 8—11 in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCV. 1867. 477—482, 713—716.

- Chandler.** *Miscellaneous emendations and suggestions*; London, 1866.
- Madvig.** *Adversaria critica ad scriptores Græcos*; Copenhagen, 1871. 8, 461 ff.
- H. Sauppe.** **Hayduck.** **M. Vermehren.** In communications made to me for my first critical edition of 1872, together with one or two conjectures of **Godfrey Hermann** sent me by Sauppe. Cp. also Sauppe's *Epist. crit. ad G. Hermannum*.
- Bücheler.** In my first critical edition and in Part I. of my *Quæstiones criticae*; Greifswald, 1867. 4.
- Mor. Schmidt.** In communications for my first critical edition; also an edition of Book I. *Arist. Pol. Liber I.*; Jena, 1882. 4 (2 parts); and an article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXV. 1882. 801—824.
- Vahlen.** *Aristotelische Aufsätze* II.; Vienna, 1872. 8; reviewed by me in *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1872. 673—676; and an article on II. 5, 1264 a 1, in the *Zeitschrift f. d. östr. Gymn.* XXI., 1870. 828—830.
- Polenaar.** Degree dissertation; *Tirocinia critica in Arist. Politica*; Leyden, 1873. 8.
- Trieber.** In communications with me by letter.
- Henkel.** *Studien zur Geschichte der Griechischen Lehre vom Staat*; Leipzig, 1872. 8.
- Riese.** An article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CIX. 1874. 171—173.
- Diebitsch.** Degree diss., *De rerum conexu in Arist. libro de re pub.*; Breslau, 1875. 8.
- Heitland.** *Notes critical and explanatory on certain passages in Pol. I.*; Cambridge, 1876. 8.
- Broughton.** Edition of Books I. III. IV (VII) with short notes, Oxford and London, 1876. 16.
- Bender.** *Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen*; Hersfeld, 1876. 4; further in communications with me by letter.
- Freudenthal.** In communications with me by letter.
- H. Jackson.** Articles in the *Journal of Philology* on I. 3. VII. 1877. 236—243; on IV (VII). 13. 5—7, X. 1882. 311, 312: also in communications by letter published in the Addenda of my third edition, Leipzig, 1882.
- Postgate.** *Notes on the text and matter of the Politics*; Cambridge, 1877. 8.
- Von Kirchmann.** German translation with notes; Leipzig, 1880. 8 (2 vols.).
- Tegge.** In oral communications to me.
- J. Cook Wilson.** Article in the *Journal of Phil.* X. 1881. 80—86.
- Busse.** Degree diss., *De praesidiis Arist. Pol. emendandi*; Berlin, 1881. 8. 52 p.
- Ridgeway.** *Notes on Arist. Pol. in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society*, II. 1882. 124—153.
- Welldon.** English translation with notes; London, 1883. 8.
- H. Flach.** An article on Book V (VIII) in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXVII. 1884. 832—839.

## II. THE COMPILATION AND SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF THE TREATISE.

In recent times critics seem more and more disposed to agree that the systematic writings of Aristotle, that is to say, most of the works that have come down to us together with others that have perished, were never actually published by their author himself<sup>1</sup>. At the end of the fifteenth chapter of the *Poetics* he contrasts the exposition there given with that contained in his published works, to which upon certain points the student is referred, ἀφηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδοδομένοις λόγοις ἱκανῶς, the reference being undoubtedly to one of his own dialogues, that namely *On Poets*<sup>2</sup>. Of the works which had thus been given to the world some information may be gathered, as that they chiefly comprised popular writings like the dialogues, adapted to the intelligence of a wider public; perhaps also descriptive works on natural science, 'histories' of plants and animals. But not the *Poetics*, nor indeed any of the similar treatises strictly philosophical and systematic which make up "our Aristotle," to use Grote's phrase: we may safely conclude that they were none of them in circulation at the time. It has indeed been doubted whether they were primarily written with a view to publication. They had their origin in the oral lectures of the Stagirite, and stood in the closest connexion with his activity as a teacher; this much is clear, but the precise nature of the connexion has been sorely disputed. The materials of these works may have been on the one hand Aristotle's own notes; either sketches drawn up beforehand for his lectures; or, which is more likely, reproductions of them freely revised and enlarged for subsequent study in the school. Or, again, they may have been merely lecture-notes taken down by pupils at the time. The former supposition is favoured by the analogy of Aristotle's master, Plato, who takes this view of his strictly philosophical writings in the famous passage in the *Phaedrus*<sup>3</sup>. Nor is there any reason to distrust the evidence that shortly after his master's

<sup>1</sup> [What follows has been freely condensed from a paper *On the composition of Aristotle's Politics* in *Verhandlungen der XXX. Philologen-Versammlung*, 17 ff. (Leipzig, 1876), and from the Introduction to the *Poetics* (Greek and German), edited by Nussmühl (Leipzig, 1874, ed. 2) 1-6. It is thus mostly earlier than the discussion in the 3rd edition of Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen* II ii chap. 3, 126-138, which should be compared.] See also *Jahrbücher f. Phil.* CIII. 1871. 121-124;

*Burian's Jahrbücher* XVII. 1879. 231-254; and Zeller *On the composition of the works of Plato and Aristotle with their personal teaching* in *Erman* XI. 1876. 84-96.

<sup>2</sup> 15 § 12, 1454 b 17; see note (108) to Nussmühl's edition of the *Poetics*.

<sup>3</sup> 276 D: ἐν τῷ τῷ ὁμοιωμένῳ ὁμοιωμένῳ, εἰς τὸ ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει περὶ τῶν, 278 A: ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅτι αὐτὸν τοῦ βέλτερον αἰδέσθαι ἐκείνου γέγονεν.

death Theophrastos had Aristotle's autograph of the *Physics* in his possession<sup>1</sup>. Something similar may be inferred for other works if it be true that Eudemos edited the *Metaphysics*<sup>2</sup>, and that Theophrastos (probably also Eudemos) supplemented modified and commented upon the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* in writings of his own bearing the same titles<sup>3</sup>: this is at any rate precisely the relation in which the *Physics* and *Ethics* of Eudemos stood to those of his master. The writings of Aristotle then were designed to serve as aids to the further study of his pupils: they were the text-books of the Aristotelian school.

In support of the other hypothesis has been adduced a number of passages which contrast decidedly with the immediate context by unusual vivacity or sustained style, or by especially prominent allusions to an audience as if present. Here the readiest explanation is that the editors have actually made use of notes taken down by pupils. Such passages have been collected by Oncken from the *Nicomachean Ethics*<sup>4</sup>; the latter part of *Politics* IV (VII). c. 1, and the conclusion, if genuine, of *De Soph. Elench.* are further instances. It should be remembered also that in one catalogue of the Aristotelian writings the *Politics* appears as πολιτικὴ ἀκρόασις<sup>5</sup>, while φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις is still the title borne by the *Physics* in our manuscripts. All these circumstances however can be satisfactorily explained in other ways, partly upon the former hypothesis, partly by assuming a merely occasional use to have been made of pupils' lecture-notes as subsidiary sources:—an assumption which it is hardly possible to disprove<sup>6</sup>.

In the Aristotelian writings we find a great diversity of treatment and language; at one time the briefest and most compressed style carried to the extreme of harshness, at another numerous needless redundancies, and often literal repetitions. The careless familiar expressions natural in oral discourse alternate with long artistic periods absolutely free from anacoluthia; at times the composition of one and the same book appears strangely unequal, as if the material which at

<sup>1</sup> See Heitz, *Die verlorenen Schriften* 12. Eudemos wrote to Theophrastos to enquire concerning the reading of a passage in the *Physics*, Θεοφράστου γράψαντος Εὐδήμου περί τινος αὐτοῦ τῶν διημαρτημένων ἀντιγράφων κατὰ τὸ πέμπτον βιβλίον. “ὕπερ ὧν” φησὶν “ἐπέστειλας κελεύων με γράψαι καὶ ἀποστεῖλαι ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν, ἥτοι ἐγὼ οὐ ξυνήμι, ἢ μικρόν τι παντελῶς ἔχει τοῦ ἀναμέσον τοῦ ὅπερ ἡρεμεῖν καλῶ τῶν ἀκινήτων μόνον.” Simpli-  
cius *Comm. in Arist. Physica*, 231 a 21, *Schol. in Arist.* (Brandis), 404 b 11 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias in his com-

mentary on the *Metaphysics* 483. 19 ed. Bonitz: καὶ οἶμαι καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκείνοις εἶδει συντάττεσθαι, καὶ ὥς ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλους συντάκται... ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ Εὐδήμου κεχώρισται.

<sup>3</sup> Alexander, *Schol. in Arist.* 158 b 8, 161 b 9, 184 b 36, and Simpli-  
cius *ib.* 509 a 6: see Zeller II ii 71.

<sup>4</sup> *Staatslehre des Arist.* I. 60 (1).

<sup>5</sup> Diog. Laert. V. 24.

<sup>6</sup> See the arguments advanced against Oncken by Sussemihl *Jahrb. für Phil.* CIII. 1871. 122—124.

first flowed abundantly had suddenly become scanty. Such peculiarities however generally admit of more than one explanation; even where the same question is treated independently two or three times over (unless indeed one of the versions is to be regarded as the paraphrase of a Peripatetic) the inference may be *either* that different drafts of Aristotle's own have been incorporated side by side<sup>1</sup>, or that a pupil has supplemented the notes which he had actually taken by a statement in his own words of their substance. Yet at other times the contrast is unmistakeable, as when we compare the *Posterior* with the *Prior Analytics*, or the third book of the *Psychology* with the two preceding books: we seem to have before us nothing but disjointed notes or rough drafts badly pieced together. Such imperfection in whole works can hardly be referred to any one but Aristotle<sup>2</sup>. If some treatises, again, or at least considerable portions of them, prove upon examination so far advanced that the author's last touches hardly seem wanting, the inference is irresistible that, granted they arose at first out of Aristotle's oral lectures, with such fulness of details and elaboration they must have been intended for ultimate publication, whether in the author's lifetime or subsequently. Thence it is easy to pass on to the provisional assumption that Aristotle intended to bring his entire Encyclopædia to the same degree of completeness, but was prevented by death from executing his design. As it is, we seem justified in concluding that the unfinished works were brought out by his immediate pupils from a combination of the materials above mentioned, pieced together and supplemented by not inconsiderable additions: much in the same way (to use Bernays' instructive analogy) as most of Hegel's works for the first time saw the light in the complete edition made by his pupils after his death.

There is a further circumstance which must be taken into account. From this edition, of which comparatively few copies were ever made or in circulation<sup>3</sup>, the works as they have come down to us must be allowed to deviate considerably. Our present text can be traced back in the main to the revised edition of Andronikos of Rhodes, a contemporary of Cicero<sup>4</sup>. This edition is known to have differed as to order and

<sup>1</sup> As in the *Metaphysics*, K cc. 1—7 = B, F, E; A cc. 1—3; M cc. 4, 5 = A cc. 9.

<sup>2</sup> In the *Physics*, Bk. VII, *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, are other instances only less striking than those named.

<sup>3</sup> So far we may accept Strabo's inferences (XIII. 608, 609), although his story of the fate of Theophrastus' library contains a gross exaggeration; see now *Burmian's Fabricius*, IX. 338; XVI. 453 f.

n. 5, Diels *Doxographi Graeci* 187 f., 215 ff., Zeller *op. c.* II ff. 138—154.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo I. c., Pherearch *Solia* 26, *Timophrys Vita Platoni* 26, *Quintus* cc. 8, 10; Ptolemaeus as cited by Ibn el-Kifri and Ibn Abd Oualid, Ross (in vol. 3 of the *Bollin* ed.) p. 1473; *Cassiri Bibliotheca Arabo-Hispana* p. 308 f., *Wessely De antiquorum Graecorum bibliothecis* p. 122; also by David and Simplicius *Scholae in Arist.*

arrangement from the former one; besides, in the intervening 250 years the text had received considerable damage. Thus may be explained the appearance of numerous Peripatetic interpolations; also cases where a series of fragments represents the original work, as in Bk. VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in some measure in the *Poetics*<sup>1</sup>; or where excerpts from another work are inserted, e.g. from the *Physics* in the latter part of Bk. XI (K) of the *Metaphysics* and in part of what is now Bk. V (Δ) of the same work<sup>2</sup>.

Only by such a combination of assumptions is it possible satisfactorily to interpret the present condition of the *Politics*, where traces of its mode of compilation may clearly be discerned in interpolations, glosses incorporated in the text, abrupt transitions, inequalities of execution, frequent lacunae, transpositions and double recensions. Yet the whole is pervaded by an organic plan well considered even to the finest details<sup>3</sup>, and beyond all doubt the actual execution is mainly based upon written materials from Aristotle's own hand<sup>4</sup>. There is only one

(vol. IV of the Berlin ed.) 25 b 42 f., 81 a 27 f., 404 b 38 f.; Zeller *op. c.* II ii 50 ff. 139 nn. (1), (2), III i 620 ff.; Heitz *Die verlorenen Schriften* I—53.

<sup>1</sup> See Susemihl's ed. of the *Poetics*, pp. 3—6.

<sup>2</sup> The hypotheses above noticed may thus be recapitulated. Aristotle did not himself publish his scientific works. They may have been edited *primarily*

(I) from Aristotle's own drafts as revised after his lectures for the use of his pupils: supplemented by the use, as

(II) *subsidiary* sources, of

(a) Aristotle's own sketches, prepared for use at his lectures:

(β) lecture-notes taken by pupils (with or without supplements of their own):

(γ) passages from works by his pupils:

(δ) additions by editors: very rarely

(ε) excerpts from his own works.

<sup>3</sup> Sober criticism will not be deterred from attributing the plan to Aristotle simply because at the beginning of Bk. III there is no δὲ in the received text to correspond to a preceding μὲν οὖν, or because a connecting δὲ is sought in vain in II<sup>1</sup> at the opening of Bk. II, and should at least be altered to γάρ, if this opening and the close of Bk. I are to be kept side by side. Such twofold transitions from one book to another are found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* between IV and V, VII and VIII, IX and X; while between VIII and IX Grant has good ground for suspecting the words περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω I 163 b 27. [On the

transition from *Metaph.* VI (E) to VII (Z) see Bonitz II 294.]

<sup>4</sup> That the work in its present shape is as late as Cicero's time is the opinion of Krohn *Zur Kritik aristotelischen Schriften* I 29 ff. (Brandenburg 1872. 4), and Polenaar *Tirocinia critica in Aristotelis Politica* (Leyden 1873. 8), and in one sense they are not far wrong; cp. the introduction to my edition of the *Poetics*, 4 n. (1). They suppose the compiler or compilers to have had mere fragments of Aristotle's own composition before them, which they arranged and pieced together for themselves into a whole full of contradictions by borrowing from the writings of Theophrastos and other Peripatetics, or, as Polenaar thinks, by additions of their own. Polenaar's arguments, however, rest almost entirely on misapprehensions, and this is partly true of Krohn's, while others do not in the remotest degree suffice to establish such sweeping assertions. Krohn does indeed allow that the first book is by Aristotle; but from 13 § 15 he infers that it was originally an independent work, not reflecting that, when taken in connexion with 3 § 1, this passage proves just the opposite; that further the first chapter has no sense except as an introduction to the whole of the *Politics*, of which we have also an express anticipation at the commencement of c. 3, where there is no trace of a change by another editor. The greater part of Bk. II, in which only "isolated pillars" of Aristotle's structure have been left

passage of any length, IV (VII). 1, where we seem to catch the tones of the more animated oral lecture in such marked contrast to all the rest of the work as forcibly to suggest the idea that here we have the lecture-notes of a pupil<sup>1</sup>. But the parts executed are often unequal; they never grew to the dimensions of a book actually fit for publication; and when such a work made its appearance after the master's death the editors did not refrain from adding a good deal of foreign matter contradictory of the spirit and interdependence of the work<sup>2</sup>. Here and there, again, we find a twofold discussion of the

standing, he assigns to Theophrastos; c. 6, he says, is wholly spurious and of very late origin, c. 5 defective and largely interpolated: and that there is much to offend us in both these chapters is undeniable: see below p. 33 n. (4). The third book he seems to regard as a medley taken from Theophrastos, and various writers of his school, and from other Peripatetics: c. 14 in particular as an excerpt from Theophrastos, *Περὶ βασίλειας*: cp. p. 18 n. (7) and n. on III. 14. 9 (624). In the principal part of Bk. IV (VII) he finds "fragmentary sketches"; he agrees with Niebuhr (*Röm. Alterth.* 578 Isler) in deciding that the second and larger part, if not the whole, of Bk. V (VIII) was not written by Aristotle, any more than a considerable part of Bk. VI (IV), of which c. 15 together with VII (VI). 8 is an excerpt from a work by Theophrastos on magistracies; while the greater part of Bk. VIII (V) probably consists of excerpts and pieces retouched from Theophrastos, *Περὶ καμῶν*; comp. *nn.* on III. 14. 9 (624) and VIII (V). 11. 9 (1720<sup>n</sup>). There are some resemblances to the *Areopagitikos* of Isocrates: see on III. 3 § 1, § 9, 6 § 10, 7 § 1, 11 § 10, IV (VII). 4 § 1, VI (IV). 5 § 7, VII (VI). 2 § 10, VIII (V). 1 § 1. Yet Spengel's assertion "totum Isocrate Areopagiticum in usum suum Aristoteles vertit, tam multi sunt loci, qui eadem tradunt" (*Aristotelische Studien* III. 59) is a gross exaggeration, as unproved as it is impossible to prove. But why Aristotle should not be credited with them, why we must follow Krohn in rejecting as spurious all the passages where they occur, is simply inexplicable. Compare further my review of Krohn in *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1873. 676—686. The most material objection which he raises to the genuineness of Bk. V (VIII) is that *ἐθνοκρατία*, *ἐθνοκράτης* are elsewhere only found in spurious or semi-spurious Aristotelian writings,—*ἐθνοκρατία* only

in the *Problems*, *ἐθνοκράτης* only in the dialogue *On Philosophy*.—whereas Theophrastos paid great attention to this morbid state of ecstasy or delirium.

<sup>1</sup> But a pupil of Aristotle, not necessarily of Theophrastos, as Krohn thinks: see *notes* on IV (VII). 1 § 2 L, § 13. Another well-written chapter is VI (IV). 11, and this even Krohn reckons as part of "the well-preserved patrimony of Aristotelian thought." His attempt even there to ferret out at least an interpolation, § 15, rests upon nothing but a gross misconception, as is shown by Susenhihl *loc. cit.* p. 679.

<sup>2</sup> To start from the internal connexion of a work as a whole is the only safe mode of procedure in all so-called higher criticism. By discarding this principle Krohn and Polenaar lose all solid footing, preferring, as they do, to regard more unconnected fragments as the genuine kernel of the work: Susenhihl *loc. cit.* 679. Not every contradiction is sufficient proof of diversity of authorship; however small the dimensions within which this genuine Aristotelian kernel is reduced, we shall never succeed in eliminating from it all discrepancies of doctrine. Nay, Krohn justly reminds us that "even this original kernel can only be understood on the assumption of a gradual advance in the great thinker's development." After we have detected interpolations, and restored by their excision the connexion which they restored, only an accumulation of difficulties, or such contradictions as strike at the very heart of the system, need be taken into account. Further it must be admitted that no hard and fast line can be drawn here, so that at times the decision is doubtful. Upon such considerations a list of spurious or suspected passages (without reckoning glosses of later introduction and other smaller matters) might be drawn up, in partial agreement with Krohn, as follows:

same topic<sup>1</sup>; either both were found amongst Aristotle's materials and then included that nothing might be lost, or else only one was written by Aristotle and the other was derived from a pupil's notes. The work is disfigured by numerous *lacunae* of greater or less extent: entire sections of some length are wanting altogether<sup>2</sup>. The right order has often been disturbed<sup>3</sup>. The two grossest instances are that Books VII and VIII should come before Bk. IV, and Bk. VI before Bk. V (counting the books in the order in which they have come down to us)<sup>4</sup>. No scruple has been felt about restoring the proper sequence in this edition, though the dislocation was unquestionably very ancient<sup>5</sup>. For to all appearance

II. 8 § 1 (*δς...βουλόμενος*), 10 §§ 3, 4,  
12 §§ 6—14:

III. 17 §§ 3, 4:

IV (VII). 2 § 3—4 § 1, 10 §§ 1—9:

V (VIII). 7 §§ 13, 14:

VI (IV). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19.

VII (VI). 2 § 7 (*ἐτι...βαναυσία*), 2 § 9—  
3 § 6:

VIII (V). 6 § 5, 6 §§ 12, 13, 7 §§ 5—10,  
12 §§ 1—6, perhaps also 12 §§ 7—18.

To this total of about 515 lines shorter bits must be added from II. 6 § 18; III. 14 § 15, 15 § 11; VI (IV). 7 § 5, 14 § 5. On VI (IV). 14 §§ 11—15 see below p. 65 *n.* (1). Several of these passages display historical erudition valuable in itself but out of place—a characteristic of the school as contrasted with the master. As to the doubts recently cast upon IV (VII). 7 by Broughton, and upon IV (VII). 13 by Broughton and Wilson (and earlier still by Congreve), see the critical notes and *n.* on IV (VII). 13 § 8 (881).

<sup>1</sup> Besides the end of Bk. III and the beginning of IV (VII) see II. 7 §§ 10—13 = 7 §§ 18—21, III. 15 §§ 7—10 = 16 §§ 10—13; IV (VII). 1 §§ 11, 12 = 2 §§ 1, 2; VIII (V). 1 § 1; 7 § 1; 10 § 24 = 10 § 25.

<sup>2</sup> See particularly I. 8 § 3, 10 § 1, 12 § 1; II. 2 § 6, 5 § 2, 11 § 5;

III. 3 § 2, 12 § 6, 13 § 3, § 6, 16 § 2;

IV (VII). 11 § 2, 13 § 11, 14 § 7;

V (VIII). 7 § 15;

VI (IV). 8 § 7, § 8, 10 § 2, 11 § 1, 12 § 5;

VII (VI). 4 § 1, 8 § 24;

VIII (V). 1 § 7, 7 § 9, 10 § 25, 12 § 11, § 18. Conring saw this, but carried it too far: "noctem aristoteliam quasi stellis illustrare satagit" Götting sneeringly writes, taking credit for having put all these "stars" out. But when the asterisks are removed the lacunae are still plain enough if the critic has the eye to see them. Cp. my critical edition p. LII.

<sup>3</sup> [On these transpositions see pp. 78

—95.]

<sup>4</sup> The one transposition was first made by Nicolas Oresme (died 1382) in his French translation, not published until long afterwards (Paris 1489): and again by Segni in his Italian translation (Florence 1549). A more detailed proof of its correctness was undertaken by Scaino da Salo *Quinque Quaestiones ad octo libros de republica* (Rome 1577), Conring, Barthélemy St Hilaire, Spengel *Ueber die Politik* Transactions of the Munich Acad. v. 1 ff. *Arist. Studien* II. 44 ff. (Munich 1865), Nickses *De Arist. Politicorum libris* (Bonn 1851), Brandis in his history *Griech-Röm. Philos.* II ii 1666 ff., 1679 ff. and by others. It has been disputed without success, amongst others by Woltmann in the *Rheinisches Museum* (New Series) I. 1842. 321—354, Forchhammer in *Philologus* XVI. 1861. 50—68, Bendixen in *Philologus* XIII. 1858. 264 ff., XIV. 332 ff., XVI. 408 ff. and in *Der alte Staat des Aristoteles* (Hamburg 1868. 4to), by Krohn *op. c.* 30, and Diebitsch *De rerum conexu in Arist. libris de re publica* (Breslau 1875).

The other transposition was very nearly assumed by Conring; the first who actually made it and tried to demonstrate it was St Hilaire. He was followed by Spengel and even by Woltmann, but was opposed not merely by Bendixen, Forchhammer, Krohn, and Diebitsch, but even by Hildenbrand *Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie* I (Leipzig 1860) 371 f., and by Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 672 f. *n.* (2), although they have accepted the first transposition, Hildenbrand under certain conditions and Zeller unreservedly. See below p. 58 *n.* 2.

<sup>5</sup> See *Fahrbücher für Philologie* XCIX. 1869. 593—610, CI. 1870. 343 f., 349 f. and the following paragraphs in the text.

even the epitome in Stobaeus<sup>1</sup> presents the traditional arrangement<sup>2</sup>; and this epitome was taken from a more comprehensive work by Arcion Didymos of Alexandria, the friend of Augustus and of Maecenas<sup>3</sup>. Didymos naturally followed the new recension, the work, beyond all doubt, of his contemporary Andronikos of Rhodes, in which, as has been said<sup>4</sup>, the text of the *Politics* has come down to us. Yet, as we shall see<sup>5</sup>, in the incomplete sentence with which the third book breaks off sufficiently clear and certain evidence remains that in the older edition Bk. iv (vii) still stood in its right place after Bk. iii.

But there is another circumstance which makes it very questionable to start with, whether the work ever existed in a more complete form. There was a *Politics* in the Alexandrian library attributed by some to Aristotle, by others to Theophrastos<sup>6</sup>; consisting, it would seem, of exactly eight books; a numerical correspondence not easy to ascribe to mere accident. This fact we learn from the catalogue of Aristotle's writings in Diogenes of Laerte<sup>7</sup> and in the Anonymus of Ménage<sup>8</sup>. The catalogue goes back to the biographies of Hermippos of Smyrna, a pupil of Callimachus, as its ultimate authority; and no doubt that author followed closely what he found in the Alexandrian library<sup>9</sup>. Before this the Peripatetic philosopher Hieronymos of Rhodes appears to have used the Aristotelian *Politics*<sup>10</sup>; even Eudemos may possibly betray an earlier acquaintance with the treatise<sup>11</sup>. And it is

<sup>1</sup> *Ecl. eth.* 326 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See Henkel's careful investigation *Zur Politik des Aristoteles* (a Gymnasium Programme of Seehausen) Stendal 1875, 4 pp. 10—17. Buchsenschutz in his *Studien zu Aristoteles Politik* 1—26 (*Festschrift zu der 2ten Säcularfeier des Friedrich-Werderschen Gymnasiums*, Berlin 1881) judges differently; but see the review by Cook Wilson in the *Philol. Rundschau* 1882, pp. 1219—1224.

<sup>3</sup> See Meinike *Zu Stobaeus in the Zeitschrift f. Gymnasialwiss.* xiii. 1859, 563 ff., Zeller *op. c.* iii i 614 f., Diels *Doxographi Graeci* 69 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 13 n. 4.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 47 f.

<sup>6</sup> Zeller suggests that this confusion may be explained if Theophrastos edited the work: *op. c.* ii ii 678 (1).

<sup>7</sup> *v.* 24: ἐνδοξασθὶ ἀποδοτέον [14] § [for the MS. §] Οροφπάρου α—β. Cp. Usener *Diagnostica Theophrastica* 16 (Leipzig 1858); Zeller *op. c.* ii ii 679 (1); Sussenhöl's critical edition of the *Politics* SLIII n. (73).

<sup>8</sup> ἐνδοξασθὶ ἀποδοτέον § (so the Ambrosian MS. discovered by Rose: see

Berlin Aristotle v. 1467. No. 70). Ménage incorrectly gave K, which Zeller *op. c.* ii ii 75 ed. 1 had conjectured to be a mistake for H. Rose suggests that the Anonymus was Hesychios of Miletus, fl. 500 A.D. In Ptolemy's catalogue the work occurs as No. 32, *liber de regimine civitatum et nominibus publicorum tractatus* viii (Berlin Aris. vol. v. p. 1471).

<sup>9</sup> See the Introduction to my edition of the *Politics* (ed. 2) 19 f.

<sup>10</sup> He is quoted in Diog. Laert. i 26, cp. *Pol.* i. ii. 9 with the critical notes.

<sup>11</sup> See my third edn. of the *Politics* xix note †: *Eud. Eth.* vii. 2 1238 b 3 ff. should be compared with *Pol.* iv (vii). 15 ff 2—7; *Eud. Eth.* viii. 3 1248 b 26 ff., 1249 a 12, with *Pol.* iv (vii). 13 § 7. Compare further *Eud. Eth.* iii. 2 1231 b 38—1232 a 3 with *Pol.* i. 9 § 2 1252 a 6—1253 a 12; *Eud. Eth.* ii. 11 1237 b 19—23 with *Pol.* iv (vii). 13 § 1: 1235 b 26—38; *Eud. Eth.* vii. 10 1242 a 8 f. with *Pol.* iii. 6 §§ 2—5 1278 b 31—38, esp. 21 f., 24 f. See also Zeller in *Monist* xv. 1880, 323—356, who compares *Eud. Eth.* ii. 1. 1218 b 31 ff. with *Pol.* iv

highly improbable, to say the least, that in the century (200 B.C.—101 B.C.) which elapsed between Hermippos and Apellikon of Teos, the precursor of Tyrannion and Andronikos<sup>1</sup>, this older edition should have been so completely lost that the new editors had not a single copy of it at their disposal<sup>2</sup>, while it is equally incredible that they should intentionally have declined to use it. The exact agreement in the number of the books would undoubtedly render it a far more reasonable conclusion that—except for the transposition, to which we have now no clue—the new edition of this work differed much less from the old than was the case with some other Aristotelian writings.

The first distinct traces of actual use of the treatise are next to be found in Cicero<sup>3</sup>. It is true he did not use it directly<sup>4</sup> and the new recension of Andronikos was not at the time in existence. Yet we are not obliged to assume that he drew from an earlier writer who availed himself of the former edition<sup>5</sup>: it is quite as conceivable that Tyrannion, with whom he was in frequent intercourse, may have provided him with extracts from the work suitable for his purpose, and these may have been his sources<sup>6</sup>. Even when the new edition appeared, it found but few readers; the traces of its use are extremely scanty<sup>7</sup>, and it is in

(VII). I. 1323 a 23, b 18, b 27; and *Eud. Eth.* II. I. 1219 a 33 with *Pol.* IV (VII). 8. 5, 1328 a 35.

<sup>1</sup> See Strabo *l. c.*, Plutarch *l. c.*

<sup>2</sup> Polenaar *op. cit.* p. 78 finds no difficulty in this.

<sup>3</sup> *De fin.* V. 4. II, *ad Quint. fratr.* III. 5. I, *De leg.* III. 6. 14, *De rep.* I. c. 25 (comp. *Pol.* III. 9 §§ 11, 12, 6 § 3 f., I. 2 § 9), c. 26 (cp. *Pol.* III. I § 1, 6 § 1, 7 §§ 1, 2), c. 27 (cp. *Pol.* III. 9 §§ 1, 2, 10 §§ 4, 5, 11 §§ 6, 7, 16 § 2), c. 29 (cp. *Pol.* VI (IV). cc. 8, 11). The doubts of Heitz (*op. c.* 241), whether after all we get any real evidence from Cicero, are unreasonable in face of the quotation *ad Quint. fr.*

<sup>4</sup> See Zeller *op. c.* II ii 151 n. (6).

<sup>5</sup> So Zeller *l. c.* Whether the author of the *Magna Moralia* in I. 4, 1184 b 33 f. shows any acquaintance with *Politics* IV (VII). 13. 5 Zeller rightly regards as uncertain.

<sup>6</sup> Cp. *ad Att.* IV. 4 b § 1, 8 a § 2, *ad Qu. fr.* II. 4 § 2, III. 4 § 5, 5 § 6.

<sup>7</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias *On the Metaphysics* 15, 6 (ed. Bonitz): Eubulos, a contemporary of Longinus, 'Επισκέψις τῶν ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἀντειρημένων ed. Mai *Script. vet. nov. coll. Vat.* II. 671 ff.: Julian *Letter to The-*

*mistios* 260 D, 263 D: *Scholia Aldina* upon Aristoph. *Acharn.* 92, 980: *Scholia* on Lucian *Dream* 3 (ἐν πέμπτῳ): Michael of Ephesus *On the Nicom. Ethics* fol. 70 a, 186 a, 187 b, 188 b, 189 a: Pseudo-Plutarch *De nobil.* c. 6 932 B ff., c. 8 937 A ff.: Suidas and Photios s.v. ἐσχατὰν: Eustathios *On the Iliad* p. 625, 36, p. 126, 12 ff.: *De Thessal. urbe* p. 281, 60 (ed. Tafel): Theodoros Metochites *Miscell.* 644, 667 (ed. Kiessling).—Thus Dionysios of Halikarnassos in his description of the Greek αἰσχυμνητεία *Roman Antiquities* v. 73 has not used Aristotle III. 14 §§ 8, 9 as his authority, but the similar account in Theophrastos *περὶ βασιλείας*. In his critical edition, p. XLIV and note (82), Susemihl wrongly followed Spengel *Arist. Stud.* II. 57 n. (4) in maintaining that everything which Dionysios relates *l. c.* v. 73 f. exactly agrees with Aristotle III. 14 f., and consequently that Theophrastos *περὶ βασιλείας* is borrowed altogether from Aristotle. Meanwhile Krohn, *op. c.* 47, pointed out certain essential differences, and Henkel, *op. c.* 3 note 1, has more accurately explained where Theophrastos' line of thought diverges and becomes original. Hence what Dionysios has here borrowed from Theophrastos could not have been derived from Aristotle. But this only

keeping with their infrequency that we do not possess a single ms. of the *Politics* of earlier date than the fourteenth century. Amongst the Arabs it remained quite neglected. To the reading public of the west in the Christian middle age it was introduced by the Latin translation of the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke<sup>1</sup>: on the basis of his version Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas wrote commentaries to the work<sup>2</sup>.

### III. GENERAL ESTIMATE.

At the time when the *Politics* was first made known to mediæval students, and for some centuries afterwards, the ground was not prepared for a due appreciation of it. It was only by degrees, as the development of the modern state went on, that the treatise began to be rightly understood<sup>3</sup>, until at last even in its present incomplete and fragmentary condition we have learnt to recognise in it 'the richest and greatest contribution of antiquity, or, allowing for the difference of the times, perhaps the greatest of all the works we have upon political science'<sup>4</sup>. There is certainly no second work to be named in this field of enquiry which in a like degree displays the rare combination of statesmanlike intellect, a scholar's acquaintance with history, and the observation of a man of science, with the philosopher's systematic arrangement of phenomena and keen penetration into their inmost nature<sup>5</sup>. Marvellous student of human nature that he was, Aristotle, although never actually engaged in public affairs, has observed with all a statesman's shrewd sense the complicated political and social relations

increase the improbability of Krüger's assertion mentioned p. 15 *n. above*, for which these two passages are his sole authority,—that *Pol.* III. 14 is an excerpt from that very work of Theophrastus. Compare the note on III. 14. 9 (624).

<sup>1</sup> See above p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> That of the two Thomas wrote his earlier than his master Albert, between 1261 and 1269, was the view of Jourdain *Recherches critiques sur les anciennes traductions d'Aristote* 393 f., 456 (Paris 1819). Nearly the whole text of the old Latin version was incorporated in the commentary of Albert, who in this work imitated the method of his pupil. Cp. my critical edition VI *nn.* (4) & (5). [Von Hertling in *Rh. Mus.* XXXIX. 1884. 446—457 argues that the question of relative priority cannot be decided, but that St. Thomas left his commentary unfinished at his death in 1274. Albertus Magnus

died 1280.]

<sup>3</sup> On this subject generally see Oncken *l. c.* I. 64—80. The first beginnings of such an appreciation are to be found in Oresme: cp. Roscher in the *Zeitschrift f. d. Staatswissenschaft*. XIX. 1863. 305 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II ii 753 f. Compare Bradley's admirable exposition in *Millenium* (Oxford, 1880) 181—183. Lang is certainly not far wrong when he remarks in the Introductory Essays to Bolland's translation of Bks. I. III. IV (VII) p. 13 (London 1877. 8), 'Indeed, when we come to analyse his method we find three incongruous elements, really scientific enquiry, aristocratic prejudice, and the dreams of a metaphysic which literally *sublimi fert sublimiora verba*, and listens for the eternal harmonies of Nature'. This thought is worked out more fully by Grant *Aristotle* 117 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Zeller *op. c.* I. II ii 707, 708.

of his nation, and in part of other nations. He has analysed them with the cool indifference of the biologist, with the same unwearied calm and caution which characterize his treatises on natural science. The astonishing store of information which he had amassed upon history in general and the special history of nearly all the Greek communities is here turned to the best account. At the same time there is diffused throughout the work a warm genial breath of philosophic and moral idealism, which, however closely allied to some of its defects, nevertheless reconciles us to certain harsh traits in it. From the writer's peculiar point of view however this very tendency to idealism, so far from softening such traits, serves only to bring them into stronger relief: so that every now and then we see the shrewd thinker, elsewhere so strictly logical, entangle himself in a network of contradictions.

The peculiarity of his point of view and therewith the distinctive importance of the work, historically and for all time to come, consists in this, that Aristotle alone with full and complete success has given expression in theory to the whole import of the Greek state and of Greek political life in all its bearings. The only limitation to this is the decided repugnance he manifests to certain political and social ideas, the outcome of that development of democracy, whereby we may fairly admit the Greek state to have been, so to speak, carried beyond itself. This success deserves to be all the more highly estimated in proportion as his position is in this respect unique. Certainly even before he wrote, not to mention Plato's trenchant dialogues, there was a literature—it may be a tolerably large literature—upon political, legal and social questions, as may be learnt from his own<sup>1</sup> and Plato's<sup>2</sup> cursory notices, although we know next to nothing else about these writers<sup>3</sup>. The passages quoted show how many ideas deserving of consideration they had disclosed, but at the same time how far they fell short of the goal which Aristotle attained. Here again his dependence on Plato is

<sup>1</sup> I. 3. 4 with *n.* (31), I. 6 §§ 1—5 *nn.* (49 b) (50 b), I. 9. 11 *n.* (88 b), II. 6 §§ 17—19 *nn.* (219) (221), II. 8. 16 *n.* (269), II. 9. 33 *n.* (342), II. 12 §§ 2—4 *nn.* (400) (404), III. 3. 1 *n.* (454), III. 13. 11 *n.* (596), IV (VII). 2. 5 ff., IV (VII). 6. 1 *n.* (770), IV (VII). 14. 16 *n.* (911), VI (IV). 1 § 5, § 6 *nn.* (1118) (1123). Comp. also III. 4. 8 *n.* (476), VI (IV). 3. 7 *n.* (1158). To this list may be added Phaleas II. 7, 12 § 12, Hippodamos II. 8, Thimbron or Thibron, IV (VII). 14. 17 and perhaps Telekles VI (IV). 14. 4. *n.* (1321). Aristotle makes no mention of Xenophon: yet see *n.* on IV (VII). 14. 16

(911). In many of the passages cited above it is doubtful whether he means statements in writing. See L. Stein's paper *Greek theories of political science before Aristotle and Plato* in the *Zeitschrift f. d. gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. IX. 1853. 115—182.

<sup>2</sup> *Laws* I. 630 E, XII. 972 E. Cp. on the latter passage *n.* on II. 6. 17 (219), on the former Hildenbrand *op. cit.* 395 *n.* (2).

<sup>3</sup> See Henkel's exhaustive collection of facts *Studien zur Geschichte der griech. Lehre vom Staat* (Leipzig 1872, 8) p. 2 ff.

evident; a dependence far greater than was once imagined or than might be expected from the severity of his polemical criticism, which is frequently, nay in most cases, successful. For firstly, Aristotle's criticism touches what are merely external excrescences of the two pattern states sketched by Plato in the *Republic* and the *Laws*; enough of common ground still remains on which to raise his own design of an absolutely best constitution side by side with them<sup>1</sup>. Further, the *Laws* proves Plato by no means deficient in exact knowledge of Athenian public life; while above all, his descriptions in the *Republic* of other constitutions besides the 'only perfect state', i.e. of the actually existing forms of government, suffice to show 'that he did not lack experience or penetration for judging of political conditions'<sup>2</sup>. In short Aristotle is indebted to his master for numerous ideas in every department of political speculation<sup>3</sup>. But it should not be forgotten how often these ideas in Plato are mere germs which only received a fruitful development at the hands of his disciple; or random statements which require to be demonstrated and expanded by Aristotle, and to be fitted into their place in the whole framework of his system, before their full scope is attained. When all has been deducted that can in any way be regarded as an inheritance from Plato, quite enough remains which Aristotle can claim for his very own. One great difference in the works of these two men is most characteristically presented. When Plato comes to deal with existing forms of government he depicts them in a rough and ready way; whereas Aristotle bestows

<sup>1</sup> I may refer to the notes on

I. 13. 16 (137) IV (VII). 6. 3 (774),  
II. 3. 2 (133) IV (VIII). 10. 13 (838),  
II. 3. 2 (133) IV (VIII). 12. 2 (869),  
II. 3. 15 (166) IV (VII). 15. 10 (936),  
II. 6. 5 (192) IV (VII). 16. 1 (937),  
II. 6. 10 (208) IV (VII). 16. 1 (944),  
II. 6. 15 (215) IV (VII). 16. 14 (945),  
II. 7. 6 (236 b) IV (VII). 16. 15 (946),  
II. 9. 5 (285) V (VIII). 5. 4 (1024),  
II. 9. 23 (318) V (VIII). 5. 5 (1025)  
also in Thurot *Études sur Aristote* 109 ff.  
(Paris 1866, 89), Van der Kooij *Platon et  
Aristote* 452 ff. (Bruxelles 1876, 8).

<sup>2</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II. 1 783 (Eng. tr. *Plato*  
p. 491). More precise details are given  
in Steinhart *Introduction to Plato's Works*  
V. 238 ff., Nussbaum *Plat. Phil.* II. 226 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Reference may be permitted to the  
notes on the following passages:

Bk. I. 2 § 2 n. (5); 5 § 9 (46); 6 § 8  
(124); 9 § 18 (231); 10 § 4, 3 (251); 11 § 6  
(100); 13 § 12 (122); 15 § 16 (127):

Bk. II. 3 § 1, 2 (153); 5 § 16 (167),  
3 § 17 (168); 5 §§ 19—24 (172); 6 § 5

(192); 6 § 6 (201); 6 § 9 (206 b), (207),  
6 § 15 (212); 8 § 1 (273) (274); 8 § 17  
(277); 9 § 2 (279); 9 § 5 (283) (284),  
9 § 11 (293 b), 9 § 12 (297); 9 § 16 (303),  
9 § 25 (330); 10 § 17 (312); 10 § 21 (341);  
10 § 34 (344):

Bk. III. 2 § 9 (466); 4 § 18 (499);  
7 § 1 (523); 11 § 19 (579); 16 § 2 (622);  
16 § 11 (631):

Bk. IV (VII). 6 § 2 (724); 2 § 2 (787);  
10 § 13 (823); 10 § 2 (829); 12 § 2 (860),  
12 § 8 (866) (867); 14 § 13 (907); 14 § 14  
(908); 15 § 10 (929); 16 § 1 (927); 16  
§ 12 (944); 16 § 14 (945); 16 § 15 (946),  
16 § 17 (948); 17 § 1 (950); 17 § 2 (951):

Bk. V (VIII). 4 § 2 (1006); 4 § 7  
(1014); 4 § 9 (1015) (1016); 5 § 5 (1022);  
6 § 2 (1064); 6 § 9 (1071); 7 § 9 (1082):

Bk. VI (IV). 1 § 1 (1114); 2 § 2  
(1139) (1140):

Bk. VII (VI). 2 § 2 (1204):

Bk. VIII (V). 9 § 12 (1264); 11 § 10  
(1274) (1275); 12 § 11 (1277); 12 § 12  
(1279); 12 § 8 (1273); 12 § 9 (1274):

the most affectionate care on explaining and reproducing their minutest details; it is evident that he lingers over them involuntarily, as if they were his own peculiar province, with far greater pleasure and patience, in spite of his theories, than when he is treating of his own ideal state.

From the point of view which has just been characterized the horizon is to Aristotle necessarily limited. Here, too, it is to the limitation that he owes most of what he has in common with Plato upon this subject. In both, the close connexion of Politics with Ethics has a beneficial effect; in both, it is a weakness that this connexion becomes, in genuine Greek fashion, too much like entire unity. Each of them recognises in the state itself the school of morality in the Greek sense of the word, as the harmonious development of all the powers with which individuals in different kind and degree have been endowed; the preparation, therefore, for true human happiness. Only from this point can we explain the peculiar assumption, common to these two thinkers, of a pattern state to be specially constructed in contrast to all actually existing constitutions; a state only possible amongst Hellenes as the most highly gifted race; in which the perfect citizen is also the perfect man<sup>1</sup>. Further, these two philosophers have no higher or more comprehensive conception of the state than as merely a Greek city-community, a canton with hamlets and villages: hence their ideal of a perfect state never really emerges from this narrow setting<sup>2</sup>. Nay more, it is saddled with all the conditions of a small Greek city-state: slavery in the first place; depreciation of labour; contempt for commerce, industry, and trade; and the peculiarly Greek conception that leisure, to be devoted to the exclusive pursuit of the affairs of the state, and to the intellectual and moral culture of himself and his fellow-citizens, free from all compulsion to trouble about a living, is the only thing worthy of a true freeman; a conception that to our present view savours strongly of idleness. Lastly this makes it necessary that the minority, consisting of an exclusive body of full citizens, should have a secure capital guaranteed to them<sup>3</sup>.

But there is this vast difference between Aristotle and Plato. By the latter this very limitation of the Greek city-community is carried to the

<sup>1</sup> I may refer the reader to the somewhat daring but ingenious attempt of my excellent colleague Von Wilamowitz-Möllerndorff *Aus Kydathen* 47—54 (Berlin 1880. 8) to trace the growth of this idea in Plato and his predecessors, and the rise of political speculation generally, to the internal history of the Athenian people and state.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. on I. 2. 4 note (11), I. 2. 6

II. (19 b), II. 2. 3 (132), III. 3. 4 (460). Wilamowitz on the other hand endeavours to show, *op. c.* 110—113, that the Athenian state of Cleisthenes and Pericles, as it actually existed, was not really subject to this limitation.

<sup>3</sup> See the notes on I. 9 § 18, 10 § 4, 11 § 6, 13 § 13; II. 9 § 2, 11 § 10; III. 13 § 12 (599).

extreme, and the state as it were forced back into the family, becoming under the ideal constitution nothing but an expanded family. The former on the other hand gives all prominence to the conception of the state, so far as the above limitation allows; he is careful to draw the sharpest distinction between the state and the family at the very time when he is demonstrating the true significance of the latter in relation to the former. This is made the starting-point not simply of his whole exposition, wherein at the outset he assumes a hostile attitude to Plato<sup>1</sup>, but in II. 2 § 2, § 7, of his attack upon Plato's ideal state in particular<sup>2</sup>. By exploring, in all directions farther than did his master, the nature of the Hellenic state, he has penetrated to the inmost essence of the state in general, of which this Hellenic state was at any rate an important embodiment. He has thus succeeded in discovering for all succeeding times a series of the most important laws of political and social life. Here first, for example, not in Plato, do we find the outlines of Political Economy. At the same time in this limitation of his point of view must be sought the reason why from the soundest premisses, from observations of fact most striking and profound, he not unfrequently deduces the most mistaken conclusions.

#### IV. ECONOMIC (O'IKONOMIKH)—SLAVERY AND THE THEORY OF WEALTH<sup>3</sup>.

The opening chapters, Bk. I. cc. 1, 2, form the introduction to the work, and here we follow our author with undivided assent. In opposition to Plato he traces the origin of the family to a process of organic natural growth, and next shows how the state arises out of the family through the intermediate step of the clan-village<sup>4</sup>. At the same time he states what is the specific difference between the state and the family, and characterizes the former as the product of no arbitrary convention, but rather of a necessity arising from man's inner nature. He proclaims a truth as novel as it was important<sup>5</sup> that man, and

<sup>1</sup> See the notes on I. 1 § 1, 3 § 4, 7 § 1, 2.

<sup>2</sup> See further II. 3 § 4—4 § 10, 5 § 14—26 and note on II. 2, 2 (131).

<sup>3</sup> On this and the following sections comp. Sussehl *op. cit.* *On the composition of the Politics* 17—29.

<sup>4</sup> Mommsen's account in the *History of Rome*, I. c. 3, p. 37 ff. of the Eng. trans. (London 1877, 8), may be compared.

<sup>5</sup> Van der Rest *op. cit.* 372. That from this proposition there follows for Aristotle the natural right of slavery, as Oncken (*op. cit.* II. 29 L.) maintains, is undeniable; yet he deduces it only by the aid of his other assumptions. Oncken (p. 23) thinks no one would now subscribe the further proposition that he who is by nature outside the state, *freely*, is either entitled slave humanity or a degraded savage. I am of the contrary opinion;

properly speaking he alone of all creatures upon the earth, is a being destined by nature for political society. Nevertheless the actual combination to form the state appears (see 2 § 15) to be man's own spontaneous act<sup>1</sup>, quite as much as the actual formation of poetry out of its germs in man's inner nature and the first rude attempts to develop them<sup>2</sup>.

The expositions which form the first main division of the work, the theory of the household or family as the basis of the state (*οἰκονομική* I. cc. 3—13), make a mixed impression upon the reader: especially is this true of the account of slavery c. 4. ff.

Besides (1) the view of those in favour of simple adherence to custom, who would maintain the existing slavery due to birth, purchase, or war, as perfectly justified, and (2) the more moderate view accepted by Plato, which pronounced against the extension of slavery to Hellenes<sup>3</sup>, Aristotle found a third theory already in the field which rejected all slavery as contrary to nature. However true in itself, this last-named theory was many centuries in advance of the age<sup>4</sup>; and beyond all doubt its defenders had lightly passed over what was the main point, the possibility namely of making their principle a living reality at the time<sup>5</sup>. Either Plato was unacquainted with this view or he considered that it did not require to be refuted; in any case it was an axiom with him, that within the limits assigned slavery was justified. Thus Aristotle deserves unqualified approval for having been the first to appreciate the

the proposition is just as true now as when Aristotle wrote it.

<sup>1</sup> Hildenbrand *op. cit.* 393 f., Oncken *op. cit.* II. 18 f. Comp. *n.* on I. 2. 15 (28 b).

<sup>2</sup> *Poet.* c. 4 §§ 1—6.

<sup>3</sup> See on I. 5 § 9 *n.* (46), 6 § 8 (54).

<sup>4</sup> Even in the time of the Roman empire voices like Seneca's remained unsupported. The whole order of ancient society was once for all established on the basis of slavery, and even Christianity, although it contained in itself the principle which must lead to its extinction, could make no alteration for the time being. The primitive Christian Church may have indirectly prepared for the abolition of slavery (see Lecky *History of Rationalism* II. 258 ff.), but it was directly hostile to such a change. See for proof and elucidation of this statement L. Schiller *Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Sklaverei* 3 ff. (Erlangen 1847. 4) and Oncken *op. cit.* II. 60—74. It should be remembered that even now all the traces of slavery have not as yet disappeared

amongst Christian nations, one of the most important having only been destroyed by the recent civil war in North America; that serfdom was but lately abolished in Russia, and the last remnants of it in Germany were not removed until the present century. [If the status of slavery is not tolerated openly in Christendom, there is much analogy to it in the position of uncivilized tribes in relation to European peoples in colonial settlements, *e.g.* that of the South-African natives to the Boers, under the guise of indenture. But the system of labour recruiting in the Western Pacific for Queensland and Fiji, even assuming that no irregularities occur, and the coolie traffic generally (whether in English, French, or Spanish possessions) have equally the effect of placing ignorant and unprotected natives entirely at the mercy of their employers, and that, too, in a strange country. H. W. J.]

<sup>5</sup> So Hildenbrand rightly thinks *op. c.* 405.

difficulties of the question in their full extent. But a successful solution of it was for him impossible. With a clear and true insight he saw that the theory referred to could not practically be carried out in the Greek state; a higher conception of the state, as we have said, he neither did nor could possess. It was inevitable that this insight should mislead him into the belief that the view itself was theoretically incorrect, that he should honestly endeavour to find scientific grounds for this belief of his, is entirely to his credit. It was just as inevitable that the attempt merely involved him in self-contradictions, and indeed resulted in the proof of the exact opposite<sup>1</sup>. In substance he decides in favour of a view similar to Plato's, which he more exactly determines and modifies by saying that there are certain slaves by nature who are to be sought for amongst non-Hellenes, and that none but these ought actually to be enslaved<sup>2</sup>. 'The thought that slavery is incompatible with 'the dignity of man' has occurred to him as well as to the unconditional opponents of the institution, but not as yet 'the thought of the universality of man's dignity'<sup>3</sup>. In contradiction to his own psychological principles he makes the difference between the most perfect and the least perfect of men as great as that between man and beast, and thinks that thereby he has theoretically discovered his slaves by nature. But he has himself to admit that there is no certain practical criterion by which to distinguish these men from others. It is quite possible that a slave's soul may dwell in a nobly formed body, and the soul of one of nature's freemen in an ignoble frame; furthermore men of truly free and noble mind may be born amongst the non-Hellenes, or men of servile nature amongst the Hellenes. The consequence is that the criterion of Hellenic birth, to which on the whole Aristotle adheres, ought not to serve as an unconditional protection against well deserved slavery<sup>4</sup>. These, he thinks, are only exceptions to the rule; but he cannot deny that these exceptions are numerous; and yet he does not observe, that therefore of necessity there must be many cases where slavery as it actually exists is in perpetual conflict with the law of nature, even as laid down by himself. His remarks on the need of domestic servants for the house, and on the natural antithesis of ruler and subject pervading all relations of existence are clear and striking; but they by no means warrant the conclusion that these servants must at the same time be slaves or serfs<sup>5</sup>. Yet in all fairness it ought to

<sup>1</sup> See on 1. 4 § 2, 5 § 8, § 9 *n.* (45), 6 § 3, § 5 *n.* (48), § 9 *n.* (46), § 10 *n.* (47).

Compare also the notes on 1. 4 § 5, 13 § 12.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. the notes on 1. 5 § 10 (47), 6 § 8 (54).

<sup>3</sup> Hildenbrand *op. cit.* 404 f.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. the notes on 1. 5 § 4 (46), and 6 § 3 (50).

<sup>5</sup> See the notes on 1. 5 § 8 (45) and 5 § 9 (45).

be borne in mind not merely that the Fathers of the early Church used arguments in favour of slavery which are no better<sup>1</sup>, but that in all ages attempts have been made to justify serfdom or slavery by similar fallacies<sup>2</sup>. Nay more, Aristotle's arguments, when properly qualified, are well suited to become the subject of grave consideration even in our own day; to make us aware of contradictions in our present views; and thus to suggest some modest restraint upon a too vehement criticism of the great thinker of antiquity. Or does the conviction, which is forced upon us by experience, that whole races of men lack the capacity for civilization, so readily accord with our belief, no less well founded, in the dignity of human nature everywhere? And does the interval between the lowest individual of such a race and the greatest spirits of humanity really fall far short of that which separates man from the animals? If lastly it is not to be denied, that even within the pale of civilized nations Providence ensures the necessary distinction between some men adapted to physical toil and others who are suited to intellectual exertion, should we not be as perplexed as Aristotle if we were required to set up a valid criterion between the two sorts of natures? As a matter of fact he who has to live by the labour of his hands will always be debarred from that complete participation in political life which constitutes the citizen proper. Even the educated man of our own day is so fully occupied with the discharge of his professional duties that frequently he has no time to take that share in politics which the modern state, if it is to prosper, is obliged to demand from him<sup>3</sup>.

The more general discussions on production and property<sup>4</sup> which follow the investigation into slavery, I. 8—11, cannot be said to be attached to it 'in a fairly systematic manner'<sup>5</sup>, but on the contrary quite loosely and lightly<sup>6</sup>. It is open to question, however, whether the passage which we must in all probability assume to be lost a little further on (I. 12. 1) did not originally supplement and complete the requisite organic connexion of these discussions with the theory of the family as a whole<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Oncken *op. cit.* II. 73 f.

<sup>2</sup> Oncken *op. cit.* II. 38.

<sup>3</sup> On this subject see some remarks of Lang, *op. c.* 60, and Bradley *op. c.* 215 f., 217 f., which are quoted in the notes on I. 5, 10 (47) and III. 5. 7 (511).

<sup>4</sup> [Both are included under *χρηματιστική*. The Greek *κτήσις* and the German 'Erwerb' more properly mean 'Acquisition'. Plato indeed, *Soph.* 219 c, d, opposes *κτητική* to *ποιητική*, classing all the 'arts'

under one or the other of these two divisions. But it is convenient to retain the established technical term in English treatises on Political Economy, viz. 'Production', that is, production of wealth. TR.]

<sup>5</sup> As Teichmüller asserts *Die Einheit der aristotelischen Eudämonie* 148 (St Petersburg 1859. 8).

<sup>6</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II ii 693.

<sup>7</sup> See on I. 12. 1 n. (107).

add. lat. yearlings (Nov. 28) developed from early yearlings (Oct-Nov) & (Jan-Mar) 40: 60: 100; 10: 15: 9—13: further (Mar, III, on Plk. 1 and n. (28) on 11. 9. 4.

plunder by its very nature cannot possibly be included, as it is by him, with direct appropriation of the gifts of nature as distinct from sale and barter, that is, from every kind of voluntary exchange: for it is nothing else than the transfer of property in the rudest form by violence and without compensation. Whoever then regards the most violent form of this transfer as natural would be bound in all fairness to hold the same of its milder forms, fraud and theft. Nothing but personal labour creates a valid and incontestable right to property, and such a right over the soil can only be won by the plough. Thus Aristotle can make an excellent defence of the utility of property against Plato and can set it in its true light; but missing the conception of economic labour he misses therewith the full and logically clear notion of property. His notion too of what is natural must under such circumstances lose all definiteness when it comes to be applied to civilized nations in advanced stages of development. He certainly never intended to concede to plunder a place in his model state; but he is exposed to the charge of inconsistency, when he nevertheless declares it to be something natural on the ground that it undoubtedly is so to men in a state of nature, without seeing that what is natural for men in a state of nature is not natural for civilized men<sup>1</sup>. Indeed he has in general no sort of insight into the nature of historical development; for in history he discerns, not the reign of general laws, but merely the action of individual men, free or even capricious, although often wrecked on circumstances.

When he comes to treat of exchange, not merely do we find Adam Smith's distinction between value in use and value in exchange already anticipated<sup>2</sup>, but the whole discussion is evidence 'how acutely Aristotle 'has thought out a subject which Hellenic philosophy before him 'seems at the best to have barely touched. The successive steps in 'the rise of commerce and the origin of money could not be exhibited 'with more of truth to fact or of historical accuracy than has been here 'accomplished in a style of unerring precision, piercing to the heart of 'the subject to reproduce it with classic brevity and definiteness, yet so 'exhaustively that modern science has found nothing to alter or to 'add.' Besides admitting that exchange of commodities is not contrary to nature he goes on to show how from it buying and selling necessarily arose, and from that again a new mode of acquisition, trade in merchandise. Apparently he would further allow exchange to be carried on through a coined medium, so long as it is merely to relieve indispensable barter and not as a business of its own. But here comes in again his want of clearness and that inconsistency which leads

<sup>1</sup> See on I. 8. 7 *n.* (71) and I. 9. 8 *n.* (82).

<sup>2</sup> Van der Rest *op. c.* p. 382.

him to see an ever increasing degeneracy and departure from the paths of nature' in what he himself recognises as a necessary development: 'starting with the most accurate views on the nature and necessity of monetary exchange he is led in the end actually to reject all commerce and all practical trading with capital.' He rightly sees how essential it is that the article chosen as the medium of exchange should be useful in itself<sup>1</sup>, but at the same time as the determinate value of each coin is regulated by law and convention he is misled into the belief that nothing but pure caprice has a hand in this convention: that it was by mere chance that metals have been selected out of all useful articles, and in particular that amongst all the more highly civilized nations gold and silver are exclusively employed for coining into money, at all events for foreign trade. Once for all he states the case in such a way that it might easily be believed he has come, a few lines further on, in contradiction to himself, to hold that coined money no longer current loses even its value as a metal<sup>2</sup>.

Further, while correctly explaining the origin of money, 'he nevertheless fails to recognise to the full extent the way in which its introduction must naturally react upon the value of natural products: how they are all without exception thereby turned into wares, whose value is regulated by their market-price, so that anything which finds no market, or no sale in the market, possesses no more value than heaps of gold on a desert island; the richest harvest of the productions of nature, if its abundance does not attract a purchaser, being just as useless rubbish as the wealth called into existence by Midas'. After the later stage of a monetary system has been attained Aristotle makes the vain attempt to preserve in his conceptions the primitive economy of nature, which has come to an end simply because it has become impossible. In the business of the merchant he sees no more than what lies on the surface, speculation, money-making, the accumulation of capital: accordingly he condemns it as a purely artificial and unnatural pursuit. There too he overlooks the mental labour, the economic service which trade renders, not by any means exclusively to benefit the purses of those engaged in it.' The insatiate nature of unscrupulous avarice he opposes in most forcible language, but it is in vain that 'he endeavours to restrict productive labour in domestic economy within any other limits than those which are set by the powers and conscience of the individual'. Of industry as

<sup>1</sup> See on l. 9. 8 n. (82).

<sup>2</sup> See on l. 9. 8 n. (84).

<sup>3</sup> Cp. on l. 9. 11 n. (88).

<sup>4</sup> Comp. the notes on l. 9 § 13 (90).

<sup>5</sup> But see on the other hand the note § 18 (93).  
on l. 9. 11 (87).

‘understood in Political Economy he has no more conception than ‘of labour.’ Having failed to recognise the importance of agriculture in human development he now mistakes still more the benefits introduced by property, which money first made really capable of transfer, ‘that ‘second great victory in the struggle between human labour and the ‘forces of nature’<sup>1</sup>. To this great democratic revolution it is impossible ‘to accommodate’ his thoroughly aristocratic economic theory, which, at the expense of toiling slaves and resident aliens, guarantees in true Hellenic fashion to the handful of privileged citizens their leisure and the secure provision of their subsistence from their family estates, so that in fact they need take no trouble to increase their possessions. ‘Aristotle’s freeholder,’ in Oncken’s words, ‘is not a producer at all, but ‘consumes what is given by nature. Aristotle has no insight into the ‘true natural law of economic development, the aim of which is to ‘overcome nature by freeing industrial life from the vicissitudes of her ‘smile and frown.’ Of the importance herein attaching to capital antiquity generally and the middle age never had an inkling; as little did they perceive that to receive interest on capital is not really different from selling the produce of labour. On the perverse view which Aristotle took of money<sup>2</sup> it is intelligible, that in accord with all ancient philosophy and the whole of the middle age<sup>3</sup>, he declares lending money upon interest to be the most shameful of all modes of gain; yet it is certainly true on the other hand that ‘the free community of antiquity ‘was in reality nothing but an association of capitalists who lived on ‘the interest of the capital they had invested in their slaves.’

Lastly, it is interesting to see how inconsistent this whole economic theory becomes when it passes over to the ‘practical part’. What is here (I. II §§ 1, 2) described as the most natural mode of life is nothing but cattle-raising and tillage pure and simple on a large scale, which is impossible without considerable capital, an industrial spirit and a knowledge of the market. Consequently ‘the separation which Aristotle has ‘made between artificial and natural modes of life cannot be strictly ‘maintained even in the case of those who rear cattle and till the soil, ‘for whom nature herself, in the strictest sense of the word, provides a ‘field of labour. He proves in his own case the truth of his profound ‘remark made in this same connexion: that in all such matters, while ‘speculation is free, practice has its necessary restrictions.’ It is no less noteworthy that in his economic theory he completely loses sight of that

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *n.* on I. 9. 18 (93).

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *iii.* on I. 10 §§ 4, 5.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Lecky *op. c.* II. 277—289,

Lang *op. c.* 59. [See however Cunningham *Christian Opinion on Usury* pp. 26—33, 36 (Edinburgh 1884).]

essential distinction between the family and the state upon which he insists so much elsewhere. Several times in these discussions he mentions the *πολιτικός* who controls the finances of a state as well as the *οικονόμος* who manages the property of a household, and that too in a way which forces the reader 'to assume that the task and the procedure in both cases are completely similar': I. 8 §§ 13—15, 10 §§ 1—3, 11 § 11. With this agrees the decided irony<sup>1</sup> with which he speaks of those statesmen whose whole political wisdom lies in their financial devices, while these devices amount to nothing but keeping the state coffers constantly filled by all kinds of monopolies. And yet 'the great revolution caused by the necessity of exchange he has deduced with perfect correctness from the fact that entirely new conditions of life and of production arise as soon as ever a single family develops into a circle of several families (I. 9. 5). What changes then are to be anticipated when small communities coalesce into a political unity; when intercourse springs up between different political bodies and reacts in a modifying and transforming manner upon the internal condition of each of them! Had Aristotle gone into this question the untenableness of his economic theory would have been made even more glaringly manifest than is at present the case.'

In the last chapter of the first book, when Aristotle comes to enquire into the treatment of the slave and his capacity for virtue, his peculiar view of natural slavery involves him in an awkward dilemma, from which he cannot be said to have escaped very happily. The slave by nature to a certain extent remains a human being, and yet again to a certain extent he has, properly speaking, ceased to be one. On the one hand Aristotle demands that there should be a specific difference, and not merely one of degree, between the virtue (*ἀρετή*) of the man, the woman, the child, and the slave (e.g. 13 §§ 4, 5). On the other, his own subsequent elaborate enquiry into ethical virtue<sup>2</sup>, as soon as the question is started, wherein consists the distinction between the virtue which commands and the virtue which obeys, tends far more to a mere quantitative variation than to really distinct species<sup>3</sup>—to say nothing of the further question, wherein the obedience of the wife differs from that of the child, and both from that of the slave. And this is not the only defect which this enquiry displays<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Strangely misunderstood by Oncken *l.c.* II. 113, who in consequence unjustly accuses Aristotle of a fresh contradiction here. While admitting that many states need such devices, Aristotle does not thereby imply that he thinks this a proof of the excellence of such states.

<sup>2</sup> On the way in which Aristotle distinguishes intellectual from moral excellence see on I. 13. 6 *n.* (112).

<sup>3</sup> Van der Kest *op. c.* 378. Comp. also *no.* on I. 13 § 7 (114 b) and on §§ 11—13 (120—122).

<sup>4</sup> See the *no.* on I. 13. 11.

## V. THE REVIEW OF PRECEDING THEORIES AND APPROVED CONSTITUTIONS.

With the second book we come at once to the theory of the state properly so called; divided, according to Aristotle's own statement, into two parts which treat (1) of the constitution, and (2) of legislation. From two passages in the later books, III. 15 § 2, VI (IV). 1 §§ 9, 10, it is unquestionable<sup>1</sup> that the philosopher intended to treat of both in his work; but in the form in which it has come down to us it has not advanced beyond the former, and even of this considerable sections are wanting.

The second book more especially constitutes the critical part, the remainder of the work the positive or dogmatic part, of the theory of the constitution. In the former is contained an examination of the model constitutions proposed by other theorists, Plato, Phaleas, and Hippodamos, as well as of the best amongst the forms of government actually established, Sparta, Crete, Carthage, and the Solonian constitution; a criticism which of course gives us glimpses<sup>2</sup> of many of the positive features of Aristotle's own ideal of a constitution. His attack upon the polity of pure reason, as it claims to be, in Plato's *Republic* ranks among the most successful parts of the whole work. In a higher degree perhaps than anywhere else is here displayed 'the philosopher's practical sense, his clear eye open to the conditions 'and laws of the actual, his profound comprehension of human 'nature and of political and domestic life<sup>3</sup>.' Against every form of socialism and communism it remains unrivalled in cogency up to the present day. All the well-meaning attempts that have been made to defend Plato against this criticism<sup>4</sup> have disclosed very little that will

<sup>1</sup> If this sense could be disputed for the latter passage, the former at all events excludes all objection. Cp. the notes on these passages, (636) and (1130); also Hildenbrand *op. c.* 351 f., Zeller *op. c.* II ii 677.

<sup>2</sup> See II. 5 § 7 n. (158), § 15 n. (166), § 17 n. (168), § 25 n. (182): 6 § 7 ff. n. (207), §§ 10—14 nn. (208—211), §§ 16—19 nn. (216—219), § 22 n. (230): 7 § 5 n. (234, 236), § 6 f. nn. (236 b, 237 b): 9 § 2 n. (279), § 5 n. (285) § 14 n. (300), § 18 n. (313), § 30 n. (339), § 31 n. (341): 10 § 8 n. (365), § 9 n. (368): 11 § 3 n. (381), § 4 n. (383), § 6 n. (388), § 7 n. (391), § 10 n. (393), § 15: 12 § 5 n. (413).

<sup>3</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II ii 697 f.

<sup>4</sup> The oldest attempt of this kind known to us is that of the Neo-Platonist Eubulos, mentioned above p. 18 n. 7. It has been submitted to an examination in detail by Ehrlich *De iudicio ab Aristotele de republica Platonica facto* (Halle 1868. 8). Amongst the moderns similar attempts have been partially made by Camerarius, J. G. Schneider, &c.; more thoroughly by Schlosser, who displayed a singular and singularly unfortunate zeal against Aristotle; much more moderately and impartially by Fülleborn; lastly by Pinzger *De iis quae Aristoteles in Platonis politia reprehendit* (Leipzig 1822. 8). These have also been answered by Ehrlich, as well as by other writers.

stand proof; nor have the charges of sophistry brought against it been to any extent successfully made out<sup>1</sup>. Only this much is true, that however forcible this criticism is in general it nevertheless contains misapprehensions in particulars, some of which are very serious<sup>2</sup>; and its author had not the power, if indeed he ever had the will, to transfer himself to the innermost groove of Plato's thought<sup>3</sup>.

These defects stand out far more forcibly when in the following chapter he treats of the state described in Plato's *Laws*. Upon this criticism we cannot pronounce a judgment by any means so favourable: indeed it contains some things which are all but incomprehensible<sup>4</sup>. Even the refutation of community of goods has not altogether that full cogency, derived from the essential nature of the case, which is apparent in the refutation of community of wives and children<sup>5</sup>. As we see from this criticism, and yet more clearly from that upon Phaleas, 7 § 6 f, Aristotle is himself in favour of considerable restrictions upon the rights of property<sup>6</sup>. Every difference of principle in this respect between his own ideal state and Plato's in the *Laws* disappears: when all things are taken into account Aristotle is no further removed from Plato's first ideal state in the one than Plato himself in the other<sup>7</sup>. Here, therefore, Aristotle's criticism can only affect what are relatively subordinate points, and under these circumstances it frequently assumes a petty and generally unfair character<sup>8</sup>. The refutation of

<sup>1</sup> See on II. 2 § 4 (133), 3 § 9 (142): 4 § 1 (145), § 2 (146) (147), § 9 (151) (152): 5 § 3 (154), § 10 (162), § 16 (167), §§ 20—23 (172), § 25 (181) (182), § 27 (184).

<sup>2</sup> See on II. 5 § 17 (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179), § 27 (184): 6 § 3 (187) (189); also on 5 § 22 (177), 6 § 5 (195).

<sup>3</sup> See Zeller *Plat. Studien* 203 ff. (Tübingen 1839. 8).

<sup>4</sup> Even Zeller and Oncken do not seem as yet to have observed this difference. It was fully recognised by Van der Rest *op. c.* 108 ff., 121 f., 221 ff., 348 ff.: but he did not investigate its causes, and in one particular he should be corrected by the notes on II. 5. 25. It would be quite possible to suspect with Krohn (see p. 14 n. 4) that, wholly or in part, c. 6 is not genuine. But it is hard to see who but Aristotle could have written §§ 10—15, and scarcely anywhere are the difficulties greater. See the notes on these sections.

<sup>5</sup> See on II. 5. 5.

<sup>6</sup> See on II. 5 § 7 n. (158), § 15 n. (166), 7 § 6 n. (236 b). How Van der Rest *op. c.* 340 can blame Aristotle for requiring the public education to aim at creating

such a spirit of fraternity that we willingly grant our fellow-citizens a share in the enjoyment of our own possessions, is incomprehensible.

<sup>7</sup> It is much to be regretted that all comparisons between the ideal states of Plato and Aristotle—such as Böcher *Politiconum, quae docuerunt Plato et Aristoteles, disquisitio et comparatio* (Leipzig 1844. 8), Orges *Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis librorum de republica* (Berlin 1843. 8), Pierson *Vergleichende Charakteristik der Platonischen und der Aristotelischen Ansicht vom Staate* in the *Rhein. Mus.* XIII. 1858. 1—48, 209—247, Rasso *Die Republik des Plato und der beste Staat des Aristoteles* (Weimar 1866. 4)—have either been expressly confined to the ideal state of the *Republic*, or, being left incomplete, contain no sort of collection of the similarities and differences between the political ideal of the *Laws* and that of Aristotle. See further the notes on I. 13 § 16: II. 6 § 5 (192), § 6 (201), § 14 (212): 7 § 5 (234), § 6 (236 b): 9 § 5 (284): IV (VII). 16 § 15.

<sup>8</sup> See the notes on II. 6 § 5 (188) (189), § 4 (190), § 5 (192) (193), § 6 (201), § 7

Phaleas, again, is enriched with the fruits of extensive observation of mankind; but, like the review of Plato's *Laws*, it leaves untouched the kernel of the matter, the inalienability and indivisibility of the equal portions of land allotted to the citizens. Furthermore Aristotle sees with keen perception that if this measure is to be carried out, a normal number of births and deaths must be calculated and the surplus population, on the basis of this calculation, removed by a resort to abortion, in order that the number of citizens may always remain the same. Nor has he any scruples about recommending this horrible measure and thus invading far more than Phaleas, or Plato in the *Laws*, the sanctities of marriage and family life<sup>1</sup>. What he further insists upon in reply to Phaleas is the same thing which he had already insisted upon when criticizing Plato (c. 5 § 15), namely that uniformity of education of the right kind is the main point, while all the other institutions have only a subsidiary importance<sup>2</sup>.

We may admit then with Oncken<sup>3</sup> that Aristotle belonged to the few privileged spirits of antiquity who were the pioneers of progress towards that richer and riper humanity which remained foreign to the heathen world at large. In defending the natural law of marriage and private property he first discovered the fundamental laws of the independent life of the community: the position which he assigns to women goes far beyond the Hellenic point of view: and he was the first who, by adjustment of the unity of the state to the freedom of its citizens, at least attempted to determine the limits of the state's activity. But we must also bring out more forcibly than Oncken has done how far, even in Aristotle, all these great conceptions fall short of attaining their clear full logical development to important results. And the review of Hippodamos shows us how little, after all, he was disposed, or even qualified, to follow ideas even then not unknown to Greek antiquity, the tendency of which was by a sharper limitation of the field of law and justice so to break the omnipotence of the state that its legislation should be confined to the maintenance of justice within these limits; this, rather than education, being made its function<sup>4</sup>. Here, as in the defence of slavery, we see that along with the excesses of democracy Aristotle rejected many just conceptions which had grown out of it<sup>5</sup>. However much to the purpose the

(204), § 9 (206 b), § 10 (208), § 13 (210), § 14 (212), § 15 (213—215), § 18 (220), § 19 (225—227).

<sup>1</sup> See *nn.* on II. 6 § 5 (192), § 10 (208), §§ 12, 13 (209) (210), 7 § 5 (234).

<sup>2</sup> See *nn.* II. 5 § 15 (165 b), 7 § 8

(238).

<sup>3</sup> *op. c.* I. 191 f.

<sup>4</sup> See the Excursus II on Hippodamos at the end of Bk. II.

<sup>5</sup> See above p. 20; and further the Excursus on Hippodamos just cited.

objections which he brings against Hippodamos with regard to his division of the civic body<sup>1</sup>, they are defective from the jurist's point of view<sup>2</sup>; while he makes not a single attempt to refute what is the real foundation of the whole scheme, the need for the restriction upon legislation described above. Evidently he thinks it not worth while to do so, just as in a later passage (III. 9. 8) he treats every opinion on the function of the state which implies such a mode of regarding legislation as *ipso facto* disproved.

The review of the political institutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage is primarily of great historical value for our knowledge of their constitutions<sup>3</sup>: indeed apart from it we should know next to

<sup>1</sup> Compare the notes on II. 8 § 2 (253), § 9 (264), § 24 (276): but on the other hand II. 8 § 12 n. (265).

<sup>2</sup> See the notes on II. 8 § 5 (258), § 15 (268).

<sup>3</sup> Triebler *Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfassungsgeschichte* 99 f. (Berlin 1871. 8) endeavours to prove that, in his account of Sparta and Crete, Aristotle chiefly followed Ephoros. Here I in the main agreed with him in my critical edition p. LXII f., with considerable qualifications however in regard to Sparta. Meanwhile Gilbert *Studien zur altspartanischen Geschichte* pp. 86—109 (Göttingen 1873. 8) endeavoured to show that on the contrary Ephoros made use of the *Politics* of Aristotle. Frick in the *Jahrb. für Philol.* cv. 1873 p. 657 made reply to him that Ephoros' work, as is well known, only went down to the year 340 B.C. (It would have been more correct if he had said to 355: for all that follows was added by Demophilos, the son of Ephoros, probably after his father's death.) But it can be proved that Aristotle wrote at his *Politics* as late as 331, and for the proof Frick refers to Muller *Fragm. hist. Gr.* II p. 121. Both Gilbert and Frick ought to have known that, from the dates there quoted by Muller on the authority of Meier, Rose *Aristoteles principiorum* p. 397 ff. had with far greater reason inferred that the *Politeia* did not appear until the period between the years 348 and 307, and further that it is only on account of the uncertainty of the dates themselves that Heitz *Die vorlesenen Schriften des Aristoteles* (Leipzig 1863. 8.) p. 247 sq., *Aristote, fragm.* (p. 241 to the Paris edition of Aristotle), rejects this inference. Even if Rose is right we should conclude from this, not as he does, that Aristotle cannot have been the true au-

thor, but only that the work was first published after his death with additions by the editor. For the genuineness of the groundwork at least has been sufficiently made out by Heitz and by Bergk *Zur Aristotelischen Politik der Athener* (On a fragment of the *Politics* found lately, treating of Athens), in the *Rhein. Mus.* XXXVI. 1881. 87—115: cp. Susseml in *Bursian's Jahrbuch.* XXX. 1882. 20—22. If the matter rested thus Gilbert would be completely refuted. But leaving the correctness of these dates an open question, it is not very probable, to say the least, that Aristotle should have published thus early a work like the *Politeia* based upon such comprehensive studies. On another side Oncken *op. c.* II p. 330 f. by the help of fragments of this work which we still possess on the *Polity of Lacedaemon*, has tried to prove that Aristotle, quite independently of Ephoros, was the first to investigate Spartan constitutional history in true scientific spirit; that he probably visited Sparta himself for this purpose and drew information there from living oral tradition. The difficulties in connexion with this hypothesis are patent, and with reference to Crete at any rate the coincidence between Aristotle and Ephoros is of such a kind that in accordance with the line of argument above Aristotle must have used either Ephoros or his authority: see the notes on II. 10 § 1 (351), § 2 (352, 354), § 5 (359), § 6 (360). Even with reference to Sparta hardly any other conclusion seems possible: see the notes on II. 9 § 17 (310); 10 § 1, § 2 (352, 354), § 5 (359): VIII (v). 1 § 10 (1498), 7 § 2 (1592), 11 § 3 (1710), 12 § 12 (1771), and compare Rose *op. cit.* 398, 490. Only we are not to infer from this that Ephoros was Aristotle's only authority

nothing of the Carthaginian constitution : moreover we are bound on the whole to subscribe to Aristotle's estimate of them<sup>1</sup>. We shall not venture however to rank his merits quite so highly as Oncken has done. Certainly there never was before so mercilessly destructive and yet so just a criticism upon that Spartan state which up till then had been, most unwarrantably, the idol of all aristocratic and oligarchical circles. Yet on the one hand we must remember that close as were his relations with those circles, and although in essentials his own pattern-states were based upon similar foundations, Plato had been by no means blind to the defects of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions. Indeed in important particulars, and even in those of the greatest importance, Aristotle can but repeat the censure pronounced by his master<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand it is really necessary to reflect how, after so crushing a criticism which leaves scarcely anything untouched, Aristotle can possibly still be content, like Plato, to pronounce the Cretan and

here. On the contrary while it is more than doubtful whether he has Ephoros in view when he quotes certain opinions and statements (see on II. 6. 17, II. 9. 11), it is quite certain that in regard to both states Aristotle diverges considerably in details from Ephoros, partly indeed from all other authorities. This divergence must be due to another source, and here and there to one which he alone has utilized : see on II. 10 § 6 (360), § 10 (369) : VI (IV). II § 15 (1301).

<sup>1</sup> In spite of Oncken's opposition it will still remain the universal belief that the picture which Aristotle draws of the condition of Sparta agrees fully and completely only with the Sparta of later times. But the extreme view that this description in no respect applies to the Sparta of the earlier times should perhaps be modified. What is to be said, for instance, when Trieber *op. cit.* p. 136 ff. actually praises Aristotle for having in his criticism of the Spartan constitution taken into account simply the existing historical relations of his age, thereby fulfilling a condition laid down generally by the science of history in our time ; while at the same time he would fain persuade us that this procedure, so far as the history of Spartan antiquity was neglected, was due to ignorance and resulted in misstatement ! Why should not a part of the mischiefs discovered by him, and the germ at least of the remainder, have always existed in the Spartan state, even if it was not perhaps until after the Persian wars that this germ developed with gradually increasing strength and

banefulness ? And the procedure which Trieber commends only deserves to be praised because in fact even in historical matters we are fully entitled to argue from consequences to their causes, from the end to the beginning. Whoever considers the facts collected in the note on II. 9. 37 (350) will hardly find the suggestion of Trieber and others—that the readiness of the Spartan ephors and senators to receive bribes only belongs to later times—particularly credible ; but first of all he will enquire, with what date these later times ought rightly to commence. Fülleborn in a note to Garve's translation II p. 242 says most sensibly : ' Aristotle's 'remarks are very strangely contradicted 'by all the famous anecdotes of the heroism and chastity of the Spartan women. 'But different periods must be distinguished in Spartan history.....and it 'should be borne in mind that Aristotle 'after all deserves more credit than 'scattered anecdotes of such a kind.' But should not this consideration be extended to other cases ? Where Aristotle assumes that Spartan institutions were always thus and thus, while later writers contradict him and even claim to know the names of those who introduced the change, should we directly and unhesitatingly pronounce these later authorities right ? See the notes on II. 9 § 14 (299, 300), § 15 (303).

<sup>2</sup> Of what is really the main point Aristotle says this himself II. 9 § 34 (cp. note). See further the notes on II. 9 § 5 (283), § 11 (295 b), § 20 (318), § 23 (324), § 25 (330), § 27 (335), § 31 (341).

Spartan constitutions (with the addition merely of the Carthaginian) to be the next best after his own model state, and thus himself to sacrifice to the idol he has just destroyed. As to the socialist elements in those constitutions, they certainly do not go too far for him, but on the contrary not far enough; like his master, he is far more rigidly logical. The social principles of Aristotle's model state are as strictly deduced as those of Plato's.

It would be quite incredible that, amongst the best approved constitutions actually established, Aristotle should not have mentioned Solon's as well as the other three. For this reason alone it is hardly conceivable that the section in which it is discussed should not be genuine: rather is it matter of surprise that the subject is dismissed so briefly. But the mere list of legislators, with which the second book ends, is certainly a foreign interpolation which contradicts the clearly expressed purpose of the book<sup>1</sup>.

## VI. THE LEADING PROPOSITIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

We might naturally expect the exposition of Aristotle's own model constitution to follow directly upon this criticism of those which claim that title. But here again, with that characteristic unlikeness to Plato which was before remarked\*, our philosopher declines to regard as comparatively unimportant everything else in political theory except the perfect state. The positive or constructive side of the theory of the constitution, to which we now come, includes two parts, one general, the other special. The former<sup>2</sup> and much shorter portion, III. cc. 1—13, treats of the fundamental conditions of the healthy working of constitutions, which, as such, apply equally to the best form of state and to all others<sup>3</sup>. More explicitly, this portion falls into two main divisions: the first (A), cc. 1—5, while touching here and there by anticipation<sup>4</sup> upon the classification of separate constitutions, for the most part merely prepares for this by a discussion of the fundamental political conceptions which must be assumed for all of them: the true citizens cc. 1,

<sup>1</sup> See further the notes on II. 12 § 1, § 10 (421), § 12 (423, 425), § 13 (427).

<sup>2</sup> p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> On what follows compare Susenhihl *On the Third Book of Aristotle's Politics* in *Philologus* 55 (1876) 97—110.

<sup>4</sup> Hildenbrand, *op. cit.* 408 f. He rightly points out another reason why Bk. III should follow closely on Bk. II: 'the latter, at its very outset, along with its task of criticism attempts a positive

'solution of the problem'—of the utmost importance for all constitutions and intimately connected with the subject of Bk. I—'whether and to what extent the family and private property, institutions subserving individual interests, have any right to continue in the presence of the state, the organization for the common weal.'

<sup>5</sup> III. 1 § 9 *n.* (439 b), § 9 § 1, 2 *n.* (436), § 9 § 5—7 *n.* (408).

2: the essential identity of a state c. 3: the relation between the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man cc. 4, 5. Now this relation will vary under different constitutions and thus determine their nature and comparative merit. The subject of the remaining chapters (B), cc. 6—13, is, *firstly*, a definition of constitution (πολιτεία) in general, and a preliminary classification of the several forms of the state (πολιτεῖαι). As we are told in Bk. I., the end of the state is Happiness, the true well-being and common weal of the citizens. All constitutions which make the interest of the governed the end of government are normal constitutions (ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι): those which exist for the interest of the governors are corruptions or degenerate varieties (παρεκβάσεις) c. 6. Then, by a merely numerical standard, the normal constitutions are provisionally divided into Monarchy, True Aristocracy and Polity (Πολιτεία proper); the corrupt forms into Tyranny (τυραννίς), Oligarchy, Democracy; according as one man, a minority, or the majority respectively rule (c. 7). We pass on (c. 8) to consider *secondly* a series of difficult problems (ἀπορίαι). From the discussion of the first of these it appears that it is merely an accident of Oligarchy and Democracy that a minority governs in the one, a majority in the other. It is essentially the selfish government of the rich by the poor which constitutes Democracy, the selfish government of the poor by the rich which constitutes Oligarchy (c. 8). The remaining discussions treat at greater length three separate inquiries: (α) in c. 9, (β) in cc. 10, 11, (γ) in cc. 12, 13<sup>1</sup>. From the definitions just framed the first (α) draws the inference that in reality the true end of the state is not adequately secured upon the democratic principle—equal political privileges to all citizens who are equal in respect of free birth: nor yet upon the principle of oligarchy; for the state is no joint-stock trading company: the aristocratical principle of intelligence, virtue, and merit is alone sufficient

<sup>1</sup> The subdivisions of III. cc. 1—13 may thus be tabulated:

- (A) First main division: cc. 1—5
  - (α) Who is the true citizen? cc. 1, 2
  - (β) What constitutes the identity of a state? c. 3
  - (γ) Is the virtue of the good citizen the same with the virtue of the good man? cc. 4, 5.
- (B) Second main division: cc. 6—13
  - (I) Constitution defined; preliminary classification of constitutions: cc. 6, 7.
  - (II) Discussion of difficult problems (ἀπορίαι): cc. 8—13

More precise definitions of Democracy and Oligarchy: c. 8

The comparative merit of constitutions: cc. 9—13

- (α) the aristocratical principle preferable to that of democracy and of oligarchy: c. 9
- (β) the mass of the citizens and the laws in what sense sovereign on an aristocratical principle: cc. 10, 11
- (γ) the claims of the better citizens and of the mass how best accommodated on this principle, and the varieties (monarchy, pure aristocracy, polity) thence resulting: cc. 12, 13.

(c. 9). This is followed by the inference ( $\beta$ ) that the higher the capacity of a body of citizens, and consequently of a state, the more as a rule does the worth of eminent individuals fall short of that of the great mass of other citizens taken collectively, just as the wealth of the richest individuals amongst them is outweighed by the total property belonging to the remainder. Hence, even on an aristocratical principle, sovereignty belongs to the whole body. Yet this many-headed sovereign, besides being restrained by the laws, must always in the direct exercise of its powers be confined to the election of magistrates (*ἀρχαγερίας*) and to the scrutiny of their conduct, when, at the expiry of their term of office, they render an account of their stewardship (*εὐθυναί*). All the details of state affairs will be entrusted to the magistrates elected by such a competent civic body from amongst its ablest members.

A marvellously profound thought this, marking its author's essential independence of Plato<sup>1</sup>, and proving how powerfully he had been influenced by democracy and the Athenian polity. However distinctly he, like Plato, disapproves of its unrestrained development in Athens and elsewhere subsequently to the time of Pericles<sup>2</sup>, he has nevertheless laid down for all time the justification of the democratic element in political life<sup>3</sup>, and has done something at least to set a proper limitation to it. Moreover this thought has a far wider bearing. A true constitutional state combining freedom and order, whether under a monarchy or a republic, whether prince or people is sovereign within it, is only conceivable if the sovereign has definite limitations imposed by law upon the direct exercise of his sovereignty, in keeping with the true

<sup>1</sup> Spengel *Ueber Arist. Pol.* 15 n. 18, Henkel, *op. cit.* 80, n. 12, Oncken *op. cit.* 11 165 f., 174. The last rightly remarks that with this proposition Aristotle set himself free from the conceit of philosophic omniscience, while to Plato 'nothing was so certain as that the Demos meant the sovereignty of folly, and the rule of philosophers the reign of wisdom itself.' But how can Congreve conceive of Aristotle's own ideal state if he thinks (p. 137) that this proposition is only relatively true (not the slightest trace of this is to be found in its author), and is intended only to indicate that of the two evils, democracy and oligarchy, the former is the lesser? This is strange exaggeration.

<sup>2</sup> For this reason Oncken's assertion *l. c.* 172, that the exposition given 11 17, 16 is borrowed from observation of the Attic democracy, as it was even after Pericles' time, is not correct.

<sup>3</sup> Whether Trendelenburg in *Natur-*

*recht* p. 463 ff (Leipzig 1860. 8) has really shown "the fallacy of his analogies" as Henkel thinks *l. c.*, may be seen from the note on 10. 41. 1 (262 b). Zeller (*op. cit.* 11 ii 717) on the other hand finds them to the point, and Henkel himself continues: "However, as Spengel remarks '*Arist. Stud.* 11. 56 n. 1, "even Aristotle is not disposed to allow the public "a correct judgment on that which is "strictly scientific. But of that which "concerns mankind at large—what the "Greeks denote by *κοινὰ ἄνθρωποις*—every "one can judge, and the multitude "often judges more correctly than a specialist; who is often prejudiced without knowing it." Or as Goethe in "one passage expresses it, "There is no "doubt this public, so much honoured and "despised, is almost always wrong in "particulars, hardly ever in its broad "views." That Aristotle's confidence goes somewhat too far is shown in the note on 111. 15. 8.

external and internal relations of power. No doubt the restraints imposed by a constitutional state of large size in modern times are very different from those devised by Aristotle for his Greek canton-state, and suggested by the forms most suited to his purpose amongst those in actual existence. Yet after all, although the idea was foreign to him and to all antiquity, it is upon just this principle that representative government rests. Now-a-days the people does not elect the magistrates, unless it be the president of a republic, the borrowed monarchical head of the whole state: they are nominated by the monarch or his republican fac-simile, and there is no popular court to which they are directly accountable. Legislation again, the settlement of the state revenue and expenditure, and all that is included therein, are no longer directly in the hands of the entire body of the citizens. But even under a strict constitutional monarchy, where the monarch is the only recognized sovereign, the people have a most substantial share of political privilege, in that through their representatives they take part indirectly in legislation, in voting the budget, the ratification of treaties and the control of the administration. Even the most conservative modern statesman no longer overlooks the fact that the strange phenomenon, changeable as the wind, called public opinion<sup>1</sup>, may in certain circumstances be consolidated into a firm, enduring, real popular will, which even under the most absolute monarchy gradually becomes the most powerful and irresistible of all political forces; and that thus the so-called sovereignty of the people, which as a legal principle is more than doubtful, yet in fact indirectly and ultimately ever prevails. No one knows better than Aristotle that nothing is more foolish than the masses: but he is quite as well aware, that again there is nothing wiser. Where the one quality ceases and the other begins he has not attempted to determine and perhaps this is an attempt which no mortal man can make with success. He is 'far too well-trained a realist,' to fall into the error of those who treat that Proteus, the public, as if it did not exist, or who do not know how to reckon with such a force<sup>2</sup>. He was, so far as we know, the first to expound, prove, sift, and limit this thought which up till then had only been thrown out by democratic party leaders<sup>3</sup>; the first who, while accepting it not with interested views merely but from full conviction, yet considers it impartially in the spirit 'of the true statesman 'who has in view only the welfare of all, and of the psychologist who 'has an understanding for the instincts of a great people. He believes

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. *Fals. leg.* 135: ὡς ὁ μὲν δη-  
μός ἐστιν ἀσταθμητότατον πρᾶγμα τῶν πάν-  
των καὶ ἀσυνθετώτατον, ὥσπερ ἐν θαλάττῃ  
πνεῦμα ἀκατάστατον, ὡς ἂν τύχῃ κινούμενος.

<sup>2</sup> Oncken *op. c.* II. 168.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Athenagoras in Thucyd. vi.  
39. 1: also Pericles *ib.* II. 40, Otanes in  
Herod. III. 80 *s. fin.*

'the individual can be ennobled through the common feeling of the  
'body corporate to which he belongs; that his powers and intelligence  
'can be multiplied, his good instincts raised, his bad ones corrected  
'through being merged in a higher unity; and this is the only ethical  
'point of view, under which an intrinsic right to political elevation can  
'be ascribed to the people. Aristotle uses an example here (c. 11 § 3)  
'which contains in itself a great concession. The capacity of the  
'public for judging in matters of artistic taste he touches upon as a  
'truth which needs no proof; and yet on this very field the right of  
'the masses to decide is much more disputed and much more dis-  
'putable than on that of public life, where the weal and woe of each  
'individual is in question and the healthy instinct frequently sees  
'further than all the intelligence of the experts'.<sup>1</sup> Plato is of quite  
another opinion (*Laws* III. 700 E. ff.), and 'nothing is easier than by  
'resolving the public into its elements to show that it really consists of  
'mere cyphers'; but it is impossible to do away with the fact that the  
'poet or artist is nothing without this public, which he must conquer in  
'order to rule, and that the judgments of this court have a force with  
'which the view of the experts, who are seldom agreed, can never be  
'matched'.<sup>2</sup> Spengel<sup>3</sup> is undoubtedly right: these chapters (III. cc. 9—  
13) contain doctrines more important than any to be found elsewhere  
in the work, doctrines 'which deserve to be written in letters of gold.'

This section ends with the remark (III. 11. 20) that all this does not  
as yet inform us what kind of laws there ought to be, but simply that  
those made in the spirit of the right constitution are the right ones. In  
other words, the order of merit of the normal constitutions, and in its  
complete form that of the degenerate varieties<sup>4</sup>, is not yet decided. We

<sup>1</sup> See however the notes on III. 11 § 2 (365 b), 15 § 8 (647).

<sup>2</sup> Yet on the other hand see *Symp.* 194.

<sup>3</sup> Such a resolution Socrates undertakes in Xenoph. *Memor.* III. 7 in the case of the popular assembly (Vettori).

<sup>4</sup> Oncken II. 165 f. 'What,' he rightly adds, 'would have become of the German drama of Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller, had its fate rested solely with the critics, from Gottsched and Nicolai down to the romantic school?' It is however a mistake to suppose that the further step from this 'passive' popular sovereignty to the 'active' sovereignty, which finds expression in the self-government of the *Demos* by the *Demos* was also taken by Aristotle, 'when he recognized Polity as a form of government on an equality with Monarchy and Aristocracy' (Oncken II. 169, 239 f.). For

(1) Aristotle did not recognize Polity as standing on an equality with the other two forms of government, VI (IV). 8. 1; and (2) no greater rights are granted to the people in a Polity than in an aristocracy or a moderate democracy, VI (IV). 14. §§ 10, 14. And when Oncken made the assertion (II. 174) that Aristotle invariably subordinated to the law and the popular decree the wisdom and virtue of even the best individual citizen, he must surely have forgotten the substance of III. c. 15, c. 17 §§ 5—8.

<sup>5</sup> *Arist. Stud.* II. p. 54 (646).

<sup>6</sup> In general the result of the preceding statements is that Democracy is preferable to Oligarchy, and the latter preferable to a Tyranny; but whether and how far a moderate oligarchy deserves to rank before an unrestrained democracy has not yet been decided.

naturally expect the remaining discussion (γ), cc. 12, 13, to give at least the outlines of such a decision, bringing the whole exposition into real organic connexion with the previous classification of forms of government, and thus concluding the general theory of the constitution. But at first sight this expectation would seem to be wholly disappointed. Schlosser<sup>1</sup> was the first to find fault, not without reason. So much of the previous discussion (cc. 8—11) is repeated in cc. 12, 13 that he conjectured, not very happily, that these chapters had been transposed. After him Bernays<sup>2</sup> declared cc. 12, 13 to be simply another version of cc. 9—11 and cc. 16, 17. This view requires careful examination. Against it may be urged that the subject of cc. 14, 15 (indeed the whole discussion *περὶ βασιλείας*, cc. 14—17) is quite as closely connected by its contents with c. 11 as it is with the latter half of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), and much more so than it is with cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12; and as it most naturally follows upon c. 13<sup>3</sup>, there would be a tremendous gap, in accordance with the remark above made, between the end of c. 11 and the discussion on Monarchy at the beginning of c. 14, which on Bernays' view would directly follow. Notwithstanding this, cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12 might well pass for another version of cc. 9—11, lacking only the important second question as to the limits to the sovereignty of a competent body of citizens. In that case, however, the editor must have made more than a slight change in the passage to adapt it to its present place. For though the reference in 13 § 1 to c. 9 ff. as preceding might be cut out as a loose addition, that contained in 13 § 2 is firmly embedded in the context<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, the latter part of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), which is really devoid of all connexion with the earlier part as it at present stands<sup>5</sup>, might conveniently come immediately after c. 11 as an exception to the rule there set forth, thus: 'if however an individual man is superior to all the 'citizens together, then in the best state he stands above the law 'as absolute king and ruler.' The question of 11 § 20 noticed above<sup>6</sup> would then remain unanswered, but it might be urged that it belongs to the theory of the special constitutions to provide the answer. But graver considerations remain. From 11 § 8 it would

<sup>1</sup> In his translation vol. I. p. 296 *n.* 79. Cp. my note on III. 13. 12 (599).

<sup>2</sup> In the note to his translation, p. 172.

<sup>3</sup> Bernays indeed disputes this. He maintains that the sentence which states the propriety of this transition, *φαμὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην* i. e. *βασιλείαν* (III. 14. 1) finds no point of connexion in the last words of c. 13, since the normal constitutions are not there men-

tioned. But surely it is enough that in 13 § 20 the mention of them as opposed to the corrupt forms serves to introduce the whole of the succeeding exposition, although at last this stops short (§ 24) merely at the antithesis of the *best* constitution and the corrupt forms.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the notes on III. 13 §§ 1, 2.

<sup>5</sup> As Conring saw.

<sup>6</sup> P. 41: see also p. 43 *n.* 2.

follow, in contradiction to Aristotle's view, that even in the best state the magistrates might be elected from men of a definite census only'. Further there is one short sentence in c. 13, in its traditional place entirely unconnected with what precedes or follows, § 6, which however would be quite in place immediately before § 13. The close of § 12 has no counterpart at present in the previous chapters, yet it cannot be separated from its immediately preceding context; and it is evident that the subsidiary question here raised,—‘Are the best laws to be made for the advantage of the better citizens or of the majority?’—stands in the closest connexion with the main question at 11 § 20<sup>2</sup>; but no less evident that the answer to it here given is incomplete<sup>3</sup>. There is then in any case a lacuna after 13 § 12: we can easily imagine something to fill it, after which what in our present order stands as § 6 followed quite naturally<sup>4</sup>.

If therefore we really have two versions of the same subject-matter before us, then the older one contained in cc. 12, 13 has been handed down to us in worse condition and is the more incomplete; the later version, cc. 9—11, must have been left unfinished. In any case there is no redundancy noticeable here, but rather a lamentable deficiency. But on the other hand, the inquiry as to which is the most normal and best of the normal constitutions (11 § 20) can only be conducted by a more exact determination and modification of the previous result with regard to the most legitimate holder of sovereign power; and this consideration seems to render necessary a certain review of all the political factors, whatever their justification. It was further stated expressly, 11 § 1, that all the cases except that in which the sovereignty of the people is justified are to be afterwards discussed. Now it cannot be denied that c. 12 does make a start in this direction by first deciding universally which factors really can lay claim to political rule and thereby granting at the outset that wealth (and therefore Oligarchy) has a certain justification<sup>5</sup>. The diffuseness of the repetition is not commendable<sup>6</sup>, but in such works as those of Aristotle's which have been preserved it has simply to be accepted

<sup>1</sup> See the note on III. 11. § (260).

<sup>2</sup> πότερον τῶν νομοθέτη νομοθετήσεων, βουλευόντων τίθεσθαι τοὺς ἀποδιδόντας νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιότων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειότων; III. 13 § 12. Compare ἀρετὰς μέγισται τούτῳ δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς ἀποδιδόντας νόμους, οὐδὲν πῶς δῆλον... πλὴν τούτῳ γε φανερόν ἐστι δεῖ πρὸς τῇ ἀρετῇ κοινῶς εἶναι τοὺς νόμους, 11 § 20.

<sup>3</sup> See Thuret's excellent and convincing analysis *Études* 47 ff., from which Nussimbl should not have expressed par-

tial dissent in *Philologus* XXIX. 113—12 and in the critical edition. It requires correction in one important point only which does not affect the present question: see the note on III. 13. 12 (supra). Compare also Nussimbl *Comment. de Arist. Pol.* 23 ff (where however the last sentence of n. 19 should be reworded) and in part Sprungel *Arist. Stud.* III. 14.

<sup>4</sup> See again the note on III. 13. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Cp. the note on III. 11. 1.

<sup>6</sup> See on III. 13. 12 n. (supra).

in silence. The main point is that in the lacuna following 13 § 12, before § 6 (the proper place of which is between § 12 and § 13), a convenient place presented itself for a discussion declaring the true Aristocracy to be an unlimited democracy of none but competent men and ranking it above Polity (Πολιτεία)<sup>1</sup>; as in the latter the inferior capacity of the body of citizens leads to the introduction of a property qualification to ensure the election of none but men of special excellence as magistrates. Lastly, it is clear from cc. 14—17, that in the developed Greek state there is only one case where Aristotle admits monarchy, namely, when the monarch is superior in ability to all the rest taken together; and he assumes that only the citizens of the best state, all men of ability themselves, will accept such a monarchy. It becomes doubly difficult then, nay almost impossible, that such a case should ever occur. Still it remains just conceivable, and as long as this condition of things lasts the best state, instead of being an aristocracy, is, in this exceptional case, the only true monarchy: this then is the absolutely best constitution, superior even to Aristocracy<sup>2</sup>.

## VII. MONARCHY AND THE BEST STATE.

If the foregoing arguments are sound, the special theory of the constitution falls into three parts; the theory (i) of monarchy, (ii) of the best constitution, (iii) of the remaining constitutions. The first comprises Bk. III cc. 14—17, the second Bks. IV and V. (in the old order VII, VIII), the third the remaining three books.

Aristotle's conception of monarchy as explained above not unnaturally determines the very character of his discussion of it. This discussion has indeed come down to us in the utmost confusion, and appears somewhat defective: but even after a clear order of thought has been attained by means of various transpositions, the impression it makes upon us is, from the standing of our own political development and experience, highly unsatisfactory. The cause of this is not far to seek. The only true and proper monarchy which Aristotle from his point of view can recognise, is absolute monarchy: we may for the most part entirely concur in his objections to this form, and yet consider that, treated thus far, the subject has been by no means exhausted. In Aristotle's time the sole monarchies of any note which history had

<sup>1</sup> See the note last quoted.

<sup>2</sup> See VI (IV). 2. 2 with *nn.* (1136, 1137). If this premiss be granted, the unlimited rule of a person superior in

ability to all the others together, including even the best, must certainly be absolutely the best.

produced, except the Greek tyrannies, were despotism, as found in the huge empires of the east, and the so-called patriarchal kingship of the heroic age—the rule of a chief over a small clan and territory, over a Phœnician or Hellenic city-state or canton in prehistoric centuries. Even the rule of the Macedonian kings was, by him at least, regarded in no other light. For the small Greek state, which he keeps solely in view, monarchy is hardly deserving of much more consideration than as the imperfect historical starting-point of all subsequent development<sup>1</sup>. In the organism of the large modern state, absolute monarchy, where it has rightly understood its task, has actually helped to educate men for a reign of law under a constitutional monarchy. Nowhere else could this latter arise. The ancient state had not got so far as its very first condition, which is representation; and like all other political thinkers of antiquity even Aristotle, as was remarked above (p. 40), was as yet far removed from the faintest idea of this kind<sup>2</sup>. It was his too one-sided conception of the state as the exclusive means of educating men to mental and moral excellence that gave rise to his ideal state, and made him set ideal monarchy in it above ideal aristocracy, thereby declaring the form of government proper for intellectual minors to be the highest form for the most enlightened,—although, this being so, he can scarcely hide from himself its impossibility<sup>3</sup>. This however did not hinder him from seeking, by the adjustment of opposite forces, a further practical ideal amongst the degenerate constitutions in *Polity* (Πολιτεία) and so-called aristocracy. Here he has rightly pursued the thought of elevating the authority of the state above the strife of divergent interests; yet from the circumstances, the most effective realization of this thought in limited monarchy never came under his ken. He can finely describe the functions of the king<sup>4</sup>, but the real significance of this form of government is concealed from him: he gets no farther

<sup>1</sup> Spengel *Arist. Stud.* II. 57: "Βασίλεια is to Aristotle a historical tradition rather than a form with any further capacity for life in the mental development of his own nation;—and like all Greek philosophers and political writers he rarely notices any other. Thus he is careful to set forth in various *discussions* the difficulties involved in the practicability and proper limits of this government.<sup>5</sup> Our astonishment at this defective method of treatment, which first surprised Schlosser, hereupon ceases. Spengel put the question *Ueb. Arist. Pol.* 16—

<sup>2</sup> Did Aristotle conceive the theory of monarchy to be complete with the dis-

cussions of cc. 14—16? The way kings govern, their inner life, their influence on the people is quite lost sight of. This must be answered in the affirmative with one exception, to be afterwards mentioned p. 46, for which we can easily account. The ideal king, the preeminently best man, can have no instructions given him (c. 13 § 14, c. 17 § 2).

<sup>3</sup> And therefore far from any idea that true popular liberty thrives best under wisely limited monarchy.

<sup>4</sup> See the notes on III. 13 § 14 (601), § 25 (615).

<sup>5</sup> See Heukel *op. v.* 95. n. 25; also VIII (v). 10 §§ 9, 10 with n. (166).

than to base it exclusively upon personal merits<sup>1</sup>, so that no place is left for it in the practical ideal of mixed constitutions<sup>2</sup>. This inevitably causes an internal inconsistency in the work. According to his plan, the last three books ought to have treated exclusively of the remaining constitutions other than monarchy and pure aristocracy. But on the historical ground of revolutions and their prevention he cannot help treating of monarchy over again in Bk. VIII (v).

It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that nothing can be a greater mistake than the assertion, sometimes made of late, that in his ideal king Aristotle had his own pupil, Alexander, before his mind<sup>3</sup>. It may be surprising that the philosopher's relations with the court of Macedon failed so completely to influence his political theory, that he had no apprehension that he was living right at the close of Hellenic history, with its political development, its system of great and small states; but on the contrary saw nothing impossible in such a new development of a Greek city-state as his ideal constitution would present. But the fact that it is so cannot be altered by our astonishment and inability, with the means at our disposal, satisfactorily to explain it. This ideal of Aristotle's is in reality a small Hellenic city and not a large state like Macedon, which ceases to be a state (πόλις) in his sense of the term, and is no more than a race or nationality (ἔθνος), carrying out a policy of conquest and not, as he requires, a policy of peace. If then the ideal king is to arise only in the ideal state, he cannot be an Alexander. Once no doubt the thought flashes forth, IV (VII). 7. 3, that the Greeks united in one could conquer the whole world<sup>4</sup>. But to Aristotle the end of the state is, as we said, not the conquest of the world but something quite different; no longing for such a state

<sup>1</sup> See the *n.* on III. 13. 9; also VI (IV). 2. 2, VIII (v). I § 11 with *n.* (1503), 10 §§ 36, 37 *n.* (1708).

<sup>2</sup> Henkel *op. c.* 86.

<sup>3</sup> So Hegel *Gesch. d. Phil.* II. 401, Hildenbrand *op. c.* 426. Recently Oncken (*op. c.* I. 16 f., 188 f., II. 261 ff.) fancied he had discovered traces of Macedonian sympathies completely pervading the *Politics*. How unsuccessful this attempt was may be judged upon referring to Torstrik *Litt. Centralbl.* 1870 coll. 1177—1179; Henkel *op. c.* 89 *n.* (19), 97 *n.* (26); Bradley *op. c.* 179, 238 f.; Susemihl in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CIII. 1871. 133—139 (where too much is conceded to Oncken) and Bursian's *philol. Jahresber.* III. (1874—5). 376 ff.; or to the notes on III. 13 § 13 (601), § 25 (615); 14 § 15 (633); 17 § 5 (678): VI (IV). II § 19 (1303). The

last attempts to stamp Aristotle as a Macedonian partizan, made by Bernays *Phokion*, pp. 40—42 (Berlin 1881), and Wilamowitz *Antigonos von Karystos* 182 f., 185 f. (Berlin 1881), have not proved more fortunate; see Bursian's *Jahresber.* xxx. 1882. 11, 15 ff. Compare also Hug *Demosthenes as a political thinker* (*Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum* I. 51—103, Freiburg 1881), who goes still further than I do. Wilamowitz in a review of Hug (*Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 1882, col. 1081 f.) has already somewhat modified his position: see *Jahresber.* l.c. 18 f., where I have also explained why the passage IV (VII). 2. 11 (cp. the note) is still important for this question although the whole chapter, to which it belongs, is spurious.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. the note there (782).

of united Hellas, which would contradict all the rest of the *Politics*, is in the least discoverable in this passage.

On the subject of historical science Aristotle's notions are very defective: he is in truth still far removed from that 'which we ourselves have only learned to know within the last century, that which "Turgot and Lessing intended by the improvement and education of humanity, and Hegel defined as its organic development." He altogether mistook the true importance of labour, 'the mightiest lever in this process.' Yet it would be going too far to deny him all insight into the course of development of the Greek nation from the state of nature to the state of civilization, and from one grade of civilization to another, or into the features of this progress stamped upon the history of the Greek constitutions'. We are set right on this point by a brief but especially interesting part of the discussion on monarchy (III. 15 §§ 10—13), when taken in connexion with similar passages further on'. 'Aristotle has not simply observed for himself the career of the 'separate states; he knows that they have also a common constitutional history: that a definite order of polity belongs to an entire period: that the same development of mental culture, of social and military organisation, is accomplished all through a group of connected states and causes their political relations to assume an homogeneous form. And so he depicts with a few masterly strokes the chief stages of development through which the political world of Hellas passed'. The first development embraces the normal constitutions as far as Polity: the second, in another order, the degenerate forms as far as democracy: the former carrying us to restrained, and the latter to unrestrained, popular supremacy. The main character of both periods is republican. In the first of them Monarchy is only a starting-point, as has been said, for Aristocracy and Polity; in the second Tyranny is only a stage in the transition to Democracy'.

Any one who has followed the order of our work up to this point will be bound to admit that the description of the ideal Aristocracy, or the normal and absolutely best constitution, can now no longer be deferred. If so, then the two books containing it, which have come down to us as the seventh and eighth, should according to Aristotle's design follow directly as the fourth and fifth. Now the last chapter of Book III, c. 18, forms an immediate transition to this description, breaking off with an unfinished sentence, which is repeated in another

<sup>1</sup> Oncken II. 169, cp. 137 f.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. the notes on III. 14 § 12 (617), 15 § 11, § 12 (662), § 13 (663).

<sup>3</sup> Henkel *op. cit.* 94. But certainly this

description leaves much to be desired, as may be gathered from Oncken's remarks. Cp. also the notes on III. 15 §§ 11—13.

<sup>4</sup> Henkel *op. cit.* 96 f.

form at the beginning of the seventh book of the old order<sup>1</sup>, but with an apodosis here added and the sense complete as follows: 'He who would investigate wherein the best constitution consists *must first determine what is the best life*,'—since on Aristotle's view of the end of the state the one serves as an aid to the other<sup>2</sup>. And this circumstance loses none of its weight by the fact that this transition can hardly be by Aristotle himself, but by the author of the older edition. For even then it shows (see above, p. 17) that he at all events found the seventh and eighth books still arranged correctly as the fourth and fifth.

It can hardly be maintained that the discussion contained in the first chapter of the seventh or, more correctly, the fourth book, as to where that best and most desirable life, the life of happiness, is to be sought, is not by Aristotle: but while appropriate to his oral lectures, as was remarked above (p. 12), it is to all appearance very foreign to this written work<sup>3</sup>. And this is no less true of the treatment of a second preliminary question which follows in close connexion, in cc. 2 and 3 and the beginning of c. 4; namely, whether capacity in war or in peace is more desirable for the state, and in particular whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific inquirer is the happier for the individual. Further, the way in which this subject is settled or rather left unsettled is quite unlike Aristotle<sup>4</sup>. To the genuine Aristotle this is no preliminary question, but the really fundamental problem of his whole ideal of the state. The one side of it he has himself settled with the most desirable clearness when describing his ideal, IV (VII). 14. 10 ff., in such a way that he at the same time lays down the principles for the solution of the second and much more difficult question, which is really the cardinal problem of his whole practical philosophy. For here no less than in what follows<sup>5</sup>, as in the *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*<sup>6</sup>, he ranks the theoretical life above the life of practical politics, and yet he considers the individual to be merely one living member of that corporate body the state: and the reconciliation of this antithesis can only be found in a political life which itself regards the promotion of art and science as its highest and ultimate aim<sup>7</sup>. This

<sup>1</sup> In the text both versions will be found at the commencement of Book IV (VII).

<sup>2</sup> Cp. in particular Spengel *Ueb. Arist. Pol.* 17 ff., *Arist. Stud.* II. 60 (652) ff., and Susemihl in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCIX. 1869. 604 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See the notes on IV (VII). I § 2, § 10 (704), §§ 13, 14.

<sup>4</sup> See the notes on IV (VII). 2 §§ 3—6, § 11 (725), § 16 (729); 3 § 3, § 6 (741),

§ 8 (743), § 9 (745), § 10: 4 § 1.

<sup>5</sup> IV (VII). 15 §§ 8—10, V (VIII). c. 3, c. 5 § 4 with *nn.* (1023, 1024) §§ 12—14. Cp. the notes on IV (VII). 14 § 8 (903), 15 § 2 (921): V (VIII). 2 § 1 (977): also on c. 3 § 5 (991, 992), 5 § 10 (1032), and Excursus I upon Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>6</sup> See the passages quoted by Zeller II ii 614 n. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Cp. Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

is really the fundamental thought of Aristotle's ideal state, but we nowhere find it worked out; nor could the editor to whom we must attribute the section in question, cc. 2, 3. He would not else have attempted in his clumsy manner, unlike Aristotle's<sup>1</sup>, to solve the problem and fill up the lacuna which he had rightly perceived to exist. This circumstance shows then, either that Aristotle stopped short on the very threshold of his description of the ideal state, or else that his continuation of it, which has not come down to us, had disappeared remarkably early.

With the fourth chapter the outline of this best constitution really begins. Aristotle sets out with the external conditions, treating first of the natural conditions, of the land and the people (cc. 4—7); then of the social and socio-political conditions, the exclusion of the citizens from all work for a livelihood, the proper division of the soil, the proper qualifications and position of the cultivators, the regulations for the building of the city, its small towns and villages (cc. 9—12). Here at length begins the internal development of the best constitution: yet by the end of Bk. v (VIII). it has advanced no further than its first stage, the education of the boys, in the middle of which it comes to a dead stop, so that the third of the three questions proposed in the last chapter—namely whether melody or rhythm is of greater importance for the purposes of musical instruction—is never discussed at all, and the question what sorts of time are to be employed for the same purposes remains undecided<sup>2</sup>. We may at all events be thankful to fate for sparing us a section of the work, which is rich in interest for the science of education in all ages, though it fails to satisfy our curiosity as to the further organisation of the ideal state. Some compensation for the deficiency in this direction is afforded by many observations not merely, as has been said before, in Bk. II, but also in Bk. III. Thus in the latter we learn how this or that ought to be regulated in the state, or sometimes even how it should be in the best state or the best constitution, or in the Aristocracy<sup>3</sup>. And Aristotle's many previous intimations<sup>4</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> See the notes on IV (VII). 1 § 10 (703); 3 § 6 (717); 3 § 2 (736); II 3—10.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. the note on V (VIII). 7. 1 (1081). Even William of Moerbeke writes at the end of his translation: *restitutum huius operis in grece nondum inventi*. Of older scholars Conring in particular endeavoured to determine more accurately the parts missing; of the moderns more especially Hübnerbrand (op. c. 449 foll.), who at the same time refutes, most successfully in the main, the arguments by which others have in vain sought to show that the deficiency

does not exist or is at any rate unimportant. So too Zeller op. c. II ii 676 L., 736 ff. Compare further Spengel *Op. de Pol. des Arist.* 8 foll.

<sup>3</sup> See III. 1 §§ 9, 10 *nn.* (440, 441); 4 §§ 4, 5 *n.* (471); *n.* (490) *nn.* 3 § 16; 5 §§ 2, 3 *n.* (504); 5 § 5 *n.* (509); 7 § 3 *nn.* (536, 537); 11 §§ 8, 9 *n.* (569); 13 §§ 8, 9 *n.* (595); §§ 11, 12 *n.* (599); II 24, 25; 15 §§ 4—6, 9, 10; 16 §§ 2—12; 17 §§ 1, 21 c. 18 with the *nomoi*.

<sup>4</sup> I. 13, 15 with *n.* (116)—cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6 *n.* (285)—II. 9 § 1, 10 § 9 *n.* (308).

taken along with other considerations, give us at least partly to understand what portions are wanting.

When we consider the very high mission of culture with which Aristotle's ideal state is entrusted in the promotion of the sciences, and the preference which Aristotle expressly concedes to the education of the intellect over that of the character<sup>1</sup>, it is surprising that he takes up the whole of early education until the twenty-first year with gymnastic and military exercises, so as to leave no more than three years, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth, for all the other subjects of instruction<sup>2</sup>. Moreover one of them, music, is so limited that an influence upon the formation of character, or very little else, is all that is left to it<sup>3</sup>. Besides this, only reading, writing, numeration, and drawing are noticed; and this short course of three years will be wholly taken up with them. Hence we cannot look for more advanced scientific instruction, and even poetry can scarcely be employed for anything further than learning to read and write, or getting by heart lyric pieces to sing<sup>4</sup>. The exclusion of comedy, moreover, and of all connected kinds of poetry, from the domain of youth is expressly mentioned IV (VII). 17. 11; and the same holds of all music with a 'cathartic' effect, V (VIII). 7. 3 ff.<sup>5</sup>. On this analogy it can scarcely be doubted that the exclusion must be assumed to apply in general to all the kinds of poetry to which solely this sort of effect is ascribed by Aristotle, that is, to epos and tragedy<sup>6</sup> as well as to comedy: and that Aristotle wished to restrict attendance at the theatre and the recitals of the rhapsodes to grown-up persons, or at any rate not to allow them to young men until after their seventeenth year. Thus the use made of poetry for the education of the young in Aristotle's ideal state could hardly go beyond a mere chrestomathy from Homer, Hesiod, perhaps also from a few tragedies and easy prose writers, in learning to read and write. But Aristotle states, IV (VII). 15. 9, V (VIII). 3. 13, that the education of the body must form the commencement, while the moral education must advance within the soul, from "which we indirectly learn that a chapter on

IV (VII). 5 § 2; 10 § 10, § 14; 16 § 12; 17 § 12—cp. 17 § 5 § 7: V (VIII). 3 § 10—cp. 7 § 3; 6 §§ 15, 16. Cp. also the note on V (VIII). 2 § 2 (979). On II. 6 § 14, III. 3 § 6 foll. see below.

<sup>1</sup> See IV (VII). 14 § 8 foll. *n.* (903), 15 § 8 and generally the passages quoted on p. 48 *n.* 5.

<sup>2</sup> See V (VIII). 4 §§ 7—9 with Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>3</sup> See V (VIII). 5 §§ 4—7 with *nn.* (1024-5-7); § 15 foll. *nn.* (1044, 1045);

6 § 1 ff. *nn.* (1061-2-7-8, 1071-3); 7 § 3 ff. *nn.* (1086-7, 1098, 1104-5-9): also the Excursuses I, II, III, IV at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>4</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II ii 737 should be corrected by this.

<sup>5</sup> Cp. V (VIII). 6 § 9 with *n.* (1073); also *nn.* on 7 § 4 and Excursus V at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>6</sup> See the Introduction to my edition of the *Poetics* pp. 8 f., 15, 64 f.

'scientific education was intended to follow'. And the question, how far the 'higher' sciences are to be considered for educational purposes, is assuredly not proposed, v (viii). 2. 2, in order to remain unanswered. Lastly, in v (viii). 3. 10, a later investigation is expressly announced to decide whether one or more subjects should belong to the more refined training which aims at the highest intellectual satisfaction: but in the account which has come down to us we seek in vain for the fulfilment of this promise. On the other hand every direct influence in this direction is expressly excluded from the boys' education up to their twenty-first year, v (viii). 5. 4. Hence we may infer from his own words that Aristotle, like Plato<sup>1</sup>, intended a later training in the higher sciences for state purposes to follow this lower educational course<sup>2</sup>; and this would furnish the solution of the riddle<sup>3</sup>. Even as to the subjects of this higher instruction Aristotle can hardly have thought differently from Plato, except that perhaps he added poetry; Pure Mathematics, however, Astronomy, the Theory of Music, and lastly, for natures most scientifically endowed, Philosophy proper, were certainly the means of instruction enjoined. There is ample time for them, as the active duties of full citizens do not begin until military service is over, iv (vii). 9 § 5 f, 14 § 5; and no one will be eligible for a civil magistracy much before his fiftieth year, even if he enters the popular assembly earlier, 9 § 9 n. Thus their service in the army leaves the younger man leisure for scientific studies. Only Aristotle must have maintained, in opposition to Plato, that this extended course should be different for practical minds and for those whose bent is more towards theory; in order to make of the former officials for the state, and of the latter its men of science, who in other respects may, and indeed ought to rest satisfied with the fulfilment of their general civic duties<sup>4</sup>. In this particular Aristotle approached the modern idea of the state more nearly than any other ancient thinker. Yet when looked at in the light of his own premisses this solution of the problem cannot be said to be altogether happy. If in the best state the best man is to be at the same time the best citizen and statesman<sup>5</sup>; if moreover scientific activity

<sup>1</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II ii 737 n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> See *un. in* O. p. 21 (181), IV (90), 17. 15 (970).

<sup>3</sup> No previous enquirer has thought of this. Oncken alone felt the difficulty, but did not also see that with the means at our disposal the veil may be sensibly lifted. See next note.

<sup>4</sup> This disposes for the most part of Oncken's objections *op. c.* II 204 ff.

218 f. He does not see that it is only in the instruction in practical music and in gymnastic that Aristotle maintains a mean which must not be exceeded; he never says a word to the effect that in the sciences also one can learn too much: see Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. V (viii).

<sup>5</sup> See the note on IV (vii). 3. 8 (743).

<sup>6</sup> See III. c. 4 with the notes on § 1 (468), § 5 (471), § 16 (491); c. 5; 18 § 1:

is to be the higher, moral and practical excellence the lower, part of human virtue; then the only logical consequence is Plato's government by philosophers—which, taken in itself, Aristotle rightly rejects, II. 5. 25<sup>1</sup>.

The chapters on the education of the boys are incomplete: this theory of the subsequent higher training of our future citizens, as well as the discussion on female education which was expressly promised I. 13. 15 (cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6)<sup>2</sup>, is wanting. We lack too the entire regulations for the external life of children and adults whether men or women,—or in other words the whole of civic discipline; for Aristotle no less than Plato conceived the state to be an educational institution. As a necessary consequence, he took this discipline and moral guidance through the whole of life to be simply a continued course of education<sup>3</sup>, and both alike to be the proper field of state-activity. Almost all the other intimations of Aristotle, to which we find nothing corresponding in the execution, relate to this comprehensive subject. One special division which he mentions IV (VII). 16 §§ 12, 13, 17 § 12 (comp. 17 §§ 5, 7, 10), is the superintendence of the morals of the boys and their education under Inspectors (*παιδονόμοι*), officers appointed on the Spartan precedent<sup>4</sup>. They are to have their official quarters near the gymnasium for the young, IV (VII). 12. 5: to take care that no stories unseemly to their age are told to children even under five years of age, c. 17 § 5; and that they have as little as possible to do with the slaves, § 7. They have also to take precautions that no improper statues or pictures are exposed to view within sight of the children (§ 10), from whom even the paintings of a Pausanias with their comical and satirical exhibitions of what is low and hateful must be kept at a distance: V (VIII). 5. 21<sup>5</sup>. In this part of the work too we were to have been more precisely informed what habit of body in the parents is best adapted to give them healthy offspring<sup>6</sup>; whether comedies should be exhibited, and the recital of satirical poems (*e.g.* *ἱαμβοί*) allowed, and in what manner; perhaps also how far drinking

IV (VII). 7 §§ 1—3, 9 § 3 *n.* (808): 13 §§ 9, 10; 14 §§ 7, 8; V (VIII). 1 §§ 1, 2 *n.* (974): VI (IV) 7 § 2.

<sup>1</sup> See the note on II. 5. 25 (182): *Nic. Eth.* VI. 7. 7 (VI. 8 1144 b 14 ff.) *Metaph.* I. 1. 11 ff. (981 a 12 ff.).

<sup>2</sup> See the notes on both passages (126-7), (285).

<sup>3</sup> *Nic. Eth.* X. 9, 9, 1180 a 1 ff. This is not expressly stated in the *Politics*; but the same thought forms the basis of

the remarks in IV (VII). 12 §§ 4—6; 17 §§ 8, 9, as Zeller *op. c.* II ii 739 *n.* 4 rightly reminds us. Cp. *nn.* on IV (VII). 12 § 5 (863), 17 § 9 (962).

<sup>4</sup> See Schömann's *Antiquities of Greece* I. p. 248, Eng. trans. by Mann and Hardy (London, 1880. 8).

<sup>5</sup> See the notes on IV (VII). 12 § 5, 16 § 12, 17 § 5, § 10, § 12; V (VIII). 5 § 21.

<sup>6</sup> See on IV (VII). 16. 12.

parties of adults are to be countenanced, IV (VII). 17. 12<sup>1</sup>. Inspectors for the women (*γυναικοκόμοι*) are also mentioned along with the inspectors of boys as officials in aristocracies, VI (IV). 15. 13, VII (VI). 3. 23: they certainly ought not to be absent from the true Aristocracy<sup>2</sup>. We can hardly be wrong in assuming that on the decision of these two boards of officers the exposure or rearing of new-born infants depended<sup>3</sup>; and that for the purpose of maintaining the same fixed number of citizens they were authorized, nay were bound, to enforce abortion if necessary; II. 6. 10 ff., IV (VII). 16. § 15, § 17<sup>4</sup>.

This unalterable number of citizens is bound up with the equally unalterable number of inalienable and indivisible family properties, IV (VII). 10. 11, of which, as in Plato's *Laws*<sup>5</sup>, each citizen holds two, one near the town, and one further off in the country towards the boundaries of the territory. This indicates a second treatment of the same subject, comprising the more accurate discussion of property in general and of national wealth which was expressly promised, IV (VI). 5. 2; and here the propriety of the provisional definition of national wealth adopted in the passage just cited should have been submitted to a second and more detailed examination<sup>6</sup>. Here also a place would no doubt be found for explaining more fully the reasons promised IV (VII). 10 § 10, § 14, why Aristotle was induced to adopt *σοφίστα*; why it is better to promise and grant freedom to serfs and slaves as a reward for good conduct; together with the discussion of their general treatment announced in this passage<sup>7</sup>; also the consideration of the question postponed in II. 10. 9, as to what means it may be expedient to tolerate in order to prevent an increase of population beyond the limits fixed<sup>8</sup>.

But there is an explicit proof, that even the political organization of the ideal state was to be treated in detail. In one passage, II. 8. 25, the more precise solution of the question whether and under what conditions and at whose instance changes in the established laws are admissible is left over for further consideration<sup>9</sup>. What sort of restrictions Aristotle wished to introduce in this respect we cannot tell: it is only certain that, while he did not allow the popular assembly the initiative, he yet made every new law dependent upon their consent<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Zeller, *op. c.* II ii 739 n. 3, assumes a discussion on this last point to be promised. The context does not appear to me to warrant this: see the note there.

<sup>2</sup> See the notes there.

<sup>3</sup> The usage was somewhat different, though still analogous, at Sparta: see n. on IV (VII). 16. 15.

<sup>4</sup> See the notes there; also II. 7. 5 with n. (236).

<sup>5</sup> Cp. the notes on II. 6. 15, IV (VII). 10. 11.

<sup>6</sup> Cp. the note on IV (VII). 5. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Cp. the notes there.

<sup>8</sup> Cp. n. on II. 10. 9 (368).

<sup>9</sup> Cp. the note there, (378).

<sup>10</sup> Of course constitutional changes are not permissible if it is seriously meant that this constitution is in all points absolutely the best.

Moreover, the powers of the popular assembly were but limited even in this best of all communities, composed of men not under thirty-five<sup>1</sup> nor yet over seventy years of age. Apart from the election of magistrates they were not to extend much beyond the acceptance or rejection, without further debate or amendment, of treaties, and of peace or war, as previously determined upon and proposed by the senate and the highest magistrates<sup>2</sup>. Yet on the other hand popular courts of justice on the Athenian model were to decide charges brought against magistrates during the time of their accountability<sup>3</sup>. Equal in birth, in landed estate, in immunity from all remunerative or productive labour<sup>4</sup>, and in respect of a public education from their seventh year<sup>5</sup>, all citizens of this state enjoy equal rights. Any qualified citizen may, it seems, vote for any other for any magistracy, such a civic body being credited with the intelligence and good will to nominate to each branch of the government the persons most suitable on the ground of the distinctions in capacity and training which, in spite of equal circumstances, have manifested themselves<sup>6</sup>. But Aristotle certainly did not intend to leave undecided at what precise age the entrance upon full citizenship was to take place; nor again at what age men were superannuated, and upon retiring became priests, IV (VII). 9. 9, whereby almost entire leisure for science was secured to them in their old age<sup>7</sup>. The figures 50 and 70 which have been tentatively assumed will at least be not far removed from his view; and thus this governing civic body will be considerably in the minority when compared with the total number of citizens superannuated or not yet fully qualified, the boys, younger men, and the aged of the citizen order<sup>8</sup>. Only foreigners and resident aliens are allowed to engage in trade, industry, or manual labour: a pro-

<sup>1</sup> See *nn.* on IV (VII). 9 § 9, 16 § 9.

<sup>2</sup> This follows from II. II. 6, III. II. 8 *n.*, taken in connexion with the other passages quoted in Exc. IV at the end of Bk. II.

<sup>3</sup> This may be inferred from II. 12. 5, III. 11. 8: see notes there: also Exc. V at the end of Bk. II. But Aristotle might have required that the jurors in these courts should be elected instead of being chosen by lot; see II. 11. 7 *n.* (391).

<sup>4</sup> II. 9 § 2 ff., 11 § 10: III. 5 § 2 *n.* (504), § 3, § 5 *n.* (509): IV (VII). 9 § 1, § 3 f., § 9; 10 § 13; 12 § 4: V (VIII). 2 §§ 3—6 *n.* (982); 4 § 1 *n.* (1004); 5 § 8 *n.* (1028); 6 § 4 ff.; § 16; 7 § 1 with notes. Cp. also Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (VIII); *n.* on I. 11. 6 (103) with the passages there quoted.

<sup>5</sup> IV (VII). 17 § 7, and the note on § 4; § 15 *n.* (970): V (VIII). 3 § 13 *n.* (1003); 4 § 7 ff. and Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>6</sup> See I. 7 § 1 *n.* (58 b): III. 1 §§ 9, 10 *n.* (440, 441), 11 §§ 2 ff., 13 § 9 *n.* (595), 16 § 2 *n.* (672), § 13; 17 §§ 1, 2: IV (VII). 8 § 4; 9 §§ 7, 8; 13 § 9 *n.* (885), 14 § 5: VI (IV). 11 § 8: also II. 2 §§ 6, 7, and cp. the notes on II. 2. 4 (133) and III. 13. 12. Other passages seem to contradict this, as II. 2 § 2 ff. § 4 *n.* (133): III. 4 § 5 *n.* (471); 5 § 10; 6 §§ 1, 2; 7 §§ 1, 2; 15 §§ 8—10; 18 § 1: but see the notes: also *n.* on IV (VII). 9. 9.

<sup>7</sup> Because old men are no longer of service for government II. 9. 25. See the note there and on IV (VII). 9. 9 (816).

<sup>8</sup> Cp. *n.* on IV (VII). 9. 9 (817).

hibition which strikes a severe blow at the cultivation of the imitative arts, that is, at the fine arts<sup>1</sup>. The soil is to be cultivated by serfs who are not free, or at all events by vassals of non-Hellenic descent who are but half free<sup>2</sup>.

But, while emphatically not a conquering military power any more than a trading community, this state with its one aim of culture<sup>3</sup> makes the largest concessions possible in both these directions. It is to be a maritime state, IV (VII). 6. 1 ff.<sup>4</sup>, as well as, like Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, to exercise an hegemony; that is, to stand at the head of a more or less dependent confederation, in which union has been achieved, if necessary, with the edge of the sword<sup>5</sup>. In this way Aristotle thinks that the peculiar spirit and core of Athenian social and political life, that wonderfully noble union of manliness with culture, has been best preserved and promoted by a partial fusion with Spartan forms. He may even have counted on the tribute of the allies to fill the treasury. Otherwise it is not easy to see why, after the wise regulation that only a part of the soil should be broken up into family properties, the rest being reserved as domain land, only the expenditure upon public worship and the common messes, not that upon any other state function, is taken into account when he comes to deal with the revenue from this domain land, IV (VII). 9. 7. 'The messes (*συσσίτια*) 'are with Aristotle, as they were at Sparta<sup>6</sup>, at once common meals 'and military unions. Some of them are to be held in the guard-houses inside the city wall<sup>7</sup>. All boards of officials have their messes, 'each in its own official quarters: so, too, the priests; even the 'rangers and field-patrols in the country<sup>8</sup>. The rule of a common mess-table is binding on all collective members of the political body corporate<sup>9</sup>. In particular from them springs that voluntary communism which Aristotle praises in the Spartans<sup>10</sup>, and the entry into them was undoubtedly to begin with enlistment amongst the recruits at the age of seventeen<sup>11</sup>. Later on, but yet hardly before the training of these recruits is completed<sup>12</sup> with their twenty-first year<sup>13</sup>, they are also per-

<sup>1</sup> Even vocal and instrumental virtuosi in music are classed with manual labourers (*θέρμενοι*), V (VIII). 5 § 8, n. (1028) 6, § 4 ff., §§ 15, 16; 7 § 6: comp. Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>2</sup> IV (VII). 9 § 8, 10 § 13.

<sup>3</sup> ['Culture-state'; one which exists to promote the higher civilization: see p. 48. Tr.]

<sup>4</sup> Cp. notes on IV (VII). c. 6.

<sup>5</sup> See IV (VII). 14. 21 with n. (917).

<sup>6</sup> Cp. Schömann *op. c.* pp. 272, 279

Eng. tran., Tricher *op. c.* 1—26.

<sup>7</sup> IV (VII). 12. 1.

<sup>8</sup> IV (VII). 12 §§ 2, 7, 8.

<sup>9</sup> Oncken *op. c.* II. 198.

<sup>10</sup> II. 5. § 8, IV (VIII). 10. 9, op. II. § 15, 16, with notes, also the notes on II. 5 § 6 (136 b), § 7 n. (138): also VII (VI). 5. 10 with note.

<sup>11</sup> V (VIII). 4. 9, op. Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>12</sup> See on IV (VII). 17. 11 n. (926).

<sup>13</sup> IV (VII). 17. 13.

mitted to attend drinking-parties<sup>1</sup> and there to sing,—which under all other circumstances is strictly prohibited to adults<sup>2</sup>; further to visit the theatre and musical and poetical entertainments of all kinds<sup>3</sup>.

From the foregoing it is also clear now that the passages to which we are referred in II. 6 §§ 12, 13, are still extant<sup>4</sup>, but that more precise explanations ought to follow. Similarly the promise of future discussions upon the size of the town and the question whether it is essential that the citizens should be of the same descent, III. 3 § 6, is fulfilled as far as the first part is concerned in IV (VII). c. 4; but the second part was scarcely to be dismissed with merely the subsequent remark VIII (V). 3 § 11 f.; it was no doubt to be more thoroughly discussed in the examination of the absolutely best constitution<sup>5</sup>.

It appears to us, it was remarked before (p. 46), not so easy to understand how the resident alien of Stageira, the great realist, the friend of the Macedonian kings under whose spear the last energies of Greek life were bleeding away, was still Greek and Athenian enough to dream of the possibility that the 'nobility of mankind,' the Greek nation, had yet to wait for the future to produce its noblest race, who alone would be one day capable of creating this pattern state, IV (VII). c. 7. More intelligible, but all the more repulsive, is it to note how Aristotle sets about the propagation of this noblest of civic bodies, in true Spartan or Platonic fashion<sup>6</sup>, by tyrannical marriage-laws and matrimonial supervision and inhuman exposure of children, as if he were raising a breed of race-horses: to see the successful defender of the family and of property, who investigates with admirable profundity the moral nature of marriage<sup>6</sup>, at the same time hampering and almost stifling the free use of property and of the mental faculties, and destroying the healthy vital atmosphere of marriage. And this by measures which, as we have said (p. 34), go far beyond those of Plato in the *Laws*, by fixing a normal number of children which the whole body of citizens are permitted to have and sanctioning abortion in order to secure that the number is never exceeded.

#### VIII. THE PATHOLOGY OF THE EXISTING CONSTITUTIONS.

The opening words of the sixth book—Bk. IV. in the old order—are in their most suitable connexion when following directly upon the

<sup>1</sup> IV (VII). 17. 11.

<sup>2</sup> V (VIII). 5 § 8, 6 § 4 with notes: cp. *n.* on IV (VII). 17. 11 (966). No weight can be given to V (VIII). 7. 13 f., as the passage is conjectured to be spurious;

see *n.* (1113).

<sup>3</sup> IV (VII). 17. 11.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. *n.* on II. 6. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Cp. *n.* on III. 3. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Cp. Exc. I at the end of Bk. II.

description of the ideal state. The task of Politics, we read, is not simply confined to an examination of the absolutely (*ἀπλῶς*) best constitution. It equally includes the determination of what is best on the average (*ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι*); and of the best constitution under the given circumstances (*ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*), or in other words the best for a given people or a given population. If finally it happens that even this last is out of the question, political science has to treat of the best possible form of some worse constitution; and hence must investigate all possible species and even sub-species of constitutions. The third book, for example, spoke of democracy and oligarchy; this is now corrected by the statement that there are several subordinate varieties of both. But while those fundamental distinctions of the third book are again resumed, we are expressly told in c. 2 that the first problem has already been solved by an account of the absolutely best constitution, or, what is the same thing, of monarchy and aristocracy proper; thus only the remaining normal constitutions and their corruptions have still to be discussed. The order in which these stand is as follows: mixed or so-called Aristocracies<sup>1</sup>, Polity (*Πολιτεία*), Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny<sup>2</sup>. The problems to be solved are as follows; to determine (1) how many subordinate kinds of constitutions there are; (2) what is on the average the best constitution; (3) for what different sorts of people the different forms are adapted; (4) how we ought to set to work in regulating each form of democracy and of oligarchy; and, last of all, (5) what are the causes which overthrow and the means to preserve the various constitutions. Thus, first of all, we here find from Aristotle himself an express corroboration of the view that the seventh and eighth books (old order) came fourth and fifth in the work as he wrote it; and in c. 7 § 2, he once more repeats the same declaration, that the absolutely best constitution discussed in those books alone deserves to be called Aristocracy in the strict sense of the word, just as the interpolator of c. 3 § 4, refers to this part of the work under the name of the "discussions on Aristocracy" (*ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας*), and so must still have had the original order before him. In the next place the order given in the above arrangement is adhered to most strictly in the exposition which follows.

For setting aside c. 3 and c. 4 §§ 1—19, which certainly do not contradict this procedure, but, as was just remarked, can hardly<sup>3</sup> be by

<sup>1</sup> *αἱ δευτερεύουσι ἀριστοκρατίαι* VI (IV). 9, 10; see note on VI (IV). 2, 4.

<sup>2</sup> See the note on VI (IV). 1, 4 (1116).

<sup>3</sup> See the notes on VI (IV). 3 § 1, § 2,

§ 4 (1154), § 8; 4 § 1, § 4 (1164), §§ 5, 6, § 8 (1176), § 12 (1182, 1183), § 13 (1183), § 15 (1187), § 17 (1189), §§ 19, 20.

Aristotle himself, there is, first, an enumeration (1) in c. 4 §§ 20—31 of the four varieties of Democracy and at the beginning of c. 5, §§ 1—3, of the four varieties of Oligarchy passing from one resembling Polity to one which approaches Tyranny; then, c. 6, it is shown why there can only be four varieties for each of these two constitutions: next follows a discussion of mixed or spurious Aristocracy in its two varieties, when mixed with democratic and oligarchical, or merely with democratic elements, c. 7; cc. 8, 9, treat of the constitution most nearly allied to this last, Polity (Πολιτεία) or equal combination of Oligarchy and Democracy; and c. 10 of Tyranny and the forms in which it blends with Monarchy. Then (2) c. 11 presents Πολιτεία in its character as the rule of the well-to-do middle class, as the best constitution on the average. The next investigation (3) breaks off unfinished in § 5 of c. 12<sup>1</sup>: the passage which follows (12 § 6, 13 § 1—11), i.e. all the following chapter except § 12, does not belong to this subject but to the regulation of Polity: had it been more correctly edited it would have been worked into c. 9 to which I would transpose it. Only one circumstance is out of harmony: in the order which has come down to us, (5) the theory of revolutions and the safeguards of constitutions does not come last of all, but takes up the whole of (old) Bk. v; while (4) the regulation of the different forms of Democracy and Aristocracy does not appear till the first four chapters of (old) Bk. vi. The last three chapters of (old) Bk. iv, cc. 14—16, are taken up with fundamental considerations of a general kind on the regulation and organization of all possible constitutions, except Monarchy, Tyranny, and true Aristocracy, according to each of the three authorities in the state. Thus the deliberative or decreeing body is treated in c. 14, the administrative body or the organisation of the officials and magistrates in c. 15, the judicial power in c. 16. In accordance with this it has been proposed to transpose the (old) Sixth Book before the (old) Fifth, so that the former becomes the (new) Seventh and the latter the (new) Eighth: and this order has been followed in the text<sup>2</sup>. If it is right

<sup>1</sup> See the note there, (1315).

<sup>2</sup> Hildenbrand *op. c.* p. 372 ff. defends the received order here by saying that Aristotle intended to lay down in VI (iv). cc. 14—16 the elements of the constitutions and then in the first place in Book v of the old order, went on to describe their practical working, because upon this depends the right combination of the elements which follow in the (old) Book vi. Zeller on the other hand *op. c.* 11 ii 675 ff., evidently with the right view that thus to

interlace questions (4) and (5) directly contradicts Aristotle's express announcement above, makes this whole announcement refer only to the contents of Books IV and V of the old order: in these two books Aristotle, as he thinks, gives a complete discussion of the theory of the imperfect constitutions with regard to their general underlying principles; in the (old) Book VI he adds a more special exposition. I have explained in the *Fahrh. f. Philol.* CI. 1870. 343—346, 349 f. why

it must certainly be assumed that the four references back to the (old) Fifth Book which we find in the (old) Sixth do not, at least in their present form, belong to Aristotle, but at the earliest to the author of the later edition which has come down to us. One of them, VII (VI). 4. 15, is in fact so little suited to its context that it at once proclaims itself to be a spurious insertion<sup>1</sup>. Two of the others, VII (VI). 1 § 1 and 1 § 10, may be removed, at least without much harm, on the same grounds<sup>2</sup>. But the fourth, VII (VI). 5. 2, is so firmly embedded in the context that there is no resource but to assume that the interpolator has changed the future, which Aristotle himself used here, into the past<sup>3</sup>; an assumption quite as possible for the third passage as that of an interpolation<sup>4</sup>. The two parts of the work thus moved into immediate proximity—the three concluding chapters of Bk. VI (IV) and the first seven chapters of Bk. VII (VI)—then become the general and particular parts of the same discussion<sup>5</sup>. But we miss the account, promised at the beginning of Bk. VII (VI), of the possible combinations which may arise when in one and the same state the several political authorities are regulated according to the principles of *different* constitutions, VII (VI). 1. 3 f.<sup>6</sup> Nor is this the only defect. In the eighth and last chapter of Bk. VII (VI) the theory of the organization of the executive still remains a rough sketch, not yet worked out in detail. It certainly brings to a real solution a part of the questions merely proposed or mentioned provisionally in VI (IV). c. 16<sup>7</sup>; but it contributes hardly anything towards a more thorough solution of a problem expressly mentioned there VI (IV). 15 § 14, as not yet satisfactorily solved; namely a discussion of the differences between magistrates in different constitutions; while it omits altogether any mention of the influence of the various departments of public business on the mode of election to different offices, which was also expressly promised there, VI (IV). 15. § 22<sup>8</sup>. But these are inconsiderable defects, and if on the transposition

I cannot accept this solution: the main points of my explanation will be found with some modifications in the notes on VI (IV). 2 § 5 (1143), § 6 (1144).

<sup>1</sup> See the note there (1124).

<sup>2</sup> Only in the latter passage the  $\alpha\delta$  which follows must be changed into  $\delta\delta$ , or else the whole of the following clause  $\alpha\iota\tau\eta\delta\epsilon\ \rho\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\iota\kappa\eta\sigma\alpha\iota\ \dots\ \lambda\epsilon\gamma\omega\mu\epsilon\iota$  expunged.

<sup>3</sup> See the note there, and Spengel *Excerp. de Politic.* 36 ff.

<sup>4</sup> In that case the change of  $\delta\delta$  into  $\alpha\delta$ , slight as it is, will be unnecessary.

<sup>5</sup> See the note on VI (IV). c. 6 (1144). Oncken, *op. c.* II. 253, thinks these seven

chapters contain nothing but repetitions of propositions enlarged upon long before; but this statement is not proved, and is quite incorrect.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. the deliberative body and the election of magistrates on aristocratical, the lawcourts on aristocratical, principles. Cp. the last note (1148) at the end of Bk. VII (VI).

<sup>7</sup> Cp. upon this point the more precise explanation in the note on VI (IV). 15. 1 (1143).

<sup>8</sup> Oncken, *l.c.* complains of the way in which this sketch, modelled in its main features on the organization of the Athenian

proposed this book, VII (VI), no longer forms the conclusion of the discussion on imperfect forms of the state it will be most obvious to treat them like other spaces left blank in the course of, and not at the end of, principal sections: where we have more reason to conjecture subsequent losses than to infer that the execution on Aristotle's own part was deficient.

For the highly artistic construction of Book VIII (V) it will be sufficient to refer to the *Analysis*; on the transpositions necessary even in this book, as well as on the spurious passages in all the books, to the *Commentary*<sup>1</sup>. It would be superfluous to commend to the thoughtful reader the ripe political wisdom shown in the account of the forms of government actually established; and this eighth book in particular preeminently reveals the statesman<sup>2</sup>. In his picture of the despot of the shrewder type who skilfully copies the genuine king, VIII (V). 11. 17—34, it really looks as if he had anticipated with prophetic eye the second French Empire and the third Napoleon. Can these precepts on despotism (τυραννίς) have actually been read by the latter and turned to account? That question no one perhaps is in a position to answer.

There is yet another fact which quite apart from this may be emphasized here. As Teichmüller especially has shown<sup>3</sup>, Aristotle recognised even in his day the importance of the influence which the mode of life and the social relations of a nation exercise upon the form of its political development and of its constitution. Yet Zeller's remarks<sup>4</sup>, that he nevertheless does not speak of civil society as distinct from the state, and that the different principles of classification which he assigns for the forms of government will not quite blend into a unity, appear to be by no means completely answered by Teichmüller's explanations. It is true that in III. 5. 9 ff., IV (VII). 7 f., Aristotle draws a definite distinction between social relations and the political relations proper which

government, follows without any introduction upon what precedes. This is quite true, but he appears to overlook ἅμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἴ τι λοιπόν, οὐ χεῖρον ἐπισκέψασθαι in the announcement of the contents VII (VI). 1. 1, which points to a supplement with such additions; since in the execution it is the first four chapters that answer to the following words καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἐκάστην, but in reverse order. That the whole book is 'a regular medley of 'motley elements, which, although perhaps of the same date, certainly never 'stood in the same original connexion'

is therefore (see p. 59 *n.* 5) an ungrounded assertion. See the note on VIII (VI). 1. 2 (1379 b).

<sup>1</sup> [See also below, pp. 93 ff.]

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Hildenbrand *op. c.* 469—486; Zeller *op. c.* II ii 750; Oncken *op. c.* II. 241—252; Henkel *op. c.* 91; Van der Rest *op. c.* 519 ff.

<sup>3</sup> In *Die aristotelische Eintheilung der Verfassungsformen* 12 ff (St Petersburg 1859. 8). Compare the review by Sussemihl *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CIII. 1871 p. 137 sqq., from which is taken all of importance in what follows.

<sup>4</sup> *op. c.* II ii 699, 705 foll., 749.

in various ways depend upon them: VI (IV). 4 §§ 20—22, 6 §§ 1—3, 12 § 2; VII (VI). 4 §§ 1—3, 8—14; *ep.* III. 12 § 7 f.; IV (VII). *cc.* 8, 9; VI (IV). *cc.* 3, 4. But he nowhere attributes to the former independent importance, or a separate province of their own: they are generally regarded only as the condition which is requisite in order that the life of the state may take this or that form. But this leaves the distinction imperfect. In general, where Aristotle discovers a new conception he also coins his own term for it, or at any rate remarks that there is as yet no appropriate word for it in Greek. But here, in keeping with this imperfection, there is no such remark with reference to civil society; but, as Teichmüller<sup>1</sup> himself quite rightly observes, the word 'city' or 'state' (πόλις) is sometimes used in a narrower sense to exclude the merely social elements, sometimes with a wider meaning to include them. Further, the distinction of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity, and so also amongst the degenerate forms, that of Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy, merely according to the number of the rulers (III. 7. 2 f.), is certainly only provisional. Immediately afterwards (III c. 8, see above p. 38) it is described as something merely accidental in the case of Democracy and Oligarchy, which in the extreme case might even be absent, the real ground of the distinction being poverty and wealth. Indeed later on the mere distinction in number is, in the case of Aristocracy and Polity, completely abandoned. Even in the ideal Aristocracy the whole civic body rules itself; and although here, as was remarked above (p. 54), the real governing body of fully qualified citizens forms a minority of the whole number, yet one can see no reason why in a spurious Aristocracy the actual civic body must necessarily be a smaller number than in a Polity. Thus the only normal constitutions proper that remain are ideal Monarchy and ideal Aristocracy, see VI (IV). 7 § 2, 8 § 1; spurious Aristocracies and Polity only occupy the place of intermediate or transitional forms between the normal constitutions and their corruptions. The so-called Aristocracies are said to be mixed forms combining aristocratic with democratic elements or both with Oligarchy, VI (IV). 7 § 4, 8 § 9; why there should not also be among them combinations of aristocratic and oligarchical elements<sup>2</sup> without democratic admixture, is not quite clear. Polity appears as a mixture of Oligarchy and Democracy: if this is the case, both these extremes, to which it is intermediate, must be considered to be perverted forms of it, instead of Oligarchy being a corruption of Aristocracy and Democracy of Polity, as was said at first (III. 7. 1 foll.) and again repeated VI (IV). 8. 1. There are however even later passages

<sup>1</sup> *L. c.* 14 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See the note on VI (IV). 7. 4 (1038).

in which Oligarchy is defined as a corruption of Aristocracy; and his qualification of prevailing views, that it is the rule of the rich rather than of the minority, is in some measure ignored VIII (v). 7. 1.<sup>1</sup> In Polity then no aristocratic element is recognised; for the principle of Aristocracy is virtue or superior excellence<sup>2</sup>, while the only excellence discoverable in Polity is superiority in war; III. 7. 4, comp. VI (IV). 13. 7 foll.<sup>3</sup> This is just what Aristotle censures in Sparta, II. 9. 34 f., IV (VII) 14 § 15 ff. (cp. 2 § 9); and consequently he ought not to have reckoned the Spartan constitution, as he does, with spurious aristocracies, but with Polities. But on the other hand how should Polities be counted amongst normal constitutions of even the second rank unless a certain excellence of the citizens was also required in them? Or is the public education, for which Sparta is praised, v (VIII). 1. 4<sup>4</sup>, to make the difference? But there was nothing of the sort at Carthage, and yet Aristotle classes the constitution there with aristocracies and not with Polities<sup>5</sup>. Again, the rule of the majority and of the minority is represented as quite indispensable to the notions of oligarchy and democracy, VI (IV). 4 §§ 5, 6; while in VIII (v). 7 §§ 5—9, VI (IV). 7 § 4, 8 § 3 ff., Aristotle is made to adopt—at one moment to adopt and then at the next to contradict—a view which is altogether incompatible with such definitions, viz. that the mixed constitutions which incline more to democracy should be called Polities, and those which incline more to oligarchy, Aristocracies<sup>6</sup>. Such inconsistencies would certainly be too glaring even for a far less able thinker. They are not made a whit more intelligible by the fact that the conception of Oligarchy oscillates somewhat between a government of wealth, of birth, and of a minority: on the contrary they bear the clearest marks of interpolation<sup>7</sup>. But further: the best of the four varieties of democracy is a departure from Aristotle's conception of democracy, the government of the rich by the poor, for it represents both as sharing the government equally, VI (IV). 4. 22. Even the conception of a degenerate constitution as government in the interest of the governors is not at all applicable here, if we follow the description given in VII (VI). 4 §§ 1—7, nor yet in the case of the best and most moderate oligarchy. Thus both should be reckoned

<sup>1</sup> See note there, and on VIII (v). 7. 6 (1599).

<sup>2</sup> See the note on III. 7. 3 (536).

<sup>3</sup> See the note on III. 7. 4 (538).

<sup>4</sup> So *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 3, 1102 a 10 f., X. 9. 13, 1180 a 29 ff.

<sup>5</sup> VI (IV). 7 § 4, II, VIII (v). 7 § 4 and also perhaps 12 § 15. In II. 11 § 5 the expression is more hesitating.

<sup>6</sup> It is a strange misconception of Oncken's *op. c.* II. 236 f., to attribute the propositions contained in VI (IV). 8 §§ 3, 4 to Aristotle himself, whereas in fact the whole chapter is written to refute them.

<sup>7</sup> See the notes on VI (IV). 4 § 4 (1164); 7 § 4 (1238): VII (VI). 27 (1402): VIII (v). 7. 6 (1599).

amongst the normal constitutions of the second class: and even the second and third varieties of oligarchy would have to be included with them as forming the lowest types of normal constitutions; since they are still governed by the laws, and so are constitutional, not arbitrary, governments<sup>1</sup>. It is surprising how Teichmüller<sup>2</sup> could overlook the fact that on his own showing, the social element—whether the predominating employment is agriculture and cattle-rearing, or trade and industry, or something intermediate, the pursuit of both equally—only suffices to distinguish three varieties of democracy, so that Aristotle is obliged to take other points of view in order to make out four. In the case of oligarchy the distinction, which Aristotle certainly makes, between the rich nobles and merchants or manufacturers who have made money, does not come into consideration to mark the distinction which he draws between the four varieties of this constitution. In place of it we have merely the ever increasing growth of wealth and its accumulation in fewer and fewer hands, and here again in the account which Teichmüller<sup>3</sup> himself gives of these varieties this is precisely the case. In the whole scheme of the successive grades of constitutions from the Ideal Monarchy downwards, through the genuine and spurious Aristocracies, Polity, first Democracy, first Oligarchy, &c., down to the most extreme Democracy, then the most extreme Oligarchy (government by Dynasts)<sup>4</sup>, and finally Tyranny, (this being the ultimate stage of development<sup>5</sup>), there is no place where the historical forms of the monarchy could be fitted in. Lastly, from what precedes it is seen that the early and provisional statement of the relation of the constitutions to one another, III. c. 7, has not simply been modified by the further course of the discussions, but that in the end hardly any part of it is left standing; so that it may well be asked whether under these circumstances Aristotle was justified in putting it forward even provisionally. No doubt all these vacillations, inequalities, and contradictions, affect the husk rather than the core of Aristotle's political theory: indeed a certain portion of them are by no means to be regarded as actual mistakes. The main supports of this political system are, that the unqualified principle of democracy and the absolute principle of oligarchy, the latter more even than the former, introduce the same sort of arbitrary government, which comes to a head in Tyranny—that a good middle class is the foundation of a healthy political life: and

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Oncken *op. cit.* II. 252, who however is not altogether right; he goes too far in maintaining that hence under certain conditions an oligarchy does not differ from an aristocracy, nor a demo-

cracy from a polity.

<sup>2</sup> *op. cit.* 18 f.

<sup>3</sup> *op. cit.* 20 f.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.* on II. 10. 13.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.* on VI. (IV.) 11. 33 (1291).

their strength has outlasted the storms of centuries. Poets like Phocylides and Euripides (the latter with a political intention), had, it is true, sung the praise of the middle class<sup>1</sup>; 'but Aristotle is the first thinker who makes the functions of the middle class in society and in politics the foundation of his practical political theories, and of his explanation of political history. His love of the mean in all things is nowhere so systematically and so consistently carried out as here<sup>2</sup>.' He forcibly depicts the equalizing force of the well-to-do middle class and the permanence of the constitution where it is most strongly represented, that is, Πολιτεία. The next best condition is one where it is at least as strong as one of the two contending extremes, rich and poor, and thereby is enabled to stave off the decisive victory of either. Even then it is possible to maintain, according to circumstances, either another Polity, or at least a law-abiding and moderate Democracy or Oligarchy, as the case may be. But where the middle class is weaker than either separately a perpetual struggle prevails between the two extremes, with never-ending revolutions, 'and the end is the fatal exhaustion of both: while Tyranny succeeds to their inheritance<sup>3</sup>.'

But the more essential the part played by Polity in the philosopher's political system, the more surprising does it appear that his remarks on this form of government cannot be combined in all their details into a consistent whole, a complete picture which shall be quite distinct. At one time he represents it as being in accordance with an aristocracy and a 'polity' to fill all offices by election, without a property qualification; in the case of polity, therefore, by no higher qualification than is generally requisite here for actual citizenship VI (IV). 9. 5. At another time however the application of the lot, either alone or accompanied by election with restriction of the right of voting or being voted for, VI (14). 15 § 19 f, is said to be characteristic of Polity. This contradiction may not be so important perhaps as at first sight appears<sup>4</sup>; yet we are all the more surprised to find in the same chapter the restriction of the popular assembly to the mere election of the council and the magistrates represented as characteristic of Polity, VI (IV). 14 § 10<sup>5</sup>, and then to hear (§ 15) that usually in Polities the resolutions of the popular assembly may be annulled by the council and the questions which they affect brought before the former assembly again and again, until it passes a resolution conformably<sup>6</sup>. In the same place exactly the opposite procedure is recommended as more just, and that, too, for Democracy:

<sup>1</sup> See *n.* on VI (IV). II. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Oncken *op. c.* II. p. 225.

<sup>3</sup> Oncken *op. c.* II. 227, 228.

<sup>4</sup> See the note on VI (IV). 15. 21

(1371).

<sup>5</sup> See *n.* on VI (IV). 9. 5 (1255).

<sup>6</sup> See *n.* on VI (IV). 14. 15 (1340).

thus then the latter, by adopting it, would become even better than the ordinary Politics. Must we here recognise another of those additions whereby the school obscured the master's work? Who again can fail to be surprised at the great concession which is made to unqualified popular rule and paid democracy, VI (IV) 9 § 2, 13 § 5, when Aristotle states that the combination of the two measures, payment of the poor for attendance in the popular assembly the council and the law-courts, and punishment of the rich for their non-attendance, is appropriate to Polity? It may be that he is thinking only of those Politics in which the middle class is not numerous enough to maintain a decided preponderance as compared with the two extreme parties, where consequently its deficiency must be artificially made good in this way<sup>1</sup>. But this, to say the least, has never been expressly mentioned by Aristotle<sup>2</sup>, and there is all the more reason to hold<sup>3</sup>, that in the end he has approximated, much more than he himself believes, to unqualified government by the people, and that his Πολιτεία is nothing but Attic democracy without its unfavourable side. Aristotle himself remarks, III. 15. 13, that when once states have grown more populous and cities increased in size it is not easy to call into life any constitution except a democracy; and in VII (VI). 5 §§ 5, 6, that since then even the older moderate patriarchal democracy of peasant proprietors has come to an end. It is a result that he laments, but he is aware that it is unalterable. All that remains is so to shape the most advanced democracy itself that it may lose as far as may be its arbitrary, despotic character and wear the appearance of something like Πολιτεία. This may be done by regulating for the advantage of all the system of payment, which cannot be altogether avoided here, and by checking the demagogues in their practices of vexatious accusations. The detailed proposals which Aristotle makes in this direction VII (VI), 5 §§ 3—8, 6 § 4; VIII (V). 8. 15 ff, 9 §§ 5—11 ff, prove his lively interest in this question. Oncken<sup>4</sup> has well said: "Either renounce freedom and equality, that is, the essential nature of the constitutional state in Hellas, and give up the community to the despotic rule of violent oligarchs; or make the whole civic body legislators and judges, summon the rich to take honorary magistracies, compensate the poor for the service of watching over them. It was

<sup>1</sup> The practical proposals in VI (IV). 14 §§ 11—12, which Kröner refuses to attribute to Aristotle, would certainly not be missed, if omitted altogether.

<sup>2</sup> As Oncken thinks *op. cit.* II. 239.

<sup>3</sup> Nor can it be inferred from the following words in VI (IV). 13. § 7 on the amount of the property qualification in

the Polity, to which Oncken appeals, if these words are rightly taken—see the note there (1269); and on 9 § 3 (1254).

<sup>4</sup> With Oncken *op. cit.* II. p. 240, though his assertions require considerable modification in accordance with what is stated in II. 4 on p. 41.

<sup>5</sup> *op. cit.* II. 259, 260.

“the only alternative which could be found. This once conceded, even  
 “an opponent could not deny that the embodiment of the Athenian  
 “spirit in Athens was without parallel in Hellas. With all its failings  
 “it was the only state in which the political idea of the Hellenes at-  
 “tained to complete expression, the community in which dwelt the  
 “heart and soul of the Hellenic race ; with whose power and liberty the  
 “national life of Hellas became extinct. With deep dislike Aristotle  
 “watches the great multitude in this mighty city reigning and ruling  
 “like an all-powerful monarch ; few there are whose observation traces  
 “the mischiefs of its constitution so clearly to their causes. But the  
 “idea of this state conquered even him. He investigated, observed,  
 “described<sup>1</sup> Athens, its history and its organization, as no one ever  
 “did before him. The study which he devoted to it was the only  
 “homage which he voluntarily paid it: no word of acknowledgment  
 “escapes him. But throughout it receives from him involuntary hom-  
 “age, since it is the only state whose actual life he could or did take  
 “as a model for his own political design. He imagined himself stand-  
 “ing as a physician at a sick bed ; but the patient revealed, what no  
 “healthy subject could teach him, the very idea of the Hellenic state.”

#### IX. DATE OF THE WORK AND ITS ASSUMED CONNEXION WITH THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

“There are notices in the *Politics* of the Sacred War, VIII. (v). 4. 7,  
 “as of something in the past ; of Phalaecus’ expedition to Crete, which  
 “took place at the end of it, Ol. 108, 3 (B.C. 346)<sup>2</sup>, as a recent event,  
 “νεωστὶ πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, II. 10. 16 : lastly, of  
 “the assassination of Philip (B.C. 336), VIII. (v). 10. 16<sup>3</sup>, without any  
 “intimation that it had but very lately happened<sup>4</sup>.” On the other hand  
 the passage II. 10. 16 appears to have been written before B.C. 333<sup>5</sup>.  
 The *Politics* as a whole must have been written later than the *Nico-*  
*machean Ethics*, which is quoted six times, II. 2 § 4 ; III. 9 § 3, 12 § 1 ;  
 IV (VII). 13 §§ 5, 7 ; VI (IV). 11. 3<sup>6</sup>, and earlier than the *Poetics* which is  
 announced as to follow in V (VIII.) 7. 3<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> In his *Constitution of Athens* in the *Πολιτεῖαι*: see above, p. 35 n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. XVI. 62.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. the note there (1673).

<sup>4</sup> Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 154 n. (4).

<sup>5</sup> See the note there (375).

<sup>6</sup> See *nn.* on these passages.

<sup>7</sup> Cp. the Introduction to my edition of

the *Poetics*, p. 11 f. Heitz’ objection (in *Die verlorenen Schriften* 99 ff.) there mentioned in n. 2 on p. 12 has in the meantime been answered in detail by Vahlen *Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad.* LXVII. 1874. 293—298: he has made it tolerably certain that the chapter on *κάθαρσις* in question, which is now lost,

It must indeed be admitted, and has already occasionally been pointed out above, that a part of the inconsistencies in the work were, from Aristotle's general position, inevitable, nay even characteristic; that on the most careful revision he would never have detected them. Others again are such as might easily have escaped his notice. Yet after all, enough inconsistencies repetitions and other discrepancies remain<sup>1</sup> to compel the inference that not only did Aristotle never give the finishing touches to this work, but that he must have been a long time over it, taking it up at intervals and with many interruptions through other works. In consequence of this he had altered his views on many points, and had not always the details of the earlier portions fully present to his mind when he came to write the later ones. The view here taken would be materially confirmed if the larger sections which are wanting were never really written, the work never having been completed as a whole.

It will be hardly possible to substantiate a well-grounded objection to the Aristotelian origin of the six citations of the *Ethics*<sup>2</sup>, and yet that work itself<sup>3</sup> calls the theory developed in it not *Ethics* but *Politics*, and the same title is confirmed by passages of the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*<sup>4</sup>. For the intermediate expression of the *Rhetoric* (I. 4. 5, 1359 b 10 L), ἡ περὶ τὰ ἥθη πολιτικὴ, is here our guide, by making *Ethics* and *Politics* in the narrower sense appear as parts of *Politics* in the wider sense. The matter is thus stated with perfect correctness by the author of the *Magna Moralia* at the commencement of his work<sup>5</sup>, and Aristotle himself explains in the last chapter of the *Ethics* that a full realization of the principles laid down in it can only be expected from political education and legislation.

stood at the conclusion of the whole treatise after the discussion on Comedy, and not where I looked for it. Yet my remarks *loc. cit.* p. 8 still retain their force.

<sup>1</sup> Comp. the notes on Bk. II. 4 § 4 (149); § 5 § 1, 2 (153), § 14 (164); 6 § 15 (215), § 18 (220); 10 § 8 (366):

Bk. III. 4 § 5 (471), § 9 (478):

Bk. IV (VII). 13 § 4 (872), § 8 (881); 14 § 6 (899):

Bk. V (VIII). 3 § 6 (993), § 11 (1000); 3 § 4 (1024), § 15 (1041); 6 § 14 (1079):

Bk. VI (IV). 1 § 7 (1124-5) 1 4 § 3 (1140), § 5 (1143); 4 § 21 (1194, 1198), § 21 (1199-1201), § 24 (1203), § 27 (1204); 6 § 4 (1223); 7 § 1 (1230 b); 9 § 9 (1262); 14 § 3 (1281), § 9 (1283), § 10 (1284), § 13 (1287), § 14 (1288); 15 § 10 (1296), § 19 (1299), § 21 (1271):

Bk. VII (VI). 1 § 6 (1383); 7 § 1

(1430):

Bk. VIII (V). 1 § 2 (1493), § 13 (1504); 3 § 4 (1511); 5 § 9 (1559); 10 § 3 (1649), § 5 (1650), § 6 (1657); 11 § 16 (1731); 12 § 11 (1767), § 14 (1777).

<sup>2</sup> See however the notes on IV (VII), 13 § 5, 7 (876, 879, 881); and *loc. cit.* (1287) on VI (IV), 11, 3 in regard to the citations there.

<sup>3</sup> I. 2, 3 1094 a 24 L.

I. 3, 5 1095 a 2.

I. 4, 1 1095 a 14 L.

cp. I. 13, 2, 1102 a 7 L.

VII. 11, 1, 1152 b 1 L.

<sup>4</sup> *Poet.* 6, 16, 1450 b 6 sqq. (cp. *note* 71 to my edition of this work). *Rhet.* I. 2, 7, 1356 a 26 sqq.

<sup>5</sup> Brandis *op. cit.* II ii 1335 *sc.* certainly expounds his words differently; but see Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 608 *sc.*

To regard the *Ethics* and *Politics* however as forming the first and second parts of one and the same work, as has now and then been done, is certainly not correct<sup>1</sup>. Yet this view is undoubtedly very old. For it must even have been adopted by the writer who at the close of the *Ethics* appended that introduction to the *Politics* now to be read there which may be translated somewhat as follows<sup>2</sup>: "Since then previous writers have omitted to make legislation the subject of their enquiries, it might perhaps be as well that we should ourselves take this subject into consideration together with the theory of the constitution generally, in order that the philosophy of Man may be as far as possible brought to a conclusion. First then let us try to review whatever has been rightly stated at various times by our predecessors; next from a comparison of the constitutions to investigate what it is which preserves and destroys states and individual constitutions, and from what causes some are ordered well and others ill. For when this has been considered we should perhaps be more likely to gain a comprehensive view not only of what constitution is absolutely the best, but also how each separate constitution should be regulated, and what laws and customs it must adopt (in order to be the best of its kind). Let us begin then with our discussion."

Schlosser long since, with good reason, doubted the genuineness of this patchwork in the forcible and cogent remark<sup>3</sup>: "there is no coherence between the close of this passage and the beginning of the *Politics*, and Aristotle does not follow the plan here marked out." The opening of the *Politics* is only intelligible when regarded as belonging to an independent work which starts from the notion of its own subject-matter, the state. We are not told that something similar was stated rather differently at the commencement of the *Ethics*; the state is here first constructed as the all-comprehensive association which has the highest good for its end: nor is there the least intimation that for the realization of unimpeded virtuous activity, the full meaning of this highest good, we were referred in the last chapter of the *Ethics* to the *Politics*. The supposed transition then is pure fancy with nothing here

<sup>1</sup> So recently by Nickes for example.

<sup>2</sup> *Nic. Eth.* X. 9 §§ 22, 23 1181 b 12 f. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἰτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς

πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς αἱ δὲ τούναντίον πολιτεύονται· θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποῖα πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.

<sup>3</sup> In his translation of the *Politics* I. xviii. His further conjectures need not be refuted now.

to support it. In keeping with the announcement contained in it Aristotle should rather have begun with the second book<sup>1</sup>, making what is contained in Bk. VIII (v). come next, and then developing the contents of IV (vii), V (viii), and lastly of VI (iv). and VII (vi). What must be understood by a 'comparison of constitutions' we see clearly from X 9 §§ 20, 21, 1181 a 16, 17, b 7<sup>2</sup>; at the same time we also see how much the interpolator has misunderstood the expression he borrows. There it denotes the combination of different laws and elements of different constitutions into a new constitution and new legislation: here it can only denote an accumulation of information on the constitutions of as many different states as possible and on the history of their development, because only from that can we gather what is here intended to be gathered from this 'comparison'<sup>3</sup>. That before Aristotle no scientific enquiry into legislation existed is palpably untrue; and had the absence of such enquiry been the only inducement to the composition of his work, how could this have sufficed to make him lay down "the theory of the constitution generally"? That no writers had been found to elaborate this is not asserted even here; on the contrary we are promised an exposition and estimate of all the facts already discovered by earlier enquirers. Even the words *καὶ ὅλος δὲ περὶ πολιτείας* contain an un-Aristotelian idea, for they imply that Legislation must be a part of the theory of the Constitution, while to Aristotle, we have seen, both are parts of Politics proper. Of the incredible mode of expression in the concluding words from *καὶ ποία πολιτεία ἀρίστη* onwards we will say nothing: it is sufficient to remark that the interpolator has left out just what is most important, which in the translation above has been added within brackets. In short, to whatever period this interpolation belongs its author did not himself know what he was about, and it would be for the most part lost labour to seek to discover "method in his madness."

That in spite of their close connexion<sup>4</sup> the *Ethics* and the *Politics* are regarded by Aristotle as two independent works, is sufficiently shown by the way in which the one is quoted in the other. Until sufficient reason

<sup>1</sup> For the interpretation which Nicksa, *l.c.* pp. 29, 30, puts upon the concluding words,—“Let us then follow this statement of ours, but only after prefixing ‘a commencement dealing with other matters,’—is not calculated to inspire confidence.

<sup>2</sup> *ὅδ' ἔσθ' ἡμεῖς (iv. α. 1092-1093) ἡμῶν εἶναι τὸ νομοθετεῖν συναγαγόντι τοῖς εὐ-δοκίμοις τοῖς νόμοις, and τὸν νόμον καὶ*

*τὸν νόμον αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, where the expression certainly tends to pass over into the meaning put upon it by the interpolator, but goes no farther.*

<sup>3</sup> This disposes of the unhappy attempt of Nicksa *l.c.* 29 f. to interpret the passage. In his reputation of the earlier attempts he is not the whole innocent.

<sup>4</sup> As Zeller observes *op. l. c.* II II 124 f. n. (1).

is adduced for transferring the first chapter of Bk. IV (VII). from Aristotle to Theophrastos or some one else<sup>1</sup>, the yet more unequivocal mention of Ethics there (§ 13) as 'another study,' ἐτέρας...σχολῆς<sup>2</sup>, has the most decisive importance: although the term 'another study' would mean no more when so applied than it does in the case of the *Prior* or *Pure* and *Posterior* or *Applied Analytics*, for example. Yet no one has tried to show from the close connexion between them that these latter treatises are merely parts of one and the same work. In fact Politics in Aristotle's sense, so far as the state according to its idea is a means of training to human virtue and therefore to happiness, is nothing but Applied Ethics: the problem of Pure Ethics being to show wherein virtue and happiness consist. But since this idea of the state could only be truly realized in the absolutely best state, which does not as yet exist, which even if it did exist would only be one state amongst many—since therefore the virtue of the citizen is dissociated from the virtue of the man—Ethics has to deal with the moral activity of the individual, Politics with that of the state<sup>3</sup>.

In Aristotle's classification of the sciences, both studies, in common with Poetics, have a somewhat uncertain place and worth assigned them, as Zeller<sup>4</sup> and Walter<sup>5</sup> have shown: nor does it appear that Aristotle cleared this up sufficiently to himself, or even tried to do so. It is a peculiar weakness of his Ethics that it has no purely scientific importance for him; it merely serves as an introduction to practical morality<sup>6</sup>: but again, as he himself explains, the direct value of mere theoretical instruction for this purpose is very slight, nay, quite insignificant<sup>7</sup>. Yet practical insight (φρόνησις), without which there is no moral virtue<sup>8</sup>, can be materially promoted by Ethics<sup>9</sup>, although it does not by any means coincide with Ethics in subject-matter<sup>10</sup>. So too the practical insight of the leading statesman in political life can exist in a purely

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 15 n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. the note there (709).

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 104 f. n. 1, 182, 607 n. 3: Oncken *op. c.* I. 164 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *op. c.* II ii 176—185.

<sup>5</sup> *Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft* 537—554 (Jena 1874. 8). But not every statement in that work is correct.

<sup>6</sup> *Nic. Eth.* I. 3 §§ 5—8 1095 a 3 ff., II. 2. 1 1103 b 26 ff. Cp. Walter *op. c.* 151 ff. Zeller *op. c.* II ii 631.

<sup>7</sup> *Nic. Eth.* I. 3 §§ 5—8 1095 a 3 ff.; cp. I. 9. 10 1100 a 1 ff.; II. 1. 1 1103 a 14 ff.; II. 4 §§ 3—6, 1105 a 26—b 18; X. 9=X. 10 (Bekk.): cp. *Pol.* IV (VII). 13. 11 f., *Nic. Eth.* II. 6 §§ 4—8, § 15 1106 a

26—b 7, and 1106 b 36 ff.; II. c. 9. Comp. also Walter *op. c.* 151—162 who certainly should not have relied upon the probably spurious chapter II. 7.

<sup>8</sup> Cp. *nn.* in I. 5. 9 (45), I. 13. 6 (112).

<sup>9</sup> *Nic. Eth.* I. 2. 2 1094 a 22 ff., I. 3. 7 1095 a 10 f., I. 4. 6 1095 b 4—13, VI. 7. 7 1141 b 21 ff. Comp. Walter *op. c.* 157, 400 ff.

<sup>10</sup> As Zeller thinks, *op. c.* II. ii 608 n.; he has been refuted by Walter p. 151. There is no doubt that the passage of the *Nic. Eth.* adduced by Zeller, VI. 8 §§ 1—4 1141 b 23—1142 a 11, is not by Aristotle, as was long ago shown by Fischer Fritzsche and Rassow.

empirical manner without a comprehensive theory of politics; but on the other hand there is much to learn from such a theory, and the great practical statesman will be all the greater the more he has appropriated it to himself. That the main value of *πολιτικὴ* consists in affording this important contribution to the education of capable statesmen is stated by Aristotle III. 1. 1; VI (IV). c. 1; VII (VI). 5. 1; IV (VII). 13. 5, and in other passages, and this fully agrees with his analogous view about Ethics. But his inconsistency with himself does not go so far here as before; rather he demands of political theory III. 8. 1 (cp. VI [IV]. 13. 5), that it should exhaust all conceivable cases, even those of which it can be foreseen that they will seldom or never actually occur<sup>1</sup>.

# [X. THE MOST RECENT CRITICISM OF THE TEXT.

## The comparative worth of the Manuscripts.

This question, of which some notice will be found above<sup>2</sup>, has recently been raised anew by Busse in an excellent dissertation *De praesidiis emendandi Aristotelis Politica*<sup>3</sup>. By a minute analysis of the old Latin version, Busse proves beyond all doubt that it has been over-estimated by Vettori and Schneider, and even by Susemihl, and is by no means so strictly literal or correct as they supposed<sup>4</sup>.

To begin with, William of Moerbeke's ignorance of Greek was something deplorable<sup>5</sup>. He renders *περὶ τῶν ἀποφηναιμένων περὶ κτλ.*, *de pronunciatis de optima civitate*; *πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀφ' αὐτοῦ*; *ἀπενέλκεσθαι praeferrī*; *ἐπιδημῶν praefectum populi esse*; evidently arriving at the meaning of a compound by the most rudimentary analysis, as *τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμόχνητα bona quae circa res bellicas*<sup>6</sup>. But mere ignorance whether of the meaning of words or of the construction—and it would seem as if, in II. 12. 8, he made *Ὀλυμπίῳσιν* an accusative after *τοῦ νικῆσαντος* *qui vicit Olimpiasem*<sup>7</sup>; at any rate he gives *super tacta* for

<sup>1</sup> Comp. *nm.* on III. 8. 1 (542); III. 13. 13 (601); VI (IV). 15. 4 (1350); see also III. 2 §§ 1—3.

[Here Prof. Susemihl's own *Introduction* ends. The following section is mainly an attempt to present succinctly some results of his critical labours; but for its form, and for occasional divergences of opinion, he is not responsible. *Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> *Op.* I. 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Merlin*, 1881. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Susemihl however in the large critical edition (1871) p. XXXI (f.) had already pointed out inaccuracies and inconsisten-

cies in William's translation and the need of caution in inferences from it to the original. See also the edition of 1879, *z.g.* I p. 204 n. 1, 210 n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Yet it is an exaggeration when Roger Bacon writes "ut notum est omnibus Parisiis literatis nullam novit scientiam in lingua graeca de quo praesumit, ut ideo omnia transfert falsa et corrumpit scientiam Latinorum." Cp. *Jordanus Eusebius* p. 67.

<sup>6</sup> Busse *op. cit.* p. 36 f. Space permits only a few typical instances to be selected from his stock.

<sup>7</sup> p. 9. The best mss. gives *Olimpiasem*.

ἀνὰ δώματα in v (VIII). 3. 9<sup>1</sup>—does less to obscure the readings of his original than a fatal inconsistency and fluctuation in the choice of renderings. The prepositions are changed or confused on almost every page. So likewise the particles: γὰρ *autem* in ἔστι γὰρ II. 9. 18, ἵσως γὰρ IV (VII). 17. 13, δὲ γὰρ v (VIII). 1. 2<sup>2</sup>; γὰρ *igitur*, III. 7. 5; δὲ *enim* I. 2. 1; οὖν *enim* I. 8. 6<sup>3</sup>, etc.: not to speak of the stock renderings καὶ...δὲ *et...etiam*, καὶ τοι *et quidem*. Sometimes he omits particles (μέν, γάρ, δέ, οὐτε); sometimes, *c. g.* II. 5. 9 δικαίως *et iuste*, he inserts them. They are most frequently inserted to avoid asyndeton, as in II. 3. 7 φράτορα φυλέτην *fratruelem aut contribulem*, etc.<sup>4</sup> He is careless of the order of words; thus II. 4. 6 καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἕνα *et ambo fieri unum ex duobus existentibus*; IV (VII). 3. 8 κυρίως καὶ *et dominos (i. e. καὶ κυρίους)*<sup>5</sup>. His carelessness leads him repeatedly to translate the adjectives ἀριστοκρατική, ὀλιγαρχική by the nouns *aristocratia, oligarchia*<sup>6</sup>.

This being the ordinary style of his translation, when he comes to passages where his Greek original was defective, it is only occasionally that he transmits the defect faithfully: as in VIII (v). 6. 3 ἐν θω (for ἐνθα) *in tho*, which he took for a proper name; III. 11. 3 κρίης (for κρίνουσι, so M<sup>s</sup>) *Kries*; II. 9. 30 φιλέτια (so M<sup>s</sup>) *amicabilia*; v (VIII). 1 § 4 M<sup>s</sup> αὐτ' *ipsorum* (he has read the compendium αὐτῶν); 6 § 9 M<sup>s</sup> ὁ αὐτός (for αὐλός) *id ipsum*<sup>7</sup>. More frequently he tries to get some sort of sense by putting in a word or phrase suggested by the context, or by a parallel passage in the *Politics*. Take for instance VIII (v). 1. 3: P<sup>1</sup> gives ἀνίσους ἐ. τι ὄντας, with space for one letter; M<sup>s</sup> has slurred over this defect of the archetype by reading ἔτι; not so William; from the immediately preceding ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὅτι οὖν ὄντας he derives *inaequales in quocunque existentes*. Similarly with *natura* for δύναμις in IV (VII). 11. 4 (from the adjoining φύσιν), *alia quidem esse eadem* for τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι VI (IV). 4. 25 (from the following τᾶλλα μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά): see also III. 16 § 5 *universale* borrowed from c. 15 § 4 τὸ καθόλου, IV (VII). 1 § 4 *quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant*, IV (VII). 11 § 1 *si ad votum oportet adipisci positionem* borrowed from 5 § 3 τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρὴ ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχὴν; etc.<sup>8</sup> Thus the defects and false readings of his original, which must have resembled M<sup>s</sup> though not so corrupt, are made worse by alterations and superficial remedies. In IV (VII). 14. 22 Γ had the same hiatus as M<sup>s</sup> has now, through the homoeoteleuton σπουδάζειν, σχολάζειν: William does what he can

<sup>1</sup> p. 12.<sup>2</sup> p. 11.at v (VIII). 5. 17, where ἀκ... is all that stands in M<sup>s</sup> of ἀκροώμενοι.<sup>3</sup> p. 30.<sup>4</sup> pp. 29, 30.<sup>5</sup> pp. 14, 27.<sup>6</sup> p. 9.<sup>8</sup> Busse pp. 15—20.<sup>7</sup> pp. 9, 12, 23. Compare the lacuna

to conceal this by translating *ἔνεκεν τάξεῃ καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης gratia ordinis et pacis*, as if he had read *τάξεως*. In VI (IV). 4. 11 M<sup>s</sup> gives *τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἧ* instead of *τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἧ*; so too Γ, for William renders *<minus> quam* to make sense. Similarly V (VIII). 6. 11 M<sup>s</sup> has *ἦποντο* for *ἦποντο*; William *sequabantur*; which must be his attempt to make sense out of *ἦποντο*<sup>1</sup>.

Another source of divergence between the codices and William's Latin must also be kept in view, viz. the freedom with which he sometimes translates. Thus in II. 9. 20 *δημαγωγᾶν αὐτοὺς ἡναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς regere populum se ipsos* (he read *αὐτοὺς*) *cogebant reges*, he may perhaps have simply exchanged the passive construction for the active. This is a not uncommon resource with him: see VII (VI). 7 § 5 *προσκῆσθαι apponere*, 8 § 1 *διηγῆσθαι dividere* etc.; and for the converse II. 7 § 6 *δᾶξῃ ostendatur*, 8 § 5 *γράφειν scribatur*, VIII (V). 8. 9 *παρὰ λαφύειν comprehenduntur*, etc.<sup>2</sup> Though he hardly ever appears to omit words from Γ, it can be shown that he sometimes adds: e.g. I. 5. 8 *εἴπερ τοῖς εἰρημένους si quidem et dictis <creditur>*, II. 9. 3 *κεκτημένοις περὶ οἴκους* (so M<sup>s</sup> for *περιούκους*) *possidentibus <praedia> circa domus*, etc.<sup>3</sup> Yet additions may be due to glosses, like *videro fugientem proelio*, (?) *ἀπάνευθε μάχης νοήσω* in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>, etc.<sup>4</sup> Lastly, how much caution is needed in handling this translation may be judged from a few characteristic blunders taken almost at random: I. 9. 1 *οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης neque longe <posita>*; II. 8. 13 *οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδ' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξίων κτλ non bene autem neque de iudicio habet lex indificare dignificans*, though here one might suppose he had *ὁ κρίνειν ἀξίων* before him<sup>5</sup>; II. 11 § 14 *ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν unum quodque perficitur ab eisdem*<sup>6</sup>; c. 11 § 15 *τῇ πλειονείᾳ, αἰεί τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκκρίπνυντες ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις inditando unper aliquam populi partem emittentes super urbes*, suggested perhaps by *πλειονῶν ἀπόρρητος* in VII (VI). 5. 9<sup>7</sup>; III. 3 § 2 *εἴπερ οὖν δημοκρατοῦνται si quidem igitur in democratiā versae fuerant quaedam*: 13 § 2 *οἴκοι habetur*: IV (VII). 16. 14 *πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπείαν τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμὴν ad deorum reverentiam hiis, quae sortitae sunt cum qui de generatione honorem* (as if *ταῖς εἰληχυαῖς* were read)<sup>8</sup>.

From this examination of the old translation Busse concludes that it is a less trustworthy representative of the better recension (Π<sup>1</sup> i.e. Γ P<sup>1</sup> M) than P<sup>1</sup>, the codex of Demetrios Chalkondylas. Its lost original was slightly better than the very corrupt Ambrosian manuscript

<sup>1</sup> pp. 21—23: Γ may have had *εἶ* instead, but this is less probable.

<sup>2</sup> pp. 24—26.

<sup>3</sup> p. 32.

<sup>4</sup> p. 34.

<sup>5</sup> p. 20.

<sup>6</sup> pp. 43, 20, 41.

<sup>7</sup> pp. 24, 45.

<sup>8</sup> p. 41.

M<sup>s</sup>, but closely resembled it; the common archetype of the two being itself very corrupt, with numerous omissions through homoeoteleuta and one or two glosses inserted in the text<sup>1</sup>. And it was from this Latin translation and not from another manuscript, he thinks, that the scribe of P<sup>5</sup> derived those readings wherein he departs from the second or worse family<sup>2</sup>.

These conclusions however are by no means warranted<sup>3</sup>. The ignorance and uncritical spirit of William of Moerbeke render it all the more certain that in the majority of the right readings which are due solely to his translation he must have followed a codex considerably better (as it was also older) than the archetype of P<sup>1</sup> or of M<sup>s</sup>. When all deductions have been made for variants arising from conjectures and mistranslations, the old translation presents the correct reading 18 times unsupported: 7 times in conjunction with P<sup>5</sup> only: once in conjunction with P<sup>2</sup> only: 3 times with P<sup>1</sup> (or its corrections) only; once with Aretinus only: 5 times in conjunction with more than one of the inferior manuscripts<sup>4</sup>. To these may be added some 12 other passages where the evidence, though good, is less convincing<sup>5</sup>. Whereas the correct reading is due to P<sup>1</sup> alone 11 times, to P<sup>1</sup> in conjunction with inferior authorities (Ar., P<sup>2</sup> margin, P<sup>3</sup>) 5 times: and several of these are such changes as Demetrios or Aretinus could

<sup>1</sup> pp. 45—47.

<sup>2</sup> In proof of this Busse quotes (p. 48)

from v (VIII). 8. 2—a passage where the second family II<sup>2</sup> exhibits an hiatus—

P <sup>1</sup> M	William	P <sup>5</sup> (margin)
παράδομένη	subintrans	ὑπεισδύουσα
παράνομια	praevaricatio	παράβασις
τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα	parvae expensae	αἱ μικραὶ δαπάναι
ἀναιρεῖ	consumunt	δαπανῶσιν.

There is nothing new in this observation. Compare Susemihl's large critical edition (1872) p. XIII: "mirum autem est in eis 'verbis, quae in vulgatae recensionis co- 'dicibus omissa hic liber (P<sup>5</sup>) cum paucis 'aliis et vetusta translatione servavit, 'eum aliis illis interdum accuratius cum 'hac assentire aut alias eiusdem sensus 'voces quam illos hic illic offerre, ut 'propensus facile fias ad credendum hos 'in eo locos non ex codice Graeco anti- 'quiore, sed ex ipsa translatione Latina 'esse haustos."

<sup>3</sup> With what follows compare Susemihl *Politica tertium edita* (1882) Preface pp. VIII—XVIII.

<sup>4</sup> Γ alone gives 1258 b 40 Χρητίδῃ 1260 a 4 ἀρχόντων καί, 1260 b 41 εἰς ὁ τῆς, 1266 b 2 δ' ἥδη, 1271 a 20 καὶ, 1276 a 33 ἔθνος ἐν, 1282 a 27 μέγιστα, 1285 a 7 αὐτοκράτωρ, 1332 a 42 ἐνια δέ, 1336 a 34

σπουδασομένων, 35 κατὰ, 1296 a 8 συστά- σεις, b 38 πλήθει, 1320 b 9 τὴν Ταραντί- νων ἀρχὴν, 15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, 1321 a 12 ὀπλιτικὴν, 1303 a 24 ἐγγὺς ὄν (or ἐγγι- ζον?), 1311 a 6 χρημάτων: ΓP<sup>5</sup> 1328 a 5 παρὰ, 1336 a 6 εἰσάγειν, 1340 a 16 δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ, 1321 b 29 τὰ omitted, 1322 b 36 προσευθύνas (?), 1306 b 39 καὶ omitted: ΓP<sup>2</sup> 1259 b 28 δέ; ΓP<sup>1</sup> 1265 a 16 παρὰ, 1272 b 39 καθ' αἰτό: ΓP<sup>1</sup> (corrector) 1278 b 22 παρ': ΓAr. 1289 b 38 πολέ- μους; ΓP<sup>5</sup>Ar. 1336 a 5 δέ: ΓR<sup>b</sup> 1303 b 31 τὰ: Γ Aldine P<sup>2</sup> (corrector) 1332 a 33 τὰ: Γ Ar. P<sup>2</sup> (corr. 3) 1335 a 26 σώ- ματος: ΓP<sup>2</sup> 1254 a 10 ἀπλῶς (ἀπλῶς ὅλως M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ὅλως cet).

<sup>5</sup> Of the disputed cases 1260 b 20 οἰκο- νόμοι, 1262 b 32 τοὺς φύλακας, 1274 b 20 (ἀποτίνειν or ἀποτίνυνεν?), 1280 a 29 τα- λάντων may be mentioned.

easily make for themselves<sup>1</sup>. In 4, or perhaps 5, places P<sup>2</sup> has alone preserved the right reading: it is difficult to find a single passage where it is due to M<sup>2</sup> or to P<sup>3</sup> alone<sup>2</sup>. From P<sup>2</sup> and from Aretinus unsupported a greater number of such cases is derived; but the uncertainty, whether we are dealing with a genuine reading of a manuscript or merely with conjecture, proportionately increases. The latter is more probable not only for P<sup>2</sup>, but for the few occasional good readings of the worst manuscripts<sup>3</sup>.

Further it must be noticed that while M<sup>2</sup> Γ are often found alone supporting a variant against P<sup>1</sup>, M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> are less frequently (the number of such cases being about  $\frac{2}{3}$ ) alone in agreement against Γ, and it is very seldom indeed that P<sup>1</sup> Γ alone support any reading against M<sup>2</sup>. What is the right inference to draw from this state of things? Evidently that Γ and M<sup>2</sup> go back to one common archetype, and P<sup>1</sup> to another (from which also must be derived the traces of the better recension in P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup>): only the immediate ancestor of M<sup>2</sup> had been corrected by the latter, while this was not the case with Γ or the authorities from which it is derived<sup>4</sup>. The genuine readings of the family Π<sup>1</sup> will be found to have been preserved sometimes in the one archetype (of M<sup>2</sup> Γ), sometimes in the other (of P<sup>1</sup> and of the corrections in P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>4</sup>): and the relationship between the members of the family may be represented by the following tree.



<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> alone 1359 a 12 *ἑκαστοῦ*, the right order of 1278 a 36 f. (corr.<sup>1</sup>), b 4 *αἰσίου* corr.<sup>1</sup> (P *αἰσίου*), 1286 b 17 *με-εἰς* (perhaps P also), 1287 b 38 *βασι-λίου*, 1328 a 5 *ἀνὰ* γέναι, 1335 b 20 *γνο-μῶν*, 1338 b 4 *πρότερον* (corr.<sup>1</sup>), 1340 b 30 *παῖδες*, 1399 b 24 *δύο*, 1314 a 25 *τὸ πᾶν* (P); P<sup>2</sup> Ar., 1263 b 4 *τὸ*, 1280 b 19 *ἐν*; P<sup>3</sup> (corr.) Ar., 1323 a 37 *δύο*, 1399 a 14 *παῖδες*; P<sup>1</sup>P<sup>2</sup> (margin) P<sup>2</sup> (later hand) 1284 a 37 *κοινοῦ*. Of these *ἑκαστοῦ*, *πρότερον*, *παῖδες*, *τὸ πᾶν*,

*ἐν*, *δύο* are of slight weight.

<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> 1253 a 29 *καὶ* omitted after *οὐκ*, 1270 b 38 *ἐν*, 1325 a 29 *ἀνὰ* *τὸ* (corr.<sup>1</sup>), 1339 a 14 *ἐν*; perhaps 1328 b 23 *ἀποδοῦναι*.

<sup>3</sup> 1267 b 23 *τὸ* L<sup>1</sup> U<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), 1274 b 20 *τὸ* *πᾶν* L<sup>1</sup>, 1274 b 28 *τὸ* L<sup>1</sup> Abline and M<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), 1331 a 24 *καὶ* P<sup>2</sup> Ar., 1392 a 28 *τὸ* L<sup>1</sup> C<sup>1</sup> Ar., 1312 a 12 *τὸ* R<sup>1</sup> Ar., 1304 b 28 *τὸ* R<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> For proof of this see (beside the anti-

Few of the readings common to M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> or of those common to Γ M<sup>s</sup> have much to recommend them. Yet this is far from proving P<sup>1</sup> to be our best authority. Against such a view may be urged (1) the number of mistakes with which, no less than Γ or M<sup>s</sup>, it abounds: (2) the futile attempts at correction which it sometimes exhibits, *e.g.* III. 13. 15 ταύτας γὰρ δεῖ διώκειν for αὗται γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν (δοκοῦσι having been omitted in the archetype of Π<sup>1</sup>): (3) the fact that, as just shown, Γ, solely or with inferior manuscripts, furnishes the true reading at least 34 (perhaps 46) times; whereas P<sup>1</sup>, alone or with inferior manuscripts, does the same only 16 times. These considerations are not to be set aside by an isolated passage like III. 9. 8, where P<sup>1</sup> διακόπουσι is a trifle nearer right than M<sup>s</sup> διακονοῦσι Will. *ministrant*<sup>1</sup>.

All existing manuscripts of the *Politics*, when compared even with those of the *Ethics*, are late and bad. Still there are degrees of badness: and if to follow Γ M<sup>s</sup>, other things being equal, in preference to P<sup>1</sup> sometimes leads an editor away from the true reading of Π<sup>1</sup>, he would yet oftener go astray if he followed P<sup>1</sup> against Γ M<sup>s</sup>. The relationship between the two families is itself obscure. In some respects Π<sup>2</sup> is the better of the two, particularly where it preserves words omitted in Π<sup>1</sup>: in such cases it is seldom Π<sup>2</sup> that has a gloss inserted, nearly always it is Π<sup>1</sup> that is mutilated<sup>2</sup>. Yet as a general rule Π<sup>1</sup> should be followed in preference to Π<sup>2</sup>.

Coming now to Busse's view about P<sup>5</sup>, we must admit that this manuscript presents most remarkable variants. Take v (VIII). 2 § 5 ff. (1337 b 17 ff.):

	P <sup>1</sup> M <sup>s</sup>	William	P <sup>5</sup>
	πρὸς ἀκριβείαν	ad perfectionem	πρὸς τὸ τέλειον
	εἰρημέναις	dictis	ῥηθείσαις
§ 6	ἐνεκεν	gratia	χάριν (Bekk.)
	τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ	ipsius quidem enim	αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ (Bekk.)
	φίλων	amicorum	τῶν φίλων
c. 3 § 1	τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἤδη	de musica autem	περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς
§ 3	τέλος	finaliter	τελευταῖον
	ὅτι δεῖ ποιοῦντας	quod facientes oportet	τί ποιοῦντας δεῖ (Bekk.) <sup>3</sup>

In some of these instances the discrepancy has nothing to do with

cal notes) Susemihl's Third edition (1882) Preface pp. x, xi, where also the diagram is given, p. xvi.

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Busse p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> The manuscripts of the *Nicomachean Ethics* show an equally perplexing discrepancy between K<sup>b</sup>M<sup>b</sup> and L<sup>b</sup>O<sup>b</sup> in

some parts of the treatise, K<sup>b</sup>O<sup>b</sup> and L<sup>b</sup>M<sup>b</sup> in others.

<sup>3</sup> Other instances of close agreement with the old translation, in 1327 a 34, 1329 a 17, 18, 1334 a 37, 1336 a 34, b 18, 1320 a 10, 1307 b 32 f. Susemihl *op. c.* VIII.

the old translation: and this is still more plain from the following variants of P<sup>2</sup>: 1330 a 32 *χρή* for *δα* c. c.<sup>1</sup>; 1333 b 2 *δὲ καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα* for *καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δὲ* (II<sup>1</sup> omit *δὲ*); 1335 b 23 *παιδοποιίας* for *τενοποιίας*; 1336 b 5 *γὰρ τοῦ* for *τοῦ γὰρ*, 1339 a 16 *χίριν* for *ἔκτα*, 1340 a 8 *δῆλον* for *φανερὸν*; 9 *ἄλλων* for *ἐτέρων*; 1342 a 6 *ἀπάσις* for *πάσις*; 1309 a 18 *οὐ* for *μή*. But at the same time this corrupt carelessly written book has some readings agreeing with P<sup>1</sup> and M<sup>2</sup> against the old translation, and others which no Latin version would ever have suggested. Thus 1338 b 27 *λαπομένοις* M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> *deficientes* William, 1318 b 31 *τιμημάτων τὰς μείζους ἀπὸ* omitted by M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> translated by Will.; 1326 b 4 *μὲν τοῖς* M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1-2</sup> Ald., *τοῖς μὲν* II<sup>2</sup>; 1332 b 1 *μεταβάλλειν* M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1-2</sup> *μεταβαλῶν* II<sup>2</sup>; 1334 b 2 *τε* untranslated by Will., τὰ P<sup>1-2</sup>; 1335 a 16 *τὸ* c. c. *τοὺς* M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup>; 1337 a 18 *βέλτιον* M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ar., *βέλτιστον* c. c. *optimus* Will.; 1319 b 24 *καὶ τὰ* P<sup>1-2</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>2</sup>, *κατὰ* c. c. *in* Will.; 27 *αἱ πρότεροι* II<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> and the corrector of P<sup>2</sup>, *αἱ πρότερον* II<sup>1</sup>; 1322 a 22 *τοῖς ἐξημένοις* M<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>1-2</sup> (1st hand), *τῇ ἐξημένης* c. c. *dicto* Will.; 1306 a 22 *ἐγχαίρισωμεν ceteri, ἐγχαίρισωσιν* M<sup>2</sup>, *ἐγχαίρισουσιν* P<sup>2</sup> *manus iniicerint* Will.; 1313 b 2 *φρόνημά τε* P<sup>1-2</sup> R<sup>2</sup>, *φρονήματά τε* c. c. *sapientiae* Will.; 1316 a 32 *τῶν* c. c. *τῷ* P<sup>1-2</sup> Ar., in P<sup>2</sup> M<sup>2</sup> a hiatus. Take even the suspected passage 1334 a 28, 29 *δαὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πολλῆς σοφροσύνης τοὺς ἀριστα δοκοῦντας προέττειν καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας* c. c., *indigent iustitia et multa temperantia qui optime videntur agere et omnibus beatis frui* Will. Any one correcting the text from the Latin version would surely have written *ἀπολαύειν*; but P<sup>2</sup> has *δεόρται.....οἱ ἀριστα δοκοῦντες.....ἀπολαύοντες*. Or again, 1311 b 7 *διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχεῖναι* (*αἰσχεῖναι* M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> *αἰσχύνεσθαι* II<sup>2</sup>); *propterea quod aliqui monarcharum in corpus verecundiam fecerunt* would have suggested *αἰσχεῖναι*, not *αἰσχύειν* which is what we find in P<sup>2</sup>. So again had the scribe wished to amend the corrupt *ὀπλίτην* of 1321 a 12, William's *armaticam* would have suggested *ὀπλιτικὴν* or *ὀπλίτιν*, not *ὀπλιτικὸν* which is the reading of P<sup>2</sup>. Far more probable is it that here traces of the archetype still remain. Similarly in 1320 b 3 the right reading *ἀφικμένους* seems to have come down in P<sup>2</sup> as well as in P<sup>1</sup>; it is at least unlikely that William's *respuentes* suggested it. Even in viii (v) S. 2, the passage which Busse thinks conclusive, but for the reminiscence of a phrase in Plato it is by no means clear that *παρὰδομένη* should supersede *ἐπεωδύουσα*<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Consensus codicum.

<sup>2</sup> Bekker, who took P<sup>2</sup> of the second or worse family as the foundation of his text, often adopted readings from P<sup>2</sup>: in

some cases even, e.g. 1336 b 18, 1337 b 16 f., 34 f., where M<sup>2</sup> have a better reading. See p. 76.

## Dislocations and double recensions.

The text of the *Politics*, when put into the more coherent shape which to the German editor most nearly reproduces Aristotle's intention<sup>1</sup>, is seen to depart from the order of the manuscripts not merely in the two great instances of the arrangement of the books<sup>2</sup>, but also in a large number of other cases. It will be useful here to review, at greater length than can be done in the critical footnotes, the difficulties for which transposition seems to be suggested as a natural remedy, especially as the fullest account of these suggestions has often to be sought in monographs or magazine articles not always readily accessible.

(1) Bk. I. 11 §§ 5, 6. Montecatino, p. 422 of his Commentary on Bk. I., was the first to enquire what is the connexion between § 6, εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης, βαναυσόταται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται δ' ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς, and the context. Piccart, p. 140, proposed to remove it to follow τῷ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων (l. 27). As Schneider saw, this will not do; for the third or mixed sort of χρηματιστική could not be excluded from the ἐργασίαι of § 6. Now the last words of § 5, immediately before εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται κτλ, are, περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. This reads like the final remark of Aristotle on the separate branches of χρηματιστική, considered not in regard to theory but to practice (τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν, § 1): no new remarks upon them ought to be added. If so, § 6, which consists of such remarks, would be in place if it preceded περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ κτλ: or, which is the same thing, if the sentence περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ...τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν be transposed to follow ἀρετῆς. The argument too runs on better to the next sentence ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα κτλ, § 7. "I have here said what was necessary in a "general way on each of these various branches; to go accurately into "details would no doubt be useful for the various pursuits themselves, "but it would be a tedious subject to dwell upon. The reader is "referred for particulars to the separate works which have been written "upon them<sup>3</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> As may be done by passing over the parts printed in Clarendon type and reading the duplicates of the same passages in their transposed place; where they stand in ordinary type between thick brackets

thus < >.

<sup>2</sup> See above p. 16 n 4.

<sup>3</sup> Sussemlahl *Quaestiones Criticae* I p. 9 (Greifswald 1867. 4).

(2) Bk. I. 13 § 8. q. v. "It is strange," says M. Thurot<sup>1</sup>, "that after having spoken of the deliberative part of the soul, Aristotle does not say one word of the ἀρεταὶ διανοητικαὶ which properly belong to it, while speaking three times, ll. 15, 17, 20, of ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ in the same sense. Further, it is singular that in order to prove that he who commands ought to have ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ in perfection, he says that the work belongs to him who directs it and that reason (λόγος) is a directing faculty: this reflexion evidently applies to the ἀρετὴ διανοητικὴ of τὸ λόγον ἔχον, elsewhere called φρόνησις, III. 4. 17, and not to the ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ of the ἄλογον." He proposes therefore to transpose ll. 14—17, ἀμοίως τοῖνυν... ἔργον to follow ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς: to omit ἠθικὴ in line 20, and change ἠθικὴν to διανοητικὴν in l. 17. (The transposition becomes less needed and less satisfactory if ἠθικὴν be retained.) Now there is no doubt that, on the stricter Aristotelian theory, φρόνησις inseparably involves ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ, Nic. Eth. VI. 13 §§ 2, 3, 6 (cp. *ib.* 12 § 6, ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν); so l. 20 ἠθικὴ may stand. The dianoetic virtue, in its perfection, seems to reside solely in the master who commands. Cp. § 7, just above the present passage, ὁ δοῦλος ὅπως οὐκ ἔχει τὰ βουλευτικόν, and Pol. III. 4. §§ 17, 18, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχόντος ἵκται ἀρετὴ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἵκται ἀναγκάων εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένων δὲ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθὴς with the notes.

(3) II. 4. 4, εἰκε δὲ μᾶλλον... μὴ νεωτερίζειν. "It is singular that Aristotle supposes here what he has not yet proved and is going to prove later on, namely, that communism relaxes the bond of family affections. Again in c. 5 § 24, 1264 b 1, he supposes without saying "so, that community of wives and children will make the labourers more obedient" (Thurot)<sup>2</sup>. He therefore suggests that II. 4. 4 should follow κοινωνίαν in II. 5. 24. A better place would seem to be in 4 § 9, 1262 b 24, after Aristotle has proved that ὑδαρὴς φιλία must result from the Platonic institutions in the absence of the ordinary motives to mutual kindness. The argument of §§ 5—9 goes to show συμβαίνει ἀνάγκη τούτωντιόν ὡν προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰτίους γίνεσθαι; the application to the agricultural class would come in appositely to point this reversal of the effect intended<sup>3</sup>.

(4) II. 6 § 3 *sub fin.* καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποῖαν τινα δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων. Aristotle would hardly consider a discussion περὶ παιδείας to be extraneous to the main political subject of the *Republic*. Moreover

<sup>1</sup> *Études sur Aristote* 18, 19. Comp. also Sussemlil *Quaest. Crit.* VI. 9—11.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* 26, 27.

<sup>3</sup> Sussemlil *Quaest. Crit.* I p. 13.

in line 37 he exchanges the construction with *περὶ* for a new one *οἷεται δεῖν...πεπλήρωκε*. The clause *καὶ περὶ παιδείας...φυλάκων* should come amongst the subjects (*περὶ ὀλίγων πάμπαν*) on which Socrates in the *Republic* has touched, and therefore in § 1 after *κτῆσεως* 1364 b 30<sup>1</sup>.

It is possible, however, while admitting that the transposition would give a better position to these words, to defend their present place. Aristotle is evidently criticizing in an unsympathetic spirit. He has reduced the points touched upon to a minimum (*περὶ ὀλίγων πάμπαν*). Afterwards, when he complains of the extraneous topics which take up the bulk of the treatise (criticism on poetry and art, psychology, metaphysics, ethics), he has grudgingly to allow that some of these long digressions do serve the purpose (or at least are introduced under the colour) of elaborating the training of the guardians.

(5) II. 7 § 1, αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν. Giphanius (Van Giffen)<sup>2</sup> comparing c. 12 § 1, ἔνιοι μὲν οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ' ὠντινωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον... ἔνιοι δὲ νομοθέται γεγόνασιν...πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί, proposed to omit φιλοσόφων καὶ. Spengel<sup>3</sup> simply transposed these words before ἰδιωτῶν.

(6) II. 7 §§ 10—13 = §§ 18—20.

The third objection to Phaleas' scheme, §§ 8—13, emphasizes the necessity for equality of education as well as of possessions. Like the preceding criticisms, §§ 5—7, it deals with the internal arrangements of the state. In §§ 14—17 there is a transition to its external relations, which Phaleas ought not to have overlooked, as he did. It is not likely then that in §§ 18—20 (with which we must take § 21) Aristotle would return to internal matters and repeat his previous objection in other words. Yet this is what he has done if the common order be retained. Let the two passages be read side by side, and it will be seen that there is no new thought in the latter, but only a reiteration of the former in different language.

ἐπεὶ στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτῆσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τοῦναντίον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον (οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτῆσεις ἄνισον,

ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας εἶναι τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὥς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ χαρίεντες

<sup>1</sup> Compare Victorius *Comm.* p. 106 (ed. of 1576): adiungit autem in extremo disputasse etiam illic Socratem de disciplina quam putaret convenire custodibus illius rei publicae: hoc enim coniungi debet cum iis quae nunc repetit facienti-

bus ad materiam eorum librorum indicandam, non cum inferioribus ut quidam falso putarunt.

<sup>2</sup> In his commentary p. 210.

<sup>3</sup> *Arist. Studien* III, p. 14 (66).

οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν,  
ἐὰν ἴσαι· ὅθεν καὶ

ἐν δὲ ἐξ τιμῇ ἡμῖν κακὸς ἦδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός),  
οὐ μόνον θ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαιὰ  
ἀδικοῦσιν, ὣν ἄκος εἶναι νομίζει  
τὴν ἐσότητά τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε μὴ  
λωποδυνεῖν διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν ἢ πεινῆν,  
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ  
ἐπιθυμῶσιν· ἐὰν γὰρ μείζω ἔχω-  
σιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ  
τὴν ταύτης ἰατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν,  
οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ  
καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς  
ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν  
τρωῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βρα-  
χεῖα καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνη·  
τρίτον δ', εἴ τινες δύναιντο δι' αὐτῶν  
χαίρειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ  
φιλοσοφίας ἄκος, αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἄν-  
θρώπων δέονται. ἐπεὶ ἀδικοῦσιν γε  
τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλ'  
ὡς διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαιὰ, οἷον τυραννοῦσιν  
οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥιγῶσιν (διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ  
μεγάλαι, ἂν ἀποκτεῖναι τις οὐ κλέπτῃ  
ἀλλὰ τύραννον)· ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικ-  
ρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον ὁ τρό-  
πος τῆς Φαλείου πολιτείας. 7 §§ 10—  
13.

It seems advisable therefore to remove §§ 18—21 to precede § 14  
εἰ, to treat as parallel versions §§ 10—13, §§ 18—20 cited above, and  
to take § 21 as coming directly after them but before § 14<sup>1</sup>.

(7) II. 11 § 12. In § 9 Aristotle says that eligibility to office on  
the ground of wealth and on the ground of merit are traits of oligarchy  
and aristocracy respectively: hence the Carthaginian constitution, where  
wealth and ability combined are qualifications for the highest offices,  
must be a third and distinct scheme. This, he adds, § 10, is a fault in  
the legislator, who ought to have made provision that ability should not  
be associated with poverty even in citizens in a private station: ὅρῳ  
ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνανται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον

ἀγανακτοῖεν [ἀν] ὡς οὐκ ἴσων ὄντες  
ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ φαίνονται πολλάκις  
ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιαζόντες· εἰτι δ'  
ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον,  
καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἱκανὸν διωβολία  
μόνον, ὅταν δ' ἡδῇ τοῦτ' ἢ πάτριον,  
αἰεὶ δέονται τοῦ πλείους, ἕως εἰς  
ἄπειρον ἔλθωσιν. ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ  
τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἥς πρὸς  
τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν.  
τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ  
τὰς οὐσίας ὁμαλίζειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν  
ἐπικαιεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρα-  
σκευάζειν ὥστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεον-  
εκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φανίλους ὥστε μὴ  
δύνασθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἂν ἡττοὺς  
τε ὦσι καὶ μὴ ἀδικῶνται. 7 §§ 18—  
20.

<sup>1</sup> Susseml in *Jahrb. für Philol.* xcvi. 1866. p. 330.

ἄρχοντες ἀλλὰ μὴδ' ἰδιωτεύοντες. Now here, as far as the sense goes, the clause in § 12 belongs: βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελείσθαι τῆς σχολῆς. "If he was forced to neglect the last-mentioned task, at least he might have made provision for poor men in office." Then would follow quite naturally the criticism of § 10: "at all events he should not have allowed these high offices to be virtually put up for sale<sup>1</sup>."

(8) III. 7 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρονι, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως. ἓνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ πλείους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἡκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα. Spengel<sup>2</sup> first called attention to the difficulty of συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, when as Aristotle goes on to explain (ἤδη χαλεπὸν) it is hard for a large number of citizens to attain a high standard of excellence. Thurot<sup>3</sup> supposed a lacuna to precede συμβαίνει, containing a reason for the name Πολιτεία, something like this: <διὰ τὸ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἀπλῶς ἀρίστους>. The parallel passage in III. 17. 4 πολιτικὸν πλῆθος ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικόν may have suggested to Zeller the insertion of πολεμικόν before πλῆθος in § 3. In any case he is right so far as this, that the remark to which συμβαίνει εὐλόγως refers must emphasize the warlike character of Πολιτεία<sup>4</sup>. Schmidt lastly found such a remark, and the lost subject of the verb συμβαίνει, in the last clause of § 4, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα, which he would transpose to come after πολιτεία.

(9) III. 11 § 20 ἀλλὰ γὰρ...§ 21 κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους. Schneider bracketed the clause ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους as superfluous and disturbing to the context. If retained in the present order there appears to be a double recension ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους = πλὴν τοῦτο...νόμους<sup>5</sup>. But it seems better, with Congreve, to reverse the order of the two sentences.

(10) III. 13 § 6 εἰ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν...ἐξ αὐτῶν. Thurot<sup>6</sup> sums up his elaborate examination of the context as follows. Aristotle has proposed, § 5, to investigate who ought to have power in a state where all kinds of superiority are represented—wealth, nobility, virtue, numbers. The discussion continues as follows: (i) If the virtuous are few in number we must enquire whether there are enough of them to govern the state

<sup>1</sup> Susemihl *Jahrb. f. Ph.* xcvi. 1866. p. 333.

<sup>2</sup> *Ueber die Politik* p. 23 n. 24.

<sup>3</sup> *Etudes sur Aristote* p. 42, 43.

<sup>4</sup> Susemihl *Philol.* xxix. 1870. 106 n. 16, *Quaest. Crit.* III. p. 15, IV. p. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* III. p. 16.

<sup>6</sup> *Etudes sur Aristote* 47—51.

or to constitute a state by themselves, § 6. (ii) No superiority gives exclusive right to power, §§ 7—10. (iii) The best laws are adapted to the interest of the whole state and the body of citizens, §§ 11, 12. (iv) Individuals, one or more, of pre-eminent virtue cannot be reduced to a level of equality, §§ 13, 14 (then follows a digression on ostracism). Now (i) has no direct bearing on the question proposed: the right of virtuous men to command must be proved before any enquiry as to what ought to be done when the virtuous are few in number: (ii) is the negative solution and (iii) has the germs of a positive solution, which we may suppose more fully developed in a part now lost. A discussion of a particular case, analogous to that in (i), is presented in (iv). The conclusion is that the proper place for (i) will be after (iii), *i.e.* somewhere between ἀρετήν (§ 12, end) and εἰ δέ τις ἔστω, the beginning of § 13. For §§ 7—12 are certainly just as much in place immediately after the question proposed in § 5, which they answer from the negative side. And although in itself § 6 might very well follow § 5, it must excite considerable suspicion to find that the important question started in § 6 is never fully answered at all and not even noticed until § 13<sup>1</sup>.

(11) III. 13. 22. The sentence ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο...τοῦτο δρῶσιν, if genuine, interrupts the thread of the remarks begun in § 20 and continued to διαρθεῖν in § 23, to the effect that the problem, what to do with unduly eminent citizens, is one which is equally urgent in all constitutions. The words cited ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο...τοῦτο δρῶσιν, however, do not bear upon the general problem, but on the particular case of monarchs. Hence, as Thurot<sup>2</sup> saw, they would be more in place in § 23 after διαρθεῖν, at the end of the general reflexions. Bernays<sup>3</sup> however found them a place at the end of § 20 above, after ἔχει τρόπον.

(12) III. cc. 15, 16. On the question of absolute sovereignty, πότερόν ποτε ἔνα συμφέρον κρείττον εἶναι πάντων ἢ οὐ συμφέρον, a succession of ἀπορία and a general investigation are promised in 15 § 3. What follows in the order of the manuscripts may be briefly summarized as follows<sup>4</sup>: (α) Is the rule of the best man more advantageous than the rule of the best laws? §§ 3—6. (β) Assuming that in certain directions the laws are insufficient, should the decision rest with the one best man or with a number of the more competent citizens, in the extreme case the whole body of a qualified community? §§ 7—10. Then comes a historical or antiquarian appendix to this ἀπορία, contained in §§ 11, 12. (γ) How are the standing difficulties of hereditary succession, §§ 13, 14.

<sup>1</sup> Sussemlil in *Philol.* XXIX. 1870 pp. 113—4.  
<sup>2</sup> *Études sur Aristote* 51—53.

<sup>3</sup> In his *Translation* p. 211.

<sup>4</sup> For a fuller account see the *Analysis* p. 112 f.

and (δ) a body-guard, §§ 14, 15, to be dealt with? Aristotle appends to this last enquiry a sort of digression, § 16, showing what would be the decision in the case of the constitutional monarch. But, as he explains, resuming his argument with c. 16, it is not the constitutional monarch, but the absolute sovereign about whom the question is now being raised (§§ 1, 2, down to the words *κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς*). Here it seems absolutely necessary to assume a lacuna. For what immediately follows, § 2 *δοκεῖ δέ τισιν...* § 4 *πάντων*, relates to a different *ἀπορία* altogether: (ε) Is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly where the citizens are all on the same footing (*ἐξ ὁμοίων ἢ πόλις*)? Should not power rather pass from hand to hand (*ἀνὰ μέρος*)?

Here the limit of *ἀπορία*i distinctly discernible is reached: in the remainder of c. 16, §§ 4—13, *ἀλλὰ μὴν...ὁμοίως*, no new question is started, but remarks are jotted down which bear more or less directly on those formulated in the preceding chapter. Thus all from § 4 *ἀλλὰ μὴν* as far as *κατὰ τὸ ἔθος* in § 9 must belong to the first *ἀπορία* (α): Is the rule of the best man to be preferred to that of the laws? Not that it could anywhere find a place as a whole in 15 §§ 3—6; but the earlier part (α) *ἀλλὰ μὴν...* § 5 *τῶν κειμένων* could suitably be transferred to the end of 15 § 5 to follow *κάλλιον* and precede *ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν*; the remainder (β) 16 § 5 *ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον...* § 9 *κατὰ τὸ ἔθος* might be inserted a little higher up in 15 § 5 between *πᾶσαν* and *ἀλλ' ἴσως*. Again, the next piece of c. 16, (γ) §§ 9, 10 from *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥάδιον* as far as *συμφράδμονες*, clearly has for its subject that comparison of the one best man with a number of qualified citizens which is introduced in (β): and this might go in 15 § 10 after *ὁ εἰς* and before *εἰ δὴ*. To this same *ἀπορία* further belongs the remainder of c. 16, from § 10 *εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν* to the end *δεῖν ὁμοίως*; when placed side by side with c. 15 §§ 7—10 *καὶ γὰρ...ὁ εἰς*, it is seen to be another recension of that passage.

καὶ γὰρ νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι  
καὶ βουλευόνται καὶ κρίνουσιν, αὗται  
δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κρίσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν  
καθ' ἕκαστον. καθ' ἓνα μὲν οὖν συμ-  
βαλλόμενος ὅστισοῦν ἴσως χείρων  
ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἢ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ  
ἐστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μιᾶς  
καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄ-  
μεινον ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἰς ὅστισοῦν.

εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνίων αἱ ἀρχαὶ  
κύριαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ  
ᾧ ὁ νόμος ἀδυνατεῖ διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ  
περὶ ᾧ γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβη-  
τεῖ περὶ τούτων ὥς οὐκ ἂν ἄριστα ὁ  
νόμος ἄρξειε καὶ κρίνειεν. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ  
τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς  
νόμοις τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ  
ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον

ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πολὺ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον· τοῦ γὰρ ἑνὸς ὑπ' ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος ἢ τινος ἐτέρου πάθους τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρίσιν, ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἀμυγεῖν. ἴστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ τοῦτο βῆδιν ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἶεν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἰς ἀδιαφθορώτερος ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πάντες; ἢ δὴλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάζουσιν ὁ δὲ εἰς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθετέον ἴσως ὅτι σπουδαῖαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥσπερ κἀκείνος ὁ εἰς. 15 §§ 7—10.

τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχαν αἰρετώτερον ἢ τὸν αὐτῶρα τὸν ἄριστον. περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλευόμεναι νομισθῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. οὐ τοίνυν ταῦτό γ' ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνθρώπον εἶναι τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι οἷχ' ἔτα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς. κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἄτοπον τ' ἴσως εἶναι δόξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἔχοι τις δοῦν ὁμμασι καὶ δυνεὶ ἀκοαῖς κρίνων, καὶ πράττων δυνεὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσίν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολλοῖς, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μονάρχαι ποιοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ὤτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας. τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αἰτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν σὺν ὅτις οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι κἀκείνων καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὁ γὰρ φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὁμοῖος, ὥστ' εἰ τοίτους οἶται δεῖν ἄρχαν, τοῖς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχαν οἶται δεῖν ὁμοίως. 16 §§ 10—13.

Such would be the best restoration of the primitive order of these two chapters, if the order of thought and the connexion were solely to be followed. Yet undoubtedly the less complicated and artificial assumption is that of two independent versions combined by an over-careful or unintelligent compiler. Such a view has been acutely advocated by Mr J. Cook Wilson<sup>1</sup>. "It may be that the two chapters belong "almost wholly to two parallel versions and that instead of being "combined they should be still further resolved." Thus

- (i) 15 §§ 2, 3 τὸ μὲν οὖν...ἐνούσας = 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ...ἐλαττον.
- (ii) 15 §§ 3—6 ἀρχὴ...πάντας corresponds in subject to  
16 §§ 3—9 τὸν ἄρα νόμον...κατὰ τὸ ἔθος + §§ 10, 11 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ  
...περὶ τῶν τοιούτων.
- (iii) 15 §§ 7—10 καὶ γὰρ...ὁ εἰς corresponds in subject to  
16 §§ 11—13 ἀλλ' ὅτι...δεῖν ὁμοίως and to §§ 9, 10 ἀλλὰ μὴν

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Philology* x. 1881. pp. 82, 83.

οὐδὲ ῥάδιον...συνμφράδμονες. "Of these passages the third [16 §§ 9, 10] disturbs the context and looks like a parallel version of the second."

To this arrangement of the contents of the two chapters it may be objected<sup>1</sup> (1) that the second version is so fragmentary as to present no statement of the problems under discussion and no intimation when we pass from one of them to the other. (2) The arrangement destroys what appears to be one connected sentence beginning 15 § 16 τάχα μὲν οὖν and continued in 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως. The sense runs on without a break from 15 § 14 ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν to 16 § 2 ὁ βασιλεὺς. (3) The resolution into parallel versions is not complete; it must be supplemented by transposition: for it has to be admitted that 16 §§ 4, 5 ἀλλὰ μὲν ὅσα...τῶν κειμένων "interrupts the argument of the context: "it belongs to the same part of the subject as [§§ 10, 11] 1287 b 16—23 "and may be read after τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν 1287 b 23" (in § 11).

Spengel<sup>2</sup> proposed a simpler remedy for the confusion of cc. 15, 16: viz. to transpose 16 §§ 4—9 ἀλλὰ μὲν ὅσα γε...κατὰ τὸ ἔθος to follow κάλλιον, at the end of 15 § 5. The passage following κατὰ τὸ ἔθος in 16 § 9 also begins with ἀλλὰ μὲν, and there is an actual case, viz. the MS. A<sup>c</sup>, where the recurrence of a word (συλλογισμός in *Rhet.* I. 2 1357 a 17 and b 6) led to the omission of the intervening passage and its insertion in the margin. The inadequateness of this solution of the difficulty need hardly be demonstrated. For not only (1) does Spengel propose to insert οὐ after ζητεῖν in 16 § 11, but (2) when he has transposed 16 §§ 4—9 to follow 15 § 5, he is obliged to explain that what we then get is a sort of dialogue between the supporters of personal rule and of the laws<sup>3</sup>.

(13) IV (VII). 1 §§ 11, 12 = C. 2 §§ 1, 2

ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν  
λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα  
τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν  
καλῶς. ἀδύνατον γὰρ καλῶς πράτ-  
τειν τὴν μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσαν.  
οὐδὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον οὗτ' ἀνδρὸς

πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν  
αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἑνός τε ἐκάστου  
τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν  
αὐτὴν, λοιπὸν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν. φανερόν  
δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογή-  
σειαν εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Susemihl *Aristotelis Politica tertium ed.* p. XXI.

<sup>2</sup> *Arist. Stud.* III. 26 (78), f.

<sup>3</sup> ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βουλευσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα κάλλιον. The reply is: ἀλλὰ μὲν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἀνθρωπος

ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. Objection: ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοσάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ πειρωμένοις ἄμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. Final reply and decision: ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κτλ.

οὔτε πόλεως χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρο-  
νίσεως· ἀνδρία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιο-  
σύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει  
δαίμων καὶ μορφήν, ὣν μετασχών  
ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαι-  
ος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων. C. I  
§§ 11, 12.

πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εἰ τίθενται ἐφ' ἑνός,  
οὔτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, εἰν ἢ  
πλουσία, μακαρίζουσιν. οὔτοι τε τὸν  
τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν,  
οὔτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείωτων ἄρ-  
χουσιν εὐδαιμονιστάτην εἶναι φαῖν  
αἶν. εἰ τέ τις τὸν ἑνα εἰ ἀρετὴν  
ἀποδέχεται, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονιστί-  
ραν φήσκει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. C. 2  
§§ 1, 2.

Here the language is by no means similar and the thought that virtue in the state is the same as virtue in the individual seems introduced in different connexion in the two passages. Nevertheless they cannot both stand. The latter opens the discussion afresh without any allusion to the previous chapter, as Spengel observed<sup>1</sup>. If it is to be fitted into this part of the work, it must be intended to supersede some part of C. I. Sussemlahl is probably right in holding this part to be §§ 11, 12<sup>2</sup>.

(14) IV (VII). 4 §§ 8, 9. Giphanius (Van Giffen)<sup>3</sup> calls attention to the difficulty of connecting the last words of § 8, ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἶθε γίνεσθαι, with those immediately preceding. Schneider proposed to transpose the whole period to the end of the chapter to follow εὐσύνοπτος: in this way § 9 ὁ λεχθείς ὅρος would refer to the number of the citizens. If the words ἐπεὶ...γίνεσθαι are in their right place and are to be taken with § 8, the preceding sentence θαίς γάρ...τὸ πᾶν must be parenthetical. They cannot go with § 9 as the passage stands. Koraes omitted διό: it is a smaller change, with Böcker<sup>4</sup>, to transpose ἐπεὶ...γίνεσθαι to follow ἀναγκαῖον in § 9.

(15) IV (VII). 8. 2 οἷον αἶτε τροφή τοῦτό ἐστιν αἶτε χάρις πλήθος αἶτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. Bojesen<sup>5</sup> saw that these words should follow directly upon § 1 ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν which they illustrate. They are not suitable to be instances of ἔν τι κοινὸν καὶ ταῦτό τοῖς κοινοῖσι ἄλλης κοινωνίας, as on the ordinary arrangement they might be taken to be.

(16) IV (VII). 8 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δ' ἡ...συνέσις ἐστω. The proposal to make this passage follow πολιτείας at the end of § 5 serves to bring the mention of κοινωνία in § 4 nearer to the κοινοῖσι of § 2<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *Ueber die Politik*, pp. 45, 48.

<sup>2</sup> *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCIX. 1866 p. 602.  
See also Böcker *De quidam Pol. Ar.*  
Lecō (Greifswald, 1863) p. 61, Spengel  
*Arist. Stud.* III. 30 (83).

<sup>3</sup> *Comm.* pp. 921, 2.

<sup>4</sup> *op. c.* 13, 14.

<sup>5</sup> *Bidrag* (Copenhagen 1845) pp. 24—26.

<sup>6</sup> Sussemlahl *Quæst. Crit.* I. p. 12.

(17) IV (VII) CC. 13—15. Wilson<sup>1</sup> regards c. 13 as a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15. "In each the same question is proposed, what is 'happiness or the chief good? (compare 1332 a 7 and 1333 a 15, 16); 'and the discussion of it is followed in each by a transition, in almost 'the same terms, to the subject of education (cp. 13 §§ 10—13, with '15 §§ 6, 7 ὅτι μὲν οὖν...ἦχθαι)." These transitional passages stand as follows:

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίνονται διὰ τριῶν. (§ 11) τὰ τρία δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶτον οἶον ἀνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῶν, εἴτα καὶ ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. ἔνια δὲ οὐδὲν ὄφελος φῦναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθῃ μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ· ἔνια γὰρ ἐστὶ διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. (§ 12) τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῶν μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἀνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον.

ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις. πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον.

(§ 13) τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἷους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐχειρώτους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἥδη παιδείας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μαθητάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες. 13 §§ 10—13.

... <τὴν ἀρετὴν,> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων· πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον, τυγχάνομεν δὲ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τούτων δὲ ποίους μὲν τινὰς εἶναι χρὴ τὴν φύσιν, διωρίσται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρηῆσαι πότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν.

ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ πρὸς ἀλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἦχθαι. 15 §§ 6, 7.

There is certainly a striking parallelism here: compare especially 13 § 13 with τούτων δὲ ποίους...ἔθεσιν in the right hand column; but it is partly covered by the reference back τυγχάνομεν δὲ διηρημένοι πρότερον, which Wilson is obliged to suppose inserted or to be, possibly, a reference

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Phil.* x. pp. 84, 85.

to the *Ethics*. That there is an advance in the treatment of c. 14, 15 will become apparent on a close comparison with c. 13; see the *Analysis* (p. 116). Similarly in III. c. 9 there is an elaboration of the earlier sketch in III. c. 6; in I. cc. 5—7 the conclusions anticipated in I. c. 4 are but amplified and supported<sup>1</sup>.

In 13 § 12 the fact that man often obeys reason in opposition to his habits and nature is a strange reason why habits and nature should be in harmony with reason<sup>2</sup>. Hence Böcker<sup>3</sup> proposed to transpose *ὥστε ... ἀλλήλους* to follow *βέλτιον* at the end of § 11. In this place it emphasizes the agreement necessary between the habits and the natural capacity of our citizens. But Wilson points out that the parallel clause in c. 15 refers to *λόγος* and *ἔθῃ*; hence he defends the order of the manuscripts. The meaning then would be: "reason ought to work for the end which the legislator has in view in harmony with nature and habit; for men may be induced by reason to do what they would never do by nature or by habit."

(18) IV (VII). 16 §§ 4, 5 *σχέδον δὲ πάντα...τούτους*. This solution of the whole question discussed in this chapter should surely follow the difficulties enumerated, and not interrupt the enumeration, as it does at present. It is proposed to remove it to follow § 8 *πληθύνει ἔτι· ἡ μικρύνει*. If this be done, (1) § 6 *ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων κτλ* will directly explain § 4 *ἔτι δ' ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι...βούλησιν*; (2) the transposed passage will have an excellent continuation in § 9, which fixes the ages for marriage at 18 and 37(?) respectively<sup>4</sup>.

(19) IV (VII). 17 § 6 *τὰς δὲ διατάσεις...διατεινομένοις*. These remarks must apply to the very earliest infancy. If so they ought to come after § 3 *ἄσκησιν*; for in § 4 Aristotle goes on to discuss *τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν*. The transposition suggested is supported by the fact that then *ἐπισκεπτέον δὴ* will follow directly upon § 5, to which in any case it must be referred<sup>5</sup>.

(20) IV (VII). 17 § 12 *τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν παρὰδρομῇ...ἀναγκαῖον*. These remarks are clearly intended to put a close to the whole discussion of §§ 8—14. If so, they should come at the end, i.e. after *διεργάζεσθαι* (? *δυσγένησθαι*) in § 14<sup>6</sup>.

(21) V (VIII). 4 § 7. The clause *δαὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων κρίναι, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν· ἀνταγωνιστὰς γάρ τῇ παιδείᾳ τὴν ἔχουσι*,

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Susemihl *Arist. Politica tertium* ed. pp. XXI, XXII.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Susemihl in *Philol.* XXV. 1867. p. 403.

<sup>3</sup> *op. c.* 15.

<sup>4</sup> Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* VII. p. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Susemihl in *Philologie* XXV. 1867. pp. 408—9.

<sup>6</sup> Susemihl *l. c.*

πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον must refer to the Lacedaemonians and their recent rivals the Thebans. They would stand better directly after the criticism on the Lacedaemonians in § 4; the intermediate remarks, §§ 5, 6, being of a general character and a deduction from this particular case<sup>1</sup>. Moreover δὲ should then be changed to δὴ.

(22) V (VIII). V § 17 ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. As they stand, these words, introduced by ἔτι, should give a *second* reason ὅτι γινόμεθα ποιοί τινες τὰ ἥθη διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς, the first being the 'enthusiasm' inspired by the melodies of Olympos. But the reason alleged is surely only a generalization of the first: 'enthusiastic' strains inspire 'enthusiasm': and, further, all men become attuned to the mood of musical imitations by listening to them. Now a little further down, § 18, we are told that "rhythms and melodies afford the best imitations, "short of the reality, of emotions, virtues, and moral qualities generally: which is plain from their effects. For as we listen to music the "soul undergoes a change." But why should this change of mood in the soul prove music to be the best means of faithfully portraying morality and emotion? Transfer to this place the words from § 17, and the reason is plain: "because all men are attuned to the mood of the musical imitations to which they listen, even if there be no words, but mere rhythm and melody," *i.e.* a purely instrumental performance<sup>2</sup>.

(23) V (VIII). V § 25 καὶ τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς \* \* εἶναι (διὸ πολλοὶ φασι τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, οἱ δ' ἔχειν ἀρμονίαν). Böcker<sup>3</sup> recommends that this, the only clause not at present included in the huge period stretching from § 17 to the end of c. 5, should be transposed to a place before the apodosis, *i.e.* after § 23 and before ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων § 24.

(24) VI (IV). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19. — There are good grounds<sup>4</sup> for believing that this portion of Bk. VI (IV) is not genuine. From the parallelism of 4 § 7, ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεία πλείους καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτία, εἴρηται διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον, to 4 § 20 (the first words after the suspected section) ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰς πολιτεία πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον, the inference was drawn that there were two interpolations. That the second is not a continuation of the first, but rather a parallel version unskilfully added by the compiler<sup>5</sup>, seems probable from the

<sup>1</sup> Susemihl *ib.* p. 411, *Q. C.* IV. 20, also Böcker independently *op. c.* p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Susemihl *Philologus* XXV. 1867. 411—413, *Q. C.* IV. 20, Spengel *Arist. Stud.* 44, 45.

<sup>3</sup> *op. c.* p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> Susemihl in *Rhein. Mus.* XXI. 1866.

554—560.

<sup>5</sup> See Cook Wilson in *Journal of Philol.* x. 80, 81.

fact that the promise made in 4 § 7 *ὅτι δὲ πλείους εἶναι*, is never redeemed: instead of this the main subject of c. 3 is treated over again in 4 §§ 7—19. We will here cite only the more exact correspondences adduced by Wilson in support of this view.

τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας αἷτιον ὅτι πάσης ἐστὶ μέρη πλείω πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμόν. 3 § 1.

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οἰκιῶν συγκαίμενας ὀρώμεν πάσας τὰς πόλεις, ἔπειτα πάλιν τούτου τοῦ πλήθους τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς δ' ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ μὲν ὀπλιτικὸν τὸ δ' ἄσπλον. καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὀρώμεν ὄντα, τὸν δ' ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ βάνανσον. 3 §§ 1, 2.

ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἔστιν ἢ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἢ δὲ κατ' ἀρετήν. \* \* καὶ εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐκὰ γὰρ διείλομεν ἐκ πόσων μερῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἐστὶ πᾶσα πόλις. 3 § 4.

φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείας, εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἶδει διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. 3 § 5.

ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσάυτας ὅσαι περ τάξαις κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχάς εἰσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μορίων. 3 § 6.

ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οἷον ἐν μένῃ ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχει πόλιν. 4 § 7. καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οἷα ἐξ ἐνὸς ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῶν στήκεινται μορίων, ὥστε εἴρηται πολλάκις. 4 § 9.

ἐν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν τροχὴν πλήθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάνανσον, κτλ

τρίτον δὲ «τὸ» ἀγοραῖον, κτλ

τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμῆστον, ὁ ταῖς αἰδὲν ἦττον ἀναγκαῖος ἐστὶν ἐπάρχειν κτλ 4 §§ 9, 12.

ὥστε κτλ.....φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ γὰρ ὀπλιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ τῇ πόλεως μέρος. \* \* ἔβδωμον δὲ τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῖν, ὡς καλούμεν εὐπόρους. ὀγδῶν δὲ τὸ δημοκρατικὸν κτλ

.....ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντα εἶναι τινὰς ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν. 4 §§ 15—17.

ὥστε οὖν εἰ ζῶν προημετέρη λαβεῖν εἶδη, πρῶτον μὲν ἂν ἀποδιωρίζομεν ὅπερ ἀναγκαῖον πᾶς ἔχει ζῶν κτλ

εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα εἶναι δεῖ μῖστος, ταῖς δ' εἶναι διαφοραῖς, ...ὁ τῇ συζείσει τῆς τοῦτων ἀριθμῶς ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοσούτοις πλείω γένη ζῶν κτλ... ὥστ' ὅταν ληφθῶσι ταύτων πάντες οἱ ὀφειλόμενοι συνδυασμοί, ποιήσονται εἶδη ζῶν, καὶ τοσαῦτ' εἶδη τοῦ ζῶντος ὅσαι περ αἱ συζείσεις τῶν ἀναγκαῖων μορίων εἰσὶν· τὸν αἰτὸν δὲ τρίτον καὶ τὸν εἰρημένον πολιτεῶν. 4 §§ 9, 19.

μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. 3 § 6.

ἀλλὰ πένεσθαι καὶ πλουτεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον. διὸ ταῦτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὐποροὶ καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλούς, ταῦτα ἐναντία μέρη φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστᾶσι, καὶ δύο πολιτεῖαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. 4 §§ 18, 19.

Whereas in 3 § 4 the one version refers to Bk. IV (VII), ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν (whence it may be inferred that its author had the original order of the books before him), "the second version inserts, "instead of the reference, a long passage similar to that part of Bk. "IV (VII) which the first version refers to."

To sum up, there does appear to be sufficient evidence of a parallel version: it must be remarked, however, (1) that the second version, as it now stands, plainly refers to the former 4 § 7 ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην<sup>1</sup>: therefore this at least must be due to an editor who wished to make the two continuous. (2) There seems to be nothing in c. 3 to correspond with the simile of an animal in 4 §§ 7, 8; for the sense and bearing of 3 §§ 5, 6, suggested by Wilson, appear very different.

(25) VI (IV). 6 §§ 2, 3. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἕξεστιν, ὅταν κτήσωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἕξεστι μετέχειν. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐξεῖναι σχολάζειν ἀδύνατον μὴ προσόδων οὐσῶν.

The clause διὸ...μετέχειν is omitted by the manuscripts of the second recension. Either it is an interpolation or, if genuine, out of place; for there is nothing preceding διὸ of which it could be the effect. Thurot<sup>2</sup> would find a place for it after προσόδων οὐσῶν, but he has to admit that ἐξεῖναι σχολάζειν is forced and unusual; it is ἐξεῖναι μετέχειν wherever this subject comes up, and the second claim forms no real antithesis to the first. Rassow<sup>3</sup> gives a more satisfactory contrast by inserting δημοκρατικὸν after ἐξεῖναι: "on general grounds to exclude from citizenship "those who have the requisite amount of property would be an "oligarchical measure, to admit them democratical." After this rule

<sup>1</sup> "The words may perhaps refer to Bk. IV (VII)" (Wilson). But he does not further explain.

<sup>2</sup> *Etudes sur Aristote* 60, 6

<sup>3</sup> *Bemerkungen* pp. 13, 14.

has been laid down the clause διὸ...μετέχειν comes in with excellent sense as stating the practical result. It will be necessary to insert *εἰ* after *σχολάζον*.

(26) VI (IV). c. 12<sup>1</sup>. The subject of this chapter is the third of the investigations enumerated in c. 2 §§ 4—6, *ἅπαντα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰς τίον αἵρετή*: what form of government is most adapted to a state under given circumstances. After the general conditions, that it must be that supported by τὸ κρείττον whether their preponderance comes from τὸ ποῖον or τὸ ποσόν, Aristotle points out (1) when a democracy is desirable in the words of § 3, ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἐπέρχεται...τούτων; (2) when an oligarchy would suit better in the remainder of § 3, ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων...πλήθους; while (3) the circumstances favourable to a Polity (in the technical sense) are pointed out in §§ 4, 5, ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων...ὁ μέσος. The similarity of their form proves that these three sentences ought to be taken closely together: (2) and (3) are however separated by the words δαὲ δ' ἀλλὰ τὸν νομοθέτην...τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς, the former part of § 4. Not only so, but this sentence has nothing to do with the special conditions of an oligarchy: ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ must refer to Polity in the technical sense; accordingly the sentence belongs to the second investigation of c. 2, τίς κοινοτάτη κτλ. Moreover from 12 § 6, ὥσπερ δ' ἂν ἄμεινον right on to the end of c. 13, τὸ ἄρχεσθαι, Aristotle never recurs to the enquiry τίς τίσιν αἵρετή. He appears to go off on the subject of the stability of Polities (in the technical sense), ending with a brief historical digression, 13 §§ 6—12<sup>2</sup>.

The conclusion to which these facts point is as follows: The enquiry τίς τίσιν αἵρετή is broken off abruptly at ὁ μέσος in 12 § 5; if it was ever complete—cp. VII (VI). 1. 5, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίς, εἴρηται πρότερον—the rest of it has been lost. The beginning of 12 § 4, δαὲ δ' ἀλλὰ...τούτους, together with 12 § 6 and the whole of c. 13, belong to the previous enquiry. Bücheler with great probability would insert 12 § 4, δαὲ...τούτους + 12 § 6, c. 13 §§ 1—6, ὥσπερ δ' ἂν ἄμεινον...ἰστέον μόνον in the account of the constitution of Polity given in c. 9 § 6, between ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς μίξεως οὗτος and τοῦ δ' εὖ μερίζεσθαι, where certainly the subject-matter is strikingly similar. For the remainder of c. 13, §§ 7—12, δαὲ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν...ἄρχεσθαι, he finds a fitting place at the end of c. 9 after ὅλως.

(27) VIII (V). I § 8. There are two ways in which revolutions arise, διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διχῶς: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ...ἐκείναι, ὅτι δὲ...

<sup>1</sup> See Susemihl in *Reich. Mus.* xxi. 564 ff.; also Böcker *op. cit.* § 11, pp. 24—30.

<sup>2</sup> The reader may satisfy himself of this by careful examination of the passage: cp. *Demetrius* p. 121 L.

μοναρχίαν. But in § 9 another way is seemingly brought in ἐτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον κτλ, and in § 10 another ἐτι πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κτλ. Further, these two latter cases properly belong to the first alternative, when the revolutionary party wish for a change in the government; they are both equally opposed to the other ὅτε δὲ κτλ, where the object is not to overthrow the form of government, but to crush the present holders of power. If then Aristotle wrote in the proper logical order, the place for the second leading alternative ὅτε δὲ οὐδὲ...ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν is in § 11 between πολιτεία and πανταχοῦ<sup>1</sup>.

Wilson<sup>2</sup> discovers a parallel version of 1 §§ 2—7, δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον...στάσεών εἰσιν, in 1 §§ 11—16 πανταχοῦ γὰρ...τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν. The most striking correspondences which he adduces are:

δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλαὶ γεγένηται πολιτεῖαι πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, τούτου δ' ἀμαρτανόντων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὅτιοῦν ὄντας οἷεσθαι ἀπλῶς ἴσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν), ὀλιγαρχία δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἔν τι ὄντας ὅλως εἶναι ἀνίσους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ' οὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες ἀπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι). §§ 2, 3.

ὁμολογοῦντες δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, διαφέρονται, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, οἱ μὲν ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὴν ἴσους ὦσιν, ἴσοι ὅλως εἶναι νομίζουσιν,

οἱ δ' ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὴν ἄνισον, πάντων ἀνίσων ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. §§ 13, 14.

Further "the main thought of these two parallel passages is repeated "in a shorter form" in 2 §§ 2, 3: "there is here then perhaps another "re-writing, seemingly by a later hand, of the introduction to the book "and with this third beginning seems to cohere the rest of cc. 2, 3." Wilson sees in each of these a probable reference to Bk. III; at 1 § 2, § 13, 2 § 2. It must be observed however (1) that the main difficulty of c. 1 lies in §§ 8—11, and is not removed by these suggestions: (2) there is a real advance in c. 2 as compared, for instance, with 1 §§ 11—16: and yet (as Wilson sees) if 1 §§ 11—16 is another recension of 1 §§ 2—7, 2 §§ 2, 3 has quite as much right to be so considered. (3) It is possible that 3 § 14, στασιάζουσιν δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις...ἴσοι ὄντες,

<sup>1</sup> Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* v. p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Journal of Philology* x. 84.

should precede 1 § 11, πανταχοῦ γὰρ κτλ. At all events that passage is out of place where it stands in c. 3<sup>1</sup>.

(28) VIII (v). c. 4. In this chapter §§ 1—7, γίνονται μὲν... ἐν τοῖς ἀσθεῖς, have for their subject the cases where ὁμόνοια has arisen from dissensions amongst the leading men. The subject of §§ 8—12, μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ... πρὸς πολλούς, is wholly different. Aristotle returns to the case which he calls in c. 3 § 6 δι' αὐξήσιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνίστασθαι, when any party in the state has become over-powerful. This αὐξήσιν may be κατὰ τὸ ποσόν or κατὰ τὸ ποιόν; but all the examples in 3 §§ 7, 8 illustrate the former kind. It seems best then to transpose 4 §§ 8—12, μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ... πρὸς πολλούς (which contain examples of the latter kind) to follow δεσποτίας at the end of 3 § 8<sup>1</sup>.

(29) VIII (v). 6 §§ 10—13, ὁμονοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία... ἢ ἱφίππου. In its present place this passage interrupts the orderly enumeration of the causes which tend to overthrow oligarchy owing to internal dissensions: (1) 6 §§ 2—5 continual decrease of the privileged body, (2) §§ 5—7 rise of demagogues amongst them, (3) §§ 8, 9 extravagance and reckless living, (4) §§ 14, 15 insults offered κατὰ γάμον ἢ δίκας, (5) § 16 refusal on the part of some oligarchs to go the full length in oppression of the Demos. In §§ 10, 11, coming between (3) and (4), the conditions of permanence in an oligarchy are touched upon; a better place for them is after § 16; while §§ 12, 13 are probably interpolated<sup>2</sup>.

A few remarks may be useful on the suggestions here passed under review. Though necessarily an unsatisfactory remedy<sup>3</sup>, transposition has been used with great effect in some authors (e.g. Lucretius) and has always been a recognised expedient. But it has been most successful when applied to verse and to dislocations arising mechanically through the displacement of leaves or by carelessness of transcribers. Now only a small part (if any) of those here assumed can have had such an origin. The most reasonable account of the majority presupposes an editor dealing unskillfully with Aristotle's materials<sup>4</sup>. In proportion as this is

<sup>1</sup> Sussemlil *Politica tert. ed.* p. 3311; Bucker *op. cit.* 37.

<sup>2</sup> Bucker *op. cit.* 40, 41.

<sup>3</sup> Sussemlil *Quæst. Crit.* 8, 11, 12.

<sup>4</sup> "Before we can prove that a transposition is correct, we must have shown not only that the passage *cannot* be placed in its old position, but that it *must* be placed in its new." Postgate *Notes* p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> "Hoc est verisimillimum: ipsum Aristotelem omnes has particulas, quas in altera Politicorum recensione sine uberius tractare sine continenti exposi-

tionis ordini inserere illa proposuit, in margine hic illic adiutorem; postremo autem, qui ediderunt illam, cum non essent, quod nota illis vidisset scriptum, ineptissime confusus in locum, quæ hodie tenent, locum contulisse, quæ fortasse remota mutilatione locum suum deprehenderant." Bucker *op. cit.* p. 33. There was no place for footnotes in an ancient book: but some instances in the above list—e.g., (3) (11) (12) (13) (14) (17) (19)—have quite the look of marginal notes. Compare the remark of Wellman *Translation* p. 100 n. 2.

admitted the certainty that a given transposition restores the original form, due to its being logically required, diminishes: and room must always be allowed for the misgiving “ne hoc modo ipsum potius Aristotelem corrigamus quam editores eius antiquos: certe cur ab eo ipso in libris celerrime scriptis, nequaquam diligenter ubique elaboratis, incohatis potius quam perfectis optimam semper disponendi rationem esse inuentam non sane scio cur credam<sup>1</sup>.”

These observations are all the more necessary as the most recent edition of any part of the *Politics*<sup>2</sup> carries still further the disintegration of the text, transposing and rejecting supposed interpolations in a part of the treatise hitherto believed not to need these remedies<sup>3</sup>. The most important change introduced is to make Bk. I. cc. 8—11, *περὶ χρηματιστικῆς*, precede the discussion *περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου*, thus inserting them in I. c. 3 § 3 between *χρηματιστικῆς* and *πρώτον* δέ. That the topics of Bk. I. would be thus better arranged may be admitted: but the probability (not to say the certainty) that Aristotle even intended ultimately so to arrange them will require cogent proof, especially if it can be shown that with the present order the transition from topic to topic is natural, the development logical, the indications of a disposition of the subject-matter borne out in the sequel. Briefly to sum up, Schmidt presents Bk. I. in the following order: c. 1, c. 2 §§ 1—6 *παίδας*: then comes § 8 presented as two parallel versions:

ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ἦδη. γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὔσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν <ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν>. [ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστί.] οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἶπερ καὶ αἱ πρώται κοινωναί. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων. 2 § 8, 1252 b 28—34.

<ἡ δὲ> πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκειας, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, 1252 b 28.

<μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ> αἰτία<sup>4</sup>. τὸ <γὰρ> οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον. ἡ δ' αὐταρけία [καὶ] τέλος, <ὥστε> καὶ βέλτιστον. 2 § 8, 1252 b 34 1253 a 1.

Then follows 2 § 7 διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον...τῶν θεῶν. Then another double recension consisting mainly of 2 §§ 13, 14:

<sup>1</sup> Susemihl *Politica tertium* ed. p. xxvi. Cp. also p. xiii.

<sup>2</sup> *Aristotelis Politicorum liber primus* ex recensione M. Schmidt (Jena 1882. 4to). The arrangement adopted is justified in an article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cxxv. 1882. 801—824. Compare with

what follows Susemihl *Politica tertium* ed. (Teubner) pp. xxiv—xxvi.

<sup>3</sup> Even Krohn *Zur Kritik* 33—35 regards the first book as Aristotle's. He nowhere states how far it had been manipulated by the *οἰκείων συναγωγῇ*.

<sup>4</sup> *αἰρί* <*a*> for *ἔτι*.

καὶ πρότερον ὅτ' τῇ φέεται ἢ πόλιν  
ἢ οἰκίαν καὶ ἑκαστος ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τῆς.

τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκασίαν  
εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ  
τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται [τοῦς οὐδὲ χεῖρ] εἰ  
μὴ ὁμονύμως [ὥσπερ εἰ τις λέγει τῇ  
λιθίνῃ. διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ <οὐκ> ἔσται  
τοιαύτη.] πάντα γὰρ τῷ ἔργῳ ὄρισται  
καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα  
ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, ἀλλ'  
ὁμώνυμα. 2 §§ 12, 13: 1253 a 19  
—25.

What is left of c. 2 follows in the usual order, *i.e.* §§ 9, 10 in τῷ αὐτῷ... ἐπιθυμητῇ, §§ 10—12 διότι... πόλιν, §§ 13, 14 φέεται... οἰκίαν: c. 3 §§ 1—3 as far as χρηματιστικῆς. Then cc. 8—11 in the following order: 8 §§ 1—13 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν (the preceding sentence of 8 § 1 ὅλως... ἦν is enclosed in brackets).. οἰκίας: 10 §§ 1—3 ὅλον... ζώων: 8 §§ 14, 15; 9 § 1 καὶ ἔοικεν... γίνεται μᾶλλον: 9 §§ 12, 13 καὶ αὐτῇ... χρημάτων κτήσις: 9 §§ 2—12 λάβωμεν... ὁ κατὰ φύσιν: 9 §§ 14—18 τῇ δ' οἰκονομικῆς οὐ <σης> χρηματιστικῆς... ὅρον: 10 §§ 4, 5; c. 11: c. 12 § 1 as far as γαμικῇ. The rest of c. 3 follows, *i.e.* §§ 2, 4 πρῶτον [καὶ] κατὰ δύσιν... βίαιον γάρ: cc. 4—6 as usual; c. 7 §§ 2—5 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀσπότης... θρησκευτῆς, after which ἡ δαὶ χρῆσθαι... τὸν πόλεμον [καὶ πρῶτον] should be inserted from c. 8 § 12: then 7 §§ 1, 2 φανερόν δέ... ἵσταν ἀρχῇ: lastly cc. 12, 13 from καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς (in 12 § 1) to the end. *Tr.*

<sup>1</sup> The parallel versions here given hardly deserve that name if compared with those pointed out by Spengel, Susemihl, Wilson. It is essential that the same thought, or something very similar, should be found repeated with a mere variation of language. Schmidt employs the two columns to separate genuine Aristotelian fragments from the additions of editors. In the right hand column above, the conception of ἀσπότης is found three times, and the passages where

[ὅτι μὲν αὐτὸς ἢ πόλιν καὶ οἰκίαν καὶ πρῶτον ἢ ἀσπότης ἢ ἐκαστος ἔχουσιν.] εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀσπότης ἑκαστος χρηματίζεται, ἐκαστος τοῦτο ἄλλους μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον. ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμεται ἀσπότης, ἢ μὲν δούμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος πόλεως, [ὥστε ἢ θρησκὴ ἢ βία] 2 § 14: 1253 a 25—29.

αὐτὸς περ ἀρχῇ ὡς ὥσπερ ἐν περὶ τοῦ  
2 § 10<sup>1</sup>: 1253 a 6, 7.

it occurs are judged by him to be additions to the original Aristotle text, *i.e.* *Tr.* because, if the end of the state is εἰς τὸν, it cannot be ἀσπότης. Thus then, he argues, is an instance of two independent definitions which have been blended into one. Similarly with other cases where, according to his view, the present text, or, as Krohn calls it, 'our old tradition', has been formed by the conglomeration of heterogeneous materials.]

# ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

## INTRODUCTION. B. I. cc. 1, 2.

I. As the end and aim of every society is a good, the end and aim of the state, the highest society under which all the rest are included, is the highest good: 1 § 1.

II. The assertion (in the *Politicus* of Plato) that the difference between the family and the state is merely quantitative, not qualitative, and hence that there is no essential difference between a father, a master, a king, and a republican statesman, 1 § 2, disproved by an analytical enquiry into the origin of the family, the village-community, and the state: 1 § 3, 2 § 1.

(a) The family is formed by nature out of the two smallest natural unions, of husband and wife, and of master and slave, solely for the support and propagation of life: 2 §§ 2—5.

(b) In the same natural manner out of the household or family grows the village-community, the first in the ascending scale of societies formed for purposes wider than the satisfaction of mere every-day wants. Out of the village arises the state, in which the primitive form of government was accordingly monarchy: 2 §§ 5—7.

(c) The state itself then, the most complete society, springing up, like the rest, to provide the bare means of living, continues to exist for the full development and perfecting and independence of life. It is, in a higher sense of the term, most truly a natural growth; and man is a being by nature ordained for civil society, 2 §§ 8, 9, far beyond all other animals, because he alone possesses speech and the perception of good and evil, of right and wrong: 2 §§ 10—12.

(d) Moreover the state is in the order of nature prior to the family and to the individual: 2 §§ 13, 14.

(e) Only the actual establishment of the state raises man to what he really is and endows him with those higher gifts of virtue, in the absence of which he is no better—far worse indeed—than any of the brutes: 2 §§ 15, 16.

## PART I: OF THE FAMILY: B. I. cc. 3—13.

**A. Of the Family in general.** There being three fundamental constituents of the family, the subject is divided into a consideration of the several relations (1) of master and slave, (2) of husband and wife (the conjugal relation), (3) of father and child (the parental relation). To which must be added a consideration of wealth and its acquisition (*χρηματιστική*); the relation of this subject to that of the family (*οικονομική*)<sup>1</sup> is a disputed point needing investigation: 3 §§ 1—3.

**B. Special Exposition: c. 3 § 3—c. 13 § 6.****I. Of the relation of master and slave, or of Slavery: 3 § 3—7 § 3.**

(a) Transition to this subject, 3 § 3. Statement of the two main points in the inquiry, 3 § 4.

(b) These two points discussed at length: cc. 4—6, c. 7 §§ 1—3.

(a) The nature and justification of Slavery: cc. 4—6.

(i) The nature and character of the slave: he is an animate chattel, c. 4.

(ii) How far Slavery is in accord with the law of nature: cc. 5, 6.

(a) There are as a fact men whom nature intended to be the slaves of the rest, c. 5.

(b) But for that very reason slavery imposed simply by the laws of war upon men who are not of this sort is contrary to nature, c. 6.

(β) The view quoted in the *Introduction* from Plato's *Politicus* that rule over freemen and over slaves, whether in the family or in the state, is not essentially different and that it rests upon a science, is now more completely stated and disproved on the ground of the results just obtained, 7 §§ 1, 2.

There are however sciences treating of the functions of master and slave. Wherein such science consists: 7 §§ 3, 4.

**II. Of Property and its acquisition: cc. 8—11.**

(*περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς*: of the acquisition or management of property, the art of wealth.)

<sup>1</sup> [No uniform rendering of these two words has been attempted, and the term 'economic science', used a little lower down as a virtual reproduction of one of them, is without authority in this sense.

The more common equivalents are, for *χρηματιστική* 'finance', 'money-making art'; for *οικονομική* 'household management', 'domestic economy'. [4.]

(a) Theoretical discussion. The relation of the art of wealth (*χρηματιστική*) to a theory of the family or economic science (*οικονομική*): cc. 8—10.

(a) The different cases possible: 8 §§ 1, 2.

(β) Proof that the first is inadmissible: acquisition of property does not coincide with the whole field of economic science: 8 § 2 (*ὅτι μὲν οὖν...*).

(γ) To decide whether the former is at any rate a branch of the latter (or even an auxiliary science), it is necessary, 8 § 3, to distinguish

(i) direct acquisition through production by means of cattle-breeding, hunting, plundering, fishing, agriculture, and fruit-growing: a species of acquisition belonging as such to economic science and forming a part of it, or an auxiliary science: 8 §§ 3—15,

and (ii) indirect acquisition by exchange, c. 9:

either (a) simple barter, not in itself unnatural provided it does not go beyond actual needs, 9 §§ 1—6,

or (b) exchange through the medium of money, an artificial, though necessary, development of barter to facilitate intercourse. So long as it remains true to this object and no more than a means to the easier satisfaction of actual needs it does not become unnatural or foreign to economic science, as it does when trade is carried on as a distinct profession, money is made an independent end, and exchange simply a means to unlimited accumulation of money and capital: 9 §§ 7—18.

(δ) It is now possible to decide finally between the various alternatives remaining, so far as the *natural* species of acquisition is concerned. This is in one respect an actual branch of Economic, in another respect, and more truly, only an auxiliary to it: 10 §§ 1—3.

(ε) The most unnatural species of exchange is trading with money in the strict sense, the lending out of money on interest, which directly makes money out of money: 10 §§ 4, 5.

(b) The art of acquiring wealth in its practical application: c. 11.

(a) Classification of the different branches of this art: 11 §§ 1—4.

(i) Production proper: cattle-rearing, agriculture, fruit-growing; culture of bees, fish, birds: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) Acquisition by means of exchange: 11 § 3.

(a) trade: whether (1) maritime, (2) inland, or (3) retail trade;

(b) the lending of money on interest;

(c) hired labour (1) of artisans, (2) of day labourers.

(iii) Branches of a mixed nature: forestry, mining, 11 § 4.

(β) General remark on the different character of these various branches as judged by an ideal standard, 11 § 6.

(γ) For particular information as to the practical exercise of these various branches of acquisition reference is made to special works upon these subjects and to

the stories current in various quarters of the means by which individuals have been enriched : 11 §§ 7—13.

**III. The management of the household, as it affects the members, especially in the marital and parental relations; also in the relation of master and slave: cc. 12, 13.**

(a) Different nature of the rule exercised over the wife and over the children: c. 12.

(b) The management of a household extends to immediate property but especially and primarily aims at promoting virtue and excellence in the members of the family, preeminently in those who are free : 13 § 1.

(c) Proof that even a slave is capable of a certain mental and moral excellence and that he requires it : that the virtue of man, woman, child, slave, is different in kind and degree, 13 §§ 2—12, since

(a) although the parts of the soul are the same, they exist differently in man, woman, child, and slave, 13 §§ 5—9:

(β) a more detailed investigation shows that by common consent certain qualities would not be virtues in a man which are so in a woman, a child, or a slave : 13 §§ 10, 11.

(γ) The virtue and excellence of a boy and a slave belong to them not as themselves, but in relation to another : 13 § 11 (*ἐπει δὲ...*).

(d) A more precise statement wherein the excellence of a slave consists. It is the master's business to train him to it. The right mode of treating slaves: 13 §§ 12—14.

(e) The right course of training for women and boys is a subject that goes beyond the limits of the family and more properly belongs to the theory of the best polity : 13 §§ 15, 16.

## PART II: OF THE POLITY OR CONSTITUTION: B. II.—VIII.

## A. CRITICAL PART.

Examination of the schemes of an ideal best polity put forward in the theories of preceding philosophers, together with those most commendable amongst the constitutions actually established. It is shown that none of them really answers to the best polity: B. II.

I. The object and principles of this review: c. I §§ 1, 2.

II. CRITICISM OF THE IDEAL POLITIES: I § 3—8 § 25.

a. PLATO'S IDEAL STATE IN THE *Republic*: I § 3—5 § 28.

(a) The end which Plato assumes for the state, its utmost possible unity, really involves, in the form in which he assumes it, the abrogation of the state, and is thus incapable of realization: c. 2.

(β) But even granting that this is the true end and practicable it would not be secured by the means which Plato proposes; viz. the enforcement, upon the two upper classes, of community of wives and children and community of property: 3 § 1—5 § 13.

(i) Arguments against community of wives and children: cc. 3, 4.

(1) Plato thinks it a proof of perfect unity that all should apply to the same objects the terms 'mine', 'another's'. But there is an ambiguity in the word "all". Plato's view would not be correct if "all" meant "all collectively", but only if "all" meant "each individual":—a meaning here impossible: 3 §§ 1—3. This argument applies also to community of property.

(2) Men care far less about the things which they share in common than about what is their own. Hence the community of children will result in the total neglect of them by all alike: their real or nominal parents will, one and all, feel but slight interest in what becomes of them. So that a specific real relationship, however distant, would be of far more service to them than this general indeterminate paternity: 3 §§ 4—7.

(3) Many parents however would inevitably recognise their own children: 3 §§ 8, 9.

(4) As a rule violence and outrage are avoided with especial care in the case of near relations, but when it is not known who these are this heedfulness disappears: 4 § 1.

(5) It is strange that in spite of the community of children Plato does not altogether prohibit unnatural love but only its worst excesses; nor even that because he is scandalized at its impropriety between the nearest blood relatives: 4 §§ 2—4.

(6) The end Plato has in view is the greatest possible unity and harmony amongst the ruling class of citizens: all are to feel themselves members of a single family. But the result would be just the opposite, since when that generalist all specific affection for kinsfolk would be abrogated and replaced by a feeble attachment in the last degree 'watery' and attenuated: 4 §§ 5—9. — For Plato's purpose, then, these institutions would have been better adapted for the third class of the population, than for the first two as he proposes, in order to make its members disinclined and more obedient: 4 § 4. >

(7) Plato's regulation for removing children, under certain circumstances, from the two upper classes into the third, and conversely, would be attended by great difficulties: and as such children are not to be informed that they were born in a different class, the mischiefs pointed out under (4) and (5) would be more likely to occur in their case: 4 § 9 (ἀλλὰ μὴν...), § 10.

## (ii) Arguments against community of property: 5 §§ 1—13.

(1) The different forms of communism possible, 5 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Community of property is no doubt more conceivable where, as in the Platonic state, the cultivators are not the owners of the soil: 5 § 3. But still in all that relates to social intercourse, to *meum* and *tuum*, communism is shown by experience to produce much dissension, 5 § 4. Far preferable therefore would be that state of things where property in general remains in private ownership, but the laws have inspired the citizens with so much public spirit, that they are willing to give up to their fellow-citizens much of their private possessions for common use: 5 §§ 5—8.

(3) Communism destroys the high enjoyment afforded by private property, which is in itself fully justified and in many respects morally noble: 5 §§ 8, 9.

(4) With community of wives, children, and property there could be no such virtues as chastity (*σωφροσύνη*), in respect of one's neighbour's wife, or liberality: 5 § 10.

(5) Lawsuits about disputed property, cases arising from perjury, &c. are not due, as Plato maintains, to the absence of communism, but to the prevalence of moral corruption: 5 §§ 11, 12.

(6) In general Plato's procedure is unfair: he has before him only the evils of which we should be rid by communism: the advantages we should lose he overlooks: 5 § 13.

(7) Further objections to the Platonic institutions generally: 5 §§ 14—28.

(i) Their defects are ultimately due to the defectiveness of the end which they subserve, as pointed out above under (a). But so far as political unity within due limits must be the object of political institutions it is surprising that, considering the great importance which Plato attaches to the right education, he should not seek to attain this unity amongst his citizens by education, the introduction of common menses, &c. instead of the means which he employs: 5 §§ 14, 15.

(ii) If the Platonic institutions were really serviceable, they would have been carried into effect before now: 5 § 16.

(iii) But the experiment would prove beyond all doubt that the practical application of them could not be carried further than is at present actually the case in some states: 5 § 17.

(iv) Besides, the regulations laid down by Plato are extremely imperfect. They only apply to the two upper classes of citizens, and equal difficulties present themselves whether they are extended to the third class or not. In the former case the true foundation of the Platonic state would be annulled; in the latter the state would be divided into two hostile camps in direct contradiction of the unity intended, as the advantages which Plato claimed for his state (see 5 § 11 above) would for the most part be rendered illusory: 5 §§ 18—24. —

(v) The analogy of animals, who have no domestic life, does not prove that women can share the occupations of men: 5 § 24 (*ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ...*).

(vi) To keep the same rulers always in office is a dangerous measure, but consistency on Plato's part requires it: 5 §§ 25, 26.

(vii) Plato himself admits that his regulations do not secure the complete happiness of the upper classes. If so, then further this is true of the whole state: 5 §§ 27, 28.

### b. The ideal polity of Plato's Laws: c. 6.

(a) Comparison of the *Republic* with the *Laws*; the relation between the schemes of polity laid down in these two works: 6 §§ 1—5.

(β) Criticism of the state in the *Laws*: 6 §§ 6—22.

(i) It would require far too large a territory: 6 §§ 6, 7.

(ii) It is not enough that a code of laws should take account of the land and the people; the neighbouring people have also to be regarded: 6 §§ 7, 8.

(iii) Again, the principles regulating the limit to be set on possession need to be expressed more clearly and fully: 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) There is an inconsistency in demanding equality of landed estate without at the same time fixing a definite unalterable number of citizens: 6 §§ 10—13.

(v) We are not told how the ruling citizens are to receive an education distinguishing them from the rest, nor in what this education should consist: 6 § 14.

(vi) It is inconsistent to make landed estate inalienable and at the same time allow moveable property within certain limits to change hands: 6 § 15.

(vii) The division of each citizen's real estate into two separate establishments is awkward: 6 § 15 (*καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων...*).

(viii) The constitution proposed in the *Laws* is a combination of Oligarchy and Democracy, *i.e.* a Polity (*πολιτεία*) technically so called. But

(1) this sort of mixed constitution, though perhaps the best on the average, is by no means the next best after the absolutely perfect scheme: 6 §§ 16, 17.

(2) Plato himself calls it a blending of Democracy and Tyranny, which is self-contradictory and, as a matter of fact, incorrect: 6 § 18.

(3) The oligarchical element is far too preponderant in this constitution of Plato's: 6 §§ 19—21.

(ix) The mode in which the magistrates are elected is politically unsafe: 6 § 22.

## c. Phaleas' scheme of polity: c. 7.

(a) Brief account of this scheme: 7 §§ 1—4.

(β) Criticism: 7 §§ 5—23.

(i) The objection brought against Plato, 6 § 16, holds also against Phaleas: if there is to be a maximum fixed for property, then the number of children must also be limited: 7 § 5.

(ii) Although a certain equality of possessions is no doubt of importance for the state, it is much more important that the estates should on the average be neither too large nor too small: 7 §§ 6, 7.

(iii) Far more important, again, is equality in respect of a good education, which trains the intellect properly and duly moderates the desires: 7 §§ 8, 9. II 10—11—7 §§ 18—20.

(iv) Moreover Phaleas has never sufficiently defined equality of possessions, as he makes no allusion to moveable property: 7 § 21.

(v) In his regulation of property he ought to have taken some account of the external concerns and relations of the state, but he has left them altogether unnoticed: 7 §§ 14—17.

(vi) Phaleas prohibits all handicrafts to his citizens; but the measures adopted by him to render this possible are not suited to his object: 7 §§ 22, 23.

## d. Hippodamos' scheme of polity: c. 8.

[(a) Introductory remarks on Hippodamos himself: 8 § 1.]

(β) Account of his model constitution: 8 §§ 2—7.

(i) Number of the citizens, 8 § 2.

(ii) Division into artizans, farmers, soldiers, 8 § 2.

(iii) Division of the land; a part to belong to the temples, a part to the state, a part to private individuals, 8 § 3.

(iv) Legal regulations: 8 §§ 4, 5.

(1) The administration of justice to be confined to three objects, § 4.

(2) Right of appeal, § 4.

(3) Alterations in the mode in which jurymen record their verdicts, § 5.

(v) Honorary distinctions for those who are the authors of useful reforms in the existing laws and institutions: 8 § 6.

(vi) Maintenance, at the cost of the state, of the orphans whose fathers have fallen in war: 8 § 6.

(vii) Election of magistrates: 8 § 7.

(γ) Criticism: 8 §§ 7—25.

(i) That all three classes should have an equal share in all the privileges of citizenship is impossible: 8 § 7 (ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι) — § 10.

(ii) It does not appear what is the end to be answered by such a farmer class owning the private lands: if it is also to cultivate the state lands its very existence is contrary to the object in view: yet one is at a loss to know who else could do this: 8 § 10 (*ἐτι οἱ γεωργοί...*).

(iii) Nor is the proposal as to the mode in which the jurymen should vote, § 5, any better: 8 §§ 13—15.

(iv) The proposal to reward reforms in legislation, § 6, is open to the objection that while on the one hand the unchangeableness of the existing laws is dangerous, 8 §§ 16—22, on the other there is pressing need that any change in them should be attended by conditions every whit as stringent: 8 §§ 23—25.

### III. CRITICISM OF THE BEST AMONGST ACTUALLY EXISTING POLITIES: CC. 9—12.

#### (a) The Spartan polity: c. 9.

(a) General prefatory remark upon the twofold standard to be set up in criticising a polity: 9 § 1.

(β) The defects of the Spartan polity: 9 §§ 2—36.

#### (i) Social defects: 9 §§ 2—19.

(1) Under a good constitution judged by the first standard there will be provision that the citizens are released from all manual labour, and hence that the soil is cultivated by others than the citizens. But the position of the Spartan peasantry, the Helots, is radically wrong: 9 §§ 2—4.

(2) The license of the women, and their virtual supremacy at Sparta, are mistakes judged by either standard: 9 §§ 5—13.

(3) The permission to give away or bequeath land at pleasure, the absence of any limit to the amount of dower, the unrestricted right of the father (or of the successor to his rights) to bestow an heiress upon any one he likes;—all this combined has brought two-fifths of the Spartan land into female hands and occasioned moreover terrible inequality of possessions with a frightful diminution in the number of men capable of bearing arms. In these circumstances the very law which was designed to increase as much as possible the body of Spartan citizens serves only to swell the ranks of paupers: 9 §§ 14—19.

#### (ii) Political defects: 9 §§ 19—36.

(1) In the Ephoralty, 9 §§ 19—24:

(2) in the Council of Elders, 9 §§ 25—28:

(3) in the Kingly office, 9 §§ 29, 30.

(4) Bad management of the public messes at Sparta: 9 §§ 31, 32.

(5) The Admirals (*ναύαρχοι*), 9 § 33.

(6) All the institutions tend solely to military excellence, 9 § 34, which is, after all, but a means to an end and not an end in itself, 9 § 35.

(7) Defects in the financial administration, 9 § 36.

**(b) Criticism of the Cretan polity: c. 10.**

(a) How the resemblance between the Cretan and Spartan polities may be historically explained: 10 §§ 1, 2. [Digression on the geographical position of Crete and its political relations under Minos: 10 §§ 3, 4.]

(β) Comparison of the Cretan and Spartan polities: 10 §§ 5—16.

(i) The resemblances, 10 §§ 5—7.

(ii) The differences between the two: 10 §§ 7—14.

(1) How far the public messes are better regulated in Crete than at Sparta. Some other social rules peculiar to the Cretans: 10 §§ 7—9.

(2) How far again the magistracy of the *ademos* is worse managed even than the ephoralty: 10 §§ 9—14.

(iii) Nothing but its favourable geographical position has saved Crete more than once from the outbreak of mischiefs similar to those at Sparta: 10 §§ 15, 16.

**(c) Criticism of the Carthaginian polity: c. 11.**

(a) General introductory remarks on the excellence of this polity, its resemblance to the Cretan, and more especially to the Spartan polity: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(β) Comparison of Carthage and Sparta in respect of the institutions at Carthage which correspond to the public mess, the ephoralty, the kingship, and the senate: 11 §§ 3, 4.

(γ) To what extent

(i) the democratical element: §§ 5, 6,

(ii) the oligarchical element,

is more strongly represented at Carthage than in Crete or at Sparta.

(1) in the Boards of Five, 11 § 7,

(2) in the exaggerated respect paid to wealth in the appointment to the highest offices, and in the fact that they can be bought—a practice inimical to a true aristocracy: 11 §§ 8—10, § 12, §§ 10—12.

(δ) One defect very usual at Carthage is that the same individual simultaneously fills a number of offices: 11 §§ 13, 14.

(ε) From many of the evils resulting from the defects of their polity the Carthaginians are preserved solely by external means, placed at their disposal by the incessant favour of fortune: 11 §§ 15, 16.

**(d) Criticism of the Solonian constitution: 12 §§ 3—6.**

(a) Transition to this criticism, 12 § 1.

(β) There are no good grounds

(i) either for the praise bestowed by its friends: 12 §§ 2, 3.

(ii) or for the censure bestowed by its opponents: 12 §§ 4—6. Upon Solon's constitution.

## [IV. APPENDIX.

On the most prominent legislators, whether they aimed at founding new polities or not: 12 §§ 6—14.

(a) Zaleukos, with remarks upon a supposed school of legislators, Onomakritos, Thales, Lycurgus, Zaleukos, Charondas: 12 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Philolaos, 12 § 8,

(c) Charondas, 12 §§ 8—10,

(d) Phaleas, 12 § 11,

(e) Plato, 12 § 12,

(f) Draco, 12 § 13,

(g) Pittacus, 12 § 13,

(h) Andromadas, 12 § 14.]

## B. POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: B. III.—VIII.

## I. FUNDAMENTAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

## B. III. cc. 1—13.

**First group: the most general conceptions: III. 1 § 1—6 § 2.**

a. The essential nature of a polity or constitution, of a state, of a citizen: cc. 1, 2.

(a) The enquiry into the nature of a constitution raises the question 'What is a state?' and this introduces the further question 'What is a citizen?': 1 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Citizenship is defined by participation in the government of the state, there being two forms of this government, the one exercised by the general deliberative and judicial bodies, that is, the popular assembly and the jurymen (*δικασταί*), the other by the particular magistrates. Different polities have different regulations as to the government, and so too as to the right of participation in it. Citizenship not necessarily dependent on descent from citizens: 1 § 2—2 § 5.

$\beta$ . The true nature of the state is so largely bound up with its constitution that a change in the latter is sufficient to destroy the identity of the state, c. 3.

$\gamma$ . Is the excellence ( $\delta\pi\epsilon\tau\eta$ ) of the citizen the same as the excellence of the man? 4 § 1—6 § 2.

(a) Not unconditionally the same, since

(i) the former varies with the particular polity, while the latter is always one and the same: 4 §§ 1—3.

(ii) It is true that in the highest sense the excellence of the citizen means the excellence of a citizen of the best polity. Yet even in the best polity the citizens are not all equally good men, although they may be equally excellent in their several functions: 4 §§ 4, 5.

[(iii) The state consists of very dissimilar elements, which differ in their degrees of excellence: 4 § 6.]

(b) Government in the state must fall to the men who are intellectually and morally the most capable. Hence the excellence of the citizen who rules, *i.e.* his excellence as a ruler, must coincide with his excellence as a man: 4 §§ 7—9.

(c) But no one can properly command in the state unless he has first learnt properly to obey; this then is a further qualification included under the excellence of the ruler, that is, by (b), under the excellence of the good man. It follows that the excellence of the citizen and the excellence of the man are in their inmost nature really identical and only apparently distinct (and the best polity that in which they are coextensive). The moral excellences ( $\delta\pi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ ) displayed in ruling and obeying, though specifically distinct, are yet generically the same. Only the intellectual or *dianoetic* excellence is generically different in the ruler, where it is higher practical thought and prudence, from what it is in the subject, where it is merely right apprehension of the command: 4 §§ 10—18.

(d) In agreement with these results the best polity refuses to allow its citizens to engage in agriculture or trade, to be artisans or labourers. Men who are thus occupied must have a status assigned them distinct from that of the citizens. In all the other polities, true civic excellence, identical with the excellence of the good man, can neither wholly nor approximately be attributed to any of the citizens except those who are in a position to abstain from such occupations: 5 § 1—6 § 2.

**Second group of principles.** Development of the chief species of particular constitutions, with their order of merit: 6 § 2—13 § 25.

a. Determination of all the possible leading types of polities: 6 § 2—7 § 5.

(a) A polity or constitution is nothing but a form of government, and the separate polities are especially distinguished by the different supreme authorities in whose name government is administered. This being so, the difference in polities is mainly based upon the observance of the end of the state, and upon the different possible modes of ruling men, whether in the interest of the governed, or in the selfish interest of the governors. Thus the important distinction is that between normal polities—in which the government is for the good of the governed and so for the true end of the state, the common weal; that is, the general happiness and the perfecting of life—and perverted forms: 6 §§ 2—11.

(b) The next subdivision is into three normal constitutions—Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity—and three corresponding perversions—Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy, according as the supreme power is vested in one man, in several, or a large number: c. 7.

β. Closer investigation into the nature of these constitutions and their relative values: cc. 8—13.

(a) Democracy more precisely defined as selfish government by the poor, Oligarchy as selfish government by the rich; the rule of the majority or the minority being but a subordinate characteristic, the absence of which, even when amounting to a reversal of the numerical proportions, would not affect the essential nature of the case: c. 8.

(b) Which of the normal constitutions is the most normal and the best, and what is their order of merit: cc. 9—13.

(a) The right (*δίκαιον*) recognised by the principles of Democracy and of Oligarchy respectively, and its divergence in each case from the absolute right which is based on excellence (*τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον, τὸ κατ' ἀρετήν*): c. 9.

(β) Who ought to be sovereign, judged by the standard of this absolute right, and how far his powers should extend: cc. 10, 11.

(i) Objections to the exclusive sovereignty of every class or person: c. 10.

Not simply of (1) a tyrant, § 1 or (2) the great masses of the poor, §§ 1, 2 or (3) the rich, § 3; but also (4) the respectable classes (*οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς*), § 4, or (5) the one best citizen (*εἰς ὁ σπουδαιότατος*), § 5.

If however (6) the law is held to be the true sovereign, precisely the same questions recur in another form, § 5.

(ii) The true normal state of things: the whole body of citizens relatively so virtuous that the merit of the great majority of them taken collectively will exceed that of the specially gifted minority. In that case

(1) sovereignty should be vested in this whole body of citizens, 11 §§ 1—5: but

(2) its exercise restricted to legislative and judicial powers, more particularly the election and control of the responsible magistrates, to whom the

citizens should entrust the details of state business: II §§ 6—7.

(iii) First objection to this arrangement, II §§ 10—12, and reply to the objection, II §§ 13, 14.

(iv) Second objection, II §§ 15, 16: how disposed of, II 16, 17.

(v) Under this arrangement the law must undoubtedly be the truly supreme sovereign: the unrestricted plenary powers of the human sovereign being exercised only in the province of the particular and individual which law by its very nature cannot define. The more precise character of the laws must in each case be determined by the constitution: II §§ 19—21.

(7) True constitutional principles more precisely elaborated: *cc.* 14, 15<sup>1</sup>.

(i) A claim to political privilege not conferred by all personal advantages, but only by those which are necessarily connected with the essential nature of a state, viz. free birth, wealth, and more especially merit (*dperñ* = capacity and virtue): to which may be added nobility, as being a higher degree of free birth and a combination of excellence with affluence: *c.* 12. Politics where the case is otherwise, are no normal forms but mere perversions, 13 § 1.

Fuller statement of the claims justified, 13 §§ 2—5.

(ii) None of the advantages mentioned can lay exclusive claim to justification even from the one-sided oligarchical or democratical point of view, much less from that of the true aristocracy, as even in respect of merit it is always a question whether the excellence of the pre-eminently good men is or is not outweighed by the aggregate endowments of the great majority: 13 §§ 7—10.

(iii) If it be so outweighed there is a solution of the difficult question, whether the laws should be made for the advantage of the majority or of the better men: 13 §§ 11, 12.

(iv) This case also provides for

(1) the normal and best polity proper, True Aristocracy:

(2) a Polity, where distinctions of property are also regarded, will be the utmost attainable in other cases.—*This whole statement, (1) and (2), or something similar, is lost.*

(3) In general, the superior merit of a body of men within the state can only establish its right when this body is large enough numerically to form a state of itself, or at all events to appoint the magistrates, 13 § 6. When it is a single citizen, or a few, whose preeminent endowments outweigh those of all the rest collectively, perverted forms of government resort to extraneous and other violent measures to remove such men and get rid of them, but in the best constitution nothing remains except to give them unlimited authority unfettered even by law. In such a case the best constitution would take the form of Absolute Monarchy: 13 §§ 13—15.

<sup>1</sup> [Bernays supposed *cc.* 12, 13 to be another version of *cc.* 9—11: see *Introduct.* p. 43.]

## II. THE SEPARATE POLITIES OR CONSTITUTIONS:

## B. III. c. 14—VIII (V).

## A. Monarchy and the best constitution in the strict sense, Pure Aristocracy: III. c. 14—V (VIII).

## MONARCHY: III. cc. 14—18.

(a) The questions which come under consideration in the examination of Monarchy: 14 §§ 1, 2 (*διαφοράς*).

(b) The different varieties of monarchy or kingship: 14 § 2 (*ῥαῖδιον*...) —§ 15.

(a) The office of the Spartan kings; §§ 2—5.

(β) Despotic monarchy amongst non-Hellenic races; §§ 6, 7.

(γ) *Αἰσυμνητεία* or elective tyranny; §§ 8—10.

(δ) The Hellenic kingship of the heroic age; §§ 11—13.  
Recapitulation of these four varieties, § 14.

(e) True absolute monarchy, with full powers, § 15.

(c) Why it is only absolute monarchy that requires fuller consideration in this place: 15 §§ 1—3.

(d) Objections to its utility: 15 §§ 3—16.

(a) In general it is better to be governed by the best laws than by the best man: 15 § 3—§ 5 (*πᾶσαν*): 16 § 5 (*ὁ μὲν οὖν*)—§ 9.

(β) It may be granted that there certainly is one province, that of particular fact, for which the decision of the laws is insufficient; yet it is always a question whether it is better that in this province the one best man or the whole body of capable citizens should have the decision in its own hands:

15 § 5 (*ἀλλ' ἴσως... κάλλιον*): 16 § 4 (*ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα...*)—§ 5: 15 § 6:

15 §§ 7—10, 16 § 9 (*ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ...*)—§ 10=16 § 10 (*εἰσι δὲ*)—§ 13:

15 § 10 (*εἰ δὴ*)—§ 13 (*δημοκρατίαν*).

(i) Many questions are more correctly decided by the great majority than by an individual: 15 § 5 (*ἀλλ' ἴσως...*)—§ 7, and many eyes see more than two: 16 § 10 (*εἰσι δὲ*)—§ 12.

(ii) A large majority of men of comparative excellence cannot be so easily led astray by personal feelings; 15 §§ 8—10.

(iii) As it is the custom for monarchs to associate their friends with them in power, they themselves *ipso facto* allow the claim of those who are equal and alike to an equal share in the government; 16 §§ 12, 13.

(iv) Even a monarch cannot be sole ruler; a number of officials is always required. If so, it is better from the first not to have a monarchy but to appoint this number of ruling officials by the constitution: 16 § 10.

(v) If the absolute rule of a single ruler can only be justified on the ground of merit, several capable men have in general more capacity than one: 16 § 11.

(vi) Historical appendix on the development of the remaining constitutions out of monarchy: 15 §§ 11—13 (*δημοκρατία*).

(7) What opinion should be held of hereditary succession to the throne? 15 §§ 13, 14.

(δ) And of the armed force or body-guard to be assigned to a king? 15 § 14 (*ἡ χεὶρ δ' ἀπορρέει*)—16 § 2 (*βασιλεύς*).

(i) This question can easily be settled in a monarchy limited by law: 15 §§ 14—16.

(ii) Here, however, we are discussing absolute, not limited, monarchy: 16 §§ 1, 2.

(ε) The unrestrained rule of one man over all the rest for his whole lifetime appears unnatural when these others are more or less his equals: whereas the only normal course appears to be to divide the government amongst several men under the restrictions imposed by the laws: 16 § 2 (*δοκεῖ δὲ τίσιν*)—§ 4.

(ε) How far these doubts and objections are well grounded: c. 17.

(α) Monarchy not in itself unnatural any more than the rule of a master over slaves (*δασπορία*) or a normal republican government (*πολιτεία*); under changed conditions each of them becomes appropriate: 17 § 1.

(β) In fact, however, as an actual form of government in the developed state, kingly rule is only conceivable as an absolute monarchy under the most capable citizens, yet not actually suitable and natural save in a single exceptional case, namely, in the state of things explained above (c. 13 §§ 13—25): 17 § 2.

(γ) [Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity severally adapted to citizens of different kinds: 17 §§ 3, 4.] It is only in the single case above-mentioned that Absolute Monarchy should supersede Aristocracy: 17 §§ 5—8.

(f) Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the stricter sense: c. 18.

## PURE ARISTOCRACY: THE TRUE NORMAL FORM OF THE ABSOLUTELY BEST CONSTITUTION: B. IV (VII), V (VIII).

### Preliminary Questions: IV (VII) cc. 1—3.

(α) The best form of polity is that which is auxiliary to the best and most desirable life. A definition of the latter is thus required and first obtained: 1 §§ 1—10. This best life or happiness is shown to be the same for the individual and for the state: 1 §§ 11, 12 = 2 §§ 1, 2.

Summary of the results of this investigation: 1 §§ 13, 14.

[(β) A second preliminary question. Even if happiness is made to depend pre-eminently upon virtue and excellence, we may yet be in doubt whether excellence in peace or in war is the main thing for the state, whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific enquirer is the happier for the individual: 2 § 3—3 § 10.

(i) Excellence of the internal administration is the main thing for the state: military excellence is only needed for self-defence and for acquiring as slaves those for whom nature intended this lot. The state should not make conquest and subjugation its aim and end: 2 §§ 8—18.

(ii) For the individual it is not the tyrant's life but active employment in the service of a free and capable state that is alone a great or noble thing. Yet the scientific life is no less an active life, and is besides an activity of a higher order than the other: c. 3.]

#### OUTLINE OF THE ABSOLUTELY BEST CONSTITUTION:

##### B. IV (VII) c. 4—V (VIII) c. 7.

##### (a) The External Conditions: IV (VII) cc. 4—12.

(i) The natural conditions; the land and the people: cc. 4—7.

(A) Prefatory remarks: 4 §§ 1—3.

(B) Of the proper number of citizens and inhabitants: 4 §§ 4—14.

(c) Of the character and extent of the territory and of its geographical form: 5 §§ 1—3.

(D) The position of the city, 5 § 3 (*τῆς δὲ πόλεως...*)—6 § 8,

(a) on the land side: 5 §§ 3, 4,

(b) towards the sea: 6 §§ 1—5.

Of the regulation of the naval force: 6 §§ 6—8.

(E) The best natural endowment and disposition for the citizens: c. 7.

(ii) The social or socio-political conditions: cc. 8—12.

(A) Exclusion of the citizens from work for a livelihood, and of all who work for a livelihood from citizenship: c. 8—10 § 8.

(a) Distinction between the classes which are actual organic members of the state, and such as are merely indispensable conditions for the existence of the former: 8 §§ 1, 2; §§ 4, 5; §§ 3, 4.

(b) Enumeration of the classes indispensable to the state, 8 §§ 6—9.

(c) It is a feature of the best polity that only the classes which are from the nature of the case members of the state, viz. fighting men and administrators (including those who administer justice), with the addition of the priests, who form a third, peculiar element, are in fact recognised as its members, or have the citizenship. These functions are exercised by them alone, the first in their youth, the second in their mature age, and the third when they are old men. All other classes—farmers, artisans, tradesmen, etc.—are excluded from citizenship. Hence every such employ-

ment, even agriculture, is prohibited to the citizens, yet so that the soil belongs to them, although it is cultivated by serfs or dependents (*ἡλικία ἡ ὑπόκειται*) of non-Hellenic descent: c. 9.

[(d) Such regulations are no mere innovation; they are of old standing in Egypt and Crete, as also are public messes in Italy and Crete: 10 §§ 1—9.]

(B) The proper scheme for dividing the land: the right qualifications and position of those who cultivate it: 10 § 9 (*περὶ δὲ...*)—§ 14.

(a) General leading principles: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(1) No community of property, only a certain common use granted out of friendship, § 9;

(2) No citizen to be in want, § 9:

(3) The common messes to be provided at the public expense, § 10.

(4) So also the worship of the gods, § 10.

(b) The territory is accordingly divided into public land and private land, and each of these again into two parts: 10 §§ 11, 12.

(c) The cultivators of the soil should be either (1) serfs of different races and of docile temper (*μὴ θυμοειδὲς*), those on the state domain to belong to the state, those on private estates to the private owners; or failing this, (2) dependent subjects (*πρόξιοι*) of similar temper and of non-Hellenic descent: 10 §§ 13, 14.

(c) Regulations for the building of the city and the hamlets and villages: cc. 11, 12.

(a) The city: 11 § 1—12 § 7.

(1) Its site, on the slope of a hill, if possible, facing the east or else the south: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Provision for a perennial supply of sufficient wholesome water, 11 §§ 3—5.

(3) Of fortified positions inside the city: 11 § 5.

(4) Plan for laying out the streets: 11 §§ 6, 7.

(5) The walls, 11 §§ 8—12. Plan of sites in the walls where the guards may hold their mess, 12 § 1.

(6) The Upper Market-place, a public square for freemen (*ἀγορὰ δυνάμει*) with the principal temples and the gymnasia for the older men, 12 §§ 2—5. The Market-place for trade and in it the law courts and official buildings: 12 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Public buildings in the country: 12 § 8.

(B) A detailed sketch of the internal working of the Best Polity: IV (VII) c. 13—V (VIII) c. 7 (*incomplete*).

(i) General introductory remarks: IV (VII) c. 13.

(A) A right knowledge of the end of the best polity is as necessary as of the means which actually conduce to it: 13 §§ 1, 2.

(B) Its end is the happiness or well-being of all the citizens, which mainly consists in their highest excellence, though this is impossible apart from favourable external conditions, under which alone such excellence can be fully realized: 13 §§ 3, 4. These favourable conditions assumed to be at the legislator's disposal include, besides those already discussed, a happy natural capacity on the part of the citizens (*φύσις*), whilst the concern and principal task of the legislator is to see how this capacity can be improved into actual excellence by habituation and instruction: 13 §§ 5—13.

(ii) **The Education of the citizens: IV (VII) c. 14—V (VIII) c. 7** (*left incomplete*).

Its unity: IV (VII): 14 §§ 1—8.

Its aim and end: 14 § 9—15 § 6.

The means to be employed: IV (VII) § 6—end of v (VIII).

(A) Should the education of the rulers and of the ruled be different or the same, on the principles of the best constitution?

Different, in so far as the two are here different persons: the same, in so far again as they are the same persons but at different ages, and as in a government exercised for the common good of the ruled it is not possible to govern well unless one has learnt to obey well: 14 §§ 1—8.

(B) At what should the education of the citizens aim? What is the distinctive end and object of a virtuous life? 14 § 9—15 § 6.

(1) The virtues of the non-rational part of the soul (the moral virtues) are inferior to those of the rational part (the mental excellences or intellectual virtues) and have their end in the latter just as work has its end in leisure, war in peace: 14 §§ 9—14.

(2) Hence appears the defectiveness of constitutions like the Spartan, which, conversely, make war and conquest the object of the state, and strive solely to educate the citizens to be good soldiers, and nothing more, instead of treating military excellence as only a means to an end: 14 §§ 15, 16. Besides

(i) such principles have already been refuted by experience, namely by the sudden and lamentable collapse of the Spartan state and its power: 14 § 17.

(ii) Such principles aiming at the subjugation of other states imply the perverse opinion that it is nobler to rule over slaves than over freemen: 14 §§ 18, 19.

(iii) They are also dangerous in their influence on the behaviour of the citizens towards their own state: 14 § 19 (*ἔτι*)—§ 21 (*ἀνθρώπων*).

(iv) What are the ends for which alone war must be waged and citizens become good soldiers: 14 § 21 (*τὴν τε...δουλεύειν*).

(v) Another appeal to experience; states which have not learned to excel in the arts of peace must necessarily fall as soon as they have acquired their empire: 14 § 22.

(3) The virtues of peace and of leisure must rather have the preference; all the others ought however to be practised; since without the means the end cannot be attained and many indispensable virtues are easier to practice in war than in peace. For undisturbed peace easily leads us to rank external goods above others. But on the other hand this same mistake is the foundation for a one-sided military tendency as, for instance, amongst the Spartans: even capacity in war, which is all they value to attain, is only a means to an end, to the complete acquisition of external goods: 15 §§ 1—6.

(c) The right educational means: 15 § 6 (*ὁδὸς*...)—end of B. V (VIII).

(a) Preliminary remarks on the right course of education in general and the order of succession of educational agencies. Bodily development must precede that of the mind; in the latter, again, the training of the irrational soul by habituation must precede that of the rational soul through instruction: yet in such a way that the former always regards the latter as its aim and end: 15 §§ 6—10.

(b) Means to be employed before birth; the care requisite for the procreation of children of mental and bodily vigour and of good capacity: c. 16.

(1) The proper age for marriage: 16 §§ 1—10.

(i) The leading principles which determine it: 16 §§ 2—4, §§ 6—8.

(a) The difference of age between the parents to be such that their powers of procreation do not cease disproportionately, § 2.

(β) The difference in age between parents and children not to be too great or too small, § 3.

(γ) The educational requirement above mentioned, that the children to be brought up must be physically strong, § 4 (*...δυσχερὲς*). Whereas the offspring of marriages between those who are too young is usually stunted, § 6.

(δ) Further, young mothers invariably suffer greatly in childbirth, § 7: and

(ε) cohabitation begun at too early an age is prejudicial to female morality: also

(ζ) it stunts the growth of the husbands, § 8.

(ii) All these considerations may be satisfied by observing the limits of age within which married people are capable of having children, 16 §§ 4, 5, and thus we arrive at the proper determination, viz. 37 (?) for men and 18 for women: 16 §§ 9, 10.

(2) The season of the year and appropriate weather for entrance upon marriage and its duties: 16 §§ 10, 11.

(3) The right bodily condition for the parents: 16 §§ 12, 13.

(4) Provision for the proper treatment of women with child: 16 § 14.

(5) Exposure of deformed infants: procurement of abortion to be mentioned, in order that the prescribed number of children may not be exceeded: 16 § 15.

(6) Further a limit of age should be set beyond which parents are not to have children: this limit prescribed. Procurement of abortion when conception takes place beyond this age: 16 §§ 16, 17.

(7) Penalty for adultery: 16 § 17 (ὥστε...)—§ 18.

(c) Means to be employed directly after birth, 17 §§ 1—14.

(1) In infancy, §§ 1—3, § 6, § 4.

(2) In the subsequent period to the fifth year, § 4 (τῇν δ' ἐχομένην...)—§ 7. With a preliminary discussion of the question how far all coarseness and indecency is to be proscribed, and on the other hand how far male adults should be allowed to be spectators at comedies and the like: § 7—§ 14, § 13, § 14, § 12.

(3) Education from the fifth year on to the seventh: § 14 (διεξελεθόντων...αὐτούς).

(d) The course of Public Education proper from the age of seven to that of twenty-one: IV (VII). 17 §§ 15, 16, V (VIII).

(1) **General introductory remarks.** Two grades of age distinguished. Statement of the three questions to be discussed in regard to this course of education proper: IV (VII). 17, §§ 15, 16.

(2) It is more than necessary, it is most essential for the best polity, that a definite regulation of this educational course should be prescribed by law: V (VIII). 1 §§ 1, 2.

(3) It is not to be a domestic private education: it must be a universal and public course: 1 §§ 3, 4.

(4) **The right educational course:** V (VIII). cc. 2—7.

(i) Fundamental considerations: 2 § 1—3 § 12.

(a) Difference of views both as to the subjects of instruction, and as to the end and aim of the training: where there is agreement as to the subjects there are divergent views as to their practical application and mode of treatment, due to the difference of opinion as to their end: 2 §§ 1, 2.

(β) The pupils must indeed be taught what is indispensable for external life, yet here the right limits should be observed. The educational means usually employed should not be used (as, music alone excepted, they all may) with the idea of their conferring a purely practical external utility. They ought rather to be regarded as simply the conditions to the attainment of a higher end: 2 §§ 3—6.

(γ) The list of these subjects of ordinary education: reading, writing and arithmetic, gymnastic exercises, drawing, music: 3 § 1.

(δ) The ultimate end of education is the right occupation of the highest and truest leisure, which is not merely an interlude to work, but in itself the highest goal of life. Amusement and pastime serve as recreation to fill the less exalted leisure: but for the higher leisure the mind requires a different kind of activity, bringing with it the enjoyment of the highest intellectual gratification. Preliminary proof that amongst the ordinary subjects taught, music even in the judgment of our ancestors tends to this end, 3 § 2—§ 11 (δῆλον); and that the other subjects should be so used as not to lead away from it, but, indirectly at least, to conduce to it: 3 § 11 (ἐτι δέ)—§ 12.

(ii) Athletic exercises (*γυμναστική*): cc. 3 § 13—4 § 9.

(α) As was stated above, IV (vii). 15 §§ 6—10, education must begin with bodily exercises: 3 § 13.

(β) But two errors should be avoided; the one, of training up the boys like athletes, as is commonly done; the other, the Spartan practice of brutalising them by excessive exertions: 4 §§ 1—7.

(γ) We must therefore begin with easier exercises for the first period, and wait until they have attained puberty, and have been taught the other subjects of instruction for three years, before we commence the more exhausting gymnastic training: 4 § 7 (*ὅτε μὲν οὖν*)—§ 9.

## (iii) Music: cc. 5—7.

(α) Statement of the question: Should music serve for pastime recreation and relaxation, or for moral training, or lastly as a purely æsthetic and theoretical enjoyment, thereby ministering to the highest intellectual gratification? 5 § 1—§ 4 (*ἐλεγεῖσθαι*).

(β) The first and third of these ends are to all appearance foreign to the education of youth, though something may be said in favour of taking notice of them too in connexion with it. But it is still a question whether for any of these three objects it is necessary to learn to be a practical musician oneself: 5 § 4 (*ὅτε μὲν οὖν*)—§ 8.

(γ) Answer to the first question: Music can and should subserve each of these three aims, not only the highest intellectual gratification, but also mere recreation, since it is a thoroughly innocent enjoyment; and considering the frequent need for recreation in life this alone would suffice to justify its admission to a place in the instruction of youth. This consideration is not then to be wholly disallowed, as we supposed above (§ 4): yet it is only subordinate, 5 §§ 9—15, and the main point is that music is, thirdly, an excellent means for the moral training of the young: 5 §§ 16—25.

(δ) From this follows the answer to the second question:

(i) that in general the young should in fact be taught to become practical musicians: 6 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) and yet the adult citizens of the best state have in general to refrain from practising music themselves: §§ 3, 4.

(iii) Further this musical instruction should be regulated, §§ 5, 6, as follows:

(α) With regard to the degree of proficiency to be attained, the pupils should not be trained up to be professional virtuosos, but only receive the needful training of their characters and their tastes: 6 § 6 (*παρὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον*)—7 § 3.

(β) For this reason all musical instruments, like the flute, which are only in use with professional performers, should be excluded from the instruction of the young: 6 §§ 9—16.

(c) Lastly, as to the various modes (*ᾠμοὶ*) and rhythms :

(1) for musical performances by professional musicians all modes are permissible, since all serve to promote the homœopathic purification of the emotions which procures the educated the highest intellectual gratification and the multitude recreation and amusement. Hence for the sake of the public at large who are not citizens—the farmers, artisans, labourers—at such performances even the modes and pieces which gratify their low taste must be admitted. But for the moral training of the young only those which best represent, and for that reason best train, character, the Dorian mode especially. The Phrygian mode should not be allowed : 7 §§ 3—12. [Perhaps however the Lydian mode may be tolerated, since we are not excluded from paying some regard to the amusement of a maturer age, and even adult citizens are on certain occasions allowed to sing : also the modes which are appropriate to the compass of the voice in mature life may be allowed as well as those specially adapted to the young : 7 §§ 13—15.]

(2) *The elucidation of the further question stated in 7 § 2, whether the rhythm or the melody and tune is of chief importance for the instruction of the young, is altogether wanting.*

## B. THE REMAINING CONSTITUTIONS : B. VI (IV), VII (VI), VIII (V).

### Introductory remarks : B. VI (IV) cc. 1, 2.

i. Why it belongs to political philosophy to consider not merely the absolutely best constitution, but also the best on the average, the best in any given case, and even the best possible organization of any actually existing polity : 1 §§ 1—7.

ii. This implies an exact acquaintance with all possible forms of government, and therefore with all the possible varieties of Democracy, Oligarchy, etc., which up till now have been left out of sight : 1 § 8.

iii. The theory of legislation moreover is based upon this exact acquaintance with constitutions : 1 §§ 9—11.

iv. The department of constitutional theory which remains for treatment defined : 2 § 1. Order of merit of the degenerate forms of government : 2 §§ 2, 3. The arrangement to be followed in the succeeding exposition : 2 §§ 4—6.

The actual details of the theory of the established constitutions : VI (IV). c. 3—VIII (V).

### i Enumeration of all possible constitutions : VI (IV) cc. 3—10.

[(1) The difference between polities depends on the extent to which different classes take part in the government, c. 3.

(ii) How Democracy and Oligarchy ought rightly to be defined: 4 §§ 1—6.

(iii) The explanation of the fact that Oligarchy and Democracy come to be regarded as almost the only constitutions. Why there are more than these two and their sub-species. The classes of people necessary in the state: 4 §§ 7—19.]

(iv) The different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: 4 § 20—6 § 11.

(a) The basis of the general difference between them, 4 §§ 20, 21 (*...ἀρεταί*).

(b) Enumeration of the four kinds of Democracy from the best, which resembles Polity, down to the worst or unrestrained Democracy, which resembles Tyranny: 4 § 22 (*δημοκρατία*)—§ 31.

(c) Enumeration of the four kinds of Oligarchy in corresponding manner, from the most moderate to that which resembles Tyranny, viz. arbitrary dynastic government (*δυναστεία*): 5 §§ 1, 2.

(d) In spite of a constitution externally oligarchical a state may nevertheless bear a democratic character, and conversely: 5 §§ 3, 4.

(e) Reasons assigned why there can only be these four species ( $\alpha$ ) of Democracy. 6 §§ 1—6, ( $\beta$ ) of Oligarchy, 6 §§ 7—11.

(v) The different species of Mixed Aristocracy and the forms of Polity: c. 7—9 § 5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—12, 13 §§ 7—11.

(a) Of Aristocracy and Polity in general: 7 §§ 1—4.

(b) The species of Mixed Aristocracy: 7 §§ 4, 5.

(c) Of Polity: c. 8, 9 §§ 1—5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(a) Justification of the arrangement by which Polity is reserved for treatment to this point and Tyranny comes last of all: 8 §§ 1, 2.

( $\beta$ ) A further and more exact distinction between Polity and the Mixed Aristocracies. Refutation of the view that those species and varieties of Polity which incline more to Oligarchy than to Democracy should be included under Mixed Aristocracies, 8 §§ 3—9.

( $\gamma$ ) Genesis and organization of Polity: 9 §§ 1—5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(i) The three different ways of fusing Democracy and Oligarchy in Polity, 9 §§ 1—5. (ii) The middle class as the proper support of Polity, 12 § 4.

(iii) On the degree of success in the fusion depends the durability of the Polity. When therefore Politics or Mixed Aristocracies are established, if it is a grave mistake if out of favour to the rich the claims of the poor are only satisfied in appearance, the concession made to them being in reality annulled and rendered void by all kinds of

illusory devices. Enumeration of such illusory measures and of the similar counter-measures adopted in democracies with the opposite intent: 12 § 6—13 § 6.

(iv) The criterion of a successful fusion in Polity, also in Mixed Aristocracy, 9 §§ 6—10.

(v) The amount at which the property qualification for the franchise should be fixed, 13 §§ 7—9 (*πολεμεῖν*).

(vi) Peculiar constitution of certain individual Polities, 13 § 9.

(vii) Historical remarks: 13 §§ 10, 11.

(vi) The different species of Tyranny, c. 10.

**ii The best constitution on the average** (*ἀρίστη ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι*): c. 11.

(1) This is, in the main, Polity, as the rule of the well-to-do middle class: 11 §§ 1, 2.

For (a) as in the life of the individual moral virtue and excellence consist in the right mean between two opposite extremes of error, so the life of the state prospers best when the well-to-do middle class has the preponderance, whereas the extremes of wealth and poverty are two main sources of the two opposite kinds of crime and wrong-doing: 11 §§ 3—5.

(b) Excessive wealth leads to despotic ambition, extreme poverty to servile submission: 11 §§ 6—8 (*πόλεως*).

(c) The middle class has the most assured existence; the more strongly it is represented in the state, the more the state is secured from insurrection and internal troubles and from the danger of degenerating into one of the three worst perversions or degenerate types of polity, extreme Democracy, extreme Oligarchy, or Tyranny: 11 § 8 (*καὶ σφύρονται*)—§ 13. This accounts for the fact that Democracies are ordinarily more stable than Oligarchies, because in the former the middle class is usually more numerous and influential than in the latter, 11 § 14.

(d) The best legislators have come from the middle class, 11 § 15.

(11) All this explains why Polity, although the constitution best adapted for most states, is yet of rare occurrence: 11 §§ 16—19.

(a) It frequently happens that the middle class in a state is not very numerous, 11 § 16.

(b) In the frequent party conflicts between rich and poor it is invariably the practice for the victorious side to seize the government for itself, and not to come to terms with the defeated side, 11 § 17.

(c) Of the two states that were in succession supreme in Greece, the one, Athens, introduced democracies and the other, Sparta, oligarchies, each in her own interest: 11 §§ 18, 19.

(111) The nearer any one of the remaining constitutions stands to that which is the best on the average, the better it is: the further it is removed therefrom, the worse it is: 11 §§ 20, 21.

iii What kind of polity is relatively the best for different kinds of people (*τίς πολιτεία τίσι καὶ πῶς πῶς συμφέρει*): 12 §§ 1—3, § 4 (*ἄρα...*)—§ 5.

(i) General positions laid down, 12 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) Their application (a) to Democracy and its different species, 12 § 2.

(b) to Oligarchy and its different species, 12 § 3 (*ἄρα...*), (c) to Polity, 12 § 4 (*ἄρα δὲ...*)—§ 5, (d) to so-called or Mixed Aristocracy (*this is wanting*).

Recapitulation of all the previous discussion, 13 § 12.

iv The theory of the best possible organization of the different Democracies and Oligarchies, or of that which most corresponds to the spirit and intent of each of them respectively: VI (IV), 14—VII (VI).

(i) General fundamental positions as to the ordering and organization of all possible polities: VI (IV), cc. 14—16.

(a) Distinction of the Deliberative, Executive, and Judicial authorities in the state: 14 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Organization of the Consultative or Deliberative body in accordance with the various polities: 14 §§ 3—15.

(a) The department of the Deliberative authority, and the three possibilities that either the whole body of citizens, or particular magistrates, have to decide upon all that belongs to this department, or again that it is divided between the one and the other: 14 § 3.

(β) These three possible cases, the different forms under which they may appear in practical application, and the sphere of action (whether larger or smaller) assigned to the different deciding factors, how distributed amongst different polities: 14 §§ 4—10:

(i) amongst the different species of Democracy, 14 § 4—§ 7 (*ἄρα*);

(ii) those of Oligarchy, 14 § 7 (*τὸ δὲ τινος...*)—§ 9;

(iii) Mixed Aristocracy, 14 § 10;

(iv) Polity inclining to Aristocracy, and Polity proper, 14 § 10.

(γ) Measures by which at all events to secure that the decrees passed and the verdicts of the courts shall be good and salutary for the state, (i) in the most extreme Democracy, where all is decided by decrees of the people, through the adoption of certain oligarchical elements or of institutions related to Polity, while the democratical principle is still retained: and (ii) in an Oligarchy, through the adoption of certain democratical institutions or of others peculiar to Polity, or else by a procedure the reverse of that usual in Politics: 14 §§ 11—16.

(c) Organization of the Executive power, or the magistrates: c. 14.

(a) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 14 § 1, 2.

(β) What kind of officials are to be regarded as really magistrates, i.e. as ministers or authorities of the state: 15 § 2 (*ἀλλὰ δὲ...*)—§ 4.

(γ) What officials are required for every state, great or small, 15 §§ 5—8.

(δ) The distinction between different magistracies according as the nature of the department they administer involves its extension over the whole state or its division according to definite localities, 15 § 9 (...τὸν αὐτόν), and further according as the same department controls all the persons affected by it, or different classes are assigned to different magistrates, 15 § 9 (καὶ πότερον...)

(ε) The difference between magistracies in the various constitutions: 15 §§ 10—13.

(i) Certain offices are the same under different forms of the state, only the mode of appointment to them being different, 15 § 10.

(ii) Others are generically the same under different forms but specifically different: i.e. different as to the extent of their powers, § 10.

(iii) Others again are peculiar to given forms of the state, §§ 11—13.

(ζ) The different modes of appointing to magistracies and their distribution amongst the forms of government, 15 §§ 14—21.

(i) Each of the three questions to be considered, viz. who have the right to elect, who are eligible, and what is the mode of election, admits of three possibilities: combine each possibility under the first of these heads with each possibility under the second and third severally, and we obtain as the total number of conceivable cases nine for each of the three, i.e. 27 in all: 15 §§ 14—18.

(ii) These modes classified under (A) Democracy § 19, (B) Polity, not only Polity proper, but also the variety which has an aristocratical, and that which has an oligarchical character, §§ 19, 20, (c) Oligarchy §§ 20, 21 and (D) Mixed Aristocracy § 21.

(η) The duties of its department must determine what mode of appointment is advantageous for each office, 15 § 22.

(d) Organization of the judicial authority; c. 16.

(a) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 16 § 1.

(β) The different kinds of courts, 16 §§ 2—5.

(γ) The possible differences between them as to who are eligible as jurors (οἱ δικάζοντες); how they are to be appointed; whether they are to exercise all possible judicial functions or only to serve in certain courts, 16 §§ 6, 7.

(δ) Classification of them under the different forms of the state, Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity, 16 § 8.

(II) Organization of the different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: VII (VI) cc. 1—7.

(a) The discussion of this subject announced: the questions which remain as to the organization of other constitutions, and as to the blending of different forms when one power in the state is regulated in accordance with one form, and another in accordance with another form: I §§ 1—4.

## (b) The species of Democracy: 1 § 5—c. 5.

(a) Species are distinguished according to the various occupations of the different democratic populations, and the degree to which they have severally adopted democratic institutions: 1 §§ 2—10.

(β) The principles of Democracy enumerated: 2 §§ 1—4.

(γ) All the democratic institutions developed from them: 2 §§ 5—8.

[(δ) Objections to absolute Democracy and recommendation of a peculiar form of compromise between the claims of Democracy and those of Oligarchy: 2 § 9—3 § 6.]

(c) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Democracy. 4 §§ 1—14:

(5) of the two intermediate species, 4 § 15: and

(η) of the extreme Democracy, 4 § 15 (τῇ τε τελευταίᾳ...)—5 § 11.

(i) The institutions which promote the growth of this form: 4 §§ 15—20.

(ii) The measures which tend to neutralize its dangerous effects, and even impart to it, so far as is possible, a tolerable and durable character: c. 5.

(A) Preliminary remark on the urgent need for such measures: 5 §§ 1, 2.

(B) Particular instances of measures of the kind, 5 §§ 3—11:

(a) a diminution in the number of political trials, 5 §§ 3, 4:

(1) by not distributing the fines amongst the people, (2) by imposing severe penalties upon false accusation:

(b) the practice of summoning few popular assemblies and allowing the courts to sit as seldom as possible in the poorer states, 5 §§ 5, 6; and in the richer states of bestowing large sums at rare intervals upon the poor, and freeing the richer citizens from useless burdens: 5 §§ 7—9.

(c) Measures taken at Carthage and Tarentum; 5 §§ 9—11.

## (c) The species of Oligarchy: cc. 6, 7.

(a) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Oligarchy: 6 §§ 1, 2;

(β) of the several intermediate species, 6 § 3; and

(γ) of the most extreme Oligarchy or Dynastic government, 6 §§ 3, 4.

(δ) Measures more directly affecting oligarchies at large, 6 § 5—7 § 7.

(i) The principal safeguard of Oligarchy, 6 § 5.

(ii) Arrangement as regards the military force and service in the army. 7 §§ 1—3.

(iii) Individual members of the popular party may be won over to the oligarchical government, 7 § 4.

(iv) To the highest posts in the government should be attached costly burdens to be defrayed for the commonwealth, 7 §§ 5—7.

(III) The theory of the organization of public offices : a fuller account in detail, c. 8 (*incomplete*).

(a) The questions to be discussed, 8 §§ 1, 2.

(b) The officials necessary in every state, 8 §§ 3...21.

Superintendents (α) of the markets (ἀγορανόμοι), § 3, (β) of the streets, public buildings, harbours; the city police (ἀστυνόμοι) §§ 4, 5. (γ) Police officers in the country (ἀγρόνομοι, ὑλωροί); (δ) financial officers (ἀποδέκται, ταμίαι), § 6. (ε) Keepers of archives and registers (μνήμονες, ἐπιστάται), § 7. (ς) Officers for penal administration, executioners and the like, §§ 8—13. (η) Military officers (στρατηγοί, πολέμαρχοι, ναύαρχοι, κτλ), §§ 13—15. (θ) Board of control, for scrutiny of the accounts of retiring officials (εὐθυνοί, λογισταί, ἐξερασταί), § 16. (ι) Legislative committee, to summon and direct the popular assembly, and to bring matters before it (πρόβουλοι, βουλή), § 17. (κ) Officers to superintend public worship (ιερεῖς κτλ), §§ 18—20. (λ) Recapitulation, § 21.

(c) Magistrates peculiar to certain given constitutions, 8 § 22.

*The theoretical treatment of the cases where different forms of polity are combined in one and the same state, is wanting.*

## v The causes of decay in the various forms of the state and the corresponding safeguards: B. VIII (V).

1 Preliminary Observations: 1 §§ 1—8, §§ 9—11, § 8:

3 § 14: 1 §§ 11—16.

(a) Statement of the whole question: 1 § 1.

(b) The general cause of all internal political disturbances consists in dissension as to the extent to which political equality should be carried: the rich and the nobles claim special privileges over the poor, the latter on the ground of their free birth claim equality with the rich: 1 §§ 2—7.

(c) Two species of revolution, 1 §§ 8—11:

(α) Overthrow of the constitution, §§ 8—11: whether

(i) subversion of the entire polity, § 8; or simply

(ii) accentuation or relaxation of the same form of government, § 9; or

(iii) abolition of single parts of the constitution, § 10.

(β) Change merely in the holders of power, § 8.

(d) Special application of the remarks in 1 §§ 2—7 to Democracy and Oligarchy. Two kinds of equality distinguished: it is necessary to pay attention to both kinds: 3 § 14, 1 § 11 (πανταχοῦ...)—§ 15.

(e) Why Democracy is in general more enduring than Oligarchy, 1 § 16.

# II The causes of decay inherent in all polities in common: *et.* 2—4.

(a) The three points for general consideration in this inquiry: the tendencies, the objects in view, and the external occasions which lead to political revolutions, 2 § 1.

(b) The tendencies and claims which lead to intestine disturbances and to revolutions have been already characterized (1 §§ 3—7). How far they are justified, or not, 2 §§ 2, 3.

(c) The objects sought to be attained in rebellions and insurrections: 1 § 3 (*τὰς ἀποστάσεις*).

(d) The definite occasions of revolution: 2 § 4—3 § 8, 4 §§ 8—12, 3 § 9—4 § 7.

(a) General enumeration: 2 §§ 4—6.

(β) Consideration of them in detail: 3 §§ 1—8, 4 §§ 8—12, 3 § 9—4 § 7.

(i) Insolence in the rulers, 3 § 1.

(ii) Their greed for aggrandisement, 3 § 1.

(iii) Efforts of the subject body to attain higher political honours, 3 § 2.

(iv) Preponderating influence of individuals, 3 § 3.

(v) Fear of punishment or of injustice, 3 § 4.

(vi) Contempt for the governing class on account of their weakness, 3 § 5.

(vii) Disproportionate growth of separate elements in the polity or classes of the population, 3 §§ 6—8; 4 §§ 8—10: and conversely

(viii) The establishment of an equivalence in point of numbers between opposing elements in the state.

(ix) Appropriation of offices by electoral intrigues (*διὰ τὰς ἐπιδησίας*), 3 § 9.

(x) Neglect of the dangers threatening the constitution from individuals, 3 § 9.

(xi) Gradual introduction of slight changes unobserved, 3 § 10.

(xii) Any sort of difference between the inhabitants, 3 §§ 11—13, §§ 15—16.

As (A) difference in race, particularly when alien settlers have been admitted, §§ 11—13:

(B) difference in sentiment, and especially in political sympathies, between the dwellers in different localities of one and the same state, due to a difference of character in the localities, §§ 15, 16.

(xiii) Private feuds between leading, influential citizens, 4 §§ 1—7.

(e) The means usually employed to effect revolutions, 4 §§ 11, 13:

(a) force, (β) stratagem, (γ) stratagem succeeded by force.

III The causes of decay and the corresponding safeguards in the particular forms of government: cc. 5—12.

(a) Positive or dogmatic exposition: c. 5—c. 12 § 6.

(a) Republics, cc. 5—9.

(i) THE CAUSES OF DECAY, cc. 5—7.

(A) In democracies, c. 5.

(a) Change to Oligarchy due to the continual persecutions of the rich by the demagogues, 5 §§ 1—5.

(b) Change to Tyranny, the demagogues usurping absolute power. Why this only happened in former times, why it is no longer usual for tyrannies to arise, 5 §§ 6—10, namely, because

(1) formerly demagogues were also generals, 5 §§ 6, 7.

(2) formerly certain officers had too large powers assigned them, 5 § 8 (*ἐγίνοντο...πρύτανις*)<sup>1</sup>.

(3) The states were as yet small, and the people in former times busy with their occupations in the country, so that it was easier for military chiefs to seize absolute power, 5 §§ 8, 9.

(c) Change from the most moderate to the most extreme form of democracy, due to the demagogic intrigues of candidates for office, 5 §§ 10, 11.

(B) In oligarchies, c. 6.

(a) Downfall of oligarchies through ill-treatment of the people, 6 § 1.

(b) Downfall through dissensions between the rich oligarchs themselves, 6 §§ 2—9, §§ 14—16, § 10.

(1) If the actual members of the oligarchical government are reduced to a mere handful, so that even persons belonging to the ruling families are excluded from it by law, 6 §§ 2—5<sup>2</sup>.

(2) If the oligarchs themselves from mutual jealousy adopt demagogic intrigues, 6 § 5 (*κινούνται...*)—§ 7:

(i) one member of the government, or a minority, intriguing to gain over the rest to his support, 6 § 6:

(ii) a part of the oligarchs (or all of them) intriguing with the people, 6 §§ 6, 7:

(a) where the people has the right of electing to the public offices, § 6, or if

(β) the law courts are constituted out of the people, § 7, or

(γ) in case some of the oligarchs are aiming at concentrating the power of the state in yet fewer hands, § 7.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps (2) should properly follow (3).

<sup>2</sup> If § 5, *καὶ ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς...πολιτεῖαν*, be genuine we must add: "In the same way

a small number of oligarchs, in spite of good government, can procure the downfall of the oligarchy at the hands of the people."

(iii) If individual oligarchs who have squandered their property attempt to make a revolution or to enrich themselves from the public treasury, thus embroiling themselves with the government, or raising a popular insurrection, 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) If members of the oligarchy are involved in private enemy suing to marriage relations or lawsuits, 6 §§ 14, 15.

(v) An oligarchy may be subverted by its own members on account of the too despotical character of the government, 6 § 16.

Concluding remark: an oligarchy united in itself is not easily overthrown long without, 6 § 10.

(c) Fall of the old oligarchy by the formation of a new one within it, 6 § 11<sup>1</sup>.

[(d) Overthrow of oligarchies by the generals of mercenary troops enrolled for war; or in time of peace by the generals called in because of the mutual distrust of the oligarchs; or by a commander appointed on the same grounds to mediate between them, 6 §§ 12, 13.]

(e) Change from Oligarchy to Polity and from Polity to moderate Democracy due to a depreciation of money, whereby the property qualification required by law for the franchise ceases to be adequate, 6 §§ 16, 17.

(f) Change from one kind of Oligarchy to another: 6 § 18.

(c) **In Mixed Aristocracies and Polities: c. 7 §§ 1—13.**

(a) Fall of aristocracies and revolutions in consequence of the number of those who take part in the government becoming too small, 7 §§ 1—4:

(1) especially when the large body excluded consider themselves equal in merit, 7 §§ 1, 2;

or (2) if able and distinguished men are ill-treated by men not superior to them in desert although occupying higher offices in the state, 7 §§ 3, 4;

or (3) are excluded from the government in spite of their merits, 7 § 5;

or (4) if some of the citizens are too poor and others too rich, 7 § 2;

or (5) an individual is so powerful that he is likely to attain supreme power.

7 § 4.

(b) The principal danger for Aristocracies of this type and for Polities consists in the fact that the oligarchical element in them has not quite successfully blended with the democratical element, but the one of these preponderates over the other, 7 §§ 6, 8. [Consequently a revolution to this preponderating side may easily take place, and so to complete Oligarchy or Democracy. Sometimes however there is a movement in the opposite direction: 7 §§ 7—10.]

(c) Aristocracies of this type are subject, above all other forms of government, to dissolution brought on by unperceived gradual changes, 7 §§ 11—13.

(d) **Concluding remark on the changes in republics taken to common.**

Sometimes they are of internal origin, sometimes they are brought about by powerful foreign states, 7 § 14.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps §§ 10, 11 should also be enclosed in the square brackets.

## (ii) THE SAFEGUARDS: CC. 8, 9.

## (A) Preliminary remark.

The safeguards are implied in the statement of the causes of destruction: 8 § 1.

## (B) Enumeration of the safeguards: 8 § 2—9 § 22.

(a) In Polities and Mixed Aristocracies especial care must be taken that slight changes and deviations from the existing laws do not gradually creep in unobserved: 8 §§ 2, 3.

(b) In the same governments precautions must be taken against those illusory measures discussed in VI (IV), 12 § 6—13 § 6: 8 § 4.

(c) In Aristocracies and Oligarchies the government must not only treat the governed well, but must also treat its own members on a footing of democratic equality, 8 § 5: hence many democratic measures are often quite in place even under these constitutions, 8 §§ 6, 7.

(d) The citizens must be kept in constant vigilance over their constitution, 8 § 8.

(e) All disputes between the principal men must as far as possible be avoided and prevented; and, so far as this fails, care must be taken that no others but the original parties to the quarrel are involved in it, 8 § 9.

(f) In Polities and Oligarchies a fresh valuation of property must be taken frequently in order that the property qualification for the franchise, if it is to retain its relative importance, may undergo the necessary revision at the proper time, 8 §§ 10, 11.

(g) No citizen to be disproportionately elevated: in particular, provision should be made by legislation to prevent the rise of unduly powerful individuals: if this does not succeed, they should be removed from the state by ostracism: 8 § 12.

(h) There should be a special board of magistrates to have supervision over the private lives of the citizens and see that they are in accord with the existing form of government, 8 § 13.

(i) Care must be taken that one part of the citizens does not prosper at the expense of the rest, 8 §§ 14—21; and hence

(1) that magisterial offices never fall exclusively into the hands of one of the two opposed classes of the population, 8 § 14:

(2) that the antagonism between rich and poor is adjusted or else that the middle class increases, 8 § 14:

(3) especially that the public offices do not afford any opportunity for enriching oneself from the public property, 8 §§ 15—19.

(4) In democracies the property of the rich must be spared, 8 § 20;

(5) in oligarchies posts with emolument attached to them must be assigned to the poorer citizens, and the insolence of a rich man towards a poor man must be punished more severely than if it were towards another rich man, 8 § 20.

(6) Further in oligarchies the accumulation of landed property in the same hands must be restrained within limits fixed by law, 8 § 20.

(7) Care must be taken in an oligarchy that the decisive authority rests in the hands of the rich, and in a democracy that it rests with the poor: but in other respects equal, nay even higher, privileges must be granted in the former case to the poor, and in the latter case to the rich, 8 § 11.

(k) It must always be kept in view that attachment to the established form of government, special knowledge of the subject, and bodily virtue and integrity are requisite for the highest official positions: the second qualification is best in certain offices in a higher degree than the third, in others again the third qualification is a higher degree than the second: c. 9 §§ 1—4.

(l) In a word, every measure that helps the healthy working of a constitution tends also to preserve it, 9 § 5.

(m) The citizens who desire the continuance of the form of government must be the numerical majority, 9 § 5.

(n) Even in the worse forms of Democracy and Oligarchy the mean must be preserved: it is the exaggeration of democratic and oligarchic measures which inevitably leads to the downfall of Democracy and Oligarchy respectively: 9 § 6—1 to 10 § 1.

(o) But the principal thing is to educate the young in the spirit of the established form of government: 9 § 11 (*μεγιστον δε*)—§ 16.

### (β) Monarchies: c. 10—c. 12 § 6.

#### (i) THE CAUSES OF DECAY: c. 10.

(A) Discussion of certain fundamental points: 10 §§ 1—13 (*δημοκρατία*).

(a) The government of a king is closely related to Aristocracy, but Tyranny (*τυραννίς*) combines the evils of the most extreme Democracy and of the most extreme Oligarchy: 10 §§ 1, 2.

(b) The opposite nature of kingly rule and tyranny is at once shown in their divergent and opposite origin: 10 §§ 3—8.

(c) A more precise statement of the antithesis between them: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(d) The points which Tyranny has in common with Oligarchy on the one hand and with Democracy on the other: 10 § 11—§ 13 (*δημοκρατία*).

(B) Causes of the overthrow of monarchies and of monarchs in general.  
10 §§ 13—28.

(a) General statement

(1) of the motives for conspiracies and attacks upon a sole ruler, 10 §§ 15, 16.  
and (2) of the objects sought thereby, 10 § 14.

(3) Some of these attacks are directed against the person of the monarch; in others the assailant desires to seize the throne for himself, or to effect a revolution in the government: 10 § 15.

(b) These points of view presented in detail: 10 §§ 15—28.

(1) Attacks in consequence of injuries received, 10 §§ 15—20:

(2) from fear of punishment, 10 § 20:

- (3) from contempt for the ruler, 10 §§ 22—25;
- (4) from greed of gain (*largely wanting*), 10 § 25;
- (5) from ambition, 10 §§ 26—28.

(c) **Special causes of the downfall of (a) tyrants and tyrannies, (b) of kings and kingships: 10 §§ 29—38.**

(a) **Tyrants and tyrannies: 10 §§ 29—34.**

(1) A tyranny is destroyed from without by more powerful foreign states not tyrannies whether (I) under a royal or aristocratical, or (II) under a democratical government, 10 §§ 29, 30.

(2) It is ruined from within by the members of the ruling family quarreling amongst themselves, 10 § 31.

(3) Most tyrants make themselves despised and this most frequently brings about their fall, 10 §§ 32, 33.

(4) Again, every tyrant is necessarily hated; hatred and righteous indignation against him often accomplish his overthrow, 10 §§ 33, 34.

(5) The same causes which threaten Extreme Democracy and Extreme Oligarchy are also dangerous to Tyranny: 10 § 35.

(b) The government of a king (as distinct from a tyrant) is mostly destroyed from within.

Either (1) feuds break out between members of the royal family, 10 § 36: or

(2) the kings overstep the legitimate limits of their authority and aim at making themselves tyrants, 10 § 38.

(3) Under an hereditary monarchy it is often impossible to prevent the succession to the throne of princes who render themselves contemptible, 10 § 38,

or (4) to exclude others who behave with insolence and violence, forgetting that they are not tyrants but kings, 10 § 38.

(5) Why it is that even in recent times tyrannies have sprung up, but no new monarchies arise, 10 § 37.

(ii) **THE SAFEGUARDS: C. 11, C. 12 §§ 1—6.**

(A) The office of king is best preserved by the gradual diminution of its absolute authority in keeping with the spirit of the times, 11 §§ 1—3.

(B) The tyrant can only secure his throne, 11 §§ 4—34,

(a) by employing the most extreme measures of force and corruption, 11 §§ 4—16:

(1) by getting rid of all the principal men, entirely forbidding the common pursuit of culture, and putting down all messes and clubs, 11 §§ 4, 5:

(2) by compelling all the citizens to live in public, 11 § 6,

and (3) by imitating all the other regulations of Persian and other oriental despotisms, 11 § 6:

(4) by sending secret spies and detectives amongst the citizens, 11 § 7;

(5) by setting all classes of the population against one another, 11 § 8;

- (6) draining the means of all his subjects, 11 §§ 9, 10,
- and (7) perpetually creating wars, 11 § 10,
- (8) by suspecting his own friends most of all, 11 § 10,
- (9) by allowing families to be governed by women and by giving slaves license to indulge all their caprices, just as in the most extreme democracy, 11 §§ 11, 12;
- (10) by permitting no dignified or free-minded character to remain near him, 11 § 13;
- (11) by being more intimate with strangers than with his own townsmen, 11 § 14;
- (12) The three leading points of view in this policy, 11 §§ 15, 16.

Or (4) by demagogic devices joined with activity in war, when the tyrant poses as the friend of the people and makes his usurped power approximate to that of a king, 11 §§ 17—34.

(1) Careful management of the state funds; avoidance of lavish grants to mistresses, foreigners, or artists; a statement of accounts presented; no treasures accumulated for himself, 11 §§ 19—21.

(2) He should endeavour to create the impression that all taxes paid and services rendered are not for him but for the state, 11 § 21.

(3) He must inspire reverence by a dignified bearing and by incapacity to waver, instead of inspiring fear by severity and rough treatment, 11 § 22.

(4) He should not merely himself avoid crimes and offences against his subjects, but he should not allow them to be committed by any of his family or court, especially those who are of the female sex, 11 §§ 22, 23.

(5) He should be moderate in his indulgences, or at least should conceal his excesses from the world, 11 §§ 23, 24.

(6) In his care for the adornment of the capital he must not seem to have any ulterior object, 11 § 24.

(7) He should create the impression that though he is free from childish superstition yet he is very specially concerned to honour the gods, 11 § 25.

(8) He must award, to those who show themselves deserving, higher honours and distinctions than they could hope for in a free state, and he must always reserve distinctions and rewards himself, but have punishments inflicted and executed by others, 11 § 26.

(9) On the other hand, like monarchs generally, he should especially avoid raising individuals to greatness, least of all a man of bold and enterprising character, 11 § 27.

(10) Of all deeds of violence, personal insults or ill treatment, and seditions accomplished by force are the most dangerous. If he cannot altogether avoid them, he should give to the former the colour of paternal chastisement, and seek to succeed in his intrigues by dint of imprisoned promises alone, 11 §§ 28, 29.

(11) He should especially be on his guard against people who imagine that they, or some one whom they love, have been so deeply wronged by him that they are ready to hazard their lives in opposing him, 11 § 30.

(12) While he should seek to please rich and poor alike, he should put greater weight upon the poor where they are the stronger, but where the rich have the upper hand, upon the rich, 11 §§ 31, 32.

(13) The leading points in this whole policy, and the great advantages which attend on it, 11 §§ 33, 34.

[(c) Oligarchy and Tyranny the least enduring forms of government. Historical survey of the tyrannies which lasted the longest, with the reasons why this was the case: 12 §§ 1—6.]

(b) Criticism of Plato's doctrine

of the successive changes from one form of the state to the other: 12 §§ 7—18.

(a) His theory of the transition from the best form of polity to the remaining forms: 12 §§ 7—10.

(i) It takes the right point of view for the cause of the decline in the best form; but the explanation given of the appearance of this cause is

(A) not peculiar to the best form of the state, but applies to all human affairs in common, 12 § 8, and

(B) supposing the best form of government to have been introduced into different states at different times before the period which Plato assumes for the universal decline, it is scarcely conceivable that, on the approach of this period, it would be subverted at one and the same time in them all, 12 §§ 9, 10.

(ii) No reason can be given why the best form of state should invariably pass over into that which stands next to it, 12 § 10.

(β) The case stands no better with his account of the transitions from the remaining forms of the state, to one another or to the best form: 12 § 10 (ὁ δ' αὐτὸς)—§ 18.

(i) Plato adheres to the same principle that every form of polity is changed into the form nearest to it, whereas the change to the opposite form is quite as frequent or even more so, 12 §§ 10, 11.

(ii) As to the second point, Plato has said nothing definitely about the change to the best form of the state; but if the omission is to be supplied in accordance with his exposition there is nothing for it but to assume that the sole transition *from* Tyranny or *into* the best state is the change when the former passes into the latter: which would be incorrect, 12 §§ 11, 12.

(iii) Further, in regard to the first point, the change from Oligarchy to Tyranny does take place, 12 § 13.

(iv) Nor is the reason assigned by Plato for the change from Mixed Aristocracy to Oligarchy the true one. For

(1) the true motive is different;

(2) what Plato takes to be the true ground for the transition to Oligarchy is not present in many oligarchies; and

(3) where it is found in Mixed Aristocracies experience shows that no such transition takes place, 12 § 14.

(v) As regards the transition from Oligarchy,

(a) that the state is divided into two states, one of the rich, the other of the poor, is not more true of Oligarchy than of the Mixed Anarchy at Sparta or of other forms of government: 12 § 15.

(b) The change from Oligarchy to Democracy is really due to several causes, but Plato (1) only cites one of them, which does not hold *except* under *certain* limitations, 12 § 17, while (2) this cause is not altogether necessary to a revolution from Oligarchy to Democracy, provided there are other causes: 12 § 16, § 18.

(vi) Again, the transition from Democracy to Tyranny is not adequately explained. 12 § 18. (*This is almost entirely wanting.*)

(vii) Plato speaks throughout as if there were only one species of Democracy and of Oligarchy, 12 § 18.

PART III. *The third main division of the work, treating of legislation, is entirely wanting.*

### *Symbols and Abbreviations.*

Γ=codex Graecus deperditus ex quo originem deduxit  
vetusta translatio latina Guilelmi de Moerbeka.

M<sup>s</sup>=cod. Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105 ord. sup.

P<sup>1</sup>=cod. Parisinus 2023.

P<sup>1</sup>(corr.<sup>1</sup>)=correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.

p<sup>1</sup>=correctiones pallidiores et luteolae.

Π<sup>1</sup>=the agreement of ΓM<sup>s</sup>P<sup>1</sup> in a reading, presumably that of their archetype.

P<sup>2</sup>=cod. Parisinus Coislinianus 161.

P<sup>2</sup>(corr.<sup>1</sup>)=correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.

P<sup>2</sup>(corr.<sup>2</sup>)=correctiones nigriores.

P<sup>2</sup>(corr.<sup>3</sup>)=correctiones pallidiores et luteolae.

p<sup>2</sup>=correctiones rubrae.

P<sup>3</sup>=cod. Parisinus 2026.

P<sup>4</sup>=cod. Parisinus 2025.

P<sup>5</sup>=cod. Parisinus 1858.

P<sup>6</sup>=cod. Parisinus 1857.

Q=cod. Marcianus Venetus 200.

M<sup>b</sup>=cod. Marcianus Venetus 213.

Q<sup>b</sup>=cod. Laurentianus 81, 5.

R<sup>b</sup>=cod. Laurentianus 81, 6.

S<sup>b</sup>=cod. Laurentianus 81, 21.

T<sup>b</sup>=cod. Urbinas 46.

U<sup>b</sup>=cod. Marcianus Ven. append. IV, 3.

V<sup>b</sup>=cod. Vaticano-Palatinus 160.

W<sup>b</sup>=cod. Reginensis 125.

C<sup>c</sup>=cod. Camerarii deperditus.

Ar.=cod. Aretini deperditus.

Ald.=editio princeps Aldina.

Π<sup>2</sup>=the agreement of Ald. and all existing MSS. *except* M<sup>s</sup>P<sup>1</sup>P<sup>5</sup> in a reading.

Π<sup>3</sup>= „ „ „ „ *except* M<sup>s</sup>P<sup>1</sup>P<sup>2</sup>P<sup>3</sup>P<sup>5</sup> in a reading.

Π=codex archetypus deperditus superstitum librorum et Aldinae.

Bas.<sup>1</sup>=Basel ed. of 1531. Bas.<sup>2</sup>=Basel ed. of 1539. Bas.<sup>3</sup>=Basel ed. of 1550.

Bk.<sup>1</sup>=the Berlin Aristotle in quarto edited by Imm. Bekker in 1831.

Bk.<sup>2</sup>=the *Politics* reprinted in octavo (3rd edition in 1855; 4th, unaltered, in 1878).

Susem.<sup>1</sup>=Susemihl's critical edition, 1872. Susem.<sup>2</sup>=his edition of 1879.

Susem.<sup>3</sup>=his ed. in *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, 1882. Susem.<sup>4</sup>=the present work.

*Note that* P<sup>4.6</sup>(corr.)=the corrector of P<sup>4</sup> and the corrector of P<sup>6</sup>; *but*

P<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup>(corr.)=the first hand of P<sup>2</sup> and the corrector of P<sup>4</sup>.

[ἀρχων] Bernays=Bernays proposes to omit ἀρχων from the text.

<καὶ οικονομικῶ> Rassow=Rassow proposes to insert καὶ οικονομικῶ in the text.

? Susem.=Susemihl conjectures; *but*

Γ(?)=Γ may have had the reading in question.

ἔστιν \* \* denotes a lacuna; that after ἔστιν some word, or words, has been lost.

*The passages conjectured to be out of place in our authorities are, as a rule, printed twice over: where they occur in the MSS. in thick Clarendon type; again, in ordinary type, but between angular brackets < >, in the place to which the editor would transpose them.*

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ

## ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α.

Bekker 4to.  
p. 1252 a

Schneider  
c. I. § 1

1 Ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ  
πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν (τοῦ γὰρ  
εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆ-  
λον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ  
5 καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἢ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας

1252 a 1 [ἐπειδὴ...7 πολιτικῇ] Schmidt || 5 καὶ before τοῦ is omitted by II<sup>1</sup> R<sup>b</sup> Ar. ||  
κυριωτάτη before πασῶν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

**Introduction, cc. 1, 2:** περὶ οἰκονομίας, cc. 3—13 (the latter a necessary preliminary to the rest of the work, πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκίων). The prevailing tone is dialectical, and the contents of Bk. I. are nearly exhausted by a list of the problems (ἀπορίαι) started for discussion; (1) the difference between a city-state and a family, between πολιτικός and οἰκονομικός, (2) the elements of the state, πόλις ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται, c. 2, (3) the natural basis of slavery, ὅτι εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δούλοι, cc. 4—6, (4) the relation of χρηματιστική to Economic, πότερον ἢ χρηματιστική ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ κτλ, cc. 8—11, (5) the capacity of the slave (and the artisan) for moral virtue, πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικάς, 13 § 2 ff. See further the *Analysis* and *Introd.* pp. 23—31.

c. 1. *The city is the highest form of association, having the highest good for its end:* § 1. *The city not an enlarged family, but an essentially distinct organization, as is evident when it is analysed into its simplest elements:* §§ 2, 3.

§ 1 i πόλιν] A 'city,' but at the same time a sovereign 'state.' κοινωνία—which includes any form of communication or social intercourse, κ. ἀλλακτικαί, commercial transactions, exchange *Nic. Eth.* v. 5. 9; ταύτην τὴν κ.=τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν, the marriage union *Pol.* IV(VII). 16. 2—denotes chiefly in this treatise (1) the voluntary combination, association, or co-operation of free men with each other in

objects in which they have common interests (τόπου, ζωῆς, so ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας κοινωνεῖν), or, as it is sometimes put, formed with a view to certain common advantages (χρήσεως μὴ ἐφημέρου ἕνεκεν: τῆς μεταδόσεως, συμμαχίας, καλῶν πράξεων χάριν). Hence by a natural transition, concretely (2) the associated body, the members who compose the union; so that ἡ πολιτικὴ κ., 'civil society'=the *community*, τὸ κοινόν (e.g. II. 3. 1 compared with II. 2. 2, IV[VII]. 14. 1). See further on I. 2 § 12, 8 § 13, III. 9. 12.

3 δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ] seeming good, which may not really be the agent's true interest, although he thinks so, cp. IV(VII). 13. 2. (See this case fully elucidated *Nic. Eth.* III. 4 §§ 1—4, § 17, § 20, the solution being ὁ σπουδαῖος ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται.) Both δοκεῖν and φαίνεσθαι are often opposed to εἶναι as semblance to reality, but while δοκεῖν = *putari* to be thought, φαίνεσθαι = *videri* to appear, of an object present to sense; hence τὸ δοκοῦν = subjective opinion, τὰ φαινόμενα = objective facts. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v.

4 πᾶσαι μὲν...μάλιστα δὲ] The clause with δὲ gives the true apodosis to ἐπειδὴ: 'while all aim at some good (κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφλένται), the highest and most comprehensive aims especially at the highest good.'

5 κυριωτάτου] Cp. III. 12. 1 and note SUSEM. (1)

Aristotle's proof, if we assume ἡ πολι-

περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις (1)  
καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική.

§ 2 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἶονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκουμένην  
καὶ δεσποτικὸν [εἶναι] τὸν αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν [πλήθει γάρ  
καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι διαφέρειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἴδει τοῦτων διαστῶν, καὶ οὐκ  
οἶον ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλειόνων, οἰκουμένην, ἂν  
δ' ἔτι πλειόνων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικὸν, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρου-  
σαν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρὰν πόλιν· καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ  
βασιλικὸν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκη, βασιλικὸν, ὅταν  
δὲ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέγεθος  
ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος, πολιτικὸν ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀληθές]

9 εἶναι omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (added after τὸν by a later hand in M<sup>1</sup>); 14 ἐφεστήκη M<sup>1</sup>  
(1st hand), ἐφέστηκε M<sup>2</sup> (corrector), ἐφεστήκει P<sup>4-6</sup> Q<sup>2</sup> R<sup>2</sup> S<sup>2</sup> T<sup>2</sup> U<sup>2</sup> V<sup>2</sup> W<sup>2</sup> L<sup>2</sup> Al<sup>1</sup> Bk. 1  
15 τοὺς is omitted by Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. 1; 16 [ἄρχων] καὶ ἀρχόμενος; cf. Bk. 1. 1. 17. 1)  
nondescriptly

τις to be the 'art' concerned with ἡ κοι-  
νωσία ἡ πολ., is given Nic. Eth. 1. 2  
§ 5—7; cp. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ  
καὶ πόλει, μείζον γὰρ καὶ τελευταίον τὸ τῆς  
πόλεως.....κάλλιον καὶ θεώτερον εἶναι καὶ  
πάλαι, sc. τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν: which  
is more minutely described in the case of  
the 'city' as justice and the interest of the  
community, τὸ κοινὴν συμφέρον.

ἡ πασῶν...πᾶσαν περιέχουσα] See n.  
on 11. 2 § 7, where is explained, from Nic.  
Eth. viii. 9 § 4—6, how this universal  
society embraces all the inferior as 'parts'  
(μέρη) of itself.

§ 2 ἡ ὅσοι μὲν κτλ] Plato *Politics*  
258 e ff.; cp. c. 3 § 4, 7 §§ 1, 2 *ms.*  
Socrates too expresses himself to this  
effect in Xenoph. *Memorab.* iii. 4 § 6 f.  
§ 12 ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει  
μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν. SUSM. (2)

πολιτικόν] A practical statesman, a  
magistrate in a free city, self-governed  
according to Greek ideas; so 8 § 15,  
11 § 13, 11. 7. 1 πολιτικὸς (cf. φιλόσοφος  
καὶ ἰδιώτης, cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. 14) ἡ  
σοφία. Occasionally much more than  
this, for Aristotle requires that δὲ ὡς ἀν-  
θρώπ. π. should know psychology, N. E.  
1. 13 §§ 2—7, legislation, and other  
sciences: hence joined with *καταλόγος*, a  
theoretical statesman, student of politics:  
iv(vii). 4. 3, vi(iv). 1 § 3, viii(v). 9. 9.

9 πλήθει κτλ] They assume that  
a king differs from e.g. a household  
only in having more numerous, not more  
heterogeneous, dependents. πλήθος =  
numbers: 8 § 15, *Eth.* 1. 4. 10 (cf.

πλήθος τῆς φύλας;—the strength of the  
defensive force), cp. *Metaph.* 1. 9. 14  
ἀριθμὸς = τὸ πᾶν καὶ ὀλίγον.

10 εἶδει] as *κατὰ τὴν εἶδαν*, 'qualitatively',  
'in kind'; εἶδει διαστῶν = to be essentially  
different, because different in *quality*,  
takes account only of essential qualities.

11 ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων] Scholastic sup-  
plies ἄρχων here, and explains before dis-  
tinction, but *καταλόγος* (εἶδος) would do just  
as well in the latter case, and in line 14,  
while either ἄρχων or ἐφεστήκη must be  
understood to follow *ὅταν δὲ* in line 15.

12 ὡς οὐδὲν κτλ] Whence the state  
is composed cf. *Polit.* 1292a, 1293a, 1294a,  
where see n. SUSM. (2) b.

Plato *Polit.* 1295 a μεγάλῃς καὶ μικρᾷ  
στῆται ἡ πόλις καὶ πόλις ὅραται καὶ πρὸς  
πρὸς ἄρχοντα διαστῶν; NE III. 1294a  
ἐκείνη, ἡ καὶ ἐκείνη διαστῶν, πο-  
λίς δὲ διαστῶν καὶ πρὸς πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι  
ταῦτα δὲ εἶδη διαστῶν εἰς πολιτικὴν καὶ  
οἰκουμένην καὶ δεσποτικήν, καὶ ἐκείνη δια-  
στῶν.

13 καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν]  
sc. οἱ εἶδει κοινῶν καὶ διαστῶν.

14 τῆς ἐπ. τῆς τοιαύτης] i.e. τῆς τοῦ  
βασιλικῆς, not τῆς τοῦ πολιτικῆς, the sci-  
ence of government (*Politicus Liber-  
tatis* p. 21). SUSM. (3)

15 ὡς οὐκ εἶναι κτλ] 1. 2 § 7. The one  
man governs over the state as father &  
king; the ruler who follows only the prin-  
ciples of the same things rules as father  
in office, but follows his own interest when  
at governing and being governed is a  
republican magistrate.

§ 3 δὴλον δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὑψη-<sup>(I)</sup>  
 γημένην μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθε-  
 του μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλά-  
 20 χιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται  
 σκοποῦντες ὁψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέ-  
 ρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ  
 ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων.

2 εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φνόμενα βλέψειεν (Bk. I.)  
 25 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις, κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω  
 § 2 θεωρήσειεν. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνευ 4

§ 3 17 τὸ λεγόμενον] sc. 9 ὅτι οὐ  
 καλῶς λέγουσιν, all between being paren-  
 thetical. When such side-notes are im-  
 bedded in the text the construction of the  
 main sentence is often difficult to follow:  
*e.g.* 2 § 2, § 9, 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 §§ 4—6, perhaps  
 13 §§ 6—8: II. 10. 7—9: IV(VII). 3 § 1,  
 13 §§ 2—4, 16 §§ 2—4: V(VIII). 5 §§ 2—  
 4, §§ 18—24, perhaps 6 § 15—7 § 1,  
 7 §§ 6—8. In III. 9 §§ 6—8, VI(IV).  
 4 §§ 8, 9 and perhaps in III. 12 §§ 1, 2  
 the interruption of the original construc-  
 tion almost amounts to anacoluthia. See  
 Bonitz *Aristotelische Studien* II. III.

κατὰ τὴν ὑψημένην μέθοδον] in ac-  
 cordance with the method of inquiry  
 which has previously been 'started' or  
 'traced out' or 'followed,' and so the  
 usual method of inquiry (Bonitz): *De*  
*Gener. Anim.* III. 9. 1, 758 a 28 ff.: τὸν  
 ὑψημένην τρόπον *Pol.* I. 8. 1, *Nic. Eth.*  
 II. 7. 9. The participle is passive, as is  
 ὑψηγείται (ὑψήγεται Bk.) *Pol.* I. 13. 6.  
 See 3 § 1, 8 § 1 n. (66), III. 1. 2 with n.  
 (434) (Schneider). SUSEM. (4)

18 ὥσπερ γὰρ κτλ.] "As in other  
 subjects a compound has to be resolved  
 into its ultimate elements, these being  
 the smallest parts of the whole, so here  
 by inquiring of what elements a city,"  
 which is a compound III. 1. 2, "is com-  
 posed, we shall better discover the differ-  
 ence between the four types above-men-  
 tioned (πολιτικός, βασιλικός, etc.) and  
 whether systematic knowledge can be  
 attained about them severally." Although  
 he did not apply the mathematical method  
 of pure deduction to biological or political  
 sciences Aristotle derived both the pro-  
 cesses of Analysis and Synthesis and the  
 terms (ἀναλύειν, σύνθετον διαιρεῖν) from  
 geometry: see the instructive passages  
*Nic. Eth.* III. 3 §§ 11, 12 ζητεῖν καὶ  
 ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διά-  
 γραμμα (a geometrical problem), *Metaφ.*

VIII (Θ). 9. 4 1051 a 21—29 εὑρίσκεται  
 δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργεῖα, διαιροῦντες  
 γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν.

21 τούτων and 23 τῶν ῥηθέντων  
 should be taken as above and not referred  
 to ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται (πόλις) as the gram-  
 matical antecedent.

c. 2 *Origin of the city from the*  
*family through the village-community:*  
 §§ 1—8. *The city a natural institution*  
 §§ 8—12, *prior in the intention of nature*  
*to the family and individual* §§ 13, 14,  
*and of incalculable utility* §§ 15, 16.

We have here the Patriarchal Theory,  
 as it is called by Sir H. Maine, applied  
 to the origin of society. The family living  
 under the headship of the father is taken  
 as the ultimate social unit. Until quite  
 recently this was the accepted view: see  
 Maine *Ancient Law* c. 5 esp. 122—135,  
*Early History of Institutions* c. 3, *Early*  
*Law and Custom* cc. 7, 8. There are  
 certain difficulties of this derivation of  
 the state which Aristotle avoids 'by mak-  
 ing the combination of families of different  
 stocks (γέννη) depend on contiguity of  
 residence and on convenience.' See J. F.  
 McLennan's criticisms *Studies in Ancient*  
*History*, esp. 213—227, 235—309.

On the origin of civil society there is  
 something in Plato *Rep.* II. 369 B ff., *Laws*  
 III. 676—682, Polybios VI. cc. 4—7, Cicero  
*De Rep.* I. 25, 26 §§ 39—42 (with Lac-  
 tantius *Instit.* VI. 10), *De Off.* I. 17 §§ 53,  
 54, *De Fin.* III. §§ 62—67. A. C. Brad-  
 ley *Hellenica* 190—212 gives the best  
 commentary on cc. 1, 2; Oncken *Staats-*  
*lehre* II. 3—27 is also helpful.

§ 1 24 τὰ πράγματα φνόμενα]  
 "things in their growth or origin"  
 (Shilleto); Plato *Rep.* 369 A, *Laws* 757 C.

§ 2 26 συνδυάζεσθαι] *Nic. Eth.* VIII.  
 12. 7 ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν  
 μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν.

ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῇ  
γενέσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ἀστυ-  
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικόν τὸ ἐφίστασθαι  
30 οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον). ἄρχον δὲ καὶ  
ἀρχόμενον φύσει διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐντίμενον τῇ  
διανοίᾳ προορᾷ ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπότην [φύσει], τὸ δὲ  
δυνάμενον ταῦτα τῷ σώματι ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον φύσει καὶ  
3 δούλον· διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλον ταῦτό συμφέρει). φύσει μὲν  
οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δούλον (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις  
ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πε-

28 γεννήσεως Stobaeus (p. 324) Sussem.<sup>1-2</sup> || 32 δυνάμενος τὸ δυνάμεν? Sussem. ||  
δεσπότην [φύσει] Thurot || 33 ταῦτα after τῷ σώματι H<sup>2</sup> Bk. || φύσει, ed. Al., ed.  
φύσει Γ II Bk., ἀρχόμενον, [καὶ] φύσει Bernays

1252 b 2 ol is omitted by H<sup>2</sup> Bk.

27 οἷον] "namely," introducing the two relationships (each of which needs a long parenthetical explanation) into which the family can be analysed, § 5.

28 καὶ τοῦτο κτλ] Cp. Zeller *Philosophie der Griechen* II ii 311, who quotes *De Anima* II. 4. 2, 415 a 26 φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν ὡς τέλει· τὸ ἐκείναι ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἕνεκα μὲν ζῶντος, φύσιν δὲ φύσιν, ὅσα τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ θεῖα μετέχουσιν ἢ ἔδραται. Individuals perish but the species, the kind, is immortal. See first *Plato* *Allegoria*, 106 E, 107 C—108 B. SUSSEM. (5)

οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως] not by design or of deliberate purpose, ἡ γὰρ ἐργασίη μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας: instinctively.

30 ἄρχον κτλ] "governer and governed by nature" clearly—"master and slave" not as I § 2 "political ruler and subject."

31 On Aristotle's conception of φύσις in general Zeller *Ph. der Gr.* II ii 384—389, 422—431; Grant *Ethics* I. 279—285. Various senses of the term *Metaph.* V (Δ), c. 4.

διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν] "for preservation": i.e. to secure the means of subsistence. How far this is true of the 'slave by birth' on Aristotle's view is explained § 11 6—10, as Fulleborn has correctly observed: in the case of the master it should be remembered that without slaves in his household he can procure at best but a poor and uncertain subsistence: see § 5 n. (14), 4 § 1—4. SUSSEM. (6)

τὸ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. § 11 8—10, 11 § 6 n. (10). SUSSEM. (6 b)

33 ταῦτα—δ τὸ ἄρχον ἐργασίη.

§ 3 34 διὸ δεσπότη κτλ] "It is not simply, as Fulleborn (II. 71) supposes, that both master and slave are alike interested in the maintenance of this relationship: Aristotle really means that the master's interest is advantageous for the slave, and conversely": see § 1 n. (57). Only the advantage to the slave comes indirectly, κατὰ συμβεβηκός, III 6 n. (L. Schiller). SUSSEM. 70 Cp. 1 § 2.

1252 b 1 οὐδὲν γὰρ κτλ] "For nature never fashions things separately, for various and dissimilar purposes, as Delphic cutlers do their tools" (Schiller).

2 τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν] According to Hesychius, i.e., the Delphic knife had the upper part only of iron, χαλκὸς δὲ ὑπερθερ αὐτοῦ σιδήρου; the handle, perhaps also the back, was of wood. Citing *De m. D.* *quae ut apud Aristotem* (Oxford 1856. 4) maintains it was a knife and sword combined, for martial purposes (Schützler). Huxley Gifford proposes αὐστρον for αὐτοῦ in Hesychius, as above. Oudendorp, II. 25—27. The most obscure words of Hesychius is from of Oresane's explanation: "ὑπερθερ a piece of iron with a thick end and a pointed end, with the thick left rough and the other side smoothed to a blade. Then you have a knife for cutting, you can file with the rough back, and by turning it round use the thick end for a hammer. Such a rough use of tool would certainly be cheap enough." Cp. *ἐπεκτατολογία* γένει 21. F n. SUSSEM. (6) *Δελφικὴ μάχαιρα* διὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν Μαιστρεα ap. Wolfson *Acad.* 179: with which agrees the explanation

νιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἑν' οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα (I)  
 4 τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δουλεῦον·  
 § 4 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει

5 τὸ after καὶ is omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

in *arphend. φρον.* I. 94 (tom. I. p. 393 of the *Corpus Paroemiograph.*, Gotting. 1839) Δελφικὴ μάχαιρα: ἐπὶ τῶν φιλοκερδῶν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς λαμβάνειν προαιρουμένων, παρόσον οἱ Δελφοὶ τὸ μὲν τι τῶν ἱερείων ἐλάμβανον, τὸ δέ τι ὑπὲρ τῆς μαχαίρας (? for the use of the knife) ἐπράττοντο. Athenaeus IV. 74 p. 173: 'Αχαιοὶ δ' ὁ Ἑρετριεὺς ἐν' Ἀλκμαίωνι τῷ σατυρικῷ καρνοκοποιοὺς καλεῖ τοὺς Δελφοὺς διὰ τούτων· Καρνοκοποιοὺς προσβλέπων βδελύττομαι· παρόσον τὰ ἱερεῖα περιτέμνοντες δῆλον ὡς ἐμαγεῖρον αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκαρύκενον. εἰς ταῦτα δὲ ἀποβλέπων καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἔφη· Ἄλλ' ὦ Δελφῶν πλείστας ἀκονῶν | Φοῖβε μαχαίρας | καὶ προδιδάσκων τοὺς σοὺς προδόλους. It was from Thomas Aquinas *ad locum* that Oresme derived the explanation cited above. See Von Hertling *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIX. p. 447. Mr W. Ridgeway thinks the name given to "a large kind of knife, which could be used for either fighting or carving, from the sacrificial knife having been used as a weapon to slay Pyrrhus, Pindar *Nem.* VII. 42."

3 ἐν πρὸς ἑν] There are of course exceptions to this rule, as Aristotle himself allows *De Part. Anim.* IV. 6. 13, 683 a 22 ὅπου γὰρ ἐνδέχεται χρῆσθαι δυσὶν ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα καὶ μὴ ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐδὲν ἢ φύσις εἴωθε ποιεῖν ὥσπερ ἢ χαλκευτικὴ πρὸς εὐτέλειαν ὀβελισκολύχνιον· ἀλλ' ὅπου μὴ ἐνδέχεται, καταχρῆται τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ πλείω ἔργα. SUSEM. (9) See *De Anima* II. 8. 10, 420 b 16. We shall find the rule applied to political offices II. II. 13, VI(IV). 15. 6.

4 μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις κτλ] "if restricted in use to a single function." Fülleborn asserts that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, even supposing there is no exception to the rule (see preceding note). But surely the propagation and the preservation of the species are two different ends. At the same time Aristotle should have emphasized the fact that woman is not nearly so far below man as the natural slave (see § 2) is below his master. SUSEM. (10)

§ 4 5 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις κτλ] 'Whereas in Greece wife and slave are distinct, in *barbaria* they are not, because all—men and women—are slaves' (Jackson). In Thrace e.g. the women did farm-work *μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν*

δούλων Plato *Laus* 805 E. Fülleborn (II. 84) objects that this is an unsatisfactory reason to assign for the servitude of women outside Greece, since where all of both sexes are slaves we should rather infer that they are all equal. (In this last sense indeed Congreve seriously takes the words, supplying τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν sc. τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἄρσεσι καὶ τοῖς δεσπόταις.)

"Fülleborn's objections arise from his having been misled by the omission mentioned above, in *n.* (10), and so having misunderstood the real sense of the passage. Aristotle's meaning is this: because the barbarian nations are slaves by nature, the men are not capable of respecting the freedom of the female sex in the women, and of according to them the position which by nature belongs to the woman in relation to the man; but treat them as slaves. And hence necessarily arises the perversion of nature, that in the marriage relation you have one slave ruling despotically over another. To the same cause, the servile character of these nations, or at least of the Asiatics (I. 6. 8 *n.*), Aristotle attributes the fact that they themselves are ruled by their kings as slaves; or in other words that the form under which the state exists amongst them is despotism, III. 14. 6 *n.*, which in reality cannot be considered to constitute a state at all, a state consisting of free citizens but not of slaves, 7 § 1, III. 9 § 6, 12 § 8; cp. VI(IV). 4 § 11, a passage which is probably not genuine. Such a despotism is only an abnormally expanded family: ('non civitas erit sed magna familia,' Grotius *De iure belli ac pacis* III. 8. 2). It is a species of that which Aristotle denotes by *ἔθνος*, i.e. a mere aggregate of men of the same race, a tribe population or nationality, as contrasted with πόλις, a city-state: § 6; II. 1 § 3; III. 3 § 5, 13 § 19, 14 § 15; IV(VII). 4 § 11; VIII(V). 10 § 8 with *nn.*; *Nic. Eth.* I. 2. 8, 1094 b 10; *Rhet.* I. 5. 5 1360 b 31: cp. Schlosser I. 278. [Cp. *ἔθνος* = federation in Polybios and Diodoros, esp. of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues: δι' ἐθνικὰς χρείας 'for federal purposes' Diod. XVIII. 13.] See further *n.* (13): 5 § 8, 6 § 4—6 with *nn.* (47), (54), (56): 7 § 5, 8 § 12; IV(VII). 2 § 15, 14 § 21 with *nn.*" SUSEM. (11)

6 τάξιν. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οἷς ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῆς  
ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δοῦλου. Τὰ φασὶν εἰς πλείονα  
βαρβάρων δ' Ἑλλήνων ἄρχαν εἶναι.

5 ὡς ταῦτό φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν ταύτης τῆς  
10 δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὀρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε πρῶτον  
οἶκον μὲν πρῶτα γυνικὰ τε βῆξ τε ἀμείβει.

ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἐστίν.

ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ  
φύσιν οἶκός ἐστιν, οὗς ὁ μὲν Χαρώνδας καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύλους. Ἐπει-  
15 μὲν δὲ ὁ Κρῆς ὁμοκάπους· ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείονων οἰκῶν κοινωνία.

9 ὃν before ταῦτο Γ, omitted by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> 12 ὁσίον· \* \* Susem.<sup>3</sup> wrongly, see Dittenberger *Gott. gel. Anz.* 1874 p. 1372 ff. 15 ὁμοσιπύλοι: IP P<sup>1</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>3</sup> and M<sup>1</sup> (corr.), perhaps rightly, but see Dittenberger p. 1377 ff. and Commentary n. (12): ὁμοκάπους = ὁμοκήποις Ridgeway (also Shilleto in unpublished *Adversaria*: "A Tyrrhenides *epicā poesi* utebatur, certe ὁμοκάπους. Nisi forte ὁμοκάπους = ὁμοκήποις")

8 Euripides *Iphigenia in Aulis* 1400 Nauck. The words following are ἄλλ' οὐ βαρβάρους, μήτηρ, Ἑλλήνων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλον, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι. SUSEM. (12)

9 ὡς ταῦτό κτλ] In this Aristotle only expresses the view which had gradually become universal among the Greeks, and was not constituted until a late period and then by but few: 3 § 4 n. (31). This view is explained by the justifiable consciousness they had of their mental superiority: it was especially fostered by the Persian war, and found external confirmation in the fact that the vast majority of Greek slaves were of barbarian origin, while in itself again it tended to hinder the enslavement of Greeks (L. Schiller). See also n. (47) on 6, 4 § 10. That slaves are non-Hellenes is assumed quite as an understood thing in Xenoph. *Memor.* II. 7. 6, Demosth. 232 (c. *Mic.*) 48. See however n. (64) on 1. 2 § 5. SUSEM. (13)

§ 5 10 πρώτη] predicatively, "from these two relationships,"—man and wife, master and slave,—"arises primarily the family." For the sense, *πρῶτον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεις τίς. Eccl.* VII. 12. 7. The three stages, *οἰκία εἰς οἶκον πόλιν*, are given by Plaut. *Lauti* I. 616 c ff. Ἡσίοδος] *Hesiod and Plato* 401. Clearly Aristotle did not know of the spurious line 406 in our text, *εἰς οἶκον δ' οὐ γυναικός, ἦν καὶ παρὰ θεῶν*. SUSEM. (14)

12 ὁ γὰρ βοῦς κτλ] "the ox supplies the place of a servant." Cp. 3 § 9

n. (46). If with such three passages we compare 4 §§ 1—4, it is evident that Varro's division *De re rustica* I. 17, which Groun mentions *op. c. 1. 2. 3. 4*, is quite in the sense and spirit of Aristotle: all in three parts (*loc. dividunt*) instrumenti genus: *vocale et semivocale et mutum, vocale in quo sunt vocales, semivocale in quo sunt voces, mutum, in quo sunt plura.* (L. Schiller) SUSEM. (15)

12 ἡ μὲν οὖν κτλ] *μὲν μὲν*, not *ἀν*, repeating after the quotation from Hesiod the clause 9 *ἐκ μὲν οὖν κτλ*. Take care *φάσιν* with *κατασκευαῖα*: "thus then the society which in the order of nature has arisen to meet every-day needs is the household: chosen to our number as Charondas calls them; possessor of a piece of land in the place of Hyemondas the Cretan. The union of a number of families first formed with a view to needs beyond those which are of daily recurrence is the village." Elsewhere in Aristotle *ἀφαιρέσις* = taking for a day; so Herodotus here, "the recurrence of less transient duration."

14 Χαρώνδας] n. 13 § 2, § 10 n. (46): VI (VI. 11 § 13, 12 § 2 n. *Plato* *Georg. for Stallone in* *Adversaria* (Lugdun. 1870) I. p. 125 ff., 401. SUSEM. (14)

Ἐπειμύδης] See Epimenides at the end of this book, p. 204. SUSEM. (17)

15 ὁμοσιπύλοι] The meaning is doubtful. (1) The men of the same family give *ἀμείβεται*. (2) If Aristotle is pointing from a collection of families (*κοινωνία*)

§ 6 πρώτη<sup>1</sup> χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη. μάλιστα δ' ἔοικε (I)  
 17 κατὰ φύσιν ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι, οὓς καλοῦσί τινες

16 ἔοικε after 17 κατὰ φύσιν P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 17 ἀπ' [οἰκία] Heitland, but see the Comm.

ascribed to Epimenides, then, as these would be written in hexameters, the text requires a word capable of standing in an hexameter verse and ὁμοκάπνους, which satisfies this condition, appears to possess a decided advantage. For ὁμοκάπνους of the inferior MSS. is usually taken to be a compound with κάπη a *trough*, *crib*; hence *any feeding-place*; and if this etymology be correct nothing but arbitrary lengthening of the first syllable in *arsi* could adapt the word to an hexameter verse. (3) Göttling, again, thinks that Epimenides could not possibly have called the *families* of the Cretans 'mess-mates,' because the *συσσίτια* were established amongst them. But, even assuming that Epimenides actually wrote the line in question, there was, as Dittenberger remarks, no absolute necessity that he should confine himself in this oracle to the circumstances of Crete, especially as his influence was actively felt far beyond the island.

In favour of ὁμοκάπνους Dittenberger urges that 'it is like Aristotle to support the results of his own inquiries by a subsequent appeal to the language of common life, to proverbs, passages in the poets, or specially significant sayings and expressions of prose writers. In this place Charondas and Epimenides are evidently quoted for this same purpose, in connexion with the definition of the family as a society existing for the whole of daily life. Consequently it is the satisfaction of daily recurring needs which brings individuals together in a household. The expression of Charondas (and that of Epimenides also, if we read ὁμοκάπνους) fits in perfectly with this, by making common participation in food, which is the most important daily need, characteristic of the household. But ὁμοκάπνους = smoke-fellows could only be taken as alluding to the common sacrificial fire, which would not suit the present context, although it is true that from the point of view of the Greek the family was a society for worship.' Yet ὁμοκάπνους should be understood of sharers in the smoke of the common hearth, just as we might speak of 'hearths' meaning

homes or families\*; thus the same idea of a common participation in food would be denoted but in a different form.

All these difficulties Ridgeway (Camb. Philological Soc. *Transactions* Feb. 23, 1882) seeks to avoid by retaining the reading ὁμοκάπους (with *ā*), Doric for ὁμοκήπους (κήπος) = with a common plot of ground. SUSEM. (17)

"The Cretan poet used a Doric form, for the retention of the dialectic form in Aristotle cp. Θάλεω I. II. 12: κήπος is the common plot of ground that furnishes the common food supply (σιπύνη): cp. II. 5. 2 (γῆπεδον and καρπός). The scale of social development here indicated seems to be (1) original οἰκία: (2) οἶκος = joint family of Hindus or Slavonic house-community, where the proceeds of the undivided property (κήπος) must be brought into a common chest or purse: vide Sir H. Maine (*Early Law* 237—255): after that, "(3) the οἶκος breaks up into separate οἰκίαι forming the κώμη (= the Russian village community): all are sprung or believe themselves to be sprung from a common ancestor (ὁμογάλακτες)" (Ridgeway). For the undivided family property comp. E. de Laveleye *La propriété primitive* cc. 13—15 (Engl. tr. pp. 175—214), Hearn *Aryan Household* 176—191, and the criticism by D. McLennan *Patriarchal Theory* c. 8: also Caillemet *Droit de succession* p. 34 ff., Jannet *Les institutions sociales et le droit civil à Sparte* (Paris 1880) p. 88.

ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κτλ.] Instances of services needed from time to time for which members of a village community unite (as distinct from the daily wants which originate the family) are, to repel a common enemy or to execute a great work of common utility (Fülleborn II. 95, 96). Add the exchange of commodities, which is unnecessary in the household: 9 § 5 with *note*. SUSEM. (18)

16 πρώτη = simplicissima, quae tamquam pars inest aliis (Bonitz).

§ 6 17 ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας] i. e. all the rest of the village except the original

\* So Grote, "each society having its separate meal-bin and fireplace." Cp. Gaelic teadhloch and coediche, J. F. McLennan p. 123.

20 γάρ [συνήλθον]· πάντα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου.

18 \* \* παῖδας Schmidt, [παῖδας.....παῖδας] Sinuon. 1 20 σωφροσύνη missing in II<sup>1</sup> (added by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) 1 πᾶσα γὰρ πᾶσα δ' Schmidt in a former signature, transposing 18 οὐδ'.....20 συνῆλθεν to follow 24 φῶς (now with a comma)

household may be most naturally regarded as a colony or offshoot of the original household. SUSEM. (18b)

13. [μογάλακτας] According to Philochoros *Frag.* 91—94 and *Frag.* 139 in Harpokration and Suidas (i. πρ. γεννηται, μομαγάλακτες, ὄργωνες) the members of each of the 360 ancient Attic γένη who were afterwards called γεννηται = kin, clansmen, were originally called μομαγάλακτες = foster-brothers, fellow-nurslings (J. G. Schneider *Addenda* II. 471). Pollux VI. 37, VIII. 2 οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ γένους ἑκαλοῦντο γεννηται καὶ μομαγάλακτες, γίνεαι μὲν οὐ προσήκοντες, ἐκ δὲ τῆς συνόδου οὕτω προσαγορευόμενοι. SUSEM. (19)

Thus only is the *γένος* hinted at here. "The identity of the *κώμη* and the *γένος* is apparently indicated III. 9 §§ 12, 14 where we have the πόλις defined as (*a*) ἡ τοῦ εὐ ζῆν κοινωλία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, and (*b*) ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωλία" (Heitland *Notes* 8). Even then no place in the development is found for *φάρμαι*, *φύλαι*, or Aristotle's 'associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals' *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 9, 5; *cp. Pol.* III. 9, 13 (Oncken). Apparently they are held to be of later origin than the state. Nor is there any explicit reference to *συννοικισμός*, although, as Stein suggests, Aristotle has doubtless been influenced by the history of Attica.

As to the meaning of *ἀν-γάλακτες*, Aristotle unquestionably understood it to imply common ancestry in our sense, even if *παῖδάς τε καὶ παῖδων παῖδάς* be rejected as a gloss. And this may well have been the sense in which it was anciently applied to the *εὐγενέες* (*γενεῖαι*). For descent had long been reckoned through males in Athens, indeed *Τὸ κληρονομία* (*cf. q. Müller*) appears to denote by *κλῆρα* what is usually called the *γένος*; and even where individuals not connected by blood had entered a clan they may have come to believe the contrary. (See Maine *Early Law* p. 274 ff.)

Or the word may have first meant 'those of kin by descent through females only.' On the evidence of Spartan and Athenian customs, and from information in Homer and the legends, it has been with good reason inferred that this system of kinship once prevailed in Greece. M. Lénauq op. c. 325-309; cf. L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* c. 5 esp. 130-134. "ἡ ἀπογονία = members of a *gens*, the name itself demonstrates that this membership in the *gens* depended on their having had the same mother's milk" (Kiddway). If so, may we similarly interpret ἀπογονία and ἀπογονοί as *matrilinei* from a time when eating from the same meal jar or sharing the same work, and not inheritance of the same father's blood, constituted in a savage society the earliest idea of kinship? See *Eos*, 1 to B. 11.

Another meaning proposed is: 'those who offer the same milk', from a comparison of Sanskrit *sapāṇa*, *samānāṇa*—those who offer the same milk, the same water: i.e. 'near kin', 'distant kin' respectively (Harrison *op. cit.* 171: 142 for this there is no evidence).

Sid's lecture was because the "line" arose through the village from the family. Thus Plato argues *Zurw* III like to the air to experience things but at the same time it is warlike and perfect perfection. This is the way we have seen in the past.

19 αἱ πόλεις—*Hellas*—the cities, τὰ ἔθνη—*non-Hellenic* races or populations. As in IV(III). 2. 10 ὅτι δὲ ἐν ταῖς πόσιν ταῖς ἀποσταλέναις ἐκπορεύουσι—*also do Sicilians and Helonians and Dacians and Kelebsai*, Aristotle *non-Hell.* as the gentes assigned in α. (11) as equivalent to *non-Hellenes*, precisely as the word is used in the New Testament for Gentiles (e.g. Jews and Christians) ἐξ ἐθνῶν (Gal. 3. 12; 1. 13; 1. 14; 1. 15; 1. 16; 1. 17; 1. 18; 1. 19; 1. 20; 1. 21; 1. 22; 1. 23; 1. 24; 1. 25; 1. 26; 1. 27; 1. 28; 1. 29; 1. 30; 1. 31; 1. 32; 1. 33; 1. 34; 1. 35; 1. 36; 1. 37; 1. 38; 1. 39; 1. 40; 1. 41; 1. 42; 1. 43; 1. 44; 1. 45; 1. 46; 1. 47; 1. 48; 1. 49; 1. 50; 1. 51; 1. 52; 1. 53; 1. 54; 1. 55; 1. 56; 1. 57; 1. 58; 1. 59; 1. 60; 1. 61; 1. 62; 1. 63; 1. 64; 1. 65; 1. 66; 1. 67; 1. 68; 1. 69; 1. 70; 1. 71; 1. 72; 1. 73; 1. 74; 1. 75; 1. 76; 1. 77; 1. 78; 1. 79; 1. 80; 1. 81; 1. 82; 1. 83; 1. 84; 1. 85; 1. 86; 1. 87; 1. 88; 1. 89; 1. 90; 1. 91; 1. 92; 1. 93; 1. 94; 1. 95; 1. 96; 1. 97; 1. 98; 1. 99; 1. 100; 1. 101; 1. 102; 1. 103; 1. 104; 1. 105; 1. 106; 1. 107; 1. 108; 1. 109; 1. 110; 1. 111; 1. 112; 1. 113; 1. 114; 1. 115; 1. 116; 1. 117; 1. 118; 1. 119; 1. 120; 1. 121; 1. 122; 1. 123; 1. 124; 1. 125; 1. 126; 1. 127; 1. 128; 1. 129; 1. 130; 1. 131; 1. 132; 1. 133; 1. 134; 1. 135; 1. 136; 1. 137; 1. 138; 1. 139; 1. 140; 1. 141; 1. 142; 1. 143; 1. 144; 1. 145; 1. 146; 1. 147; 1. 148; 1. 149; 1. 150; 1. 151; 1. 152; 1. 153; 1. 154; 1. 155; 1. 156; 1. 157; 1. 158; 1. 159; 1. 160; 1. 161; 1. 162; 1. 163; 1. 164; 1. 165; 1. 166; 1. 167; 1. 168; 1. 169; 1. 170; 1. 171; 1. 172; 1. 173; 1. 174; 1. 175; 1. 176; 1. 177; 1. 178; 1. 179; 1. 180; 1. 181; 1. 182; 1. 183; 1. 184; 1. 185; 1. 186; 1. 187; 1. 188; 1. 189; 1. 190; 1. 191; 1. 192; 1. 193; 1. 194; 1. 195; 1. 196; 1. 197; 1. 198; 1. 199; 1. 200; 1. 201; 1. 202; 1. 203; 1. 204; 1. 205; 1. 206; 1. 207; 1. 208; 1. 209; 1. 210; 1. 211; 1. 212; 1. 213; 1. 214; 1. 215; 1. 216; 1. 217; 1. 218; 1. 219; 1. 220; 1. 221; 1. 222; 1. 223; 1. 224; 1. 225; 1. 226; 1. 227; 1. 228; 1. 229; 1. 230; 1. 231; 1. 232; 1. 233; 1. 234; 1. 235; 1. 236; 1. 237; 1. 238; 1. 239; 1. 240; 1. 241; 1. 242; 1. 243; 1. 244; 1. 245; 1. 246; 1. 247; 1. 248; 1. 249; 1. 250; 1. 251; 1. 252; 1. 253; 1. 254; 1. 255; 1. 256; 1. 257; 1. 258; 1. 259; 1. 260; 1. 261; 1. 262; 1. 263; 1. 264; 1. 265; 1. 266; 1. 267; 1. 268; 1. 269; 1. 270; 1. 271; 1. 272; 1. 273; 1. 274; 1. 275; 1. 276; 1. 277; 1. 278; 1. 279; 1. 280; 1. 281; 1. 282; 1. 283; 1. 284; 1. 285; 1. 286; 1. 287; 1. 288; 1. 289; 1. 290; 1. 291; 1. 292; 1. 293; 1. 294; 1. 295; 1. 296; 1. 297; 1. 298; 1. 299; 1. 300; 1. 301; 1. 302; 1. 303; 1. 304; 1. 305; 1. 306; 1. 307; 1. 308; 1. 309; 1. 310; 1. 311; 1. 312; 1. 313; 1. 314; 1. 315; 1. 316; 1. 317; 1. 318; 1. 319; 1. 320; 1. 321; 1. 322; 1. 323; 1. 324; 1. 325; 1. 326; 1. 327; 1. 328; 1. 329; 1. 330; 1. 331; 1. 332; 1. 333; 1. 334; 1. 335; 1. 336; 1. 337; 1. 338; 1. 339; 1. 340; 1. 341; 1. 342; 1. 343; 1. 344; 1. 345; 1. 346; 1. 347; 1. 348; 1. 349; 1. 350; 1. 351; 1. 352; 1. 353; 1. 354; 1. 355; 1. 356; 1. 357; 1. 358; 1. 359; 1. 360; 1. 361; 1. 362; 1. 363; 1. 364; 1. 365; 1. 366; 1. 367; 1. 368; 1. 369; 1. 370; 1. 371; 1. 372; 1. 373; 1. 374; 1. 375; 1. 376; 1. 377; 1. 378; 1. 379; 1. 380; 1. 381; 1. 382; 1. 383; 1. 384; 1. 385; 1. 386; 1. 387; 1. 388; 1. 389; 1. 390; 1. 391; 1. 392; 1. 393; 1. 394; 1. 395; 1. 396; 1. 397; 1. 398; 1. 399; 1. 400; 1. 401; 1. 402; 1. 403; 1. 404; 1. 405; 1. 406; 1. 407; 1. 408; 1. 409; 1. 410; 1. 411; 1. 412; 1. 413; 1. 414; 1. 415; 1. 416; 1. 417; 1. 418; 1. 419; 1. 420; 1. 421; 1. 422; 1. 423; 1. 424; 1. 425; 1. 426; 1. 427; 1. 428; 1. 429; 1. 430; 1. 431; 1. 432; 1. 433; 1. 434; 1. 435; 1. 436; 1. 437; 1. 438; 1. 439; 1. 440; 1. 441; 1. 442; 1. 443; 1. 444; 1. 445; 1. 446; 1. 447; 1. 448; 1. 449; 1. 450; 1. 451; 1. 452; 1. 453; 1. 454; 1. 455; 1. 456; 1. 457; 1. 458; 1. 459; 1. 460; 1. 461; 1. 462; 1. 463; 1. 464; 1. 465; 1. 466; 1. 467; 1. 468; 1. 469; 1. 470; 1. 471; 1. 472; 1. 473; 1. 474; 1. 475; 1. 476; 1. 477; 1. 478; 1. 479; 1. 480; 1. 481; 1. 482; 1. 483; 1. 484; 1. 485; 1. 486; 1. 487; 1. 488; 1. 489; 1. 490; 1. 491; 1. 492; 1. 493; 1. 494; 1. 495; 1. 496; 1. 497; 1. 498; 1. 499; 1. 500; 1. 501; 1. 502; 1. 503; 1. 504; 1. 505; 1. 506; 1. 507; 1. 508; 1. 509; 1. 510; 1. 511;

§ 7 ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει (p. 3)

"Ομηρος,

θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος

παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων.

σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς  
25 δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν  
ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη  
ἐαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

§ 8 ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ἦδη, πάσης 8  
ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκειᾶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν  
30 οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὔσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει

21 αἱ is omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, whether rightly, is very doubtful || 24 σποράδες γὰρ καὶ οὐπω <ἀγχιγείτονες> Schmidt edits, σποράδες γὰρ καὶ οὐτοι [τὸ ἀρχαῖον] and 26 ὥσπερ γὰρ Schmidt formerly (now withdrawn) || 28 ἡ δὲ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2,3,4,6</sup>. C<sup>4</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> Aldine Bk., ἡ δὲ U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> || ἡ δ'... 1253 a 1 βέλτιστον transposed by Schmidt to follow 18 παῖδας. See his arrangement and alterations *Introd.* p. 96 || 29 γενομένη Schneider || 30 οὖν is wanting in M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, but cp. IV (VII). 10 § 1, 1329 b 3

21 ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀπ.] 'Wherefore likewise the colonies' [*i.e.* the villages] 'because of their kinship' sc. βασιλεύονται. So § 11 ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (Shilleto).

§ 7 22 The quotation from Homer *Odys.* IX. 114 f. SUSEM. (20) Cited *N. E.* x. 9. 13. Plato has it *Laws* 680 B. Cp. Maine *Ancient Law* pp. 4—6, 125.

24 τὸ ἀρχαῖον] With the adverbial use comp. Xen. *Hellen.* v. 2. 7 καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄκουν.

24 ff. "A reminiscence of the famous saying of Xenophanes given by Clem. Alex. VII p. 711 B: "Ἕλληνες δὲ ὥσπερ ἀνθρωπομόρφους οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρωποπαθεῖς τοὺς θεοὺς ὑποτίθενται καὶ καθάπερ τὰς μορφὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοίας ἐαυτοῖς ἕκαστοι δια-ζωγραφοῦσιν" (Ridgeway).

See still stronger statements about the popular religion in *Metaph.* XII (A). 8 §§ 19—21, 1074 b 3 ff.

§ 8 28 ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κτλ] Cp. II. 2 § 8 with *note* and references, also *n.* on III. 3 §§ 3, 4; 9 § 10 (554). SUSEM. (20 b)

"The union of several village-communities forms, when complete, an actual city, attaining, so to speak, the limit of perfect self-sufficiency: at the outset a union for a bare livelihood, it exists to promote a higher life." See Grote *History* II. 341—344 on city-state) (villages: on this deduction of the state generally A. C. Bradley *Hellenica* 197—199, who observes 194 *n.* that "freedom", though not in a mere negative sense, best answers to αὐτάρκεια: a life which leaves no want of

man's nature, external or spiritual, unsatisfied. In *N. E.* I. 7. 7 τὸ αὐταρκες = δ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μη-δενδς ἐνδεᾶ, the sole condition of a life that is desirable and lacks nothing. Cp. *N. E.* x. 6. 2 οὐδενος ἐνδεῆς... ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης.

29 ff. Compare c. 4 § 1; II. 2 § 8; III. 1 § 12, 6 §§ 3, 4 ff., 9 §§ 5, 6, 11—14, esp. ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους <χάριν>. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἅρα πράξεων [χάριν] θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν; further III. 12 § 9, 13 § 1, 18 § 1; IV (VII). 4 §§ 11—14, 5 § 1, 8 § 4, §§ 8, 9, 9 §§ 1, 2; VI (IV). 4 §§ 9—11; VII (VI). 8 § 3. These passages would prove (even if it were not self-evident) that the perfected and beautified life, made complete self-sufficing and satisfying, is one with the life of happiness or well-being (εὐδαιμονία): cp. *n.* (284) on II. 9 § 5. SUSEM. (21)

The implication of εὖ ζῆν and αὐτάρκεια which disposes of Schmidt's athetesis of the clauses where the latter conception comes in (*Jahrb. f. Phil.* cxxv. 1882. 804, cp. *Introd.* 97 *n.*) may also be studied in *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 §§ 6—8. In *De anima* II. 8. 10, 420 b 19—22, τὸ εὖ is opposed to ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης in *De part. animal.* III. 7. 18, 670 b 23.

30 διὸ κτλ] Two proofs that the 'city' is natural. (1) It is the outcome and realization, the final cause, of the previous societies: they are natural, so also is the 'city'. (2) It alone is fully self-sufficing;

ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐστίν, ἢ ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γένεσος τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαρὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἰσχύοντα, ἀποφύγειν ἄνθρωπον ἵππου οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτερον ἢ ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια [καὶ] τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ ἀπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τέχνην ὅτι φαῖδρος

32 [ἡ δὲ...ἐστίν] Schmidt || 33 εἶναι after ἐστίαν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

1253 a 1 καὶ before εἶναι omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Bk. Bernays: εἶναι καὶ ἡγήσασθαι. Bernays, αὐτάρκεια \* \* Blickeher; but see Comm. || καὶ before βέλτερον omitted by W<sup>b</sup> Ald. || ἡ...βέλτιστον omitted by Q M<sup>2</sup> T<sup>2</sup> || \* \* de Schmidt, quoting 1270 b 19—28 || 2 [ἔτι...πόλις ἐστὶ] and ὅτι φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ Schmidt || 3 ἐστὶ M<sup>1</sup>, omitted by P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. perhaps rightly || ὁ omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Bk. || φανερὸς? Oncken wrongly || ἦτοι κρείττων ἢ ἀνθ. ἢ φαῖδρος ὅτι ἀνθ. Schmidt

but to be self-sufficing is end and highest good (and end = fully developed nature).

Against whom, we may ask, is this directed? No doubt there were Sophists who criticized political institutions, of whom Hippias and Thrasymachus may serve as opposite types. But perhaps Antisthenes was the first deliberately to oppose the outcome of civilisation and to advocate a return to a ruder and simpler life: Zeller *Socrates and Socratics* p. 322—3. The anti-social theories of Plato's Callicles in the *Gorgias*, of Thrasymachus and the speakers in *Republic* B. II, are not directly subversive of the state: like Hobbism, they are conservative in their aim.

32 ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος] *Physics* II. 1. 8 103 a 30 f. φύσις in first sense = ὅλη mere potency; in second sense = ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. ὥσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτως καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται καὶ τὸ φυσικόν: II. 2 § 8, 194 a 28 f. ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα· ὡν γὰρ συντεχῶν τῇ αἰφύρῃσι αἰσθη ἔστι τι ἔσχατον, τοῦτο τέλος καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα... βελλίστα γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον. *De anima* III. 12. 3. 434 a 32 f. (Eaton). "Is it the bud, or the blossom, or the ripe fruit that is natural to a tree? All three: only it is unnatural and contrary to the design of the tree that the bud should wither before coming into blossom and bearing fruit" (Fullbrook). SUSEM. (22)

§ 9 34 f. ἔτι...βέλτιστον] The whole connexion requires that this should be a second proof (or at least an amplification of the first proof) ὅτι πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν. And so in fact it is, only it must

be supplemented from what precedes. It runs thus: 'the final cause, that is, the end, of a thing is best. Now self-sufficiency is the end and the best' (thus including under one both the subject and the predicate of the former proposition). With this must be mentally supplied from the foregoing: 'the end includes the true nature of the thing', and 'political society alone' (i.e. no other sort of the state) 'affords to its members true self-sufficiency'. Then the conclusion follows that the state is by nature. Similar abbreviations of the steps in an argument are found elsewhere in Aristotle, so concise sometimes as to be almost unintelligible: e.g. *Metaph.* XII. 1. 1074, § 5, 1069 a 24, b 5 (*Prædicamenta*, SUSEM. (23))

1253 a 1 'From this then it appears that the city is part of the order of nature and man a social being'. *N.E.* IX. 9. 1: no one would choose the possession of every good to be by himself, τοῦτο οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρώπος καὶ οὐ γὰρ τεχνικόν. See also II. 1. 7. 6. "The dogma τὸν φύσιν ἔστιν ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, as interpreted by Aristotle, implies (1) that social organization is not a violation of nature, (2) that the polis differs from the polis in something more than size, (3) that existing institutions are capable of improvement, (4) that there is a form or type or end towards which they may be improved. It is plain that the repetition of this dogma appropriately holds a prominent place in the introduction to a work which has for its main purpose the development of a scheme of the natural polis" (Jackson).

3 ὁ ἀπολις καὶ] "He who is not

ἐστιν ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος (ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὕφ' Ὀμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς (I)

5

ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιτος ἀνέστιος\*

<sup>supported</sup> § 10 ἄμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής), ἅτε περ  
 ἄζυξ ὦν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς. (διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ζῶον ὁ ἄν- 10  
 θρωπος πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζώου μᾶλλον,  
 9 δῆλον. (οὐδὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ.) λόγον  
 § 11 δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων· ἢ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ

6 [γάρ] Schmidt || [καὶ] Spengel partly recognising the fault in the ordinary construction: that ὥσπερ...ἐπιθυμητής is parenthetical was first shown by Jackson (*Journal of Philology* VII. 1877, p. 236 ff.); see Comm. || ἅτε περ omitted by L<sup>s</sup>, erased in U<sup>b</sup> || ἅτε περ...7 πεττοῖς transposed to follow 29 θεός Schmidt || 7 ἄζυξ ὦν omitted by U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup>; with vacant space left, by P<sup>3.6</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup> Ald. and 1st hand of P<sup>2</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup>; ἄζυξ.....πεττοῖς omitted by Ar., ὦν by R<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand); ἄζυξ ὦν was inserted by P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>3</sup>), ἄζυξ by a later hand in Q<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> and by a later hand in the margin of T<sup>b</sup>, ἀνευ ζυγοῦ τυγχάνων V<sup>b</sup> (a later hand), ἀνευ ζύγου τυγχάνων C<sup>4</sup> also, ἀνευ ζεύγους Bas.<sup>2</sup> || πεττοῖς M<sup>b</sup>, πετεινοῖς Γ and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, γρ. πετεινοῖς P<sup>4</sup> (corrector) in the margin, and a later hand in the margin of S<sup>b</sup> || ζῶον after ὁ ἄνθρωπος Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

off from civil society by nature, and not by chance, is either low in the scale of humanity, or above it—as is also he whom Homer reproachfully described as ‘clanless lawless hearthless’; for he”, not the ἀπολις, but ὁ ὕφ' Ὀμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς, “is at once naturally unsociable and pugnacious)—being in fact solitary, like the blot at backgammon” (Jackson).

§ 10 7 ἄζυξ] From an epigram of Agathias (*Anthol. Pal.* IX. 482, esp. 20—28) Götting (*De loco quodam Aris.* (Jena 1858) showed that ἄζυξ nearly resembles the ‘blot’ of our backgammon—an exposed piece as contrasted with pieces guarded or supported, i.e. standing close together\*. Bernays in his translation and Mahaffy (*Academy* Jan. 8, 1876) take ἄζυξ to mean a ‘rover’, i.e. a piece with special powers of aggression; but this is inconsistent with Agathias’ epigram. Moreover they mistake the sense of the quotation from *Iliad* IX. 63, 64, where ἐκείνος ὃς πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίου ὀκρύνοντος is the subject of which ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιτος ἀνέστιος are predicates. What Homer really says is, as Spengel rightly saw

(*Arist. Studien* III. 5), that the lover of domestic strife is clanless lawless hearthless; not, that the outlaw or broken man or ‘rover’ is pugnacious and aggressive. The right sense can be secured by a mere change of punctuation. The parenthetical sentence refers by way of illustration to Homer’s πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής ἐπιδημίου who is a φύσει τοιοῦτος, i.e. an ἀπολις φύσει, in whom to the unsociable character is superadded an inclination to war. Aristotle does not say that the ἀπολις is always or commonly aggressive; thus there is no reason for regarding aggression as a characteristic of the ἄζυξ (Jackson). SUSEM. (24) (25)

διότι here, like ὅτι, “that.”

διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν] *De hist. anim.* I. 1. 12: πολιτικὰ δ’ ἐστι ζῶα ὧν ἐν τι καὶ κοινὸν γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον, ὅπερ οὐ πάντα ποιεῖ ἀγελαῖα. Not all gregarious animals form a community, but those which, like bees, wasps, ants, cranes, and lastly man, are engaged upon some common work (Eaton). SUSEM. (25 b)

9 For parallel passages consult Zeller II ii 424 n. (3); for Aristotle’s teleology, *ib.* 422—428, 488—497.

§ 11 On the physiological distinction between φωνή mere voice, articulate speech, and λόγος rational language, see *De hist. anim.* IV. 9. 536 a 20, b 8 ff., *Probl.* X. 39, 895 a 7 ff., *Poet.* 20 § 2, 1456 b 22 ff. στοιχείον=φωνή ἀδιαίρετος, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἧς πέφυκε συνετὴ

\* Whether πόλις was a name for this game or not, the πᾶμπόλαι πόλις of Plato *Rep.* IV. 422 E (cp. the scholion) makes it likely that a compact body of pieces was called πόλις; if an isolated piece was called ἀπολις, Aristotle’s allusion would be specially appropriate. Oncken, II. 27 f., has misunderstood Agathias’ epigram and Götting’s dissertation no less than the present passage (Jackson).

ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑστάρη  
 χει ζῶοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλεγετο, τοῦ  
 ἔχειν αἰσθῆσιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνει  
 14 ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ  
 12 τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον· τοῦτο γὰρ  
 πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθὸν  
 καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθῆσιν  
 ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.  
 19 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ θεστος ἐστίν  
 13 ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναγκαι-  
 ρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποῦς οὐδὲ χεὶρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμο-

11 λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος (ἡδέος P<sup>4</sup> U<sup>b</sup> and 1st hand L<sup>1</sup>) H<sup>2</sup> Bk. | ἐστὶ σημεῖον 12 ἡδέος. These words are wanting in Q Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> (where † stands in the margin) S<sup>1</sup> T<sup>2</sup> and V<sup>b</sup> (1st hand; added by a later hand) | 12 ἐλεγετο W<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. σημαίνει P<sup>4</sup> M<sup>2</sup> U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>1</sup> || τοῦ ἔχειν αἰσθῆσιν ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ P<sup>4</sup> M<sup>2</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ald. Bk. | 14 δηλοῦν] διελεῖν? Oncken, wrongly | 18 τοῦτων] τῶν ταύτων Schmidt | 19 καὶ πρότερον... 29 θεός transposed to follow 1253 b 27 θεῶν Schmidt. See his arrangement *Introd.* p. 97 || δὲ Schneider, δὴ F H Bk.

γίγνεσθαι φωνή. καὶ γὰρ τῶν θηρίων εἰσὶν αἰσθήσεις φωνῆ. SUSEM. (26)

15 τὸ δίκαιον γεννηθὲν by δηλοῦν] and therefore also (for the purpose of qualifying) justive.

§ 12 16 πρὸς = when compared with. ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακοῦ αἰσθῆσιν] mutual perception. *N. Eth.* II. 9. 8; IV. 5. 13, ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις: not to mention passages in Bk. VI; as II § 4 τούτων αὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθῆσιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.

18 ἡ δὲ τούτων κ.] An objective genitive with κοινωνία as in III. 9. 12 κ. τόπον, 'fellowship in goodness and justice'. The 'city' is regarded as a moral or spiritual society, church and state in one.

19 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει] It is not in order of time γίγνεσθαι (in which sense *N. Eth.* VIII. 12. 7, quoted on § 5 above, asserts the direct contrary), but in order of thought and of real existence φέσει, κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ εἶδει, τῇ οὐσίᾳ, that the state is prior to the family and to the individual. On this distinction see esp. *Metaph.* I. 8 §§ 3—7 989 a 15 ff.: 1800. 8. § 1050 a 3 ff. ἡ ἐνέργεια προτέρα τῆς δινώμεως (the realized and actual precedes the possible) κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ χρόνον. ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ οὐσίᾳ γὰρ, πρῶτον μὲν οὗτις τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερον αὖν ἀνὴρ παῖδά· τὸ αὖν γὰρ φησὶ ἔχειν τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δ' αὖ: *I' ἔργ.* VIII. 7. 12, 201 a 14 what is in process of de-

velopment appears imperfect. Thus it φαίνεται τὸ γινόμενον ἀτελὲς καὶ ἐπ' ἔργῳ ἴδῃ, ὥστε αὖ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῷ εἶδει πρότερον εἶναι. See below III. 1. 2, natural necessities are prior to the divergent, imperfect types. See also (27) Other passages in *Great Ethics* I—IV.

§ 13 20 ἀναιρουμένον κατὰ] "as if the whole body" except the foot or hand "is destroyed, there will be neither foot nor hand, except in an unusual sense such as that in which we call the hand of a statue a hand; likewise a hand in such circumstances" i.e. after the destruction of the rest of the body, "will be spoilt for use," cp. § 14 ἐν τῷ οὐκ εἶναι ἔχειν, καὶ μὴ ἐν τῷ ἀναρροῦμένῳ, "and all things are defined by their function and quality, so that things which are incapable of exercising their functions and qualities require another means ἐνεργεῖα καὶ οὐσία") must not be said to be the things in question, but to be equivocally called by these names" (Jackson). Cp. *Metaph.* II. 121: "as an elephant of wood, or an elephant of leather, so is a Brahman animal in the Vedas. These three have the name" (Frederick).

For the last is correct, the above explanation, in which Haydock and Jackson independently agree, must be

\* "Such as they were before, when they formed part of the whole and fulfilled their functions" (Copp). See also *Metaph.* I. 8.

νύμωσ, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται (I) τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισταί καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε  
 24 μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώ-  
 § 14 νυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει [καὶ] πρότερον ἢ ἕκα- 12  
 στος, δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως  
 τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος  
 κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος  
 29 πόλεως, ὥστε ἡ θηρίον ἢ θεός.

§ 15 φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνί-  
 αν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος. ὥσπερ γὰρ

22 λέγοι Bk.<sup>2</sup> and Susem.<sup>1</sup> following P<sup>2</sup> and perhaps Γ || ἀλλὰ φθαρεῖσα Bender, apparently with the following construction: λιθίνην, ἀλλὰ (φθαρεῖσα γάρ) ἔσται τοιαύτη· πάντα: hardly right || <οὐκ> ἔσται Rud. Schöll (*Comm. de legg.* XII. tabb. Bonn 1865, p. 43) which is not improbable: unless we are to bracket the words διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη. But see *Comm.* and *Quaest. Cr.* III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. || 23 <ἡ> τοιαύτη? Jackson || δὲ] γὰρ Γ apparently, adopted by Bender—rightly, if we accept his conjecture or reject διαφθ. κτλ || 25 καὶ omitted before φύσει in Π<sup>1</sup> and Paris. 963 || καὶ omitted before πρότερον by P<sup>2</sup> Ar. || προτέρα Γ P<sup>6</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup>, πρότερα P<sup>4</sup>, προτέρω Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> || 28 μηθὲν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. μηδενὸς Γ Ar. || οὐθὲν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. οὐδὲ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 31 πρῶτον P<sup>4.6</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup>

accepted: διαφθαρεῖσα must be, as Hayduck thinks, equivalent to τοῦ ἔργου ἐστερημένη καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως: “in such a case the hand and the foot are really deprived of their force. But the essential nature of an object consists in its function and in its capacity to execute that function; so that where it no longer possesses the appropriate quality it can no longer be said to be the same, but only to bear the same name”. But the parallel passages *De gener. anim.* I. 19. 7 726 b 22 ff. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν μορίων οὐδὲν ἀνευ ψυχῆς ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δυνάμεως ἐστι χεὶρ οὐδὲ μόνιον οὐθὲν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὁμῶνυμον: II. I. 42, 734 b 24 ff. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ πρόσωπον μὴ ἔχον ψυχὴν, οὐδὲ σὰρξ, ἀλλὰ φθαρέντα ὁμῶνύμωσ λεχθήσεται τὸ μὲν εἶναι πρόσωπον τὸ δὲ σὰρξ, ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἐγίγνετο λίθινα ἢ ξύλινα; *De anima* II. I. 9 412 b 18 ff. ὅψεωσ ἧς ἀπολειπούσης οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμῶνύμωσ, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος: *Meteor.* IV. 12. 3, 390 a 10 ff. ἅπαντα δ' ἐστὶν ὠρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀληθῶς ἐστὶν ἕκαστα, οἷον ὁ ὀφθαλμός εἰ ὁρά, τὸ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον ὁμῶνύμωσ, οἷον ὁ τεθνεὺς ἢ ὁ λίθινος lead to the conclusion that διαφθαρεῖσα is subject and τοιαύτη is predicate. If so, and if τοιαύτη = a true hand, the sense requires the insertion of the negative, although

we should then expect ἀλλὰ πάντα rather than πάντα δὲ: “for a hand thus rendered useless <no longer> has the qualities of a hand, whereas the definition of every object is contained in its function.” ὁμῶνύμωσ] Cp. III. I. 7 n. (438 b). SUSEM. (28)

§ 14 26 χωρισθείς] cut off from society, living in isolation, μονῶτη γὰρ χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος. Comp. the discussion in *N. Eth.* IX. c. 9 showing that friends are indispensable to Wellbeing: δεήσει τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων... ἡ ταύτη ἐνδεής ἔσται, i.e. not αὐτάρκης.

ὁμῶς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔξει κτλ] ‘will be related to the state as any other part to the whole of which it is a part’: i. e., § 13, will be relative and subordinate to it, will be ὕστερον not πρότερον.

29 ἡ θηρίον ἢ θεός] So § 9 ἡτοι φαῦλος ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος. *N. Eth.* V. 9. 17 with Jackson's note, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ (τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν) οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐθὲν μόνιον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, so that the sphere of particular justice is restricted to human society: *ib.* VII. I. 2 ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίον ἐστὶν κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ.

§ 15 31 ὁ δὲ πρῶτος κτλ] Cp. *Introd.* 24, and notes on II. 9 § 8 (288), § 12 (296), § 14 (300). SUSEM. (28 b)

ὥσπερ γὰρ κτλ] “Both the grammar and the sense of τελεωθὲν and χωρισθὲν

καὶ τελειωθὲν βαλτιστον τῶν ζώων ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἐστίν, αὐτὸν καὶ (1)  
 § 16 χωρισθὲν νόμου καὶ δίκης χείριστον πάντων. χαλεπωτάτη γὰρ  
 ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὄπλα· ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπος ὄπλα ἔχει φάνται φρονή-  
 35 σι καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τὰναντία ἐστὶ χρησθῆναι μάλιστα. δὲ ἀρ-  
 οσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἀνευ ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς ἀφροσύνην  
 καὶ ἐδωδὴν χείριστον. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη  
 πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν [ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις].  
 3 ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συνέστηκεν, (1)

32 [τελειωθὲν] and 33 [χωρισθὲν νόμου καὶ δίκης] Jackson: τελειωθείς and 33 χω-  
 ρισθείς Spengel || ὁ wanting in II<sup>2</sup> Bk., but inserted in the margin of I<sup>1</sup> I. 3. 1. 22  
 ἀρετῇ? due to 36 ἀρετῆς, having displaced a word like τέχνη Frobenius had sup.  
*Met.* I. 1. 6 p. 980 b 27 f.) or καρτερίᾳ Sussem.; not ἔρως Lindan, ἀρετῆς Humpke,  
 nor ὀργῇ Schmidt; hardly κράτει Schnitzer. [φρονήσῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ] Counting Maling  
 [καὶ ἀρετῇ] Schneider, <ἐπὶ> φρονήσῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ Welldon, "φρονήσῃ Thesaur.  
 φρονήσῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ Röske (this makes bad worse, Montecattino proposed ἁπλῶς καὶ  
 χρῆσῃ κατ' ἀρετῇ Ouckon. See Sussem. *Comment. Crit.* II. 24, 10. 24. 1. 28 [4.  
 κρίσις] Humpke, [δίκη] Spengel: δίκη] δικαιοσύνη Röske Thesaur.

νόμου καὶ δίκης appear strange, and 36  
 χωρισθείς is used in a different connexion"  
 (Jackson). Spengel (and lately Ridgeway)  
 would make the participles masculine.  
 But the concord is not too harsh: "at  
 fortasse, ut sapiens, libriorē construc-  
 tione utitur Aristoteles" (Sussem.). For  
 the thought, Plato *Lates* 765 E, πάντες γὰρ  
 δὴ φύτου ἢ πρώτης βλάστη καλῶς ὀμνηθεῖσα  
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως κυρωτάτη  
 τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τὸ πρόσφορον...καὶ ἀνθρώ-  
 πων. ἀνθρώπος δὲ, ὡς φαμέν, ἡμερὸν...μὴ  
 ἱκανῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ καλῶς τραφέν ἀγριώτατον  
 ὅποσα φύει γῆ.

§ 16 34 ὁ δὲ κτλ] "Man is born with  
 weapons to be used by (i.e. to subserve)  
 wisdom and virtue; weapons which are,  
 however, especially liable to abuse" (Mon-  
 tecattino): φρονήσῃ the dative of reference  
 (Jackson). Most editors make it causal  
 or instrumental. "But (1) what can  
 'weapons for practical wisdom and virtue'  
 mean? Practically weapons for the *eunomia*,  
 but rather such as serve for the *attain-  
 ment*, of these qualities. Yet ἀδικία  
 ἔχουσα ὄπλα shows that the former are  
 meant. (2) It is essential to the thought  
 that we should learn whence man, of all  
 creatures, gets these dangerous double-  
 edged weapons, so eminently adapted for  
 purposes mutually opposed (*ταναντία*), for  
 good and for evil. Whereas that they  
 are for good needs not be stated: Aris-  
 totle's teleological standpoint implies it."  
 SUSSEM. Cp. *Nat.* I. 1 § 13 (Spengel).

37 ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν κτλ]

III. 10. 2 αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτὸν φέρειν  
 SUSSEM. (28 c)

Jackson keeping the last clause ἡ δὲ  
 δίκη κτλ (which he holds to be a para-  
 thetical explanation of δίκη in ἡ γὰρ δίκη  
 κτλ, rightly placed last in a Greek sen-  
 tence) would translate: "now justice be-  
 longs to a state", i.e. can be found only  
 in a πόλις, "δίκη or the administration of  
 law—which is the determination of what  
 is just—being a regulation of the political  
 community." Cp. *Nat.* E<sup>2</sup> 6. 9. 6. 4 ὅ  
 γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδικοῦ  
 II. with Jackson's notes.

c. 3 *The sentence has three parts treating  
 of the relationships which make up the  
 household, (1) domesticity (ὁ γυναικῆς)  
 (2) patriarchy (II 1, 2. The relation of 1) to  
 χρηματιστικῆς ἀπονομῆς is shown  
 § 3. (2) to δικαιοσύνης, which we take  
 first, there are widely divergent views § 4.*

Roughly speaking the rest of the book  
 treats of (1) domesticity in cc. 1-2, (2)  
 χρηματιστικῆς in cc. 3-11, (3) and (4) in  
 cc. 12, 13.

c. 4 *The household must be understood  
 which may be primary or secondary,  
 and an important to call a household  
 (οἶκος), and to provide for the use  
 and for production. § 1-4. The household  
 (οἶκος) is a unit of life § 1, 2.*

c. 5 *But are there any persons answer-  
 ing to this definition, or not? (1) Yes! § 1  
 As it is understood in fact and in law,  
 and therefore and and nature that fact  
 should be taken in fact, applied to reason.*

ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ σύγ- (II)  
 κειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκῶν. οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν πάλιν ἡ οἰκία  
 συνέστηκεν· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. ἐπεὶ  
 5 δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἕκαστον ζητητέον, πρῶτα δὲ  
 καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δούλος καὶ πόσις  
 καὶ ἄλοχος καὶ πατήρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τριῶν τούτων σκε-  
 § 2 πτέον ἂν εἴη τί ἕκαστον καὶ ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ 2  
 δεσποτική καὶ γαμική (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀν-  
 10 δρὸς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον πατρική (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ  
 ὠνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι). ἔστωσαν δὴ αὗται τρεῖς ἃς εἴπο-  
 § 3 μεν. ἔστι δέ τι [μέρος] ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία,

1253 b 2 ἀνάγκη P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald., while Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> (which has however † in the margin) S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and V<sup>b</sup> (1st hand) omit ἀναγκαῖον... 4 συνέστηκεν (a later hand has inserted the words in the margin of V<sup>b</sup>) || περὶ οἰκονομίας (οἰκίας Bk.<sup>2</sup> following the mss. used by Accoromboni and Sepulveda) εἰπεῖν πρότερον P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. Bk. in place of πρῶτον.....εἰπεῖν || σύγκειται after 3 οἰκῶν P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. Bk. || 3 οἰκονομίας] οἰκίας Γ P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Bk. Bernays || πάλιν ἡ οἰκία Γ apparently, πάλιν οἰκία P<sup>2.3</sup>. C<sup>4</sup> and a later hand in V<sup>b</sup>, ἡ οἰκία πάλιν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, αὐθις οἰκία P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. Bk. || 4 συνέστηκεν] συνίσταται P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. Bk. || 5 πρῶτον] <καὶ> πρώτοις Bender || 7 τούτων σκεπτέον after 8 ἂν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 9 καὶ is wanting before γαμική in M<sup>s</sup> M<sup>b</sup> || 10 πατρική Ar. apparently (cp. c. 12 § 1), τεκνοποιητική Bk. following Γ and the mss. (W<sup>b</sup> Ald. omit ἀνώνυμον.....τεκνοποιητική), τεκνοποιική Dindorf (Steph. Thes.): πατρική was abbreviated πρῆκή; this became ποιική or ποιητική, and was then wrongly emended || 11 δὴ Susem.<sup>2</sup>, δ' Γ Π Ar. Bk. || 12 δ' ἔτι or δέ τι <ἔτι> Susem., δέ <δ'> τι: i.e. δέ <τέταρτόν> τι (after first suggesting δ' ἔτι <τέταρτόν> τι) Schmidt, probably right. || [μέρος] Zeller (*Phil. d. Gr.* II ii 693 n. 4, ed. 3)

§§ 5, 6, *beasts to man, female to male*, § 7, *so it is better (i.e. § 11 advantageous and just) that a man whose function is bodily service, who is a mere adjunct of another, should be subject to his superior in excellence of soul*, §§ 8, 9. *Nature designs to mark this distinction upon the bodies of the two, but does not always succeed*: §§ 10, 11.

On the question of slavery cc. 3—7, consult *Introd.* pp. 24—26, the excellent dissertation of L. Schiller *Die Lehre des Aris. von der Sklaverei* (Erlangen 1847. 4), Hildenbrand *op.c.* 395—406, Oncken II. 29—74, Becker and Hermann *Charikles* III. 1—12, Eng. tr. 356—373. SUSEM.

c. 3 § 1 1253 b 3 οἰκονομίας δὲ κτλ] In his lax manner Aristotle means “the parts of Economic” or household-management “correspond to those of which the household consists”. This at least gives better sense than to read οἰκίας: see 12 § 1.

The οἰκίας μέρη, as enumerated just afterwards, are the three ‘pairs’ of relationships συζεύξεις (or, 2 § 5, κοινωνίαι).

4 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐλ. κτλ] by the method noticed I § 3 n., 8 § 1 n., III. I. 2 n. (434). SUSEM. (29)

5 πρῶτα] The ἀσύνθετα of I § 3.

§ 2 9 γαμική=‘conjugal’, πατρική=‘paternal’ relationship: senses obviously more precise than the ordinary use of the terms warranted. Thus ἡ γαμικὴ ὁμιλία, the marriage union, IV(VII). 16 § 1= simply cohabitation. Schneider thinks ἀνδρική, Göttling ποσιακή (*sic*) would better express the former relation from the side of the stronger analogously to δεσποτική, or Latin *maritalis*. Strictly πατρικός= hereditary, as e.g. in III. 14. 6: but in *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 8, VIII. 10. 4 it is used, as here, for ‘paternal’.

τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῆς· ὅπως δ' ἔχα, ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ  
λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρηματιστικῆς.

- 15 πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἰπωμεν, ἵνα τὰ τε  
πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρεῖαν ἴδωμεν, καὶ εἴ τι πρὶν τὸ εἶναι  
περὶ αὐτῶν δυναίμεθα λαβεῖν βέλτηον τῶν νῦν ἐνυπαρξάντων.  
§ 4 20 μένων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία,  
καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ βα-  
20 σιλική, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀρχόμενοι· τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ  
δεσπόζειν. νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δούλον εἶναι τὸν δ' ἐλευθέρου  
φύσει δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρειν. διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον· βίαιον γάρ  
4 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτησις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ [καὶ ἡ κτησις]

15 [δὲ] Schmidt, who transposes πρῶτον [δὲ].....1256 a 1 τρῖτον (c. 3 § 2—3 § 5) to follow 1259 a 39 γαμική (c. 12 § 1): see *Introd.* p. 97. 3 17 ἀναγκαῖον M<sup>1</sup> C<sup>1</sup>, ἀναγκαῖον Γ (?) Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, poterimus William. 3 23 ἐπὶ αὐτῶν εἴπωμεν αὐτῶν αὐτῶν Schmidt. 3 [καὶ.....24 οἰκονομίας] Susem. On 23—33 cp. Susem. *ibid.* C. c. 11. 3 R.

§ 3 13 τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος] § 3 1. 9 §§ 12—18, 11 § 13. SUSEM. (29 b)

15 ἵνα κτλ] 'first in order to observe what has a direct bearing upon practical use, and secondly for our theory, to ascertain any facts which may enable us to improve upon the views at present held'.

§ 4 20 καθάπερ εἴπομεν κτλ] 1 § 2 f. 11 7 § 1 *nm.* SUSEM. (30)

τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν] Comp. below 6 § 1 foll. with *nm.* The only representative of this view of whom we have certain knowledge was the rhetorician Alkidamas of Elaia, a disciple of Gorgias (see III. 2. 2 *n.*), who gave expression to it in his 'Messenian' speech delivered on behalf of Messene after its restoration by Epaminondas, in order to overcome the obstinate refusal of the Spartans to recognize the new state: ἐλευθέρους ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν βίαια, ἀλλ' ἔπειτα βιάσας ἡ φύσις καταβίβασεν, Aristot. *Rhet.* 1. 13. 3, with scholium. Compare Spengel (ii. 179) [and Corn.] on that passage: and esp. Vahlen *De Rhetor Alkidamiae* (Vienna 1864, 85. 14 ff. Finally (see 7 § 2 *n.*) Aristotle was acquainted with the lines of the comic poet Philemon (*Fragmenta*, inc. xxiv Meineke, cp. Meineke's ed. p. 410) καὶ δοξαίᾳ ἐστὶ σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει. | φύσει γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶ βιάσας ἀναβιβάζειν αὐτὴν | 3 δ' αὖ οὐκ ἐστὶ σῶμα καταβιβάζοντο. SUSEM. (31)

Zeller *Scythien* p. 328 *n.* 3 is inclined to attribute this view to the Cynics.

21 νόμῳ φύσει] On this famous antithesis of the 'conventional' and the 'natural' see *Suppl. Alcock*, 13 § 6 173 a 2 ff.,

Grant *Ethics* 1. 149—151, and esp. *Edinburgh Journal of Philosophy* 5. 11—17.

22 διόπερ κτλ] Whence the slavery (τὸ δεσπόζειν) is unjust also, as involving an mere force (Wysie).

c. 4 § 1 23 ἡ κτησις is the theory of the acquisition of property. Gilling and Bernays in a more general sense, 'the theory of property'; and certainly with this rendering the words in brackets would fit better into the context. But in what follows Aristotle everywhere discusses the same thing as χρηματιστικὴ in the wider sense, the 'science' or 'art' of acquiring wealth, first introduced 2 § 2. see 8 § 1 *n.* Property, as being indispensable for living, belongs to the household: hence by analogy it follows that every chattel is an instrument for the household's use, and that the slave is an animate instrument of the kind. But from the fact that the theory of acquisition or even the theory of property is a part of the science of household management, no such conclusion follows, even when taken in connection with the first premises, which is sufficient or need to prove it in the manner indicated above. Besides, the words bracketed anticipate the doctrine which at 2 § 2 is distinctly postponed to 11 ff. and the way in which the question is treated 2 § 2 presupposes that no such division by acquisition has yet been given. The statement made here does not agree with the results of c. 2—11: for we see the whole theory of property and its acquisition.

μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας] (ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον (II)  
 25 καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν). ὥσπερ δὴ ταῖς ὀρισμέναις τέχναις  
 ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει  
 § 2 ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] τῶν  
 δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα (οἶον τῷ κυβερ-  
 νήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἷαξ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῶρεὺς ἔμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ  
 30 ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνου εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ <τῷ  
 οἰκονομικῷ> τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωὴν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ κτήσις

25 καὶ εὖ ζῆν wanting in Γ M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (first hand, added in the margin) || δὴ Susem., δὲ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2-3</sup>. C<sup>4</sup> M<sup>b</sup>, δὲ ἐν Q Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Bk.; wanting in P<sup>4-6</sup>. U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. Hence [δὲ] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>. || 26 μέλλοι Koraes and perhaps Γ || 27 τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] τῶν οἰκονομικῶν P<sup>2-3-6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. Bk., with a later hand in C<sup>4</sup> and the 1st hand in V<sup>b</sup> (the dative in V<sup>b</sup> by a later hand); [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] and 30 οὕτω καὶ <τῷ οἰκονομικῷ> Rassow Susem. Thurot once proposed to omit 30 οὕτω καὶ and transpose 27 οὕτω καὶ.....30 ἐστίν to follow 31 ἐστὶ || 31 [ἡ... ..32 ἐστὶ, καὶ] Schmidt

but only as much of it as relates to the 'natural' part concerns οἰκονομική, and that only indirectly. My defence of the words, *Rhein. Mus.* xx. 510, is exposed to objections not then foreseen: it would seem that this is an un-Aristotelian interpolation. SUSEM. (32)

24 ἄνευ γὰρ κτλ] Cp. 2 § 8 n. (21). Mere life, bare existence, ζῆν, is of course the immediate end of the household and of household management: good life or well-being, εὖ ζῆν, is the end which the state has in view: but indirectly the state and its end is the end of the household 2 §§ 2—9. Consequently we find that side of οἰκονομία, which is directed towards securing the fitness of those belonging to the household, and so towards the perfecting of life, ranked above the use and preservation of property, or the side which is directed to mere living, 13 § 1 n. SUSEM. (33)

25 ταῖς ὀρισμέναις τέχναις = the arts which form distinct professions: 'as the craftsmen of a particular trade-guild must be provided with suitable tools &c.' Bernays. In any case the phrase means 'the arts' properly so called; immediately below they are termed productive or creative (ποίησις, ποιητικὰ ὄργανα § 4 with n.) as contrasted with the merely practical activities to which Economic and the art of life belong. According to Aristotle these productive arts are to be subdivided into (1) the useful, and (2) the imitative or 'fine arts'.

In the sphere of practice the end lies in the activities themselves, ἐνέργειαι: in the sphere of the

arts, in certain definite special products, ἔργα, distinct from the activities which produce them: *Nic. Eth.* I. 1. 2, 1094 a 3 f., διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά, I. 1. 5 1094 a 16 διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεῖσων ἐπιστημῶν, II. 4. 3 1105 a 26, VI. 2 5 1139 b 2, II. 5. 3 1140 b 3, 6. In conformity with this distinction Schlosser prefers to explain ὀρισμέναις τ. as arts *restricted* to definite distinctive ends. But can this be expressed by the one word ὀρισμέναις? Fülleborn wavers between this explanation and his own, which makes ὥρ. τέχ. = definite *special arts* (the one all-embracing art of life. But conduct or the art of life—even if we include in it the perfecting of life—embraces at the most only the practical activities; and from what has been said it follows that the technical or productive activities, ποίησις, would be excluded from it. Cp. also IV (VII). 3. 3 n. SUSEM. (34)

§ 2 30 ἐν ὀργάνου εἶδει] is classed with, ranked under the head of, implements: cp. τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἶδει ἀρχὰς *Meta.* I. 3. 3 983 b 7, the material sort of causes; ἐν μορίου εἶδει *De Caelo* I. 1. 7 268 a 5. The same idiom frequently where εἶδος and the genitive are almost a paraphrase for the thing in question: νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας *Pol.* III. 15. 2, cp. VI (IV). 6. 9 ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδος.

31 τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον κτλ] "the chattel is an instrument to aid him in

πλήθος ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμα τι ἐμψυχον. καὶ (III)  
 § 3 ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶν [ὁ] ὑπηρέτης. αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐμψυ-  
 νατο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κειλευσθὲν ἢ προαισθανόμενον ἀπο-  
 35 τελεῖν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον, ὥσπερ τῷ Δαιδάλῳ φασὶν ἢ τοῖς τοῦ  
 'Ηφαισίου τρίποδας, οὓς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς αἰτομάτους εἶναι  
 [ὑπο]δύεσθαι ἀγῶνα, οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκέρκιζον αἵται καὶ τὰ  
 40 πληκτρα ἐκιθάριζεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει οὔτε τοῖς ἀρχιτέκτοσιν  
 ὑπηρετῶν οὔτε τοῖς δεσπόταις δούλων. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα  
 ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα πρακτικόν· ἀπὸ

32 [καὶ] before ὁ δοῦλος so that the apodosis begins here Thuc. I. 23. 4 wanting in M<sup>s</sup>, erased in P<sup>4</sup> || 34 προαισθόμενον Kornee || 35 αὐτοῦ II || 37 ἐμψυ- P<sup>4</sup> Bk. || οὕτως <el> Susem.<sup>1</sup> following William's translation *id est, ὅτι καὶ Scholium* || αἵται only Γ and a later hand in C<sup>1</sup>: the rest have αἵται.

1254 a 1 [τὰ μὲν... 4 μόνον] Schmidt

living." But it is not true conversely that every instrument of use for living is a piece of property or chattel. The analogy of the distinctive crafts is against this; for the helmsman's assistant is not his property, and the difference between the ends for which instruments are used in the two cases does not supply any reason for this distinction. See further I. 2 § 5 n., 6 § 10 n. SUSEM. (35)

33 ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων] an implement superior to other implements; see 7 § 3 and *De part. animal.* IV. 10. 21 687 a 21 ἐστι γὰρ (sc. ἡ χεὶρ) ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων. For this relation δοῦλος = ἐμψυχον ὄργανον, ὄργανον = ἐμψυχος δοῦλος Eaton cites *N. Eth.* VIII. 11. 6

§ 3 35 Δαιδάλῳ] Not a real historical personage, but only the legendary personification of the first prominent advance in Greek architecture and more especially in sculpture. Before him the human figure had been represented with the feet together, the arms joined to the body and the eyes shut. He first made the eyes look as if open, detached the arms from the sides, and showed the feet stepping apart (scholiast on Plato *Meno* 97 b, Suidas s. v. Δαιδάλου ποιήματα). When contrasted with the archaic style his figures came to be praised for their illusive lifelikeness; and this, or rather his choice of attitudes of motion and action for his figures, is all that is meant by the story to which Aristotle here alludes, viz. that his figures moved as if alive and had to be chained to prevent their running away (Plato *L.* c.). See Brunn *History of the Greek Artists* I. 14—23. SUSEM. (36)

36 ὁ ποιητὴς] Homer *Iliad* XVIII. 376 ὅφρα αἱ αἰδέμεναι θεῶν ἑκάστη ὄργανα. SUSEM. (36 b) There is a similar ingenious fancy in Lygdamus' *Coming Race*.

§ 4 1254 a 2 ποιητικὰ = for production (of fresh utilities embodied in material objects), πρακτικὰ = for action = merely for use, i.e. as we see from 8 § 2: the consumption or utilization of commodities. In Political Economy production is either *productive* or *unproductive*, and the definition of wealth will vary according as we consider it from the producers' or the consumers' point of view: Mill c. 3, Sidgwick *Principles* I. c. 4 § 7.

On the distinction here made between ποίησις and πρᾶξις cf. *ant.* 124, 125 and Zeller *op.* c. 11 p. 164, 177 ff., 180, 186, 652 ff. Consult also the special treatises Ed. Muller *History of the Theory of Art in Greece* II. 38 ff., 374 ff., Tischmüller *Prinzipien der Ästhetik* (Leipzig 1874) II. 12—62, Reinhold *Ästhetik von Art* I—II, 169—170; Schmidt in the *Zeitsch. f. Philol.* CV. 1872, 319 ff., Rich. Schulte *Die praktische Ästhetik* (Berlin 1874, 8), Walter *Theory of Practical Reason in the Philosophy* (Jena 1874, 8) p. 80 ff., 243 ff., 278 ff., 296 ff., 304 ff.

On this note see justly remarks, *op.* c. 11, p. 164, that even from Aristotle's own point of view we must be surprised at a conception of the labour as one-sided that even he expresses for production (i.e. of fresh utilities of utility) is denied. "This could not be maintained in view of the fact that in the art and industry of Hellenic the whole of the unskilled labour engaged upon the

μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἕτερόν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν (II)  
 αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἢ χρῆσις μό-  
 5 νον. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἢ ποίησις εἶδει καὶ ἢ πράξις, 6  
 καὶ δέονται ἀμφοτέραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν  
 § 5 αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν. ὁ δὲ βίος πράξις, οὐ ποίησις ἐστίν.  
 διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πράξιν. (p.)

τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον. τό τε γὰρ μό-  
 10 ριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου.  
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου  
 δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκείνου δ' οὐκ ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον  
 δεσπότην δοῦλός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου.

§ 6 τίς μὲν οὖν ἢ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἢ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων 7  
 15 δῆλον [ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ' ἄλλου ἄνθρωπος ὢν, οὗτος  
 φύσει δοῦλος ἐστίν, ἄλλου δ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἂν κτῆμα ἦ] [δοῦ-

5 δ' wanting in M<sup>s</sup> and perhaps also in Γ, hence [δ'] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 6 καὶ δέονται Π<sup>1</sup>  
 P<sup>2-3</sup>. C<sup>4</sup> W<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald., δέονται δ' P<sup>4-6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Bk. || 10 ἀπλῶς Γ  
 and p<sup>2</sup> (but ἐρμήνεια [sic] ἐστὶ τοῦ ὅλως mg.<sup>3</sup> P<sup>2</sup>, i.e. a marginal note in dark yellow  
 ink), ἀπλῶς ὅλως M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ὅλως all other sources Bk. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>. || The clause  
 15 ὁ...16 ἐστίν is noticed by Alexander of Aphrodisias on the *Metaphys.* p. 15,  
 6 ed. Bonitz || 15 ὢν Π<sup>1</sup> Paris. 963 Alex. (apparently) and P<sup>4</sup> (corrector in margin),  
 δὲ P<sup>2-6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and the 1st hand in P<sup>4</sup> C<sup>4</sup>: no  
 doubt also in P<sup>3</sup> (an erasure here), γρ. δὲ p<sup>1</sup> in margin, ἐστίν a later hand in C<sup>4</sup> ||  
 16 ἀλλ' οὐδ' P<sup>1-6</sup>. W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald., ἀλλ' οὐδὲν M<sup>s</sup> || ἢ Γ M<sup>s</sup> || δοῦλος ἐστίν or δοῦλος ἢ Γ  
 apparently, δοῦλος ὢν M<sup>s</sup> C<sup>4</sup> and P<sup>1-2-3</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> (1st hand), ἄνθρωπος ὢν δοῦλος ὢν P<sup>4</sup>, ἄνθρω-

production of fresh utilities was performed exclusively by slaves, and thus the slave in the great workshops and manufactories was not merely an aid to the use or enjoyment of the goods of life but indirectly a producer of new commodities, at least in the sense in which this is true of the weaver's shuttle." SUSEM. (37)

§ 5 9 κτῆμα...μόριον] Eaton compares *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 8, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ἦ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ; a chattel and a child, until he reaches a certain age and becomes independent, are as it were parts of one-self.

10 ἀπλῶς ἄλλου] "belongs absolutely to another". To express relation to and dependence upon something else we find (1) the genitive with εἶναι, as here and Pl. *Rep.* IV. 433 B τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι του, or (2) ἐνεκα with the genitive, as in *Metaph.* I. 2. 19 quoted in n. on 14, or (3) πρὸς with the accusative, as in the technical term for the category πρὸς τι, and *Rhet.* I. 9. 27 ἐλευθέρου τὸ μὴ πρὸς

ἄλλον ζῆν.

12 ὁ δὲ...ὅλως ἐκείνου] *Eth. Eud.* VII. 9. 2 1241 b 19 οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐστίν (sc. δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος), ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός...τοῦ δεσπότητος ὁ δοῦλος ὥσπερ μόριον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ὥσπερ δοῦλος ἀψυχος.

§ 6 14 δύναμις] essential quality, attribute: a sense the word acquires because 'the real nature of a thing is denoted by that which it πέφυκε ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν': Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. Cp. *Nic. Eth.* v. 2. 6 ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, *Pol.* IV (VII). 1. 12 τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, also IV (VII). 4. 10; Plato *Parm.* 134 D τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἢν ἔχει, *Rep.* IX. 588 B τό τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν ἢν ἐκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν.

15 ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ κτλ] Conversely in *Metaph.* I. 2. 19 982 b 25 we have a definition of the free man ἄνθρωπος, φαιμέν, ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου (L. Schiller). SUSEM. (38)

5 λος ἐστίν], κτῆμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χρηστικόν· πότερον III  
δ' ἐστὶ τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον, βέλτιον καὶ ἐκείνῃ τι  
δουλεῖν ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ μετὰ  
20 ταῦτα σκιπτίον. οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῇ λόγῃ θεωρεῖται καὶ  
§ 2 ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι  
οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστὶ  
καὶ εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς ἕνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεσθαι  
τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεῖν. καὶ εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ  
25 ἀρχομένων ἐστίν (καὶ οὐ βελτίων ἢ ἀρχῇ ἢ τῶν βελτιόνων  
§ 3 ἀρχομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελοῦνται  
ἀπὸ τῶν βελτιόνων βέλτιον ἔργον· ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀρχεῖν  
τὸ δ' ἄρχεται, ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον). ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων

$\pi\omicron\varsigma \tilde{\omega}\nu$  p<sup>1</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and, with  $\gamma\alpha$  before them, in  
 corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin of P<sup>2,3,4</sup>, a correction in red ink on the margin of Q, and V<sup>b</sup> has  
 in margin); [ $\tilde{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma \tilde{\omega}\nu$ ] Koraes. Dittographia, whichever of the two— $\tilde{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$   
 or  $\tilde{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma \tilde{\omega}\nu$ —gave rise to all the other readings: || 23 and 24: || 24  $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$   
 $\chi\epsilon\omega$  Susem.<sup>1</sup> transposed to immediately precede 28  $\delta\alpha$ , but see Dittenberger op. cit.  
 p. 1375 f. who has now been followed in punctuation. Cp. Comm. || 24 [1st colla  
 ...28  $\epsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$ ] Schmidt who thinks the proper context is before  $\mu\alpha\rho\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon$  1193 b 28,  
 and if so conjectures  $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\lambda\ \delta\epsilon\ \epsilon\tilde{\iota}\delta\eta$  || 25 [η]  $\tilde{\alpha}\nu\chi\eta$  Koraes || 26  $\tilde{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$  of Susem  
 Schmidt || 27  $\tilde{\omega}\pi\delta$  Bk.<sup>2</sup> instead of  $\tilde{\alpha}\pi\delta$

17 χωριστόν] Hereby opposed to μόριον which when separated can do no work, as we saw, 2 § 13 (Shilleto).

Thus the definition of  $\delta \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma \delta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$  is  $\delta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma \alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma \delta\epsilon$ , and this exactly corresponds to the limited meaning of  $\kappa\tau\eta\mu\alpha$  'chattel', 'thrall', as for instance in *N. E.* v. 6, 8 quoted above.

c. 5. To whom then does this definition apply? Are there any *φύσει δοῦλοι*, for whom a slave's estate is greater good and just?

§ 1. 20 τῷ λόγῳ...ἐκ τῶν γινομένων] Aristotle emphasized the distinction between the abstract and concrete treatment of a subject. The former is λογικῶς or διαλεκτικῶς ζητεῖν as opposed (a) to ἀναλυτικῶς or ἐκ τῶν καμένων, (β) to φυσικῶς ζητεῖν or ἐπισκοπεῖν: *Waitz, Organon* II. 354; *Zeller Phil.* II ii 171 n. 2. *Easton* rightly compares IV (V11). 1. 6.

§ 2. 31 τὸν συμπληρωτὴν) Under the limitation laid down III. 6, 6, see II. (7).

24 εἶδη πολλά] Cp. *Alc. Est.* viii.  
10 ff. 4. 5: Plato *Lysis* iii. 690 A. The  
variety implies a gradation.

25 καὶ ἀὲ βελτ(ων κτλ) This passage is referred to IV (VII), 3, 2, see the note: cp. IV (VII), 14, 10 τοῦ γὰρ δευτέρου

ἀρχὴν ἢ τὰς ἐλευθέρους ἀρχὰς καὶ λαοὺς καὶ  
 πολλοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ. Σελ. 11. (28 b)

Cp. also VIII (5) 11, 34.

§ 3 26 tò yáp ávτ. κτλ] Cp. *Act.*  
*Act.* II. 6. 4 τὴν ἀντ. αὐτὴν τὴν ἀντ.  
αὐτὴν τὴν ἀντ. αὐτὴν τὴν ἀντ. αὐτὴν τὴν ἀντ.  
αὐτὴν τὴν ἀντ. αὐτὴν τὴν ἀντ. αὐτὴν τὴν ἀντ.

18 τούτων (ργον) The function proper to them, the work which they exclusively perform in their relation of government and governed, lies in the mere exercise of command and tender of obedience. See Plato Rep. I. 313 A; *ταῦτα δὲ αὐτοῖς ἔστιν ἔργον, τὸ δὲ ἄλλοτερον, τὸ δὲ ἄλλοτερον τὸ εἶναι ὑπακούοντα*.

δσα γὰρ] This argument only applies to the general proposition, and does not deal directly with the *degeneration* part, and to the particular explanation, attached to it animal Metempsychosis. See also [10]

The sentence is parenthetical in 1. 1. 3, where we read: "For wherever several parts, whether continuous or discrete, combine to form a single composite whole, in all such cases may be discerned a principal or ruling part and one subordinate which is ruled." This follows from the whole order of nature we noted, at e.g. 4a 22-23, where it is said that "it holds good of living things."

συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἐν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ (II)  
 διηρημένων, ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχό-  
 § 4 μενον, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς  
 ἐμφύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἐστὶ τις  
 ἀρχή, οἶον ἀρμονίας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικωτέ-  
 ρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως· τὸ δὲ ζῶον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς 10  
 καὶ σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ' ἀρχό-  
 § 5 μενον — δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον  
 τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλ-  
 τιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀν-  
 θρωπον θεωρητέον, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἢ

31 [καὶ τοῦτ'...32 ἐμφύχοις] Schmidt || 33 <ἐν> ἀρμονία? Susem. || 35 ἀρχό-  
 μενον—(to mark a break in the construction) Bonitz || 39 μοχθηρῶν ἢ μοχθηρῶς] *res-*  
*titentium et prave* William; apparently Γ had φαύλως which Bücheler approves,

§ 4 31 ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως] The conclusion is based upon the whole order of nature: it is a universal natural law, not a special law applying to living organisms (Bernays). SUSEM. (38 c) It is not probable that ἐκ with genitive=a partitive genitive (Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 235 b 11), for the only support for such a use is the spurious treatise *Περὶ φυτῶν*, 836 a 39, τὸ φυτὸν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν στερουμένων ψυχῆς, and 828 b 27. It would be an improvement, but hardly correct, to render 'taking the whole of nature this is preëminently true of living things'.

32 τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι κτλ] αἰεὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτιονός ἐστιν ἔνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν· οἰμῶς ἐν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν IV (VII). 14. 10.

33 ἀρχή, οἶον ἀρμονίας] "Even in things without life there is a species of dominance, in music for instance": each musical 'mode' being ruled by its key-note, ἡ μέση (originally the note struck by the middle string of the heptachord\*). Compare *Probl.* XIX. § 33 920 a 21 ἡ γὰρ μέση καὶ ἡγεμῶν: § 36 920 b 9 τὸ ἡρμόσθαι ἐστὶν ἀπάσαις sc. ταῖς χορδαῖς, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὴν μέσην: § 44 922 a 23 ἐπειδὴ τῶν μεταξύ τῶν ἀκρων τὸ μέσον μόνον ἀρχή τις ἐστὶν ...27 φθόγγοι ὧν ἡ μέση καλουμένη μόνῃ ἀρχή ἐστὶ θατέρου τετραχόρδου. On the technical sense of ἀρμονία=εἶδος δια-  
 πασῶν see Exc. III. on Bk. V (VIII). Another political simile from the 'modes' *Eth. Eud.* VII. 9. 4: ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, inas-

\* The term 'dominant' for the fifth above the key-note in a modern scale is quite different.

much as some are ὀρθαί, others παρεκβά-  
 σεις. Giphanius and others wrongly take ἀρμονίας as qualifying ἀρχή=dominance in the sense, that is, of a blending or subordination of parts. Cp. *De Anima* I. 4. 1 τὴν ἀρμονίαν κράσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι. This would be the sense of συμφωνία, rather than of ἀρμονία, in music: *Probl.* XIX. 38 921 a 2.

ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως] "would perhaps involve a discussion somewhat outside the subject". Obviously the simple meaning here as in ἐξ. πράξεις IV (VII). 3. 8: not to be pressed (as by Thurot *Etudes* 219 f., Ueberweg *Hist. of Phil.* Eng. tr. I. 143) to signify 'those parts of Aristotle's strictly scientific works which are "dialectical" i.e. controversial, rather than "apodeictical" i.e. purely scientific.'

34 τὸ δὲ ζῶον κτλ] The enumeration is interrupted at ἀρχόμενον by the qualifying phrase in parenthesis δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν... ἔχειν in such a way that even the first member (ζῶον) is only quoted by its first division into soul and body, while the second subdivision into rational and irrational parts of the soul is not added until the enumeration is resumed, § 6. We should expect δεῦτερον, τρίτον to correspond with πρῶτον, in place of them we find πάλιν and ἔτι δὲ in § 7. SUSEM. (39 b)

§ 5 This does not help us to determine what ἵς κατὰ φύσιν. But Aristotle's meaning is the same as in 2 § 8 οἶον γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης ταύτην φανερὴν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου. Cp. *N. Eth.* IX. 9. 8, Cic. *Tusc.* I § 32 (Eaton).

μοχθηρώς ἐχόντων δόξαιεν ἂν ἄρχαι πολλὰς τὸ σῶμα  
 6 τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶχει. ἔστι  
 δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζῳῇ θεωρεῖσαι καὶ δε-  
 σποτικὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώ-  
 5 ματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ τοῦς τῆς ἀρίστης πο-  
 λιτικῆς καὶ βασιλικῆς· ἐν οἷς φανερὸν ἔστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύ-  
 σιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυ-  
 χῆς καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μακροῦ τοῦ  
 9 λόγου ἔχοντος, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἴσου ἢ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερόν πᾶσι.

erasing *φαιλως* and just afterwards; *μοχθηρως*, due to a mistaken correction written over *μοχθηρων*, may have displaced *φαιλως*, as Schmidt once suggested; now he suspects *μοχθηρων* η: [*η* *μοχθηρως* *εχθρων*] Studemund.

1254 b 2 *καὶ παρὰ φύσιν* wanting in M<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), but added in the margin by p<sup>1</sup> || P<sup>2,3</sup> have *περὶ* for *παρὰ* || 6 [*καὶ βεβαιώσιν*] (Clericus, perhaps rightly)

§ 6 1254 b 3 f. This analogy is carried out in *Nic. Eth.* v. 11 § 9, l. 13 § 18, III. 3 § 18, 12 § 6. Cp. also Plato *Phaedo* 80 A ἐκείδαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ᾧσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεῖν καὶ ἀρχεῖσθαι ἢ φέειν κτεράται, τῷ δὲ ἀρχεῖν καὶ δουλεῖν; *Phaedrus* 237 f., not to mention *Rep.* ix. 589 E, 590 C, D (Eaton). Several characteristic phrases here come from Plato. For similar analogies turning on various forms of ἀρχή see *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 8 f., 11 § 9 with Jackson's notes, VIII. 10 §§ 4, 5, 11 §§ 1—6.

8. τῷ παθητικῷ λόγῳ ἔχοντος] Cp. IV (VII). 17. 9 with n. (938). More precisely Aristotle distinguishes in the human soul (1) the rational part or thinking soul, νοῦς, (2) the sentient appetitive soul, cp. IV (VII). 7. 5 n. (786), and (3) the nutritive or vegetative soul. The lower animals have the two latter merely, plants have only the third: see Zeller *op.* I, II §§ 497 f., 509 f., 566 ff. The nutritive soul is of no importance for the present inquiry, compare *Nic. Eth.* I. 13 §§ 11—14; here it is left entirely out of the question as in c. 13 § 6, IV (VII). 14 § 9 f., 13 §§ 9, 10, where see the notes, *op.* also III. 4 § 6 n. (472). He further divides the rational soul into two parts: i cognitive reason (ἐπιστημονικόν), a reflective or opining reason (λογιστικόν, δεισσημονικόν). The latter includes that part of the speculative reason which arrives at a mere idea or opinion (ἐπ' ἀληθείᾳ—unverified belief, assumption, δόξα) but


falls short of true knowledge, and means especially the practical reason with its peculiar faculty of taking counsel or deliberating with itself (*the Nous*, see *ib.* § 7 n.), or in other words the faculty of reflecting *from within*. Aristotle has loaned the name (*Nous poietikos*) for all this part of the reason. It was explained in a 1931 (n. 1, p. 1) that the practical reason is again divided into (1) *theoretical reason*, practical reason in the strict sense, and (2) construction, i.e. technical reason, *techné*, which when developed becomes *résumé*, artistic skill": see *Art. 228*, VI, 1 § 5 (1 + 1 2 3 4 5: a 1 2 3 4 5, 1 2 3 4 5), *Metaph.* VI, 1, 5 1013 b 23 f. Compare Walter and Zeller as above quoted, and in modification of their views *Schneid. Studien in die Phil.* 224, in the *Philos. J. Philol.* CXIX, 1879, 727 ff.

If we continue with the above, the results stated in the note on p. 1, c. 2. A we obtain the following scheme of the rational soul according to Aristotle:

\* In the *Politics* however, every practically important (i) Act as opposed to Science, in the broad activity in any department whatsoever of technical skill or the introduction of new products, the exercise of craft and industries of all kinds, including practically every practical activity such as Household Management, is covered. Thus in the sense is a  $\frac{1}{2} \times 1$  class, where the former or "art" papers are intelligible distinguished from practical activities in the subjects of agriculture, the  $\frac{1}{2} \times 1$  is not only in a  $\frac{1}{2} \times 1$  that Expressions American is composed where artistic skill is most required, the  $\frac{1}{2} \times 1$  is not.

§ 7 πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ὡσαύτως· τὰ 12  
 11 μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς τῶν ἀγρίων βελτίῳ τὴν φύσιν, τούτοις δὲ  
 πᾶσι βέλτιον ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου· τυγχάνει γὰρ σω-  
 τηρίας οὕτως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν  
 κρεῖττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον.  
 15 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώ-  
 § 8 πων. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχῇ σώματος 13  
 καὶ ἀνθρώπου θηρίου (διακείνται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὅσον

13 ἔστι Ar. (?) *est igitur*, Susem.<sup>3</sup> (a misprint) || 14 Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. omit καὶ || 16 διε-  
 στᾶσι τοσοῦτον M<sup>s</sup>, διεστᾶσι τοιοῦτον P<sup>1</sup> || ψυχῆς σῶμα καὶ ἀνθρώπου θῆριον? Thurot,  
 more correctly; but perhaps an improvement upon Aristotle himself || 17 δὲ  
 wanting in M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>·3· Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, supplied by corr.<sup>2</sup>)



Now in the *Politics* we have to deal throughout with the supremacy of practical reason (in the strict sense of the term) over the second part of the soul, the αἰσθητικόν or ὀρεκτικόν (cp. *De Anima* III. 7. 2 οὐχ ἔτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν καὶ φευκτικόν, οὐτ' ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο) in regard to its appetitive or emotional, and not to its sentient or percipient side. Obedience to this supremacy constitutes moral or ethical virtue, virtue of character, ἡθός. Cp. I. 13. 6 n., *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 § 12 f., 13 § 10 f.; VI. 12 § 6. SUSEM. (40)

§ 7 10 πάλιν... 13 ἔτι δὲ] See on § 4 a 34 above. ὡσαύτως] Here again, in man's relation to the animals we see the same thing: clearly, from what follows, the difference between ruler and ruled and the advantage derived by the one from the rule of the other. SUSEM. (41, 42)

Cp. 2 § 2 διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (Congreve).

11 τὰ ἡμεῖς τῶν ἀγρίων] Plato *Politicus* 264 A, διήρητο τὸ ζῶον τῷ τιθασῷ καὶ ἀγρίῳ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντα τιθασεύεσθαι φύσιν ἡμεῖς προσείρηται, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔχοντα ἄγρια. A division which Aristotle censures as unscientific *De part. animal.* I. 3. 13 643 b 3, πάντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὅσα ἡμεῖς, καὶ ἄγρια τυγχάνει ὄντα.

13 τὸ ἄρρεν κτλ.] Cp. 12 § 1 n. (108, 109), 13 § 9 ff. (117, 120). SUSEM. (42 b)

14 κρεῖττον... χεῖρον] Elsewhere τὸ θῆλυ is declared to be ὥσπερ ἄρρεν πεπηρωμένον, or ἀναπηρία. This is Plato's doctrine of the natural inferiority of the sex: *Rep.* V. 455 E ἐπὶ πάσιν ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρός, *Laetus* VI. 781 B ὅσῳ δὲ ἡ θήλεια ἡμῖν φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χείρων τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων, *Timaeus* 42 A, B: τὸ κρεῖττον τοιοῦτον εἴη γένος... ἀνὴρ, 90 E f.

15 ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθ. sc. in relation to one another.

§ 8 16 ὅσοι... 17 θηρίου] Cp. III. 11. 5 καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ἐνίοι τῶν θηρίων, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν; How is the existence of such men possible, on Aristotle's own psychology? There is a difference of kind between man and the brutes, the latter not having a rational part of the soul (see n. on § 6 above); but between the most perfect and the least perfect of men there is at most but a difference of degree, even when in the latter this rational part is reduced to the minimum immediately described, n. (45). We must understand Aristotle to follow the general current of Greek ideas and the usage of language when "he regards bestial limitation to sensual enjoyments, callousness to insult, indifference to knowledge, coarseness and vulgarity in act or speech in general as a servile, degraded disposition ἀνδραποδωδία" (Schiller, who quotes Orelli *Arís-*

ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρήσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ  
 19 βέλτιστον), οἷτοι μὲν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι. οἳ βέλτιστον ὄντως  
 20 ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοι. ἔστι γὰρ  
 φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (εἰς καὶ ἄλλον  
 ἐστίν) καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ  
 μὴ ἔχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῶα οὐ λόγῳ αἰσθάνονται ἀλλὰ

18 ἐστὶν M<sup>a</sup>, ἐστ' P<sup>23.4</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> A<sup>1</sup> Bk., ἔσται S<sup>b</sup> | 20 ἔστιν B<sup>1</sup> B<sup>2</sup> B<sup>3</sup> B<sup>4</sup> B<sup>5</sup> B<sup>6</sup> B<sup>7</sup> B<sup>8</sup> B<sup>9</sup> B<sup>10</sup> B<sup>11</sup> B<sup>12</sup> B<sup>13</sup> B<sup>14</sup> B<sup>15</sup> B<sup>16</sup> B<sup>17</sup> B<sup>18</sup> B<sup>19</sup> B<sup>20</sup> B<sup>21</sup> B<sup>22</sup> B<sup>23</sup> B<sup>24</sup> B<sup>25</sup> B<sup>26</sup> B<sup>27</sup> B<sup>28</sup> B<sup>29</sup> B<sup>30</sup> B<sup>31</sup> B<sup>32</sup> B<sup>33</sup> B<sup>34</sup> B<sup>35</sup> B<sup>36</sup> B<sup>37</sup> B<sup>38</sup> B<sup>39</sup> B<sup>40</sup> B<sup>41</sup> B<sup>42</sup> B<sup>43</sup> B<sup>44</sup> B<sup>45</sup> B<sup>46</sup> B<sup>47</sup> B<sup>48</sup> B<sup>49</sup> B<sup>50</sup> B<sup>51</sup> B<sup>52</sup> B<sup>53</sup> B<sup>54</sup> B<sup>55</sup> B<sup>56</sup> B<sup>57</sup> B<sup>58</sup> 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*toletes Pädagogik* 69). The passages to consult are III. 4 § 11, IV (VII) 17 § 7, § 9; also V (VIII) 6 § 8, IV (VII) 14 § 2 with the notes: *Nic. Eth.* I. 5 § 3; III. 10 § 8, II § 3; IV. 5 § 6; and the further references under ἀνδραποδῶδες Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 54 b 30 f. SUSEM. (43)

19 οἷς βέλτιστον κτλ] Plato *Rep.* IX. 590 D ὡς ἀμεινον ὅν παντὶ ἐπὶ θεῶν καὶ φροσύμῳ ἄρχεσθαι μάλιστα μὲν οὐκ εἶναι ἔχοντες ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐξωθεν ἐφεστῶτες: a passage which contains something more than the germ of Aristotle's whole doctrine of natural slavery.

20 τοῖς ἀρρημίνοις] τῷ νόμῳ, τῷ παθητικῷ νόμῳ, τῷ θητικῷ, τῷ φητικῷ (Congreve).

§ 9 21 διὰ καὶ ἄλλου [ἐστίν] As a general rule slavery is due to a natural inferiority. But this must not be pressed too far: from c. 6 an unjust slavery is possible, cum hi sunt alterius qui sui possunt esse, Cic. *De Rep.* III. § 37 (Congreve). SUSEM. (44)

22 ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν] In c. 13 § 14 the capacity to admit reason or understand its commands (αἰσθάνεσθαι) is ascribed to these natural slaves in a higher degree than to children ὡς παιδὶ, for children, while their reason is still undeveloped, attend too much to the mere suggestions of the instincts and passions of sense; *Nic. Eth.* I. 3. 6, III. 12. 6. Moreover Aristotle is here asserting more than his own psychology justifies: for what he here leaves to the slave's practical reason is more correctly attributed to the irrational soul, that is, to speak accurately (see n. on § 6), the appetitive soul, in IV (VII). 14 § 9, cp. *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 15 f.: namely, the capacity of allowing itself to be guided by

practical reason. As the power to reflect is to Aristotle amongst the most essential peculiarities of the practical reason—see n. (40) on § 6—this instinct with any consistency be wholly denied to the slave as it is here and c. 13 § 7 (where we may if it be once granted that the slave's soul has a rational part under which is included the possession of practical reason. At the most there can be merely an approximation to the state here described. See further on c. 13 § 11.

ἄλλου, which here means, as the *scholastic* of 13 § 7 (see n.): more precisely, ἄλλου λόγῳ in the *Praxis*, right or sound understanding as the law and measure of human action in the sphere of practice and morals. Prominent still in the exercise of this λόγῳ is *phronesis*—prudence; see Zeller *op. cit.* II. 2. 114 f., Walter *op. cit.* 313—315. Aristotle is consistent when he allows *phronesis* to none but the *phronimos* (I. 12. 8 n. (115), III. 4. 17 n. (147)). But if the *phronimos* were wholly devoid of practical reason of his own he would, by Aristotle's own definition, cease to be a human being and to possess even the *praxis* remains of capacity for human and moral virtue which is left him according to c. 13 §§ 1—14: cp. *Praxis* c. 13 § 1 with my note (194). He would then be reduced to the level of the brute, be himself unable to resist the promptings of animal desires. See n. p. 111. SUSEM. (45)

23 λόγῳ αἰσθάνεσθαι] On *αἰσθάνεσθαι* see n. (194) upon III. 12. 6. SUSEM. (45 b). If λόγῳ is the right reading, then the *praxis* is limited as if *αἰσθάνεσθαι* were an *affection*. "The other animals (and not man) are not rational, but obey their passions."

παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν·<sup>14</sup>  
 25 ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ'  
 ἄμφοιν, παρά τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ζώων.  
 § 10 βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα  
 ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ  
 πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς  
 30 τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν  
 βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν  
 χρεῖαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικὴν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοῦ-  
 ναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυ-  
 χὰς· ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὥς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιοντο διὰ-  
 35 φοροὶ τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπο-  
 λειπομένους πάντες φαῖεν ἂν ἀξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν.  
 § 11 εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ  
 τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥάδιον ἰδεῖν  
 τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

28 ποιεῖ P<sup>3.6</sup>. QM<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and 1st hand of P<sup>2</sup> (emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>) || μὲν <ταπεινὰ καὶ>, or something similar, Schmidt with great probability; ὀρθὰ] νωθρὰ Reiske || 31 καὶ wanting in L<sup>s</sup>. [οὗτος...32 εἰρηνικὴν] Schneider and Schmidt, perhaps not unreasonably || 33 ἐλευθέρων] ἐτέρων or a little before <τῶν δούλων> τοὺς μὲν Heitland wrongly: Aristotle's meaning would have been clearer if he had added μόνον after σώματα or after ψυχὰς || 36 Oncken thinks the conclusion omitted after δουλεύειν; but it came first: βούλεται μὲν οὖν.....τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς

24 f. καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει κτλ] "Moreover the service afforded by the slave is not very far removed from that of domesticated animals; viz. bodily aid (note the dative) towards the necessities of life." Comp. Plato *Polit.* 289 B: slaves and domesticated animals as species of the same genus περὶ ζώων κτήσιν τῶν ἡμέρων πλὴν δούλων; also c. 2 § 5 above n. (15); and 6 § 10 n. (57). SUSEM. (46)

§ 10 27 βούλεται] Nature designs, but is sometimes thwarted. See 6 § 8 n. (56).

32 χρεῖαν] "including services in war as well as in peace."

34 ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε κτλ] Cp. IV (VII). 14. 2. Congreve and Eaton compare Herod. v. 47. This remark has a truly Hellenic ring. To the Greek, mental worth is necessarily and naturally presented in a harmonious external form; and in the very beauty of the race, of which he was thoroughly conscious, Aristotle finds direct proof of its superiority to the barbarians. What a complete justification this for the slavery of the black

and coloured races! Zeller *op. c.* II ii 691 n. (2). See on I. 2 § 4 n. (13).

Lang however from another point of view justly remarks *op. c. Essays* 60: "we must remember no one would have been more bitter than Aristotle against the negro-slavery on plantations of modern days. To turn the servants of the noble life into tools of limitless money-making would have been, in his view, unnatural. We must remember also, that he would have held up the promise and reward of freedom, to stimulate his serfs to virtuous lives, and, with freedom in prospect, and friendship in the meantime, with every lovely rite of divine service performed for their sake, there may have been worse lives than those of the Greek slaves." SUSEM. (47)

§ 11 38 οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥάδιον ἰδεῖν κτλ] Eaton compares *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 16 ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρώμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρώμεν. Should we not rather think of Plat. *Phaedr.* 250 D E, Xen. *Mem.* III. 10. 3?

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δού-  
λοι, φανερόν, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεῖν καὶ ἑκάστῳ  
6 ἐστίν· ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τάναντία φάσκοντες τρόπον τινα λέγου-  
σιν ὀρθῶς, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τὸ δουλεῖν  
καὶ ὁ δοῦλος. ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ  
δουλεύων· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τίς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾗ τὰ κατὰ  
12 πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν. τοῦτο δὲ  
τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὥσπερ ῥήτορα γρά-

1255 a 1 ὅτι... b 3 δύναται is cited by Pseudo-Plutarch de nobil. c. 6, p. 912 B sq. 5 kai before κατὰ omitted in P<sup>1</sup> M<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Plat. and in P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand—added by a later hand) || 6 ἐν ᾗ Bas.<sup>a</sup>, ἐφ' ᾗ omitting the following φασίν Bessarion; Hampke punctuates δουλεύων (ὁ...τις ἐστίν), ἐν ᾗ κατὰ, cp. *Hermes* XIX. 177 n.

c. 6. *There is then one species of slavery, which is natural. But there is another species, conventional slavery: § 1. The justice of the convention which allows prisoners taken in war to be sold for slaves is unconditionally challenged by some (A) and defended by others (B): § 2. The reason why there are these conflicting views, and why nevertheless they have a common ground, is the implication of virtue and superior force. The issue turns on what constitutes right and justice: § 3. Weakness of the one view (A), which implies a denial of the right of superior virtue to rule: § 4. Others (C), again, argue that all slavery, so far as it is legal, is just: but the war might be unjust, and they would refuse to apply their principle consistently to captive Greeks: § 5. This refusal leads them back to τὸ φασὶ δοῦλον: § 6. Illustration from the conception of nobility: § 7. Men are marked off for true freedom and true nobility by virtue (ἀρετή): § 8. Recapitulation: §§ 9, 10.*

See Excursus II.; Hampke in *Philologus* XXIV. 1866. 172—175, who compares IV(VII). 2 §§ 12—18; in *The Transactions of Camb. Philol. Soc.* II. 1881; Jackson pp. 111—116, Postgate pp. 119—123, Ridgeway pp. 128—130; and Nussimbl in *Hermes* XIX. 1884. 576—588. The chapter reminds us of *N. Eth.* I. cc. 8—12, in so far as Aristotle is testing his theoretical conclusions by a comparison with various received opinions.

§ 1 1255 a 1 ff. "It is thus plain that in certain cases there are natural freedom and natural slaves, for the latter of whom the estate of slavery is both advantageous and just. And yet it is easy to say that those who maintain the opposite" viz. of

the doctrine of natural slavery (against Ridgeway 129 f) "do, to a certain extent, argue correctly. For the same slavery and slave are used in two senses. — Besides the natural — there is also the conventional slave and conventional slavery; this convention being a species of agreement whereby the conquered in war are declared the property of their conquerors."

6 ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἡ φασίν] *Χρονολογία* Cyr. VII. 5. 73 πᾶσι γὰρ ἐν πόλεμι ἀποδύ-  
πον εἶναι ἔστιν, ἔπειτα πωλεῖσθαι καὶ  
ἀλφ., τὰς ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ τὰς δούλους καὶ  
ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὰ γράμματα ἡγουμένην.  
It is well known that customs and usages purely conventional and resting on mere tradition were called νόμος by the Greeks and considered more sacred and venerable than the written laws: III. 15 § 2 ὁ νόμος ἀρχαῖος καὶ πρὸ νόμων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὰ γράμματα ἡγουμένην. and VII (VII). 5 § 2. Yet these "unwritten laws" are regarded as if each of them could be derived from a single law-giver: see on II. 9 §§ 12, 13. *Strauss* (48).

§ 2 7 "That conventional right is by many justiceminds assigned, like a the-  
magogue, of unreasonableness." Yet  
"slavery among the ancients was at first  
an unthought slavery — an arbitrary  
conquest of the spirit of humanity. When  
men were altogether lawless they  
killed their prisoners." *Lecky Eth. of*  
*Nationalism* II. 124.

8 γράμματα ἡγουμένην] "This in-  
distinction was laid against any philo-  
sophers who had proposed or settled an  
unconventional law as superior to nature,  
i.e. one which contravened laws of nature  
in force at the time and not previously

φονται παρανόμων, ὥς δεινὸν εἰ τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυναμένου (II  
 10 καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος ἔσται δούλον καὶ ἀρχόμενον  
 τὸ βιασθέν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὕτως δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἐκείνως, καὶ  
 § 3 τῶν σοφῶν. αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὃ 17  
 ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγ-

II ἐκείνως [καὶ] Koraes, wrongly

repealed. Proceedings had to be commenced within a year from the day when the proposal was made or adopted; otherwise the proposer escaped a personal prosecution. The illegality might consist in the substance of the proposal, in its form, or in both at once. (A decree (ψήφισμα) would be formally unconstitutional if brought before the popular assembly without consent of the βουλή previously obtained, although there might be no decree proposed by the βουλή on the same subject which it could contravene') (Meier and Schömann *Attischer Process* 283 f.). The comparison here relates to illegality in substance, for the sense is that the convention or positive law in question violates natural law. SUSEM. (49)

9 ὥς δεινὸν κτλ] "on the ground that it is monstrous if mere ability to subdue by force, and superiority in might alone, shall give ownership and rule over that which it subdues." The representatives of this view are no doubt the same as those who declare all slavery to be contrary to nature: see § 4, τοῖς μὲν εὐνοία δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι and 3 § 1, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν, where see note. SUSEM. (49b) Note the genitive after ἀρχόμενον, "subject of the coerced".

II "This then is their view: others again take the former view" (ἐκείνως): namely, that prescribed by the convention or positive law mentioned in § 1: δοκεῖ ἐκείνως repeats the φασίν of line 7. For convenience we may denote by (A) the opponents (τοῖς μὲν), and by (B) the defenders of conventional slavery (τοῖς δὲ); the view of the latter is shared, though on other grounds, by a third party (C) the τινές of line 22.

§ 3 12 "The reason of the conflict" between (A) and (B) "and what" at the same time "makes the (two opposed) views overlap." The general sense, as explained p. 206, is that (i) the views of (A) and (B) stand sharply opposed (cp. 19 διαστάντων χωρὶς), and yet (ii) they have a common point of contact, the two distinct facts (i) and (ii) being due to one and the same cause, the implication of virtue and force.

Bernays differently, see p. 209. SUSEM. (51)

13 λόγους, often taken as = arguments, or again as = propositions, should be explained more widely as "the propositions [conventional slavery is just, is unjust] together with the arguments supporting them and the conclusions adopted in consequence of them," thus nearly = views or reasonings (Postgate *op. c.* 121, 123 n.), 'platforms' (Heitland), theories.

ἐπαλλάττειν, as in I. 9. 15, VI(IV). 10. 2, VII(VI). 1. 3; see Heitland's examination of these passages *Notes* 11—13, and the passages collected by Jackson *op. c.* 114 n. Bonitz *Index* s.v. compares ἐπαμφοτερίζειν and explains that from the sense of "to alternate" it comes to be applied *ad ea quae inter duo genera ita sunt interposita ut cum utroque cohaerent*. "Said of two different, or even opposite, things or views which yet have something in common and again approximate or meet or even cross or run into each other or are in inseparable connexion" (Susem.). Oncken took it of 'arguments crossed or traversed by counter arguments.' Heitland and Jackson of 'propositions overlapping': but the former thinks these are the sub-contraries (a) some slavery is just, (b) some slavery is unjust: the latter holds that it is the λόγοι of (A) and (B)—all slavery is unjust, all slavery is just—which 'overlap': because the "slaveries which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just." (See by all means the context of this remark, Ex. II. p. 208.)

τρόπον τινὰ κτλ] "in a sense virtue, provided it finds proper appliances, is in fact best able to subdue by force, and the conquering side always has advantage in good of some sort." These two clauses are not opposed (against Jackson 114 f., Postgate 122), they merely put the same thing in a different form. There is always a presumption that βία carries with it ἀρετή: this is the common ground where the two contending parties meet, and here Aristotle also agrees with them. But from this they draw opposite inferences as to the nature of τὸ δίκαιον, as to when it is just to use force.

χάνουσα <sup>γίαν</sup> χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ 11  
 15 ἔστιν αἰεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός, ὥστε δυνάμει  
 μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου νό- 2 γὰρ  
 24 νον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν εἰσὶν αἰσιν  
 δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὰ τῶν  
 κρείττονα ἄρχειν)· ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λό- 3  
 20 γων οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθαίην ἄνευ λόγου, αἰ

17 *ἐνόμια* Lambin, wrongly: «μετ'» εἰσὶν? Schneider

14 *χάνουσα* = means, resources: ἡ δὲ τοῖς χ. favourable external circumstances, external goods *Nic. Eth.* x. 8 § 4; so of the individual *Pol.* iv (vii). 13 § 3. In a wider sense, anything with which the state requires to be furnished, even population, territory iv (vii). 4 § 2, § 4.

13—16 *δοτ...βίαν*] Fullborn remarks with truth that the qualifications necessary here (amounting in all to *ἐνὶ ᾧ* *παύσει*) really make the whole theory futile, because 'other things' in this connexion are so seldom 'equal'. Bodily qualities, superior numbers and weapons, all sorts of external circumstances often largely contribute in victory. Conquest is no valid proof of the higher excellence of the conqueror: besides, the one kind of mental capacity which has contributed to his victory is no guarantee that he also possesses the other which qualifies him for wise government, above all for the exercise of despotic rule over a conquered foe. Nevertheless Aristotle would be borne out by a belief in the moral government of the world\*: in the main, success attends upon the most capable nations. *SUPRM.* (60)

15 *ὥστε δοκεῖν κτλ*] "hence it seems that force to coerce is never independent of virtue, but that the dispute turns on the nature of right and justice."

§ 4 17 f. ("For this reason some take the mutual goodwill" of governors and governed "to constitute right, others stand on the naked right of the stronger to rule.") The parenthesis is due to Ridgway; Heitland saw that 'this remark breaks the course of the argument' (p. 14). The grounds for the view of (13), which had not been stated above III 4, 1, are now given by *διὰ τοῦτο*.

*τοῖς μὲν*] Clearly again the unqualified opponents of slavery. *SUPRM.* (20 b)

Jackman, 112 n., first proved that one meaning of *εἰσὶν* is 'loyalty; the will.'

\* [And so too by the sensible doctrine of the survival of the fittest.]

ing obedience which an inferior renders to a kind and considerate superior. To take it solely to mean 'the goodwill of governors to governed' seriously invalidates the proof of the anti-slavery party *παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ δεσπεύειν*; nations might always urge the plea that they hold their slaves from disinterested motives. Giphanius notes well: *bonitas est bona exultimatio magnitudo et dominus repent.* Cp. viii (v). 5 § 4, § 10; viii (v). 11 § 11: *ἀπογυῖον εἶναι εἰς τὴν παρρησίαν τοῦ δεσπότη καὶ τοῦ γένους.*

18 *τὸ τῶν κρείττονα ἄρχειν*] Cp. Thuc. v. 105. 2, Plato *Alcibiades* 114 d.

19 *ὅτι* answers the sentence 13 *αἰεὶ δυνάμει*... "If however these two views stand opposed and apart, the former has neither force nor plausibility, implying as it does that the superior in virtue has no right to rule and be master." *χωρὶς* is used predicatively, *διαστάντων* is the opposite of *ἐπαλλήλων*: if the point of contact between the two views be lost, if they stand opposed without any community. For the sense of *αἰσιν* the passage quoted by Jackman (*see p. 107* *The Logic of Greek Ethics*, 114 b 25, is most instructive: *περὶ τούτων ἀποφασίς καὶ τῆς φύσεως ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀποφασίς, ἡ περὶ φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποφασίσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποφασίσεως, ἡ καὶ ἐστὶν ἀποφασίς (ἐπαλλήλων) τὰ περὶ τῆς φύσεως ἀποφασίς καὶ τῆς ἀποφασίσεως, καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀποφασίς ἀποφασίς καὶ ἀποφασίς ἀποφασίς*. Others (Schneider, Jackman, Postgate, Ridgway) take *διαστάντων* as *per se* *propositiones*, 'if disentangled,' each taken separately.

20 *ἄνευ λόγου* = *one of the two sorts of argument advanced*, that of *pol.* Postgate (pt. 1. 112) thinks *ἄνευ λόγου* would be clearer, Schneider took it as *modus entis* to which Hume's remark that this sense implies slavery. Jackman however still maintains that it is a true plural 'as in 13 *τοῖς μὲν*', but that we should have *ἀποφασίς*, his novel and ingenious interpretation, *op. cit.* p. 112 f.

- § 5 οὐ δέ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀρχεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν. ὅλως (II)  
 δ' ἀντεχόμενοι τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δικαίου τινός (ὁ γὰρ νόμος  
 δίκαιόν τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίαν,  
 ἅμα δὲ οὐ φασιν. τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δι-  
 25 καίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδα-  
 μῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς (p. 9)  
 εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων, εἰ  
 § 6 συμβῇ πραθῆναι ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται  
 λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέ-  
 30 γωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον ὅπερ ἐξ  
 ἀρχῆς εἴπομεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τινας φάναι τοὺς μὲν  
 § 7 πανταχοῦ δούλους τοὺς δὲ οὐδαμοῦ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ 19

24 ἅμα] ὅλως Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>6</sup> M<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> (γρ. ἅμα p<sup>1</sup> in the margin), ἀπλῶς apparently Ar. ||  
 27 καὶ ἐκ δούλων transposed to follow 1255 b 2 ἀγαθόν Schmidt || 28 αὐτοὺς Monte-  
 catino and perhaps P<sup>3</sup>. Over this word p<sup>2</sup> has the gloss τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ κρατηθέντας  
 which M<sup>s</sup> has in the text after ληφθέντας || 32 πανταχοῦ] ἐξ ἀρχῆς Π<sup>1</sup>, γρ. ἀπαν-  
 ταχοῦ p<sup>1</sup> in the margin

departs widely from that here given. Hampke also takes 19 *τούτων τῶν λόγων* as a singular of one view and hence infers that *ἅτεροι λόγοι* denotes one view also: M. Croiset, 'les opinions de nos adversaires'.

ὡς οὐ δέ, expegetical of λόγοι, 'the view namely that...'. But Jackson following Heinsius makes it depend on *πιθανόν*: "plausibility to shew that it is not the right of superiority in virtue to rule". Why does Aristotle expose the weakness of (A)? He admits *εὐνοία* as the principle regulating the relations of citizens in the normal *πολιτεία*, but as between master and slave it is not to supersede the right of virtue to rule.

§ 5 21 Take ὅλως with ἀντεχόμενοι. "Others again simply holding fast to something just and right as they suppose (for whatever is legal is just) admit the justice of slavery in accordance with the laws of war, but in the same breath withdraw the admission. For not only may the war have had an unjust origin, but further no one would call him, who is undeserving of slave's estate, a slave. Else it will follow that men who are held to be of the noblest birth are slaves or come of servile ancestry, if they" [or their ancestors] "happen to have been taken prisoners and sold":—as Plato was by Dionysios. The view of (C), 22 *τινές*, is substantially the common opinion in Greece, with its latent incon-

sistencies. ὅλως was taken by Hampke = 'embracing both the former views'. Ridgeway (*op. c.* 130) objects that 'if Aristotle was enunciating another theory here, he would have used *ἐτι δέ*'. It will be found upon comparison of *De Anima* I. 5 §§ 10, 11 410 b 2 and *Meteor.* II. 3 §§ 14, 15 357 b 10, 12, that ὅλως and *ἐτι δέ* are used in parallel clauses to introduce *distinct* objections, the order of the clauses being indifferent.

§ 6 28 διόπερ κτλ] "Hence they refuse to call their own countrymen slaves, and only apply the term to barbarians": αὐτοὺς used absolutely for αὐτοὺς < τοὺς Ἕλληνας > which comes to the same thing as 33 αὐτοὺς. Eaton compares the noble conduct of Callicratidas, *Xen. Hell.* I. 6, 14.

30 οὐδὲν ἄλλο κτλ] In making this qualification they are really on their way to the principle of natural slavery laid down by us at the first: they are compelled to admit that in certain cases there is a distinction between two classes, the one who are everywhere, the others who are nowhere, slaves. Having thus reduced the intermediate view of (c) to its right sense Aristotle has no need to refute at length the extreme views of (A) and (B).

§ 7 32 πανταχοῦ] *Nic. Eth.* v. 7. 1, 1134 b 19, τὸ μὲν φύσει <δίκαιον> ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν (Congreve). τὸν αὐτὸν κτλ] *Cp.* III. 13. 2 ἢ εὐγένεια παρ' ἐκάστοις οἰκοτίμιος. SUSEM. (52)



θηρίων γίνεσθαι θηρίον, οὕτω καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθόν. ἡ δὲ φύ- (II)  
σις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πολλάκις μέντοι οὐ δύναται.

§ 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, καὶ 20  
5 οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δὲ ἐλεύθεροι, δῆλον,  
καὶ ὅτι ἐν τισι διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὧν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ  
δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν  
ἄρχεσθαι τὸ δ' ἄρχειν, ἣν πεφύκασιν ἀρχὴν ἄρχειν, ὥστε  
§ 10 καὶ δεσπόζειν, τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν (τὸ  
10 γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ σώματι καὶ  
ψυχῇ, ὁ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότητος, οἷον ἔμψυχόν τι  
τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος· διὸ καὶ συμφέρον 21  
ἐστὶ τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς

1255 b 2 γενέσθαι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>.4.6. Q T<sup>b</sup> || ἀγαθόν, <καὶ ἐκ δούλων δούλον> Schmidt,  
cp. a 27 || 3 τοῦτο after ποιεῖν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || πολλάκις μέντοι οὐ Ar. πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι  
ΓΠ Plut. Bk. which, though unsatisfactory, might perhaps be defended: see Ditten-  
berger *op. c.* p. 1371 f. || 5 The text can hardly be sound: <εἰσὶ καὶ> οὐκ Camot,  
Bk.<sup>2</sup>, perhaps the best suggestion; οὐκ <ἀει>? Susem.<sup>2</sup>, οὐκ <ἀναμφισβητήτως> or  
οὐχ <ἀπανταχοῦ>? Schmidt formerly: <ὅτι> Bojesen; οὐκ is omitted by W<sup>b</sup> Ald.  
Lambin Göttling, εἰ for 4 καὶ and <ἡ οὐ> before δῆλον Lambin, οὐκ for 4 οὖν Göttling, οἱ  
μὲν <εἰ μὴ> Thurot || οἱ μὲν φύσει | φύσει <τινὲς> οἱ μὲν and 6 <δῆλον δὲ> καὶ ὅτι  
Schmidt now edits || φύσει wanting in M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added in the margin by  
p<sup>1</sup>) || 7 τὸ is omitted before δεσπόζειν by Π<sup>3</sup> || τὸν μὲν and 8 τὸν δ' Ar. Nickes,  
who would prefer 6 τοῖς μὲν...7 τοῖς δὲ...τοὺς μὲν...8 τοὺς δ' || 8 In M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Ar. ἄρχειν  
and ἄρχεσθαι are transposed || 12 τοῦ σώματος in some older mss. probably came  
after μέρος where it is repeated by Γ M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand)

2 ἡ δὲ φύσις κτλ.] So above § 10  
συμβαίνει...ἐλευθέρων. Fülleborn remarks  
with truth that this admission quite in-  
validates all practical application of Aristo-  
tle's theory. It is even possible for a  
Greek to be a natural slave, for a bar-  
barian, though an Asiatic (see on I. 2.  
4 and above n. 54), to be a natural free-  
man: *e. g.* Hermeias, Aristotle's friend  
and the uncle of his wife, who had actually  
been a slave: see on II. 7. 17. Hence the  
non-Hellene may even prove to be the  
natural master of the Hellene. SUSEM.  
(56)

§ 9 5 οὐκ εἰσὶν] Fortunately we can  
check the text (see *Crit. Notes*) by the  
directly opposed statement with which  
c. 6 opens, by § 6, § 10, and the next  
words, line 6, ἐν τισι κτλ. "in certain  
cases there is a clearly marked distinc-  
tion of this sort, where namely....."

9 τὸ δὲ κακῶς] sc. ἄρχειν.

§ 10 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ κτλ.] See I § 3 n. (7).

11 ὁ δὲ δοῦλος...12 κεχωρισμένον δὲ

μέρος] This is said of property (κτήμα)  
generally and of the child *Nic. Eth.* v. 6.  
8 quoted on 4 § 5 above. SUSEM. (57)  
See however Jackson's note *ad loc.*

12 διὸ...13 πρὸς ἀλλήλους] In *Nic. Eth.* VIII. II §§ 6, 7, 1161 a 32 ff., it is said  
that there can be no friendship between  
master and slave *quā* slave: ἐν οἷς γὰρ  
μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστιν τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχο-  
μένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον. The  
relation is like that of a craftsman to  
his tools, of soul to body, of master to  
slave. ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα  
ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων (cp. τὸ αὐτὸ συμφέρει of  
the text), φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστιν...ὁ γὰρ δοῦ-  
λος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος  
δοῦλος. ἡ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν φιλία  
πρὸς αὐτόν, ἡ δ' ἀνθρώπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ  
εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα  
τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθή-  
κης, καὶ φιλία δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἀνθρώπος.  
Zeller II ii 692 f., following Ritter, rightly  
calls this an inconsistency which does the  
philosopher honour. The author of the

φύσει τούτων ἡξιωμένοις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ τούτων τινὲς τρώπον, (21)  
 7 ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθεῖσι, τοῖναντι(όν)· φανερόν δὲ  
 16 καὶ ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι οὐ ταυτόν ἐστι δεσποτεία καὶ πολι-  
 τική, οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ τινὲς φα-  
 σίν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἡ δὲ δοῦλων ἐστίν, καὶ  
 19 ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖται γὰρ τῷ οἴκῳ),  
 2 ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή. ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπότης  
 τῆς οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι,

14 τούτων] τοιούτοις Susem.<sup>122</sup>, τοιούτοις «εἶναι» ? Susem., ταύτων «καὶ» Schmidt at one time: τούτων was suspected by Schneider and Koraes, οὗτοι ἡξιω-  
 μένοις Koraes || ἡξιωμένοις transposed to follow 12 νόμον Schmidt || 12 φανερόν  
 ...20 ἀρχή transposed to follow 1256 a 1 τρώπον Schmidt || 16 καὶ ταύτων ἐκ ταύτων  
 would perhaps come better after those words

*Eudemian Ethics*, VII. 9. 2 1241 b 17 ff., withdraws the concession: since there is the same relation between soul and body, craftsman and tools, master and slave, in these cases there is no association (κοινωνία) possible. αἱ γὰρ οὗ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός (the two members of such a relation are not independent). οὐδὲ διαμετρεῖται τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀμφοτέρῳ τὸ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ ἐστίν (the good of the one is not separable from the good of the other, the good of both is the good of that one of the two for whose sake the other exists). τὸ τε γὰρ σῶμα ἐστὶν ὄργανον σύμφυτον, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότου ὁ δοῦλος ὥσπερ μόνιον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν. That even a slave is a man is emphasized in another fragment of Philemon, besides the one quoted on 3 § 4, viz. Ἐθιοικίζοντο 19: καὶ δοῦλοι ἢ τοῖς οὐδὲν ἴσταν, ὁλοκατα, ἀνθρώποις ὅτι ἐστίν, ἢ ἀνθρώπων ὅ. Cp. Becker *Classical Lat.* III. 12 (ed. 2), Eng. tr. p. 357. Consult further *Pol.* IV (VII). 8 §§ 1—4 n. (501); I. 2. 3 n. (7); III. 6. 6. SUSSEM. (57 b) Comp. F. A. Paley's *Enquiries*, *Proof.* to vol. 1, pp. xlii f. with refl. there given, esp. *Hcl.* 728, *Melanippe* fr. 206 (515), *Patriani* fr. 823 (828); also Oudendorp II. 33 ff.

c. 7 Δεσποτεία then, or rule over slaves, is not the same as slavery (III. 1 § 1). Nor does the relation of δεσποτεία depend upon slavery: § 2. In what sense there may be a mixture of the duties (1) of slavery (2) of slavery (the latter quite distinct from ἡ ἀστυκία, or slavery): III 3—5.

§ 1 17 τινὲς] Plato. See on 1 § 1 n. (2). SUSSEM. (58)

"It is plain that here and 1 § 1 Aristotle is thinking of Plat. *Polit.* 128 a 30, 31, 32, 33. It is however a mistake to attrib-

bute the doctrine, without qualification, to Plato, who at 128 b introduces a long and elaborate myth with the express intention of warning us, that though the shepherd-king of the theocratic period exercised all regulative functions indiscriminately, this state of things ended with the Saturnian age. See by all means 274 f. sup. From that point to the end of the dialogue the Liberator is mainly engaged in discriminating the monarchs from a host of rivals. Clearly the doctrine in question is at variance with the whole tenor of the *Republic*. May we not attribute it, on the strength of Xenoph. *Memorab.* III. 4 § 12, *Charm.* 13 § 2, to Socrates?" (Jackson).

19 ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ το ἀρχή] Compare IV (VII). 8 § 4 (cf. *Enchiridion*, VI. 101. 11 § 8 (cf. *Isaac* and *Ammon*), also II. 12 § 2, III. 16 § 2, 17 § 1 and n. (122) on II. 1 § 4. On the other hand see III. 4 § 2 with n. (471). SUSSEM. (58 b)

20 A similar distinction between ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ ἡ δεσποτεία is seen in *Nat. Eth.* V. 6 § 4, § 8. where Jackson refers to *Pol.* IV (VII). 14 §§ 6, 7, § 19. See his notes.

§ 2 21 οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην] As is asserted in the passage of the *Politics*; cp. c. 1 § 2 n. (2), 3 § 4. ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι] But does this latter at once exclude the former? As was shown in n. (54) on c. 6 § 8, Plato is very far from denying the one because he asserts the other. He too, like Aristotle, regards the more capable as the natural ruler, but far that very reason assigns the perfect art of ruling, of whatever kind, to those alone who in the wider sense have knowledge, i.e. to the philosophers; for, on the Socratic principle that all virtue is

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ δούλος καὶ ὁ ἐλεύθερος· ἐπιστήμη δ' αὖν (II)  
 εἴη καὶ δεσποτική καὶ δουλική, δουλική μὲν οἷαν περ ὁ ἐν  
 24 Συρακούσαις ἐπαίδευσεν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνων τις μισθὸν  
 § 3 ἐδίδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παῖδας), εἴη δ' αὖν καὶ  
 ἐπὶ πλεῖον τούτων μάθησις, οἷον ὀψοποιητική καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ  
 τοιαῦτα γένη τῆς διακονίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἕτερα ἑτέρων τὰ μὲν  
 ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τὰ δ' ἀναγκαϊότερα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν

29

δούλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

§ 4 αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦται πᾶσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι εἰσὶ· δεσπο- 23  
 τική δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ χρηστική δούλων. ὁ γὰρ δεσπό-  
 της οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι τοὺς δούλους, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι  
 δούλοις. ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ  
 34 σεμνόν· ἃ γὰρ τὸν δούλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκείνον δεῖ  
 § 5 ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν. διὸ ὅσοις ἐξουσία μὴ αὐτοὺς  
 κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίτροπος λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμήν, αὐτοὶ

23 ἐν ταῖς M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup>—wrongly, see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1362, ἐν [ταῖς]  
 Susem.<sup>2</sup> || 24 ἐπαίδευεν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 26 τούτων] τῶν τοιούτων Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || ὀψοποιική  
 P<sup>2-3</sup>. Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. ὀψοποιική P<sup>4</sup>, ὀψοποιικήν Ar. || 27 ἕτερα] ἔργα Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald.  
 and 1st hand in P<sup>3-4</sup>. (γρ. ἕτερα in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>, the right reading is inserted in P<sup>3</sup>  
 by a later hand, but subsequently erased)

excellence (*ἀρετή*) arises from knowledge, philosophers have in his eyes the highest excellence in every respect. Aristotle has not taken pains enough over his refutation here. In the *Ethics* he is more accurate, beginning with a successful attack upon the Socratic principle which Plato accepted: see Zeller *op. c.* II ii 627 f. SUSEM. (59, 60)

κατὰ=in virtue of, as in καθό. The term 'master' is not applied to any one because of his knowledge, but from his being of a given character.

§ 3 27 τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα κτλ] The latter are the conditions for bare existence, the former for the ennobling refinement and perfecting of existence. SUSEM. (61)

29 A verse of the *Pankratiast*, a comedy by Aristotle's younger contemporary Philemon, frag. 2. (J. G. Schneider). But if one master thus differs from another, it is implied that in the activities of freemen there is a similar difference; that thus all human occupations exhibit an ascending scale from the lowest and most mechanical work up to the highest and most intellectual, which Aristotle calls (*διαγωγή*) employment of leisure, as distinct from work or occupa-

tion (Ludw. Schneider). See IV (VII). c. 8 f.; c. 14 § 12 ff. SUSEM. (62)

§ 4 32 οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι] Below c. 8 § 2 τίς γὰρ ἔσται χρησομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκ.; III. 4. II τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα <ἀρχὴν δεσποτικὴν>, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἀρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον. SUSEM. (63)

33 οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα] IV (VII). 3. 2 οὐδὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλω, ἢ δούλος, χρῆσθαι σεμνόν, VI (IV). 15. 3 αἱ δ' ὑπηρετικαὶ <τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν> καὶ πρὸς αὐς, ἂν εὐπορώσι, τάττουσι δούλους. But see I. 13. 14 and n. (123). SUSEM. (64)

§ 5 36 The overseer, ἐπίτροπος, or house-steward, ταμίης, was himself a slave: Pseud.-Arist. *Oecon.* I. 5 § 1 1344 a 26, 6 § 5 1345 a 8 ff., Xen. *Oecon.* 12. 2, Aristoph. *Knights* 947 f.: Becker *Charikles* III. 23 (ed. 2), Eng. tr. p. 363. Yet no doubt Greeks by birth were readily taken for this office, as well as for that of παιδαγωγός. SUSEM. (64)

Translate: hence all who have the means of escaping personal discomfort employ an overseer to take this charge and themselves the while engage in public affairs or in study.

δὲ πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. ἢ δὲ κτητικὴ ἐστὶν ἐμ- (III)  
φοτέρων τούτων, οἷον [ἢ] δικαία πολεμικὴ τις οὔσα [ἢ θηρευ-  
τικῇ].

8 περὶ μὲν οὖν δούλου καὶ δεσπότου τούτων διακρίσθαι τὸν ἐπὶ  
τῷ τρόπῳ· ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θύει.

38 [ἢ] Susem., ἢ Schnitzer wrongly: ?[δικαία] or ?[τις οὔσα] Susem. 1 [ἢ θηρευ-  
τικῇ] Susem.<sup>2</sup>, [ἢ] Jackson 1 Conring and Siengel interpret the whole sentence as  
ἢ δὲ κτητικὴ... 38 θηρευτικῇ, Schmidt all from 37 ἢ δὲ κτητικὴ... 1256 a 1 ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅτι

37 ἢ δὲ κτλ] With κτητικῇ κυρίως  
δούλων. But it may be inferred from c.  
8 § 12, διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πω-  
λεῖται (ἢ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέν ἐστιν αἰετῇ), ἢ δὲ  
χρησθῆναι πρὸς τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων  
ὄντι πειθικότες ἀρχεσθαι μὴ δέλουσιν, that  
under the one genus 'offensive war' Ari-  
stotle includes two species: (1) the chase,  
a war against wild animals, (2) war con-  
ducted for the capture of slaves.

#### πολεμικὴ

πρὸς τὰ θηρία πρὸς τοὺς φύσει δούλους  
(θηρευτικῇ)

If this be so, he knows nothing of an  
art of 'man-hunting': and the words at  
the end, 38 ἢ θηρευτικῇ, must be an inter-  
polation. Cp. further I. 2 § 4 n. (11), 6  
§ 9 n. (54, 56), IV (VII). 2 § 15 οὐ  
δὲ πάντων πειρᾶσθαι δεσπόζειν, ἀλλὰ  
τῶν δεσποστών, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ  
θόλην ἢ θυσίαν ἀνθρώπου ἀλλὰ τὸ  
πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτὴν n. (727, 728): IV  
(VII). 14 § 21, where one object of military  
training is τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δου-  
λεύειν. MUSEM. (65)

This view, that θηρευτικῇ is a species  
of πολεμικῇ, Jackson cannot accept. On  
the contrary, from 8 § 12 (just quoted) he  
infers that to Aristotle (as to Plato *Sept.*  
322 n, *Enn.* 823 n) πολεμικῇ is a species  
of θηρευτικῇ: see his note on that passage.  
He translates here, "the art of acquiring  
slaves, that is, the just art of acquiring  
slaves, is distinct from both of these,"  
from δουλικῇ and δεσποτικῇ, "being a  
species of the art of war or the art of  
hunting."

α. 11—11 περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ  
χρηματιστικῆς

c. 8 In what relation does χρηματι-  
στικὴ stand to *Economics*? Is it (1) the  
same science, or (2) a branch of it, or (3)  
a subsidiary science? It is not the same,  
for it serves a different purpose, accumula-  
tion: §§ 1, 2. Whether it is a branch or  
not is disputed, and must be decided for

each of the various species of accumulation  
separately: § 3.

*Review of the various natural means of  
subsistence: §§ 4—12.*

The natural art of production (κτητικὴ),  
which has for its object the accumulation  
of natural wealth within the limits of a  
branch of *Economics*: §§ 12—13.

For this section of the work consult  
Ludw. Schnitzer *Die aristotelische öko-  
nomischen Lehren* n. (The theories of Poli-  
tical Economy in the *Philosophy*, pt. 1  
Deutsch-Krone, 1868, pt. 11 Neudruck,  
1873: Glaser *Die Aristotelische öko-  
nomische Lehre* (Königsberg 1866, 4)  
with Bendixen's notes in *Philosophie*  
xvi. 495 ff.; Hamann *Sammlungen* (Re-  
marks on *Pol. I.*) I vol. 1861: *Beiträge  
Zu Aristoteles Politik* in *Vol. I.* 1864,  
409—516: *Sammlung* on *Pol. I.* n. 8—11  
in *Klein. Mus.* xk. 1864, 304—317: *Buchschachtel  
Zu Aristoteles Politik* n. 8—11 in *Zeitsch. für Politik* xcv. 1867,  
477—482, 713—6. *Stenzel* 1867.

There can be little doubt that Ari-  
stotle wrote with especial reference to  
Plato: *Sept.* II. 370 n—371 A, *Enn.* li.  
918 A—920 C (cp. VII. 322 n, 323 n,  
*Sept.* 319 A E, 321 A E, 322 n, 323 n, *Politica*  
1292 C—1293 A, etc.).

§ 3 κτήσις καὶ χρηματιστικὴ is applied  
(1) to the whole art of acquisition being  
thus completely identical with κτητικὴ.  
In this sense the term was introduced at  
§ 3 (cp. 4 § 1 n.) and this holds through-  
out c. 8, and in 9 § 4. In a narrower  
sense it is used (1) for the acquisition by  
exchange, accumulation of the kind of  
wealth which in Aristotle's view is un-  
natural, i.e. not for use, but to exchange  
again at a profit. In this sense χρη-  
ματιστικὴ 'money-making, profit-making',  
—καταλαβὴ 'trade'—see from c. 9 § 1  
onwards. Again in 9 § 13, 10 § 1 it is  
used (2) for that part of the art of ac-  
quisition which, as opposed to (1), is  
directed solely to natural wealth and is  
intimately connected with *Economics*.  
Plainly (3)—ἡ ἀσυνεπὴς χρηματιστικὴ

ρήσομεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦ- (III)  
 λος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν  
 ἂν τις πότερον ἢ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστίν  
 5 ἢ μέρος τι ἢ ὑπηρετικὴ, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικὴ, πότερον ὥς ἢ  
 κερκιδιοποιητικὴ τῇ ὑφαντικῇ ἢ ὥς ἢ χαλουργικὴ τῇ ἀν-  
 δριαντοποιίᾳ (οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ὄρ-  
 § 2 γανα παρέχει, ἢ δὲ τὴν ὕλην· λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκεί-  
 μενον, ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἷον ὑφάντη μὲν ἔρια  
 10 ἀνδριαντοποιῶ δὲ χαλκόν).

(p. 11)

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἢ χρηματιστικῇ,<sup>2</sup>  
 δῆλον (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασθαι τίς  
 γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ χρησομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκono-  
 14 μικήν;)· πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμ-

1256 a 5 [ἢ] ὑπηρετικόν, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικόν Bender, certainly not right. That M<sup>s</sup> omits ἢ is quite unimportant || 6 κερκιδιοποικῇ P<sup>2-4</sup>. Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P<sup>3</sup>, κερκιδιοποικῇ P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand) || 9 ἔριον Γ P<sup>1</sup> Susem<sup>1.2</sup>. || 10 χαλκός Γ P<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1.2</sup>, χαλκ' M<sup>s</sup> || 11 τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἢ χρηματιστικῇ Sylburg for οἰκονομικῇ (ἢ οἰκonoμική corr.<sup>2</sup> of P<sup>2</sup> and Bk.) τῇ χρηματιστικῇ || 13 παρὰ] περὶ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>

(2)=ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα of c. 9 § 18; and (1) the widest range of the term includes both, the getting of goods as well as the getting of gain. SUSEM. (69)

2 κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον] "in accordance with the procedure adopted," namely, that from part to whole. See I § 3 n. (4); 3 § 1 n. (29): III. I § 2 n. (434). SUSEM. (66)

ἐπείπερ...ἦν] "since the slave is, as we saw, included under the head of property," being defined as κτῆμα, a chattel.

5 καὶ εἰ ὑπὴρ. κτλ] The more precise way in which this third possibility is expressed leads us to anticipate a decision in its favour (Hampke). However when the decision comes to be made, 10 §§ 1—3, it only has a preference given it; it is not exclusively adopted, as Hampke thinks. That the question, in which of the two senses χρημ. is auxiliary to Economic, is never taken up is most surprising. We can only conjecture the answer from passing hints: see on 10 § 2. SUSEM. (67)

7 ἢ μὲν ὄργανα...ἢ δὲ τὴν ὕλην] The one provides tools to work with, the other raw material to work up (Oncken). SUSEM. (67 b)

This distinction comes from Plato *Politicus* 287 C, ὁπόσαι <τέχναι> παρείχοντο ὄργανα περὶ τὴν ὑφαντικὴν...ἐτίθεμεν ὡς συναιτίους: 288 D, E τὸ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις

σώματα παρέχον ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς δημιουργοῦσιν ὁπόσαι τῶν τεχνῶν νῦν εἴρηται (Jackson). So too the conception of ὑπηρετικαὶ τέχναι comes from the *Politicus* 281 E: ὅσαι μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μὴ δημιουργοῦσι, ταῖς δὲ δημιουργούσαις ὄργανα παρασκευάζουσιν...ταύτας μὲν ξυναιτίους <τέχναις>. The Eleate quotes τὰς μὲν περὶ τε ἀτράκτους καὶ κερκίδας as the first examples of ξυναιτίαι τέχ. (Eaton).

§ 2 8 ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον κτλ] Plato denotes this by τὸ πρωτογενὲς ἀνθρώποις κτῆμα *Politicus* 288 E: but ὕλη occurs in *Phil.* 54 C φημι δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα...πάντ' ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσι.

12 τίς γὰρ κτλ] See n. (63) on c. 7 § 4. SUSEM. (68) What art is to use the household goods if it be not Economic (παρὰ=except)?

14 Two alternatives are given in § 1, ἢ μέρος. τι ἢ ὑπηρετικὴ, and it is not easy to see what has become of the latter in the statement here πότερον μέρος αὐτῆς ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος and in § 3, 17 ἢ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι ἢ ἕτερον γένος. For reasons given in Excursus III. on Bk. I. p. 209 q. v., both alternatives of § 1 should be supposed included under μέρος, that term being so loosely used as to include even an auxiliary science. SUSEM. (69)

§ 3 φισβήτησιν, εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρήσαι πῶς χρὴ (121)  
 ματα καὶ κτήσις ἔσται. ἡ δὲ κτήσις πολλὰ περιέληψε μέρη καὶ ὁ  
 πλοῦτος, ὥστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς οἰ-  
 κονομικῆς ἢ ἑτερόν τι γένος, καὶ καθόλου ἡ περὶ τὴν τρο-  
 19 φὴν ἐπιμέλεια [καὶ κτήσις].

§ 4 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίαι πολλὰ καὶ  
 τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ζῆν ἀναι-  
 τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοῖς βίους πεποιήκασιν ὡς  
 § 5 φέροντας τῶν ζώων. τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγλαῖα τὰ δὲ σπυ-

15 εἰ γὰρ] εἴπερ Montecatino needlessly, since Vahlen (*Post.* p. 117 f. ed. 2) has shown that εἰ γὰρ can be used in the same sense. Even then Vahlen's *εἰς* after 16 ἔσται must be a full stop. But perhaps *διαφωβήθησαν. εἰ γὰρ . . . εἴηεν ἔσται*. \* \* with the punctuation of previous edd., is right. 16 ἔσται, ἡ δὲ κτήσις *Post.* p. 117 \* \* ὥστε Conring Susem.<sup>1</sup> 'The lacuna began with εἰ or εἴπερ.' Hasepole Scholium. Other proposals fruitless: see my large critical edition, *ed. loc.* and *Addenda*. 1 *οἰκονομικῆς* Garve, *χρηματιστικῆς* P' H Ar. Bk. 1 19 [καὶ κτήσις]? Susem.: καὶ κτήσις? Stahlr. 11 22 πεποιήκασιν after *διαφέροντας* M' P' 1 23 τε omitted by M' P'

§ 3 15 Vahlen (see critical notes) takes εἰ γὰρ to mean "if namely" as in *Alkidamas De off.* 11, 12 ἄρ' οὐκ εὐδαιμόνως ἄλλη τι πρὸς ποιῶσθαι μέλειτε λόγων; εἰ γὰρ οὐ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐξυγναμένον ἀπιστίας καὶ φόβου τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γνώμας ἐμπιπλάσι, and *Aris. Rhet.* III. 17. 11 εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς λόγων Πηλέα ἐπαυεῖ, εἴτα Διάκον, εἴτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν, ἡ (ms. ἡ) τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἡ τοιοῦτο ἐστίν. Elsewhere γὰρ appears redundant, or rather, no apodosis is introduced to the sentence introduced by it: *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 8, 6 οὐ γὰρ χρὴσθαι δὲ καὶ φεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον διακρίνωμεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦ λόγου ὁμοίως αἱ δὲ περιέχοντες φωναὶ ἡ ἀφελείας ἀλλήλαις· οὐ ἐπεὶ γὰρ *Rhet.* II. 25. 10, 6 γὰρ *Post.* VI (IV). 8, 6, 24 μὲν γὰρ VIII(9). 1. 8. "See however Spengel *Aris. Post. u. Vahle's neueste Bearb.* p. 13 ff." (Susemihl).

16 The elements of wealth enumerated in *Rhet.* I. 5 § 7 (and *Post.* II. 7 § 21) are γῆ, ἀνθρώπων κτήνη, ἐπὶ δὲ ἐπίπλων κτήνη καὶ βιοσκευάσματα καὶ ἀνδραποδίων: also νομισματὶς ἐλθέτω which, according to c. 9 below, is not true wealth.

17 πρῶτον] There is no word like *δευτερον* which expressly corresponds to this, cp. *Post.* 13 § 2. What, we may ask, answers to it in substance? Either (i) the expression is again inexact, and ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιμέλεια must be extended to the industries concerned with all the other necessities of life—shelter

clothing tools, all things in general which Aristotle calls 'instruments for life and wellbeing,' including *eleuta*—if *eleuta* be produced or acquired by means without resort to exchange. If so, Exchange is the *δευτερον*. This view is supported by the actual use of *τροφή* in a wider sense than food, for *nutritious generally*: "subsistence," § 8, 10 II 1, 2. (In these passages acquisition by exchange must be understood as well as that *trophē* of *γυμναστική* which, because directed to procuring the requisite subsistence, really belongs to economic science; but this does not affect the present question.)

Or, (ii) if all that is meant is direct production and appropriation of food, in the strict sense of the term, then we must look for "usually" in the remarks on the procurement of clothing and tools from the proceeds of the chase on *Post.* animals under domestication, § 11, and on the capture of slaves, § 12. In any case, whatever the grounds for supposing the text defective here on § 12 = 21, this is not one. Susem. 170

πότερον is dependent, like *πρῶτον* line 15, upon *ἐπὶ* and *γῆ* *Post.*

§ 4, 6 That the way in which animals support themselves themselves their mode of life is more fully stated *Nic. animal.* I. 1. 25. 287 b 21 ff., VIII. 1. 11. 284 a 4 ff.; and the point is given in detail in VIII. 2. 1—11. Under *ἀνδραποδίων* are included animals who feed on human

ραδικά ἐστιν, ὅποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφήν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ (III)  
 25 τὰ μὲν ζωοφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι,  
 ὥστε πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ φύσις τοὺς  
 βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ ταὐτὸ ἐκάστω ἡδὺ κατὰ φύ-  
 σιν ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἑτέροις, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζωοφάγων καὶ τῶν  
 § 6 καρποφάγων οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἀλλήλα διεστᾶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ  
 30 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρουσιν οἱ τούτων βίοι.<sup>4</sup>  
 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀργότατοι νομάδες εἰσὶν (ἢ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμέ-  
 ρων τροφή ζῶν ἀνευ πόνου γίνεται σχολάζουσιν· ἀναγκαίου  
 δὲ ὄντος μεταβάλλειν τοῖς κτήνεσι διὰ τὰς νομὰς καὶ  
 34 αὐτοὶ ἀναγκάζονται συνακολουθεῖν, ὥσπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν  
 § 7 γεωργοῦντες)· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἕτεροι ἑτέ-  
 ρας, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας, οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἀλιείας, ὅσοι λί-

25 τὰ δὲ παμφάγα omitted by the 1st hand in P<sup>1</sup> (supplied by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin), τὰ  
 δὲ by M<sup>s</sup> || 26 καὶ] κατὰ Bernays, perhaps rightly || 30 πολὺ] πολλοὶ P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>  
 Ald. and probably also Q, *multis* (?) William || 31 οὖν] γὰρ Γ apparently || 33  
 μεταβάλλειν after τοῖς κτήνεσι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 36 ἀλιείας Ald. ἀλειας M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1.2.3.4</sup>

roots, fruit and vegetables, so that the term is wider than *ποηφάγα* = herbivorous. In *Hist. animal.* *σαρκοφάγος* 'carnivorous' is chiefly used: *ζωοφάγος* hardly ever.

§ 5 26 ῥαστώνας facilities: "to enable them to get at their food and capture it." By *τούτων* understand *ζῷα* primarily, though *καρπὸς* would be included. Bernays reads *κατὰ* for *καὶ*: "to give them facilities for the capture of their food."

§§ 6—8 Smith *Wealth of nations* Introd. Chap., *Mill Pol. Econ.* I. pp. 11 ff. rightly place lowest in the scale the savages who depend upon casual hunting or fishing, although in such a life fits of prolonged and strenuous exertion alternate with periods of indolence. In Homer the cannibal Cyclopes are a pastoral people. As Aristotle thought that all domesticated animals had once been wild, *Hist. anim.* I. 1. 29 488 a 30 ff., he must have overlooked the labour of taming them; cp. *n.* above on 5 § 7.

31 The Scythians, or such North African tribes as Herodotos describes, IV. 186, would represent these *νομάδες*. They are wholly distinct from the non-migratory *νομεῖς* of Hellenic democracies, VII (VI). 4. 11.

32 "The cattle being forced to shift their quarters for pasturage the owners must also go about with them, as farmers to whom live-stock serves instead of land."

§ 7 36 ληστείας] It is highly characteristic of the Greek philosopher that while he is indignant against trade and particularly against lending money on interest, 9 § 9 ff., 10 §§ 4, 5, he includes piracy as one species of the chase amongst the direct natural modes of acquisition or production, and therefore as appropriate to a householder. He was led to this by the observation that not only do certain uncivilized tribes live by plunder, and combine with a nomad life a life of brigandage, but also amongst the most ancient Greeks, as Thuc. I. 5 precisely informs us, piracy was rather honourable than disgraceful *οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσχύνην τούτου τοῦ ἔργου φέροντος δέ τι καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον*, cp. Hom. *Od.* III. 73, IX. 252: and even later it was usual amongst the Locrians and other Hellenic peoples (Thuc. I. 5, II. 32, IV. 9. 2). Here he has forgotten his own principle, that the true nature of a thing must not be sought in its beginnings, but in its perfect development, 2 § 8. A strong national prejudice is apparent in all this, but it is well known that the earlier centuries of the Christian era had the same aversion to lending on interest (see *Introd.* 30), while many barbarities were allowed without scruple, as for instance the right to plunder wrecks, which Schlosser (I. 47 *n.*) adduces as a parallel. See *Introd.* 27 f. SUSEM. (71)

μνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμούς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτης τροφῆς [III]  
 κοῦσιν, οἱ δ' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων τὰ δὲ πλείστα  
 γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῇ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων κατ-  
 8 πῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι τοσοῦτοι σχεδὸν εἰσιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτόφυτον  
 φυτόν ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἀλλαγῆς καὶ κα-  
 11 τηλείας κομίζονται τὴν τροφήν, νομαδικὸς γεωργικὸς λη-  
 στρικὸς ἀλιευτικὸς θηρευτικὸς. οἱ δὲ καὶ μαγνύντες ἐκ τού-  
 των ἡδέως ζῶσι, προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον, ὃ  
 τυγχάνει ἐλλείπων πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι, οἷον αἱ μὲν  
 14 νομαδικὸν ἄμα καὶ ληστρικόν, οἱ δὲ γεωργικόν καὶ θηρευ-  
 19 τικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους· ὥς ἂν ἡ χρεία  
 συναναγκάζῃ, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διώγουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτης  
 κτήσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως δεδομένη πᾶσι,  
 2 ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθὺς, οὕτως καὶ τελειω-  
 10 θεῦσιν, καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκ-  
 τίκεται τῶν ζώων τοσαύτην τροφήν ὥς ἱκανὴν εἶναι μέχρι  
 οὗ ἂν δύνηται αὐτὸ αὐτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἷον ὅσα  
 σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ῥοτοκεῖ· ὅσα δὲ ζροτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννημένοις

41 [ἐργασίαν... b 1 τὴν] Schmidt

1256 b 1 πορίζονται II<sup>2</sup> Bk. perhaps rightly || γεωργικὸς is wanting in Γ M<sup>2</sup>, and perhaps Spengel is right in transposing it to follow θηρευτικὸς || 2 the ἐνδεέστατον βίον Bernays, τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον Γ Π Bk.; τὸ ἐνδεὲς τῶ βίον II M<sup>2</sup>, τὸ ἐνδεὲς τῶν βίων Reiske (better) || [ἡ... 4 εἶναι] Schmidt || S ἀναγκάζει II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 13 συναναγκάζει II<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>

37 τοιαύτην] 'such as before described' i.e. 'suitable for fishing'. The same use of the pronoun in I. 1. 2, and in II. 4. 4 δεῖ δὲ τοιοῦτοις (i.e. 'less friendly') εἶναι. See Cope on *Rhet.* I. 5. 6.

36—38 With this classification of the different modes of the chase cp. Plato *Latos* VII. 823 B: πολλὴ μὲν ἡ τῶν ἐν β-  
 ἔμῳ (sc. θήρῃ), πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν πτη-  
 νῶν, πᾶμπολυ δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ περὶ  
 θηρώματα, οὐ μόνον θηρίων... καὶ αἰω-  
 νείας καὶ ληστῶν... θήραι. See also n. on  
 I § 5.

39 ἡμέρων] cultivated.

§ 8 40 ὅσοι γε αὐτόφυτον] "derive their employment from natural growth." Nature is used now for what is primitive || (the later development).

41 καταλείπει=retail trade] ἐκπώλησις=wholesale trade, commerce. The former is used as a contemptuous term, "huckstering", Plato *Latos* VIII. 849 D, XI. 915 D, *Soph.* 223 D.

1256 b 1 τὴν τροφήν = substance,

support: see n. [70] on § 2. *Soph.* 223

2 οἱ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν] "(Of those which out of these some which they consider to order to put an agreeable conclusion, supplying by an addition the deficiency in the conclusion of a more complete mode of life" *Soph.*)

§ 9 7 συνεναγκάζει=constraint: see intensive use in *Soph.* 223.

§ 10 12 ὅσα σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ῥοτοκεῖ] Aristotle continuously believed that insects lay no eggs, but produce worms or maggots which are then transformed through several metamorphoses into the perfect insect: see *Aristotle and Western Intellect*, to the 17th generation animal, p. 14. Meyer *Philosophy of the Mind*, p. 201. What he says of the difference between worms and egg worms is particularly ex-  
 plain this passage. Thus (in some cases)  
 II. 1 § 5—12, 223 a 22 b, 223 c 22 d of animals, the development being from young like themselves fully developed, which have offspring not yet developed or of perfect form, and of these the vegetables

- 14 ἔχει τροφήν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γά- (III)  
 § 11 λακτος φύσιν. ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ [γενομένοις] οὐ- 7  
 τέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζώων ἔνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν  
 καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ  
 19 τὰ γε πλείστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἔνεκεν, ἵνα  
 § 12 καὶ ἐσθῆς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ  
 φύσις μηδὲν μήτε ἀτελές ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.  
 23 διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πῶς ἔσται (ἡ γὰρ θη- 8

15 [γενομένοις] Göttling, τελειωθείσιν Ar. Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> γενομένοις Γ Μ<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.,  
 γεννωμένοις P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), ἄλλως γενομένοις P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin), γινομένοις  
 (=the facts) Zell (in his ed. of the *Ethics* II. p. 405 f.), [καὶ γενομένοις] Bernays,  
 [δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις] Bender || 18 Before πάντα in Π<sup>1</sup> is another τὰ ἄλλα (τὰλλα  
 P<sup>1</sup>), a repetition of the preceding: παν (*sic*) P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), τὰ πάντα P<sup>4</sup> (Corrector)  
 || 20 γένηται M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || γοῦν Conring Susem.<sup>2</sup>, which suits the sense but is against  
 Aristotle's usage, γὰρ? Susem., οὖν Γ Π Ar. Bk. Bernays || 23 [διὸ...24 αὐτῆς] and  
 23 κτητικὴ φύσει πολεμικὴ also 24 [ἡ δὲ...26 πόλεμον καὶ πρῶτον] Schmidt, who  
 proposes the latter to follow 1255 b 39 θηρευτικῇ. See *Qu. Cr.* III. 5 ff.

(τὰ ἐναιμα) lay eggs, while the invertebrates (τὰ ἀναιμα) breed worms. The difference between egg and worm is this: if the young animal is developed from a part and the rest serves as nourishment for it, it is an egg: but if the whole of the young animal proceeds from the whole of what is produced, it is a worm. Also *Hist. anim.* I. 5. 3 489 b 6 ff.: a perfect germ (κύημα) is called an egg when one part of it serves for the formation and another for the nourishment of the young animal developed out of it, a worm when the whole animal is developed out of the whole of the germ by its organization and growth: cp. *ib.* V. 19. 2 550 b 28 ff. ἐκ δὲ τῶν σκωλήκων οὐκ ἐκ μέρους τινὸς γίνεται τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν ψῶν, ἀλλ' ὅλον αὐξάνεται καὶ διαρθρούμενον γίνεται τὸ ζῶον, and *De gener. anim.* III. 2. 4 752 a 27 f. οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ σκώληκες αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν (sc. τὰ ψά) λαμβάνει τὴν αὐξήσιν. It follows from these explanations that what Aristotle asserts in the present passage of worms is in reality only true of eggs. All that the former receive from the parent worm is that capacity for perfect self-development which is wanting in the egg. Cp. also 10 § 3 n. (96). SUSEM. (73)

14 τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν = the natural substance called milk. So τοῦ ἀέρος, τοῦ θερμοῦ φύσιν = air, heat respec-

tively: see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 838 a 8 ff. with the examples 837 b 42 ff.

§ 11 15 γενομένοις] "after they are born." The crude teleology of §§ 11, 12 is common to all the Socratics and was probably derived from Socrates himself: *Xen. Mem.* I. 4. 5 ff.

§ 12 23 διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ κτλ] This does not directly follow from the foregoing. Some intermediate thought has to be supplied: < it must further be assumed that amongst men themselves the less perfect are formed for the service of the more perfect >. Cp. also n. (70) on § 3. SUSEM. (74)

"There are at least four ways of taking this passage. (1) Vettori Giphanius Schneider Bojesen make αὐτῆς and ἡ both refer to πολεμικῇ. (2) Lambin, Schnitzer, Stahr refer αὐτῆς to πολεμικῇ, ἡ to θηρευτικῇ. This is plainly absurd: for if θηρευτικῇ can be used against men as well as wild animals it is no longer μέρος πολεμικῆς, but at least as extensive as πολεμικῇ. (3) Garve, followed by Hampke p. 16, refers αὐτῆς to κτητικῇ, and ἡ to θηρευτικῇ. There are three objections to this: (a) It proves too much; for if we deduce the right to make war from the right to hunt, why should not captives be eaten?—a notion which Aristotle (?) IV (VII). 2. 15 expressly repudiates with abhorrence. (β) Wars of


- ρυτική μέρος αὐτῆς), ἣ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ θῆρια καὶ (112)  
 25 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἄρχισθαι μὴ θάλασσαν, ὥς  
 φύσει δίκαιον ὄντα τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον.  
 13 ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς  
 μέρος ἐστίν· ὃ δεῖ ἥτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχει

26 ὄντα after τοῦτον P<sup>2</sup> Bk. On τοῦτον P<sup>2</sup> gives the gloss τὸν θηρευτικόν, this θηρευ-  
 τικόν has crept into the text in Γ' M<sup>1</sup> after τοῦτον τὸν ὁ πρῶτος is added after πέρ-  
 μων by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.), καὶ πρῶτον by Γ': but, as Schmidt observes, this πρῶτος  
 has arisen from ἀ=ἐν || 27 κτητικῆς after κατὰ φύσιν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || τῆς οἰκονομικῆς] καὶ  
 οἰκονομοῦ Thurot, [μέρος] Schneider Hampke Thurot; but see Comm. || 28 [ὥς  
 ...ὑπάρχει] Schmidt || 29 ὃ Thurot (*Revue critique*, 1869, p. 84 f.), M d. Reimarus, ||  
 Lamber Reiske, δ<ε> <ε> Zwingler, <αυτῶ> d. Bernays; in *Revue critique*, 1878, p. 27 f.  
 Thurot considers the sense given by the last three suggestions necessary: δ εἶδον,  
 who transposing ἀ...ὑπάρχειν to follow οἰκίας and reading αὐτὸν for τὸν ὃν has the  
 following order ἐστίν· ὃ ἐστὶ θησαυρισμός...ἡ οἰκία δ' δεῖ ἥτοι ὅπως ὑπάρχει

defense or to regain liberty can hardly be  
 called hunting: the notion of hostility is  
 the wider. (7) The clause ὥς φύσει δί-  
 καιον assigns a separate justification for  
 the kind of war in question, which is not  
 therefore deduced from the chase. It  
 depends upon the view of slavery laid  
 down in cc. 5, 6. (4) Sepulveda renders:  
*que fit ut ipse bello istum parandi ratio  
 a natura quadammodo proficiatur*, mak-  
 ing πολέμωσιν an epithet of κτητικῆς and  
 μέρος αὐτῆς=μέρος πολέμωσιν κτητικῆς;  
 he also refers ἡ to θηρευτικῆς. But  
 though this gives excellent sense it in-  
 volves transposing φύσει after κτητικῆς;  
 and there is hardly good evidence of two  
 adjectives in -ωσιν so combined, the one  
 as attribute the other as substantive."  
 SUMM. *Quaest. Crit.* III. p. 6 f. Then  
 translate: "hence the natural art of war  
 will belong in a sense to the art of acqui-  
 sition (for the chase is only one branch of  
 it) viz. of natural warfare, and θηρευ-  
 τικῆς, § 7, is ἀνθρώπων ἐργασία. "It"  
 i.e. war "has to be employed not only  
 against wild animals but also against all  
 such men as, though naturally slaves,  
 refuse subordination, this species of war  
 having a natural justification."

The view given above as (1)—αὐτῆς=  
 κτητικῆς, ἡ=θηρευτικῆς—is supported by  
 Jackson, who would extend the parenthe-  
 sis to πολέμωσιν. He translates: "natural  
 warfare will in a sense be a branch of  
 acquisition; for (1) the chase is a mode  
 of acquisition, and (2) the chase can be  
 applied either against wild animals (in which case  
 it is θηρευτικῆς proper) or against natural  
 slaves, who refuse to obey, that being a

branch of war which has a natural justifi-  
 cation." He adds: "The *ἄρχισθαι* then is



From 7 § 5 it would appear that τε-  
 λεμαὶ is still further divided. So Plato  
*Sept.* 210 C, includes ἄρχισθαι, ἀντιπα-  
 ριστικῆς, and ὑποτασσικῆς under the general  
 head of πολέμωσιν, which is one of the  
 two branches of ἐκπαιδείων."

25 ὥς φύσει δίκαιον] Consult the coll.  
 given n. (64) on 7 § 4. SUMM. (78)

§ 13 27 ἐν μὲν οὖν καὶ] See LAM-  
 BER. on II. I. p. 210. SUMM. (78-9)

28 With the changes proposed by  
 Madvig and Kamm two natural notes  
 translate: "one species of acquisition then  
 is a branch of economic science, that  
 branch namely whose task it is to collect  
 a store of objects necessary for life and  
 useful for civil or domestic society, objects  
 which ought therefore to be at hand for  
 the householder or to be provided to his  
 hand by his science (Economics)." OLLIER  
 (Lambert, Zwingler, Bernays, Vassier) either  
 change δ, or else extract from it the sense  
 of 'since', 'in so far as', taking ὡς ὅτι  
 φε. χρηματίας=the means to a store of  
 commodities (or possessions, ἐκπαιδείων): a  
 rendering not very clear, see § 14. SUMM.  
 Jackson, for the most part agreeing  
 with Bernays, interprets ὡς ὅτι φε. χρη-  
 ματίας 'things capable of being stored'  
 (here perhaps anticipated by Cassius  
 rather δὲ χρηματία ὡς ὅτι φε.) he

ὧν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ (II)  
 § 14 χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ γ' ἀλη- 9  
 31 θινὸς πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως  
 αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζῶν οὐκ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σό-  
 λων φησὶ ποιήσας

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κείται.

§ 15 κείται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἄπει-  
 36 ρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὃ δὲ πλοῦτος  
 ὄργάνων πλήθός ἐστιν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκο-  
 νόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, δῆλον·  
 9 ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ 10

29 ὧν ἐστὶ] ᾧ ἔνεστι Madvig (this I think needed whether we emend with  
 Lambin, Zwinger, Bernays or transpose with Rassow): μέρος ἐστίν· ᾧ ἔνεστι θησαυ-  
 ρισμός.....οἰκίας, αἰ δελ...ὑπάρχη Susem.<sup>2</sup> provisionally || ὧν] ὧν Schmidt || κτημά-  
 των Bernays (perhaps rightly) for χρημάτων || 32 ἀγαθῶν P<sup>2,3</sup>. Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. and P<sup>1</sup>  
 (1st hand), ἀγαθὴν P<sup>1</sup> (corrector<sup>1</sup>) || 35 κείται omitted by M<sup>s</sup>, κείται γὰρ om. by P<sup>1</sup>  
 (1st hand—supplied by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || 37 οἰκονομικῶι καὶ πολιτικῶι Γ, οἰκο-  
 νομικῶν [καὶ πολιτικῶν] Schütz, but see Comm. || 38 [ἔτι...39 δῆλον] Schmidt ||  
 39 καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς Schütz also proposes to bracket, but see Comm.

translates “in so far as Economic must either find ready to hand, or itself provide that there may be found ready to hand, necessities of life and utilities which are capable of being stored for the common use of state or family.”

30 True wealth is for use: ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κέκτησθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρήσις πλούτος *Rhet.* I. 5. 7.

§ 14 32 αὐτάρκεια = the amount of such property absolutely necessary to secure independence of all external aid.

οὐκ ἄπειρος] See 9 §§ 13, 14. The notion of a limit to true wealth recurs in Epicurus *apud* Diog. Laert. X. 144: ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὠρισταὶ καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστι, ὃ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐμπίπτει. The earlier political economists believed in a possible “glut of capital”: Mill *P. E.* I. 5 § 3.

Σόλων] *Frag.* 13, 71 Bergk. SUSEM. (76)

§ 15 35 οὐδὲν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. IV (VII). I § 5 n. (695), I § 7 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας, ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐς τι, ὧν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ βλάβειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν τοῖς ἔχουσιν. SUSEM. (76 b)

37 ὄργάνων πλῆθος κτλ] in other

words, means and appliances for life, and for the life of wellbeing and perfection as the end of the household and of the state. But cp. Exc. III. SUSEM. (77)

The definition of wealth as “instruments” (given also 4 § 2) is commended by J. S. Mill *Political Economy* I. 10 as adding distinctness and reality to the common view. His definitions are “any product both useful and susceptible of accumulation”—with which comp. 1256b 29—and “all useful or agreeable things which possess exchange value.” Mill too restricts the term to material wealth.

38 τοῖς οἰκονόμοις κτλ] See again Exc. III. p. 211 n. (2). SUSEM. 77 (b)

c. 9. *The other species of κτητικῆς, viz. χρηματιστικῆς, the art of money-making, § 1. Origin of exchange in the infancy of society, §§ 2—6. Origin and use of money: §§ 7—11. Distinction between natural κτητικῆς and this χρηματιστικῆς: §§ 12—15. Cause of the confusion between them: §§ 16—18.*

§ 1 40 ἥν μάλιστα κτλ] “which is especially called money-making” χρηματιστικῆς (2) of 8 § 1 n. “and fairly so called; to which is due the opinion that wealth and property have no limit.” But 9 § 4 the first sense seems to recur.

41 δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικὴν, δι' ἣν αἰεὶ διασῶ (III)  
 7 πέραν εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως. ἦν ὡς μίαν καὶ τὴν  
 αἰτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γαστήρα  
 ἔστι δ' οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνη. ἔστι δ'  
 4 ἡ μὲν φύσει ἢ δ' οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐμπορίας  
 2 τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν δι' παρα αὐτῶν  
 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσις  
 ἔστιν, ἀμφοτέραι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν ἀλλ' οἷχ ὁμοίαι καθ'  
 αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἢ δ' οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πρῆματός.  
 9 οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ. ἀρ-  
 3 φότεραι γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττω-  
 μενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς  
 χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἢ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν  
 χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν γέγονεν. τὸν αὐτὸν δι'  
 4 τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ  
 12 μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ  
 κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δ' ἐλάττω τῶς ἰσότητος

41 οὕτω Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin

1257 a. 1 [φρ... μᾶλλον] Schmidt || 3 ἐκείνη] τοῦτον Γ (Hermann Willems)  
 Sussem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 6 χρήματος Γ M<sup>a</sup> and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 7 καθ' αὐτό] αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ  
 Koraes || 9 ὑπόδεσις M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 12 [ἢ ὑπόδημα] Koraes, Scaliger proposed to trans-  
 pose these words to follow χρῆσιν, which also occurred to Koraes, but see Com-  
 m. (78)

§ 2 1257 a 6 ἐκάστου γὰρ κτλ]  
 "Compare *Eud. Eth.* III. 4, 1231 b 38,  
 where we find the same classification of  
 χρήσις, though the use in exchange is

excluded as useless use of ἡ καθ' αὐτό  
 χρήσις, but of ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The two  
 classifications are as follows:—

#### Politics

καθ' αὐτὸ οἰκεία  
 καθ' αὐτὸ οὐκ οἰκεία  
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός

ὑπόδεσις  
 μεταβλητικὴ  
 ὡς ἂν εἴ τι  
 σταθμῶ χρήσιμα  
 + τῷ ὑπόδηματι

#### Eud. Eth.

καθ' αὐτό  
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός  
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός

(Jackson).

9 ὑπόδεσις = wearing, ἡ μεταβλητικὴ =  
 the use in exchange. The shoe when  
 used as an article of exchange preserves  
 its proper nature, it is still to be worn by  
 somebody; although as it is not made to  
 exchange this use is *ἐκ οἰκείας*.

§ 3 10 καὶ γὰρ... 12 ὑπόδημα] This  
 is true. The question is always how  
 much money or food the shoe as such,  
 and not the leather used in making it, is  
 worth: the labour has to be paid for as

well as the materials (Guthrie). Cf. also  
 on § 3 (83) and *Isidore*, etc. See also (78)

12 ἢ ὑπόδημα] as a shoe.

§ 4 14 ἔστι γὰρ πάντων] as it ex-  
 ist. "All things have a use in exchange."  
 We now speak of the two values of a  
 thing, value in use and value in exchange.

15 ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον] i.e. its  
 ὁρμή, derived in the first instance from  
 a natural origin (whatever it may after-  
 wards become).

ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἢ καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς 12  
 χρηματιστικῆς ἢ καπηλικῆ· ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγ-  
 § 5 καὶ οὖν ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ  
 20 κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔργον  
 αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἤδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὔσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ  
 τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνουν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν  
 πάλιν καὶ ἐτέρων \* \* \* ὧν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον <ἦν>  
 24 ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔτι πολλὰ ποιεῖ [καὶ] τῶν (p. 14  
 § 6 βαρβαρικῶν ἐθνῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ  
 χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλεον δ' οὐδέν,  
 οἶον οἶνον πρὸς σῖτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλη- 13

17 [ἢ καὶ...19 ἀλλαγὴν] Schmidt || φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς] τις φύσει χρημα-  
 τιστικῇ Schmidt || 18 χρηματιστικῆς] μεταβλητικῆς Bernays || 20 [τοῦτο...οἰκία]  
 Schmidt || ἐστίν] ἦν Schmidt || 22 τῶν omitted in II<sup>1</sup> and Ar., it is supplied  
 by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 23 καὶ was left out by Camot, [καὶ] Koraes || ἐτέρων  
 <ἐδέοντο> Schneider, ἐτέρων <ἠπόρουν> Schmidt, ἐστέροντο Koraes, <ἕτεροι> ἐτέρων  
 Bernays (on which see Comm.): Fülleborn saw that something was lost: ἐτέρων  
 <ἕτεροι ἠπόρουν>? Susem. Welldon changes ἐτέρων into ἐδέοντο || Koraes added  
 ἦν || 24 καὶ is wanting in Γ, [καὶ] Susem., καὶ <νῦν> Schmidt and Bernays (per-  
 haps rightly): Busse transposes καὶ to precede πολλὰ—not badly || 25 ff. Michael  
 of Ephesus in his comm. on Arist. Ethic. f. 70<sup>a</sup> refers to this passage

17 ἢ καὶ δῆλον...καπηλικῇ] Barter  
 is sufficient for natural wants, as he goes  
 on to show. Money is an artificial means  
 of facilitating this, not of natural origin  
 but only due to custom and convention,  
 see §§ 8—11 *in*. (82, 83): though when  
 applied within due limits it is not con-  
 trary to nature. The whole explanation  
 would have been clearer, Fülleborn rightly  
 observes, had Aristotle definitely stated  
 what he means by 'trade' (καπηλική =  
 huckstering, retail trade): viz. that it is a  
 buying and exchanging "not for one's  
 own wants, but in order to sell again".  
 As it is, this is left to be inferred from  
 the context. SUSEM. (79)

18 ὅσον γὰρ κτλ] "For the necessity  
 of exchange is confined, as we saw, to  
 the satisfaction of the exchangers' own  
 wants." Cp. τοσαύτης = only so much 13  
 § 12.

§ 5 21 ἀλλ' ἤδη] but not until the  
 society extended. Since trade is intro-  
 duced at a later stage it is not 'natural'.  
 Possibly directed against Plato's primi-  
 tive state, the ἀθηναίη, ὑγιής, ὧν πόλις,  
*Rep.* II. 371 A—D: ἀγορὰ δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ  
 νόμισμα ξυμβολὸν τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα γενή-

σεται.

22 οἱ δὲ κεχωρ. κτλ] Bernays thought  
 the addition of a word for "lacked" un-  
 necessary, 'because this idea is implied in  
 κεχωρισμένοι'. If so, as κεχωρ. <ἕτεροι>  
 ἐτέρων = separated (or divided) one from  
 this thing, another from that, so κεχωρ.  
 πολλῶν should mean 'separated from  
 many things'. But as Bernays gives  
 'division of possessions' i.e. separate  
 property 'was introduced for many things'  
 he must intend κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν to  
 stand for 'living in divided possession of',  
 or *in respect of*, 'many things': a sense  
 hardly possible in any case and quite in-  
 conceivable if the participle has a different  
 construction with ἐτέρων. SUSEM.  
 Postgate would govern πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων  
 by ἐκοινώνουν, supposing πολλῶν to be op-  
 posed to πάντων (as πλείων is, II. 5. 27),  
 and understanding ἐτέρων of the primary  
 division of the joint-household into two:  
 "again when the original household split  
 into two, each half continued to hold in  
 common a large part of the stock, viz. all  
 that the other half left it".

23 κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις] Comp. 2 § 5 *in*.  
 (18). SUSEM. (80)

29 τικὴ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οἷτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν αἰεὶ αἰεὶ (111)  
 § 7 (εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἢ) ἐ-  
 μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετ' ἐκείνη κατὰ λόγον. ξενικωτέραι γὰρ  
 γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὧν ἐδεῖν καὶ ἐ-  
 πέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπο-  
 § 8 ρίσθη χρήσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν  
 35 ἀναγκαίων· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνίσταται  
 πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων  
 αὐτὸ ὃν εἶχε τὴν χρεῖαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, εἴτε

32 γενομένης Κοραεῖ, γενομένης II Bk. [ἐδεῖν] ἐδεῖν Κοραεῖ : 31 Κοραεῖ  
 conjectured <οὐκ> ὄν, but see Int. p. 28 ff. and Comm. n. (87) [ζῆν] <ποτα-  
 κομῇ> ζῆν Reiske, certainly right as to the sense, <βαστά> ζῆν Κοραεῖ (from good).

§ 7 31 κατὰ λόγον, as one might have  
 inferred. Lindau 'by agreement'. But  
 can the words bear this meaning? The  
 proof which follows seems to show that  
 this phrase expresses subjectively the same  
 thing as 33 ἐξ ἀνάγκης in objective fashion.  
 SUSEM. (81) Similarly IV (VII). 16. 10.  
 Bonitz commenting on 989 a 30: "quod  
 rationibus ad rem pertinentibus accom-  
 modatum est et consentaneum."

ξενικωτέρας γὰρ...] "when the supply  
 extended to foreign countries."

§ 8 34 οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον κτλ]  
 Yet money is not by nature, but has its  
 origin in mere convention! Here again  
 Aristotle falls into the contradiction  
 noticed in n. (71), seeking the true nature  
 of man in violation of his own principle.  
 ἄφωρ instead of ἐν the normal develop-  
 ment of civilization. Hence he ignores  
 the fact which on other occasions (Int.  
 4 §§ 1—6) by no means escapes him,  
 that there is no unconditional antithesis  
 between nature and art, nature and con-  
 vention, nature and civilization: that  
 innumerable arts institutions and conven-  
 tions take their origin from man's inmost  
 nature in the course of its development.  
 It is precisely so with the state, and as  
 with the state so with money. That in  
 history too the law of a rational necessity  
 controls chance is a thought not suffi-  
 ciently acknowledged in his works: see  
*Pol.* 9 §§ 2, 10, with my notes, and  
 Reinken's op. c. 289 ff., who somewhat ex-  
 aggerates. Cp. also below on II. 9 § 12 n.  
 (106), I 30 n. (339), III. 3. 9 n. (466).  
 SUSEM. (82)

35 διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς κτλ] On  
 the origin of money compare *Nb. Eth.*  
 V. 5 §§ 10—16 (1133 a 19 ff.): of which  
 the substance is as follows.

All things which are to be exchanged  
 must be somehow commensurable; and  
 for this purpose money has been intro-  
 duced, which serves as a sort of medium,  
 for it measures all things, e.g. how many  
 pairs of shoes are equivalent to a given  
 sum. The touched or common meas-  
 ure is in reality demanded; but demand  
 is conventionally represented by money  
 which gets its name (νόμισμα = convention)  
 because it is not by nature but by conven-  
 tion (νόμος), so that it is in our power to  
 change and demonstrate it (i.e. render it  
 no longer current). If we do not require  
 a thing now, money is still the guarantee  
 of a future exchange, to take place if we  
 require the thing at some other time.  
 And although the value of money itself  
 occasionally changes, yet it tends to be  
 more constant than that of any other  
 thing. All other commodities should  
 therefore have a price set on them, that  
 so exchange may always be possible.  
 SUSEM. (83)

36 ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αἰεὶ ὅν] Aristotle  
 thinks this is not implied by the nature of  
 money, since certain tribes use stones as  
 a medium of exchange, and the Ethio-  
 pians atoms with marks engraved upon  
 them (*Nb. Eth. Pol.* 989 a 30 ff.).  
*Κρη.* 420 n). We admit the truth of  
 this; yet only a metallic currency can  
 fulfil the proper end of money, and from  
 the nature of the case the really civilized  
 races have always availed themselves of it.  
 Aristotle however has failed to recognize  
 this sufficiently: see I 11 n. (107) and Je-  
 roni. 19. SUSEM. (84)

37 χρεῖαν νομίσμα χρησίμων: a com-  
 modity useful in itself which adapted to  
 use handsily to the purposes of daily life.

σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶ- (III)  
 τον ἀπλῶς ὀρισθὲν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον  
 40 καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλόντων, ἔν' ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως  
 § 9 αὐτούς· ὁ γὰρ χαρακτῆρ ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημείον. πορι- 15  
 1257 b σθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς  
 θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ  
 μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δι' ἐμπειρίας  
 4 ἤδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον  
 § 10 ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ  
 νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι πόθεν  
 ἔσται πλήθος [χρημάτων]· ποιητικὴ γὰρ [εἶναι] τοῦ πλούτου  
 καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλούτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νο- 16  
 9 μίσματος πλήθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν  
 § 11 καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ  
 νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὐδέν, ὅτι μετα-

38 καὶ εἰ M<sup>s</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 40 ἐπιβαλλόντων M<sup>s</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

1257 b 3 οὖν omitted by P<sup>2-3</sup>. Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || γενόμενον  
 ? Susem. || 7 [χρημάτων] Giphanius || ποιητικὴν [γὰρ] Schmidt, who transposes  
 ποιητικὴν...8 χρημάτων to follow 10 καπηλικήν || γὰρ] δ' Bernays, inserting γὰρ after  
 the next following καὶ, thus: χρημάτων· ποιητικὴ δ' εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου· καὶ <γὰρ>  
 χρημάτων· καὶ γὰρ κτλ. If so, 9 τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ must also be omitted || εἶναι  
 omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || τοῦ omitted by M<sup>s</sup>, bracketed by Koraes; ὄντως? Susem. || 8 Giphanius  
 proposed to omit γὰρ; Schmidt transposes it to follow 9 διὰ || πολλάκις after τιθέασι  
 M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 9 διὰ τὸ] διὸ? Susem. || 10 Thurot proposes to omit καὶ before τὴν, καὶ  
 <εἶναι>? Susem.; Schütz rejects καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν (or τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ) ||  
 11 νόμῳ Lambin, perhaps rightly: yet see Comm. n. (86)

38 σίδηρος] "Byzantium is an instance of the use of iron money: cp. Plato Comicus *Peis.* 3 χαλεπῶς ἂν οἰκήσαιμεν ἐν Βυζαντίοις | ὅπου σιδάρεοις τοῖς νομίμασιν | χρῶνται. These coins were commonly called οἱ σιδάρεοι, cp. Aristoph. *Clouds* 249. εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον] Aristotle has in mind some such coinage as the Electrum money used at Cyzicus" (Ridgeway). Electrum was the material of the earliest known coins of Lydia, before the time of Croesus, and of the Ionian cities: see Gardner *Types of Gk. Coins* p. 4 ff., Head *Coinage of Lydia* p. 11.

τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κτλ] This is the old-fashioned bar-money, like the iron money at Sparta, Pseudo-Plato *l. c.* ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ σιδηρῷ σταθμῷ νομίζουσι. Cp. Xen. *De Rep. Laced.* 7. 5; Plutarch *Lys.* 17 (ὀβελισκοί, spits), *Lyc.* 9; Polybios VI. 49; and H. Stein *On the Spartan iron money in Jahrb. f. Philol.* LXXXIX. 1864.

332 ff. SUSEM. (85)

§ 9 1257 b 1 Take ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκ. ἀλλαγῆς with πορισθέντος rather than with ἐγένετο, "as soon as a currency was provided in consequence of the necessary exchange, there arose the other branch of the art of wealth, I mean retail-trade: at first no doubt in a rude form, but afterwards improved by experience as to the quarters from which, and the way in which, exchange of commodities" not μεταβαλλόμενον <τὸ νόμισμα>, "will produce the largest profit".

§ 10 8 καὶ γὰρ...10 καπηλικήν] This is the error best known as the Mercantile System: the confusion of money with wealth exposed by Adam Smith *Wealth of Nations* B. IV. Cp. Mill *Pol. Econ.* pp. 1—4. Even in *Rhet.* I. 5. 7 νομίσματος πλήθος is only one of many 'elements' of wealth.

§ 11 11 νόμος παντάπασι] An allu-

θεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐδενὸς ἄξιον οἶδ' ἰσχυρὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν  
οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί, καὶ νομίσματα πλεονέκως πολλὰ  
κίς ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον  
15 εἶναι πλούτου οὐ εὐπορῶν λιμῶ ἀπολαΐται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μιδαν  
Μιδαν ἐκείνον μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εἰχλῆς  
12 πάντων αὐτῷ γινομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. ἐπεὶ  
ζητοῦσιν ἕτερόν τι τὸν πλούτου καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν ἐκδοῦν  
ζητοῦντες. ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἢ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλούτος ὁ  
20 κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὕτη μὲν οἰκονομική, ἡ δὲ καπηλική,  
ποιητικὴ χρημάτων οὐ πάντως, ἀλλ' ἡ διὰ χρημάτων με-  
ταβολῆς. καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ  
13 νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστίν. καὶ ἀπει-  
ρος δὲ οὗτος ὁ πλούτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς.

12 οὐδὲ Bk., οὔτε Π. || 20 αὕτη ἢ? Schmidt || [καὶ αὕτη... 24 χρηματιστική] Schmidt, who transposes καὶ αὕτη... 30 κτήσις to follow 1257 a 5 μᾶλλον || ὁ πλούτος μὲν corr.<sup>2</sup> of P<sup>2</sup> || 21 ἢ P<sup>4-6</sup>. Q (?) L<sup>1</sup> Ald., ἢ S<sup>b</sup>, § Ransow || Bernays omits χρυσμάτων after διὰ || 24 δὲ Giphanius || οὗτος omitted by IP

sion to the derivation of νόμισμα = money, currency, from νόμος = convention, *current* custom: see *n.* (83). It may be for the same reason that money is more pointedly said to be νόμος rather than νόμος, 'conventional', as we should expect. The same allusion in Pseudo-Plato *Εὐρυκλῆος* *L. c.* 5, *n.* (85) (Schneider). SUSEM. (86)

ὅτι μετατιθεμένων κτλ.] Although Aristotle himself, § 12, adopts the opinion that this form of wealth is οὐδὲν φέρεται, yet here the view is carried much farther than he goes in § 8, see *n.* (84). He must hold that money, when no longer current, loses its value as money, retaining only its value in exchange as this or that metal: its only use now is as metal, not as coin. SUSEM. (87)

With this comp. *N. E.* v. 5 § 11, ἐφ' ἧμιν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀχρηματον, § 14 πᾶν οὐκ ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο (σ. π. νόμισμα) τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ δὲ ἴσον δύνανται δοῦναι δὲ μεταβαλεῖν μένει μᾶλλον.

14 καίτοι κτλ.] "And yet it is strange that there should be wealth of a kind that with abundance of it a man will nevertheless perish of hunger, as the legend runs about Midas of yore, when in fulfillment of his insatiable prayer everything that was served up to him turned into gold."

16 Μίδαν.] This mythical king of Phrygia is said to have captured Silenus and restored him to Dionysos, who in

return for the kind treatment of the prisoner allowed him to wish for whatever he liked. The fatal boon was subsequently withdrawn by the god at Midas' request, see Ovid *Metamorph.* xi. 90—145. Aristotle must have had a version of the story to which, instead of this happening, Midas died from hunger and thirst. Would the Midas of the legend have fared any better in the end, if all his food had been converted into drink, or all his drink into food? In the one case he would have been starved to death, in the other killed by thirst. SENSE. (86)

§ 12 17 διὰ ζητοῦσιν κτλ.] A possible reference to previous writings, see *Sense.* 20 *n.* (1). SUSEM. (85 b)

19 (ἑτέρα ἢ χρ.) Getting of goods for use, χρηματιστική (§) of § 11 *n.*

21 διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς.] "In exchange of commodities." And this species, *i. e.* ὁ καπηλικός, is thought to deal with money, for currency constitutes and limits exchange: "i. e. trading begins and ends with money. *πραγματὴς*, main constituent, means to transact, independently agent in exchange. Elsewhere called *πραγματὴς*, *ἐν μεταβολῇ* (Silberst. *de negotiis*, *N. E.* § 14) and *πραγματὴς* *ἐν χρυσῷ*, representative of demand, § 11 *n.*

§ 13 22 καὶ ἀπείρος 24.] "In the words of the line from *Odyssey*, § 11 *n.* (Bernays). SENSE. (86)

- 25 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἄπειρόν ἐστι καὶ (III)  
 ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἄπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ  
 ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἄπει-  
 ρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς  
 29 χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος  
 § 14 πλούτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις. τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς [οὐ χρη- 18  
 ματιστικῆς] ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον.  
 διὸ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλούτου πέρας,  
 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὁρῶ<μεν> συμβαῖνον τούναντίον· πάντες  
 34 γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον αὖξουσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα.  
 § 15 αἴτιον δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν. ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις

25 As Eucken remarks, we should have expected εἰσι: but this change would be very bold (see 36 and 1258 a 1) || 30 τῆς δ'...31 ἔργον suspected as an interpolation Schmidt || οὐ χρηματιστικῆς P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>2</sup>), Reiske first omitted these two words (but after 31 οἰκονομικῆς he inserts ὁ καὶ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, in which case Schneider and Gurlitt recommend ταὐτὸ instead of τοῦτο); [οὐ] Bojesen Thurot Schütz, a<sup>2</sup> Bernays, οὐ<σης> Schmidt. The case is still undecided || 31 οἱ γὰρ .....ἔργον once transposed by Schmidt to follow 32 πέρας. This however really involves other and perhaps more serious difficulties || 32 μὲν <φύσει> ? Susem. || διὰ <τί δὲ> τῇ μὲν \* \* φαίνεται Schmidt || 33 ὁρῶμεν Sylburg, ὁρῶ Γ Π Ar. || 34 νόμισμα, αἴτιον \* \* διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν Schmidt

25 τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν depends on εἰς ἄπειρον: medicine is without end *in respect of* health; medicine recognises no limits within which its production of health is confined.

27 τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος = means to the end.

28 πέρας...πάσαις] "For all arts are limited by their ends." True in cases where, after a certain limit has been passed, the number and amount of the means applied do not contribute anything to the attainment of the end, nay even hinder it. But does it also hold for the all-embracing end of human life, the happiness and perfection not of individuals but of whole nations and finally of the human race? Aristotle did not think of that: and no wonder, when we consider it is only the discovery of modern Political Economy, that capital is simply accumulated labour: that the means to continued progress in national civilization are guaranteed solely by the transmission and growth of the national wealth from generation to generation, which money first made possible. We ought rather, with Stahr and others (*Introd.* p. 28), to recognise Aristotle's penetrating insight, the ripeness and maturity of many of his conclusions in this

9th chapter, "the unpretending germ from which two thousand years afterwards grew the science of society". Cp. further IV (VII). I § 5 n. (695), n. (700). SUSEM. (90)

§ 14 30 If οὐ be changed or omitted, take τῆς οἰκονομικῆς as an adjective: so perhaps l. 39 below, and undoubtedly § 18, 1258 a 17: "but to that branch" of accumulation "which concerns the householder there is a limit". See however n. on 8 § 12, p. 177.

31 τοῦτο = to attain this limit, χρήματα ποιεῖν as Schneider says. τῇ μὲν] "in one sense", viz. when regarded as an instrument. Lambin Schütz Bernays take it as "to the one branch", viz. that which concerns the householder.

34 εἰς ἄπειρον] Cp. [Xen.] *De Vectigal.* 4 §§ 6, 7: ἀργύριον δὲ οὐδεὶς πω οὕτω πολὺ ἐκτήσατο ὥστε μὴ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι.

οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι = those who are engaged in traffic.

35 τὸ σύνεγγυς, the close relationship between the two branches of χρηματιστικῆς is the cause of this mistake.

§ 15 ἐπαλλάττει] See on I. 6. 3. "The practical application of the two kinds of χρηματιστικῆ overlaps, through being concerned with the same article.

τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐσα ἑκατέρας τῆς χρηματιστικῆς τῇ γὰρ αὐτῇ  
 ἐστὶ κτήσεως χρήσις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταῦτόν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν  
 ἑτέρον τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ αὐξήσις. ὥστε δοκιᾷ τισι τοῦτ' εἶναι  
 39 τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον, καὶ διατελοῦσιν ἢ σφίζαν αἰσχροῦ  
 16 δεῖν ἢ αὐξεῖν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν ὡς ἄπειρον. αἰσχροῦ  
 δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ  
 μὴ τὸ εὖ ζῆν· εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὐσίαι  
 καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπείρων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τὰ εὖ  
 ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τίς σωματικῆς  
 ζητοῦσιν, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ἐπεί-  
 5 χειν, πᾶσα ἡ διατριβὴ περὶ τὸν χρηματισμὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὰ αἰσχροῦ

36 ἑκατέρας Ar. and the mss. used by Sepulveda, *ἐκατέρω* Γ II Bk. *ἐκατέρω* Schneider, *ἐκατέρω* and then *τῇ χρηματιστικῇ* Bernays, perhaps rightly. 1 17 *αἰσχροῦ* *κτῆσεως* Göttling (after Schneider, or rather Fulleborn, had proposed to omit the whole clause 36 *τῆς γὰρ*...37 *κτῆσεως*). *κτῆσεως* *αἰσχροῦ* Γ II Ar. Bk. 1 22 *αἰσχροῦ* p4.6. Q S<sup>v</sup> T<sup>v</sup>

1258 a 1 οὐσίης] *οὐσίης* Sylburg (but see on 1257 b 25) 1 2 ὅσοι... 3 ἐπιβάλλονται noticed by Eustath. on the *Iliad* p. 625, 36 1 4 ἐπείχων Korte (perhaps rightly)

Here (two *κτῆσεις ἐπαλλάττουσι* because they have the same object in common". (Fustigate).

37 *τῆς μὲν κτλ*] 'The one application has a different end' (viz. enjoyment, use) 'the other aims at mere accumulation'.

39 *διατελοῦσιν κτλ*] 'persist through life in the opinion that they ought at least to hoard their stock of money if not to go on adding to it indefinitely': *νομία*. *οὐσία* = their substance or capital in money. Bonitz s. v. Better thus taken than as a paraphrase of *εὐαίμα*, for which idiom see Waite *Oxy.* 1. 283 and cp. *ἡ τοῦ Κρατοῦ οὐσία* 893 b 6.

§ 16 This gives the reason why men fall into the error just noticed, the external cause, the trap into which they fall, having been stated in § 14: *τοῦτοι τῇ διαθέσει τῶν διατελόν ἢ σφίζαν κτλ*. (Fustigate).

40 *αἰτίον* 84 *κτλ*] 'Perhaps the thought becomes clearer' says Fulleborn 'when expressed as follows: men have a universal desire for long life, and without setting a definite aim before them,' without making clear to themselves wherein the value and happiness of life really consist, 'they work on incessantly to procure themselves the means of living through this hopeless series of years. Now if they would consider how to provide for present enjoyment' and for the ennobling

of life, 'their desire for gain would be rendered more definite and limited'. SUSEM. (91)

1258 a 2 ὅσοι 84 *κτλ*] 'those who set their hearts upon a life of happiness look for it in sensual enjoyments'. Whereas, on Aristotle's own theory, the true enlightenment and perfecting of life, i.e. happiness, consists in the utmost possible cultivation of mental and moral excellence, of which the highest and noblest enjoyments are but a necessary consequence, a moderate share of external goods and bodily pleasures being required not as constituent element but merely as indispensable condition: all beyond this hinders rather than promotes true Well-being. See Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II 669: cp. 77 (VII). 1 84 7, 8. SUSEM. 92

1 *ἐπιβάλλονται*] 'those themselves upon' (cp. Hom. *Il.* vi. 68, *ἐκείνους ἐπιβάλλουσιν*) 'desire' in the same philosophical sense as *ἐπιθυμία*, *ἐπιθυμία*. Not otherwise II. i. 1 'to adopt'. For the intransitive use of the active see I. 12 85 8, 13. In *AN.* III. 1. 3 85 1, 2 *ἐπιθυμία* is the life of sensual enjoyment. As Plato explains *Rep.* vi. 462 a f., money is the means to this life, so that *φιλοψυχία*, *φιλοχρηματία* are not equivalent terms with *ἐπιθυμία*, hence *ὁ χρηματισμὸς* belongs to be compared with *ὁ φιλοψυχισμὸς* and *ὁ φιλοχρηματισμὸς*.

§ 17 ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθεν. ἐν ὑπερ- (II)  
βολῇ γὰρ οὐσης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς  
ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικὴν ζητοῦσιν· κὰν μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστι-  
κῆς δύνωνται πορίζειν, δι' ἄλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρῶνται,  
10 ἐκάστη χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνδρίας 20  
γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστίν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς  
§ 18 καὶ ἱατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ὑγίειαν. οἱ δὲ  
πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ὥς τοῦτο τέλος ὄν, πρὸς δὲ  
τὸ τέλος ἅπαντα δέον ἁπαντᾶν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τίς,  
16 καὶ δι' αἰτίαν τίνα ἐν χρεῖᾳ ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς, εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ  
τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἑτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν  
ἢ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, οὐχ ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ἀπειρος ἀλλὰ ἔχουσα  
10 ὄρον· δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ 21

12 ὑγείαν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 15 [τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας] Schmidt || μὴ is transposed by  
Hampke and Rassow to precede 17 ἀναγκαίας—but wrongly || 16 [καὶ περὶ...19  
ὄρον] Schmidt || 17 <καὶ> κατὰ φύσιν Thurot || 18 ἢ Schneider (perhaps  
rightly, unless we prefer to omit ἢ.....τροφὴν) || αὕτη Welldon || 19 Bender  
considers the whole of c. 10 δῆλον...b 8 ἐστίν to be spurious; but see Comm. n. (95)  
|| Schmidt transposes 19 δῆλον...38 ζῶων to follow 1256 b 30 οἰκίας

§ 17 8 κὰν μὴ κτλ.] “And if they cannot procure this” (ἀπολαυστικὴν ὑπερβολήν) “by mere accumulation they attempt it by some other supposed cause, perverting each of their faculties to attain it.”

§ 18 13 πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστ[.] Compare Plato *Rep.* I 342 D: the true ἱατρὸς no χρηματιστής, and 346 C, D: ἡ μισθωτικὴ accompanies the other arts to provide remuneration.

14 ἁπαντᾶν=meet in, conspire, tend to: *referre ad*.

19 ὄρον=standard, limit. Properly ‘boundary’, ‘definition’, like ὁρισμός.

§§ 16—18 In the several points Aristotle is quite right, but in reality all this makes against him. For it shows that the fault lies with the men and not with the ‘arts’. If men misuse not medicine merely, but moral virtues like courage, as a means to their own avarice and craving for pleasure; if they can follow agriculture, cattle-rearing, etc. in the same spirit; why are commerce trade and banking to be unceremoniously rejected merely because they can serve such men as a still readier and more successful means to the satisfaction of their desires? Why should it be culpable in any one to

carry on such pursuits merely to gain a living by them? (Glaser). It is true that if there were no stock exchange there could be no speculation in stocks, and then no one would be tempted to such excessive indulgence in it as is certainly liable at times to endanger the morality of whole nations [as e.g. at the time of the South Sea Bubble]. But without the shadow no light; civilization is impossible without luxury. ‘In spite of many great evils which money has brought into the world it is to this invention alone that we owe the fact that nine-tenths of mankind are now no longer forced to serve that fortunate minority, the owners of real property. Think of the time when money was still scarce in Europe; the land then belonged almost exclusively to the clergy and the nobility. Money alone introduced a new species of commodity of inexhaustible ownership, which stands open to all to acquire’ (Schlosser). “Aristotle forgets, too, that, even before money was invented, people might find no *limit* to wealth-seeking. The ζῶη ἄσπετος of Odysseus, *Od.* XIV. 96, went beyond the limit of his consumption, and its aim was, not nurture, but power, as he could make

20 οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἐκείνη, ἀλλὰ \* \* \* (III)  
ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν (ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώποι, οἱ  
ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτικὴ, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρήται  
αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τροφήν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδίδουσαι γῆν ἢ

20 [καὶ πολιτικοῦ] Schmidt || οὐ, <ἀλλὰ ἐκείνη. οἱ γὰρ αἱρετοὶ ἐστὶ πάλαι καὶ  
ἀναγκαῖα χρήματα ποιῶν> or something similar? Süsser. (see Comm.) ad \* \*  
Schmidt. Conring and Schneider suspected some loss | 21 οὕτω] οὕτω is  
conjecture retracted by Schneider) Schmidt Bender; if taken here, it must be  
repeated in 35, and so Bender | 23 <εἰς> τροφήν? Schneider, τρέφειν Orickan, but  
wrongly

grants to his *comitatus* out of his herds and flocks" (Lang). And is not the total result attained in itself truly surprising, namely, that the landowner who sells just enough produce to defray all his other household requirements is the sole household (οἰκονομικὸς); whereas the merchant, the tradesman and the banker are not? Not unnaturally Plato and Aristotle looked only at the dark side of trade. Like true Greeks (*Introd.* pp. 22, 29 f.) their standpoint was still that of the fortunate minority supported by the remaining nine-tenths who serve: as is seen in their approval of slavery and their scheme of a body of citizens living a life of free leisure, without work, finding exclusive unpaid occupation in science, aesthetic enjoyment, and civil administration. Physical labour in Greece was for the most part converted by slavery into slave-labour. Thus all respect for it was lost: "when agriculture, trade, and work in factories or on board ships, were given up to serfs and slaves, the contempt for these occupations was made permanent, just because men saw them carried on by such people, as conversely they had originally been given up to serfs and slaves because they were thought unworthy for free citizens to follow" (Schiller). Even Plato and Aristotle thoroughly despised physical labour as something servile and, in the bad sense of the word, mechanical (*barbaric*), as intellectually and morally degrading: see c. 11 § 6 with the passages quoted in n. (103). Consequently, trade and commerce, even the pursuit of agriculture proper—see IV (VII). 9 §§ 3, 7; 10 §§ 9—14, Exc. III on Bk. I, and Plato *Lesser VII.* 806 D f.—all paid labour, see n. (103), appeared to them more or less unworthy of true freedom. It is a further consequence that, though Aristotle forcibly rejects the extreme de-

velopments of Plato's social and political theories, yet after all he is taking the same line with some persistence and reserve. See *Introd.* p. 21 nn. (1) and (2), p. 33 n. (7). Süsser. (93)

c. 10 *Division of the question raised in c. 8 § 1: II 1—3. Query the most unnatural form of gain, II 4, 5.*

§ 1 19 οὕτω καὶ τροφήν καὶ καλὰ] — But it will now be easy to decide the further question started at the outset, namely, whether the art of wealth is the concern of the household and statesman or not, but—  
...Then comes a lemma which may tentatively be filled in follows: "but, as far as in general needed for the management of a household, is the concern of a subordinate science. Plainly the latter is the case, and the former only as far as the head of the house has to see that the art of acquiring wealth is practised, without exercising it himself, for it is his function, as we said, to use and not to acquire. Furthermore it is an auxiliary science for procuring instruments for living and not the mere materials: these must be given already." But the lemma and somewhat different motivation given in the critical notes is also admissible: "but <of some one else>. For it is not his business to procure all that is necessary for living—say there must be definite materials found him beforehand." Süsser. (94)

23 οὕτω καὶ τροφήν καὶ καλὰ] "an owner must provide food or see to something else as means of support." Lantini and Gotting make γῆν ἢ κτήνην τροφήν of the *poiesis* and Jackson shows that this is not impossible by citing Plato *Lesser VII.* 806 C, τὰς φύσεις ἀποδοῦναι τροφὴν καὶ οὐ τροφὴν καὶ οὐδὲν καὶ γῆν καὶ κτήνη. But the above rendering best agrees with § III a. 11, 10 § 3.

24 θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι), ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὥς δεῖ ταῦτα διαθεῖ- (III  
 § 2 ναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον. οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς ἔρια  
 ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ χρῆσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γινῶναι δὲ τὸ ποῖον  
 χρηστὸν καὶ ἐπιτήδειον ἢ φαῦλον καὶ ἀνεπιτήδειον. καὶ γὰρ 22  
 ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, διὰ τί ἢ μὲν χρηματιστικὴ μόριον τῆς  
 29 οἰκονομίας, ἢ δ' ἰατρικὴ οὐ μόριον· καίτοι δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς  
 § 3 κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ὥσπερ ζῆν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἐπεὶ  
 δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὥς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ περὶ  
 ὑγείας ἰδεῖν, ἔστι δὲ ὥς οὐ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ, οὕτω καὶ περὶ  
 τῶν χρημάτων ἔστι μὲν ὥς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἔστι δὲ ὥς οὐ, ἀλλὰ  
 τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς· μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεῖ  
 35 φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν. φύσεως γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔργον τροφήν τῷ

24 ταῦτα] αὐτὴν Glaser (wrongly), πάντα ? Oncken, τᾶλλα Bender (both better, but hardly correct) || 25 οὐ] οὐδὲ ? Schmidt || 29 δεῖ after ὑγιαίνειν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, δεῖν P<sup>4</sup> || 32 ὑγείας Ald. ὑγείας M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1.2.3.4.</sup> || τοῦ ἱατροῦ] τῆς ἱατρικῆς P<sup>6</sup> Q L<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand—γρ. τοῦ ἱατροῦ in the margin), while in S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> ἀλλὰ.....οὐ is omitted || ἰδεῖν <ἐστίν> and 33 οἰκονόμον <ἐστίν> Welldon || 33 τῶν omitted by P<sup>4.6.</sup> Q L<sup>s</sup> || χρημάτων] χρηματιστικῆς P<sup>4</sup> and γρ. p<sup>1</sup> (in the margin), χρηματιστικοῦ P<sup>6</sup> L<sup>s</sup>, χρηματιστικῶ Q || 34 After τῆς P<sup>4.6.</sup> C<sup>c</sup> Q L<sup>s</sup> Ar. (probably also M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup>) insert κέρδους || 35 ταῦτα Bender for τοῦτο, cp. *n.* on I. 21

24 ἐκ δὲ τούτων] afterwards, *postea* (Bonitz): answering τοῦτο μὲν. "And then it is the householder's duty to dispose of these materials to the best advantage (ὥς δεῖ)."

§ 2 25 οὐ γὰρ κτλ] From this illustration it would be inferred that the domestic branch of χρηματιστικὴ is related to οἰκονομικὴ as shuttle-making to weaving, and not as the production of wool to weaving. Thus the question proposed 8 § 1 and not expressly taken up afterwards would have to be decided as follows: the domestic branch of χρηματιστικὴ provides the household with the needful raw materials for use, by artificial appropriation of nature's stores, so far as nature herself, whose especial function this is, has made no direct provision. On the other hand the sum total of the necessities of life are certainly called elsewhere, 8 § 15, 4 §§ 1—4, the *instruments* (ὄργανα) for living or managing a household. As however this is not a mode of production but a practical, utilizing activity of consumers (ὁ δὲ βλος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποιήσις), the two answers to a certain degree coincide: so far, the question which remains unanswered need not have been proposed. But there is a difference, again, between earning a livelihood directly and indirectly

procuring the appliances and tools required for it. The latter is undoubtedly the business of domestic χρηματιστικὴ, and therefore it stands to Economic in the relation of a subsidiary art that provides, not simply materials, but also instruments. Not only is c. 10 required as an indispensable conclusion to the entire discussion begun at c. 8, but even beyond that there is much that we look for in vain in it; whether Aristotle himself left it thus incomplete, or, as is not quite impossible though indemonstrable, we have here the inadequate execution of another hand substituted for a discussion that has been lost or was never really written. In the latter case there must have been a lacuna here. SUSEM. (95)

28 ἀπορήσειεν ἂν] χρηματιστικὴ (3) is just as much, or as little, a part of Politics or Economic as Medicine is, and no more. For health is just as necessary to the state as property, and yet the duty of providing health is not considered to belong to Politics or Economic.

§ 3 34 μάλιστα] if possible, this must be found by nature, *i.e.* without the trouble of acquiring it.

35 φύσεως γὰρ κτλ] It was explained in *n.* (73) on 8 § 11 that on Aristotle's own theory it is impossible to see how far

γεννηθέντι παρέχειν παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, τροφή τῷ (112)  
 § 4 λειπόμενον ἐστίν. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ  
 πάσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων.

διπλῆς δ' οὕσης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν καπηλίας καὶ  
 40 κῆς τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίης καὶ ἐπαυρο-  
 50 μένης, τῆς δὲ μεταβολικῆς ψευρομένης δικαίως (οὗ γὰρ κατὰ  
 φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν), εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολο-  
 στατικὴ διὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν ἀνάγκην  
 § 5 καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὥπερ ἐπορισάμεθα. μεταβολῇ γὰρ γίνεται χῆμα,  
 § 6 οὗ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλεόν. ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτ' ὀβλήτης

38 <ῆ> ἀπὸ Schneider || 39 [καπηλικῆς...40 μὲν] Schmidt

1258 b 1 μεταβολικῆς H<sup>2</sup> Bk. and γρ. p<sup>1</sup> (in margin); [μεταβολικῆς] now, perhaps  
 rightly, μεταβολτικῆς <καὶ> formerly, Schmidt || 3 ἐπ' Jackson, ἐπ' Bk., ἐπ'  
 ceteri || τὴν omitted by M<sup>o</sup>, [τὴν] Jackson (unnecessary) || αὐτῶν, <ἐπὶ τῶν  
 χρωμένοις> now, <ἐπὶ τ. χρωμένη ἀντῳ> formerly, Schmidt || 4 ὥπερ [ἐπορισάμεθα]  
 ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη H<sup>2</sup> Bk., ὥπερ ἐπορίσθη Schmidt || 5 αὐτῷ αὐτῷ Γ Λι.

this is intended to apply to the animals  
 which according to him are produced  
 from worms. SUSEM. (96)

36 παντὶ γάρ κτλ] "for every animal  
 has for its sustenance the remainder of the  
 matter out of which it grows." Hence  
 the animal and vegetable world is nature's  
 reserve for the support of man.

§ 4 1258 b 1 τῆς δὲ μεταβολικῆς ψευ-  
 γομένης] Attested in equally general terms  
 by Plato *Lotus* xi. 918 D: ἐμπόρε  
 Andoc. i. 137, Diog. Laert. i. 104. An  
 Athenian would find capital for mercan-  
 tile concerns, but he considered it on the  
 whole disreputable to engage in them  
 personally (Becker *Char.* ii. 134 ed. 2,  
 Eng. Tr. p. 281). SUSEM. (97)

3 ἀπ' ἀλλήλων] If *neutral*, the profit  
 made from mutual exchange. But more  
 likely *masculine*, derived from men de-  
 frauding and overreaching one another;  
 the root, probably, of Aristotle's objection  
 to trade altogether.

μισεῖται] Demetrii. xxxvii *Adv. Pan-*  
*athinism* § 21: μισοῦσι, φαίνε. 'Ἀθηναῖοι  
 τοὺς δανείζοντας. SUSEM. (97 b)

ἡ ὀβολοστατικὴ = obol weighing, petty  
 usury; Lysias *Adv. Theomn.* i. § 18 p. 117  
 explaining the law τὸ ἀργύρου πᾶσι μισ-  
 θῆναι ἐφ' ὅπου αὐτὸν βούληται ὁ δανείζων  
 εἰναι τὸ σπένδιον τοῦτο δέναι αὐτῷ ἡγῶν  
 ἔσταιν ἀλλὰ τόκον πράττεσθαι ὅπου αὐτὸν  
 βούληται. Cp. also Aristoph. *Clouds*  
 1146, Antiph. *Mus. frag.* i, Meineke 92  
 in Athen. i. 108 E (Cope). The insecu-  
 rity of the principal lent was the main

cause of a high rate of interest. Thus  
 upon bottomry the average rate charged  
 was 20 per cent., which would go to  
 cover insurance, [Xen.] *De Requit.* 11.  
 9. On house-rents the return was only  
 8½ per cent. Partly, too, the absence of  
 a paper medium of the nature of bills of  
 exchange, drafts, or bank notes, contri-  
 buted to the same result: *Handbuch des  
 Besitz und Lehen* pp. 98, 100 ff.

3 διὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ κτλ] "According  
 to the texts both of Bekker and Schneider  
 ὀβλοστατικὴ is hated because it denotes a  
 profit from coin instead of from com-  
 modities exchanged by means of coin. But  
 the explanatory sentence—μεταβολῇ γὰρ  
 γίνεται χῆμα, ὅθεν καὶ αὐτῷ τοῦτο πλεόν  
 —seems to show that ὀβλοστατικὴ is  
 hated because it seeks to accumulate coin  
 instead of using it in the furtherance of  
 exchange. In order to reconcile the  
 explanatory sentence and the sentence  
 explained, read in the latter ἐπ' instead  
 of ἀπ' or ἐκ', omit εἰς with M<sup>o</sup>, and restore  
 Bekker's ἔσται. In this way we obtain  
 an appropriate sense: 'ὀβλοστατικὴ is  
 hated because it is directed to the accumu-  
 lation of coin, instead of to the end with  
 a view to which coin was invented; for it  
 was to further exchange that coin was in-  
 troduced, while interest multiplying coin  
 itself'" (Jackson).

§ 5 5 πλεόν] "Perhaps from Plato  
*Rep.* viii. 533 E, αὐτῷ δὲ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ τὴν  
 φάρμακον, αὐτῷ ἀπορίσθησιν αὐτῶν λόγῳ, αὐτῷ  
 αὐτῶν τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀπορίσθησιν

ὅμοια γὰρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς γεννώσιν αὐτὰ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ (III) τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος. ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν.

- 11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διωρίκαμεν ἱκανῶς, τὰ IV  
 10 πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δ' ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν. ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα ἐμπειρον εἶναι, ποῖα λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, οἶον  
 14 ἵππων κτήσις ποῖα τις ἢ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ § 2 τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων (δεῖ γὰρ ἐμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλά τε τούτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποῖα ἐν ποίοις τόποις·

7 ἐκ is omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), perhaps rightly: it is added by P<sup>4</sup> (corrector) || 10 δὲ] γὰρ Γ Ar., perhaps rightly || 11 ἐλευθέριον? Jackson || 12 δὲ] δὴ Lambin, perhaps rightly || τῆς omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || κτήματα] κτήνη Bernays

τιτρώσκοντες καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκγόνους τόκους πολλαπλασίους κομιζόμενοι πολὺν τὸν κηφήνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι τῇ πόλει. Still earlier in Aristoph. *Thesmoph.* 846, ἀξία γούν εἰ τόκον, τεκοῦσα τοιοῦτον τόκον" (Ridgeway). Cp. also Plato *Rep.* VI. 507 A, *Politic.* 276 A.

With 3—8 διὰ τὸ κτλ comp. Plato *Laws* v. 742 C, VIII. 842 B. Every one will agree with Fülleborn that this proof is sophistical. But Stahr rightly observes: 'it was not until capital itself attained its complete development, that is, only in recent times, that the justification and reasonable necessity of interest became clear. The history of capital recounts the gigantic efforts that had to be made, the difficulties that had to be surmounted, in order to its formation. From the point of view of universal history the high rate of interest in ancient times has perhaps been a favourable means to that end; yet its immediate effect, in conjunction with a cruel law of debtor and creditor, was to excite repulsion in men with moral natures and this led them decisively to condemn interest altogether, as Plato did.'

All this tends to give Aristotle's whole theory of exchange the following shape: 'he first includes under the term Exchange (ἀλλαγή) all buying and selling barter. Next he subdivides this genus into two species, the one good and praiseworthy, the other not so. The former belongs to Economic. It exchanges the surplus stock of the household for commodities which the household needs; or if

this surplus stock be sold for money it is with no intention of making a profit, but only to purchase other necessities with the proceeds. The other species is distinguished by the intention of making a profit, and this exchange with a view to gain is χρηματιστικὴ in the narrower sense or trading proper. It is again subdivided into two branches: the one includes all traffic in commodities whether in exchange for other commodities or for money, the other is traffic in money alone by lending it on interest. Aristotle regards this last as wholly detestable: the former as less bad, but still bad enough' (Schlosser). SUSEM. (98)

c. 11 *Production viewed on the practical side.* Cp. *Analysis* p. 100.

§ 1 10 χρῆσιν = practical application, as in 9 § 15.

πάντα δὲ κτλ] The theory has its limitations solely in the nature of the case generally; but in practice the nature of the particular locality where we live, and therefore the climate, the character of the soil, &c, determine whether we are chiefly confined to agriculture or to cattle-rearing, to mining or commerce by sea, whether there can be preserves of fish and fishing or not, which sorts of grain or of cattle must be procured, and so on (Schütz). SUSEM. (99)

11 For ἐλεύθερον) (ἀναγκαίαν, strictly limited, cp. *Metaph.* I. 2 § 11 982 b 27: αὕτη (First Philosophy) μόνη ἐλευθέρων ἐπιστημῶν, and § 14 983 a 10, ἀναγκαιότεραι μὲν οὖν πάσαι αὐτῆς.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὐθηνεῖ χώραις), ἅτα περὶ γεωργίας, ἀνὶ  
καὶ ταύτης ἤδη ψιλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελ-  
19 τουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν πλωτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν, ἀπ’  
23 ὧν ἔστι τυγχάνειν βοηθείας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκιστάτης χρη-  
24 ματιστικῆς ταῦτα μῦρια καὶ πρῶτα, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς  
μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη ἐρία, ναυκληρία  
φορτηγία παρὰστασις· διαφέρει δὲ ταύτων ἕτερα ἵππων τῇ  
τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπι-  
34 καρπίαν), δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμός, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρνία (καὶ  
36 τῆς δ’ ἢ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν, ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχων  
καὶ τῷ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων). τρίτον δὲ εἶδος χρημα-  
τιστικῆς μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρῆτης (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τῆς  
κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς

26 τεχνῶν] τεχνιτῶν Vermehren, perhaps rightly | 27 τῆς δ’] τέταρτον II<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corrector), ἄλλως τρίτον p<sup>1</sup> in the margin | 29 ὅσα] οἷσα Bernays

§ 2 17 εὐθηνεῖ=thrive, have abundant offspring: see Verrill *Tracts of Cambr. Phil. Soc.* II. p. 165.

18 ἡδη and here (when we come to this) we find two kinds: agriculture proper and fruit-growing. The technical terms perhaps of Apollodoros, § 7.

The cultivation of the olive and in particular of the vine would be included under ἡ πεφυτευμένη; see Steitz *Hesiod's Works and Days* (Leipzig 1871) p. 27 f. SUSEM. (100)

§ 3 23 φορτηγία=inland trade. SUSEM. This is the view of the commentators generally, but Cope disputes it. He remarks: "φορτηγίης and its derivatives φορτηγίη, φορτηγιάδι, φορταγωγίη, φορταγωγίον, seem to be always applied to commerce carried on by sea, whether πλοῦς or πλοῖα be expressed or not (the sense of 'porter' given in the text, seems not necessary in any of the passages, cp. Theophr. *Frags.* 679, Aesch. *Frags.* Πάροχ. 249). For this reason, and because commerce by land at Athens and in Greece generally was so utterly insignificant in comparison that it might well be passed over without notice, I rather think that ἄνι means by ναυκληρία *hiring out and fitting out ships for traffic*, and by φορτηγία *commerce proper, the transport of goods on board of them*, perhaps including also land transport. On this view Xenophon's distinction *ἐν ἑστῇ, ἐν δὲ μὲν γεωργίῃ, ὁ δὲ ναυκληρῶς, ὁ δὲ ἐμπορεύμεναι*, would correspond to Ar-

istotle's here."

παρὰστασις virtually=εμπορία, mercantia mercatura, hominum numerus in loco consistentium.

24 ἀσφαλέστερα] For definition of ἀσφάλεια in this connection, see *ibid.* 1. 3. 7 τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ αὐτὸ ἀσφαλέστατον ἐστὶν ἀπὸ εἶναι τῇ χρησὶν αὐτῶν (i.e. ἀνὰ).

ἐπικαρπία=profit *additional* to the principal (ἐπέρχεται); see on § 11.

25 μισθαρνία κτλ] Cp. § 6 below. In any case the division is incomplete. The occupations distinguished in § 6 as τεχνιτεύεσθαι, which are not unskilled manual labour nor service for wages, are here omitted: see on I. 102, 103. Moreover in V (VIII) 2. 3, where μισθαρνίαν ἐργασίαν are said to be digging and βάναυσον, the term has quite a different meaning, see on (961). SUSEM. (101)

§ 4 26 By ἀνὰ καὶ τῇ εὐδαίμονι αἰῶνι χρησέσθαι Cope understands the θῆκη in a general division of the population: farm-labourers, porters, etc.

29 ὅσα κτλ it is more appropriate to εἶδος γεωμ., "all the wealth or property derived from land and made of its useful products as are employed by the proprietor himself," like the word of a farmer-tenant γεωργία. Even if however ὅσα is right, we cannot escape his remark (a colon after 26 πρῶτα, no punctuation, but a single sentence from ἐστὶ to πνευμάτωσιν) or his translation of αὐτῇ ἀπὸ γῆς; 'directed to the land'. SUSEM.

30 καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων, ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δέ, (IV. 1)  
 § 5 οἷον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλεύτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ  
 ἤδη περιεῖληφε γένη· πολλὰ γὰρ εἶδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλ-  
 λευομένων ἐστίν. περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται 3  
 καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν  
 § 6 πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. εἰσὶ δὲ  
 36 τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης,  
 βαναυσόταται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα,  
 δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλείεσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέ-

31 ὑλοτομία] ἡ λατομία Thomas Aquinas and Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but wrongly || 33 περὶ...  
 35 ἐνδιατρίβειν Susem. transposes to follow 39 ἀρετῆς; see *Introd.* p. 78 || δὴ Susem.,  
 δὲ Γ Π Bk., omitted by Ar. || 35 εἰσι...39 ἀρετῆς was first seen by Montecatino to  
 be out of place, it was erroneously transposed by Piccart to precede 27 τρίτον δὲ ||  
 36 P<sup>1</sup>.6. Q Ald. S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Bk. insert τῆς before τύχης || 38 ἀγενέσταται M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>.4. Q Ald.,  
 perhaps rightly

30 ἀκάρπων] Compare *Rhet.* I. 5. 7:  
 κάρπιμα δὲ λέγω ἀφ' ὧν αἱ πρόσδοι  
 (Jackson).

31 ὑλοτομία, the growing and cutting  
 down of timber as distinct from the fruit-  
 trees of ἡ πεφυτευμένη γεωργία.

§ 5 32 γένη, εἶδη interchanged: cp.  
 8 § 2 ἕτερον εἶδος with § 3 ἕτερον γένος.

§ 6 36 ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης]  
 "where chance has least play": where  
 nearly everything turns upon acquaintance  
 with the facts, technical knowledge and  
 skill; where the skilled craftsman's hand  
 is guided by intellectual training, which  
 is the all-important element. Cp. Walter  
*op. c.* 505 f. Clearly Aristotle means what  
 we call the fine arts and all the higher  
 technical pursuits, including the sciences  
 themselves and rhetoric, if followed or  
 taught professionally for pay. In parti-  
 cular the art of the sophists, for which see  
*n.* (552) on III. 9. 8, also V(VIII). 2. 5  
 with *n.* (981). SUSEM. (102)

Compare Polos, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία  
 τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τύχην,  
*Metaph.* I. I. 8, 981 a 4 (Jackson).

37 βαναυσόταται κτλ.] This and  
 many other passages—c. 13 § 13; III. 4  
 § 12, 5 § 4, § 6; IV(VII). 9 § 3, 14 § 7;  
 V(VIII). 2 § 5, § 6, 4 § 6, 6 §§ 3—6, § 16,  
 7 § 7; VII(VI). 4 §§ 11, 12 with *notes*;  
 Plato, *Laws* V. 741 E, 743 D f., cp. VIII.  
 831 C f., 846 D f.; Xenoph. *Oec.* 4 § 2 f.,  
 cp. 6 § 6, 10 § 10 — show clearly how  
 closely related were the conceptions of  
 the servile (cp. *n.* 43) and the mechanical  
 both to Aristotle and to the Greeks at large

(see further Herod. II. 167). 'Servile'  
 occupations like that of the hired labourer,  
 § 4, form according to this description  
 the proper antithesis to those which are  
 'artistic' (*n.* 102); mechanical trades are  
 intermediate, yet even the artizan, to say  
 nothing of the labourer, is only a superior  
 kind of slave. Aristotle has really be-  
 fore him the "sedentary" crafts, τέχναι  
 ἐδραῖαι *End. Eth.* I. 4. 2, 1250 a 30,  
 which are not conducive to bodily health  
 or a noble carriage; V(VIII). 2. 4 *n.* (980).  
 Similarly we read in Plato *Rep.* VI. 495 D  
 that manual labour disfigures the body  
 and mars the soul; Xen. *L. c.* says that it  
 hurts men's bodies by keeping them in  
 a sitting posture (καθῆσθαι) cooped up in-  
 doors (σκιατραφεῖσθαι), or in other cases  
 standing all day long over the furnace;  
 and Pseudo-Plato *Erast.* 137 B that it  
 makes them go about with stooping  
 shoulders and backs bent κυπτάζοντα ζῆν  
 (the references from Eaton). This is to-  
 tally unlike the way in which Socrates  
 thinks and judges: 'he speaks as the  
 son of a poor craftsman, Plato Xenophon  
 and Aristotle like men of rank and prop-  
 erty', Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II i 142 (Eng.  
 tr. *Socrates and Socratics* p. 170 *n.* 1).  
 Compare Xen. *Mem.* III. c. 10. With  
 the definition of servile employments  
 compare c. 2 § 2 *n.* (6b) and c. 5 § 7 ff.  
 SUSEM. (103)

For λωβῶνται see V(VIII). 4. 1: the  
 workmen themselves 'spoil' or 'deprave'  
 their bodies; *i.e.* render them feeble and  
 unfit to do service for the state in war.

39 σταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς.

(IV)

33 <περὶ ἐκάστου δὴ τούτων καθόλου μὲν ἀρετῆς  
34 <καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογῆσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς  
37 <τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν>. ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ἐνίοις  
40 γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, ὅλον Χαρητίῳ τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ  
41 Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Λημνίῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ φύλης καὶ  
πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις περὶ ἄλλων, ταῦτα μὲν  
ἐκ τούτων θεωρεῖτω ὅτῳ ἐπιμελές· ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα  
4 σποράδην, δι' ὧν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν ἔνιοι χρηματίζονται.  
8 δεῖ συλλέγειν. πάντα γὰρ ὠφέλιμα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῖς τιμῶσι  
τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, ὅλον καὶ τὸ θάλασσαν τοῦ Μιλήσιου·  
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κατανόημά τι χρηματιστικόν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ  
μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι  
9 ὄν. ὀνειδιζόντων γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν περίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς  
10 τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὔσης, κατανόησαντά φασιν αὐτὸν θλαίῳ  
φορὰν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας, ἐτι χειμῶτος ἐντοῦ  
εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων ἀρραβῶνας διαδοῦναι τῶν  
ἐλαιουργείων τῶν τ' ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὀλίγῳ  
μισθωσάμενον ἅτ' οὐδενὸς ἐπιβάλλοιτος· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καιρὸς  
5 ἦκε, πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἅμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκμισθῶντα

40 χάρητι (χάρητι M\*) δὴ II Ar. Bk. Bernays

1259 a 6 ὅλον.....18 σπουδάζουσιν seems to have been used by Hieroclymus of Rhodes as quoted by Diog. Laert. I. 26 | 13 ἐλαιουργίῳ P<sup>2</sup> and Hieron. ἐλαιουργῶν I<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, ἐλαιούργων P<sup>1</sup>, ἐλαιουργῶν M<sup>1</sup> (Q (?) S<sup>1</sup> T<sup>1</sup>), ἐλαιουργίῳ P<sup>3-4</sup> Ald. Bk. Bernays, ἐλαιουργῶν L<sup>1</sup>

39 ὅπου ... ἀρετῆς] "where excellence" of any kind, and so, where bodily excellence "is least needed." No doubt handling money on interest is particularly mean, 10 § 4. Such business he includes under the servile occupations. SUSEM. (104)

§ 7 40 περὶ τούτων] With the transition this aptly refers to 34 τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογῆσθαι, exact particulars in detail.

1259 a 1 Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Λημνίῳ] Also mentioned by Varro R. R. I. 1. 8, and several times in Pliny's *Natural History*. SUSEM. (105)

3 ὅτῳ ἐπιμελές = whoever is interested in the subject. We are referred to written works in *Rhet.* I. 4. 13, 1360 a 30.

§ 8 6 τὸ θάλασσαν] *Nat. Hist.* VI. 7. 5 1141 b 3 ff. On Thales see Zeller I. 166 ff. [Eng. tr. *Pro-Socratica* I. p. 211 ff.]

SUSEM. (105 b)

8 διὰ τὴν σοφίαν] *Λεοντῆ. Θεωρ.* 180, *Rhet.* 1009.

καθόλου τι] The doctrine here advanced is of general application, depending (as explained in § 11) on the possession of a monopoly. See Bouché p. 34 f. Eng. tr.

§ 9 12 ἀρραβῶνας διαδοῦναι, ἐπὶ "paid deposits in advance to engage the various oil-presses"; ἀρραβῶνας money as guarantee for the execution of the contract; διαδοῦναι the sums were distributed, paid to various owners. Quite apart from the external evidence for ἐλαιουργίῳ (Hieroclymus), it seems when business like to engage the oil-mills, six months beforehand, that the wealthy

13 ὀλίγον ποσὶ] "taking them of a low rental, because there was no one to outbid him"; ἐπιβάλλων = adding, making a higher bid, run up the price.

ὃν τρόπον ἡβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδείξαι, (I  
 ὅτι ῥάδιόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλ'  
 § 10 οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ περὶ ὃ σπουδάζουσιν. Θαλῆς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τοῦτον 6  
 τὸν τρόπον ἐπιδείξιν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας· ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ  
 20 εἵπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικόν, εἴαν τις δύνηται  
 μονοπωλίαν αὐτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἔνιαι (P  
 τοῦτον ποιοῦνται τὸν πόρον, ὅταν ἀπορῶσι χρημάτων· μονο-  
 § 11 πωλίαν γὰρ τῶν ὀνίων ποιοῦσιν. ἐν Σικελίᾳ δέ τις τεθέντος 7  
 παρ' αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνεπρίατο πάντα τὸν σίδηρον ἐκ  
 25 τῶν σιδηρείων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἀφίκοντο ἐκ τῶν ἐμπο-  
 ρίων οἱ ἔμποροι, ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβο-  
 λὴν τῆς τιμῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις  
 § 12 ἐπέλαβεν ἑκατόν. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν ὁ Διονύσιος αἰσθόμενος τὰ 8  
 μὲν χρήματα ἐκέλευσεν ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ μέντοι γε ἔτι  
 30 μένειν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς πόρους εὐρίσκοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ  
 πράγμασιν ἀσυμφόρους· τὸ μέντοι ὄραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο  
 ταυτόν ἐστιν (ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχνασαν γενέσθαι  
 § 13 μονοπωλίαν)· χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολι-  
 τικοῖς. πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων  
 35 πόρων, ὥσπερ οἰκία, μᾶλλον δέ. διόπερ τινὲς καὶ πολι-  
 τεύονται τῶν πολιτευομένων ταῦτα μόνον.  
 12 ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἐν μὲν δε- V  
 σποτικῇ, περὶ ἧς εἴρηται πρότερον, ἐν δὲ πατρικῇ, τρίτον δὲ

16 συλλέξαντος P<sup>4</sup> Ald., συλλέξαντες S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 25 ἐμποριῶν P<sup>2.3.</sup>, πορίων M<sup>s</sup> ||  
 28 τοῦτο S<sup>b</sup> Bk. || ὁ omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 30 αὐτοῦ II Bk. || 31 ὄραμα] εὐρημα  
 Camerarius, θεώρημα ? Koraes || Θάλη καὶ τούτῳ Susem.<sup>1.2.</sup>, *Thali et huic* William,  
 perhaps rightly || 37 μέρη omitted by II<sup>2</sup> (added by a later hand in S<sup>b</sup>) || 38 [περὶ  
 ...πρότερον] Schmidt

§ 10 21 ἔνιαι] Selymbria, Byzantium, and Lampsakos are instances given by Ps. Aristotle *Oeconom.* II. 18 1348 b 33, 4 § 4 1346 b 25, 8 1347 a 32.

§ 11 27 ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα] "on" or "in addition to his capital of fifty talents he received a hundred more": he made a profit of 100 talents on his original fifty. The preposition has the same force in τόκοι ἐπίτριτοι *Rhet.* III. 10. 7, and the analogous fractions.

§ 12 28 Undoubtedly Dionysios the elder who is mentioned III. 15. 16 n. SUSEM. (106)

31 ὄραμα] 'discovery': cp. Dem. *adv. Mid.* § 60 533, 25, οὐδεὶς πώποτε τοῦτ' εἶδε τὸ πλεονέκτημα 'had an eye to this

advantage' (Postgate). Also Plato *Phaedr.* 267 A εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα.

§ 13 35 διόπερ κτλ] See Exc. III. and *Introd.* p. 31 n. (1). SUSEM. (106 b) Possibly an allusion to Eubulos.

c. 12 *The remaining branches of Economics: the relations of the head of the household* (1) to his wife, (2) to his children.

§ 1 37 ἐπέλ...ῆν] c. 3 §§ 1, 2. SUSEM. (107) Comp. *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 9 διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον with Jackson's note, "in *Pol.* III. 6 § 7 however οἰκονομική as an epithet of ἀρχή is used to include all three relations." Justice *between man and wife* is really ἀνώνυμον, 3 § 2.

γαμική, \* \* καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς εἰρησθε. (V)  
 10 ρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ  
 15 γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς· τὸ τε γὰρ  
 ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον, εἰ μὴ πως συνέ-  
 20 στηκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεω-  
 25 τέρου καὶ ἀτελοῦς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς  
 30 πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον (ἢ ἔστιν  
 γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδὲν), ἔστι  
 35 δέ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄρχῃ τὸ δὲ ἄρχηται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι  
 καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἄρασις εἶπε

39 γαμική \* \* καὶ γὰρ Conring; Bernays by altering ἄρχον into ἀρχεῖν, Az. by translating ἀρχει, ignore the lacuna: ἔστιν ἀρχεῖν, a Paris ms. 1042. See the Comment.  
 1259 b 2 πού] πού II<sup>1</sup> (emended by p<sup>1</sup>)

39 γαμική\*\*] There is here a considerable lacuna. For the sense some such restoration as the following may be proposed: "Economic science has, we saw, three branches, treating of (a) the relation of master and slave which has been discussed above, (β) the paternal and (γ) the conjugal relation. <Further we saw that in general a slave is only a piece of property, persons as well as things being included under that head; and it is not the acquisition but the use and maintenance of property which is properly a part of economic science. This science may therefore be divided into (1) the guidance and rule of the *persons* of the household, (2) the right use of the *property*. The former includes the treatment of the conjugal and paternal relations: the relation of master and slave would come partly under the one, partly under the other. The householder has to care for the improvement and excellence of all that belongs to the household, and hence for the improvement and excellence of the property; but property is only a means to the end which the household seeks to attain, and the living chattel is more important than lifeless objects. It is therefore the householder's main task to direct aright the free members of the house." > In c. 12 the differences in this rule as exercised over the different free members of the family are parenthetically specialized, but in c. 13 the leading thought itself is resumed and explained. Cp. Tharol *Études* p. 14 f., Susenhihl in *Äthien. Mus.* 88. pp. 212—215 (where however some mistakes need

correction). Bachmann *op. cit.* 112. SUSENH. (107 b).

1259 b 1 πολιτικῶς] like a magistrate in a republic, or, more properly, an aristocracy. *Mus. Acad.* VIII. 10 § 1, 11 § 4. Cp. Zeller II § 619 n. (1). SUSENH. (108)

§ 2 4 ἐν μὲν οὖν καὶ] Here follows a discussion, as to (1) how far the rule of the husband over the wife may differ from that of a monarch over his subjects, (2) how far the rule of a father over his children may be compared with monarchical government. Cp. further I. 2 § 7 n. (42 b) and II § 9 n. (127). SUSENH. (109)

"In some cases where citizens rule over citizens rulers and subjects change places, for they too have one ἄρχοντος nom. to father and to father tend to be on an equality in nature and to differ not at all"; see also an adverbial accus. as II. 2. 6 τὴν πρὸς θεῷ, IV (VII). 1. 10 ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν, cp. 13 below φύσιν ἀρχόμεν. Yet some have taken τὴν φύσιν, as subject of εἶναι, to mean the spirit of equalitarian citizenship, or the 'natures' of the citizens.

8 σχήμασι, outward signs, images; λόγοις, tales.

Ἄρασις καὶ Ἄρασις καὶ] Hesiodus tells this story, II. 171. Aratus, who had deposed his predecessor Arion (Hoplus), was at last deposed by the Egyptians on account of his low birth. Whereupon he had a statue of gold made out of a low birth, in which he and his guests had been accustomed to wash their feet. When this statue was set up the Egyptians paid it due reverence, and

§ 3 τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτήρος λόγον· τὸ δ' ἄρρεν αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ (V  
10 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική·  
τὸ γὰρ γεννῆσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρε-  
σβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς. διὸ καλῶς Ὀμη-  
ρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν

πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε

(P.

15 τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάντων. φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα δια-  
φέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ  
πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.  
13 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἢ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας 3  
περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων κτήσιν, καὶ  
20 περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τούτων ἢ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, ὃν καλοῦμεν  
πλοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἢ δούλων.  
§ 2 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ἔστιν  
ἀρετὴ τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμι-  
ωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ  
25 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕξεων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ  
§ 3 τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας (ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως· εἴτε  
γὰρ ἔστιν, τί διοίσουσιν τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὄντων  
ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον)· σχεδὸν δὲ 4

15 After ἀπάντων P<sup>2</sup> adds as a gloss δηλονότι πατέρα εἰπὼν, and this πατέρα εἰπὼν has crept into the text of Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 17 τὸ] τὸν Γ P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> Ar. before νεώτερον || 18 \* \* φανερόν [τοίνυν] ? Schmidt; see on 1254 a 24 || 26 εἴτε] εἴτι P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, εἴ τι P<sup>3.6</sup>. Ald. || 28 δέ] δὴ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1.3.4</sup>. Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>2</sup>)

Amasis, calling them together, explained to what vile uses the object of their present adoration had once been put. Similarly he had risen from the common people to the throne, and as king he demanded their respect. SUSEM. (110)

§ 3 9 αἰεὶ) (κατὰ μέρος I § 2. The husband holds, as it were, permanent office.

11 κατὰ φ.] by right of affection.

12 ὅπερ ἐστὶ κτλ.] = and this gives a form of monarchy, viz. hereditary monarchy, III. 14. 6. Bernays takes εἶδος as 'essential nature', but compare *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10. 4, ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατὴρ πρὸς υἱεὶς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα.

16 τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν] So too in Pindar's words, ἐν ἀνδρῶν ἐν θεῶν γένος, ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι *Nem.* 6. 1, men are of one race with the gods, earth being the common mother of both. The same is implied by Hesiod's verse ὥς ὁμόθεν γεγάασιν θεοὶ θνητοὶ τ' ἄν-

θρωποι *Works and Days* 108 (J. G. Schneider). See Steitz *op. c.* 50 f. SUSEM. (110 b)

c. 13 Various degrees of excellence requisite in the different members of the household; §§ 1—11. The promotion of this excellence in slaves, §§ 12—14; in women and children, §§ 15, 16.

Cp. *Analys.* p. 101, *Introd.* p. 31.

§ 1 18 'τοίνυν traducendo ad novam cogitationem inservit' Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* quoting *Physics* I. 2 §§ 7, 8 185 b 3, 9. Perhaps it only resumes a thought previously expressed, 'then', 'accordingly': see n. (107 b). Bernays gives 'It is clear beforehand then.' SUSEM.

20 Here πλοῦτος = ἀρετὴ κτήσεως, but in 8 § 15 it is πλῆθος ὀργάνων.

21 μᾶλλον ἢ δούλων] Cp. n. (33) on 4 § 1 καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὐ ζῆν. SUSEM. (111)

§ 2 25 τῶν ἄλλων ἕξεων sc. τις = τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν; *Rhet.* I. 6. 9 with Cope's n.

ταυτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδα, (9)  
 30 πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τῆς γυναῖκος σόφρων  
 εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ ταῖς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀν-  
 40 λαστος καὶ σόφρων, ἢ οὐ; [καὶ] καθόλου δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιτε-  
 πτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερα ἢ αὐτῇ  
 ἀρετῇ ἢ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλ-  
 35 καγαθίας, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἄρχειν ἐξοί ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι  
 καθάπαξ; (οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οἶόν τι διαφέ-  
 ρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν εἶδει διαφέρει, τὸ  
 5 δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οὐδέν). εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν δὲ μέ-  
 θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἄρχων μὴ ἔσται σόφρων καὶ δι-  
 40 καιος, πῶς ἄρξει καλῶς; εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθή-  
 σεται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστον γὰρ ὦν καὶ θαλόν οἷον ποιήσει  
 τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν  
 ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δ' εἶναι διαφορὰς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν  
 6 φύσει ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων. καὶ τοῦτο αἰθὺς ὑφηγῆται πε-  
 5 ρὶ τὴν ψυχὴν· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ'  
 ἀρχόμενον, ὦν ἑτέραν φαρὲν εἶναι ἀρετὴν, οἷον τοῦ λόγου καὶ  
 ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον

30 σόφρονα after 31 εἶναι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. | 31 καὶ before ἀκόλαστον omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> | 31  
 καὶ before καθόλου omitted by Γ M<sup>2</sup> | 37 διαφέρει τῷ Ar.

1260 a 4 ἀρχόντων καὶ omitted by H Ar. Bk. | ὑφηγῆται. Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., and γ' is in the  
 margin, ὑφηγῆται <τὰ> Schütz; yet ὑφηγῆται can also be used passively | 6 μὲν  
 εἶναι φαρὲν M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, μὲν φαρὲν εἶναι Γ<sup>4</sup> (corrector)

§ 3 31 παῖς...σόφρων] Compare *Nic. Eth.* III. 12. 5 1119 a 33; we apply the term ἀκολασία to the faults of children so far as they bear a certain resemblance to the vice of intemperance (ἀκολασία). SUSEM. (111 b)

§ 4 37 εἶδει διαφέρει] see on 1 § 2.

§ 5 1260 a 3 ὥσπερ καὶ ἀρχομένων] καὶ διαφέρει εἶναι, as explained 1 § 2 ff.

§ 6 4 ὑφηγῆται] "this is illustrated (or, given in outline) in the case of the soul." The participle ὑφηγῆται (1 § 3) seems evidence that the verb is used passively (*Bonitz Int. Ar.*); but Schütz's suggestion <τὰ> gives the middle a fair name: "to this result the relations which exist in the soul at once lead us." SUSEM.

6 ὦν ἑτέραν... ἀλόγου] "and we say that a different kind of excellence belongs to the one and to the other of these, I mean to the rational and irrational parts of the soul." Namely intellectual or

rational soul: moral virtue (ἠθική ἀρετή, excellence of character) courage, temperance, etc. to the irrational appetitive soul; Zeller III 514—515. The domestic virtues are discussed in II. vi of the *Nic. Eth.* and the latest detailed investigation of this subject, Walker op. cit. 272—537, gives the following results.

Each of the three kinds of reason, theoretic, creative, and practical in the narrower sense (not as, and not in particular domestic virtue, as it may be, virtues. Practical wisdom or thought (σοφία), if not the only virtue, is at all events the most indispensable and the most important virtue of the practical reason (Walker p. 215 ff.). see on 1 § 2 ff. 1211 II. 4 II 7. 8 see 1214—41, II 15, 27 ff. To theoretic reason belongs all knowledge of the permanent world, mathematics, metaphysics, etc. (Walker p. 215 ff.). see on 1 § 2 ff. 1211 II. 4 II 7. 8 see 1214—41, II 15, 27 ff. To the creative reason belongs all knowledge of all impermanent things, which must be assumed for every education and

§ 7 ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥστ' <ἐπεὶ> φύσει πλείω τὰ [ἄρχοντα (V) καὶ] ἀρχόμενα (ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου  
10 ἀρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός), καὶ πᾶσιν

8 ὥστ' <ἐπεὶ> Bernays, while Susem.<sup>1.2.3</sup> had simply ὥστε || πλείω τὰ Ramus, τὰ πλείω Γ Π Bk. || [ἄρχοντα καὶ] Susem.<sup>4</sup>, especially as otherwise the insertion of ἐπεὶ, l. 8, is untenable || 10 ἀνὴρ] πατήρ ? Koraes

for scientific demonstration; at the lower end of the scale the immediate judgment of perception, and at the other end, by means of induction, the principles and axioms on which all demonstration, definition, and division rest :

(ii) ἐπιστήμη, demonstrated science with the exception of metaphysic; and (iii) σοφία, wisdom, the highest or metaphysical knowledge which consists of elements of both kinds, demonstrated truths and truths immediately known. It is of slight importance whether Zeller and Walter are right, that Aristotle regarded all three as dianoetic 'virtues', or whether, as Döring tries to prove against Walter in *Kunstlehre des Arist.* (*Aristotle's Theory of Art*) p. 62 f., only the third, σοφία, was really so considered by him. In the creative reason, lastly, τέχνη, artistic skill, is not itself a dianoetic excellence, though it can lead to one, *Nic. Eth.* VI. 5. 7, 1140 b 21 f.<sup>1</sup>

For the 'excellences of character' cp. 5 § 6 n. (40): in regard to temperance in particular II. 6 § 9 n. (206 b), 5 § 10 n. (162), 7 § 12, III. 4 § 16 n. (491), IV (VII). 1 § 4 n. (693). SUSEM. (112) 7 τολύνη] See on § 1. 'But' or 'now it is clear' (Bonitz).

§ 7 8 ff. "Since then there are by nature various sorts of things subjected to rule (the rule of a free man over a slave being different from that of a husband over a wife, and again from that of an adult over a child), and all have the elements of the soul present in them, only in different degrees (the slave in general being destitute of the deliberative faculty, which in the woman has not sufficient authority and in the boy is as yet undeveloped);

<sup>1</sup> Whether this is really Aristotle's theory or not, Döring does not venture to decide. I see no ground for doubt. But perhaps Aristotle wished to restrict this artistic excellence to the higher group of arts, the imitative arts, see n. (34). If this be so Walter's conception of them, p. 512, is unaffected by Döring's objection, p. 65 n. In *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 20 σύνεσις, apprehension,—see *Pol.* III. 4 §§ 16, 17 nn. (497, 8), VI(IV). 4. 14 n. (1186)—is adduced as a dianoetic virtue along with σοφία and φρόνησις. It would take too long to explain how this is to be understood.

for this reason the ruler requires the intellectual virtue in perfection (for the work belongs simply to the master-workman, and here this is reason), while each of the others needs only his fitting share thereof. And so, too, must it be with the moral virtues: we must suppose all to need a share of them, though not equally, but only in so far as each requires for his work."

Bernays defending the order of the mss. translates from 14 ὁμοίως as follows: "A similar gradation must likewise be assumed for the moral virtues: all must possess them, though not equally, but only in such measure as is necessary for their respective duties. The ruler must have moral virtue in its perfection;—for every work depends in all its parts on the supreme master, and reason" i.e. *that which makes the ruler a ruler* "is supreme master"; *if then the work is to be successful, the ruler must satisfy the demands of reason on all sides, and must therefore possess complete moral virtue.* "Those again who obey need severally so much virtue as is proportional to their share of the total work." This however does not meet Thurot's objections, *Études* 16 ff. "The transposition is indispensable. From the proposition 'reason is the master-workman' it first follows that the ruler must possess the highest *intellectual* virtue, and only secondarily that he must have the highest *moral* virtue. Aristotle has been speaking (a 2—7) of a virtue of the rational, and of a virtue of the irrational, part of the soul, and he admits (a 10—14) that both these parts are possessed by slaves, women, and children. Before going on to inquire how they all share in the *moral* virtue of the *irrational* part he must have noticed the manner in which they share in the *intellectual* virtue of the *rational* part. Indeed the words which Bernays inserts 'the demands of reason on all sides' imply the dianoetic virtue." Cp. *Hermes* XIX. pp. 588—592, *Quaest. Crit.* VI. p. 9 f. SUSEM. 9 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον] See 12 § 1, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς. SUSEM. (113)

ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει δὲ αὖ  
 φερόντως (ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οἷα ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν,  
 τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν,  
 ἀλλ' ἀτελές)· ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τῶν  
 ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν· ὑποληπτίον δαὶν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ'  
 οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον  
 διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελείαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν <διανο>ητικὴν  
 ἀρετὴν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ  
 λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει  
 αὐτοῖς. <ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τῶν  
 ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν· ὑποληπτίον δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ'  
 οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον>  
 ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν <ἐκάστῳ ἰδίᾳ ἢ> ἠθικῇ ἀρετῇ τὸς εἴρας  
 μένων ἀπάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός,  
 οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ'

14 ὁμοίως.....16 ἔργον Thurot Susem. transpose to follow 20 αἰετός: see *Introd.*  
 p. 79. Bernays transposes ἀναγκαῖον, Wellmann ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν to follow 15 ἀλλ' ἔχειν  
 and both punctuate 15 ἀρετῶν ὑποληπτίον δαὶν, rejecting Thurot's proposed transpo-  
 sition. See *Comm.* || 15 After ὑποληπτίον corr.<sup>2</sup> of P<sup>2</sup> insert γὰρ, Ar. 34 (see also  
 Koraeus in his commentary) || 16 αὐτοῦ Bk., αὐτοῦ Γ II || 17 διανοητικὴν Thurot,  
 ἠθικὴν Γ II Ar. Bk. Bernays || 20 <ἐκάστῳ ἰδίᾳ ἢ> ἠθικῇ Susem.<sup>1</sup> ἰδίᾳ ἢ? Susem.  
 earlier, οἰκεία or οἰκεία ἢ Schmidt, [ἠθικῇ] Thurot || 21 ἀπάντων II<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup>, πάντων P<sup>1</sup> +  
 Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. || 22 ὁ Σωκράτης P<sup>4</sup>, which Wilson (perhaps rightly) argues

12 ὁ μὲν γὰρ...βουλευτικόν] Just the  
 same thing is said in other words § 9 *n.* (45). See also *n.* (115). SUSEM. (114)

13 ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον] Cp. *n.* (117).  
 This can establish a difference of degree  
 only, not a difference of kind, between  
 the virtue of a man and of a woman.  
 See III. 4. 17 *n.* (495). SUSEM. (114 b)

§ 8 17 τὴν <διανο>ητικὴν ἀρετὴν]  
 It is self-evident that only the 'dianoetic'  
 virtue of practical life, φρόνησις or prac-  
 tical wisdom, is here treated: see *nn.*  
 (45) (112); IV(VII). 1. 4 (693). Where  
 it is a question of executing another's  
 command, as it is always and uncondi-  
 tionally with the slave, there this virtue  
 belongs only to him who gives the com-  
 mand, he who obeys having merely 'right  
 opinion' about it. All the difference now  
 is, whether he can attain this right ap-  
 prehension more or less easily, thoroughly  
 or carelessly: III. 4. 18 *n.* (498). Com-  
 pare also *nn.* on III. 4 § 16 (493), § 17  
 (497), § 7. 8 (474—6). But so far as a  
 natural slave, who is denied every ca-  
 pacity for deliberation, can be said to

have ever so small a share of appropriate  
 intellectual virtue or the department of  
 practice, such virtue consists merely in  
 the fact that one slave understands his  
 master's commands and knows how to  
 execute them better, more quickly, and  
 more aptly than another. SUSEM. (114)

19 [καὶ οὕτως] or, ὅσον διὰ τὸ εἶναι  
 ἐν[αῖ]λλον] 'as far as is convenient or  
 them.' Important: cp. *The Long*, vol. 1,  
 § 4. 494 b 33, ὡς εἶναι ἐν[αῖ]λλον  
 τῷ φρονεῖν φιλοσοφίας; HANOT. II. the two  
 Δεδοσὶ δὲ ἐν[αῖ]λλον παραχρῆμα.

16 ὅσον ἐκάστῳ] or, ὅσον ἑκάστῳ.

§ 9 20 <ἐκάστῳ ἰδίᾳ ἢ> ἀρετῇ καὶ]  
 "that the moral virtue of each of the  
 above classes is peculiar to itself." Ber-  
 nays translates as if he had before him  
 the words inserted.

22 Σωκράτης] The historical Socrates  
 unquestionably did so. Xen. *Sympt.* 2. 21  
 cp. Keller op. l. 11 i 221 (*Qu. 12. So-  
 crates and I*, 11 i 221 *n.* 1). But  
 here no doubt Aristotle has in view the  
 Platonic Socrates, amongst other pas-  
 sages in *Meno* 71 b 4, to which he alludes

ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρία ἡ δ' ὑπηρετική, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ (V)  
 § 10 περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπι-  
 25 σκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι  
 τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι τῶν τοιού-  
 των· πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρε-  
 § 11 τὰς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὀριζομένων. διὸ δεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ  
 ποιητὴς εἶρηκε περὶ γυναικός, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων·  
 30 γυναικὶ κόσμον ἢ σιγὴν φέρει, 9  
 ἀλλ' ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δὲ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον ὅτι

24 καὶ, which Ar. leaves untranslated, Lambin omitted || 26 ἡ τὸ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4.6</sup> L<sup>3</sup> W<sup>b</sup> Ald., καὶ τὸ Q Ar., τὸ P<sup>2.3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || τοιοῦτον for τῶν τοιούτων M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 31 ὁ before παῖς omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>

more distinctly § 10 n. (118). Like Socrates in Xenophon *l. c.*, Plato (*Rep.* v. 452 E f.) holds that, apart from begetting and bearing children, the difference between the sexes is a difference of degree: upon this is based his demand that women should share in the education of men, in war and public business, also (although this is expressly stated only in the *Laws*) in the public messes: see II. 5 § 1 n. (153), 6 § 5 n. (196), 7 § 1 n. (231 b). Further, community of wives in the two upper classes of his ideal-state (II. 1 § 3 ff., 7 § 1) is clearly connected with this; compare n. (142) on II. 2 § 9, Zeller *op. c.* II i 775 [Eng. tr. *Plato* p. 481], Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 168—170. Aristotle on the contrary records the results of careful scientific observations on the difference in temperament between the two sexes in *Hist. Anim.* IX. 1 § 5, §§ 7, 8 608 a 21 ff.: τὰ θῆλεα μαλακώτερα καὶ κακουργότερα καὶ ἥττον ἀπλὰ καὶ προπετέστερα καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν τέκνων τροφὴν φροντιστικώτερα... ἔστι δὲ καὶ δύσθυμον μᾶλλον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος καὶ δύσελπι, καὶ ἀναιδέστερον καὶ ψευδέστερον, εὐαπατητότερον δὲ καὶ μνημονικώτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἀγρυπνιώτερον κτλ. Cp. *De gener. anim.* IV. 6. 10 f., 775 a 12, and Zeller II ii 688 with n. (3). SUSEM. (116)

23 ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ κτλ.] Cp. III. 4 § 3 n. (470), § 16 n. (491), § 17 n. (495): also I. 5 § 7 n. (42 b), 12 §§ 1, 2 nn. See on the other side n. (120) on I. 13 § 11. SUSEM. (117)

§ 10 24 κατὰ μέρος] 'in detail'.

25 The same protest in *Nic. Eth.* II. 7 § 1, cp. 2 §§ 3, 4.

26 τὸ εὖ ἔχειν] Plato *Rep.* IV. 444 E ὑγιειὰ τις καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς: *Gorg.* 506 D

τάξει τεταγμένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου.

27 οἱ ἔξαρ. κτλ.] As Gorgias does in Plato's *Meno* 71 B f., where the Platonic Socrates attacks the doctrine. Aristotle is here defending Gorgias against that polemic and expresses his agreement with him in the main. Schlosser well observes that the defence certainly misses the mark, as Plato in the *Meno* insists with perfect right that the generic notion of virtue ought first to be defined, and in the *Ethics* Aristotle starts from that. On Gorgias see n. (448) to III. 2. 2. SUSEM. (118)

§ 11 28 ὁ ποιητής] Sophocles *Ajax* 293. See further n. (117). SUSEM. (119)

31 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ.] "Since the child has not yet fully developed, his excellence is not to be referred simply and solely to himself, but to perfect development and the standard of his educator."

The slave's moral excellence is restricted to that which fits him to be well employed by his master, the child's to that which fits him to be well trained by his father. In the child only the germ of human virtue is present (*Nic. Eth.* I. 9. 10, III. 12. 5 ff.); on this see IV(VII). 13. 5 n. (875): but in the adult slave, so far as he possesses the indispensable minimum of such a virtue at all, it is at least actually developed. Children and slaves have only to obey; the wife must indeed obey her husband, but then she has along with him to command the remaining members of the family. This implies that her virtue is not merely ὑπηρετική, as Aristotle inexactly puts it § 9. Further with §§ 8—11 compare *Poetics* 15 § 3 and note (191 b) in Susemihl's edition. SUSEM. (120)

τούτου μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς (V)  
12 τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δοῦλον πρὸς ἐσπότην.

ἔθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον,  
35 ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὥστε μὴ  
μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων. ἀπο-  
ρήσειε δ' ἂν τις, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἀληθές. ἀρα καὶ τοῖς τεχνί-  
13 τεχνίτας δεήσει ἔχειν ἀρετὴν· πολλάκις γάρ δι' ἀκολασίαν  
ἐλλείπουσι τῶν ἔργων. ἡ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλεῖστον; ὁ μὲν γάρ  
40 δοῦλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρωτέρον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπι-  
βάλλει ἀρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ δουλείας· ὁ γάρ βάνιυστος τε.

32 αὐτὸν Γ (*ad se ipsum* William) § 33 τὸ τέλος] τὸν τέλος Γ<sup>4</sup>· W<sup>2</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ai. Add. Bk. || 36 ἐλλείψει Γ<sup>3</sup> (but ἐλλείψῃ corr.<sup>1</sup>) Goul. Bk.<sup>2</sup> Susem.<sup>1-22</sup> perhaps rightly || [ἀπορήσειε... b 2 τεχνιτῶν] Schmidt § 37 ἀρα Γ II<sup>2</sup> (yet Q perhaps has ἀρα) § 39 ἡ<οῦ. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ> διαφέρει<ν> Schmidt. § τοῦτον II<sup>2</sup> (omitted apparently by p<sup>1</sup>) || 40 Whether Ar. read αὐτῷ in his ms. after τοσαύτου as I have assumed from his translation, is more than doubtful: τοσαύτου <αὐτῷ>? Schneider § ἐπιβάλλει] ἐπιβαλεῖται Schmidt § 41 <δοουλιᾶς> or <ἐπὶ τῷ δουλείᾳ>? Susem. (see Comm.); yet in 38 ἀρετὴν alone expresses this § text omitted by Γ M<sup>2</sup>, hence [περ] Susem.<sup>1</sup>

§ 12 35 ἀρετῆς.... 36 ἔργων] But how on Aristotle's own psychology and theory of virtue is even this minimum of moral virtue, which is the condition of his serviceableness, possible in the slave, if he shows no trace of deliberation or purposed action of his own? See *Nile, Eth.* III. iv. 2, 3, Walter *op. cit.* p. 169 ff., 172 ff., Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 590 n. (3). Yet all goodness or badness of character and conduct is derived from the quality of the will in intention and purpose: *Phil.* 6 II 3, 6, 17, 15 § 1, n. (SS4) on *Phil.* IV (VII), 13 § 9.

Plato speaks far more humanely on this subject *Lysis* vi. 776 D, where he admits that ere now many a one has found in his slaves men on all points of more approved virtue than his brothers or sons. But in this he contradicts the fundamental assumptions which he makes in common with Aristotle: cp. Zeller II i 755 f. [Eng. tr. *Phaedo* p. 459]. Aristotle himself grants that even slaves may have a noble character, *Phil.* 15 § 1, καὶ γὰρ γυνὴ ἐστὶ χρηστὴ καὶ δοῦλος, καὶ τοὶ γε τῶν τοσούτων τὸ μὲν χεῖρον τὸ δὲ ὄλον φαίνομαι εἶναι. If he is more consistent elsewhere, his consistency only involves the whole theory in self-contradiction in another way, and discloses all the more its untenableness on internal grounds: see § 8 n. (43).

§ 9 n. (43): also p. 211. See *ibid.* (123).

39 ἡ <οῦ> introduction Aristotle's own theory: "we shall see rather less..." says Susem.; "surely here is a very great difference."

§ 13 40 τοσοῦτον [ἐπὶ τῷ] whereas the citizens are *autonomous* men: *Phil.* 128 n. 6, 41 τῶν Γ ἐστὶ *αὐτονομία* βίον καὶ τὸ εἶναι *αὐτόνομον*]; the slave is excluded from this, *ib. n. 6*, § *αὐτονομία* δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ἀλλ' ἀνελκόντων, εἰ μὴ οἱ βίον.

ὁ δὲ πορρωτέρον] "farther removed", "less dependent" on his master.

τοσοῦτον [ἐπιβάλλει ἀρετῆς] as αὐτῷ just so much of virtue as of himself falls to his share. The verb intrinsically has personal. Compare *Phil.* 6, 3, and *ibid.* ἐπιβάλλει μέγας ἐκείνῳ τῷ [ἢ τοῦ] 1111 ff. 1, 10, ἐκείνῳ τῷ εὐδαίμονι ἐπιβάλλει τοσούτων δευτέρῳ ἀρετῆς. *Phil.* 10, 113, VII, 12, Dem. *De Cor.* § 214, p. 121, 2.

"Thus special virtue, i.e. perfection of function, of the free workman differs from the true virtue of man in being something inferior and approximating to that of the slave: see n. (102) on 1: § 5 with the reference, esp. 112 n. 10 n. (106)." Susem. (123).

Mr T. L. Heath objects to this, that it amounts to the saying of Aristotle, the change of subject from § 12 to 13 is really very harsh. "Indeed, nothing more, is it not unacceptably harsh?" I think the sentence would go much better, if we could

1260 b χνίτης ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δούλος (V)  
τῶν φύσει, σκυτοτόμος δ' οὐδεὶς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν.

§ 14 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αἴτιον εἶναι δεῖ τῷ 11  
δούλῳ τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλ' οὐ <τὸν> τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν  
5 ἔργων [δεσποτικὴν]. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους  
ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον· νουθε-  
τητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.

§ 15 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ  
δ' ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρὸς, τῆς τε περὶ

1260 b 4 <τὸν> Schneider following Ar.; τὸν for τὴν Scaliger Reiske || 5 [δε-  
σποτικὴν] Giphanius (cp. the Comm.); Koraes conjectures ἐπιστήμην, Bender δουλικήν;  
δεσποτικῇ, transposed to follow ἐπιτάξει, Schmidt

make δ δὲ the subject of ἐπιβάλλει. I should translate 'the artizan is further removed and entrenches on virtue only to the same degree as he entrenches on slavery.' Cf. for the supposed use of ἐπιβάλλει *De caelo* I. 5 § 10, 272 a 25 ὅσον γὰρ ἡ ἐτέρα [γραμμὴ] ἐπιβάλλει τῆς ἐτέρας, καὶ ἡ ἐτέρα ἐκείνης τοσοῦτον, where ἐπιβάλλειν contrasts with ἀπολύεσθαι. Is there any reason why ἐπιβάλλει should not = ἐπαλλάττει?" In point of fact this is perhaps the right construction. That we require αὐτῷ with the other, was pointed out by M. Schmidt and by me in my first edition (1872). At the same time is not ἀρετῆς by itself also strange? (See *Critical Notes*). If something like δούλου or τῆς τοιαύτης has been lost, αὐτῷ may well have been lost with it. We certainly should expect 'he shares in servile virtue in so far as his condition approximates to a slave's.' SUSEM.

1260 b 1 ἀφωρ. τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν = is under a definite, limited form of slavery. Comp. *Rhet.* I. 1 § 1, 1354 a 3, with Cope's note: also ὠρισμέναις above 4 § 1, n. (34). Some interpret wrongly, 'detached from the master.' That the slaves should be ranked as a natural class and the artizans (who had largely sprung from them, III. 5. 3) as an artificial class, is significant of the Greek contempt for labour. See n. (93).

§ 14 4 <τὸν> τὴν διδασκ. ἔχοντα] "the person who instructs him in routine duties." This is the possessor of, or proficient in, the δουλικὴ ἐπιστήμη which is more fully described above 7 § 2, where it is distinguished from δεσποτικῇ. The discussion on the 'virtue' of the slave results in a more precise determination of δεσποτικῇ and its elevation by an exten-

sion of its functions. The master may entrust his steward with the employment and direction of the slaves in his service, as Aristotle ironically remarks, 7 § 5: but he must himself develop in them the minimum of virtue which they require for this. Cp. n. (64) on 7 § 5. In line 5 δεσποτικὴν must be wrong: δουλικὴν is what we require, and Bender would accordingly insert it in the text. But neither δουλικὴν nor δεσποτικὴν is free from grammatical objections; I prefer therefore to bracket the word. SUSEM. (123)

Here δεσποτικὴ or δεσποτεία is the art of making good servants. The household like the state exercises a moral superintendence over its members, 13 § 1, and its head is responsible for their moral improvement.

5 οἱ λόγου...6 μόνον] "Those who permit no conversation with slaves, and hold that we should merely give them orders." Plato *Laus* 777 E, τὴν δὲ οἰκέτου πρόσρησιν χρὴ σχεδὸν ἐπιτάξιν πᾶσαν γίγνεσθαι. Elsewhere Plato strongly recommends a humane treatment of slaves: see n. (121) on § 12. SUSEM. (124)

Plato's view is still from time to time approved, as notably by George Eliot.

6 νουθετητέον] Plato *ib.* κολάζειν γε μὴν ἐν δίκῃ δούλους δεῖ καὶ μὴ νουθετοῦντας ὥς ἐλευθέρους θρύπτεσθαι ποιεῖν.

7 μᾶλλον] Because the slave, albeit unable to deliberate rationally himself, yet, as an adult, understands better than the child the rational admonitions conveyed to him by others (Fülleborn II. 184). Compare n. (120) on § 11 above, and n. (45) on 5 § 9. SUSEM. (125)

§ 15 8 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον] Compare the close of c. 7.

ἑκάστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφῶν αἰτῶν ἀριστείας. τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστί, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ δια-  
 κειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ [τάς] πολιτείας ἀναγ-  
 καῖον ἐπελθεῖν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα δ'  
 οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν  
 ἀρετὴν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν  
 καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ  
 τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους  
 καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν· εἰ μὲν  
 γὰρ γυναῖκες ἡμῖς μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παιδῶν  
 οἰκονόμοι γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων  
 διώριστα, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἄλλοις λεκτέον, ἀφέντες ὥς τέλους  
 ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν,  
 καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφηναμένων περὶ τῆς  
 ἀρίστης πολιτείας.

12 Nickes omits τὰς, following Ar. § 13 διελθεῖν Schmidt § 17 καὶ is omitted  
 by II<sup>1</sup>, [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 20 οἰκονόμοι Γ, οἱ κοινῶσι II Bk., qui gubernant? (οἰκον-  
 νόμοι?) Ar. || [ἐπεὶ...21 λεκτέον] and 22 [λέγωμεν καὶ] Schmidt || 24 ταύτας τῆς  
 ἀρίστης II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

11 τί τὸ καλῶς sc. ὁμολεῖν (Congreve).  
 πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ <ὁμολεῖν> διώκειν,  
 how the right intercourse ought to be  
 followed: cp. τὰ δὲ κακῶς <ἀρκεῖσθαι καὶ  
 ἀφεῖν> ἀπομόρφον ἐντὶ διαφορῇ, 6 § 10.

12 ἐν τοῖς πολιτείας] This dispo-  
 sition means the scheme of the best state  
 more especially, as is shown by the reason  
 subjoined. But so far as that has come  
 down to us in B. IV(VII) and V(VIII),  
 this point was never reached, nor the  
 question of the proper training and edu-  
 cation of the women. Cp. *Introd.* p. 49  
 n. (4), p. 72. SUSEM. (126)

13 ἀναγκαῖον] Probably because the  
 family will then be treated as a part of  
 the state, and will be better understood in  
 relation to the whole. Comp. n. (13).

πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κτλ] Cp. V(VIII).  
 1. 1, VIII(V). 9. 11 ff., and *Nic. Eth.* v.  
 2. 11, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς  
 ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενομοθέτηται περὶ  
 παιδείας τῆς πρὸς τὸ κοινόν κτλ, with  
 Jackson's notes.

The all important  
 term πολιτεία will be fully explained in  
 B. III (1 § 1, c. 3, 6 § 1 &c). It will

be found to be a much wider term than  
 'constitution' or 'form of government'  
 (τάξις τῶν ἀρχῶν), as indeed the English  
 word 'polity' is still. See VIII. 2. 3,  
 βίη τί ἐστὶ πόλις, and n. (4) on III.  
 3. 9.

16 διαφέρει πρὸς—is an intransitive  
 means towards the excellence of the city;  
 literally "makes a difference with regard  
 to..." So IV(VII). 14. 7, τὸς δὲ καλῶς  
 διαφέρουσιν αἱ πόλεις.

§ 18 18 αἱ μὲν ἐλευθέρων] Cp. II. 9  
 §§ 5, 6 n. (185), *Plato Laws* vi. 781 b, αἱ  
 γὰρ εἴματα μὲν ἐστὶν αἱ δόξαι αἱ, τὰ  
 περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. SUSEM. (127)

20 οἰκονόμοι, administrators, qui ratio-  
 nant publicis Aristot. vi. 1360a, at least as  
 well as of domestic: see III. 2  
 §§ 14, 15; IV(VII). 14 §§ 4-6.

21 ἀφέντες κτλ] "let us dismiss the  
 present discussion as complete, and pass  
 on our subject from a fresh starting point.  
 And first let us review those theorists  
 who have put forward a scheme for the  
 best form of polity." With such an  
 ἄρχη cp. τὴν πρώτην ἀρχήν, III. 2. 3.

## EXCURSUS I.

## EPIMENIDES I. 2 § 5.

THE most detailed account we have of Epimenides is in Diog. Laert. I. 109—115 (cp. Suidas *s. v.*), whilst of modern writers Heinrich *Epimenides of Crete* (Leipzig 1801. 8), Höck *Kreta* III. 246 ff., and C. Schultess *De Epimenide Crete* (Bonn 1877. 8) give the fullest particulars. He was probably of Phaistos in Crete, but lived principally at Knosos and was held in unbounded esteem as an expiatory priest, a prophet, and a worker of magical cures. At the same time, it would appear, he was shrewd in practical statesmanship, so that some reckoned him among the seven wise men. His whole history is mythical. He is said to have reached the age of 154 or 157, or in the Cretans' version of the story, of 299 years, and further to have passed 57 years of his early life asleep in a cave. The story of his having effected the purification of Athens about 596 B.C. has been shown to be unhistorical by Niese *Contributions to the history of Solon and of his time* pp. 12—14 (in *Historische Untersuchungen Arnold Schäfer gewidmet*, Bonn 1882). Whether he owes his place among the seven sages solely to this work attributed to him as Solon's coadjutor, which is Niese's opinion, is not so certain. For to all appearance it is on better authority, at the least, that he is said to have played an important part in Sparta about 580 B.C., where he seems to have pronounced the oracles whereby the transference of the election of ephors from the kings to the popular assembly<sup>1</sup> received the requisite religious sanction<sup>2</sup>. In connexion with this he introduced there the worship of the Cretan moon-goddess Pasiphaë and her oracular dreams: in their ancient official building the ephors had a memorial to him (Paus. III. 11. 11) and even preserved the hide, or animal's skin inscribed with oracles which he was alleged to have written. See Urlichs *On the Rhetra of Lycurgus* in the *Rhein. Mus.* VI. 1848. 217—230, Duncker *History of Antiquity* VI. p. 352 ff. ed. 5 (1882), Schäfer *De ephoris Lacedaemoniis* pp. 14—21 (Leipzig and Greifswald, 1863. 4); also Gilbert *Studien (Studies in the history of ancient Sparta)* p. 185, Frick *De ephoris Spartanis* p. 31 f. (Göttingen 1872. 8). There is a curious story which makes him come to Athens only ten years before the Persian wars, and there prophesy these wars, Plato *Laws* I 642 D. The works attributed to him in Diog. Laert. I. 111—two epics, *Κουρήτων καὶ Κορυβάντων*

<sup>1</sup> If indeed, considering the strange method by which the ephors were selected (see *n.* on II. 9. 23); they can be said to have been elected by the popular assembly at all.

<sup>2</sup> Trieber (*Forschungen* Berlin 1871. 8) *Researches into the history of the Spartan constitution*, p. 130 ff., has indeed endeavoured to prove that the new position of the ephors did not begin until a consider-

ably later period. Of course the ephors did not attain their new position at a single blow, as it were, by the mere fact that their election was taken out of the hands of the kings. On the contrary it must evidently have taken long and arduous struggles to change the disproportionate superiority of the kingly power into corresponding inferiority.

γένεσις καὶ Θεογονία, and Ἄρρητοι κινητήρια τε καὶ ἱστορίαι ἐκ Κρήτης ἀνέκδοτοι, with prose works *περὶ θεοῦ* and *περὶ τῆς ἐν Κρήτῃ πολιτείας* — *SAUV* had any existence: they are a mere invention of the romancer Laëon of Argos in his work *περὶ ποιητῶν*, as *HILLER* has shown in the *Rhén. Mus.* XXXIII. 1898. 525 ff. Other works really appeared under the name of Epimenides, of which some were forgeries attributed to him, others the writings of a later Epimenides. The Fathers mention a work *On Oracles*, *περὶ χρησμῶν*, which can hardly be a prose writing by him, but rather a collection of his oracles; if it is here that the hexameter *Κρήτες δὲ φεύσονται, σὺ δὲ θεῖα, γαστήρ ἀργαῖ* occurs, which the writer of the *Epistle to Titus*, i. 13, attributes to one of the Cretan prophets, ἴδιον αὐτῶν προφήτην, without mentioning his name. Theodoret indeed ascribes the verse to Callimachus, but in his hymn to Zeus (l. 8) only the first words are found: hence Epiphanius (c. *haer.* i. 14) and Hieronymus (T. VII A. p. 707 Vall.) remark that Callimachus on the contrary first took them from Epimenides: cp. *Lübeck Hieronymus* p. 12 f. However that may be, the word quoted by Aristotle most probably occurred in a hexameter, very likely in a collection of oracles which Aristotle had before him, of which Epimenides was the reputed author. Moreover, in *Rhet.* III. 17. 10, 1418 a 23 f., Aristotle says that Epimenides did not divine the future, but only interpreted the obscurities of the past, *περὶ τῶν ἐσθλῶν οὐκ ἐμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν, ἀέθλων δέ;* and this could hardly be affirmed except upon the evidence of such a collection. What connexion there was between this published collection of his oracles and the one which was jealously guarded at Sparta, it is impossible to say. *SUTEM.* (37)

## EXCURSUS II.

ON I. 6 §§ 1—8, 1255 a 5—b 3.

THE recent contributions of Jackson Postgate and Ridgway to the explanation of this passage, referred to in *n.* (51) on δ § 1, have not superseded the more successful results attained by Hampke in the *Philologus* XXIV. 1866. 172 ff. Jackson however has the credit of clearing up the sense of *εἶποναι*, and Ridgway by restoring the right punctuation has helped to correct Hampke's interpretation and to remove apparent difficulties. He saw that in § 4 the words *17 διὰ γὰρ . . . 19 ἀρχαί* form a parenthesis, and hence that the *ἐνὲ* following refers not to this parenthesis but to the sentence which precedes it.

Aristotle admits that not every form of actual slavery is natural; a distinction must be drawn between a slave who is so by nature and a slave according to convention and law. The two may, but need not necessarily, coincide. There are natural bondsmen who are not as a matter of fact enslaved, and people who are not nature's slaves are actually in servitude: the former though not in slave's estate deserve to be so; while the latter, although held in bondage, are undeserving of it. The *unwritten* law in question consists in the universal agreement that persons captured

in war are the slaves of their conquerors (ἐν ᾧ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν). This brings Aristotle to the two extreme and opposite views between which his own holds the mean, the views of the unconditional opponents (A) and of the unconditional defenders (B) of each and every form of slavery. He first speaks of the former, remarking that they impeach the legality of the convention or positive law in question, inasmuch as the better man may become the slave of the stronger or more powerful, whereas in a rational state of society virtue is the sole title to rule<sup>1</sup>. This then is their view (11 οὕτως): the others (B), on the contrary, take the former view, ἐκείνως, that namely prescribed by the foregoing positive law. The two views stand sharply opposed (19 δίστανται χωρίς) and in conflict (ἀμφισβήτησις), yet they have a common point of contact (ἐπαλλάττουσι), both facts being due to one and the same cause. Aristotle might have prevented all misapprehension of these words if he had written ποιεῖ δὲ in line 13. This common cause of both facts is, namely, that virtue (ἀρετή) is that which primarily gives force and might, and that without some sort of excellence the exercise of force is impossible (ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν αἰεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός); only, of course, virtue still requires the indispensable condition of favourable external circumstances (χορηγία). This then is the common point in the two contending views, the point where Aristotle agrees with both, that in the first place only virtue deserves to rule, and in the second place the requisite force to rule essentially depends upon virtue (ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν). But from this common point the conflict between the two theories breaks out on the question, wherein right and justice consists (ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν). Just for this reason (διὰ τοῦτο) the opponents of all slavery make the essence of right to consist in the mutual good-will of rulers and ruled: i.e. in the fact that the ruler, on his part, does not govern in his own selfish interests, but for the welfare of his subjects; and in the willing obedience, on their part, of the ruled. In other words they transfer to the relations between master and servant the principle which Aristotle himself recognizes as the true one in the state, where he uses it to distinguish "normal politics" from "degenerate forms" (παρεκβάσεις). In this Aristotle discovers their mistake: they assume that the truly virtuous man cannot desire to exercise any other kind of lordship,—that it would be a misuse of his force, were he to do so: that he would thereby cease to be a truly virtuous man. So conversely, from the pro-

<sup>1</sup> [Dr Jackson having kindly read this excursus as it was passing through the press remarks upon this last sentence, that in his opinion this is precisely what these people do not appreciate and what Aristotle wishes to impress upon them, viz. that virtue is the sole title to rule. He objects (1) that the words ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ...ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός are not to be taken as implying that the two parties have formulated their views in this way, but as Aristotle's explanation

of their common statement μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν. Further (2) he regards the two propositions contained in ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ...ἀγαθοῦ τινός as the cause but not the matter of the partial agreement between (A) and (B): and he demurs (3) to the statement that the two views simultaneously δίστανται and ἐπαλλάττουσι, (4) to the sense given to ἀτεροὶ λόγοι, and (5) to the vagueness in which the whole passage is left, especially in the part about τὸ δίκαιον.]

...the two... differ at a point prior to the one... Both parties agree that virtue ought to rule, & that virtue... is that which... the argument... agrees...

position 'virtue gives force' the defenders of all slavery argue that 'might is right'—forgetting that it is not virtue alone that gives force, but that it must have favourable external circumstances; when this is not the case the weaker man may easily succumb to the inferior. Aristotle might well wonder this to be actually the reasoning employed by (B), for no other is logically conceivable. In regard to (A), the philosopher is not so certain whether they do thus far agree with (B) and with himself; whether they all really assume that, as a rule, virtue leads to victory. As therefore the sole right of virtue as rule became doubtful, he feels obliged to give an explicit justification of his course in attributing to them the argument above. This is because, if the point of contact between the two views is lost, and both stand opposed without any community, the views of (A), *ἀπείροι λόγοι*, contain nothing tenable or convincing, since they would yield this result that those who stand highest in mental and moral capacity do not deserve to be rulers and masters (*οὐκ ἐστὶν πάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οἰδὴν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πειθεῖν ἄξιον λόγοι, ὥς οὐ δαί τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν*). Postgate correctly remarks that it would have been clearer if Aristotle had written *ἀπείροι λόγοι* for *ἀπείροι λόγοι*.

Aristotle next passes to the view of a third party (C), agreeing in the practical result with that of (B), though not in the reason assigned, as its defenders simply (*ὥλως* to be taken with *ἀντεχόμενοι*) adhere to the principle "what is legal is right"; while even this result is restricted, because the principle is not allowed to apply to the case of non-Hellenes conquering Hellenes, but only to that of Hellenes conquering non-Hellenes or to the relations of the non-Hellenes to one another. The view of (C) is thus essentially nothing else than the popular opinion current in Greece, involved in this inner contradiction; and Aristotle shows that, in the main, his own coincides with it, since it maintains what is true in the popular opinion at the same time that it gets rid of its inconsistencies. For on Aristotle's theory also Greeks are, in the main, the natural rulers, barbarians the natural slaves, though this is a rule which certainly admits of many exceptions (*see Introd.* p. 25). SUSEMIHL.

[Some salient features of Dr Jackson's interpretation may here be appended in his own words. He distinguishes three theories in 1255 A 7—26: viz. i. that of (A) who argues that all slavery is unjust and unnatural, because violence is wrong; ii. that of (B) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because might is right; iii. that of (C) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because what is legal is just<sup>1</sup>: while Aristotle declares that in practice *some* slavery is just, *some* slavery unjust. "In 1255 A 12—21" he continues "Aristotle seeks to show that the positions of (A) and (B) are open to attack precisely in so far as they differ from his own.

"Now the *λόγοι* of (A) and (B)

- i. All slavery is unjust
- ii. All slavery is just

<sup>1</sup> [Dr Jackson's notation X, Y, Z is here altered to (A), (B), and (C), for the sake of uniformity.]

ἐπαλλάττουσιν : *i.e.* slaveries which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just. How is it, then, that these λόγοι ἐπαλλάττουσιν? What is the reason of the controversy between (A) and (B)?

The reason is, Aristotle tells us, that, as ἀρετή with proper appliances is able to exert force or violence, while force or violence implies ἀγαθόν of some sort or other, (A) and (B) agree in assuming that where there is βία, there there is ἀρετή, and consequently suppose that they differ fundamentally in their notions of δίκαιον. That is to say, on the assumption that βία is always accompanied by ἀρετή, (A), who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βία is detestable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, condemns all relations between inferior and superior which are not based upon 'loyalty', *i.e.* the willing obedience which an inferior renders to a kind and considerate superior; while (B) who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βία is respectable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, takes as his principle 'might is right'.

When however the two theories are withdrawn within their proper limits, so that they διεστᾶσι χωρὶς and no longer ἐπαλλάττουσι, the theory which (A) advances against (B) and the theory which (B) advances against (A), ἄτεροι λόγοι, have neither force nor plausibility as against the modified doctrine ὡς δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν<sup>1</sup>.

He adds in a note: "In other words, so long as (A) maintains that All slavery is unjust, and (B) that All slavery is just, (B) has something ἰσχυρόν and πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has something ἰσχυρόν and πιθανόν to urge against (B). But when (A) and (B) respectively fall back from their advanced and untenable positions to the position of Aristotle, (B) has no longer anything ἰσχυρόν or πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has no longer anything ἰσχυρόν or πιθανόν to urge against (B). It will be seen that I take τοὺς λόγους and τῶν λόγων to be 'the theories of (A) and (B)', ἄτεροι λόγοι to be 'the theory *adverse* to (A's) theory and the theory *adverse* to (B's) theory', *i.e.* 'the theories of (B) and (A)'." He agrees with Heitland (*Notes* p. 11) that ἐπαλλάττειν means primarily to 'overlap', whether by superposition or by juxtaposition, and continues: "But when may propositions be said to 'overlap'? At first sight two cases suggest themselves: (1) *All X is Y* might be said to overlap *Some X is Y*, and (2) *Some X is Y* and *Some X is not Y* might be said to overlap one another, provided that these subcontraries are incompatible. It appears however that ἐπαλλάττειν marks not so much the transgression of a limit, as the invasion of a region beyond, and consequently that *All X is Y* could not be said to ἐπαλλάττειν *Some X is Y*. For this reason, as well as because ἐπαλλάττειν understood in the former of the two senses indicated above, would not find a proper antithesis

<sup>1</sup> Apart altogether from my doubts whether the words of § 4 (especially ἐπεὶ, ἄτεροι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ as constructed with πιθανόν) can grammatically bear the meaning which Dr Jackson here assigns to them, I fail to see what imaginable

interest the unconditional supporters of slavery, (B), have to contest the right of τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν to rule at all, or why they should seek to advance anything possessing force and plausibility against 'the modified doctrine.' SUSEM.

in διαστάτων χωρίς, I take ἐπαλλάττειν here in the latter of these senses, the whole field of slavery being a debatable ground which from opposite quarters (A) and (B) have overrun. With the phrase διαστάτων χωρίς, which represents the relative position of (A) and (B) when they have withdrawn to their own sides of the field, compare the kindred use of ἀχώριστος in *ib.* 1, *ib.* 2 & 27. Thus while I agree with Heitland that 'overlap' is the best English equivalent for ἐπαλλάττειν, I demur to his unqualified statement that the latter word expresses the relation in which subcontraries stand to one another.<sup>7</sup>)

Bernays' rendering of 6 §§ 3—5, 1255 a 12—24, mentioned in *ib.* (11), is as follows (the words in italics being supplied by him to explain the connexion of thought).

"The reason for the difference of opinions, and the common ground taken by the divergent views, is that to a certain extent *intrinsic merit*, when it attains external means, becomes also most competent to do violence, and every superior force depends upon the excess of some good quality or other, so that violence seems not to be devoid of all nobler elements and the difference of opinion therefore concerns the question of justice only. For the one side discovers justice in benevolent treatment, *which precludes slavery*; the others even hold it to be just that the stronger should rule. Whereas if the views stood harshly opposed to each other, *so that merely external or brutal violence according to the one, and intrinsic merit according to the other, justified the claim to rule*, then the view which impugns the right of the man, who is the better by his intrinsic merit, to be ruler and lord would be unable to adduce anything cogent or even plausible on its own behalf. Others however fasten wholly on an assumed empirical justice, such as the law, and declare slavery brought about by war to be just *merely because the law sanctions it*; yet in the same breath they are forced to admit that it is unjust."

### EXCURSUS III.

#### THE RELATION OF χρηματιστική TO οἰκονομική: I. B. 2.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἢ χρηματιστικῇ, δῆλον... πότερον ἐκ μέρους αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν. The most obvious reason is to understand ἕτερον εἶδος as only another expression for a mere auxiliary science (ὑπηρητική), or at least as including the relation of an auxiliary science under the case that the two are wholly distinct. In this sense all the commentators take it; both (1) those who think with Blampin—see *ib.* (67) on I. 8. 1—that Aristotle simply wished to set up as an auxiliary science just so much of χρηματιστική as stands in a natural relation to οἰκονομική, and consequently in c. 8 § 13 would set matters right by naming μέρος, so that the direct branch of χρηματιστική is not thereby said to 'be a part of', but only 'to belong to', οἰκονομική, as that with which it is concerned:—and (2) those who with Büchtemann rely on the involved word

of 8 § 13 and maintain Aristotle's decision to be this: that the direct branch of *χρηματιστική* is really a part of *οικονομική*, but that the 'natural' part of indirect *χρηματιστική*, the theory of exchange, is, on the contrary, merely an auxiliary science. Now there is no passage in which Aristotle makes even the slightest allusion to such a difference in the relation of the two to *οικονομική*. But he states explicitly that not until c. 10 does he proceed to give a definite answer to the question proposed in c. 8 § 1, viz. how that branch of *χρηματιστική*, with which the householder is concerned, is related to *οικονομική*; the answer being that it is in one respect a part of *οικονομική*, in another respect an auxiliary science, 10 §§ 1—3. The matter cannot therefore have been previously decided. And yet he had just said that *οικονομική* has to do with the use or consumption of commodities, *χρηματιστική* with their production, and that hence the two are heterogeneous, because consumption and production are not the same thing. Now, as Schütz remarks, this necessarily implies that for the same reason even the branch of *χρηματιστική* most closely allied to *οικονομική* cannot be a part of it except in a restricted and relative sense<sup>1</sup>. This again is decisively confirmed by Aristotle's requirement, IV(VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 18; 10 §§ 9—14, that while none but landowners are to be citizens and none but citizens landowners, they shall not themselves carry on agriculture or cultivate their own estates, since in this way even agriculture really ceases, strictly speaking, to be a distinctive part of household management or domestic economy. Yet on another side the connexion still remains so close that Aristotle can distinguish between the functions of husband and wife in housekeeping by saying III. 4. 17 *n.* (496), that the one has to acquire, the other to keep; in other words that the external management of the property is more appropriate to the husband, the internal management to the wife. From all this it follows that *ἕτερον εἶδος* denotes something which is not connected with *οικονομική* either as a part of it, or simply as an auxiliary to it: the more subtle distinction between branch and subsidiary science is, for the present, to remain undecided; and *μέρος* is used in a vaguer sense, even covering the case of an auxiliary science, this being also true of 10 § 1, so that there is certainly no need to expunge the word there. Such instances of inexactness and careless expression frequently obscure Aristotle's meaning; but in this part of the work they are unusually numerous. Thus *χρηματιστική* has three meanings, (1) = *κτητική*, in the widest sense; 3 § 3 and c. 8: and, in a narrower sense, (2) = *μεταβλητική* or *καπηλική*, ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαία of 9 § 18 (so from c. 9 § 1 onwards); and again (3) = ἡ ἀναγκαία, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν, 9 § 12, c. 10 (*cp. n.* on 8 § 1). Several times only accurate observation of the context can determine which of the three senses the word has. Similarly *μεταβλητική* or *μεταβολική* as a general term for exchange includes under it both the natural and unnatural species of indirect acquisition, both that which comes under *οικονομική* and

<sup>1</sup> If Büchschütz had definitely put the question to himself, whether acquiring can be a branch of using and consuming he would no doubt have answered

in the negative. To acquire and to spend, or consume, are really opposed; which is what Aristotle says briefly, but to my thinking quite clearly.

that which is alien to it : but sometimes it is found in the narrowest application of retail trade proper, *καπηλική*, as in 9 § 12, 10 § 4, 11 § 4. Teichmüller has some good remarks on the want of a strict terminology in Aristotle *Arist. Forschungen* II. 4 ff.

Besides, to ask whether *χρηματιστική* is a part of *οικονομική*, is, as Charles has pointed out<sup>1</sup>, a perverse way of raising the question. For *οικονομική*, conversely, has a wider field than *οικονομική* : even the finances of the state and the labour of the whole society of the citizens are intimately concerned in it, and the earnings which supply the wants of single households form only an important part of this sum total of the national income. Aristotle finds himself accordingly compelled to speak of a *χρηματιστική* (I II 12—13, II § 13) which is not simply for the householder and the family circle, but for statesmen and the commonwealth. At the same time he is so inconsistent as to designate the accumulation of a stock of commodities or possessions which shall be useful for civil society, whether it be by direct production or by plunder, a branch or a concern of *οικονομική*<sup>2</sup>. Cp. the notes on I §§ 13—15, and on II § 13. SUSEM. (69)

#### NOTE ON I. 13 § 12: REASON AND VIRTUE IN THE SLAVE.

The difficulty pointed out in notes (45) and (121) on I § 9 and II § 12, may perhaps be removed as follows. If the slave by nature is to be altogether without that lower part of reason, which Aristotle here calls *τὸ βουλευτικόν*, he would be without reason altogether ; for still less can he be said to have the higher part, *τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν*, scientific thought. But then he would quite cease to be a human being. The expression *ὅλος αὖτε ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν*, II § 7, should therefore be taken as hyperbolic and interpreted in the light of that other, and itself hyperbolic, statement *καταστὰς λόγος συνίσταται ἑαυτοαὐτοῦ αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχον* I § 9: reason is present in the slave only, as to speak, as a *δύναμις*, not as a *ἔξις*; and Aristotle avails himself of the

<sup>1</sup> *Staatslehre* II. 81: "It is just like putting the question: Is the universal the same as the particular, or a part of it, or a distinct species? For that *χρηματιστική* has the wider generality and that *οικονομική* is the particular, is evident. We should have expected to hear, what *χρηματιστική* is in itself, what comes under it, and then the relation of *οικονομική* to it would have followed of itself and have been arrived at very simply. Whereas by adopting the opposite" (?) "procedure, we can only with difficulty surmise that *χρηματιστική* is unambiguously an independent branch of science, treating quite generally of the means to acquire property and increase wealth; that *οικονομική* teaches us to apply to the manage-

nance of the household the means, which the other science indicates." It must be observed in reply to this, that only the smaller and less essential branch of *οικονομική* in Aristotle's sense has this function, II § 1, 10 that as it has to do with consumption, while *χρηματιστική* is concerned with accumulation, even the branch of *οικονομική* is not related to *χρηματιστική* simply as particular to universal.

<sup>2</sup> Schütz alone saw this difficulty and vainly tried to get over it by the means of an *ἐκ βουλευτικῆς καὶ ἐκ ἐπιστημονικῆς*, II § 13. He failed to see that it was unnecessary to reject without § 13 I § 1 and hence, that those words indeed need be the first to go.

hyperbole μὴ ἔχειν to denote that only the indispensable, or roughly speaking insignificant, minimum of rational deliberation, and therefore of reason generally, is found in such men. It is precisely similar with c. 6 of the *Poetics*, where first of all § 9, 1450 a 7, characters (ἥθη) are said to form a part of every tragedy, and then a little farther on § 14, a 23, we read ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγωδία, ἄνευ δὲ ἡθῶν γένοιτ' ἄν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀήθεις τραγωδίαί εἰσιν καὶ ὅλως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι. Comp. *Hermes* XIX. 1884, p. 592. SUSEM. Plato too, *Rep.* IV. 441 A, says λογισμοῦ δ' ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε. Taken strictly this would deny to children and many adults the possession, as well as the use, of reason.

## NOTE ON I. 2 § 13: 1253 a 20—24.

ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται πούς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ (? γὰρ) τῷ ἔργῳ ὠρίσται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα. The words of n. (28) p. 150 "if τοιαύτη=a true hand" will admit of further elucidation. Schöll, who maintains this to be the meaning of τοιαύτη, 'talis qualis esse debet vera manus' (Susem. *Quaest. Crit.* IV. p. 5), cites as analogous the use of τοιοῦτος in *De part. animal.* I. 1 §§ 25, 26, 640 b 33; καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματος μορφήν, ἀλλ' ὁμως οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. ἔτι δ' ἀδύνατον εἶναι χεῖρα <τὴν> ὅπως οὖν διακειμένην, οἷον χαλκὴν ἢ ξυλίνην, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ τὸν γεγραμμένον ἱατρόν. οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται ποιεῖν τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἔργον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' αὐλοὶ λίθινοι τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἔργον, οὐδ' ὁ γεγραμμένος ἱατρός. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν τοῦ τεθνηκότος μορίων οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστί, λέγω δ' οἷον ὀφθαλμός, χεῖρ (where Schöll has himself added τὴν). The citation is the more apposite because Schöll takes διαφθαρεῖσα χεῖρ to mean precisely τοῦ τεθνηκότος χεῖρ, 'manus corporis extincti, ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ ὅλου, quae propter hanc solam causam simul corrupta est appellanda.'

There is however another suggestion. Even granting that, as Schöll contends, διαφθαρεῖσα is subject and τοιαύτη predicate, and that διαφθαρεῖσα means 'a dead man's hand,' may not τοιαύτη mean simply 'homonymous,' a hand in much the same sense as a hand of stone? Thus explained ἔσται τοιαύτη is parallel to οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα, there is no need to insert οὐκ, and πάντα γὰρ (which the best MSS. of the old translation attest) is a distinct improvement upon πάντα δὲ. So in effect Vettori p. 14 (ed. of 1576): "posset enim, inquit, aliquis manum vocare e lapide formatam, quae tamen manus non esse perspicitur: neque enim fungitur munere manus. . manus vero hominis mortui talis profecto est."

## B.

ἐπεὶ [δὲ] προαιρούμεθα θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωίας τῆς πολιτικῆς, τίς κρατίστη πασῶν τοῖς δυναμένους ζῆν βέλτιστα κατ' εὐχὴν, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι τοιαύτας, αἷς τε χρῶνται τινες τῶν πόλεων τῶν εὐκταμένων λεγομένων, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνουσιν ἐπὶ τῶν εὐκταμένων καὶ δοκοῦσαι καλῶς ἔχειν, ἵνα τό τ' ὁρθῶς ἔχον ἀφ' οὗ

1260 b 27 δὲ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> Ar., and γάρ would make a better transition. See *Intr.* p. 14, n. 3 || 28 τίς Π<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr. in the margin over an erasure, cf. P<sup>2</sup> Bk. P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || 31 καθ' Π<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. (perhaps rightly) || τυγχάνουσιν P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand) and perhaps Γ, τυγχάνωσιν M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1-2-4</sup> C<sup>3</sup> Q<sup>3</sup> T<sup>3</sup> U<sup>3</sup> Ald. Bk.<sup>1</sup> and a later hand in P<sup>4</sup> || εὐκταμένοι Schneider, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1368 f. || 31 τ' omitted by M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>4</sup>

Book II is the critical portion of the work, just as an examination of preceding theories serves for an introduction to other Aristotelian treatises, *Metaphysics Physics Psychology* &c. Here cc. 1-8 deal with Political Thinkers, cc. 9-12 with Existing Constitutions. See *Intro.* p. 32.

§ 1. Our object is to discover the best scheme of political society. We must therefore examine in detail the best existing form of government and the theories of our predecessors: § 1.

First of all, should the community which in some measure is implied in every city (§ 2) extend to wives and children and to property, as in Plato's *Republic*? § 3.

§ 1. 1260 b 27 προαιρούμεθα This is evidence (as against Götting *Preface* p. xviii, and others) that Aristotle intended to construct an ideal state: see Spengel *Über die Politik* p. 11, and compare 18 (VII). 13. 4.

κοινωνίας τῆς πολ.] This takes us back to 1. 1 § 1. The imperfect 'associations' whose relation to civil society, § παλιναῖα was, was the preliminary problem, have been dealt with in B. 1.

29 κατ' εὐχὴν] For this expression see 6 § 7 n. (202); 1V(VII). 4 §§ 1, 2. 5 § 3.

10 § 13, 11 § 1, 12 § 9, 13 § 9, 14 § 1, 11 § 1 with notes. See 1260 b 1260.

In Plato εὐχὴν ἔσται a visionary scheme, e.g. *Rep.* 456 C, εἰς δὲ αὐτὴν γὰρ αὐτὴ εὐχὴν ἔσται ἐκαστοῦ, καὶ τὸ δικαίον δὲ κατασκευασθαι, καὶ αὐτὴν εὐχὴν λέγουσι; and in 458 C καὶ εὐχὴν εὐκταμένοι is explained by Εἰς πόλιν μὲν, δυνατὸν δὲ εἶναι. Thus εὐχὴν ἔσται, something visionary, impracticable, as in Demosth. 1. *Timonee*, 711, 12, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ εὐχὴν, καὶ δυνατὸν δὲ εἶναι, εὐχὴν αὐτὸν εὐκταμένοι δὲ λέγουσι. Similarly ὁρθῶς in Latin. Bk. II (the scheme κατ' εὐχὴν Aristotle implies that no restrictions are placed on the realization of the scheme by circumstances).

30 τινες τῶν πόλεων] See 11 (VII). 14. 13 n. See 1260 b 1260.

εὐκταμένους λεγομένων] e.g. by the historical Socrates *Xen. Mem.* vi. 2. 12, vi. 4. 13; Plato *Cratyl.* 41 n, Pa. *Plato* *Alcibi.* 130 n. Add *Nic. Eth.* i. 12. 3.

31 ἵνα καλῶς] 'in order to make what they have of right and useful, and to show that it is from no love of happiness or gratification at all, but only for the sake of some new form of policy, distinct from these, might seem to imply that some the

καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτὰς ἕτερον μὴ (I)  
δοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ  
35 καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην  
δοκῶμεν ἐπιβάλλεσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.

§ 2 ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον, ἥ περ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης 2  
τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦτοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς  
πολίτας, ἢ μηδενός, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ μή. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδενός  
40 κοινωνεῖν φανερόν ὡς ἀδύνατον (ἢ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τις  
ἐστί, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἰς  
1261 a ὁ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολῖται κοινοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως).  
§ 3 ἀλλὰ πότερον ὅσων ἐνδέχεται κοινωνῆσαι, πάντων βέλτιον  
κοινωνεῖν τὴν μέλλουσαν οἰκῆσεσθαι πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν  
μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ  
5 γυναικῶν καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλοις,  
ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης

33 τί P<sup>1</sup>, omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup>, hence [τι] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || 36 ἐπιβα-  
λέσθαι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 40 πολιτεία Π, πόλις Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> Ar. (?) and Γ (?),  
*civitas* William || 41 τοῦ τόπου after κοινωνεῖν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || εἰς ὁ τῆς Γ, ἰσότης Π  
Ar. ||

1261 a 2 ἀλλὰ... b 15 αἰρετώτερον. Eubulos, in Angelo Mai's *Script. vet. nov. coll.*  
*Vat.* II. p. 671 sqq., attempts to refute this passage || ὅσον M<sup>s</sup> C<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> ||  
πάντων omitted by Γ, [πάντων] Susem.<sup>1</sup> but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1363 f. || 6  
πλάτωνος πολιτεία M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, πολιτεία τοῦ πλάτωνος Q<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald.

defectiveness of all schemes hitherto framed that we have undertaken this investigation.'

34 σοφίζεσθαι = affect wisdom, show one's cleverness, whence σοφιστής. Elsewhere in the treatise simply 'to devise,'  
5 § 19, VI(IV). 13. 1, VII(VI). 14. 19.

36 ἐπιβάλλεσθαι] Shilleto compares Thuc. VI. 40, Plato *Soph.* 264 B, *Tim.* 48 C, *Laws* X. 892 D, for this sense 'to take up.'

§ 2 37 ἡ περ πέφυκεν] The natural beginning, seeing that every state is a form of association, *κοινωνία*, I. I. 1 (Eaton). SUSEM. (129)

38 ἦτοι πάντας πάντων κτλ] The same alternatives are given IV(VII). 8 § 8—9 § 2.

41 τοῦ τόπου] The converse is not universally true. Mere contiguity of residence is not enough to constitute citizenship : III. 1 § 3, 9 § 9. Note here the idea of *territory* in the germ.

§ 3 1261 a 3 οἰκῆσεσθαι] Eaton proposes a reflexive sense, "direct itself

aright," comparing Thuc. VI. 18 τὴν πόλιν τρήψεσθαι αὐτὴν περὶ αὐτὴν and other instances.

6 ἐκεῖ] *Rep.* IV 423 E f. V 449 C—466 D. This passage and V(VIII). 7. 9 justify the inference that ὁ Σωκράτης with the article V(VIII). 7. 9, means throughout ὁ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σ., Socrates, the character in the Platonic dialogue, in keeping with Aristotle's cautious manner of referring controversially to contemporary thought. Not directly named, as a rule, Plato lurks under Socrates (cp. *nn.* 116, 199), as under τινές, τις τῶν πρότερον, and the like. See Campbell's apt remarks on similar reticence in Plato, *Introd.* to *Theaetetus* p. xxxiv, ed. 2.

cc. 2—5 An Examination of Plato's Republic.

c. 2 Communism would not secure Plato's end, which is the utmost possible unity. Excessive unification subverts the city, reducing it to a family or an individual: §§ 1, 2. The elements of the city are dissimilar, and thus it is differen-

φησὶ δεῖν κοινὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι καὶ τὰς  
κτηήσεις. τοῦτο δὴ πότερον ὥς νῦν οὕτω βέλτιον ἔχει, ὅ  
κατὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ γεγραμμένον νόμον;

2 ἔχει δὲ δυσχερείας ἄλλας τε πολλὰς τὸ πάντων εἶναι τὰς  
γυναῖκας κοινὰς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νεομορφασθῆναι τὸν  
τρόπον τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων  
ἔτι δὲ πρὸς, τὸ τέλος ὃ φησι τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὥς μὲν

10 ἔχει... 1269 a 27 διαφορὰν noticed by Mich. of Ephesus op. c. f. 128<sup>a</sup> | 49 f. 1<sup>a</sup>  
II<sup>a</sup>, perhaps rightly | 11 κοινὰς «καὶ τέκνα» Spengel | 13 δεῖ δὲ πρὸς, cf. *De Rep.*,  
cp. τοσοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ἐτι πρὸς, *De Soph. Elench.* 4 § 7. 166 a 24 f.: δεῖ δὲ [τὰς] ἐκ  
Susem.<sup>123</sup>, tracing it to a variant πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον of *deῖ δεῖ*: yet the construction  
πρὸς τὸ τέλος with Thurot's construction ("as regards the end," making an *ad*  
*ἐρηται* νῦν subject to ἀδύνατον) is not impossible: πρὸς δὲ τέλος φησὶ Boeckl

dated from an offensive and defensive  
alliance (συνμαχία) and a race as tribe  
(φύλας); § 3. It is this which makes neces-  
sarily the political safeguard, § 4, allowing  
the citizens to become alternately rulers  
and subjects, although a permanent govern-  
ing body would be better, §§ 5, 6; allowing  
also a change of functions among the offi-  
cials, § 7. Further, the greater independ-  
ence (αὐτάρκεια) secured in the city essen-  
tially depends upon a degree of unity  
lower than that of the family, § 8.

See Grote's *Plato* c. 35, III. pp. 160—  
242, Oncken I. 171—193 and various  
monographs quoted in the *Introd.* p.  
32 n. 4, p. 33 n. 7. The main defects  
of this criticism are at once apparent;  
Zeller, *Platonis Studios* p. 103, 190, has  
rightly traced them to an excessive  
striving after logical clearness; a tendency  
to reduce the Platonic utterances to a  
number of precise dogmatic propositions  
and to test the independent validity of  
each empirically, without regard to its  
inner connexion with the whole system of  
idealism. Hence it comes about that the  
spirit of the Platonic teaching is hardly  
ever adequately appreciated, while now  
and then there is a captious, almost pe-  
dantic, disposition to get at external  
results and to fasten on details with but  
little insight into their true relative im-  
portance. "Several objections urged by  
him turn more upon the Platonic lan-  
guage than upon the Platonic vein of  
thought, and if judged by Plato from his  
own point of view would have appeared  
admissions in his favour rather than objec-  
tions" (Grote). This is the sober fact,  
and serves to account for the frequent  
charges of injustice, sophistry, and mis-

take sometimes brought against Aristotle.

§ 1. 10. πάντων καὶ γυναικῶν are un-  
intentional misrepresentations of the kind  
just criticised. The 'marriage laws' in  
question affect only Plato's Guardians,  
and do not establish community of wives  
at all, in the strictly literal and unquali-  
fiable sense of the term, which would  
be a gross libel, we are told, on the philo-  
sopher who made marriage, as to speak,  
a 'sacrament'. Indeed they 'were to him  
at an impossible structure,' hardly less  
exacting than vows of celibacy (Grote  
*Plato* p. 489 Eng. tr.). And this must  
have been Aristotle's judgment; he never  
attacks them on the score of license, but  
only on grounds of public expediency.  
Moreover the aim of these laws and the  
arguments by which they are defended  
are such as to lay them open to the  
inexact and misleading application even  
at the hands of impartial modern critics.  
See e.g. Dr Jowett's remarks *Plato* III.  
p. 160 ff.

11 δὲ ἣν αἰτίαν—αἰτία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ  
which he assigns as the reason why  
such legislation is necessary does not ap-  
pear to result from his proposals; it ap-  
pears following on of τὸν δὲ I had pre-  
ceded. In 4 § 3 is a similar attraction.  
The 'reason' in question is the funda-  
mental assumption of the Platonist, that  
the utmost possible unity is desir-  
able; communism, within certain limits,  
is a means to this unity.

13 Thurot would translate: 'referring  
in view of the end which he now ought to  
be set before the city his present proposal  
(of his scheme) is impracticable.' But it  
is simpler to take *εἰς* as *propter*; *εἰς*  
may be adverbial (see *Gram. Nouns*); "the

εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον, πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν, οὐδὲν διώρισται. (I)  
 § 2 λέγω δὲ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἄριστον ὃν ὅτι μάλιστα  
 16 πᾶσαν· λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης.

καίτοι φανερόν ἐστιν ὡς προϋοῦσα καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλ- 4  
 λον οὐδὲ πόλις ἔσται· πλήθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις,  
 γινομένη τε μία μᾶλλον οἰκία μὲν ἐκ πόλεως ἄνθρωπος δ' ἐξ  
 20 οἰκίας ἔσται· μᾶλλον γὰρ μίαν τὴν οἰκίαν τῆς πόλεως φαίμεν (p.  
 ἄν, καὶ τὸν ἕνα τῆς οἰκίας· ὥστ' εἰ καὶ δυνατός τις εἴη τοῦτο  
 § 3 δρᾶν, οὐ ποιητέον· ἀναιρήσει γὰρ τὴν πόλιν. οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ  
 πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἶδει δια-  
 φερόντων. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. ἕτερον γὰρ συμ-

14 εἴρηται] διήρηται Zwinger || δεῖ omitted by M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, inserted by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || διελεῖν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2,3</sup>. C<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, εἰπεῖν? Susem. || 15 ὃν omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. and the 1st hand of P<sup>4</sup> (inserted between the lines and by a later hand in the margin) || 16 πᾶσαν before 15 ὡς ἄριστον Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. (in P<sup>4</sup> corrected by a later hand in the margin) || 18 οὐδὲ] οὐ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || ἡ omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>; hence [ἡ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 21 ἕνα <μᾶλλον ἕνα>? Riese, needlessly || καὶ after εἰ omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup>, [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1</sup>; notwithstanding Dittenberger's protest, *op. c.* p. 1361, καὶ is not indispensable, see III. 16 § 9, 1287 b 6 || 22 δ' ἐκ Π<sup>2</sup>, ἐκ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, δὲ [ἐκ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 23 εἶδει] εἶδους C<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, εἰδείους P<sup>6</sup> U<sup>b</sup>, in P<sup>4</sup> the word stands over an erasure

end as there stated by Plato is impossible (to attain).” For νῦν=in the case supposed, see 3 § 2, 8 § 10: νῦν δ' (on the scheme of Hippodamōs) ἰδίαν ἔχουσιν.

14 διελεῖν=analyse, define (by analysis), more nearly determine: III. 13 § 6, 14 § 2, *De gen. et corr.* I. 1. 1 τὰς τε αἰτίας διαιρετέον.

§ 2 16 λαμβάνει γὰρ κτλ] *Rep.* IV 422 D f., 423 D f.; V 449 B f., 462. The three general positions which Aristotle takes up against Plato in §§ 1, 2 are treated in reverse order in the sequel. The third, “the end is impracticable” in c. 2; then the second, “the means are unsuitable” in cc. 3, 4, 5 §§ 1—13: lastly, “the many other difficulties” in c. 5 §§ 14—28 (Thurot). *Comp. Analysis* pp. 102, 103. SUSEM. (130)

17 μία μᾶλλον] too much of a unity.

18 πλήθος γάρ τι] See 5 § 15, III. 1 § 2, § 12.

22 οὐ ποιητέον...πόλιν] With these words the polemic against Plato is resumed exactly where it had started at the commencement of the work, I. 1. 2 cp. *note* (2 b) and *Introd.* p. 23, i.e. with the specific difference between a state and a family; and this point of view is retained in §§ 7, 8, 3 § 4—4 § 10, 5 §§ 14—24.

The discussions in this book supply the further relation that the maintenance of the state itself is conditioned by the maintenance of the family. SUSEM. (131)

§ 3 The state is an organized unity. The plurality of parts which it contains are specifically distinct and properly subordinated. This however is one distinctive thought of the *Republic*, the ground of Plato's analogy between the state and the individual.

24 οὐ γὰρ...ἐξ ὁμοίων] Apparently contradicted by III. 8 § 4, 16 § 2, VI (IV). 11 § 8; but there equality of rights is intended by ὁμοίων (Eaton). The present statement is repeated III. 4. 5 where *uniformity* of moral excellence is disclaimed: here the sense is similarity of functions (Postgate), as is illustrated by *N. Eth.* V. 5. 9, οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἰατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἱατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ, καὶ ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι. It is the basis of the arrangements proposed *Pol.* IV (VII) cc. 8, 9. See on I. 7. § 1 n. (58 b).

συμμάχια] A confederation is a different thing from a state: see III. 3 § 5, 9 §§ 7, 10. It is not an organism but an aggregate of homogeneous members. The

μαχία καὶ πόλιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ προσῶ χρήσιμον, εἰς ὃ  
τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἶδει (βοηθείας γὰρ χάριν ἡ συμμαχία τίθη-  
κεν), ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμὸς πλεῖον ἰσχύσει (πλεῖον τε τῷ  
τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλιν ἔθνους, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κράτος ὦσι ἐκχω-  
σμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες)· ἐξ ὧν εἰ εἰς ἐν  
γενέσθαι, εἶδει διαφέρει· διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιστοιχεῖν

26 τῷ (τῷ P<sup>4</sup>) αὐτῷ P<sup>4</sup>C<sup>1</sup>Q<sup>1</sup>T<sup>1</sup>U<sup>1</sup> | 27 ἰσότην H<sup>1</sup>Bk., ἰσότην M<sup>1</sup> | ἰσότην  
'Αρκάδες (transposed by Sussem.<sup>1</sup> to come before ἀλλὰ πλεῖον εἶδος &c. but wrongly) |  
28 καὶ πόλιν] πόλιν καὶ? Sussem. | 29 ἀλλ' πάλαι Schneider, [ἀλλ'] Schömann (ἴσων  
| 'Αρκάδες \* \* Conring, ὅσον «ἴσων» Riese; but see Dittenberger op. cit. p. 117 B and  
the Comm. below | 30 γινέσθαι? Sussem. | εἶδει = εἶδος διαφέρειν Dindorf (pro-  
bably right), εἶδει διαφέρειν M<sup>1</sup>

separate autonomous states, the Lacedæ-  
monians and their allies, for example,  
are homogeneous.

25 τὸ μὲν answered by 29 ἐξ ὧν δέ. The  
one (the alliance for war) will be of ad-  
vantage from its mere size however  
much alike in kind, just as (it will be of  
advantage) if a weight shall pull more  
(than another): i.e. like a heavier weight  
which turns the scale. The more mem-  
bers the stronger the alliance.

27 διοίσει κατλ] "Upon something  
similar", the character of the constituents,  
whether *heterogeneous* (so as to allow of  
reciprocity) or *homogeneous*, "will de-  
pend the difference also between a city  
and a race, provided the race does not  
live with its population separated over a  
number of villages, but like the Arca-  
dians." Not observing the parenthesis  
and taking *ὅσον μὴ ὦσι ἐκχωρ.* as expe-  
ditious of τῷ τούτῳ the editors have  
referred this remark to the process of  
*συνουκισμὸς*, the change from village life  
by which a Greek *ἔθνος* was consolidated  
into one city. But (1) the Arcadians  
must surely be cited as an example of a  
race and not (as they would be upon  
that view) of a city: (2) this is not a dis-  
tinction between *ἔθνος* and *πόλις* univer-  
sally, but between one *ἔθνος* and another.  
(3) We should then expect *οὐκ εἶναι*, or  
*ὅσον = εἶδος*—or something equivalent: and  
the exact force of the future and of τῷ  
τούτῳ (not τούτῳ) would be missed.  
(4) In that case Arcadians means sim-  
ply Megalopolitans, whereas Tegeates,  
Mantineans and others might equally  
claim to belong to the Arcadian league  
(τὸ Ἀρκάδιον). Hence Dittenberger, in  
*Goth. gel. Anzeigen* 1874 p. 1381, re-  
jects the supposed reference to *συνου-  
κισμὸς* and takes *ὅσον μὴ εἶναι* as a

limiting clause, which excludes from the  
comparison the cases where the people  
live *συνά* almost and opposes to the city-  
state only such "races" as the Arcadians.

29 Ἀρκάδες] Who are meant? The  
interpretation of the passage turns upon  
this. When Plato, *Symp.* 192 a, *εἰς* *ἑνὸς*  
*διαίτησιν* *ὅσον* *εἰς* *ὅσον* *ἄλλοις* *Ἀρκάδες*  
*εἰς* *ὅσον* *Ἀρκάδες* *ἄλλοις* the words quoted  
show that the Mantinians are meant.  
Demosthenes *Or.* xvi must 'Αρκάδες also  
times and Μεγαλοπολίται seven times of  
the same people whose city was entitled in  
full ἡ μεγάλη πόλις τῶν Ἀρκάδων.  
There everything is clear from the inter-  
change of terms. But if the words "where  
they live like the Arcadians" indicate as  
*ἔθνος* so well known as to spare Aristotle  
further explanation the instance chosen  
ought, as Dittenberger urges, to be taken  
all things considered. Undoubtedly then  
neither the Mantinians with Schneider,  
nor the Megalopolitans with Conring,  
nor with Gellertius the Mantinians and  
Purphadians in the northwest before the  
founding of Megalopolis; none of these  
exclusively; but the entire population of  
Arcadia, as the word naturally means.  
See *Notes on Arcadia* at the end of B. vi.

"Further compare 1. 1 § 4 n. 111, 1 § 8  
(19): III. 13. 19 (207): IV (111. a 10  
[760]." Sussem. (138)

ἢ ὧν εἰς πόλιν] Whence in the case of  
the city-state the elements which must  
coalesce into one are of most far, are Civil  
Notes) specifically distinct. So that it  
would not make a single city, 10. 1 § 1,  
9 § 9, to join by an interval the two such  
similar units as the only body of Cyneth  
and that of Megara; the conditions for  
reciprocity would be wanting.

1 § 30 τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιστοιχεῖν  
Not 'equal population' but the propor-

31 σῶζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον· (I)

tional adjustment of claims, *i.e.* reciprocity of services and functions.

"As 'reciprocal proportion' regulates the exchange of different wares in *Nic. Eth.* v 5, so here it regulates the relations between the magistrate for the time being and the ordinary citizen, who render, the one service, the other *τιμὴ καὶ γέρας Nic. Eth.* v 6 § 7, 1134 b 7. On the application of the principle of *ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν*, 'reciprocal proportion', to commerce, friendship, and exchange generally, see my edition of the Fifth Book of the *Ethics* p. 88 ff. In *Nic. Eth.* v 5 § 6, 1132 b 32 it is *ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα*, *i.e.* 'reciprocal proportion' as opposed to the 'retaliation' of the Pythagoreans, which is said to hold the πόλις together. The inconsistency is however only apparent. Here, where it is not necessary to emphasize the distinction between *ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν*, *i.e.* *κατ' ἰσότητα λόγων*, and *ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἰσότητα*, *i.e.* *κατ' ἰσότητα ἀπλῶς*, τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός is the equivalent of *ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν* in the other passage. By a similar inexactitude in *Nic. Eth.* ix 1 § 1, 1163 b 33 geometrical proportion takes the place of reciprocal proportion as the rule of exchange. Just so, although τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον is τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν viii(v) 1, 1301 b 37, at vii(vi) 2 § 2, 1317 b 3 τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικόν is said to consist in τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν in the former passage including, and in the latter excluding, τὸ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσον. See my notes on *Nic. Eth.* v 3 § 7." JACKSON.

From the apparent inconsistency Grant inferred, *Ethics* i. p. 52 f., that the remarks on Retaliation in the *Ethics* are a development and improvement of those in the *Politics*. The common source may be Plato's Διὸς κρίσις, the true πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, of *Laus* vi 757 B, C: τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω τῷ δ' ἐλάττωι μικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζουσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν αἰεὶ μείζους κτλ.

31 ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς] *Nic. Eth.* v. 5. 6, where from the nature of the case and the explanations given τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός is not to be understood negatively of retaliation for evil suffered, but positively as a recompense for good received. (As there explained the one, retaliation, repays like with like; the other makes requital by the corresponding term in reciprocal pro-

portion: for in reference to his demand the builder is to shoes as the shoemaker to the house.) More precisely thus: of the different members of a community A transfers to B the goods which he (A) has and B has not, receiving in return that which he lacks himself and B has: thus a shoemaker exchanges shoes with a baker for bread. Hence we read in § 9 of the same chapter that an association (κοινωνία) of two similar members, as two physicians, is impossible: it can only be formed by a physician and a farmer, or generally by members dissimilar and unequal, between whom equality or proportion is thus said to be produced.

Now the dissimilar members in the state are rulers and subjects. The former afford the latter a wise and intelligent guidance in return for which they receive respect (*N. E.* viii. 14. 3, 1163 b 6), willing obedience, and skilful execution of their commands: and the subjects, in return for this obedience, receive from their rulers the wise government before mentioned. On this depends the continuance and well being of the state. Compare further i. 2. 16, iii. 10. 2, with notes (28 c, 562).

But as the greatest possible equality amongst the citizens is the aim of Aristotle's best polity no less than of Plato's—i. 7. 1 *n.* (58 b), iv(vii). 8. 4 (797), vi(iv). 11. 8 (1293); iii. 16. 2 (672), 17 § 2, i § 10 (440, 441), 13 § 9 (595), § 12 (597-9)—a seeming inconsistency arises; compare also iii. 4. 5 *n.* (471). The fuller explanation which follows in the text is intended to remove this inconsistency by showing that even in the ideal state there is the same difference between rulers and subjects and the same adjustment of the difference, and to what extent this holds. Thus §§ 4—7 διόπερ τὸ ἴσον...ἀρχάς are a digression, but one indispensable to Aristotle's argument, which, putting this aside, runs as follows: the state has more need than the family of a plurality, or more precisely of a plurality of *dissimilar* members, § 2. Remove the dissimilarity and you destroy the state which is still more evident if independence (αὐτάρκεια) be also taken into account, § 8.

Camerarius, and long before him Eubulos, blame Aristotle unfairly for not seeing that Plato's unity of the state meant only the utmost possible unity concord and unanimity among the citizens. From

ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἴσοις ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' εἶναι ἅμα  
 γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε πάντας ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατ' ἀναμνησιν ἢ  
 5 κατὰ τινα ἄλλην τάξιν ἢ χρόνον. καὶ συμβαίνει δὲ τῆς  
 τρόπου τοῦτον ὥστε πάντας ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μετέβαλλον  
 οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ αἰεὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ σκυτοτόμοι  
 6 καὶ τέκτονες ἦσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ \* \* βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ  
 τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὅς τοις αὐτοῖς αἰεὶ βέλ-  
 τιον ἄρχειν, εἰ δυνατόν· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατόν διὰ τῆς

32 ἅμα] ἀλλὰ P<sup>1</sup> in the margin | 33 γὰρ] ἀ Γ M<sup>1</sup> | 34 ἢ] εφ. A; (probably  
 right) | 35 μετέβαλλον M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Sussem.<sup>1-2</sup> | 36 αἰεὶ] after αὐτοῖς P<sup>1-2</sup> C<sup>1</sup> (p. 7)  
 U<sup>1</sup> Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P<sup>1</sup> (omitted by the 1st hand in P<sup>1</sup>) | 37 ἐπεὶ] ἐπεὶ  
 Bernays, who by omitting with Koraes τὰ which follows skillfully removes all traces of  
 the lacuna after δι' ἀναμνησιν by Cornutus and Schönscher (cfr. ἐπεὶ δι' ἀναμνησιν  
 ἔχει· καὶ περὶ τὴν κ. τὴν πολιτικὴν δῆλον): «οὐχ» εἴρει Schönscher—apparently wrong;  
 cp. the Comm.: «βέλτιον ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένοι· ταῦτόν ἐργον αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν  
 ἀποτελεῖται, καὶ πέφυκε δὴ» βέλτιον or something similar Thurot

3 | 31 + 32 Π., 341 + 35 11, §§ 14, 15,  
 §§ 19, 20 it is clear that Aristotle was  
 well aware of this fact. Nevertheless it  
 may easily be seen that this does not  
 affect the soundness of his reasoning  
 which, as even the language shows, is  
 directed more especially against *Archaia*  
 v. 461, where Plato is showing how the  
 abolition of family life would be the  
 means of making all the citizens of his  
 ideal state feel as the members of a single  
 family (cp. n. 140) or even of a single  
 man (cfr. *ἄρα δὲ ἐγγύστερον οὐκ ἀσφαλέως*  
*ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὅτι πάλιν ὁμοῖα διοικεῖται*). Is  
 this not, as Aristotle rightly puts it, to  
 prescribe for the state the end of repre-  
 senting as far as possible an individual  
 man? "Aristotle's argument is that  
 unity when applied to the state is an  
 analogical term, and that Plato's use of it  
 subverts the very ground of the analogy"  
 (Katon). Comp. also Oncken I. 173 f.  
 SUSSEM. 133)

31 τοῦτο=τὸ ἀντιπεπονητό. There  
 must needs be reciprocity even amongst  
 free and equal citizens, as in the ideal  
 state.

ἅμα γὰρ... 39 δυνατόν] All cannot  
 rule at once: the only possible alterna-  
 tives are (a) a perpetual ruling body,  
 αἰεὶ οἱ καθόλου (cp. I. 12 § 4) τὰς αἰῶνας  
 ἄρχοντας (b) alternation or rotation of  
 functions, μετέβαλλον, ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχο-  
 θαι κατὰ μέρους (cp. I. 1 § 2, III. 6 § 9).  
 Comp. IV (VII). 14 §§ 1, 2 where this argu-  
 ment recurs.

15 31] ἅμα apparently redundant

after συμβαίνει, as in VIII. 4. 3 smaller-  
 θενος ὡστε τὴν μὲν πολιδεῖαν εἶναι, and in  
*De Sensu* 2 § 5, 437 b 8 αἰεὶ συμβαίνει ὡστε  
 ἕσθαι. Similarly with other verbs: *Fal.*  
 VIII. 9 § 8 ἔστω δὲ τὸ ἔχειν ἑαυτὸν  
*Phys.* VIII. 6. 2, 248 b 17 ἔστω δ' ὁλο-  
 χύτως αὐτὸν αἰεὶ ποιεῖν.

16 31] ἐπεὶ 34 \* \*] The difficulty is  
 that, if no lacuna be assumed, αἰεὶ pro-  
 perly refers to αἰεὶ αἰεὶ αἰεὶ, and this is  
 against the sense. To take αἰεὶ as an  
 αἰεὶ (see c. 1 § 3), with Lonsdale, αἰεὶ  
 αἰεὶ, is as forced as to insert αἰεὶ with  
 Schönscher.

"The sense is satisfied if we supply  
 something like this: But as it is but the  
 work of a carpenter is always done by a  
 carpenter and never by a shoemaker, and  
 from the nature of the task each work is  
 more unchangeable when executed by the  
 same persons who make this their sole  
 business, and so therefore it is better  
 it should be so with political society" ...  
 [Thurot]. SUSSEM. 133)

39 ἐν οἷς δὲ αὐτῷ] "But where it is  
 not possible, because all are naturally  
 equal," τὰς αἰῶνας ἀναμνηστικῶς αἰεὶ  
 ἔχειν] comp. αἰεὶ αἰεὶ αἰεὶ αἰεὶ αἰεὶ αἰεὶ  
 and as the  
 same time therefore it is but this, whether  
 a good or a bad thing for ruling," is re-  
 sponded to saying: "that all should take  
 a turn at it—the retirement in rotation  
 of the equal citizens from office makes  
 an original dissimilarity." φαίνεται αἰεὶ  
 ἀναμνηστικῶς ἀναμνηστικῶς, αἰεὶ αἰεὶ αἰεὶ  
 the thought being possibly different from  
 Plato's in *Rep.* I. 244 b ff., which offers

1261 b φύσιν ἴσους εἶναι πάντας, ἅμα δὴ καὶ δίκαιον, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν (I) εἴτε φαῦλον τῷ ἄρχειν, πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, τοῦτο δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἶκειν τὸ ἀνομοίους εἶναι § 7 ἐξ ἀρχῆς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἱ δ' ἄρχονται [κατὰ μέρος] 5 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι. καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων ἕτεροι ἑτέρας ἄρχουσιν ἀρχάς. φανερόν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὡς 7 οὐ πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ λέγουσί τινες, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι τὰς 9 πόλεις ἀναιρεῖ· καίτοι τό γε ἐκάστου ἀγαθὸν σῶζει ἕκαστον.

1261 b I δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk., δεῖ Bas.<sup>3</sup> || 2 τῷ Susem., cp. Pl. Prot. 334 A—C, *Euthyd.* 292 D; τὸ Γ II Ar. Bk., <πρὸς> τὸ Thurot || τοῦτο] ἐν τούτοις II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. (Montecatino), γρ. ἐν τούτοις p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || τοῦτο δὲ] οὕτω δὴ Welldon || δὲ μιμεῖται] δὲ μιμεῖσθαι II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. γρ. δὲ μιμεῖσθαι p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι Montecatino || 3 τὸ ἐν] τῷ ἐν Heinsius Susem.<sup>2,3</sup>, a correction more plausible than sound, τὸ to be taken with τοῦτο || οἰκεῖν P<sup>2</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and C<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), οἰκεῖον C<sup>4</sup> (corrector), 'ἰκεῖν a later hand in P<sup>3</sup> (the 1st hand having left a lacuna) || τὸ ἀνομοίους Susem., τὸ δ' (τόδ' Γ) ὡς ὁμοίους Γ M<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), ὁμοίους P<sup>2,3</sup>, ὁμοίως II<sup>3</sup> C<sup>4</sup> Bk., γρ. ὁμοίως p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, τὸ δυσομοίους Schmidt (possibly right; I should adopt it if the word occurred elsewhere in Aristotle) || εἶναι Γ M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), τοῖς P<sup>2,3,4,6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and γρ. mg. p<sup>1</sup>, τῆς C<sup>4</sup> U<sup>b</sup> || 4 κατὰ μέρος omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, παρὰ μέρος Vettori Bk. || 5 καὶ omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || 7 οὔτε II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || οὕτως after εἶναι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

is or is not a source of individual advantage. τοῦτο τὸ εἶκειν= this yielding of the retiring magistrates to their successors, at the expiration of their term of office; μιμεῖται is the counterpart or reflexion of original heterogeneity, produces much the same effect as if rulers and subjects had always been distinct bodies of citizens.

1261 b I ἅμα δὴ καὶ δίκαιον κτλ.] Compare III. 16 §§ 2—4 with n. (672), IV(VII). 3 §§ 5, 6 n. (740); further n. (58 b) on I. 7. 1, n. (133) and (797) on IV(VII). 8. 4. SUSEM. (134 b)

2 τοῦτο δὲ] This δὲ with the demonstrative resumes the δὲ with the relative 39 ἐν οἷς δέ: so IV(VII). 9 § 5, ἥ δὲ ... ταύτῃ δέ. The two recensions of the text here widely diverge; see the *Critical Notes*. Bekker's text is nearly that of P<sup>2</sup>: ἐν τούτοις δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἶκειν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Thurot *Études* pp. 22—24 has shown the usual modes of interpreting this text to be unsatisfactory. The infinitive may indeed be governed by βέλτιον, and εἴξαι (or ἄρξαι) may be understood with τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς: but whether τὸ...εἶκειν be taken as subject or object of μιμεῖσθαι the result

is equally futile. If *object*, the sentence means 'where men are naturally equal, there it is better to imitate—what happens in a state of natural equality'! If *subject*, there is nothing to express what, as a matter of fact, is 'imitated' by the rotation of office-holders, viz. natural inequality.

§ 7 5 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι] as if, with taking up or laying down office, they assumed a new personality: γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος in *Nic. Eth.* IX. 4. 4.

ἀρχόντων] gen. abs. "while (the governors) govern, different officers interchange different offices in the like fashion," i.e. in rotation: τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον = 3 ἐν μέρει.

7 τινες] That is, Plato: see esp. *Rep.* v 462 B. Cp. n. (133). SUSEM. (135) Also 464 B μέγιστόν γε πόλει αὐτὸ ὁμολογήσαμεν ἀγαθόν.

8 καὶ... (φανερὸν) ὅτι... is the construction.

9 καίτοι... σῶζει ἕκαστον] οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ. "Cp. III. 10. 2 οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν with n. (561 b)." SUSEM. (135 b)

"What is this 'unity' which seems to Plato so beneficial, to Aristotle so

ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον φανερόν ὅτι τὸ λίαν ἐνός ἐστι (1)  
 τῆν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄμεινον. οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αἰτερεῖται  
 ρον ἐνός, πόλις δ' οἰκίας, καὶ βούλεται γ' ἤδη τότ' εἶναι πᾶσι  
 ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλεονέκτου  
 εἴπερ οὖν αἰρετώτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἥττον ἐν  
 τοῦ μᾶλλον αἰρετώτερον.

mischievous? It is not (1) 'unanimity', i.e. community of political principles and aims, the *hómōteta* of *Nic. Eth.* II. 6, 1167 a 22, as appears from c. 9 § 22, 1270 b 21 &c. Nor is it (2) 'uniformity', i.e. the suppression of individuality, so that all the citizens are of one type: for the discrimination of functions, carrying with it diversity of character, is, under the name of justice, the very foundation of the Platonic πόλις. Hence it is not (3) 'organization', as organization implies discrimination of functions combined with unanimity in the sense here given to the word. Rather it is (4) 'centralization'. Plato is anxious that his citizens should be bound together by a common interest in the πόλις, and, with a view to this, proposes to eliminate all those inferior *κοινωνίαι* which induce subordinate affections and create separate interests, thus, he conceives, weakening the supreme tie of patriotism. On the other hand Aristotle regards the subordinate affections which are induced in the inferior *κοινωνίαι*—for example, οἰκία, σύμπλοι, συστρατιαί, φιλόται, δημόται, θιασώται, ἐρασισταί *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 9 § 4 f, 1160 a 9, q. v.—as valuable in themselves, and therefore does not desire that they should be merged in patriotism. Further he maintains that the elimination of the inferior *κοινωνίαι*, which *μυκταί δόκασι τῆς πολιτικῆς* i.e. *κοινωνίας* *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 9, 1160 a 9, will not cause the subordinate affections to be merged in patriotism, i.e. to be transferred, unimpaired in force, from the inferior *κοινωνίαι* to the supreme *κοινωνία*. He thinks, in fact, that the πόλις is properly a complex organization containing lesser organizations within it, rather than a large family or a colossal man. It will be observed (1) that Aristotle's criticisms arise directly from the theory of the *πόλις* which he has developed in the first book, and (2) that they indicate the same appreciation of *φίλος* in all its forms, which has led him to devote to it two out of the ten books of the *Nic. Eth.*—JACKSON.

§ 8 10 ἐνός is infinitive, 'the endea-

your to intensify the unity of the state is not so desirable.'

12 βούλεται = totida, means: the founding of a state is then best realized or fulfilled when—

14 εἴπερ οὖν κτλ] Cp. I. 2. 8 ad (20 b, 21); III. 1 § 12 πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις πλεονέκτου πρὸς αὐτὴν πόλιν (ibid. n. (447), 9 § 14 n. (560), IV(VIII). 4 § 11 (759), 5 § 1 τὸ γὰρ πάντα ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι δόξαι μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν πόλιν (764), 6 § 8 ὁ γὰρ πόλις πλεονέκτου εἶναι αὐτὴν πόλιν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν n. (804). See also (136)

Add IV(VIII). 4. 14 πόλις τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν ἐστὶ πόλις ἀπὸ αὐτῆς, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πλεονέκτου ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι πόλιν εἶναι πόλιν.

cc. 3, 4. Objections to communism, chiefly to the abolition of separate families. Even supposing *Platonic*, i.e. the most perfect civic unity, to be desirable, the communistic scheme is not the best means to secure it. A series of detached remarks, so closely allied in sense even that it would not have been difficult to bring them together under one and the same head. See fuller details elsewhere pp. 102, 103; and compare throughout *Pl. Eth.* v.

The Platonic scheme, as Goss (p. 207) reminds us, is only partial communism. Modern communistic theories contemplate individual producers handing over the produce of their labour to be distributed among themselves by official authority. But the producing and labouring classes in the *Kyriai* are not communists at all: they are private proprietors with separate families, taxed only with the maintenance of a body of public functionaries, the guardians. Hence the arguments advanced by Aristotle, however just in themselves, have little direct application to the scheme which he is sensibly criticizing; they belong to a wider enterprise on which he has embarked, an advocacy of the principle of individualism against socialism, beginning at § 21 with the inquiry into the limits of community and individuality.

3 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ τοῦτο ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μά-8  
 λιστ' εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι φαίνεται  
 κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πάντες ἅμα λέγωσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ  
 μὴ ἐμὸν· τοῦτο γὰρ οἶεται ὁ Σωκράτης σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ τὴν  
 § 2 πόλιν τελέως εἶναι μίαν. τὸ γὰρ πάντες διττόν. εἰ μὲν οὖν  
 21 ὡς ἕκαστος, τάχ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ὃ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σω-  
 κράτης (ἕκαστος γὰρ υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυ-  
 ναῖκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου  
 δὴ τῶν συμβαινόντων ὡσαύτως)· νῦν δ' οὐχ οὕτως φήσουσιν 9  
 25 οἱ κοιναῖς χρώμενοι ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάν-  
 τες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν  
 § 3 πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν παρα-  
 λογισμός τις ἐστι τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερόν (τὸ γὰρ πάν-  
 τες καὶ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διττόν καὶ

19 ὁ omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [ὁ] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1359 || 25 τοῖς omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (? rightly) || 27 πάντες omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 28 τις omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 29 διττόν καὶ <ἀμφίβολον> or else 30 τοῖς <κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν> λόγοις Thurot; an ingenious suggestion, but not (as I once thought) necessary

to his own constructive theory in B. III.

Again, while the peculiar marriage system of the *Republic* would unquestionably result in the abolition of the ordinary separate family, Aristotle is unable, perhaps from a defect of imagination, fully to realize the new state of things which Plato intended to create. He persists in attaching the old meanings to words (3 §§ 5—8, 4 §§ 6—9), whereas it is Plato's avowed aim by an extension of the affections into an intimate and equal sympathy with a whole class (*esprit de corps*) to supersede nearer family relationships and extinguish private interests.

§ 1 16 τοῦτο=τὸ μίαν ὅτι μάλιστα κτλ. Even granting the utmost unity in the (civic) association to be the best, such unity does not appear to be made out by the scheme that all shall simultaneously apply the terms *mine* and *not-mine*.

18 κατὰ τὸν λόγον] with ἀποδείκνυσθαι, established by the proposal that all shall agree in their use of *mine* and *not-mine*: ἐὰν πάντες...μὴ ἐμὸν is explanatory of λόγον. For κατὰ=by, cp. *Metaph.* Θ. 8 § 14, κατὰ τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φανερόν ὅτι...1050 b 3.

19 ὁ Σωκράτης] In Plato's *Republic* v 462 C: ἐν ᾗτινι δὴ πόλει πλείστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταῦτα τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν, αὕτη ἄριστα διοικεῖται. SUSEM. (137)

§ 2 20 'All' has two senses, (1) each individual, *pro se quisque*; (2) the whole body collectively. If 'all' is taken in the former sense, this is perhaps more what Socrates means ("proposes to do").

24 συμβαινόντων] "circumstances": the joys and sorrows of life *Rep.* 462 E.

νῦν δ' οὐχ οὕτως] But then it is not in this sense that communists will apply the term 'all'. The whole body collectively, not the individuals exclusively, will have the right to say "mine" in this sense.

26 πάντες ]( ὡς ἕκαστος] Another instance in III. II. 2. Also VI(IV). 4. 26 where the distinction is skilfully worked in: μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεταί, σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοί εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες.

§ 3 28 τὸ γὰρ πάντες κτλ] The terms "all" and "both" and "odd" and "even" by reason of their ambiguity tend to make arguments fallacious even in dialectical discussions (and much more so when handled by sophists for purposes of deception).

29 καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια] See 5 § 27: τοῦτο (i.e. τὸ ἄρτιον) ἐνδέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, *De Soph.* *El.* 4 § 7, 166 a 33: παρὰ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ὅτι τὰ πέντ' ἐστὶ δύο καὶ τρία, καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια, 'to (fallacious) division is due the instance, that five is two

ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικούς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς· διὸ ἐστὶ τὸ πᾶν-  
 τας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὥδι μὲν καλόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δικαίον, ἀλλ'  
 4 δὲ οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικόν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐτίραν ἔχει βλαβερὸν τὸ  
 λεγόμενον. ἥκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τιγχάνει τὸ πλείοντων  
 κοινόν· τῶν γὰρ ἰδίων μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν  
 35 ἥττον, ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει· πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς  
 ἑτέρου φροντίζοντος ὀλιγωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς κί-  
 τικαῖς διακονίαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίοτε χεῖρον ἔσται-

30 ἔσται P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 34 φροντίζουσι? Susem. || 35 ἥττον ὅ (sic) Heath T. 1.  
 Heath || ὅσον] ὅσων P<sup>4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> || 36 φροντίζοντες? Susem.

and (is) three, odd and even' (Eaton).  
 SUSEM. (128)

Walford and Postgate would take *περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια* to be predicates of *πάντες* and *ἀμφότερα*. But five in the passage quoted above is at once an example of *ἀμφότερα*, 2 + 3, and of *περιττὰ*. As *ἀμφότερα* = sum of two things, so *περιττὸν* = an odd sum total, *ἄρτιον* = an even sum total. In all three cases the fallacy is not really due to ambiguity in the terms themselves, as Aristotle admits *De Soph. EL* 20 § 2, 177 b 7, οὐ διττὸν τὸ παρὰ διαί-  
 ρισιν, unless the confusion of two things as distinct as *ἀρτι* and *ἄρτι* be said to be due to ambiguity.

30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις] in disputations, in dialectic. SUSEM.

ἐριστικούς] Because they may be construed both collectively and distributively (Schneider): in Aristotle's phrase they admit of σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, illicit combination and disjunction. See *De Soph. EL* 4 § 6 166 a 22, 6 § 3 168 a 26, 20 § 1 177 a 33, 30 § 7 181 b 20: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀμφω καὶ τὸ ἅπαντα πλείω σημαίνει, the words 'both' and 'all' have several meanings (Eaton). Further compare VII(V). 8. 3: παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ δόξα ἐκ' αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος· εἰ ἐκάστῳ μακρόν, καὶ πάντα (illicit σύνθεσις). SUSEM. (139)

31 ὥδι μὲν] as ἐκ ἐκαστοῦ: ὥδι ὅλ-  
 collectively.

31 οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικόν] Since demen-  
 strats may quarrel, although πάντες μὲν, εἴχ' ὡς ἐκαστος δὲ they are supreme in the state. The individuals whose unity is Plato's main object can call nothing their own; it is only the body politic as a whole, after all, that can say "mine".

§ 4. Then comes a sensible practical suggestion. Comp. Jowett, *Lectures on Plato's Republic* p. 166 f., who refers to the statistics of mortality in *Ionian*

hospitals.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτλ.] In the next place, the scheme in question has another disadvantage. The property shared by the greatest number meets with the least attention. For men care more about their private matters and less for the public concerns. The soul and attention of individual owners are divided and chilled by division of ownership, as with the men who are a 'common possession' of the *Guerrilleros*.

35 ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει.] 'as only at most in proportion to their stake in them.' Since the whole shares equally to many and few, the work would seem to be impartial: 'as much as it falls to each man's share' to care. For the impartial one, see I. 12 § 8. For the meaning, Herod. vii. 12 πῶς ἂν ἀνείηται ἐπιβάλλει; Herod. II. 124 ἀπολαύσεται τὴν γῆν ὡς ἂν ἐκαστὸς λαὸν = their due share. Cassiodorus cites Ptolemy as using the word ἐπιβάλλει 'proportional parts' in astronomical calculations. The same thought occurs τὴν α 3 in the words ἐκαστὸν ἐγγίζει τὸν ἐκαστὸν ὄν. If the number consists of a thousand members, the interest of each is represented by the fraction 1/1000. For such is the tendency of human nature that the interest felt and care bestowed will be even less than this.

πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις κτλ.] 'Each is more likely to neglect them, through other reasons, because there is some one else to look after them; just as with the attendance of servants is somewhat less when that the work is not to well done by many as by few.'

§ 5. According to Plato's regulations, *Rep.* v 437 c—438 a, all the children of the Guardians, the two upper classes, are full citizens of the state even as to be taken from their mothers directly after

§ 5 τοῦσι τῶν ἐλαττόνων. γίνονται δ' ἐκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν 11  
 υἱοί, καὶ οὗτοι οὐχ ὥς ἐκάστου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχών  
 1262 a ὁμοίως ἐστὶν υἱός· ὥστε πάντες ὁμοίως ὀλιγορήσουσιν, ἐπεὶ οὕτως  
 ἕκαστος ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς,  
 ὁπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὧν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δέινος, τοῦ-

1262 a 1 ἐπεὶ Bücheler, ὅτι ? Susem., ἔτι Γ II Ar. Bk. Bonitz seeks to prove that this alone is right (*Hermes* VII. p. 102 ff.), and in the Addenda to my critical edition, p. lxxix, I somewhat hastily acceded. If ἔτι be accepted there must be a full stop before it || 2 λέξει Γ (?) Ar. (?) Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> || 3 τῶν ἀριθμῶν P<sup>3</sup> and the 1st hand in P<sup>1.2</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> (emended by a later hand in Q<sup>b</sup>), τῶν ἀρθμῶν T<sup>b</sup> || ὧν omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. || τοῦ δέινος II Ar. and also probably Γ, *huius filius* William || In the whole passage 1—14 Schmidt proposes extensive changes thus: ὀλιγορήσουσιν. κρείττον ἄρα ἴδιον ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι (transposed from 13) ἐνὸς τὸν αὐτοῦ μόνον προσαγορεύοντος, <ἢ> διςχιλίων ἢ καὶ μυρίων τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον υἱόν. ἔτι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον <υἱόν> λεγ<όντ>ων καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων [ἢ] ὅσων ἢ πόλιν ἐστίν, οὕτως ἕκαστος ἐμοὺς λέξει <ὥς καὶ> τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς ὁπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὧν, καὶ τοῦτο διστάζων [εἰ μὴ ἐμὸν τὸν τοῦ δέινος]. ἀδελφον κτλ

birth. The sickly and deformed are to be exposed, as well as the offspring of incapable parents and of unions formed in violation of the laws and magisterial authority (provided recourse has not been had to abortion in this latter case). The remainder are committed to public nurseries or crèches, in order that the real parents and children may be kept in ignorance of each other and that no favouritism may be shown. According to definite gradations of age all the Guardians alike are to treat one another and feel love for one another as parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, brothers and sisters. See *n.* (133). *SUSEM.* (140)

38 χίλιοι] Not a fixed number, but merely suggested as a convenient round number by *Rep.* IV 423 A. 'Now each of Plato's citizens has a thousand sons, not in the sense that each of them is *his* son exclusively, but (in the sense) that any of them is just as much a son of any other of the elder citizens. And the consequence will be that all these fathers alike will be indifferent to him.'

39 οὐχ ὥς ἐκάστου] Not as being children of his individually; but to any of the children (of a given year) any of the fathers (of that year) stands in a paternal relation.

1262 a 1 ἐπεὶ οὕτως κτλ] Almost word for word from *Rep.* V 463 E, πασῶν ἄρα πόλεων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ ξυμφωνήσουσιν ἐνός τινος ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντος, ὁ

νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εὖ πράττει ἢ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς: *i.e.* when any individual member fares well or ill, they will all with one accord use the expression 'it is well with mine' or 'it is ill with mine.' Hence translate: "As [or if ἔτι be retained, "Further] each of the elder citizens, when he uses the term 'my son' to express his sympathy in the joy or sorrow of a younger comrade, uses it only in the sense of the fractional part which he himself forms of the whole body of citizens. That is, he says 'my son' or 'so and so's'; and this 'so and so's' applies equally to each of the thousand citizens or whatever the number of which the state consists." To take ἐμὸς = my son (not my brother or my father) is justified by υἱός in the preceding line, ὁ τέκνον, 14 υἱόν (cp. 4 § 7). In spite of the χίλιοι υἱοί (b 38) it is the elder generation, the 'fathers', that are meant by τῶν χιλίων ἢ ὅσων κτλ. In fact the hypothetical round numbers (see § 6 διςχιλίων καὶ μυρίων) serve merely to present the case definitely and vividly. To οὕτως corresponds ὁπόστος... ὧν, as τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ δέινος; mine or A's or B's, and so on through all the thousand. When a 'father' uses the term 'my son' in Callipolis he will be aware that he shares the relation with a number of other 'fathers'.

2 ἐμὸς] Editors compare *Soph. Antig.* 565, ἀλλ' ἤδε μέντοι μὴ λέγε.

3 οἷον = I mean.

<sup>11</sup> For quaternary, *quaternary* present, the following references: p. 8, 17 in (1961), p. 8, 13 with Fig. 10; 111 in (1963), p. 8, 12.

10 προσαγορεύει τὸν αὐτόν, ὃ δ' ἀνεψιόν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ (I  
 συγγένειαν, ἢ πρὸς αἵματος ἢ κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ κηδείαν  
 αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἕτερος φράτορα,  
 φυλέτην. κρεῖττον γὰρ ἴδιον ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦ-  
 § 8 του υἱόν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατόν τὸ μὴ τινὰς 13  
 15 ὑπολαμβάνειν ἑαυτῶν ἀδελφούς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ πατέρας  
 καὶ μητέρας· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότητας, αἱ γίνονται τοῖς  
 τέκνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας, ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ  
 § 9 ἀλλήλων τὰς πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν  
 τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων· εἶναι γάρ τισι  
 20 τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα  
 τέκνα διαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες καὶ  
 γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οἷον ἵπποι καὶ βόες, αἱ  
 σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὅμοια ἀποδιδόναι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦ-  
 4 σιν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ κληθεῖσα Δικαία ἵππος. ἔτι δὲ 14  
 25 καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσχερείας οὐ ῥάδιον εὐλαβηθῆναι τοῖς  
 ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἷον αἰκίας καὶ φόνους  
 [ἀκουσίους τοὺς δὲ] ἐκουσίους καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιδορίας· ὧν

12 αὐτοῦ—αὐτοῦ Bk., αὐτοῦ—αὐτοῦ Γ II || ἢ] εἶτα? Susem. || ἕτερος Lindau, ἕτερον Γ II Ar. Bk., ἕτεροι Bernays, ἐταῖρον Spengel || 13 <ἢ> φυλέτην Bas.<sup>3</sup> Bk., aut contribulem William || ἐταῖρον <ἢ> φράτορα <ἢ> φυλέτην Schmidt || 27 [ἀκουσίους τοὺς δὲ] Bender, ἀκουσίους [τοὺς δὲ ἐκουσίους] Congreve; τοὺς δὲ ἐκουσίους omitted by P<sup>2</sup>, which proves nothing against their genuineness, still should not the brackets include all four words? See Comm. || Lambin omitted καὶ μάχας

(558); VI(IV). 14 § 4 (1321 b), 15 § 17 (1367); VII(VI). 4 § 19 (1427), 5 § 9 (1437); VIII(V). 1 § 10 (1499), 4 § 10 (1526), 5 § 11 (1564), 8 § 19 (1626).” SUSEM. (141)

§ 8 Yet after all parents would suspect relationship from the likeness of their own children. Comp. Jowett on the *Republic* p. 165 ff.

17 λαμβάνειν τὰς πίστεις] derive their convictions; so in IV(VII). 1. 6.

§ 9 19 τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους] Books of travel round the world, as in *Rhet.* 1. 4. 13 (where see Cope's exhaustive note), *Metéor.* 1. 13. 13, II. 5. 14. Such books were also called περίπλοι and περιηγήσεις.

Usually πραγματεύεσθαι takes περί; but once, *Rhet.* 1. 2. 5, it has πρὸς. In *Pol.* IV(VII). 14. 8 we have τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως...

20 τισι τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων] See Exc. I. to B. II p. 326 ff., as regards the evidence for these customs. Comp. also I. 2. 4 n.

(11) and n. (116). SUSEM. (142)

24 ὥσπερ...ἵππος] The same remark in *Hist. Anim.* VII. 6. 8, 586 a 12 (Schneider). Further compare *De Gener. Anim.* IV. 3. 1, 767 b 5: ὁ μὴ ἐοικὼς τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἤδη τρόπον τινὰ τέρας ἐστίν· παρεκβέβηκε γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν τούτοις ἐκ τοῦ γένους τρόπον τινὰ (Eaton). SUSEM. (143)

Δικαία here probably means “docile”: Xenophon *Cyneget.* 7 § 4, *Memorab.* IV. 4. 5: φασὶ δὲ τινες καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν τῷ βουλομένῳ δικαίως ποιήσασθαι πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι τῶν διδασκόντων (Jackson).

c. 4 § 1 25 τὰς τοιαύτας] the following.

27 [ἀκουσίους τοὺς δὲ] ἐκουσίους] Can it be said that a divine law forbids involuntary homicide in the case of father, mother, &c, but permits it in other cases? On the contrary, responsibility ceases for involuntary acts; nothing but negligence is then punishable; nor can we talk of such acts being allowed. But

οὐδὲν ὅσιόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς (1)  
μὴ πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὄντας, ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπώτερον  
ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείον συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀγνωσούντων ἢ γνω-  
ριζόντων, καὶ γενομένων τῶν μὲν γνωριζόντων ἐνδέχεται τοὺς  
νομιζομένας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μὴ <οὐ>δεμίαν. Ἄτοπον δὲ ἐστὶ  
καὶ τὸ κοινοὺς ποιήσαντα τοὺς υἱοὺς τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον ἀφε-  
λεῖν τῶν ἐρώντων, τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν μὴ κωλύσαι, μηδὲ τὰς χρῆ-

29 ἀποθεν M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup>.<sup>4</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. || 30 ἀλλὰ] ἃ II<sup>1</sup> (γρ. ἀλλὰ οὐκ.) in the margin of  
P<sup>1</sup>) || 32 μὴ <οὐ>-δεμίαν Jackson, «μὴ»-μηδεμίαν Schneider, μηδεμίαν II<sup>2</sup> Ar. III.  
Susem.<sup>1-2,3</sup>, μηδὲ μίαν II<sup>1</sup> || 33 ποιήσαντα: Γ Ar. and M<sup>o</sup> (1st hand)

intentional homicide is forbidden by the law of God and of nature in the case of the nearest blood relations, while under certain circumstances it is allowed in the case of strangers. So too outrage, blows, abuse are all intentional acts. On these grounds the words bracketed must be regarded as an interpolation (Bender). SUSEM. (144)

18 ὧν οὐδὲν ὅσιον] To this Plato might certainly reply, that where relationship is abolished, crimes (even if they are still committed) cannot be aggravated by the fact of being crimes against relations (Oncken). SUSEM. (145)

32 λύσεις=expiations. Editors compare *Aep.* II 364 E: ὡς ἂν λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσῶν καὶ παιδῶν [ἡδονῶν] εἰσι μὲν ἐτι ζῶσιν εἰσι δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελευτὰς καλοῦσιν; Eur. *Or.* 510 φόνον φόνῳ λύσαι, 597 μίσανμα λύσαι. Such purifications for homicide were unknown in the Homeric age. Grote, *Hist.* I. 34, compares Thuc. I. 126—128 for their great importance.

τῶν δὲ κτλ] "All the editors assume that the words τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν, whether with or without Schneider's addition, stand for τῶν δὲ μὴ γνωριζόντων ἐνδέχεται μηδεμίαν γίνεσθαι λύσεων, as if Aristotle wished to say 'it is possible that no expiation should be made'. He might however to say 'it is not possible that any expiation should be made'. Hence I conjecture τῶν δὲ μὴ, «οὐ>-δεμίαν." JACKSON.

2, 3 ἄτοπον δὲ κτλ] *Aep.* III. 402 A, 1: οὐδὲν ἂν πρῶτον μὴ καὶ οὐδὲν γινώσκον ἀκατάστατον ἢ ἄλλῃ ἔρῃ. αὐτὸ πρῶτον μὴ ἂν αὐτὴ ἢ ἡδονή (sc. ἢ περὶ τῆς ἀφροδισίας) οὐδὲ κοινωνοῦντες αὐτῇ ἔρῃ τε καὶ παιδικοῖς ἀρῶσι ἐρῶσι τε καὶ ἑρωμένοις...οὕτω δὲ, ὡς δοκεῖ, νομοθετήσιν ἐν τῇ οὐκ ἐπιθυμῇ πόλει φιλεῖν μὴ καὶ ζυγεῖν καὶ ἀπτεσθαι ὥσπερ

ἡδονῶν ἐρῶν, τῶν οὐκ ἐρῶν ἢ ἐρῶν τῶν πλείων. εἰ δὲ μὴ, πόρρω ἀπὸ τοῦ καὶ ἀπείροισι καὶ ἐρῶν. With this compare V 468 c, where the gallows addressee is rewarded with the right to take his comrades upon the expedition, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρῶναι ἀπαρῶνται ἢ δὲ βουλῆται φάσιν, ἢ καὶ, εἰάν τις τοῦ τέχνης ἐρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρῶναι, πρῶτον μὴ ἢ τῶν τῶν ἐρῶναι φέρων. See also Zeller's *Plato* p. 411 f. SUSEM. (146)

34 τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν μὴ κωλύσαι κτλ] This objection might apparently be met, like the last, u. (145), by some sort of defence. It would however be open to reply on behalf of Aristotle that if the relation of Guardians to one another is assumed to be taken as that of parents and children, brothers and sisters, it is necessary at any rate to make such strong comparisons to sensual passion—whatever may have been Aristotle's own opinion on the question it took in Greece (see on 10 § 9). Besides, the Platonic institutions take precautions against the "marriage" of those who are actually parents and children,—a fact overlooked by Oncken, who p. 181 attributes to Aristotle an objection which he neither did nor could bring against Plato on that score—but none at all against the "marriage" of actual brothers and sisters: compare *Aep.* V 461 a, ἀλλὰ φάσιν δὲ καὶ ἀδελφοὶ καὶ ἀδελφαὶ κοινῶν ἐρῶν, Susemild *Plat. Phil.* II. 171. As Aristotle does not take sensual passion to this it must be assumed that he did not feel his Greek sentiment excessively outraged, any more than Plato, by loved under this form. It is also significant that he has no word of blame for the deception whereby the rulers in the ideal state are directed to ensure that as early as possible of the eldest guardians of both sexes prosecute children, and as few as possible of those who are inferior. *Aep.*

35 σεις τὰς ἄλλας, ἃς πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν εἶναι πάντων ἐστὶν (ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφῶ πρὸς ἀδελφόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν  
 § 3 μόνον. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὴν συνουσίαν ἀφελεῖν δι' ἄλλην  
 μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν, ὥς λίαν δὲ ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ἡδονῆς γινο-  
 μένης· ὅτι δ' ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἢ υἱός, οἱ δ' ἀδελφοὶ ἀλλήλων,  
 § 4 μηδὲν οἶεσθαι διαφέρειν. ἔοικε δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς  
 41 εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖ-  
 1262 b δας ἢ τοῖς φύλαξιν· ἦττον γὰρ ἔσται φιλία κοινῶν ὄντων  
 τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρ-  
 χομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν. ὅλως δὲ 1  
 § 5 συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τοῦναντίον διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον νόμον ὧν προσ-  
 5 ἡκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰτίους γίνεσθαι, καὶ δι' ἣν  
 αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἶεται δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέ-  
 § 6 κνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. φιλίαν τε γὰρ οἴομεθα μέγιστον  
 εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οὕτως γὰρ ἂν ἦκιστα στασιάζοιεν), καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἐπαινεῖ μάλισθ' ὁ Σω-

35 εἶναι omitted by M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) || 40 ἔοικε... b 3 νεωτε-  
 ρίζειν Thurot transposes this passage to follow 1264 a 40 κοινῶν, Susem. to follow  
 1262 b 24 πολιτευομένοις, *Introd.* 79 || δὲ Γ Π Bk., δὴ Susem.; the alteration stands  
 or falls with the transposition

1262 b 4 συμβαίνειν P<sup>4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> and Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand, emended by a later hand) || 6 οὐ-  
 τως omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 7 τε omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, *quidem* William, but nothing can  
 be inferred from this with regard to Γ

V 457 C—461 E. See Zeller's *Plato* p. 455, 477—8: Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II 170. SUSEM. (147)

χρήσεις = endearments.

35 ἃς πατρὶ.....ἀπρεπέστατον] But the words ὥσπερ υἱός, *Rep.* III. 403 B, do not bear this implication. Plato permits to the ὀρθὸς ἔρως only such familiarities as would be unimpeachable as between father and son.

36 καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν μόνον (ἀπρεπέστατόν ἐστιν) according to Greek ideas. Such power lay in a 'little word' to extinguish the fiercest passions, *Latus* VIII 838 B.

§ 3 37 δι' ἄλλην μὲν αἰτίαν μηδε-  
 μίαν] True there is no other reason assigned, but there may well be irony under the terms ἀμουσία and ἀπειροκαλία (see the quotation n. 146): especially when viewed in connexion with the noble conception of Socrates' moral character and the language of gallantry at the same time put into his lips by Plato. See *Appendix* I to Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus*, esp. pp. 153, 161 ff. The attempt to trans-

figure and etherialize gross passion was pitched in too exalted a strain of romanticism. Plato himself renounced it afterwards. His matter-of-fact disciple simply ignores it.

§ 4 is out of place here; perhaps it is a later marginal note by the author.

§ 5 1262 b 3 ὅλως δὲ] *Comp.* I. 6. 5 n. "Such a law must bring about the very opposite to that which ought to be the result of well-framed laws and to that which was Socrates' own reason (c. 2. § 1) for thinking that the institutions regarding women and children ought to be thus ordered."

This criticism seems unfair. Such private friendships and affections as Aristotle is thinking of do not, according to Plato, promote concord in the state generally, but rather divert men's attention from the whole community into private channels, and by creating private interests tend to selfishness and disunion. So the Spartan love of domesticity is censured; *Rep.* VIII 548 A, B.

ο κράτης, ὃ καὶ δοκιᾷ κίκεῖνοι εἶναι φησι τὴν φιλίαν λέγει. III  
καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀν-  
στοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρώντων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούν-  
των συμφυῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων [ἀμφοτέρων] ἓνα.  
7 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρων ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὰς δύο, ἐν ο  
8 δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὕδαρ ἵστασθαι διὰ τὴν  
κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἥκιστα λέγειν τὸν ἑμὲν ἢ αὐτὸν  
9 πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἱόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν γλυκὺ εἰς πολλὸν  
ὕδαρ μίχθὲν ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τῆς κρύσεως, αὕτω συμβαίνει  
καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνομι-

13 συμφῶναι P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. (perhaps more correct), συμβῶναι P<sup>4</sup> (our  
hand), συμφινῆαι P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) : [ἀμφοτέρων] Congreve : 14 εἰ τὸν ἓνα Congr.,  
εἰ τὸν ἓνα <συμβαίνει> ? Susem., εἰ τὸν ἓνα Tyrrell : 19 καὶ corr. Lancelot, καὶ  
<περὶ> Koraes in his Commentary; καὶ <κατὰ> Bernays and independently, but  
hesitatingly, Vahlen (*Ztschr. f. d. östr. Gymn.* XLIII. 1872. p. 125), but Bernays  
makes ἀναγκαῖον ὄν (omitting the comma before διαφροντίζων) depend on σταθεῖς,  
while Vahlen takes this as an absolute accusative. This slight alteration is certainly  
preferable to that proposed for διαφροντίζων (see below), but, as Vahlen rightly  
judges, not absolutely necessary: either ἀναίσθητον εἶναι can be supplied with Vahlen,  
or the acc. τὴν οἰκειότητα κτλ taken as the object of διαφροντίζων, with Congreve  
and Susem.<sup>1</sup>; then ἀναγκαῖον ὄν is to be construed, as Bernays does, omitting the  
comma; in the former case it is an absolute accusative. Bernays (quoting with approval  
by Spengel) suspects ἀναγκαῖον ὄν : τὴν πρὸς] εἶναι πρὸς Spengel.

§ 6 10 φιλίας] Cp. vii (iv). 11-12 : ἢ γὰρ κοινωνία φιλίας. SUSEM.

11 ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις] Plato *Symposium* 192 c sq. comp. 191 a. Hug in p. x of his edition of that dialogue considers ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι to be another title for the *Symposium*; but this could only be allowed if the text read "Plato in the discourses on love" whereas it is "Aristophanes in the discourses on love," and there is nothing to hinder our supplying "contained in Plato's *Symposium*." Moreover Plato's own theory of love in its fullness and integrity is there given to Socrates alone, who expressly combats the suggestion made by Aristophanes that it is "seeking the other half of ourselves" 205 D; cp. 212 c. Yet no doubt, in so far as Aristotle here makes use of the thought expressed by Plato's Aristophanes, Plato agrees with the latter. This much is clear, that Aristotle intends to designate Plato as the author of the *Symposium*. SUSEM. (148)

11 ὡς τῶν ἐρώντων κτλ] The genitive absolute after λέγοντα instead of ὅτι or accusative and infinitive.

§ 7 14 ἐνταῦθα κτλ] "In this case either both will be spoiled or at least the one absorbed in the other."

15 ὕδαρ] watery, i.e. diluted if unmixed, ἀκραιτέρη. Anst. *Metaph.* 1026 b 20 εἰς ὕδαρ σπένδον φλόγην, *Physics* 27 § 12, 170 a 17 ὕδαρ μίχθων, a tame quotation.

16 ἥκιστα λέγειν] best likely to apply the term 'mine': 2 § 3. Owing to a feeble spirit the couple they would take little pains to assert the relationship. "Plato if called upon for an answer to this reasoning would probably have allowed it to be just; but would have said that the 'diluted friendship' pervading all the Guardians was apt and sufficient for his purpose, as including the whole number must needs enter the condition of one organism. Strong emotional affections between individuals he wishes to discourage; the naturally amiable he is bent on reeling out." (Cicero 111. 200 n.)

§ 8 18 οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τῆς οἰκειότητος] "So too is it in the case with the mutual affection implied in these names": συμβαίνει αὖ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι.

- 20 των τούτων, διαφροντίζειν ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὃν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ  
 τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἢ πατέρα ὡς υἱοῦ ἢ υἱὸν ὡς πατρός, ἢ ὡς  
 § 9 ἀδελφούς ἀλλήλων. δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἂ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι  
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τό τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν· ὧν  
 24 οὐδέτερον οἶόν τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὕτω πολιτευομένοις. <ἔοικε  
 § 4 a 41 <δὴ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυ-  
 b 1 <ναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἢ τοῖς φύλαξιν· ἦττον γὰρ ἔσται φιλία  
 2 <κοινῶν ὄντων τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιοῦτους εἶναι  
 3 <τοὺς ἀρχομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν.> ἀλλὰ  
 § 9 25 μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γενόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ

20 τούτων δι' αὐτὸ φροντίζειν and [ὃν] Spengel: τούτων <διαφορηθῆναι>, διαφροντίζειν Camerarius: τούτων <διαφορηθῆναι or διαφθαρήναι, ὡς> διαφροντίζειν? Schneider: τούτων δια<ρρεῖν>, φροντίζειν Madvig: τούτων, <ὡς> διαφροντίζειν Koraes in the text, but the absolute accus. is also possible without ὡς || ἀναγκαῖον ὃν] ἀναγκάζειν Bender (no comma before διαφροντίζειν) || 21 υἱοῦ] υἱῶν P<sup>2.3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. || ὡς after 22 ἀδελφούς Ridgeway || 25 γενόμενα Susem., γινόμενα II Bekk., γεννώμενα? Göttling

The special affections would be lost in the general sense of comradeship. This seems simplest, though it is also possible to govern οἰκειότητα by διαφροντίζειν; so that either ἢ πατέρα κτλ is the subject of διαφροντίζειν, as Congreve and Susemihl think, or as Ridgeway *Transactions* II. 132 proposes ἢ πατέρα κτλ is to be regarded as expegegetic of the wider term οἰκειότητα. He translates: 'so the result is that in such a constitution as Plato's least of all is it necessary to have regard for the mutual family feelings implied in these names' (of father and son).

21 πατέρα ὡς υἱοῦ κτλ] "that one citizen should care for another as father for son, or son for father, or as one brother for another." Ridgeway aptly compares VIII(V). 11. 21 ταμίαν ὡς κοινῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἰδίων, *Metaph.* M. 5 § 6, 1079 b 34 τῶν ὡς γένους εἰδῶν, species in relation to a genus. For other views of the construction see *Critical Notes*.

§ 9 23 τὸ ἀγαπητόν has been taken to mean (1) only, rare, unique;=μόνον (Eaton, quoting *Odyssey* II. 365 μόνους ἐὼν ἀγαπητός): and (2) much desired, dearly prized, precious. SUSEM.

See Cope's note on *Rhet.* I. 7. 41: καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν (μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ), καὶ τοῖς μὲνμόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ' ἄλλων, where it must have the second meaning, as *unicus* in Catullus 64. 215.

§ 4 1262 a 40 γεωργοῖς] Here as often the farmers stand for the entire third class of citizens in Plato's ideal

state, τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν πλῆθος of 5 § 18, all who are neither ἀρχοντες nor ἐπικούροι; properly including (§ 9) τεχνῖται and all who are engaged in trade as well as in agriculture. See 5 § 20, where all are enumerated. The strength of this class excites Aristotle's fears: see 5 §§ 19, 20, 22.

41 χρήσιμον] Comp. VIII(V). 11. 15 (Eaton). This section is the only new application of the argument in the whole passage which follows § 3. For the rest, §§ 5—9 are essentially a repetition, with certain distinctive and appropriate nuances, of the objections contained in 3 §§ 4—7; yet they are not constructed like another version simply to supersede them. Neither passage gives the slightest cause for suspicion of its genuineness. We must be content to set down to the occasional negligences of Aristotle's style this reiteration of a previous line of argument without any indication that it has occurred before. Comp. n. (164) on 5 § 14. SUSEM. (149)

1262 b 2 τοιοῦτους=ἦττον φιλικούς: cp. I. 8 § 7 n. Plato would altogether disclaim such a policy; see *Rep.* 416-7, 463 B. See n. on 5 § 20, 1264 a 27.

§ 9 25 περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν] In Plato's ideal state, as children of the Guardians grow up they are to be removed into the third class of citizens if they appear to degenerate. Conversely the rulers are to observe carefully any exceptional children of this third class,

6 τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δ' ἐκ τού- 10  
των εἰς ἐκείνους, πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν, τίνα εἶναι τρέψαν- 15  
καὶ γινώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς διδόντας καὶ μεταφέροντας 20  
0 τίσι τίνας διδόασιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ παλαι λεγόμενα μέλλον 25  
ο ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν, οἷον αἰκίας ἔρωται φέρονται.  
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσαγορεύουσιν ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας καὶ 30  
μητέρας οἳ τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δοθέντες τοὺς φύλα- 35  
κας καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας,  
ὥστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν 40  
5 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκες 45  
κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐχέμεν 50  
δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τίνα 55  
τρόπον δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεῖσθαι 60

28 <γὰρ> γινώσκων Bernays, perhaps rightly | 31 προσαγορεύονται  
Koraeis | 32 τοὺς φύλακας before of τε II<sup>2</sup> Bk.; omitted by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> | 33 φύλαξι  
II<sup>1</sup>, φύλαξιν δι p<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk.

who as they grow up may display higher mental and moral qualities, in order that they may be reared amongst the children of the Guardians and educated along with them for duties like theirs. See *Republic* III 415 b, IV 423 c. SUSSEM. (160)

27 πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν] Schliesser remarks that this requires a more detailed proof. SUSSEM. (151)

There does seem some variance between the rule laid down above, *Rep.* 423 c, *Tim.* 19 a (τὰ δὲ τὰν κλάσιν εἰς τὴν ἄλληλῃ διαδοῖναι εὐλῶν, ἐναυξασμένους δὲ συνεκείνους εἶναι τοῖς ἀλλοῖς τοῖς ἀνέγκαις διαι, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ ἑαυτοῖς ἀναλίσκας εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀναλίσκων χάριν μεταλλάττειν), and that other regulation about marriage *Rep.* V 460 c (τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρῶν, καὶ εἰς τὴν δέξιν ἀνέγκαι γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορήτῃ τε καὶ ἀλλῇ κατακρίνεται).

28 καὶ γινώσκων κτλ] But what harm could this knowledge do in the case of the children of Guardians who were degraded? As to the children of the third class adopted as Guardians, nothing could prevent the whole body of Guardians from knowing in the end that they were of different blood. But if we assume that all the other institutions of this ideal state are practicable, these adopted children would suffer no neglect, from any one or in anything, on that account. SUSSEM. (152)

Aristotle implies that jealousy and dis-

union would follow the recognition of the facts.

29 τίσι τίνας διδόασιν] This clause depends on γινώσκων.

§ 10 παλαι λεγόμενα, §§ 1—5. See in III. 14, 14 τὸν παλαι λόγον, γίγνηται 10, 14. Obviously Aristotle speaks with horror (as we should) from those reasons against blood relations. But there is no evidence that it is on the ground which Grote ascribes to him, "that within the chief would fall upon the community of family quarrels or domestic quarrels without religious exorcism."

34 ὥστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι] "as as to be on their guard," as they might be if they used these terms of relationship.

c. 5. *Observations on immunities of property*: §§ 1—12. See *Antiquities* p. 103.

§ 1 37 τίνα τρέψαντες κτλ] This issue is not decided as what follows, for the conclusion adopted in §§ 1—5 includes the first and third of these alternatives in their application to all the land, but does not necessarily exclude the second. Later on however, 1071d. 10 to 16. (S:14), we presume that even the second suggestion does not by any means correspond with Aristotle's view, which is more like the third, provided it be restricted to a part of the territory where, as Plato had extended it to the whole. In Plato's *Cambridge* the Guardians are forbidden the possession of gold and silver and of money altogether, and as for they

τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν (I  
 § 2 εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν τις καὶ χωρὶς σκέψαιτο ἀπὸ  
 41 τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας νενομοθετημένων, λέγω  
 1263 a δὲ [τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν] πότερον καὶ ἢ ἐκεῖνα χωρὶς, καθ'  
 . ὃν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει, πᾶσι τὰς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλ-  
 τιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις \* \*, οἷον τὰ μὲν γήπεδα χωρὶς, τοὺς δὲ

39 ἢ μὴ κοινὴν after εἶναι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>. In Γ δεῖ was perhaps repeated before εἶναι ||  
 [πότερον—40 κτήσιν]? Schmidt and then a colon after νενομοθετημένων

1263 a 1 [τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν] Susem. || 2 πάσας Γ Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> Freudenthal (per-  
 haps rightly), πασῶν M<sup>s</sup> || πᾶσι <τὰς κτήσεις ἢ τὰς χρήσεις ἢ> τὰς or πᾶσι <τὰς  
 χρήσεις ἢ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ> τὰς Spengel, \* \* τὰς Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || τε] γε Koraes Oncken  
 Bernays which gives no sense || χρήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον ἢ τὰς κτήσεις Koraes  
 Oncken || 3 καὶ ἢ Schlosser Koraes Oncken, κατὰ Bernays || χρήσεις <ἢ μόνας  
 τὰς κτήσεις ἢ τὰς χρήσεις> Freudenthal, χρήσεις <ἢ τὰς κτήσεις μόνον ἢ  
 τὰς χρήσεις> Busse, χρήσεις <ἢ> Heinsius Hampke

have no property of their own. Nevertheless the connexion of Platonic thought leaves no doubt that the entire body of Guardians is the sole proprietor of the soil, and that thus they hold landed property in common. The farmers of the third class are consequently tenants who pay a rent in kind for the farms they cultivate, this rent being a definite amount of the produce supplied to the Guardians, who have the other indispensable necessities of life provided for them by other members of the third class in lieu of a tax levied for protection. Lastly, the common dwellings and common meals of the guardians make community of property and community of life amongst them an actual accomplished fact. See *Rep.* III 416 C, IV 419, V 464 C, and comp. Zeller's *Plato* p. 481 Eng. tr. The extension of these common dwellings and common meals to women is not expressly mentioned by Plato, but it is implied in his complete equalization of male and female Guardians:—cp. *n.* (196) and I. 13. 9 *n.* (116). Thus, as Oncken I. 183 justly observes, "Plato has simply abolished the possession of capital by a theoretical fiat, while Aristotle B. 1 c. 8 has done his best to banish it to the remotest regions of economic life. Only landed property with the income derived from it is of any account in their philosophical deliberations." There is this difference between them that Aristotle believes community of property to be possible apart from community of families: whereas the fact is that there cannot be a true marriage in our sense of the term

without settled and independent house-keeping of one's own. Here he is not so consistent as Plato, which is easily explained however by the fact that his whole economic theory rests upon the basis of slavery in the genuine fashion of antiquity, of Greek antiquity especially. And one consequence of this is that, as Oncken again justly observes, his conception of property does not involve that of personal labour. On this point see *Introd.* p. 27. SUSEM. (153)

39 πολιτείαν] Cognate accus. after πολιτεύεσθαι. The phrase recurs VI(IV). I. 4. We find καθ' ἃς πολιτεύονται, II. 7. 1; the accusative in I. II. 13 ταῦτα πολιτεύονται, and in τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς II. 7. 14, is not quite similar.

§ 2 40 χωρὶς σκέψαιτο ἀπὸ] separately from=independently of. Comp. Plato *Phaedo* 98 C διαφύας ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, "to separate them." This is the sense of ἀπὸ in ἀπόφασις, negative predication, διηρημένου τοῦ ὄντος as Aristotle puts it. Compare πόρρω ἀφ' ἡμῶν *Problems* XVIII. 10, 917 b 14, and *Nic. Eth.* IX. 8. 1 οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει, nothing away from, i.e. unlike, himself.

1263 a 1 ἐκεῖνα χωρὶς = the families are separate.

2 κτήσις )( χρήσις; ownership, fee-simple )( usufruct, income returned.

3 οἷον introduces the application of the three modes of communism to land and its produce. "I mean, (1) when the estates are held separately but the crops are brought into a common stock for consumption, or (2) when the land is held in common and cultivated by the state as

καρπούς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν (ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ  
 5 τῶν ἐθνῶν), ἡ τούναντίον τὴν μὲν γῆν κοινὴν εἶναι καὶ γεωρ-  
 γεῖν κοινῇ, τοὺς δὲ καρπούς διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἰδίαις χρέ-  
 σεις (λέγονται δὲ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κοινοῦν τῶν  
 3 βαρβάρων), ἡ καὶ τὰ γήπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινούς. ἐπὶ τῷ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.  
 10 ῥάων, αὐτῶν δ' αὐτοῖς διαπονούστων τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀγέρας  
 πλείους ἂν παρέχοι δυσκολίας. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδαισεσι

8 κοινούς] χωρὶς ἡμετέρας

public property, but the produce divided for private uses, or (3) when both lands and crops are held in common." Of modern theories, (3) alone answers to what Mill *Pol. Ec.* II. c. 1 calls thoroughgoing Communism: (1) in the milder forms proposed by St Simon and Fourier.

γῆπεδα, plots of ground, farmsteads, like *οἰκόπεδον*, emphasizing the site of the property.

4 *ἔνια*] Editors refer to Lacedaemon (§ 7) and Tarentum VII(VI). 5. 10. But these instances seem hardly sufficient to establish the first form of communism; and *ἔθνη*, see n. (11), would suggest here also *non-Hellenic* tribes, to whose customs Aristotle paid considerable attention to judge from the fragments of his *Νόμος* or *Νόμιμα βαρβάρων*; esp. IV(VII). 2. 11. That work being lost, the most apposite references are from Diodorus v. 44. of the Vascaeans, a Celtiberian tribe; v. 9. of the exiled Cnidians and Rhodians who colonized the Aedonian isles (Iapari); v. 41. of Panchaia, which Strabo thinks a fiction. Nearchus in Strabo xv. 1. 66 testifies to the custom amongst certain tribes of India. Further, the prevalence formerly of this system of land-tenure would serve to explain *μυστήρια*.

7 *τινές*] On this second system, if the soil is to remain common property there must be a periodical partition, such as is in force even now in Russia, in some Swiss cantons (e.g. Glaris) and amongst the village communities (*desseux*) of Java. This was the characteristic feature of the German mark, first known by Caesar's account of the Suevi (*Hell. Gall.* VI. 19). Strabo VIII. 6. 7 affirms it of the Dalmatians, and the Greek settlers on the Aeolian islands finally adopted this plan, Thuc. v. 9. In fact, "there appears to be no country inhabited by an Aryan race in which traces do not remain of the

ancient periodical redistribution," which preceded and at length ended in perpetuity of occupation; Maine *Village Communities* p. 81. To collect these traces is the object of M. de Lamoignon's *Primitive Property*; see pp. 109, 141 ff. (of the English trans. by Martineau). It was a modification of this second system which appears to have prevailed among the Village Indians of North America at the time of its discovery. "They still held lands in common: the lands of each Aztec "group" could not be alienated. They constructed joint-tenement houses and lived in large households composed of a number of related families, sometimes fifty or a hundred families together; and there are grounds for believing that they practiced common living in the household," i.e. something analogous to *κοινότης*; L. H. Morgan *Am. Society* pp. 127, 200 ff., 211—216.

12 8 *ἐνέρων*] *ἐνέρων* is a collective noun; the citizens themselves; *ἐνέρων* is a collective noun; when they are *ἐνέρων*, Thucyd. I. 126.

"This remark is quite true in itself, but it makes for Plato rather than against him. His guardians are a distinct body from the yeomanry and are thus in the position described as most favourable to communism" (Owen). See n. (124).

10 τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀγέρας is common, the subject of *ἀγέρας* and not the object of *διαπονούστων*.

11. "For where all have not equal shares in enjoyment any more than in work, indeed have very unequal shares, dissatisfaction must needs be felt with those who have much enjoyment and little labour, by those who get less and have more work to do." This is the standing difficulty of communism; see Mill *Pol. Econ.* II. 182.



σας καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίας. δεῖ γὰρ πῶς μὲν εἶναι κοινὰ, ὅπως δ' ἰδίας. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι διηρημέναι τὰ ἐγκαίματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπιδύσουσιν· οἱ πρὸς ἰδιον ἐκάστω προσεδρεύοντες· δι' ἀρετὴν δ' ἔσται πρὸς τὰ χρήσθαι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὗτος τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐν ἐνίαις πόλεσιν οὕτως ὑπογεγραμμένων, ὥς οὐκ ὂν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλῶς οἰκουμέναις τὰ μὲν ἔστι τὰ δὲ γένοιτ' ἂν· ἰδίαν γὰρ ἑκάστος τὴν κτήσιν ἔχων τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φίλοις, τοῖς δὲ χρήται κοινοῖς, ὅλον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρεώται τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὥς εἰπεῖν ἰδίοις, ἔτι δ' ἵπποις καὶ κυσίν, καὶ

28 μᾶλλον τε? Susem. || 29 ἐκάστου προσεδρεύοντες I<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> III. (perhaps rightly) || 33 γίνονται? Susem. || 35 ὡς κοινοῖς Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, *ταυτοῖς* William || 36 εἰς ἐνίαν? Susem. ὡς εἰς πᾶσαν? Schmidt, ὡς [ἐπείν] Giphanius, ὡς περ? Kossow || 36 (?) Γ

26 For ὅλως=in general, almost like ἀπλῶς, comp. III. 9. 4, VIII(V). 1 § 3, 1 § 13 where it is opposed to κατὰ τι as here to πῶς.

§ 6 27 The division of attention will remove mutual dissatisfaction: the article implies 'those grounds of complaint specified above.' Each will set about his own task, e.g. the cultivation of land.

29 δι' ἀρετὴν κτλ] Public virtue will ensure that, as the proverb has it, *in all that relates to use* friends go shares in property.

"Comp. IV(VII). 10. 9 with n. (S31). Giphanius observes that this favourite maxim of the Pythagoreans is purposely misinterpreted here because Plato (*Rep. IV 424 A) applied it to the absolute community of property. It is not Aristotle, however, but Plato who misconstrues it: in fact after the latter had misinterpreted it, the former restores it to its original sense. See Zeller's *Pro-Socratica* I, p. 345 n. 2, Eng. tr." SUSEM. (156 b)*

31 ἐν ἐνίαις πόλεσιν] See the commendation passed on the Spartans, VIII(V). 5. 10. SUSEM. (157)

ὑπογεγραμμένων] prescribed, laid down as a rule to follow. Often in Plato. Eaten refers to *Lysis* V 734 E, νόμοις ποιεῖται ὑπογράφειν, *Protag.* 326 D ἢ πόλις νόμοις ὑπογράφεται, and *Repub.* 424 A, 449 C.

32 ὥς=implying that.

33 τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ] *either in or* might become.

§ 7 34 τοῖς δὲ χρήται κοινοῖς] Here even Aristotle's political theory has a certain dash of socialism; only in

the main he stops short of the actual facts as presented in Sparta particularly, whereas Plato set out from these Spartan institutions, but only to go far beyond them. It is also justly observed by Oncken i. 183, that in general whatever, as was the case in Greece, the Romans are principally supported by the labour of strangers who are not free, there the ruling caste as a whole stands as a mortal communistic relation as opposed to the servile caste. Compare further n. (156). SUSEM. (156)

35 οἶον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι κτλ] Xenophon *De Eq.* *Lac.* 5 § 1 p. 4 relates in the main the same facts here, as to slaves and helots; and as to horses, with the more precise limitation, that a sick man or any one requiring a carriage or desirous of travelling rapidly to a given place will, if he sees a horse anywhere, take it and after using it return it faithfully unharmed. As to dogs, he will more definitely restrict that usage to the chase. Those who require the dogs invite their owner to go hunting; while he, if he has not the time, readily sends them off with the pack. There is no such information in Xenophon about produce growing in the fields; what he does say is that after a meal in the country people left the remainder of the food they had prepared in store-chambers; others obtained while hunting and in need of food might, if they had no provisions with them, break the seals of these store-chambers and take what they required, leaving the rest behind and expelling the seal. SUSEM. (159)

- § 8 δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδίων, <τοῖς> ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερόν (1) τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς. ὅπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου  
 40 τοῦτ' ἔργον ἴδιον ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀμύθητον ὅσον διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἴδιον τί. μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς  
 1263 b αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἕκαστος, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῦτο φυσικόν.  
 § 9 τὸ δὲ φίλαντον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσί γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν  
 5 ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἐταίροις ἡδιστον. ὃ γίνεται τῆς  
 § 10 κτήσεως ἰδίας οὔσης. ταῦτά τε δὴ [οὐ] συμβαίνει τοῖς λίαν ἐν 7 ποιοῦσι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναιροῦσιν ἔργα δυοῖν ἀρεταῖν φανερώς, σωφροσύνης μὲν [τὸ] περὶ τὰς γυναικάς

37 ἐφοδίων] *pro viaticis* William || <τοῖς> or <πᾶσι τοῖς> before κατὰ Sauppe, before ἐν Susem., <τοῖς> ἐν had also occurred to Vahlen, *Ztschr. f. d. östr. G.* xxv. 1874. p. 487, [ἐν] τοῖς ἀγροῖς Oncken, [ἐν] ταῖς ἀγοραῖς Bernays, <ταμείοις> ἐν or <ταμείοις> ἐν v. Leutsch, ἐν ταῖς ἀγραῖς Busse and Ridgeway independently || χώραν] θήραν Bücheler, perhaps rightly

1263 b 1 αὐτὸς omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 3 τὸ omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand; added by corr.<sup>3</sup>) || 4 καὶ τὸ P<sup>1</sup> Ar., καὶ τὸν Γ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2</sup> 3.4 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup>, τὸν Ald. || φιλοχρήματον <καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον> ? Koraes, accepted by Bernays || 5 ἕκαστος P<sup>3</sup> 4 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand; emended by corr.<sup>3</sup>) || 6 ἐτέροις Π<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> || 7 οὐ after δὴ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 9 τὸ after μὲν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, τῷ Bernays

§ 8 39 τοιοῦτοι sc. οἶοι τῇ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς. Above δι' ἀρετήν.

νομοθέτου ἔργον] Undoubtedly Aristotle hopes for results of human legislation which now we only expect from the training of the conscience by morality and religion; see on 9 § 12 n. (296). Herein he agrees with Plato; not however, like him, from any denial or underestimate of the rights or power of individuality (Oncken). See notes (161) and (162). SUSEM. (160)

40 ἔτι δὲ κτλ] "Again, even to the pleasure we feel, the difference that it makes to call a thing our own is unspeakably great." An expression like οὐράνιον ὅσον, θαυμάσιον ὅσον, nimum quantum.

41 μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην] By μὴ or μήποτε with the indicative, no uncertainty is intended; ibi quoque adhibita reperitur, ubi res affirmatur non negatur. "It may well be that our love for ourselves is not without a purpose."

§ 9 1263 b 2 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* ix. 8. 1; 1168 a 28,

*Rhet.* i. 11. 26, 1371 b 18; also Plato *Laws* v 731 D (Eaton). Congreve quotes *Nic. Eth.* ix. 4. 1, where even friendship and benevolence are reduced to forms of self-love, τὰ φιλικὰ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους... ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτόν ἐληλυθέναι. SUSEM. (161)

3 καθάπερ κτλ] "just as the love of money means to love it more than is right": Pl. *Rep.* i 347 B τὸ φιλάργυρον εἶναι θνείδος λέγεται (Vettori). Comp. also *Nic. Eth.* iv. 4. 4, φέρομεν τὸ φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.

§ 10 7 συμβαίνει] of awkward consequences involved in a theory: συμβαίνειν dicitur ubi factis ex aliqua hypothesisi conclusionibus ipsa hypothesis refutatur (Bonitz).

8 ἀναιροῦσιν ἔργα] "destroy the functions."

9 σωφροσύνης] Even Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II ii p. 697, n. 7, thinks this an unfair objection, because in Plato's commonwealth a guardian is bound to continence

(ἔργον γὰρ καλὸν ἀλλοτρίας οὔσης ἀπέχασθαι διὰ σωφρο-<sup>(11)</sup>  
σύνην), ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ [τῷ] περὶ τὰς κτήσεις (οὔτε γὰρ ἔσται  
φανερὸς ἐλευθέριος ὢν, οὔτε πράξει πρᾶξιν ἐλευθέριον αἰδε-  
μίαν· ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἐλευθε-  
ριότητος ἔργον ἐστίν). εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη  
τη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ἂν εἶναι ἔδεικεται·  
ὁ γὰρ ἀκροώμενος ἄσμενος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζαν ἵστα-  
σθαι φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστήν πᾶσι πρὸς ἅπαντας. ἀλ-  
λως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις τῶν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων  
ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γινομένων διὰ τὸ μὴ κοι-  
νὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους  
περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίους  
κολακείας. ὧν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ

11 ἐλευθεριότητα P<sup>1</sup>, ἐλευθεριότητα M<sup>1</sup> 12 τὸ after διὰ omitted by P<sup>1</sup>, τὸ before  
|| 13 τῇ after γὰρ W<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and perhaps Q<sup>b</sup> 14 ἂν αἴσεται εἶναι ἔδεικεται M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> 15  
17 τινὰ (τινὶ M<sup>1</sup>) before φιλίαν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

in respect of all women to whom he is not married by the authorities, the Platonic 'community of wives' being the very reverse of free indulgence of the appetites. Quite true: but then neither is this the point of Aristotle's objection. What he urges is that voluntary self-restraint, which is nowhere possible save where monogamy is established, and in Plato's state is out of the question, alone deserves the name of continence, σωφροσύνη. We must admit with Oncken that he is right in this, and that §§ 9, 10 make an especially agreeable impression, as a defence of the individual's moral freedom. Further, see p. (106 b). SEUSEL. (162)

10 ἔργον καλὸν] Strictly, a goodly deed, fair to contemplate; then a 'moral action' (since the motive makes the act virtuous; it must be done τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα), with that peculiar implication of 'nobleness' which runs through the *Nic. Ethics*.

11 πρᾶξιν ἐλευθέριον] for which private property, e.g. money, is required. Comp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 8. 4 τῷ μὲν ἐλευθέρῳ δεῖται χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια; *ib.* § 7. Can we ascribe acts of liberality to the gods? τίτι δὲ δῶσουσι; ἀνθρώπων δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιαῦτον.

12 ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει... 14 ἔργον ἐστὶ] for the use of one's possessions is the field for the exercise of liberality. Cicero's *manus instituta, domus parata*, 1. 38 is analogous to ἔργον in this sense.

§ 11 17 φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστήν] Comp. Dante *Divina Com.* IV. 137-138, che per quanto si dice per li suoi, / tanto possiede più di ben ciascuno. / e per di caritate arde in quel chinarsi; 139-140, e quanta gente più liante s' intende, / più v' è da bene amare, e più vi s' ama, / e come spedischi, l' uno all' altro aiuto.

ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις] Here he evidently has in mind Plato's objections, *Republic* IV 422 C: οὐδὲ, εἰ ἀγαθὴ συμβολαίῃς τε πᾶσι καὶ ἀγαθὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἀπὸς ἀλλήλους ἐκδιδοῦσιν... οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ κοινόντι; εἰς τοιοῦτον τε καὶ ἐγχαίματα ἀπὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς ἀχρηστία; ἢ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐστὶ εἶπεν, διὰ τὸ κοινὸν οὐκ ἐκτρέφειν τὸν τὸ εἶναι; Although not precisely the same evils are mentioned there and here, nor especially deduced from the institution of private property, yet in fact Aristotle's words quite accord with the view of the *Republic*. Comp. §§ 20, 21 with *op.* (174, 175). SEUSEL. (163)

Add *ib.* 463 C: εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκτρέφεται τῶν κοινῶν ἀπὸς καὶ ἀπὸς ἀλλήλων, οὐδὲν δὲ οὐκ ἐκτρέφεται τὸ κοινόντι; εἰς τοιοῦτον τε καὶ ἀγαθὰς τε καὶ ἀγαθὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἀπὸς ἀλλήλους ἐκδιδοῦσιν, οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ κοινόντι; εἰς τοιοῦτον τε καὶ ἀγαθὰς τε καὶ ἀγαθὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἀπὸς ἀλλήλους ἐκδιδοῦσιν, οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ κοινόντι. *ib.* 463 C.

§ 12 21 ἂν οὐκὲν γίνεται] This is begging the question, though it may fairly be assumed that communism would not cure all these evils.

διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοι-  
 νωνοῦντας πολλῶ διαφερομένους μᾶλλον ὁρῶμεν ἢ τοὺς χωρὶς  
 25 τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας· ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὀλίγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοι-  
 νωνιῶν διαφερομένους πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτη-  
 § 13 μένους ἰδίᾳ τὰς κτήσεις. ἔτι δὲ δίκαιον μὴ μόνον λέγειν  
 ὅσων στερήσονται κακῶν κοινωνήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσων  
 ἀγαθῶν φαίνεται δ' εἶναι πάμπαν ἀδύνατος ὁ βίος.  
 30 αἴτιον δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρὴ νομίζειν  
 § 14 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ οὖσαν ὀρθήν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πῶς μίαν  
 καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντη. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς  
 οὐκ ἔσται προϋούσα πόλις, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἔσται μὲν, ἐγγὺς δ' οὖσα  
 τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι χείρων πόλις, ὥσπερ καὶ εἴ τις τὴν  
 35 συμφωνίαν ποιήσκειν ὁμοφωνίαν ἢ τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν.

25 τοὺς] τῶν P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. || 32 πάντως P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || ἔσται M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 33 Walford (as cited by Eaton) transposes πόλις to follow ἔσται μὲν || 34 ἔσται was added after εἶναι by Vettori Bk. Susem<sup>1,2</sup>, erit William

23 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κτλ] "Since we see just those people who are joint owners and who share property quarrelling far more than those who have their estates separate." Are these the *συναπόδημοι* of § 4? Or is the reference to commercial partnerships?

25 ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν κτλ] The cases of quarrels seen to arise out of partnerships are few, it is true; but then we compare them with the large number of those who have separate possessions.

§ 13 29 ἀδύνατος] Compare Grote III. pp. 217—222. "This supposed impossibility is the mode of expressing strong disapprobation and repugnance. Plato's project contradicts sentiments conceived as fundamental and consecrated: the reasons offered to prove it impossible are principally founded upon the very sentiment adverted to. The truly forcible objection is the sentiment itself." Plato impugns it and declares it to be inapplicable to his guardians: amongst whom as he conceives, a totally different sentiment of obligation would grow up. Similarly "if Sparta had never been actually established and if Aristotle had read a description of it as a mere project, he would probably have pronounced it impracticable."

30 παρακρούσεως] "fallacy" as in *De Soph. El.* 17 § 3, 175 b 1, Demosth. c. *Timocr.* § 194, 760 27 φενακισμοῦ καὶ παρακρούσεως ἔνεκα.

31 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κτλ] the incorrectness of his first principle: see 2 § 2. Comp. Grote III. p. 215 f. 217 n., who from Aristotle's own admissions v(viii). 1. 4, αἶμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως· μόριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως, and 1. 4. 5 τό τε γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλον ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου, argues that "the broad principle is common to him with Plato," though "each has his own way of applying it."

*General Objections to the scheme of Plato's Republic: §§ 14—28.*

§ 14 Here too it would have been as well to state that these remarks are nothing new, but only a repetition of c. 2, although as new points arise out of them (see *Ana-lysis* p. 104) there is much greater justification than there was in the case of c. 3 §§ 4—7 and c. 4 §§ 4—8: cp. n. (149). SUSEM. (164)

33 προϋούσα] advancing (to a certain degree of unity), "if its unity be carried far"; explained by *γινόμενη μία μᾶλλον* in 2 § 2.

34 ὥσπερ καὶ κτλ] "as if one were to turn the concord of parts into unison, or the rhythm into a single step." See *Probl.* XIX. 38 § 3, 921 a 2, *συμφωνία κρᾶσις ἐστὶ λόγον ἐχόντων ἐναντίων πρὸς ἀλληλα.*

35 συμφωνία = consonance of the voices singing one part with the instruments playing another: cp. *Probl.* XIX. 39,

ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος ὄν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν κοινὴν δειὰν κοινήν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν· καὶ τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν εἰσάγειν, καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἴσασθαι τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδαίαν, ἄτοπον τοῖς τοιούτοις οἶσθαι διορθοῦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσταταῖς ἐνομοθέτης ἐκοίνωσεν.

δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι χρὴ προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν, εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς εἶχεν· πάντα γὰρ σφραγίσαι εὔρηται μέν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοῖς δ' οὐ χρεῖται

39 <δεῖν> διορθοῦν Spengel || 40 ἔθεσι P<sup>1</sup>

1264 a 1 ἐκοίνωσε P<sup>2,3,4</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.), ἐκοινώσσε M<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 2 ἔθεσιν Ar., ἔθεσιν Bernays (hardly right)

Chappell *History of Music* pp. 11 f., 16. Whereas in *ἁμωνία* one or more sets of voices or instruments give the same notes. Similarly *ῥυθμίς*, ἡ τῆς κινήσεως τάξις (Pl. *Legis* II 663 A), is the orderly succession of steps in dancing or notes of music of certain definite lengths. The unit or element of which long successions of 'times' are composed is *βάσις*, 'step' in dancing, 'foot' in metre. This is clear from *Μεταφρ.* XIV (N) 1. 10, 1087 b 33, τὰ δ' ἐν ὅτι μέτρον σημαίνει, φανερὸν, καὶ ἐν παντί ἐστὶ τι ἑτερονόμοι κενον, ὡς ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ δέσσει (in music a quarter tone, the smallest interval), ἐν δὲ μεγέθει δέσσειται ἡ ποὺς ἢ τοιοῦτον, ἐν δὲ ῥυθμῷ βάσις ἢ συλλαβή. Instead of the regular orderly sequence of *βάσεις*, steps in dancing or feet in recitation, of various lengths, there will be only a single monotonous step or a single beat.

§ 15 36 πρότερον] §§ 5—8. SUSEM. (165)

37 κοινήν ποιεῖν] widen it so that all shall share in it.

τόν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν κτλ] Comp. 7 § 8 n. (1238), and below §§ 18, 19. SUSEM. (165 b)

39 τοῖς τοιούτοις = such direct, compulsory measures, as Plato proposes.

40 ἔθεσι, φιλοσοφίᾳ, νόμοις] Comp. *φάσις*, *ἔθεσι*, *λόγοι* of IV (VO). 13. 11 n. (887). SUSEM. (166)

φιλοσοφίᾳ in the wider sense, 'culture' as in 7 § 12. So *Rh.* II. 23. 11 of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, perhaps a quotation from Aikidas. An approximation to *ἱστορίας*' use of the word for 'literary training.'

τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις] Aristotle's found-

ness for social institutions of the Cretan and Spartan type—see § 7. n. 1140—de here seen in a new dimension, of which we shall hear more in c. 9 § 31 n. 1241, in §§ 7, 8, IV (VI). in §§ 5, 6 and 10. Compare further note 156, 196, 208—21, 212, 228 f., SUSEM. (144)

§ 16 1264 a 1 οὐκ ἐν δαδόν] An appeal to the evidence of history. It is like Aristotle to seek for the evidence he approves some basis in tradition, authority, popular or widespread belief. "An institution which has flourished in many different ages and races must presumably fulfil some want and correspond to some deeply-seated instinct." Gerson rejects that the same objection like the objection of impossibility would apply to the novelties in his own ideal state. But Aristotle might fairly have argued that the long time which has elapsed without a democratic state makes it the less likely that one ever will be established, as no originating cause seems forthcoming adequate to start it.

4 οὐ συνήκται] have not been systematized. A 'synthesis' is wanting.

τοῖς δ' οὐ χρεῖται] Much that is known is not introduced because it is regarded as impracticable. Assuming that the earth, and doubtless the race of men upon it (c. 9 § 31 n. 1), has always existed and always will exist, Aristotle shares the conviction of Plato and most other Greek thinkers that there has not been one single historical development of humanity, but it has begun and been carried on, in a manner similar if not quite the same, for uncountable times over and over again. Hence to a greater or less

§ 17 γινώσκοντες.

μάλιστα δ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, εἴ τις τοῖς ἔρ-

6 γοις ἴδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην· οὐ γὰρ  
δυνήσεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιῆσαι τὴν πό-  
λιν, τὰ μὲν εἰς συσσίτια τὰ δὲ εἰς φρατρίας καὶ φυλάς.  
ᾧστε οὐδὲν ἄλλο συμβήσεται νενομοθετημένον πλὴν μὴ γεωρ-

10 γεῖν τοὺς φύλακας· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπι-

§ 18 χειροῦσιν.

(οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας τίς

ἔσται τοῖς κοινωνούσιν, οὗτ' εἴρηκεν ὁ Σωκράτης οὔτε ῥάδιον

7 αὐτῶν Ald., αὐτὴν Thom., αὐτοὺς Böcker, αὐ Bernays, ἄττα Jackson, αὐτίκα  
Welldon || 8 φατρίας M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Susem.<sup>2,3</sup>, φατριάς P<sup>1</sup> || 9 οὐδὲν after  
ἄλλο M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 10 καὶ νῦν] τολυνν Trieber

extent everything has existed before, and there is nothing new under the sun: all discoveries have been already made and then lost again, so that they need to be rediscovered. See Zeller II ii 792. Comp. Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* vol. CIII. 1871. p. 135 ff.: IV(VII). 10 §§ 7, 8 n. (828). Plato however would have had all the more right to reply to this objection that he himself has but made such a rediscovery: that, as Oncken observes, he has only followed Aristotle's advice and collected institutions hitherto widely scattered: that his innovation consists solely in this combination of old material, as all the elements of his ideal state were to be found previously isolated, some in Sparta and Crete, others amongst the Pythagoreans, and others again in Socrates. Comp. Zeller's *Plato* p. 483 f. SUSEM. (167)

This view found a strong expression from K. F. Hermann *The historical elements of Plato's ideal of a state*, in *Gesam. Abhandl.* VII. 140; "Plato has drawn every single feature in his picture of the state from the actual political life of Greece: he has but applied the abstractions of science to produce a formal and harmonious combination." It is at least obvious that the Spartan ἀγωγή is, in a manner, the true starting-point of Plato, as of Xenophon and Aristotle (Grote III. 209—211); but some caution should be exercised in the choice of precedents. Thus L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* p. 417 conjectures that the system of relationship propounded in *Rep.* v 461 D, *Tim.* 18 C, D was derived from "traditions not known to us": and Curtius (*History of Greece* I p. 181 Eng. trans.) that the three orders of society *Rep.* IV were adopted from Crete (see n. 818):—two features of the scheme which bear in

a high degree the stamp of originality.

§ 17 5 τοῖς ἔργοις] "actually in process of formation." The plural is used as well as the singular ἔργῳ with or without the article, in prose or poetry.

8 εἰς συσσίτια] See n. (166). That Plato too intended this, was shown in n. (153) on § 1. From the expression here and in § 15 we might be led to believe that this was not the case. Comp. § 19 n. (170), § 24 n. (179), § 27 n. (184): 6 § 3 n. (187), § 5 n. (195). SUSEM. (168) φρατρίας] The form φατρία (as in Aeschines II § 147), not φρατρία, is supported by the *Corpus Inscr. Att.* II. No. 599, l. 1 with Köhler's remark; Philippi *Contributions to a history of the Athenian citizenship* (*Beiträge u. s. w.* Berlin 1870) p. 177 nn. 55, 56; Bürmann *Three Studies in Attic Law* in *Jahrb. f. Phil. Suppl.* IX. p. 615. At the same time φρ is often written in the cursive MSS. with a small hook to φ, so that φ and φρ can hardly be distinguished with certainty from one another. In such a case therefore it may be advisable to depart from the one safe principle of following the oldest manuscript authority and to retain the only rational form φρ even against the codices. Comp. 3 § 6 n. (141). SUSEM. (169)

10 καὶ νῦν] Here again, as so often in these chapters and elsewhere, νῦν does not mean 'at the present time' but 'actually', and ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν is but a limiting expression for ποιοῦσιν.

§ 18 11 ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας κτλ.] "has never explained what is the nature of the entire polity which (these) members of the community share. Yet the bulk of the state is made up in effect by the bulk of citizens other than the guardians." For οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται, see § 20, and n. on 4 § 4.

εἰπεῖν. καίτοι σχεδὸν τό γε πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως τὰ τὰς ἀνελόντων πολιτῶν γίνεται πλῆθος, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν ἐνέμενται, πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ [καὶ] καθ' ἑκάστον ἰδίας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας ἴσους ἢ κοινούς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κοινὰ πάντα πάντων, τί διοίσουσιν οὗτοι ἐκείνων τῶν φυλάκων; ἢ τί πείσουσιν τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν; ἢ τί παύσονται ὑπομένοντες τὴν ἀρχήν, εἰ μὴ τι σοφίζονται τοιούτων οἷον Κρήτες; ἐκείνοι γὰρ τὰλλα ταῦτ' αὖ τοῖς δούλοις ἐφέντες μένουν ἀφ' ὧν ὀρέσασιν τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀπλῶν κτῆσαι, εἰ δὲ κα-

15 καὶ after ἢ untranslated by William and Ar. 16 καὶ after δευτέρου by P<sup>1</sup> 19 ἀρχουσι or something similar, in the place of ἐνέμενται, Lachniz and Thurot: Bernays omits 18 ἢ τί πείσουσιν...ἀρχῇ with Ar. and παρανομοῦντες to follow 20 ἀρχήν 21 μαθήσονται P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bekk. Bernays, but παύσονται P<sup>1</sup> Lachniz 22 ὑπομενοῦσι Ar., ὑπομένονσι Γ Π 23 ταῦτα Γ, πάντα Ar. (9. Kassel) 24 οἷον Γ<sup>2</sup> B<sup>1</sup> T<sup>1</sup> U<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) 25 ἀπειρήσασιν Γ<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>1</sup> T<sup>1</sup> U<sup>1</sup> All. 14. and apparently P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), perhaps rightly

§ 19 17 εἰ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Aristotle might well have spared himself the consideration of this possibility. It is strange that he has not learnt from Plato whether his third order of citizens is to have community of families and of property; whether, in other words, just those characteristics which, like their education, are distinctive of the two upper classes in the ideal state, are to be extended to the third, or not. It is not easy to imagine a stronger case of inability to transport oneself to an opponent's sphere of thought. In fact he cannot be acquitted of very culpable carelessness in the use of the word he is criticizing. As regards community of property at any rate, Plato has most expressly said *Rep.* III 417 A, IV 419 that nothing of the kind is to exist amongst citizens of the third class, leaving room for no doubt whatever as to his real opinion. Nor is Aristotle even consistent. For in 4 § 4 above he has, with better reason, raised an objection which is only intelligible if these institutions are *not* supposed existing in the third class of citizens. Comp. § 24 n. (179); also n. 166) and the references there given. *Stob.* (170)

18 ἢ τί πείσουσιν κτλ] See *Criticae* Vol. II. The sense we require is not, "what compensation will those receive who submit to their rule?" (which is suggested in the next sentence), but "what

advantage will the rulers have over their subjects?" The older commentators endeavoured to extract this by taking τὰς ἐπομένους τὴν ἀρχὴν = τὰς ἐπόμενους ἀρχῇ, "those who undertake to govern." But this is against the sense of ἐπόμενοι in the next clause: "at what inducement will [the rest of the citizens] have to submit to them?"

20 σοφίζονται] = *deceit* or *concoct* (Eaton).

οἷον Κρήτες] See on 9 § 2 n. (161) and Exc. III. This statement is confirmed by the advice of the Cretan poet Hyblaeus there quoted. See also IV 411-10. 1 n. (170). *Stob.* (171)

21 τοῖς δούλοις ἐφέντες] "while allowing their serfs the same rights with themselves in other things, have degraded them". (ἐφέντες would be 'have prohibited'). As we now know, *δουλος* was the proper term for these serfs, but they are called *δούλοι* precisely in the language of Gortyn.

"The arguments in §§ 19-22 are all καὶ ἄρα...γεωργῶν γενομένων not in the main quite correct, but really not so much so as Aristotle's usual statements to Plato's (Oschel). Yet see n. 171." *Stob.* (172)

Comp. Gort. III. pp. 112-113, who lays stress on the spiritual power and contempt for the *δουλος* revealed by the nature of the questions.

θάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι, καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις ἔσται τὰ  
 τοιαῦτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς κοινωνίας; ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πό-  
 25 λει δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ὑπεναντίας  
 ἀλλήλαις. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἷον φρουρούς, τοὺς δὲ  
 § 21 γεωργούς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. ἐγκλή-  
 ματα δὲ καὶ δίκαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν  
 φησὶ κακά, πάνθ' ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις. καίτοι λέγει ὁ Σω-  
 30 κράτης ὡς οὐ πολλῶν δεήσονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παιδείαν,  
 οἷον ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορανομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν  
 § 22 τοιούτων, ἀποδιδούς μόνον τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς φύλαξιν. ἔτι δὲ  
 κυρίους ποιεῖ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς γεωργούς ἀποφορὰν φέρον-

24 Congreve brackets μιᾷ

§ 20 23 ἐκείνοις=τοῖς ἄλλοις πολί-  
 ταις, the citizens of the third class. τὰ  
 τοιαῦτα] family life and separate pos-  
 sessions.

24 τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας]  
 What will be the means of uniting them?  
 How will they associate as fellow-citizens  
 with the two upper classes, who have  
 such dissimilar institutions?

ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ κτλ] This is the very re-  
 proach which Plato levels at the existing  
 polities: ἐκάστη αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσι πάμ-  
 πολλαι, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλεις...δύο μὲν γὰρ κἂν  
 ὀτιοῦν ἢ πολεμία ἀλλήλοις, ἡ μὲν πενήτων,  
 ἡ δὲ πλουσίων *Rep.* IV 422 E; and VIII  
 551 D (Eaton). SUSEM. (173)

26 οἷον φρουρούς] *Rep.* III 415 D, E;  
 IV 419 ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς, φαίη ἄν, ὥσπερ ἐπί-  
 κουροι μισθωτοὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει φαίνονται κα-  
 θήσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ φρουροῦντες.  
 SUSEM. (174)

27 πολίτας is predicate: "his citi-  
 zens are the farmers and the artisans, &c."  
 As Grote justly remarks, this is a larger  
 and more generous conception of the  
 purpose of political institutions than any  
 we find elsewhere in Greece, even in  
 Aristotle, who sets aside the rest of the  
 people as not members of the common-  
 wealth, IV(VII). 9. 3. Plato not only  
 treats them as integral parts of the state,  
 but in a sense makes them the ultimate  
 object of his solicitude. It is for them  
 that he sacrifices the private pleasure of  
 the guardians, and compels his philo-  
 sophic rulers to descend into the cave.  
 Both rulers and guardians are truly public  
 servants, whose duty it is to protect and  
 benefit their fellows, *Rep.* 463 B.

§ 21 29 φησὶ] *Rep.* V 464 D: τί δέ;  
 δίκαι τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλή-  
 λους οὐκ οἰχίσεται ἐξ αὐτῶν; Cp. n.

(163). SUSEM. (175)

καὶ τούτοις] just as much to the citi-  
 zens of Callipolis (*ib.* ὅθεν δὲ ὑπάρξει τού-  
 τοις ἀστασιάστοι οὖσι); for by l. 27 the  
 farmers, artisans &c. who make up the  
 third class, are citizens.

λέγει ὁ Σωκρ.] *Rep.* IV 425 C, D: καὶ  
 τὸ παράπαν ἀγορανομικὰ ἅττα καὶ  
 ἀστυνομικὰ ἢ ἐλλιμενικὰ ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα  
 τοιαῦτα, τούτων τολμήσομεν τινομοθετεῖν  
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄξιον. Cp. n. (163). SUSEM. (176)

31 ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορ.] Comp  
 IV(VII). 12. 7 n. (865). SUSEM. (176 b)

"Laws concerning city-police and  
 market-police." Dionysius says of the  
 Roman aediles (VI. 90) σχεδὸν εὐοικασ-  
 πως κατὰ τὰ πλείεστα τοῖς παρ' Ἑλλησι  
 ἀγορανόμοις.

32 Take μόνον with τοῖς φύλαξιν. This  
 objection proceeds from an acute appre-  
 hension that in outward aspect the ideal  
 state would not greatly differ from an  
 ordinary Greek city, in spite of its stand-  
 ing army, half Amazons, and its govern-  
 ment of experienced military officers  
 distinguished as savants, who (like the  
 Jesuits in Paraguay or the English in  
 India) are at another stage of develop-  
 ment, and belong intellectually and mor-  
 rally to a wholly different world from  
 the mass of the population.

§ 22 33 κυρίους... φέροντας] How  
 precisely the connexion is to be under-  
 stood was explained in n. (153) on § 1.  
 Practically the result is much as Aristotle  
 represents it, and this is certainly man-  
 aged differently in his own pattern state.  
 SUSEM. (177) Pl. *Rep.* V 464 C

παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφήν λαμβάνοντα  
 μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς, κοινῇ πάντας ἀναλ-  
 σκειν, IV 416 D, E: τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδεια, ὅσα  
 δέονται ἄνδρες ἀθληταὶ πολέμου σφόδρον

τας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι χαλεποῦσθαι καὶ φρονεῖν περὶ τῶν μάλιστα πλείους ἢ τὰς παρ' ἐνίοις εὐλογίας τε καὶ τιμωρίας καὶ δουλείας. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα ταῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτε μὴ, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώριστα, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχόμενων, τίς ἐκ τούτων τε πολιτεία καὶ παιδεία καὶ νόμοι τίνας, ἔστι δ' αὖτε εὑρεῖν ῥάδιον, οὔτε τὸ διαφέρειν μικρὸν, τὸ ποῖον τινα εἶναι τούτους πρὸς τὸ σφῆζεσθαι τὴν τῶν φυλάκων κραταιότητα. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας ποιήσει κοινὰς τὰς δὲ ἀνδράσι ἰδίας, τίς οἰκονομήσει ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἱ ἀνδρες αὐτῶν; κἂν εἰ κοινὰ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γυναικῶν γυναικες \* \*. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιῆσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοὺς ἀνδράσιν, οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. ἐπισφάλλει δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὡς καθίστησιν ὁ Σωκράτης· αἱ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὰς

35 *πεισιτείας* P<sup>2-3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 36 [καὶ δουλείας] αὐτὴ καὶ «γυναικες» δουλείας Schneid., καὶ *πεισιτείας* Schneider, *μωρίας* οἱ «κοινὰς» δουλείας Schmidt || 37 *κοινὰς* Schneid. «καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν» καὶ? Sussem. || 39 *ποῖον τινα* P<sup>2-4</sup> Q<sup>2</sup> Bk. || εἶναι «εἶς» Scaliger «δεῖ» εἶναι Spengel

1264 b 3 *κἂν...γυναῖκες*. These words in IP come before τὰς ἀνδράσι (cf. *κοινὰς* in the margin): Syllburg and Bk. bracket them; Schneider and Korte transpose them to precede τὴν οἰκονομήσει, Korte's reading τὴν τε καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν. Thoma has discovered the lacuna

καὶ ἀνδράσι, συμπαροῦς παρὰ τὸν ἄλλον πολιτῶν ἀρχεῖσθαι μισθὸν τῇ φυλακῇ τοῦτον δὲ μὴτε περιεῖναι αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν λαόν· ἀλλὰ μὴτε ἀνδράσι.

ἀποφορὰν] a rent in kind.

34 *χαλεποῦσθαι κτλ*] Impulsiveness and full of arrogance.

35 *τὰς παρ' ἐνίοις...πεισιτείας*] See § 2 n. (1260). SUSSEM. (178)

36 *δουλείας*] Ridgeway *Translactions* p. 132 thinks the word means "the self-populations of states like Argos and Crete, called *Γυμνήσιοι* at Argos, and *Ἀφαιῶται* in Crete," quoting Thuc. v. 23 where the word is used of the Helots, *ἦν δὲ ἡ δουλεία ἐπαισισηται*. So also by Plato, *Lysis* 276 D of the Mafandyni.

§ 23 *εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα κτλ*] We are recalled to § 18; the question, *ποῖον εἶναι δούλειον*, is the tenure of property amongst the ordinary citizens. "Whether it is equally necessary here"—as in the case of the Guardians, to have communism—"or not, has certainly not been determined, as matters stand." *ταῦτα* = *ταῦτα* *πᾶρα* of line 17 above.

37 *καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχόμενων*] "Not about the following points: what consti-

tution and education and mode of laws are in force in the case of the citizens at large."

40 *αὐτὴν ἀπορῶν πρὸς τὸ πλεονεχῆν*. The construction as in 1264 b 14 n.

§ 24 *ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ*] But supposing he intends to have their property in individual ownership, and yet to maintain community of wives, whom are the women to be bound to superintend household matters as the men manage the work in the fields?

"What was said at n. 11 of *ἄγχι* again to this argument in the married state of the text." SUSSEM. (179)

1264 b 4 *ἐκ τῶν θηρίων*] Bp. 7 431 D. SUSSEM. (180)

*ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, ἔτι*] should show by a comparison that the human animals that... In *Alat.* II. 10 [a. 11] *παραβολή* = simile.

§ 25 7 *ἀλλὰ γὰρ κτλ*] In the Platonic state the government is not actually in the hands of the same individuals in perpetuity. Some accept themselves of the highest order, the philosophers, are eligible as rulers, but they must be ruled truly by rotation. SUSSEM. (181)

αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας, τοῦτο δὲ στάσεως αἴτιον γίνεται καὶ παρὰ  
 τοῖς μηδὲν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοις, ἥπουθεν δὴ παρὰ γε θυ-  
 § 26 μοειδέσι καὶ πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν. ὅτι δὲ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὰς  
 ΙΙ ποιεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἄλλοις  
 ὅτε δὲ ἄλλοις μέμικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυ-  
 σός, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. φησὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐθὺς γινομέ-  
 νοις μίξαι χρυσόν, τοῖς δ' ἄργυρον, χαλκὸν δὲ καὶ σίδηρον  
 § 27 τοῖς τεχνίταις μέλλουσιν ἔσσεσθαι καὶ γεωργοῖς. ἔτι δὲ καὶ  
 Ι6 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν  
 εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ

9 ἥ πουθεν δὴ P<sup>3.6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>2</sup>), ἥ πουθεν δὴ P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), ἥ πουθεν δὴ P<sup>4</sup>, ἥ πουθεν δὴ P<sup>1</sup>, εἴπουθεν δὴ Γ M<sup>s</sup>, ἥ που γε δὴ Vettori Bk.<sup>1</sup>, ἥ που δὴθεν Götting, ἥ δὴπουθεν γε Spengel || 13 δὲ] γάρ? Susem. || εὐθὺς Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. & P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand).

9 ἀξίωμα = dignity, valuation. There is no such distinction in Aristotle (as there is in Thucydides) between your own estimate, ἀξίωσις, and that of others, ἀξίωμα.

10 θυμοειδέσι...ἀνδράσι] The members of the second order of citizens, Guardians in the narrower and inexact sense (φύλακες=ἐπίκουροι) from whom the first class (ἄρχοντες) are drafted off. For after they have attained the age of twenty, only the better qualified amongst them proceed to the higher education in mathematics; and out of these again at thirty only the very ablest receive instruction five years longer in philosophy (διαλεκτική). Then after fifteen years more devoted to practical life, after serving in higher commands, they are at length received into the highest order, the rulers proper: see *Rep.* VII 536 D ff., comp. n. (970) on IV(VII). 17. 15 and Zeller's *Plato* p. 480 n. (69). In the Aristotelian model-state, however, all citizens in later life may attain to a share in the government and administration; provided, that is, their fellow-citizens elect them to the particular offices of state for which they are eligible. See on III. 1 § 10 n. (440), 4 § 5 (471), 13 § 12 (599), IV(VII). 9 § 9 (817), 13 § 9 (885) and Exc. I to B. V(VIII). As Eaton remarks, θυμοειδής = 'men of spirit' is Plato's own term (*Rep.* II 375 B, 376 C) for his caste of warriors: comp. III. 16 § 1 n. (641), IV(VII). 7 § 5 (786), § 7 (790), 10 § 13 (839), 15 § 9 (935). SUSEM. (182)

§ 26 ὅτι δὲ ἀναγκ. κτλ] "Aristotle apparently does not observe that Plato's myth does not answer its purpose, as it

does not recognize the promotion of ἐπίκουροι to be φύλακες." JACKSON.

13 φησὶ δὲ] *Rep.* III 415 A. SUSEM. (183)

εὐθὺς γιν.] directly they are born, at the moment of birth: εὐθὺς of time is not good Greek.

§§ 27, 28 This relates to one of the most brilliant and striking episodes of the *Republic*: the objection of Adeimantus at the opening of B. IV that Socrates has insufficiently provided for the happiness of his guardians: 419—421 C.

15 ἔτι δὲ...17 νομοθέτην] Here Aristotle is guilty of a further piece of carelessness. Plato certainly says, 420 B, οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἔν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὐδαιμον, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις: but Aristotle has not attended to another passage V 465 D—466 B, where this thread is taken up (μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπέπληξεν, ὅτι τοὺς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῖμεν) and to the later discussion IX 680—692 B, whence it appears that the former statement is only provisionally made. Plato's ultimate decision is the very opposite: that his polity is the sole means whereby the Guardians can attain to perfect happiness (465 D ἤσονται τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου, δν οἱ Ὀλυμπιονίκαί ζωσι, μακαριώτερον). Thus this objection breaks down entirely. We have had instances of similar negligence already in § 17 n. (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179): and there is another in 6 § 5 (195). Moreover in IV(VII). 9 § 7 Aristotle himself says εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος

εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ [μὴ] πάντων μερῶν ἢ (17)  
 τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εἶδαι.  
 μονεῖν ὥνπερ τὸ ἄρτιον· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τῷ ἄλλῳ  
 ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀπο-  
 ριζωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φύλακες μὴ εὐδαιμόνουν, τίσις ἐπι-  
 σκεψοίτο; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἷ γε τεχνῆται καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν βουλευ-  
 τῶν ἢ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περὶ ἧς ὁ Σωκράτης εἶρηκεν, ταύτης (18)  
 τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐτέραι· σχῆμα γὰρ  
 ὁδὸν δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἔχει τοὺς ἑσπε-  
 ροῦτον γραφέντας, διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα πολιτείας ἐπι-  
 σκεψασθαι μικρὰ βέλτιον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ  
 ὀλίγων πάνπαν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, περὶ τε γυναικῶν  
 καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ, καὶ περὶ κτήσεως, καὶ  
 περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων, καὶ  
 τῆς πολιτείας τὴν τάξιν (διαίρεται δὲ εἰς δύο μέρη τὸ

18 μὴ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων μερῶν Bojesen || *ei μὴ* Vossius, but then *ei μὴ* *πάντων* should be transposed to come after 19 τινῶν || [*μὴ*] *πάντων* Lindler Zeller (*Phil. II. Gr.* II ii 698 n. 2)—the easiest alteration. Basse transposes the second *μὴ* to precede τινῶν || ἢ τινῶν omitted by Bojesen || 20 ὥνπερ M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> (not hand—imended by p<sup>1</sup>), and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), ὥνπερ the remaining authorities including F, read *ἐσπεροῦτον* *et* by William || 26 τὰ is omitted by P<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 30 καὶ is inserted after ἔκτων by P<sup>2</sup> || After κτήσεως Susem. inserts the clause καὶ περὶ φυλάκων from 1264 b 40, 1265 a 1; *Introd.* p. 79 f. || the last καὶ *καὶ*? Schmidt, accepting the transposition || 31 δὲ] γὰρ P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk.

βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰ  
 ἀνταῖς τοῖς πολίταις; where see *note*.  
 SUSEM. (184)

18 ἢ τινῶν κτλ] "or unless at least  
 certain definite parts," viz. the most im-  
 portant, "attain happiness." SUSEM.  
 (186)

19 οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ] "For  
 happiness is not a thing of the same sort  
 with evenness, which may be an attribute  
 of the sum (of two numbers) where it is  
 not an attribute of either of the numbers  
 themselves." The sum of two odd num-  
 bers, 3 + 5, is even.

c. 6. Comparison of the Republic and  
 the Laws: §§ 1—5. Examination of the  
 polity proposed in the Laws: §§ 6—15.

See *Analysis* p. 104, *Introd.* p. 23  
 with *notes*; Zeller *Philos. Studien* p.  
 103—107, and pp. 1—144 generally;  
 Bruckner *l.* 194—209; Van der Rest pp.  
 81—144.

§ 1 27 ἐνταῦθα] In the *Laws*.  
 Evidently Aristotle assumes the work to

be genuine. According to Hug. *Loc.*  
 III. 37 it was published by Philip of Opus  
 after Plato's death.

28 περὶ ὀλίγων κτλ] "that precisely  
 determined very few things." In this  
 comparison of the *Republic* with the *Laws*  
 Aristotle's tendency to look for definite  
 results (noticed above, c. 2) is especially  
 prominent. He is in no way concerned  
 to exhaust the differences between the  
 two polities; indeed the whole discussion  
 started with the diagnostic inquiry, "what  
 are the limits of community in civil life?"  
 1 § 2. But one cannot help seeing that  
 the deepest ground of this difference, the  
 altered philosophical standpoint and the  
 change in the conception of the state, has  
 escaped him; had he clearly recognized  
 this, he would not have expressed him-  
 self as he has in § 1 (Zeller). See however  
 § 4 (F. L. Heitsch).

31 τὴν τάξιν] Understood *ἄνω*,  
 though the change of construction is  
 unusual.

32 πλῆθος τῶν οἰκούντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργούς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ  
 προπολεμοῦν μέρος· τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ  
 § 3 κύριον τῆς πόλεως), περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν,  
 35 πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μετέχουσί τινος ἀρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὅπλα  
 δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ τούτους καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἢ μή, περὶ τού-  
 των οὐδὲν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας  
 οὔεται δεῖν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς  
 τοῖς φύλαξιν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῖς ἔξωθεν λόγοις πεπλήρωκε

39 λόγοις after πεπλήρωκε Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> following William's translation: it is omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Bender

§ 2 32 For the repetition of εἰς compare IV(VII). 14 § 12, and possibly 12 § 6.

33 προπολεμοῦν] Plato's word *Rep.* IV 423 A.

τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων] Comp. *n.* 182 SUSEM. (186). Supply *ἐστὶ*. "The deliberative and supreme (executive) body of the state (is) a third order formed out of *these latter*." He quite correctly takes the *ἄρχοντες* to be a committee chosen out of the *ἐπικούροι*: specially trained military officers, of mature experience and of great eminence in science, are from time to time coöpted into the governing order. In the individual soul the gulf is fixed between the λογιστικὸν and the other two parts which make up τὸ ἄλογον: but in the state the wide distinction is between *ἄρχοντες* and *ἐπικούροι* together, *i.e.* φύλακες in the vaguer sense, on the one hand, and οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται on the other.

§ 3 34 περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν κτλ.] Here Aristotle contradicts himself again: see on 5 § 17 *n.* (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179), 6 § 5 (195). For at 5 § 25 above he recognised quite rightly that even the members of the second order are to have no real share in the administration: whereas now he expresses doubt whether some part in it may not fall to the third order, and whether they too are not to go out on military service! If there is one thing which Plato has made clear it undoubtedly is his principle of the division of labour. This, which he puts into the foreground, prohibits the shoemaker from ever attempting to be at the same time a tradesman or a carpenter or a farmer: *à fortiori* it prohibits the artizan or farmer from serving likewise as soldier; and either of them, or even the soldier, from ruling. See Zeller *Plato* p. 470 f. SUSEM. (187)

37 οὐδὲν διώρικεν] Yet see *Rep.* v 468 A.

ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν κτλ.] Consult the note following. SUSEM. (188)

38 συμπολεμεῖν] *Rep.* v 451 E, 457 A, 466 E, 471 D.

39 τοῖς ἔξωθεν κτλ.] But in the *Republic*. Plato treats of the community of children and wives v 457 B—466 D, of the regulation of property relations III 415 D—417 B, of education II 376 E—III 412 B, VI 502 C—VII 535 A, X 595 A—608 B, of the division into the three orders of citizens, II 367 E—376 E, III 412 C—IV 445 E, v 466 D—VI 502 C, VII 535 A—541 B (comp. II 376 E—III 412 B, VI 502 C—VII 541 B), of the women's share in the duties of the guardians v 449 A—457 B, so that this whole work is literally filled with what Aristotle has here cited; only the first two books lay the foundation for it and the eighth and ninth enlarge upon the other forms of government. Thus independently of the discussions on the immortality of the soul x 608 C—621 D nothing is left which could come under the head of these discussions which lie outside the subject. The treatment of the above questions is no doubt crossed over and over again by dissertations on metaphysics, the theory of cognition, psychology, and ethics. This is what Aristotle really means, and he might from his standpoint consider them as not properly belonging to the subject. But that is no correct standard of judgment. What should have compelled Plato to write a purely political work in the *Republic*? Why might it not have been his intention to present a work in which the specially political discussion was only an organic member of a more comprehensive whole? SUSEM. (189)

"In answering the question What is

τὸν λόγον' καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, τίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων. τῶν δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλείστον μέρος τίμασι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηται καὶ ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι ἀπὸ μί-

40 τὸν λόγον untranslated by William, Ar., [τὸν λόγον] *Summa*,<sup>12</sup> but F is untranslatable and it is better to follow II<sup>2</sup>, as I now think, or else with M<sup>2</sup> F<sup>2</sup> to omit λόγον.

the subject of a given Platonic dialogue is convenient to distinguish the subject of the conversation from the subject or subjects of the work. Thus in the case of the *Republic*, though the thesis *ὅτι ἀμείνων δικαιοσύνη ἀδίκησι* is the subject of the conversation between Socrates and his friends, it may fairly be said that the work is concerned with the καλλίστοισι, the theory of ideas, and some minor matters. It is however the thesis *ὅτι ἀμείνων δικαιοσύνη ἀδίκησι* which gives unity to the composition. Hence, although one of the incidental discussions may have, in consequence of its originality, both for its reader and for Plato himself (περὶ πόλεως δεῖ τὸ κεφάλαιον *Τίμασι* 17 C), a special interest, it is unreasonable to regard what is alien to it as in any way relevant. In fact Aristotle's remark is no more than the expression of his characteristic dislike of Plato's indirect method of approaching the doctrines which he wishes to enforce.<sup>13</sup> JACKSON.

[§ 4 1265 a 1 τῶν δὲ νόμων κατὰ] this is quite incorrect: in the *Laws* about equal parts are taken up with constitutional theory and with legislation, and the constitution in the narrower sense is treated much more fully than in the *Republic* (Suckow *Form der plat. Schriften* 132 f.). Aristotle (*n.* 466 on t. 3. 9) agrees with Plato in including under the constitution, in the wider sense, the regulation of education. From his point of view therefore the whole of the *Laws* from the middle of B. v to the end of B. viii with a large part of B. xii may be said to be περὶ τῆς πολιτείας, his books ix, x, xi and the rest of xii are a code of laws, νόμοι. SUMER, 90)

Oncken (l. 194—199) appeals to this usage in support of his view that the six four books of the *Laws*, and part of the fifth, are a later spurious introduction (τὸ πρόσθετον τῶν νόμων, 714 s) with which Aristotle was wholly unacquainted. [καὶ ταύτην βουλ. κατὰ] "and while endeavouring to make it more universally applicable to the existing states he gradu-

ally works it round to the other policy once more." *κατασκευάζει*—*compono* in many states, an average policy. Cp. I 28 and vii (iv). s. 4.

"When he wrote the *Republic* Plato looked upon the pattern constitution there described as by no means impracticable. He declares that its immediate introduction might be secured without difficulty under a definite condition, which though not indeed easy, yet of frequent occurrence, was yet by no means impossible: v 471 c f., 473 c, vi 497 a f., vii 8—302 c. In the *Republic* moreover he knows nothing of any pattern state of the second rank, holding an intermediate position between the best and the existing constitutions. But in the *Laws* he has changed his view on this point. The form of the state described in the *Republic* (though he still holds it to be the best) is an impracticable ideal: v 739 a f., vii 807 s. In 852 c, vii 874 s f., vii 892 c f., 892 s f., vii 915 c f. For that reason he now replaces it by a second best scheme of constitution which approximates much more nearly to the actual constitutions, not without expressing the apprehension that if the attempt were made to call this into life much as it would have to be abandoned, so that the actual would be only a pattern state of the third order: v 739 a—f., 741 s f., vii 899 s. Here too the possibility of thus realizing it, though only as a limited success, is made dependent on a condition, very similar though not entirely the same as the condition which is indispensable to the realization of the state planned in the *Republic*; namely, that it should be undertaken by an absolute prince (ἄριστος) with an inclination for philosophy, young, of good disposition and at the same time, in conjunction with a philosopher (ἄριστος) iv 909 s f., v 722 s. Cp. Zeller *Plat. Staat* 16 ff., *Platonismus* vi. 1 p. 485, 112 f., 121, 428 f., 442. Suckow, op. c. 132; *Summa* *Plat. Phil.* vi. 245. Geyssen *Index* of the *Laws* 978 ff. Aristotle seems to have slightly exaggerated this relation between the two: at all

§ 5 κρὸν περιάγει πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἐτέραν πολιτείαν. ἔξω γὰρ (1)  
 5 τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τὰ ἄλλα  
 ταῦτ' ἀποδίδωσιν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πολιτείαις· καὶ γὰρ  
 παιδεῖαν τὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπε-

1265 a 4 εἰς] πρὸς II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 6 δίδωσιν P<sup>4</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald.

events he gives no expression here to the opinion which is supported by many moderns, most recently by Oncken *op. c.* I. 201, that the state of the *Laws* is only meant to be a transitional form to mediate and prepare the future introduction of the true ideal state,—an opinion which is seen from the foregoing to be utterly untenable. On the contrary his words plainly amount to this; that Plato intended in the state of the *Laws* to frame something intermediate to that of the *Republic* and the existing states, but in reality he has unconsciously followed the *Republic* so much more closely than the existing states, that all essential features of the former are still retained." SUSEM. (191)

§ 5 4 ἔξω γὰρ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ.] But supposing—what is not indeed the case (see next note)—that this really were the only difference between the two schemes, is it not after all one so essential that any further discussion of a really essential identity between them is thereby precluded? And so far as this might yet be possible, does not Aristotle's ideal state come pretty nearly as close to that of the *Republic* as does that of the *Laws*? At any rate, of the three points which Aristotle lays stress upon as justifying his criticism, he too expressly approves of the two latter ones: c. 7 § 8 n. (238); 9 § 2 (279), § 31 (341); 10 § 8 f. (365); 11 § 10 (393): IV(VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 8; 10 § 9 (831), § 10 (834), *Introd.* p. 22 n. (3). His own ideal of public education also, so far as he has developed it, coincides in very important particulars with the directions in the *Laws*: see on IV(VII). 17 § 1 n. (950), § 15 (970): V(VIII). 4 §§ 7—9, nn. True, Plato's divergence comes out in that dialogue also when he insists on the education of women in common with men, on their taking part in military service and in the common messes, thus rendering true domestic life impossible; nor perhaps is Aristotle willing to follow him in assigning by law a definite limit to personal property: see § 15 n. (213), 7 § 4 n. (233). But he, too, demands, exactly like Plato in the *Laws*, that the land in the possession of private persons should be divided into equal inalienable

indivisible lots twice as numerous as the families of citizens (IV[VII]. 10 §§ 9—11, see also nn. on II. 5 § 1, 6 § 15): and that for this purpose the number of citizens be maintained perpetually the same, §§ 10—13, 7 § 5 nn. He is only more decided and consistent than Plato in not shrinking in the least from the horrible expedient of abortion, as a means of securing this (*Introd.* 34, 56, IV(VII). 16 § 15 f. nn.); while Plato, who had made the same regulation under certain circumstances in the *Republic* (see on II. 3 §§ 5, 6 n. 140), had in the *Laws* abandoned it, and had left the number of children to be produced unrestricted, in the hope of adjusting the matter in a milder way: n. (208) on 6 § 10. In this respect then Aristotle's ideal state stands even nearer than that of the *Laws* to the state depicted in the *Republic*, and makes a more severe and destructive attack upon married life. Lastly he too requires written enactments fixing the age at which marriage is advisable and compulsory (IV[VII]. 16 §§ 1—10, nn. 937, 940); in fine, whereas his view of marriage is wholly different from Plato's, and ethically regarded a modern view (Exc. I. to B. II p. 327), it is actually realized in only a very mutilated fashion. Thus in criticizing Plato he has at the same time unintentionally passed judgment upon himself. SUSEM. (192)

7 παιδεῖαν τὴν αὐτὴν] This is only relatively true. The all-essential feature in the state of the *Republic* is the rule of the philosophers; see Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II i 761 f. (Eng. tr. *Plato* 466, 467 ff.); and in the *Laws* this is dropped. Aristotle overlooks this fact. Further, in the earlier scheme those engaged in trade and agriculture are at any rate free members of the state: in the scheme of the *Laws*, the former are aliens not settled permanently in the country, while the latter are slaves: *Laws* V 741 E ff.; VII 806 D ff.; VIII 842 C f., 846 D, 850 D; XI 915 B ff., 919 D ff., 921 C; XII 952 D ff. Thus the third class of citizens is done away with. The second class is all that is left and the training prescribed for it is the same only so far as it extends; that

χομένους ξῆν, καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὡσαύτως πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ (III) φησὶ δεῖν εἶναι συσσίτια καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ τῆς μὲν χιλίων τῶν ὕπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτην δὲ πεντακισχιλίων.

τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινотόμον καὶ [τὸ] ζητητικόν, καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλεῖστον

9 καὶ before γυναικῶν omitted by Γ (?) and by Γ<sup>2</sup> (see hand, added by some.) 12 τὸ before ζητητικόν omitted by Μ<sup>1</sup> Γ<sup>1</sup>

is, not beyond the elementary principles of mathematics: *Latius* VII. However a certain survival of the philosophic rulers of the *Republic* is still retained by the formation of a higher council of state, the so-called 'nocturnal assembly.' It is to consist of the most educated and capable men in the community over fifty years of age; moreover certain of the most distinguished magistrates belong to it in virtue of their office; while younger qualified citizens, if at least thirty years old, may be admitted as extraordinary members by nomination, and are then instructed by the council in its own sciences, philosophy, higher mathematics, including astronomy and theory of music. But this higher college is destitute of political power and is restricted to its moral influence simply; it endeavours thereby to guide public opinion in such a manner that the elections to public offices may fall, wherever possible, upon its ordinary and extraordinary members. See *Latius* I 631 c, XII 951 D ff., 961 A ff. Cp. *n.* (970) on IV (VII). 17 § 15. SUSEM. (193)

καὶ τὸ των ἔργων κτλ] *Latius* V 741 c, VI 806 D—807 D, VIII 843 D, 846 D, XI 519 D f. SUSEM. (194)

ἀναγκαῶν = necessary for support, cp. III. 5. 3, IV (VII). 10. 7 where the antithesis is to τὰ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν.

8 καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὡσαύτως] Here Aristotle is perfectly aware of the fact which he appeared to have forgotten before, 5 § 17 *n.* (168), § 24 *n.* (179), that even in the ideal state of the *Republic* Plato had required there should be common messes for the guardians. SUSEM. (195)

πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ κτλ] As a matter of fact messes common to the women are assumed by Plato in the state of the *Republic*, as was stated in *n.* (153) on 5 § 1; but in the changed sphere of the state in the *Latius* he finds himself obliged expressly to lay down this requirement and assign reasons for it, as he intends to

maintain it in the later scheme: cf. the *n.* ff., VII 806 c, cp. VII 843 c, 844 c. Further compare I. 12 § 4 *n.* (164), II 7 § 1 *n.* (151) 10. SUSEM. (196)

9 χιλίων] *Aristot.* II 471 c, where however this number is given as only the minimum, δι' ἀλλοῦς ἀρχαῖος οὐκ ἔστι μῖνον 5 χιλίων τῶν προελελεγμένων. SUSEM. (197) Yet Grote (*Plato* III. c. 206 *n.* b) observes that the understanding of Aristotle himself on the point is not material evidence that that was intended by Plato. Comp. *Politeia* 191 c for the possible number of the rulers.

10 πεντακισχιλίων] More exactly 5040: *Latius* V 737 c, 740 c f., 741 c ff. etc. SUSEM. (198)

§ 6 11 τὸ μὲν οὖν κτλ] "Now all the discourses of Socrates display great acuteness originality reasonableness. *παντα*, out of the common, extraordinary; cp. *Μεταφ.* I. c. 13: *καρπύς*, surprising, subtle, as VII (IV). 4. 11 *καρπύς* τῶν ἀνέλεων δὲ εἴδους. Both latter notions of the *Latius* than with some notions of the style. (Thus Götting (*Commentationes de Arist. Plat.* II. 3 gives for *καρπύς* 'pulchritudo,' grace or finish.)

τοῦ Σωκράτους] Aristotle then ironically takes the Athenian charge in the *Latius* to be Socrates, although the time of the conversation falls long after his death. The *Latius* should rather be considered as personifying enlightened Athens. See Saenisch *Plat. Phil.* II 367 ff., Trans. of the *Latius* p. 302 f. SUSEM. (199) Yet all the more this charge, 129 c—E, apparently assumes responsibility for the proposals of "Socrates" in the *Republic*.

12 καλῶς δὲ πάντα] *n.* *Latius*, for every thing to be right: "that to be right on all points may well be a hard task." cf. *Λεγὰ εὖ καλὰ*. However however *καλῶς* = too much to ask.

13 τὸ νῦν εἰρ. πλεῖστον] The construction changes; he begins at 12 *Latius* were to follow.

δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι χώρας δεῖσει τοῖς τοσούτοις Βαβυλωνίας (Π  
 15 ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀπεράντου τὸ πλήθος, ἐξ ἧς ἀργοὶ πεντακι-  
 σχίλιοι θρέφονται, καὶ παρὰ τούτους γυναικῶν καὶ θεραπόν-  
 § 7 των ἕτερος ὄχλος πολλαπλάσιος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι (π  
 κατ' εὐχὴν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον. λέγεται δ' ὡς δεῖ τὸν 4  
 νομοθέτην πρὸς δύο βλέποντα τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς τε  
 20 τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἔτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖ-  
 ναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τόπους, εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν

14 δεῖσει τοῖς τοιούτοις after 15 ἀπεράντου Γ, perhaps rightly || 16 παρὰ Γ P<sup>1</sup>,  
 περὶ M<sup>s</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || τούτοις Welldon || 18 μηδὲν] μὴ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, omit-  
 ted by Q<sup>b</sup> || 19 τε omitted by P<sup>1</sup>, τε τὴν by M<sup>s</sup> || 21 πρῶτον μὲν added before  
 εἰ by Π<sup>1</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>, adopted by Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>: a doubtful case, the words  
 would then bear the sense of μάλιστα μὲν. Schmidt inserts them after προσθεῖναι (μὲν  
 answered by δὲ 28)

14 Βαβυλωνίας] Cp. III. 3. 5 n. (462).  
 SUSEM. (200)

15 ἀπερ. τὸ πλήθος] unlimited in  
 size.

ἐξ ἧς κτλ] But how does this cal-  
 culation agree with that made about  
 Sparta in 9 §§ 16, 17? Compare *iii.*  
 (306), (311). Even granting that the  
 present is the more correct statement,  
 how much smaller must we imagine the  
 number of citizens to be in Aristotle's  
 own ideal state according to the data  
 given IV(VII). 4 §§ 5—14? (Schlosser).  
 Suppose these data reduce the number  
 by one half, one half the same objection  
 would still apply to Aristotle. On the  
 other hand it is interesting to observe  
 how near his penetrating intellect comes  
 to a discovery of the fact, that the idle-  
 ness which belonged as a right to a privi-  
 leged minority of freeborn landholders  
 was really the fundamental evil of the  
 Hellenic state. Confined however to the  
 circle of opinions current in his own age  
 and nation, the philosopher turns back  
 when on the very threshold of the truth:  
 and follows Plato in adopting this funda-  
 mental evil as an inalienable primary  
 good for his own model state. SUSEM.  
 (201)

§ 7 17 δεῖ μὲν οὖν...μηδὲν μέντοι  
 ἀδύνατον] "We should frame our scheme  
 on the most favourable supposition, yet  
 not so as to be impracticable." Cp. *Laws*  
 V 742 E: τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὗτ' ἂν βούλοιτο  
 [ματαιὰς βουλήσεις], sc. ὁ διακοσμῶν.

ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ' εὐχὴν] A reference  
 to the expression used by Plato *Laws* IV  
 709 D εἰςασθαι δύναιτο...καὶ νομοθέτης,  
*Repub.* VII 540 D μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς

εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατὰ  
 δὲ πῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη ἢ εἶρηται; cp. VI  
 502 A—C ἀρίστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ  
 γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ  
 μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε. On his part  
 however Aristotle also appropriates the  
 expression: see the references in *n.* (128)  
 on I § 1, esp. διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποτε-  
 θεῖσθαι καθάπερ εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι  
 μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον IV(VII). 4 § 2 n.  
 (750). SUSEM. (202)

18 λέγεται δ' ὡς δεῖ κτλ] This is  
 not expressly to be found anywhere in  
 the *Laws*, but Aristotle had a perfect  
 right to infer it from IV. 704—709 and V  
 747 D. SUSEM. (203)

20 ἔτι δὲ καλῶς κτλ] But this even  
 Plato himself has by no means over-  
 looked; see *Laws* V 737 C ὅγκος δὲ πλῆ-  
 θους ἱκανὸς οὐκ ἄλλως ὀρθῶς γίγνεται ἂν  
 λεχθεὶς ἢ πρὸς τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰς τῶν πλῆ-  
 σιοχώρων πόλεις (Schlosser). Aristotle  
 brings the same objection against Phaleas,  
 7 § 14 ff. (Eaton). Compare *n.* (210) on  
 6 § 13. SUSEM. (204)

Cp. IV(VII). 2. 18 τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν  
 ἰδεῖν, ἔαν τις ἐπάρχῃσι γειτνιῶντες, ποῖα  
 πρὸς πόλους ἀσκητέον.

21 εἰ δεῖ κτλ] See *Jahrb. f. Phil.*  
 XCIII. 1866. p. 329. The sense is clear  
 from the parenthesis: 'if the state is to  
 be independent and secure against ag-  
 gression.' Editors who retained the ms.  
 πολιτικὸν extorted much the same sense  
 out of it, explaining it to mean simply a  
 "national" life, the life of a πόλις; or a  
 "social" life, a life of activity, πρακτικόν.  
 Thus Victorius: a moribus aliarum civi-  
 tatum non penitus abhorrere quae fines  
 etiam imperii proferre conantur. Shilleto

βίον πολεμικόν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν τοι-  
ούτοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλας ἀ χρήσιμα κατὰ τὴν  
οἰκείαν χώραν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξω τόπους)· εἰ δέ  
τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ μήτε τὸν  
κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἦπτον δεῖ φοβερὸν εἶναι τοῖς  
πολεμίοις, μὴ μόνον ἐλθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ  
ἀπ[ελθ]οῦσιν. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὁρᾷν δεῖ, μὴ περὶ  
βέλτιον ἐτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον. τασάντην γὰρ  
εἶναί φησι δεῖν ὥστε ζῆν σωφρόνως, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις εἴπῃ  
ὥστε ζῆν εὖ (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον, ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ σω-  
φρόνως μὲν ταλαιπώρως δὲ ζῆν)· ἀλλὰ βελτίων ἔσται τὸ

22 πολεμικόν Muret, πολιτικόν F H Ar. Bk. ὁ πολιτικὸν Montanari, - ἡγεμονικὸν  
καὶ μὴ μόνον > πολιτικόν Thurot || πολιτικὸν μὴ μονωτέρων Γ, πολιτικὸν μὴ μονω-  
τέρων P<sup>1</sup>, πολιτικὸν μὴ μονωτέρων M<sup>1</sup>, πολιτικὸν μὴ μονωτέρων P<sup>4</sup> (in the margin) — all  
glosses || 23 ὅπλασις ὁρίοις Oncken, νομίμοις? Sussem. || 24 αὐτῶν μὴ βελτίων ||  
28 ἀποδοῦν Bender || 30 εἰ is omitted by H<sup>1</sup>. Were this right εἴπερ would have to  
be altered, with Bas.<sup>2</sup>, to εἴπειν || 31 ἐπειδὴ Sussem. εἰ δ' F H Ar. Bk. Sussem.<sup>1-4</sup>

wrote "perhaps explained by Pl. *Politeia*.  
322 B πολιτικὴν τέχνην ἥτις μέρος πολεμικῆς,  
absolutely political and having therefore  
as one ingredient πολεμική." The expres-  
sion recurs IV (VII). 2 § 3, §§ 5, 6 (a prob-  
ably spurious chapter) and 6 § 7, where  
see *Critical notes*.

23 ἀ χρήσιμα κτλ] Cp. VII (VI). c. 7  
§§ 1—3 (Eaton). SUSEM. (205)

§ 8 24 εἰ δέ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον κτλ]  
"But if any one refuse to approve of a  
life such as this" i.e. warlike "for the  
state at large any more than for the indi-  
vidual." Whether war is the end of the  
state is a question debated IV (VII). 14  
§ 13 f., 15 §§ 1—6. Plato in the *Lysis*  
I 628 C, VII 803, VIII 829 A, holds that it  
is not.

28 τὸ πλῆθος really belongs to the  
dependent clause. "Whether perhaps it  
might not be better to define otherwise,  
by a clearer definition, the amount of  
property which one man may hold." It is  
characteristic of the writer to require  
analysis and precise definition, τὸ σαφές,  
τὸ διακριμένον.

29 τασάντην γὰρ εἶναί φησι] *Lysis*  
I 737 D γὰρ μὲν εἴρη πᾶσι σωφρόνως  
εἶναι ἵκανῶς ἐρῆμην πλείονος δ' οὐδὲν πᾶσι  
εἶναι. With what follows compare 7 § 7 =  
(137 b). SUSEM. (206)

31 καθόλου μᾶλλον] "For this (term)  
is too vague (cp. μία μᾶλλον, 2 § 2) since  
men may live frugally and at the same  
time wretchedly": literally, in hardships

and distress.

§ 9 σωφρόνως here and IV (VI). 4 § 2,  
and σωφροσύνη III. 4 § 15 and  
mean 'moderately', 'rationally'. But  
in II. 5 § 10 m. 1165, 7 § 10 m. 1241,  
I. 13 § 2 L. § 6 (1120), IV (VII). 1 § 4 (1241)  
§ 3, 15 § 2—4, 16 § 8 the meaning is  
temperance or self-restraint in reference  
to eating and drinking and the enjoyment of  
sex: and it is from this side that the virtue  
is depicted in *Alc. Gr.* III. m. 12, 13 (1117  
b 23 ff.). There however Aristotle himself  
explains how extravagance leads to pro-  
digy and to excesses on this direction,  
and that *σωφροσύνη*, properly a household  
virtue, comes to mean a prodigality: cf. IV. 1 § 3,  
1149 b 30, § 33, 1151 b 27. In *Alc. Gr.* IV.  
2 § 4, 1123 b 3, 4 § 4, 1124 b 12 *σωφροσύνη*  
has yet another meaning; viz. modesty.  
Lastly, Van der Boet observes that the  
next objection brought against Plato  
affects only a certain number of ex-  
pression and not the thought, which is no  
other than that followed by Aristotle of  
a right mean between excessive wealth  
and excessive poverty: see esp. *Lysis* I  
741 ff.: χρηματικὴ γὰρ αἰετὶ βέλτερος ἐστὶ  
ἐνταῦθα ἐνταῦρος; and next mss. *Εὐτατα*.  
(206 b)

31 ἔπειτα] A better definition would be,  
to live frugally and honestly. "Causa."  
IV (VI). 3. 1 m. *Πολιτικὴν δὲ τὴν ἐν-  
δομικὴν* II. 7. 7 m. καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐνδομικὴν;  
VI (VI). 11. 2 τὴν ἐνδομικὴν § 10 m. 1  
μὴ μόνον ἐνδομικὴν τὴν δὲ καὶ ἐνδομικὴν. (207)

σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως (χωρὶς γὰρ ἐκατέρῳ τῷ μὲν τὸ (I  
 τρυφᾶν ἀκολουθήσει, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἐπιπόνως), ἐπεὶ μόναι γ'  
 35 εἰσὶν [ἔξεις] ἀρεταὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρήσιν αὐται, οἷον  
 οὐσία πράως [μὲν] ἢ ἀνδρείως χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν, σωφρόνως δὲ  
 καὶ ἐλευθερίως ἔστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἔξεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι  
 § 10 περὶ αὐτὴν ταύτας. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα τὸ  
 περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ' ἀφεῖ-  
 40 ναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀόριστον ὡς ἱκανῶς ἂν ὀμαλισθησομένην  
 εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὁσωνοῦν γεννωμένων,  
 1265 b  
 § 11 ὅτι δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δεῖ δὲ  
 τοῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] τότε καὶ νῦν  
 νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπορεῖ διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς  
 ὅποσονοῦν πλῆθος, τότε δὲ ἀδαιρέτων οὐσῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς πα-  
 5 ράζυγας μὴδὲν ἔχειν, εἴαν τε ἐλάττους ὦσι τὸ πλῆθος εἴαν τε

33 ἐκατέρῳ Koraes, ἐκάτερον Γ II Ar. Bk. || τῷ τὸ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || τὸ] τῷ Π<sup>2</sup>  
 Ar. Bk. and M<sup>s</sup> (1st hand) || 34 τῷ τὸ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || τὸ] τῷ P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk.  
 || ἐπιπόνως] *laboriose vivere* William, no doubt an addition of his own: hence ζῆν  
 Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> erroneously || 35 [ἔξεις] Susem. || ἀρεταὶ] *αἰρεται* written by an un-  
 known hand in the margin of the Munich copy of the Aldine, first found in Vettori  
 and wrongly defended by Bekker, Madvig, Bernays: omitted by Schneider as a gloss  
 upon ἔξεις || χρήσιν] ἔξιν Π<sup>1</sup>. Apparently William translated from the following  
 order: αὐται αἱ ἔξεις εἰσὶν ἀρεταὶ περὶ τὴν ἔξιν τῆς οὐσίας, Ar. from the following:  
 αὐται αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσὶν ἔξεις περὶ τὴν χρήσιν τῆς οὐσίας || 36 μὲν is omitted by Γ II<sup>2</sup> Bk.  
 || 37 ἔξεις Susem.<sup>2</sup>, χρήσεις Γ II Ar. Bk., αἰρέσεις Madvig: Bernays conjectures περὶ  
 τὰς κτήσεις ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὰς εἶναι ταύτας, not happily || εἶναι after 38 αὐτὴν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.  
 || 40 ὀμαλισθησομένην Madvig for ἂν ὀμαλισθησομένην

1265 b 2 [περὶ τὰς πόλεις]. Bender who also conjectures τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε for δεῖ  
 δὲ τοῦτ' οὐχ || 4 παρίζυγας Γ M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), and the scribe restored this after  
 p<sup>1</sup> had emended it to παράζυγας

33 χωρὶς] if the two be separated.

34 τὸ ἐπιπόνως (ζῆν).

35 ἀρεταὶ...αὐται] These are the only  
 virtues that have to do with the use of  
 property. οἷον = I mean.

§ 10 38 ἰσάζοντα] *Leges* v 740 B—  
 741 A. SUSEM. (207 b)

"Tis strange that while equalizing their  
 properties he should not regulate the num-  
 bers of his citizens."

39 ἀλλ' ἀφείναι κτλ] This too is  
 very inexactly expressed. All that Plato  
 in the *Laws* intends, indeed all that he is  
 able to effect, is to keep the number of  
 citizens unalterably the same: i.e. exactly  
 5040 elder men, as many younger men,  
 with twice that number of women. All  
 beyond that number must, as he expressly  
 prescribes, go abroad, to found colonies.

One son and one daughter, then, is the  
 normal family: only when there is child-  
 lessness or death does it become neces-  
 sary that there should be other children  
 in order to marry heirs or heiresses, and  
 to be adopted by the childless (Schlosser).  
 As it stands at present, the polemic does  
 not touch Plato. If Aristotle held the  
 means proposed by Plato to avoid an  
 excess of the prescribed number to be  
 impracticable or impossible to realize he  
 should have proved his point, as he easily  
 might have done. SUSEM. (208)

§ 11 1265 b 2 οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς =  
 ἀκριβέστερον: "whereas that requires to  
 be fixed with a great deal more nicety in  
 the supposed case than at present." Cp.  
 7 § 18 οὐκ ἴσων n.

4 παράζυγας] the cadets; like παρή-

15 **ἄλλοι δὲ αὖτις** | *Lawson* v 124 n.  
the warp is necessarily stronger and longer  
than the weft, *ἔπειτα* it can warp farther before  
it will be sufficient for *ἀντιπρὸς* the new  
cylinder ruling and will maintain working  
flexibility when coherent with lignin. As  
a matter of fact this *ἀντιπρὸς* of *Arcto-*  
*telle's* is altogether untrue. In the *Law-*  
*son* Plate has done exactly what which *Arcto-*  
*telle* have required; he has provided  
for all the claims of his model save  
the most greater of working on the  
ground of which he expects them to dis-  
cover for themselves what is coming down

τας πῶς ἔσονται διαφέροντες τῶν ἀρχομένων. φησὶ γὰρ (I  
 20 δέιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἑτέρου τὸ στημόνιον ἐρίου γίνεται τῆς κρόκης,  
 § 15 οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἔχειν δέιν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. ἐπεὶ  
 δὲ τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἐφήσι γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πεντα-  
 πλασίας, διὰ τί τοῦτ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς μέχρι τινός;  
 καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, μή ποτ' οὐ  
 25 συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἐκάστῳ ἔνειμε

19 ὅπως Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 20 δέιν] δῆ Koras; Conring would omit δέιν here or in 21. Bergk, while defending δέιν, suggested <οὐ> δέν <ἄλλο ἢ> *Fünf. Abhand.* p. 65 n. 2 (Leipz. 1883) || 21 δεῖ Π<sup>1</sup> || [ἐπελ...26 οἰκεῖν] Schmidt, perhaps rightly, cp. *nn.* (213) (214) (215) || 25 συμφέρει M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2-3</sup> (1st hand), *συμφέρη* Γ P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Bk. and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>) and a later hand in P<sup>3</sup>

are better fitted for the warp and which for the woof, and to vote accordingly at the election of magistrates. What other means has Aristotle at his command for his own ideal state? Besides it must not be forgotten that by the institution of the Nocturnal Assembly (as explained in n. 193 on § 5) Plato aimed at making especial provision for a staff (personnel) more highly qualified to administer the government and to hold offices of state. The assertion then that this simile is all that we learn from him as to the character of those qualified for the government is a mistake due to a too hasty perusal of the dialogue in question. There might certainly have been good reason for a doubt whether the institution was practicable; but here no such doubt is expressed. SUSEM. (212)

It is the professed object of the *Epinomis* to expound the course of study for the Nocturnal Assembly which is to aim at controlling the election of magistrates. But nothing can be inferred from Aristotle's silence respecting it: Zeller *Plato* p. 616 n. (59) Eng. tr.

20 στημόνιον...κρόκης] Zeller *Platonic Studies* p. 107 took these terms in the *Laws* to refer to the appointment of magistracies and of the laws for them. But in *Pl. Politicus* 283 B, 309 B, the brave and energetic natures are the warp and the gentler and weaker natures the woof.

21 δέιν] Taking up the preceding δέιν of line 20.

§ 15 It would certainly relieve the chapter to reject this section, as M. Schmidt proposes.

22 μέχρι πενταπλασίας] Here and 7 § 4 Aristotle (?) has mistaken Plato's meaning, as if he had permitted the accumulation of moveable property to the amount

of four times the value of the real estate belonging to the family. As a matter of fact in *Laws* v 744 E (cf. vi 775 E ff.) he only allows the increase of the total property to this fourfold value; consequently only the acquisition of three times as much personal property. The recurrence of the mistake at least favours the assumption that both passages are by the same author. SUSEM. (213)

23 διὰ τί τοῦτ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς κτλ.] This objection is simply incomprehensible. There is not the least provision for an increase of landed property in Aristotle's own ideal state: see IV (VII). 10 § 9 ff. SUSEM. (214)

25 δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα] One homestead near the city and the centre of the territory and one placed on its borders, the latter to be occupied and managed by the married son and heir to the farm: *Laws* v 745 E, vi 775 E ff., cp. VIII 848. Aristotle (?) here blames this arrangement, but in his own pattern state he has adopted something very similar IV (VII). 10 § 11. We might assume that when he wrote Bk. IV (VII). he had changed his mind and then forgotten to expunge from his criticism of Plato the passage before us as no longer in point. Here however M. Schmidt's suggestion of interpolation is quite as obvious, although it may be met by an inquiry whether a later editor would not have carefully avoided introducing this inconsistency. SUSEM. (215)

But is the inconsistency proved? "Plato would assign to each man two οἰκῆσεις *Laws* 745 E, or, as Aristotle puts it, οἰκόπεδα, οἰκίας: Aristotle recommends two κλῆροι, not two οἰκῆσεις or regular establishments" (Jackson). To this I reply that Plato too repeatedly uses the expres-

διελών χωρίς, χαλεπὸν δὲ οἰκίας εἰς οἰκίαν. ἡ δὲ σύνταξις  
 ὅλη βούλεται μὲν εἶναι μήτε δημοκρατία μήτε ἀριστοκρατία,  
 μέση δὲ τούτων, ἣν καλοῦσι πολιτείαν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀπαι-  
 τεύοντων ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην ἀντιπροσέ-  
 ζει ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, καλῶς ἔρχεται· ἔστω·  
 εἰ δ' ὡς ἀρίστην μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, οὐ καλῶς.  
 τάχα γὰρ τὴν τῶν Λακωνίων τις ἂν ἐπαινίσσει μᾶλλον, ἢ αὐτὴν  
 ἄλλην τινὰ ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν. ἔνιοι μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν ὡς δεῖ

27 βούλεται after μὲν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> § 29 [εἰ μὲν... 1266 a 6 δημοκρατία] Schömann, prob-  
 ably rightly, cp. n. (223) § 30 πολιτείαν IP Bk. and P<sup>2</sup> Bk. (111) 70. πολι-  
 τεῖαν P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin), in P<sup>2</sup> πολιτεῖαν was written over it by a later hand,  
 but again erased § 32 τις after αὐ IP Bk.

sion εἰς οἶκον. Even supposing that, in some  
 translation to him, Aristotle really in-  
 tended to provide only one of the two  
 estates with a dwelling-house, how can  
 he have believed that to farm two estates  
 in separate localities would thus be made  
 easier than if they had dwellings upon  
 them? Is it not clear that the opposite  
 will hold good? Nay more, what idea  
 are we to form of two such detached prop-  
 erties, one near the town and one in the  
 country, unless there are farm-buildings  
 and a house upon the latter? If this be  
 so, the above supposition is *a priori* im-  
 possible. Even Plato does not arrange  
 that the country house shall be a regular  
 establishment in the sense of being *always*  
 inhabited, but the son who inherits suc-  
 ceeds to it as soon as he is grown up and  
 married, and so sets up the second estab-  
 lishment there (Zane VI 778 f.). In  
 Aristotle's best state such an appropriation  
 of the second dwelling-house is cer-  
 tainly excluded, because there, when the  
 heir marries, he succeeds his superan-  
 nuated father as citizen and consequently  
 as proprietor of both the family prop-  
 erties (see note and Schömann on IV [VII].  
 16 § 10, 13, 38 & 32—33); but that is the  
 sole point in which Aristotle diverges  
 from Plato in this matter. To what pur-  
 pose he would destine this second house  
 can only be conjectured: it may be to  
 lodge the superannuated father, perhaps  
 with the lands belonging to it as a sort of  
 retiring pension. In any case the inco-  
 sistency, as Aristotle's text has come  
 down to us, is unquestionable. SUSSEX.

26 διελών χωρίς = distinct, separate  
 homesteads.

§ 16 σύνταξις] The entire arrange-  
 ment of the constitution tends neither to

oligarchy nor to democracy but to some-  
 thing intermediate known as Polity. Plato's  
 citizens are the heavy armed men: Zane  
 VI 773 f. *ἐκείνοι μὲν πάντες οὗτοι τὴν  
 ἀρχήν τε αἰδέονται, ἀδελφικοῦ δὲ ἔστιν ἔρ-  
 ος ὃ περὶ τὸν πόλεον καὶ τοὺς ἐκεί-  
 νων νόμους.* This is the system of a  
 'Polity'.

25 πολιτείαν] Compare III. 7 § 4  
 with the notes and translations there given.  
 SUSSEX. (216)

29 ὡς κοινοτάτην κατὰ "as the most  
 universally adopted for almost all things"  
 VI (IV). c. 11 with n. (1181) and § 1.  
 SUSSEX. (217)

31 πρώτην = highest, principal, the 1<sup>st</sup>  
 principle of legislation. Compare I. 2, 3.

32 Plato's arrangement *Διὰ τὴν* τιμὴν  
 implies this.

33 ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν] i.e. a con-  
 stitution which, like the Spartan, has the  
 character of an Aristocracy to a greater  
 extent than Polity. The term may be  
 thus explained: true Aristocracy coin-  
 cides with Aristotle's best constitution,  
 but in a transferred and secondary sense  
 this name is applied by such constitutions  
 as combine aristocratical with oligo-  
 archical and democratical elements, like  
 Carthage, or only with democratical ele-  
 ments, like Sparta; this is stated expressly  
 7 §§ 2—4. Cp. VI (VI). 3 § 2 Bk. 2 § 1 A.  
 (1131), § 4 Bk. (1131), III § 4, VI § 4.  
 Further consult Aristotle I. on Pa. 13  
 and the notes on II. 2 § 10 (121), 2 § 2  
 (101), I. 1 (107), § 12 (107), § 4 (104), Pa  
 § 15 (103), 1 § 2 (103), § 2 (103), 2 § 2  
 (1125—7). Of course such mixed  
 constitutional forms are foreign to the true  
 Aristocracy, that is Polity, which is a  
 blending of Oligarchy and Democracy:  
 VI (VI). c. 8, 9. See on this the notes to

τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐξ ἀπασῶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτειῶν μεμι- (III  
 35 γμένην, διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπαινοῦσιν (εἶναι  
 γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημο-  
 κρατίας φασίν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν μοναρχίαν, τὴν  
 δὲ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ  
 40 κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς  
 ἐφόρους· οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐφορείαν εἶναι τυραννίδα, δημοκρα- (P. 3  
 τεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ τε τὰ συσσίτια καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν  
 1266 a § 18 καθ' ἡμέραν). ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἴρηται τούτοις ὡς δέον συγ- 11

34 πολιτειῶν] πολιτῶν Γ T<sup>b</sup> || 35 τὴν omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup> || τῶν omitted by P<sup>1</sup>  
 || 39 τῶν omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [τῶν] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 40 ἐφορίαν II<sup>3</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand,  
 emended by a later hand)

III. 7 § 4 (536, 538); VI(IV). 2 § 4 (1141),  
 7 § 4 (1237). SUSEM. (218)

§ 17 33 ἐνιοι μὲν οὖν κτλ.] Cp. IV(VII). 14 § 16 n. (911), VI(IV). 1 § 6 n. (1123). Thus we learn that two schools of political theorists, to one of which Ephoros perhaps belonged<sup>1</sup>, dissented from the writer's opinion and agreed in regarding monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy as elements of the Spartan constitution; while the second school (40 οἱ δὲ) added tyranny as a fourth element. It is strange that in this passage Aristotle(?) takes up no definite position in relation to the two views and does not oppose to them his own. Presumably he judged it sufficient, in order not to enter on a longer digression, to have denominated this constitution a mixed aristocracy. From the explanations which he has devoted specially to it we learn that he looked upon the council of Elders as the aristocratical, the Ephors as the democratic element in it, 9 §§ 19—28, but at the same time also as in a certain sense related to τυραννίς: see on 9 § 20. He finds another democratic element, though such in intention only, in the common messes, 9 § 32. He regards the Spartan kingship as far too limited to give the constitution any particular colouring: III. 14 §§ 3, 4; 15 §§ 1, 2; 16 § 1. It is still more strange then that Aristotle(?) only mentions here the views of those other theorists on this subject, passing over in total silence that expressed by Plato himself in the *Laws* IV 712 C ff. (cp. III 692 A f., 693 E), a view which stands much nearer to his own, representing the Spartan constitution as

mainly a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, but with the addition of the royal office and an element akin in one view to τυραννίς, in another to democracy, viz. the Ephors. Plato himself tells us, *Laws* XII 962 E, that he was not the first to pronounce a mixed constitution the most excellent in practice: οἱ δὲ σοφώτατοι, ὡς οἴονται, πρὸς ταυτὰ τε (liberty and dominion over others) καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ξύμπαντα [βλέποντες νομοθετοῦνται], εἰς ἐν δὲ οὐδὲν διαφερόντως τετιμημένον ἔχοντες φράζειν, εἰς δὲ τὰλλα αὐτοῖς δεῖ βλέπειν; presumably his predecessors were to some extent the same who are here noticed. Compare further *Excursus I* to Bk. III. SUSEM. (219)

Isocrates Lacedaemonios μάλιστα δημοκρατουμένους τυχάνειν dicit *Areopag.* § 61 (Spengel).

§ 18 1266 a 1 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις κτλ.] *Laws* III 693 D f. εἰσὶ πολιτειῶν οἷον μητέρες δύο τινές...καὶ τὴν μὲν προσαγορεύειν μοναρχίαν ὀρθόν, τὴν δ' αὖ δημοκρατίαν: Persia is the extreme case of the one, Athens of the other: δεῖ δὲ οὖν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μεταλαβεῖν ἀμφοῖν τούτων: 701 E; VI 756 E μέσον ἂν ἔχοι μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἥς αἰεὶ δεῖ μεσεύειν τὴν πολιτείαν: cp. IV 712 D f. However what Plato really says in these passages is somewhat different, viz. that a good constitution must hold the mean between democracy and monarchy. Moreover he expressly guards against being supposed to derive anything in his mixed form of the state from τυραννίς, IV 712 C: τίνα δὴ ποτε πολιτείαν ἔχομεν ἐν νῶ τῇ πόλει προστάττειν;...οἷον δημοκρατίαν τίνα ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἢ βασιλικήν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τυραννίδα γέ που λέγοις ἂν: and in the *Republic* he has already himself

<sup>1</sup> See on this *Introd.* p. 35 n. 3 and Susemihl's critical edition p. LXII.

κεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος, ὥς ἡ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν τις θεῖη πολιτείας ἢ χειρίστευ 4 πασῶν. βέλτιον οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους μινύεντες· ἡ γὰρ ἐκ

1266 a 3 χειρίστους P<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, emended by a later hand) § τῶν F § 4 [ἡ...5 βελτίων] Kiese, see Comm.

pronounced democracy and τυραννίς to be the two worst governments, the latter as the extreme of despotic rule, the former as the extreme of liberty. Aristotle however everywhere else calls *Oligarchy* and τυραννίς the two worst forms of government, see on vi (iv) 11 § 31 a. (1208): so that here he contradicts himself. According to the statement in the *Lysis* it is no doubt true that every unmixed, i.e. pure and unmixed, monarchy coincides with τυραννίς: III 691 D—701 E, IV 710 E, 712 c ff.: kingship or limited monarchy and limited democracy are intermediate or mixed forms. Hence it would certainly be no incorrect expression of Plato's thought in the *Lysis*, that the right constitution should hold a mean between democracy and τυραννίς. But from this it does not in the least follow that it must be compounded of the two: for it would also be a mean between them if it were compounded of forms which approximate partly to the one partly to the other, in order thus to blend freedom with order or authority. 'In the passages in question Plato is speaking of monarchy and democracy as principles of all government, not of certain constitutions, since he finds the principle of authority more clearly stamped on the one, that of liberty on the other' (Henkel). Consequently, to make the state in the *Lysis* a combination of oligarchical with democratical elements is not inconsistent with his requirement. Besides, it is also incorrect to call these the only constituents of the mixed form and so to make the constitution simply a Polity (πολιτεία): for it deserves to be called a mixed aristocracy with far greater right than the Spartan constitution: see on § 5 (193), § 14 (212), § 31 (219); Susemihl *Phil. Phil.* II. 624—631, Translation of the *Lysis* p. 980; also Zeller *Philos.* p. 535 f. Eng. tr. Nor is this state of the *Lysis* without a certain monarchical head; for in so far as it too is preeminently an educating institution, such a post is filled by the highest official who presides over education. However Henkel (*Studien* 65) is quite right in inferring from all the foregoing

that the monarchical element of the state is rather to be looked for in the magistrates collectively, in virtue of the extended powers assigned to them. But this by no means excludes the substantial correctness of Oncken's remark *loc. cit.* (209): "taken literally monarchy and democracy are incapable of reconciliation: for where one rules, all cannot rule, and conversely. But if a reconciliation or blending of the two is thought of as possible at all, it can only be understood in this way, that the numbers are set aside as unessential and the mode of government emphasized as the essential feature. In that case, however, the nomenclature is quite suitable to the case before us." The highest magistracy, apart from the council, in Plato's state of the *Lysis*, the 36, or (including the officer who presides over education) the 37 *εὐνοφύλακες*, have an approximately monarchical authority in consequence of the large powers entrusted to them\*: in the sense in which Aristotle himself (?) admits that the double kingship of the Spartans is called monarchy, § 17, and the board of ephors a τυραννίς, though there were five of them: and further, designates the people in the most extreme democracy as a many-headed monarch. Taken literally, the union of oligarchy and democracy, as Aristotle finds it in the *Politeia*, is just as impossible as that of monarchy and democracy. SUSEM. (220)

4 βέλτιον οὖν κτλ] That is, in the particular case here given (*loc. cit.* 213) they are more in the right: they either leave out tyranny, the worst form of government, altogether and combine other elements with democracy; or at any rate add two other elements, oligarchy and monarchy, one of which at least, viz. monarchy, is distinctly better. The two schools of political theorists and enlogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution noticed in § 17, are doubtless intended. If it were true (1266 a 1, 2) that the best polity according to Plato is one form

\* Only Oncken's assertion, that Plato intended the council to be irresponsible, is a doubtful assertion, and all the inferences which he has attached to the assertion fall to the ground.

5 πλειόνων συγκειμένη πολιτεία βελτίων]. ἔπειτα οὐδ' ἔχουσα (III)  
φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρα-  
τικά· μᾶλλον δ' ἐγκλίνειν βούλεται πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.  
§ 19 δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
ἐξ αἵρετῶν κληρωτοὺς κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐπορω-  
10 τέροις ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιάζειν εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἄρχοντας  
ἢ τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δ' ἀφεῖσθαι, τοῦτο δ'  
ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν εὐπόρων εἶναι

pounded of democracy and tyranny, then the general statement in a 4 might justly be made: for any three, or more, forms would make a better mixture than these two. SUSEM. (221)

ἢ γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων κτλ] 'This statement made thus universally is not in keeping with the philosopher's thought. He does not blame Plato for not combining elements enough, but because he would construct a polity out of the two corrupt elements' (Riese). On Aristotle's own principles a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, or even of oligarchy and democracy, must be better than one of oligarchy, democracy, and τυραννίς. As was shown in the last note, the preceding sentence, rightly understood, is a simple deduction from what has been laid down above, and needs no additional reason, least of all one which erroneously extends it beyond the limits of this right interpretation and lays it down as universally true. The chapter contains difficulties enough, but this is beyond the limits of all that we dare attribute to Aristotle himself: surely this illogical generalization is interpolated. We shall however be obliged to go some way further than this, I think. For even one who, like myself, either rejects or mistrusts Schmidt's other atheteses in this chapter will nevertheless be unable to deny that the entire passages §§ 16—18, 1265 b 29 εἰ μὲν... 1266 a 6 δημοκρατικά, and § 22, 1266 a 22 ὥς... 25 σκέψις, do most violently interrupt the connexion and leave the impression that they are non-Aristotelian. This suspicion is strengthened by the strange statements noticed in *iii.* (219, 220). SUSEM. (222)

5 ἔχουσα sc. ἢ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις πολιτεία μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν. See *n.* (220).

7 ἐγκλίνειν = to betray a tendency towards, as in VIII (v). 7. 7.

§ 19 8 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αἵρετῶν κληρωτοῖς] "For selection by lot from a body elected previously by vote belongs

to both" i.e. the lot to democracy, the voting to oligarchy [or aristocracy]. This took place in the election of the council, of the magistrates charged with the police of the city (ἀγορανόμοι and ἀστυνόμοι), and of the superintendents of the games (ἀγωνίας ἀθλοθέται): *Laws* VI 756 B—E, 763 D f., 765 B—D. SUSEM. (223)

See R. Dareste *Le système électoral des Lois de Platon* in *Annuaire de l'association pour l'enc. des études grecques*. XVII. 1883. pp. 65—74.

9 τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν κτλ] *Laws* VI 764 A: ἴτω δ' εἰς ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸν κοινὸν ξύλλογον ὁ βουλόμενος, ἐπάναγκες δ' ἔστω τῷ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ πρώτων τιμημάτων, δέκα δραχμαῖς ζημιουμένῳ, ἐὰν μὴ παρὼν ἐξετάζηται τοῖς ξυλλόγοις, τρίτῳ δὲ τιμῇματι καὶ τετάρτῳ μὴ ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλὰ ἀζήμιος ἀφεῖσθω. SUSEM. (224)

10 φέρειν is *suffragium ferre*, to vote: with acc., to vote for certain candidates for office.

καὶ φέρειν ἄρχοντας] As a matter of fact this regulation only applies to the election of the superintendents of the games (ἀγωνίας ἀθλοθέται) *Laws* VI 765 C, and of the council VI 756 B—E: but Aristotle does not come to speak of this latter election until § 20. SUSEM. (225)

11 τοὺς δ' ἀφεῖσθαι] Not however at the election of ἀγορανόμοι and ἀστυνόμοι, *Laws* 764 A: χειροτονείτω δὲ πᾶς πάντα· ὁ δὲ μὴ θέλων, ἐὰν εἰσαγγελθῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ζημιούσθω. SUSEM. (226)

τοῦτο δ'] This δὲ is resumptive of δὲ in line 9. Cp. τοῦτο δὲ μιμνῆται, 2 § 6.

12 καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι πλείους κτλ] Of these two statements the latter, viz. that the highest officers of state are to be elected from the highest classes of the census, is quite incorrect. Even for the Guardians of the Laws (νομοφύλακες) no such regulation is found: *Laws* VI 753 B, 766 A f.: nor for the supreme board of control (εὐθυνοί) XII 945 E ff.: nor again for the military officers (στρατηγοί, ἵππαρχοι, φύλαρχοι, ταξίαρχοι) 755 B ff. And as

13 τοὺς ἄρχοντας, καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων—11111  
 § 20 των. ὀλιγαρχικὴν δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἵρεσιν. αἰρεῖται 12

regards the former statement, instead of arrangements to secure the election of a majority of the officials from the richest citizens, the truth is that only in the case of a minority, namely the *deinotamoi*, is it provided that they shall be of the highest class on the register, while the superintendents of the games (*dolothetai*) must be elected from the third or the second class. *SICHEL*. (227)

13 τὰς μεγίστας sc. ἀρχαί. τίσιμα is a property qualification, *caput*. See *Latte* 744 B—E.

§ 20 14 τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἵρεσιν] Thus described in *Latte* 756 B—E: 'The council shall consist of 360 members. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety councillors for each class. First all citizens shall vote for members of the council taken from the first class; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined (*πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων διαταγὰ φέρουσι ἕξ ἀνάγκης, ἢ χρηματίζεσθαι τὸν μὴ παρόντα τῇ δοσῶν ἡμέρᾳ*). When the candidates have been elected some one shall mark them down: this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day the election shall be made from the second class in the same manner as on the previous day (*τῇ δ' ὑποταγὰ φέρουσιν ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων κατὰ ταῦτά καθάπερ τῇ πρώτῃ*); and on the third day an election shall be made from the third class, at which every one may if he likes vote and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote (*τῇ δ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων φέρουσιν μὲν τὸν παρόντα, ἐπ' ἀνάγκης δὲ εἶναι τοῖς τῶν τριῶν τιμημάτων*); but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day members of the council shall be elected from the fourth and lowest class (*τετάρτῃ δὲ φέρουσιν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ ἀμετακινήτου τιμήματος διαταγὰς*); they shall be elected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished; he who is of the second class shall pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple.' The number of candidates thus nominated is reduced

first, by election, to 180 of each class and next, by scrutiny, to 90 from each class. The passage continues: 'On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, in the presence of all the citizens, and every man shall choose out of them under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny: these are to form the council for the year' (*Dr Jowett's translation*).

Plato's object is to give the numerically smaller and wealthier first and second classes not only their half of the senators, but also a preponderant influence in the return of the other half, which they will secure provided there are abstentions enough among the poorer citizens. It is obvious that Aristotle is referring to the proceedings of the first four days. What is the number returned from each class? (a) Grote thinks 360, *Plato* III. 363 n. 9. (β) Stallbaum, J. G. Schneider follow older editors in assuming it to be ninety, but omit to explain what takes place on the fifth day. (γ) Mr Cope supposed that on each successive day each class voted for 90 candidates belonging to a given class, so that the abstentions of classes III and IV might, in the extreme case, reduce the roll of candidates published on the fifth day from 1440 to 1170 ( $360 + 360 + 270 + 180$ ). Perhaps none of these suggestions is correct; the proceedings of the first four days are in reality a nomination of candidates, not an election; there is no limitation to the number of candidates nominated, each citizen presumably recording a vote, i.e. sending in one name. The votes recorded are taken down and published on the fifth day (*ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐκχέουσιν τοὺς μὲν καταγραφέντας καὶ... πάλιν δὲ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ κατανεμηθείσῃ δόματα ἐξεργασίᾳ μὲν τοῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ πάλιν τοῖς πολίταις*). The voting on the fifth day is confined to these duly nominated candidates, and as 180 must be then selected from each class (*ἐκλέγουσιν*) Plato appears to assume that more than that number will be nominated on each of the first four days.

αἰρεῖσθαι μὲν πᾶσι] For all are bound to elect from the first class, and then again equally [i.e. in like manner] from the second; and next from the third, so that it is not compulsory for all to elect

15 ται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης [ἀλλ'] ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμή- (III)  
 ματος, εἶτα πάλιν ἴσως ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἶτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων,  
 πλὴν οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες, <ἀλλ' > ἢ τοῖς [ἐκ] τῶν τριῶν [ἢ] τιμη-  
 μάτων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου [τῶν τετάρτων] μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς  
 § 21 πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις· εἶτ' ἐκ τούτων ἴσον ἀφ' ἐκάστου τιμή-  
 20 ματος ἀποδείξαι φησι δεῖν ἀριθμόν. ἔσονται δὴ πλείους οἱ  
 ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους διὰ τὸ ἐνίους μὴ  
 § 22 αἰρεῖσθαι τῶν δημοτικῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπάναγκες. ὥς μὲν οὖν 13  
 οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν τοιαύ-  
 την πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ τῶν ὕστερον ῥηθησομέ-  
 25 νων, ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἡ σκέψις·

15 ἐξ ἀνάγκης, from Plat. *Law*s VI. 765 B ff. Schmidt (and probably Ar.), ἐπά-  
 ναγκες Γ II Bk., [ἐπάναγκες] Schlosser Susem.<sup>1</sup> || [ἀλλ'] Madvig, ἀλλ' trans-  
 posed to 17 before ἢ Susem.<sup>1</sup>; ἀλλὰ <πρῶτον> Lambin, πρῶτον Bender, as Muret  
 before him changed ἀλλ' into ῥ' (=90) || 16 ἴσως Nickes (Plato has κατὰ ταῦτα),  
 ἴσους Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> || τοῦ τρίτου Oncken || 17 [πλὴν] Madvig || οὐκ  
 [πᾶσιν] Bender || <ἀλλ' > ἢ Susem., ἢ Γ II Ar. Bk. Bender, πλὴν Götting in his  
 edition and Madvig, ἢ Götting in *Jenaer Lectonskat.* 1855, εἶτα <δ' > ἐκ τῶν τρί-  
 των οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες <πλὴν ἀλλ' > ἢ τοῖς [ἐκ] τῶν τριῶν [ἢ] τιμημάτων, ἐκ τε κτλ  
 ? Susem. Of course ἀλλ' ἢ or πλὴν would do just as well as πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ || εἶτ'  
 ἐκ τῶν τρίτων. πλὴν <ἀλλ' > οὐ πάλιν ἐπάναγκες ἢ τῶν τετάρτων τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων  
 <φέρειν μὴ βουλομένοις>· ἐκ δὲ κτλ Schmidt || εἶτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες  
 πλὴν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριῶν· εἶτ' ἐκ τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις Welldon || [ἐκ] Susem.  
 (Plato omits it) || τριῶν τιμημάτων Götting *Jenaer Lectonskat.* ut sup., from  
 Plato; τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων Γ II Ar. Bk., τριῶν [ἢ τετάρτων] Götting in his edition,  
 Madvig; Engelhardt Spengel Bender and Jowett omit τρίτων ἢ || 18 [τῶν τε-  
 τάρτων] Engelhardt Bender Susem.; but [τοῦ τετάρτου] with Sylburg is perhaps as  
 good: τῶν τετάρτων Camot Sepulveda's mss. Vettori<sup>2</sup> (and a marginal note from his  
 own hand in the copy of his 1st edition in the Munich Library), τῶν τιμημάτων  
 Götting in the *Jenaer Lectonskat.* l. c. || ἐπάναγκες <ἢν> Schmidt || 20 δὲ Π<sup>1</sup>  
 (emended by p<sup>1</sup>) || [22 ὥς...25 σκέψις] Schmidt, probably rightly, cp. n. (223) ||  
 23 οὐκ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) || μοναρχίας] ὀλιγαρχίας Heinsius Schmidt  
 || <οἰεσθαι> δεῖ Schmidt || συνεστάναι Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand) P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), συνιστάναι Π<sup>3</sup>  
 Bk. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand—altered by corr.<sup>1</sup>) and P<sup>3</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), perhaps rightly || 24  
 <καὶ> ἐκ τούτων Schmidt

but only on those of the three (higher) classes, and (in electing candidates) from the fourth (class) it is compulsory only on the first and second.

§ 21 19 εἶτ' ἐκ τούτων κτλ] More accurately stated, there is first an election of 180 candidates belonging to each class out of the larger number first returned, and in a similar manner: secondly, a selection of one half of these, 90 from each class, by lot, to make up the whole number of 360. *Vide supra.* SUSEM. (228)

20 ἔσονται δὴ κτλ] Thus those who

belong to the highest classes and who are superior men will be a majority (of the voters); because through the absence of compulsion some citizens of the popular party will abstain from the election.

21 βελτίους] I.e. men who take a higher interest in political life. So far, then, even this oligarchical regulation contains an aristocratic element. SUSEM. (229)

§ 22 24 τῶν ὕστερον...σκέψις] VI(IV). c. 7 and esp. cc. 8, 9, II. SUSEM. (230)  
 25 ἐπιβάλλῃ=devolves (upon us): see

ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἐξ αἵρετῶν (11)  
αἵρετοὺς ἐπικίνδυνον. εἰ γάρ τινες συστήναι θέλουνσι καὶ μέ-  
τριοι τὸ πλῆθος, αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦτων αἵρεθῆσονται βοήλησι.

7 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῦ IV  
30 τον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον·| εἰσὶ δὲ τινες πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄλλαι,  
αἱ μὲν φιλοσόφων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν, πᾶσαι (22)  
δὲ τῶν καθεστηκυῶν καὶ καθ' ἃς πολιτεύονται νῦν  
ἐγγύτερόν εἰσι τούτων ἀμφοτέρων. οὐδεὶς γὰρ οἷτε  
τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄλλος  
35 κεκαινοτόμηκεν, οὔτε περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν,  
42 ἄλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄρχονται μάλλον. δοκεῖ γάρ  
τισι τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι [ἀναγκαῖον] μέγιστον τετα-  
χθαι καλῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ποιῆσθαι φασὶ τὰς ἀτάσεις πάν-  
39 τας. διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τοῦτ' εἰσήνεγκε πρῶτος·

30 Krohn pronounces the whole of c. 6 as far as *τρόπον* to be spurious and of late origin, but see *Int.* p. 33 n. 4 and *Comm.* *nn.* (213, 215) || 31 αἱ μὲν φιλοσόφων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν *Sprungl.* αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν *Γ. Π. Ar. Bk.*, αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν *Piccart.* See p. 30: 37 ἀναγκαῖον erased by p<sup>1</sup>, omitted by II<sup>2</sup> *Ar. Bk.*, possibly a variant of μέγιστον || 39 Φαλλέας II<sup>1</sup>, and so throughout || πρῶτον Q<sup>b</sup> *Ar.* perhaps rightly, πρῶτος *Piccart*

on I. 13. 13 and reff. there given. A further use of the participle is seen in the Gortynian inscription lately found, οἱ ἐπιβάλλουσι αὐτῷ ἐπιβάλλει, the word of kin on whom certain obligations devolve. Cp. *λεκτόν κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα λόγον De gen. anim.* I. 2. 1, 716 a 3; and *Ist.* VI(IV). 13 § 7 τὸ πόσον ἐπιβάλλει.

36 τὸ ἐξ αἵρετῶν αἵρετοῦς] 'it is unsafe to elect from a larger number previously elected.' This would be done in the election to the Council, and in the election of *εὐνομήδαι*. First 300 were chosen, then out of these a hundred, and out of the hundred thirty-seven. It was partially so in the election of the Supreme Board of Control. *SUSSEX.* (231)

37 συστήναι] This apparently portends something like the wire-pullers and caucus of our day. Comp. VIII(V). 3. 9.

c. 7 Examination of the polity proposed by Phalaes. See *Analys.* p. 103.

§ 1 31 For the antithesis comp. I. 7. 3 πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλοσοφοῦσιν, II. 12. 1 αὐτὸ κοινώσαντες πρίξων πολιτικῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιπολιτικῶν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὰς βίαι· *Pl. Tim.* 19 κ τὸ δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος φοβεῖσθαι μὴ δεσποχεῖν ἀπὸ φιλοσόφων ἀνδρῶν ἢ καὶ πολιτικῶν.

33 τούτων ἀμφ.] that of the *Republic* and that of the *Law*.

35 συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν] Comp. § 5 with *n.* (106): also *n.* (113) on § 2 and (116) on I. 13. 9. *SUSSEX.* (231)

36 τῶν ἀναγκαίων] the necessary considerations of every-day life as opposed to its luxuries or ornaments; practical requirements) ( fanciful theories.

§ 2 37 μέγιστον τεταχθαι] The sentence is inverted; with *τεταχθαι* *αὐτῶν* take τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας; the infinitive clause so formed, τὸ περὶ τεταχθαι, is subject of δοκεῖ εἶναι μέγιστον. 'Some hold the right regulation of the relations of property to be of the utmost importance.' There has been no lack of representatives of this view. Apart from physiocrats old and new, we may refer to M. de Laveleye *Principes Économiques* Preface xxvii—xxxi, also pp. 149, 155 ff., 173.

39 διὸ Φαλέας πρῶτος] From c. 8 § 1 (comp. *Eac.* II to *E. II*) it is clear that Phalaes was younger than Hippodamus; but if πρῶτος is the right reading, he must have come forward with his political scheme before Plato published either of his. This conjecture finds support in the apparent meagreness of his proposal, its lack of all finished execution as com-

- § 3 φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν. τοῦτο <sup>2</sup>  
 1266 b δὲ κατοικιζομέναις μὲν εὐθὺς οὐ χαλεπὸν ὄρετο ποιεῖν, τὰς  
 δ' ἤδη κατοικουμένας ἐργωδέστερον μὲν, ὅμως δὲ τάχιστ' αὖ  
 ὁμαλισθῆναι τῷ τὰς προίκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν  
 λαμβάνειν δὲ μή, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβά-  
 νειν δέ. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς νόμους γράφων μέχρι μὲν τινος  
 6 ὄρετο δεῖν εἶναι, πλείον δὲ τοῦ πενταπλασίαν εἶναι τῆς ἐλα-  
 χίστης μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξουσίαν εἶναι κτήσασθαι, καθά-  
 περ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον.
- § 5 δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο λανθάνειν τοὺς οὕτω νομοθετοῦντας, ὃ λαν- <sup>3</sup>  
 10 θάνει νῦν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάττοντας πλῆθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν  
 τέκνων τὸ πλῆθος τάττειν· εἰ γὰρ ὑπεραίρη τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγε-  
 θος ὁ τῶν τέκνων ἀριθμὸς, ἀνάγκη τὸν γε νόμον λύεσθαι, καὶ χω-

1266 b 2 δ' ἤδη Γ, δὴ P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup>, δὲ M<sup>s</sup> Ar. || 3 τὰς omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [τὰς] Susem.<sup>1</sup>  
 perhaps rightly || 5 [Πλάτων...8 πρότερον] ? Susem. The brackets are necessary if  
 Schmidt is justified in rejecting 1265 b 21—26 (see Comm.) || 6 εἶναι omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>,  
 [εἶναι] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1359 f. || 9 μὴ Bender || 12 τὸν τε  
 νόμον Bas.<sup>3</sup>, τὸν γενόμενον M<sup>s</sup> U<sup>b</sup>

pared with the Platonic schemes (comp. *nn.* 255, 256 on 8 §§ 3, 4). According to Aristotle's account, Phaleas thought there was no more to be done when once he had demanded an equal division of the land into inalienable and indivisible lots, and the preservation of this equality by a uniform education which is not more minutely described, and when he had recommended the degradation of artisans to the position of public slaves. He had nothing to say about the size or number of these lots, about moveable property, or in fact hardly anything else. The spirit and tendency of these proposals strongly suggest the idea expressed by Böckh *Staats-haushaltung der Ath.* I. p. 65 and Roscher *Thukydides* p. 247 that they concealed a practical aim: that he wanted to restore, in his Dorian native town especially, the old aristocracy of well-born landholders. Henkel *Studien* p. 165 further remarks in support of this view that popular rule found its way first into Byzantium, B.C. 390, and thence to Chalcedon, under the influence of the reviving strength of the Athenian Demos: Xen. *Hellen.* IV. 8. 27, Theopompos *Frag.* 65 in Athenaeus XII 526 D. At the same time, he adds, it must be remembered that the absence from Phaleas' scheme of the warlike spirit of a chivalrous aristocracy, and his silence as regards everything military, are great

hindrances to this hypothesis. SUSEM. (232)

§ 3 1266 b 1 εὐθὺς should be taken with the participle.

2 τάχιστα] The expedient of modern writers for bringing about this much desired equality is limitation of the right of bequest.

§ 4 6 εἶναι = *laissez faire*.

8 καὶ πρότερον] 6 § 15 *n.* (213). Hence if that § be bracketed the same suspicion attaches to this one. SUSEM. (233)

§ 5 9 δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ κτλ] This remark was made before, 6 §§ 10—13, *cp. n.* (210). It is strange that Aristotle does not refer back to that passage. SUSEM. (234)

11 ὑπεραίρη = exceed, rise above. 'If the number of children becomes too great for the size of the property.'

12 ἀνάγκη...λύεσθαι] Schlosser thinks this remark unfounded, because Phaleas is only speaking of landed property, as Aristotle says himself, § 21. And he reminds us of the custom in some parts of Germany where only one child (the eldest, or the youngest, or any one whom the father chooses) succeeds to the real estate and provides portions for the rest at a fair valuation. But he should have reflected that Phaleas Plato Aristotle all alike exclude the sons of citizens from engaging in any trade. SUSEM. (235)

ρὶς τῆς λύσεως φαῦλον τὸ πολλοὺς ἐκ πλουσίων γίνεσθαι πένητας (IV)  
 § 6 ἔργον γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιούς εἶναι τοὺς τιοῦντες. διότι μὲν  
 15 οὖν ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἢ τῆς οὐ-  
 σίας ὁμαλότης, καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς φαίνονται διεγερσάμενοι, οἷον  
 καὶ Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν, καὶ παρ' ἄλλοις ἔστι νόμος δι' κωλύει  
 κτᾶσθαι γῆν ὕσιν ἢν βούληται τις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν  
 οὐσίαν πωλεῖν οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λοκροῖς νόμος  
 20 ἔστι μὴ πωλεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ φανεράν ἀτυχίαν δείξῃ συμβεβη-  
 § 7 κυίαν, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς παλαιούς κλήρους διασφίζειν (τοῦτο δὲ λυ-  
 θέν καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα δημοτικὴν ἐποίησε Λίαν τὴν πολιτείαν  
 αὐτῶν οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συνίβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρισμένων τμημάτων  
 των εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν)· ἀλλ' ἔστι τὴν ἰσότητα μὲν :

18 ὁπόσῃν Ald. Bk., ὁπόσῃν or ὅσῃν Ar., ὁπόσῃν I<sup>2</sup> 24 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> | 19 οἱ νόμοι] ἐνιοι Bücheler, probably right || 24 ἔστι] εἰς τὸ I<sup>2</sup> 4 U<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and I<sup>2</sup> (int. hand, γρ. ἔστι corr.<sup>2</sup> in the margin), εἰς Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>

χωρὶς = quite apart from the violation of the law, it is a defect that many citizens should decline from wealth to poverty. Comp. 5 § 2, χωρὶς ἀπὸ.

13 φαῦλον κτλ.] Comp. 6 § 13 n. and IV(vii). 16 § 15 ff. n. (946). SUSEM. (236)

14 ἔργον to be taken as b 2 ἔργω-δύσπερον 'it is hard for such people not to encourage sedition.' In III. 15. 8 also ἔργω ἔστι = it is improbable, in the same way as μόλις 'with difficulty' comes to mean 'hardly ever.'

§§ 6, 7 The influence which equality of possessions must exercise upon civil society was recognised (1) by Solon's legislation, (2) by laws which fix a limit to the accumulation of landed property, (3) by the law of Leont which forbids the sale of land, (4) by a law of entail, as at Leucas, where the divine of the law altered the constitution to an advanced democracy. Yet the size of properties needs regulation, if, when equalised, they are not to be over-large or over-small.

Compare c. 12 § 10 (Philolaos at Thebes), VII(vi). 4. 9 (the Aphytaeans and Oxylos in Elis), VIII(v). 7. 9 (Thurii). See further Lavelye *op. c.* pp. 161—165 Eng. trans., A. Lang *Essay* XIII, esp. p. 39; 'all attempts to restrict the sale of land and to keep it parcelled out in small lots may be taken as survivals of early custom. An early equal distribution (Maine's *Village Communities* p. 81), perhaps a periodic redistribution, was a tradition to the early lawgivers of Greece. Long after them Phaleas, and Plato in

the *Laws*, 744 E, desire a return to the old usage.

διότι μὲν... ὁμαλότης] At this point then Aristotle's own socialism begins to come out more clearly than before. See notes on 5 § 7 (158), § 15 (166); 6 §§ 10—14 (208—211), and 7 § 5 (234). Further comp. n. (192) and *Introd.* p. 33. SUSEM. (236 b)

17 Like the law of Oxylos prohibiting mortgage, VII(vi). 4. 9. Solon's *συνέχ-θαι*, or relief measure, restored mortgaged lands to their proprietors: γὰρ μέλαινα τῇ γῇ ποτὶ | ὅμοις ἀρῶν ταν-ταχοῦ πεπηγότας | τὸ πρῶτον ἀπολύσας νῦν δ' ἀνελόντα. His graduated assessment must also have tended somewhat to equality. But in addition to this Schömann, *Antiquities* p. 350 Eng. tr., and Curtius, *Hist.* 1. 329 Eng. tr., represent Solon as enacting a special law, that there should be a maximum limit to the acquisition of landed property: Grote (III. 132) thinks no such inference borne out by the present passage.

παρ' ἄλλοις] It is not known where.

19 ἐν Λοκροῖς] Presumably the Epizephyrian Locri, where Zaleucus was legislator, c. 12 § 6.

§ 7, 23 καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα] Cp. VI(vi). 4. 9 ἢν δὲ τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλοῖς τοῖς νεωτεροποιήσιν μὴδὲ πωλεῖν ἔχοντες τοὺς πρῶτους κλήρους with note, and on the custom at Sparta, c. 9 § 14 n. (1002). SUSEM. (237)

24 ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν κτλ.] But then there may be equality of possessions and

25 ὑπάρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταύτην δὲ ἢ λίαν εἶναι πολλήν, ὥστε (IV)  
 τρυφᾶν, ἢ λίαν ὀλίγην, ὥστε ζῆν γλίσχωρως. δῆλον οὖν ὡς  
 οὐχ ἱκανὸν τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας ποιῆσαι τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ  
 § 8 τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέον. ἔτι δ' εἴ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειεν  
 οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας  
 30 ὁμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ παιδευομένοις  
 ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν εἴπειεν ὁ Φαλέας ὅτι  
 ταῦτα τυγχάνει λέγων αὐτός· οἶεται γὰρ δυοῖν τούτοις ἰσό-  
 τητα δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, κτήσεως καὶ παιδείας.  
 § 9 ἀλλὰ τὴν τε παιδείαν ἥτις ἔσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν  
 35 εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν ὄφελος· ἔστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν  
 εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἐξ ἧς ἔσονται  
 προαιρετικοὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμ-  
 § 10 φοτέρων, ἐπεὶ στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς  
 κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τοῦναντίον δὲ περὶ  
 40 ἑκάτερον (οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀνι-  
 1267 a σουν, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσαι· ὅθεν καὶ  
 ἐν δὲ ἱῇ τιμῇ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἡδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός),

27 ποιῆσαι ἔσται Γ apparently || 28 τάξει M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 31 ἂν εἴποιεν M<sup>s</sup>, εἴποι ἂν  
 P<sup>2,4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P<sup>3</sup>, εἴποιεν P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand) || 38 ἐπεὶ...  
 1267 a 17 πολιτείας=1267 a 37 ἔστι...b 13 ἐάτεον. See the text arranged in parallel  
 columns *Introd.* p. 80 f. || ἐπεὶ Spengel, εἴτε Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, ὅτι  
 ?Susem. || 39 διὰ τὴν omitted by M<sup>s</sup>, διὰ by P<sup>1</sup>

1267 a 2 δ' M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1,2,3</sup> Ald. || καὶ omitted by Γ and M<sup>s</sup> (1st hand)

yet the equal shares of citizens may be either immoderately large or excessively small.

26 γλίσχωρως] stingily, 'so as barely to make a living.' Demosth. c. *Arist.* 689, 25 ὡς μικρὰ καὶ γλίσχωρα (δημοσίᾳ οἰκοδομεῖτε), c. *Pant.* γλίσχωρως καὶ μόλις: Plato *Rep.* VII 553 C γλίσχωρως καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος, thriftily and gradually, by saving and working.

28 τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέον] See this more precisely defined in c. 6 §§ 8, 9; IV(VII). 5 § 1, with the notes: also VI(IV). 11 § 2 ff., as quoted in n. (207). SUSEM. (237 b)

§§ 8, 9 Men's desires need to be regulated no less than the amount of their property: this Phaleas must admit, as he holds that there should be a public education, though he does not give a detailed scheme. Crime springs from ill-regulated desires (a) for the necessities of life, (b) for its superfluities, and for the gratification of the passions generally,

(c) for higher gratifications. Phaleas can only cure the minor social evils due to (a), but not the ambition which produces a tyrant.

30 τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστι κτλ] Compare with what follows 5 § 15 n. (165 b); see further on 9 § 12 n. (296) and Exc. II on Bk. II p. 333. SUSEM. (238)

36 ἐξ ἧς=ὥστε ἐκ ταύτης.

§ 10 38 στασιάζουσιν] Cp. VIII(V). 1. II πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀνισὸν ἡ στάσις.

40 This opposition of οἱ χαρίεντες, the educated or enlightened classes, to the mass of ordinary men recurs in *Nic. Eth.* I 5 §§ 3, 4. There joined with πρακτικοί, in *Pol.* VII(VI). 5. 10 with νοῦν ἔχοντες.

1267 a 1 ἐὰν ἴσαι sc. αἱ κτήσεις.

2 Homer *Iliad* IX. 319. SUSEM. (239)

The exclamation of Achilles, as one of the nobles, at the levelling policy which he attributes to Agamemnon.



- 15 αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι, ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ τις οὐ κλέπτῃν ἀλλὰ  
τύραννον). ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον  
§ 14 ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. ἔτι τὰ πολλὰ βούλεται  
κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολιτεύονται καλῶς,  
δεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειννῶντας καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πάντας.  
20 ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν πολιτείαν συντετάχθαι πρὸς τὴν πολε-  
§ 15 μικήν ἰσχύν, περὶ ἧς ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν εἶρηκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ  
περὶ τῆς κτήσεως. δεῖ γὰρ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς  
χρήσεις ἱκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν κιν-  
δύνους· διόπερ οὔτε τοσοῦτον δεῖ πλῆθος ὑπάρχειν ὧν οἱ  
25 πλῆσιον καὶ κρείττους ἐπιθυμῆσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἔχοντες ἀμύνειν  
οὐ δυνήσονται τοὺς ἐπιόντας, οὔθ' οὕτως ὀλίγην ὥστε μὴ δύ-  
§ 16 νασθαι πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν μηδὲ τῶν ἴσων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. ἐκεῖ- 10  
νος μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν διώρικεν, δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνειν, [ὅ] τί  
συμφέρι πλῆθος οὐσίας. ἴσως οὖν ἄριστος ὅρος τὸ μὴ λυσι-

17 ἔτι τὰ.....37 πολιορκίας transposed by Susem. to follow b 13 ἐατέον || δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι Susem.<sup>1</sup> wrongly from William, <φι>λεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι? Schmidt, βούλεται κατασκευάζεσθαι? Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1365, βουλεύεται κατασκευάζειν M<sup>s</sup> || 20 ἄρα] γὰρ? Koraes, but see Dittenberger *l. c.* || 24 ὧν] ὥστε Spengel, but see Vahlen *Aristot. Aufsätze* II. p. 21 (Wiener Sitzungsber., phil.-hist. Cl. LXXII. p. 23) || 25 ἐπιθυμοῦσιν P<sup>1</sup>, ἐπιθυμοῦ M<sup>s</sup> || ἀμύνεσθαι Ridgeway || 26 οὔτ' <οὐσίαν>? Schmidt, but κτήσιν can be understood from what precedes || 28 [δεῖ...b 13 ἐατέον] Bender, [δεῖ...37 πολιορκίας] Susem.<sup>2</sup>, probably right: see Comm. || τί Conring, ὅ τι Stahr Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, ὅτι Γ II Ar. Bk., ᾧ τί Lindau. Bender retains ὅτι and suggests πλῆθός <τι>

τοιαῦτα, οἳτοι γίγνονται τύραννοι: IV. I. 42, II 22 a 3 ff.: meanness is shown in petty gains,—those who take on a large scale, despots who plunder cities and not temples, are called *πονηροί*, *ἀσεβεῖς*, *ἀδικοί*, but not mean, *ἀνελεύθεροι* (Eaton). SUSEM. (244)

διὸ] The crime is greater because the excuse is less: it is not διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Hence the higher reward given to those who punish it.

§ 14 19 δεῖ δὲ κτλ] The same criticism as was passed on the *Latous*, 6 § 7. That the constitution must necessarily have reference to the maintenance of the military force follows directly from the assumption of the military régime which Plato and Aristotle make without reserve. Cp. again VII(VI). 6. §§ 1—5.

§ 15 24 πλῆθος sc. τῆς κτήσεως. ὧν = ὥστε τούτων; as ἐξ ἧς, § 9.

25 οἱ πλῆσιον = οἱ πέλας, *Rhet.* I. 5. 17 where see Cope's note.

ἀμύνειν τοὺς ἐπιόντας may perhaps

be defended by Plato *Phaedrus* 260 B πολεμίου ἀμύνειν. But see *Critical Notes*.

27 πόλεμον...ὁμοίων] to support a war even with an equal or similar power, ἴσοι καὶ ὅμοιοι = a state of the same standing, an equal.

§ 16 We should not fail to decide what limit to property is advisable.

28 δεῖ δὲ κτλ] This limitation has been sufficiently noticed in the preceding § 15, yet the repetition might be justified, if it now appeared under a new form, much sharper and better defined. This would not be the case unless the second explanation of 29 ἴσως οὖν κτλ, as given in the next note, were correct. But, as is there shown, this can hardly be accepted. That being so, there is certainly then fairly good reason to suspect, with Bender, that it is now appended solely for the purpose of introducing the anecdote about Eubulos. SUSEM. (246)

29 ἴσως οὖν...31 οὐσίαν] 'Perhaps the best limit of wealth is that its excess

39 τελεῖν τοῖν κρείττοσι οὐκ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν πολέμῳ, ἀλλ' (19) —  
 17 οὕτως ὥς ἂν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. οὖν Εὐβου-  
 λος Αὐτοφραδάτου μέλλοντος Ἀταρνεία πολιορκεῖν ἐκλεί-  
 σεν αὐτόν, σκεψάμενον ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ λήψεται τὸ χωρίον,  
 λογίσασθαι τοῦ χρόνου τούτου τὴν δαπάνην· ἐθέλει γὰρ ἐλατ-  
 35 τὸν τούτου λαβὼν ἐκλείπειν ἤδη τὸν Ἀταρνεία ταῦτα δ' ἐ-  
 πὼν ἐποίησε τὸν Αὐτοφραδάτην σύννοον γενόμενον παῖσα-  
 18 σθαι τῆς πολιορκίας. ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ α

34 ἐθέλειν δεῖν Γ? (*debere* William) || 35 ἐκλείπειν II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 37 ἐστι μὲν... b 9  
 ἀδικῶνται, with which goes b 9 οὐ..... 13 ἐατέον, is believed by Sussem. to be another  
 recension of the preceding 1266 b 38 ἐπελ... 1267 a 17 πολιορκίας. See *Introd.* p. 81

should not make it profitable for the stronger to attack us, but should leave them no motive for so doing which they would not have had, even if our possessions had been less.' The ellipse may be filled up thus, ἀλλ' οὕτως πολέμῳ λυσιστελεῖν ὥς ἂν ἐπολέμησαν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων, sc. τῶν ἡττόνων, τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. Our wealth should never tempt aggression: we should then only be exposed to the same attacks as a poorer state in our place. That is, we should aim at being the 'lean wiry dogs' with whom their neighbours are glad to make common cause against 'fat and tender sheep': *Κυρῆτις* IV 422 D.

A less simple rendering has been proposed: 'that is the best limit of wealth when a stronger power does not find it profitable to make war upon us for the sake of the excess of the booty to be gained over the cost of victory, but when (even if it conquers us) it is no better off than if it had not made so great an acquisition.' This suits the sequel better, but somewhat strains the meaning of ὑπερβολὴν and οὐσίαν, besides leaving a harsh genitive absolute: ἀλλ' οὕτως συμφέρειν ὥς ἂν σκεψάμεν μὴ ἐχόντων (τῶν κρείττόνων) τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. It can hardly be right.

§ 17 During the last years of Artaxerxes Mnemon and at the commencement of the reign of Artaxerxes Ochus, the confusion in Asia Minor, more particularly owing to the revolt of Artabazos, the satrap of Phrygia Lydia and Paphlagonia, suggested the idea of wresting a part of the Hellenic lands on the coast of Asia from the Persians. The requisite means for effecting this were secured, and it was even possible to maintain the severance. Eubulos was a Bithynian by birth, a money-changer, i.e. banker, by trade, and at the same time ἀνὴρ φιλόσο-

φος, i.e. probably one of Plato's scholars, like his freedman and successor Hermias. Through the medium of his business he found he could execute such a scheme as this, and make himself absolute ruler (τύραννος) of Atarneus on the Aesclie coast of Mysia, and of the stronghold of Assus in the Troad with the adjacent districts: *Vita Aristotelis* in Westermann's *Bioyphoi* p. 402, Suidas s.v. Ἀριστοτέλης, Ἐρμίας, Strabo XIII. 610. Bloch (*Hermias of Atarneus* in his *Ge. A7. Schriften* VI. 183 ff.) tries to show, as others have done, that this event happened before 359 B.C.; that in 359 Autophradates as general of the Persian king marched against Artabazos and took him prisoner, and that in the course of this same campaign he laid siege to Atarneus. The suggestion by which Eubulos raised the siege is, as Bloch remarks, one worthy of a banker. We know that he maintained his power down to his death; also that it was not before 345/44 that his successor, the eunuch Hermias, Aristotle's friend (see I. 6. 9. n. 46) was overthrown by the Rhodian Mentor, the Persian commander-in-chief, and that solely by stratagem deceit and treachery. SUSSEM. (247)

Bergk's posthumous paper *On the chronology of king Artaxerxes III, Ochus, in Rhein. Mus.* XXXVII. 1882, pp. 315—361 fixes the fall of Hermias and the escape of Aristotle and Xenocrates to Mitylene (and thence to Athens) in the year 345/44. Comp. Sussemühl in Burman's *Jahrbuch*. XXX. 1882, pp. 4—7.

36 σύννοον γενέσθαι, to become thoughtful, to reflect.

That §§ 18—20 are paralleled to §§ 10—13 has been explained *Introd.* p. 80 f.

§ 18 37 ἐστι μὲν... 38 πολιορκίας] Comp. line 3 ὥς ἂν... 4 οὐσίαν.

τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας εἶναι τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν (IV)  
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὥς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ  
 40 χαρίεντες ἀγανακτοῖεν [ἂν] ὥς οὐκ ἴσων ὄντες ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ  
 § 19 φαίνονται πολλάκις ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες· ἔτι δ'  
 1267 b ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἱκα-  
 νὸν διωβολία μόνον, ὅταν δ' ἤδη τοῦτ' ἢ πάτριον, ἀεὶ δέον-  
 ται τοῦ πλείονος, ἕως εἰς ἀπειρον ἔλθωσιν. ἀπειρος γὰρ ἡ  
 τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἥς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ  
 § 20 ζῶσιν. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὁμα- 12  
 6 λίζειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρασκευά- (p. 4)  
 ζειν ὥστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὥστε μὴ  
 δύνασθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἂν ἦττους τε ᾧσι καὶ μὴ ἀδικῶν-  
 § 21 ται. || οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας εἴρηκεν. περὶ  
 10 γὰρ τὴν τῆς γῆς κτήσιν ἰσάζει μόνον, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δούλων

38 ἴσας after εἶναι II<sup>2</sup> Bk., perhaps I; possibly right || 40 ἂν II<sup>2</sup> Bk., omitted by II<sup>1</sup>

1267 b 5 ἀρχή is corrupt: ἄκη Scaliger, ἄκος Schneider, ἀρωγή M. Vermehren, ἀλκή? Madvig probably right, <ἀπαλλαγῆς> or <ἰατρείας> ἀρχή Schmidt; ἀρκεῖ Koraes, certainly not right

38 πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν recalls στασιάζουσι of § 10.

39 οὐ μὴν μέγα κτλ] a 16 ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας κτλ.

καὶ γὰρ ἂν κτλ] "For even then (ἐὰν ἴσαι αἱ κτήσεις, § 10) the higher classes would be discontented, as they lay claim to something more than an equal share, and hence are often found aggressive and factious."

40 οὐκ ἴσων] ἀλλὰ πλείονος: on the ground that they deserve something more than an equal share, something proportionately greater. Comp. III. 13. 13 and Thuc. VIII. 89. 4 πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερὸν ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι. In Thuc. I. 132 § 2 μὴ ἴσος = superior.

§ 19 1267 b 2 διωβολία] This refers to the so-called θεωρικόν, a grant of public money to provide for shows or public amusements introduced at Athens after Pericles' time. In the first instance at those festivals only at which plays were exhibited, the sum of two obols, the price of an ordinary seat in the theatre, was paid from the state-chest to the lessee of the theatre for every citizen present. (Every one who went to the theatre received a counter which he gave up on going in; the lessee collected from the state the two obols for every counter; but

he had to pay a rent out of his receipts and to keep the theatre in repair. See Benndorf *Beiträge in Zeitschrift f. d. öst. Gymn.* XXVI. 1875. p. 23 ff.) Subsequently the poorer citizens received the like dole for all the other festivals, and these outgoings swallowed up no small part of the revenues. See Böckh *Public Econ. of Athens* p. 217 Eng. tr., Schömann *Antiquities* I p. 341, p. 438 ff. Eng. tr. An Attic obol = 1/3 d. of our money, a little more than five farthings, or 11 German Pfennige: Hultsch *Greek and Roman Metrology* p. 172. SUSEM. (245)

4 ἥς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν κτλ]

Comp. a 5 ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν.

§ 20 6 τὸ τοὺς μὲν... 7 πλεονεκτεῖν] Substantially the same remedy as in § 12 τριτόν δ' εἴ τινας... ἄκος.

§ 21 The argument from inconsistency is pressed from opposite sides here and in 6 § 15. Phaleas must have meant to include personal property, § 3.

10 ἔστι δὲ καὶ δούλων κτλ] Comp. *Rhet.* I. 5. 7 πλούτου δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλήθος, γῆς χωρίων κτήσεως, ἔτι δὲ ἐπίπλων κτήσεως καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων, where Cope explains ἐπιπλα as "moveables" opposed to fixtures; such as houses and land. Hence furniture, even if of bronze, Xen. *Oecon.* IX. 6, Thuc. III. 68.

καὶ βοσκημάτων πλούτος καὶ νομίσματος, καὶ κατασκευή (IV)  
 πολλή τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων ἢ πάντων οὖν τούτων ἐσό-  
 22 τητα ζητητέον ἢ τάξιν τινὰ μετρίαν, ἢ πάντα ἐντέον. φαί-η-  
 νεται δ' ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τὴν πόλιν μι-  
 15 κράν, εἴ γ' οἱ τεχνῖται πάντες δημόσιοι ἔσονται καὶ μὴ  
 23 πλήρωμά τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλ' εἴπερ δεῖ δη-  
 μοσίους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους, δεῖ καθάπερ ἐν  
 Ἐπιδάμνῳ τε, καὶ Διόφαιτός ποτε κατασκευάζεν Ἀθήνησι,  
 τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον.  
 20 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας σχεδὸν ἐκ τούτων ἂν  
 τις θεωρήσειεν, εἴ τι τυγχάνει καλῶς εἰρηκῶς ἢ μὴ κα-  
 8 λῶς. Ἰππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφῶντος Μιλήσιος], ὅς καὶ τὴν τῶν V

16 δεῖ] δὴ P<sup>3-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.)  
 17 δεῖ] καὶ with a comma after 16 εἴπερ Bernays; if so, ἐργαζομένους «*μένους*»  
 Susem.; probably right, but see Comm. The same sense can be obtained by Well-  
 don's punctuation εἴπερ δεῖ δημοσίους εἶναι, τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένοις δεῖ, καθάπερ  
 provided ὡς be inserted after 18 τε καὶ || 18 ὡς inserted by Morel Bk. before Διό-  
 φαντος, omitted by II; the translations of William and Ar. are no warrant that they  
 had ὡς in their mss. || 21 τι] τις II<sup>2</sup> || 22 [ὅς ..... 28 βουλόμενος] Congreve; the  
 passage had been suspected by Fülleborn. See Comm.

§ 22 15 δημόσιοι = public servants. Such were the executioners and physicians always (see III. 11. 11 δημιουργός = *iatros*): also ναυπηγοὶ and others, Plato *Gorg.* 433 a with Dr. Thierschmann's note, *Philol.* 259 A.

16 πλήρωμά τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως] Exactly Plato's expression *Rep.* 371 E πλήρωμα δὴ πόλεως εἰσι καὶ μισθωτοὶ (Eaton). SUSEM. (248)

Comp. III. 13. 13, VI (IV). 4. 12.

§ 23 17 ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ κτλ] "No one but a political dreamer or dreamy politician like Phaleas could hatch the thought that the handicrafts throughout the city should be carried on by public slaves. The proposal made at Athens by Diophantos, we do not know when, was that only the artisans who worked for the community were to be public slaves"; Hooker *Statesh.* i. 65. [not in the Eng. trans.] This was certainly the case at Epidamnus. With the present text this sense can only be obtained by interpreting the words τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένοις to mean 'those who do common work for the whole community'; and we should be forced to assume that even Phaleas' proposal went no further than this, which is very improbable. Hence the alteration

suggested by Bernays is tempting. The archon of the year Ol. 96, 2 = 395 $\frac{1}{4}$  was named Diophantos, but he can hardly have been the man. "Aelian relates that the people of Epidamnus allowed any one who liked to settle amongst them as a resident, Ἐπιδάμνῳ ἐπιδαμνῶν καὶ μετοικεῖν παρέχον τῷ βουλευμένῳ: *V. H.* III. 16" (J. G. Schneider). But this fact throws no light on the passage. On the constitution of Epidamnus see further III. 16 § 1, VIII (V). 1 § 10, 4 § 7 *sup.* SUSEM. (249)

Bernays renders: "But if (this proposal is to be tried), state-slaves ought only to be employed upon works for state objects, and the arrangement must be made as it is found in Epidamnus and as Diophantos wanted to introduce it at Athens."

c. 8 Examination of the scheme of Hippodamos of Miletus. This chapter is analysed p. 105 f.

§ 1 23 Ἰππόδαμος] See EXCURSUS II to B. II p. 331 ff.; also K. F. Hermann *De Hippodamo Mileti* (Marburg 1841). SUSEM. (250)

This chapter is treated slightly by Hildenbrand pp. 58—61, Ocken 2. 213—218, Henkel 163—165. See also

πόλεων διαίρεσιν εὔρε καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέτεμεν, γενόμενος (V)  
καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον περίττοτος διὰ φιλοτιμίαν οὕτως  
25 ὥστε δοκεῖν ἐνίοις ζῆν περιεργότερον τριχῶν τε πλήθει  
καὶ κόμης, ἔτι δὲ ἐσθῆτος εὐτελοῦς μὲν ἀλεεινῆς δὲ οὐκ  
ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοὺς θερινοὺς χρό-  
νους, λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν εἶναι βουλόμενος,  
πρῶτος τῶν μὴ πολιτευομένων ἐνεχείρησέ τι περὶ πολιτείας  
§ 2 εἰπεῖν τῆς ἀρίστης. κατεσκεύαζε δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῷ πλήθει 2  
31 μὲν μυριάνδρον, εἰς τρία δὲ μέρη διηρημένην· ἐποίει γὰρ  
ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἐν δὲ γεωργοὺς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προ-  
§ 3 πολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχον. διήρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη <καὶ> τὴν

23 πειρεᾶ (not παρειᾶ as Susem.<sup>1</sup> gave) P<sup>2,3,4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> (?) U<sup>b</sup> || 26 κόμης] κόσμω πολυτελεῖ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Bernays and γρ. p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, καλλωπισμῷ Bender, κόσμῳ Ridgeway, κοσμήσεσιν Welldon || ἔτι δὲ omitted by T<sup>b</sup> Sepulveda's codices Bender Ridgeway Welldon, ἐπ' Bernays || 28 λόγος P<sup>2,3</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, σπουδαῖος W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ar. Ald. || 32 μὲν omitted by M<sup>s</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> || 33 τὰ L<sup>s</sup> and U<sup>b</sup> (corr.), τὸ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1,2,3,4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and U<sup>b</sup> (1st hand) || <καὶ> τὴν Schmidt

M. Erdmann *On Hippodamos and symmetrical town architecture in Greece* in *Philologus* XLII. 1883. pp. 193—227.

22 ὅς καλ... 28 βουλόμενος] Fülleborn remarked long since: "every reader must be struck with one strange thing in this introductory notice by Aristotle, viz. the picture he draws of Hippodamos. With what object has he preserved for posterity these proofs of the man's vanity and effeminacy? Do they serve to explain the spirit of his work? I doubt it." And Congreve, who rightly holds that this description would be more consistent with Theophrastos than with Aristotle, suggests that here we may reasonably suspect a later hand. SUSEM. (252)

23 κατέτεμεν] cut out, i.e. laid out the streets; Pindar *Pyth.* 5. 84 εὐθύτομον κατέθηκε... σκυρωτῶν ὁδόν.

25 ζῆν περιεργότερον] was held to be somewhat affected in his way of life.

In the following words ἐσθῆτος must be taken with πλήθει according to the reading of Π<sup>2</sup> adopted in the text. It is plausible to make it depend upon some word like κόσμῳ, the reading of Π<sup>2</sup> (so Ridgeway, who quotes Aeschyl. *Supp.* 246 for κόσμος, meaning fashion or style of dress), or possibly καλλωπισμῷ or κοσμήσεσι, which are the conjectures of Bender and Welldon respectively.

τριχῶν τε πλήθει καὶ κόμης] In Sparta it remained the custom, on account of war and warlike exercises, to wear long

hair from the time of entering upon the military age. But at Athens from early times it became the practice to cut the hair upon attaining the full age for civic rights and to wear it short from that time onwards. Not to do so passed for vanity, foppishness, dandyism. The orator Hegesippos, a contemporary and supporter of Demosthenes, was on this account nicknamed Κρωβύλος or Top-knot. The knights alone are said to have kept the privilege of wearing long hair: μὴ φθονεῖθ' ἡμῖν κομῶσι, Aristoph. *Knights* 580. See Becker *Charikles* III. 233 ff. ed. 2, Eng. trans. pp. 453—55. SUSEM. (251)

26 εὐτελοῦς] of cheap material, though warm.

28 λόγιος] a man of learning, as in IV (VII). 10. 3 and often in Herodotos (Congreve). Suidas calls him μετεωρολόγος.

§ 2 30 τὴν πόλιν] Oncken I. 214 n. (1) takes this to mean that in the 10,000 are included not the citizens only but the entire free population. But according to the design of Hippodamos § 7, not merely those who bear arms but also the artisans and husbandmen are to be citizens, although it must be conceded to Aristotle's criticism §§ 8—12, that his end could hardly have been attained in such a manner. SUSEM. (253)

§ 3 33 διήρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη κτλ] So too Aristotle IV (VII). cc. 9, 10. (Eaton.) Cp. n. (365) on II. 10 § 8. SUSEM. (254)

χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱεράν τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν τὴν δ' ἰδίαν ἔθεν (V)  
 35 μὲν τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιήσουσι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἱεράν, ἀφ' ὧν  
 δ' οἱ προπολεμοῦντες βιώσονται, κοινήν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν  
 4 ἰδίαν. ᾧτο δ' εἶδη καὶ τῶν νόμων εἶναι τρία μόνον· περὶ  
 ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἡ  
 5 ἕβριν βλάβην θάνατον. ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν  
 40 τὸ κύριον, εἰς ὃ πάσας ἀνάγεσθαι δεῖν τὰς μὴ καλῶς κεκρί-  
 σθαι δοκούσας δίκας· τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκεύαζεν ἐκ τινῶν γε-  
 5 ρόντων αἰρετῶν. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῦν δικαστηρίῳ οὐ διὰ  
 ψηφοφορίας ᾧτο γίνεσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἕκαστος πι-  
 νάκιον, ἐν ᾧ γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἀπλῶς [τὴν δίκην], εἰ

35 ἱερά P<sup>3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>) || 37 δὲ καὶ εἶδη Γ  
 apparently, possibly right || 40 δεῖ Π<sup>1</sup>

1268 a 2 ᾧτο omitted by W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald., in P<sup>4</sup> inserted in the margin || 3 κατα-  
 δικάζει P<sup>1</sup> and 1st hand of P<sup>2-3</sup> (emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || τὴν δίκην omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>

35 ἀφ' ὧν δ' κτλ] Here there is just a germ of Plato's ideal state, when we consider that the soldiers answer to the second order, and the artizans and farmers together to the third order of citizens in the *Nepmides*. However even when viewed in this light the differences between the two schemes are as great as the resemblances. But the state proposed in the *Lysis* may be described as hardly anything more than an improved working out of Phaedrus' ideal. Comp. L. Stein *op. c.* p. 162 f. SUSEM. (255)

|| 4 37 ᾧτο κτλ] See Exc. II. to II. II p. 333 f. SUSEM. (255 b)

ἔβρι and βλάβη answer to crimes against the person and against property. Not precisely however; for ἔβρι implies insult; it is whatever wounds the feelings or honour, whether accompanied by violence or not. Whereas βλάβη implies loss or damage sustained, whether to person or property. See *Anal.* I. II. 26, II. 2. 3 with Cope's excellent comments.

39 ἐνομοθέτει δὲ.] This idea of a court of appeal is further evidence that Hippocrates had a fine sense for jurisprudence. It is appropriated by Plato also *Lysis* vi 767 c—e, XII 956 c f. (Oncken). Cp. also Exc. II. SUSEM. (256)

40 τὸ κύριον = the supreme court.

|| 5 1268 a 1 οὐ διὰ ψηφοφορίας] In the Athenian courts the voting was secret; each jurymen (*δικαστής*) received two ballots, one for condemnation, the other

for acquittal; and there were two urns, one of copper, into which the ballot containing the verdict was thrown, the other of wood, into which the other, unusual ballots were thrown. The ballots for voting were either differently coloured stones or small metal balls, or even differently coloured beans or shells. At what time the one or other of these were used is not known. Stones were certainly the most common; a black stone served for condemnation, a white one for acquittal: with balls of metal, one with a hole in it served for the former purpose, a whole one served for the latter purpose. Equality of votes was counted as acquittal. (Meier and Schumann *Attische Procces* 720 ff.) SUSEM. (257)

Aristotle himself is our authority for the voting at Athens: see *Prog.* 1348 b 5—41 of the Berlin ed.

|| 2 ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἕκαστον κτλ] Nearly the same arrangement was actually introduced amongst the Romans: a fact which shows how clearly this proposal testifies to a legal mind of great originality. At Rome the voting was by tablets in the manner here proposed, leaving it to the indices to affirm (not simply condemnation (C) or acquittal (A), but also a verdict of "not proven" (NL, non liquet). That Aristotle (§ 13 f.) is as yet quite unable to realize to himself the proper meaning of the proposal is a further proof of its originality (L. Stein, *Comp.* 9. (265) on §§ 13—15. SUSEM. (258)

δ' ἀπολύοι ἀπλῶς, κενὸν <ἐάν>, εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, τοῦτο (V)  
 5 διορίζειν. νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ᾔετο νενομοθετηῆσθαι καλῶς· ἀναγκά-  
 § 6 ζειν γὰρ ἐπιорκεῖν [ἦ] ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα δικάζοντας. ἔτι δὲ 4  
 νόμον ἐτίθει περὶ τῶν εὐρίσκόντων τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον,  
 ὅπως τυγχάνωσι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τε-  
 λευτώντων ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν, ὡς οὐπω τοῦτο  
 10 παρ' ἄλλοις νενομοθετημένον· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις οὗτος  
 § 7 ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἐτέραις τῶν πόλεων. τοὺς δ' ἄρχοντας ὑπὸ  
 τοῦ δήμου αἵρετοὺς εἶναι πάντας· δῆμον δ' ἐποίει τὰ τρία  
 μέρη τῆς πόλεως· τοὺς δ' αἵρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν  
 καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν.  
 15 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀξιόλογα τῆς Ἰππο- 5

4 ἀπολύει M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Q<sup>b</sup>, ἀπολύσοι L<sup>s</sup> || <ἐάν> Meier (*De bonis damnatorum* p. 58)  
 || <καὶ> τοῦτο Meier *l.c.* perhaps rightly || 6 ἦ omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup>, ἦ ταῦτα omitted  
 by L<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, both words added by p<sup>1</sup>) [ἦ] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Dittenberger  
*op.c.* p. 1360 f. || ἔτι δὲ ἐτίθει νόμον P<sup>4</sup> in the margin, in the text ἐτίθει is omitted,  
 ἐτίθει δὲ νόμον P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. Bk. || 9. τοῦτο] τότε and 10 Ἕλλησιν instead  
 of ἄλλοις Spengel, but see Dittenberger *op.c.* p. 1369 ff. and Comm. || 11 ἐτέροις  
 P<sup>3-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>) || ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου after 12  
 αἵρετοὺς Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 14 καὶ ξενικῶν omitted by M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>  
 in the margin)

5 ἀναγκάζειν sc. τὸν νόμον. *for better*  
 § 6 9 ὡς οὐπω κτλ.] “just as if this  
 law had not been made before elsewhere.”  
 So K. F. Hermann *De Hippodamo* p. 44,  
 who is defended by Dittenberger (*Gott.*  
*gel. Anz.* 1874 p. 1369) against Spengel.  
 It is true that ὡς with the participle  
 might equally mean (1) *because in fact*,  
 as in Pl. *Phaedr.* 245 E ὡς ταύτης οὐσης  
 φύσεως, or (2) *because as he thought* (ὡς  
 οὐκ ὄν ἀδύνατον § 6): but νῦν is not de-  
 cisive in favour of (1), see n. (259).

οὐπω, not μήπω; cp. Lysias 14 § 10  
 ἐτόλμησεν ἀναβῆναι, ὡς οὐκ ἐξεσόμενον τῇ  
 πόλει δίκην λαμβάνειν: 27 § 16 ὥσπερ τοῦ  
 ονειδούς ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ζημίας αὐτοῖς μέλον:  
 Xen. *Cyr.* V. 1. 13 ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ  
 κλέπτειν, αἰτία τὸν κλέπτοντα. The clause  
 is virtually oblique, and the negative is  
 reproduced unchanged.

10 ἔστι δὲ...νῦν] Here as often νῦν =  
 as things are, “under the existing system”  
 not simply = now, as Spengel explains it.  
 Unless one follows Spengel in an unten-  
 able alteration of the text, the drift of the  
 passage can only be a censure upon Hip-  
 podamos, which is even in this form  
 quite intelligible, though it would cer-  
 tainly have been more clearly expressed  
 as follows: “whereas a law like this was

already at the time in force at Athens.”  
 We cannot however prove the date of  
 this Athenian regulation (on which Wila-  
 mowitz *Aus Kydathen* p. 26 may also  
 be consulted), but the present passage  
 would seem to make it earlier than the  
 treatise of Hippodamos. It is quite pos-  
 sible that Aristotle's censure is unfair;  
 for who is to inform us that in its author's  
 intention the scheme of Hippodamos was  
 restricted to new proposals, never before  
 realized? Cp. Hermann *op.c.* 43 f.  
 SUSEM. (259) Cp. for νῦν § 5, c. 1 § 3,  
 3 § 6, 5 § 11, § 17, 6 § 11 οὐχ ὁμοίως τότε  
 (in Plato's supposed state) καὶ νῦν (as  
 things actually are), *Rhet.* I. 1 § 4, 1354 a  
 19 καθάπερ ἐν ἐνταῖς γε νῦν ἐστὶ τῶν πόλεων.

§ 7 11 τοὺς δ' ἄρχοντας κτλ] All  
 officials (perhaps even the priests) were  
 consequently to be appointed by popular  
 election and not by lot; comp. Excursus  
 II p. 332. SUSEM. (260)

12 δῆμον...πόλεως] It would seem  
 that Hippodamos did not state whether  
 all three classes were eligible (Oncken).  
 See however n. (262). SUSEM. (261)

13 τοὺς δ' αἵρεθέντας] the magistrates  
 elected to have the charge of state mat-  
 ters and of the affairs of foreigners and  
 minors in the city.

δάμου τάξεως ταύτ' ἐστίν· ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πρῶτον μὲν τῆς (V)  
 8 διαίρεσιν τοῦ πλήθους τῶν πολιτῶν. οἱ τε γὰρ τεχνῖται καὶ οἱ γε-  
 ωργοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὄπλα ἔχοντες κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες,  
 οἱ μὲν γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὄπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνῖται οὔτε γῆν οὔτε  
 20 ὄπλα, ὥστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὄπλα κεκτημένων.  
 9 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον (ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐκ  
 τῶν τὰ ὄπλα ἔχόντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πο-  
 λιτοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἀρχὰς ὥς εἰπεῖν)· μὴ  
 12 μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πῶς οἷόν τε φιλικῶς ἔχειν  
 πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν; ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ κρείττους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὄπλα  
 γε κεκτημένους ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν· τοῦτο δ' οὐ ράδιον  
 10 μὴ πολλοὺς ὄντας· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, τί δεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους μετέ-  
 χειν τῆς πολιτείας καὶ κυρίους εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων κα-  
 ταστάσεως; ἔτι οἱ γεωργοὶ τί χρήσιμοι τῇ πόλει; τεχνῖτας  
 10 μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι (πᾶσα γὰρ δεῖται πόλις τεχνιτῶν), οἱ  
 καὶ δύνανται διαγίνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλε-  
 σιν ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης· οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζοντες μὲν τοῖς τὰ  
 ὄπλα κεκτημένοις τὴν τροφήν εὐλόγως ἂν ἦσαν τι τῆς πό-  
 λεως μέρος, νῦν δ' ἰδίαν ἔχουσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἰδίᾳ γεωρ-  
 11 γήσουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὴν κοινὴν, ἀφ' ἧς οἱ προπολεμαῖντες ἔξουσιν  
 16 τὴν τροφήν, εἰ μὲν αὐτοὶ γεωργήσουσιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μά-

17 οἱ omitted by M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [οἱ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 25 καὶ omitted by P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk., || 26 γε  
 omitted by M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [γε] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 34 ἰδίᾳ] ἰδίαν P<sup>1</sup> || γεωργήσουσιν Ar. Morel Bk.

16 τάξεως] scheme, polity: cp. 10  
 § 4, 11 § 8. The fuller phrase is τάξις  
 τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας 1. 2. 16, or τῆς  
 πολιτείας 11. 6. 1, where the sense of  
*ordering, arrangement*, is as apparent as  
 in 11. 2 § 4, or 11. § 9, or 10. 1. 1.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πρῶτον] Aristotle  
 criticises (§§ 8—15) (1) the entire division  
 into classes, (2) the special position of  
 the agricultural class, (3) the innovations  
 in the administration of justice.

§ 8 τοῖς δοῦλοις] This partly explains  
 the proposal of Phaleas to make them  
 δεσποταί.

§ 9 11 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν κτλ.]  
 Yet Aristotle seems to assume this to  
 have been the intention of Hippodamus.  
 SUSEM. (262)

Obviously he is applying his own  
 standard πολιτεία δ' ἀνέχεται ἀρχῆς.

οἱ πολιτοφύλακας] what sort of ma-  
 gistracy Aristotle understands by this  
 word is not clear and is not sufficiently  
 explained by the notice, VII(V). 6 § 6 n.

(1573), of a magistracy under this name  
 in Larisa. SUSEM. (263)

As τὰς αἰετὶς are attested by an inscription  
 in Larisa of 314 B.C. (Rohdendorf *Zeitsch.*  
*Antiqu.* 11 p. 136) it seems likely that Ari-  
 stotle there uses a different term in order  
 to express the functions of the office.

24 μὴ μετέχοντας δὲ κτλ.] Aristotle  
 himself altogether excludes the farmers,  
 tradesmen, and artisans in his ideal state  
 from the rights of citizenship, which is a  
 much stronger measure. But possibly he  
 thinks it is not essential for those who  
 are thus excluded to be attached to the  
 constitution, but that if they are to be  
 citizens, it is. SUSEM. (264)

§ 10 31 διαγίνεσθαι = ~~καταγίνεσθαι~~  
 so καταγίνεσθαι, καταγίγνεσθαι.

33 εὐλόγως ἂν κτλ.] They would  
 then be in the position of the *ἀνὰ* of  
 the *Κορυδαί*.

34 νῦν δὲ = whereas what Hippoda-  
 mos proposes is that they shall have land  
 of their own.

χιμον ἕτερον καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν, βούλεται δ' ὁ νομοθέτης· εἰ (V)  
 δ' ἕτεροί τινες ἔσονται τῶν τε τὰ ἴδια γεωργούντων καὶ τῶν  
 μαχίμων, τέταρτον αὖ μόριον ἔσται τοῦτο τῆς πόλεως, οὐδε-  
 § 12 νὸς μετέχον, ἀλλὰ ἀλλότριον τῆς πολιτείας· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ  
 41 τις τοὺς αὐτοὺς θήσκει τοὺς τε τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ τοὺς τὴν κοινὴν  
 γεωργοῦντας, τό τε πλῆθος ἄπορον ἔσται τῶν καρπῶν ἐξ ὧν  
 1268 b ἕκαστος γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίας, καὶ τίνος ἔνεκεν οὐκ εὐθὺς  
 ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων αὐτοῖς τε τὴν τροφήν  
 λήψονται καὶ τοῖς μαχίμοις παρέξουσιν; ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πολ-  
 § 13 λὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως 8  
 5 ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν διαιροῦντας τῆς δίκης ἀπλῶς  
 γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν διαιτητήν. τοῦτο γὰρ  
 ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεται (κοινολογοῦνται γὰρ  
 ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ  
 ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦναντίον τούτου τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ

37 γεωργεῖν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || ἕτερον εἶναι after νομοθέτης Γ M<sup>s</sup>, a similar gloss τούτους  
 ἐτέρους εἶναι p<sup>2</sup> in the margin || 39 αὖ] οὖν Π<sup>3</sup> || τοῦτο after τῆς πόλεως M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> ||  
 42 Spengel thinks καρπῶν corrupt, Schmidt suspects ἄπορον, for which δυσπόριστον  
 seems to him to be required by the sense

1268 b 1 γεωργήσει II Bk., *ministrabit* William, *habeant ministrare* Ar., doubtless  
 on mere conjecture; hence erroneously ὑπουργήσει Vettori Susem<sup>1,2</sup> and others ||  
 δύο οἰκίας can hardly be sound, *δυσὶν οἰκίαις* Ar. Camerarius, <eis> δύο οἰκίας Ber-  
 nays, δύο [οἰκίας] Busse not happily || 2 τῆς <αὐτῆς> Böcker (not bad),  
 <ἄλλης> τῆς Madvig, [καὶ] Bernays Susem.<sup>2</sup>; there is some corruption || 5 τὸ κρίνειν  
 ἀξιοῦν II Bk., ὁ κρίνειν ἀξιῶν Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> wrongly from the translations of William and  
 Ar. || διαιροῦντα P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk., διαιροῦνται L<sup>s</sup> || δίκης Π<sup>1</sup> Ar., κρίσεως Π<sup>2</sup>  
 Bk. (which Bojesen saw to be wrong) || 6 γὰρ Ar., δ' Γ II Bk. || 7 καὶ <μῇ>  
 πλείοσιν? Koraes || 9 καὶ omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup> || τούτω τῶν p<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2,3,4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Bk.,  
 τούτων W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. (omitting the following τῶν)

§ 11 37 βούλεται κτλ] Comp. *n.*  
 (201) on 6 § 6.

§ 12 42 τό τε πλῆθος ἄπορον κτλ]  
 "the amount of produce will be in-  
 adequate for the maintenance of two  
 establishments." This again is a mere  
 assertion which ought to have been  
 proved. SUSEM. (265)

1268 b 1 γεωργήσει οἰκίας] See  
*Critical Notes*. It is impossible to defend  
 the text as meaning to maintain two house-  
 holds by agriculture on the analogy of οἰ-  
 κίας οἰκεῖν.

§ 13 4 ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως] the law  
 about passing sentence.

5 τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν κτλ] "the require-  
 ment that a verdict shall be returned  
 upon separate counts (τὸ μὲν sc. καταδι-

κάζει τὸ δὲ μῇ, § 5) when the charge in  
 the indictment is simple, whereby the  
 juror is turned into an arbitrator." ἀξιοῦν  
 is infinitive.

6 τοῦτο γὰρ κτλ] This is practic-  
 able in arbitration even (καὶ) where there  
 are several arbitrators, for they confer  
 with one another about the decision.

7 καὶ πλείοσιν] At Athens a single  
 public arbitrator decided each case, but if  
 private arbitrators were chosen by the  
 parties to the dispute themselves, a body  
 of 3 or 4 might well have been more  
 common. SUSEM. (266)

8 ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστ.] In this respect  
 then the practice in the Greek courts of  
 justice was just the reverse of that in  
 ours. SUSEM. (267)

10 παρασκευάζουσιν ὅπως οἱ δικάσται μὴ κοιμισθῶσι πρὸς τὸν  
 14 ἀλλήλους. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ταρχαλῆς ἢ κρίσει, ὅσατε  
 ὀφείλειν μὲν ὁ δικάστης οἶσται. μὴ τοσαύτον δ' ὅσον ὁ δι-  
 καζόμενος; ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικάστης κρινεῖ  
 δέκα μνᾶς (ἢ ὁ μὲν πλεόν ὁ δ' ἔλασσον), ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ  
 17 δὲ τέτταρας (καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι μεριω-  
 15 σιν), οἱ δὲ πάντα καταδικάσουσιν, οἱ δ' οὐδέν. τίς οὖν ὁ τρό-  
 πος ἔσται τῆς διαλογῆς τῶν ψήφων; ὅτι [δ'] οὐδεὶς ἐπινοεῖ  
 ἀναγκάζει τὸν ἀπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἢ καταδικάσαντα, εἰ-  
 περ ἀπλῶς τὸ ἔγκλημα γέγραπται δικαίως· οὐ γὰρ μη-  
 20 δὲν ὀφείλειν ὁ ἀποδικάσας κρίνει, ἀλλὰ τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς. 12  
 ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἥδη ἐπινοεῖ ὁ καταδικάσας μὴ νομίζων ὀφεί-  
 16 λειν τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εἰρίσκουσιν τι τῇ  
 πόλει συμφέρον ὡς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τινα τιμὴν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφα-

12 μὲν after ὁ II<sup>2</sup> and perhaps I<sup>1</sup> || δὲ P<sup>1</sup>, omitted by M<sup>1</sup> and perhaps I<sup>1</sup> ||  
 13 κρινεῖ Bk.<sup>2</sup>, κρίνει I<sup>1</sup> II Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 15 δὴ] δὲ II<sup>2</sup> || 16 οἶσται] οἶ I<sup>1</sup> M<sup>1</sup> and I<sup>2</sup>  
 (1st hand, corrected in the margin) || 17 δ' omitted by II<sup>1</sup> || 19 γέγραπται] δι-  
 καίως Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || 21 ἀλλ'...22 μνᾶς omitted by M<sup>1</sup> || 21 ὅση  
 omitted by I<sup>1</sup> M<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by corr.<sup>1</sup>), [ὅση] Susem.<sup>1</sup> wrongly || 22  
 γέγραπται M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

§ 14 12 ὁ δικάζόμενος may be either  
 litigant. If the participle is *παύων*, it  
 denotes the defendant; if *μιάων*, the  
 plaintiff. Here the latter is the case.

13 ὁ μὲν γὰρ...15 τέτταρας] "For he  
 (the plaintiff) claims 20 minae, but the  
 juror will decide for ten—or whatever  
 the larger sum may be which is claimed  
 by the former and the smaller sum which  
 is awarded by the latter—while another  
 (juror) will award five, and yet another,  
 four" (Bernays). This seems slightly  
 better than to understand *πέντε, τεττα-  
 ρας, πέντε, τετταρας* of sums awarded by  
 different jurymen (dicasts).

15 μεριωσιν] will estimate damages  
 according to a graduated scale. Cf. *Orat.  
 Demosth.* vol. I, p. 494, 4 *ἐὰν εὐδὲν  
 ἀποκρίσθαι τὰ τῶν δικαίων*.

§ 15 16 τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος] In what  
 way then are the votes to be counted, i.e.  
 sorted? *καταλογέω* = collecting and arrang-  
 ing; *dirigilis* Cic. *Pro Plancio* § 14.

19 ἀπὸρ ἀπλῶς δικάσων] "If the in-  
 dictment has been framed (not condition-  
 ally but) absolutely with justice." (II  
 has also been proposed to put a colon be-  
 fore *δικαίως* and justly too; for &c.).  
 If the suit be for 20 minae, acquittal  
 means that the defendant does not owe 20  
 minae, it says nothing about liability for

a smaller sum.

21 ἢ δὴ] when we turn to the judge  
 who condemns while not believing the  
 twenty minae to be owing, it is quite true  
 that he commits perjury. Comp. VII  
 (V). 8. 6 ὥστερ' ἄρα οἱ δίκαιος (Cicero).

§ 13—15 'L. Stein op. v. 164 n.  
 rightly calls this whole criticism a misap-  
 prehension. If the judges, or jurors, are  
 forbidden to converse with one another,  
 it is certainly impossible for them to find  
*non liquet* in concert: it is however pos-  
 sible for all to reach the same result with-  
 out consultation, and still more likely that  
 only in this way can some one of them  
 clear his conscience. And if, after the  
 fact of a pecuniary indebtedness has been  
 established, the jurors cannot agree upon  
 the amount, then a conditional verdict  
 is the only one possible, and in that case  
 certainly there can be no final decision  
 except by way of compromise. Thus this  
 objection makes for Hippodamus, rather  
 than against him' (Chickson). And hence  
 how is it made out that the 'majority of  
 legislators' were right in excluding con-  
 sultation amongst the jurors? At any  
 rate our modern regulations (see v. 174)  
 has pronounced them to be wrong. Cf.  
 also n. (248) on § 1. See also [226]

§ 16 23 οὐκ ἀσφαλές] the jury and

λές τὸ νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐόφθαλμον ἀκοῦσαι μόνον· ἔχει (V)  
 25 γὰρ συκοφαντίας καὶ κινήσεις, ἂν τύχη, πολιτείας. ἐμ-  
 πίπτει δ' εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἑτέραν· ἀποροῦσι  
 γὰρ τινες πότερον βλαβερὸν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ  
 § 17 κινεῖν τοὺς πατέριους νόμους, ἂν ἢ τις ἄλλος βελτίων. διόπερ  
 οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λεχθέντι ταχὺ συγχωρεῖν, εἴπερ μὴ συμφέ-  
 30 ρει κινεῖν. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἰσηγεῖσθαι τινὰς νόμων λύσιν ἢ  
 πολιτείας ὡς κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποιήμεθα μνεῖαν, 11  
 § 18 ἔτι μικρὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστείλασθαι βέλτιον. ἔχει γάρ,  
 ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἀπορίαν, καὶ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ  
 κινεῖν. ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τοῦτο συνενήνοχεν,  
 35 οἷον ἱατρικὴ, κινήθεισα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικὴ  
 καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ μίαν  
 τούτων θετέον καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύ-  
 § 19 τὴν ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν. σημεῖον δ' ἂν γεγενέναι φαίη  
 τις ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων· τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν

27 τὸ <μὴ> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. || 30 γὰρ Spengel, δ' Γ Π Bk. || 32 μικρὰ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk.

legislation is not safe, but only specious to the ear,"—a curious confusion of metaphors.

24 ἔχει γὰρ κτλ] for it leads to false accusation and possibly to changes in the constitution (see *n.* on line 30 below). Informers would always claim to reveal facts highly useful to the state, as did the Roman delatores. ἂν τύχη=should it so happen; and so εἰ τύχοι, τυχόν, εἰ ἔτυχε.

26 ἄλλο πρόβλημα] another question. ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες? Can this have been in written works? SUSEM. (269)

§§ 16—25 *Is it expedient to alter the laws of a country in order to introduce improvements?*

With this interesting discussion compare *Rhet.* I. 15 §§ 4—12 (Spengel); also Plato *Polit.* 294 A—302.

28 τοὺς πατέριους νόμους] 'The ancestral laws' would include much that is unwritten: customs, institutions, those traditional practices of the society which serve as a basis (οἷον ἐρείσματα) to the written code, Plato *Laws* III 680 A οὐδὲ γὰρ γράμματα ἔστι πῶ, ἀλλ' ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις πατέρισι νόμοις ἐπόμενοι ζῶσι. Comp. *Laws* VII 793 B—D: see *n.* (48) on I. 6. 1, and II. 5 § 5, § 15.

§ 17 29 τῷ λεχθέντι=the proposal of Hippodamos.

εἴπερ μὴ συμφέρει κινεῖν] "in case it

turns out to be inexpedient": i.e. if on the wider question we decide against change.

30 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κτλ] "Some may propose the repeal of the laws or the constitution as a public benefit." When thus distinguished from πολιτεία, νόμοι=the code of positive law. The revolution of the Four Hundred, it will be remembered, was effected by the suspension, in legal form, of the γραφὴ παρανόμων, the great safeguard against the subversion of the Athenian constitution.

32 διαστείλασθαι=enter into detail. It is used in *Topics* V. 3. 8, 131 b 15, 17, as synonymous with διορίσασθαι. Cp. Pl. *Rep.* VII 535 B ποῖα δὴ διαστέλλει;

§ 18 33 βέλτιον τὸ κινεῖν] This view is maintained §§ 18—22.

34 ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων κτλ] Cp. III. 15. 4, *n.* (638) medicine in Egypt; 16 §§ 7, 8: IV(VII). 2 § 13 *n.* (726); 13 § 2 *n.* (870): III. 6 § 7 *n.* (531). SUSEM. (270)

36 μίαν.....37 πολιτικὴν] It is Aristotle's invariable practice to rank Politics with the "arts and faculties": e.g. VI(IV). 1 §§ 1—3, *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 1.

§§ 19, 20 A most valuable line of inquiry. We could wish he had noted down a few more of these antiquated usages.

40 ἀπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικούς. ἐσιδηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ οἱ Ἑλ-  
 20 ληνες, καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἑωνούντο παρ' ἀλλήλων, ὅσα τε  
 λοιπὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐστὶ που νομίμων, εὐήθη πάμπαν ἐστίν,  
 οἷον ἐν Κύμῃ περὶ τὰ φονικά νόμος ἐστίν, ἂν πλῆθος

40 ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο τε γὰρ P<sup>1-3</sup>, ἐσιδηροφορουντοὶ γὰρ P<sup>2</sup>, ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο τε γὰρ P<sup>4</sup>, ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο γὰρ Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, ἐσιδηροφόρουν τότε γὰρ Bas.<sup>1</sup>, ἐσιδηροφόρουν τε γὰρ Koraes, ἐσιδηροφόρουν γὰρ τότε Susem.<sup>1</sup> misled by William's version; see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1371

1269 a 1 κόμη Γ Μ'

40 ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο] Thuc. 1. 5 § 3 τὸ τε σιδηροφορεῖσθαι τούτοις τοῖς ἡπειρώται ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ληστείας ἐμμελέηντι: 6 § 1 πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐσιδηροφόροι, οἳ τὰ ἀφροδίσια τε ἀλάττει καὶ αἰεὶ ἀσφαλεῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἐφίχοντο, καὶ ἐνέφθη τῶν δαίτασιν μετ' ἄλλων ἐπαιφάμενοι (J. G. Schneider). SUSEM. (270 b)

41 τὰς γυναῖκας ἑωνούντο] The suitor purchased the daughter of her father by means of presents (ἑδνα): see Schömann *Groß Antiquitäten* 1. 33 [Eng. trans. by Mann and Hanly p. 48 ff.]. Schneider compares marriage by *compensatio* among the Romans. SUSEM. (271)

There is a valuable note on the ἑδνα or *deidna-prize* in the English translation of the *Odyssey* by Butcher and Lang. "The ἑδνα in Homer are invariably gifts made by the winners to the father or kinsmen of the bride, that is, the bride-price, the *dotum* of the dwellers on the Volga. . . The father of the bride was thus said ἐδενασθαι θύγατρα (*Od.* II. 33), to accept certain ἑδνα as the price for his daughter,—what is called 'coming to terms about the marriage' in *Il.* XIII. 381 (ἄφρα σινώμεθα... ἀμφὶ γάμῳ). As a rule the woman would go to the highest bidder, but in the case of a favoured wooer it seems to have been not unusual either to remit the price and give the bride *deideben* (cp. Agamemnon's offer to Achilles, *Il.* IX. 145), or to return a portion of the ἑδνα after marriage (*Od.* I. 375, II. 196), as is still the custom among the Kanakas in New Caledonia." Homer also mentions gifts from the winners to the bride, and μελίσια, gifts from the bride's father to his daughter: but φερῆ, the later word for dowry, does not occur. Even in Pindar ἑδνα is used in the sense of *phersē* (*Pind.* 5. 94). (Eaton compares Tac. *German.* 18; but that is the 'Morgengabe,' something quite different.)

§ 20 1269 a 1 οἷον ἐν Κύμῃ] This forcibly recalls compurgation, the established legal usage in ancient times in

England and amongst other Teutonic peoples. That the oath might thus be employed on behalf of the accuser is sufficiently attested, although cases where it is taken on behalf of the accused are usually mentioned. The Greek custom is confirmed by the inscription of Gortyn, column 11, lines 36—44. The law prescribed certain fines, the price to be paid for the ransom of an accused person charged with adultery and in the power of his captors. But he may plead that he was (wrongfully) seized by force: cp. [Demosth.] *c. Neaerami* § 66 1367, 10 ἀδικῶς ἐλθῆναι ὡς μαχέον. If so, the captor must support his charge by compurgators, whose number depends on the amount of the fine or ransom. (a) Four are necessary if the fine is 50, 100, or 200 staters: i.e. if the aggrieved husband is a full citizen. (β) Two are necessary if the aggrieved husband is an ἀπείρατος, i.e. free but not a full citizen: while (γ) if the aggrieved husband is a serf (οἰκέτης), the serf's lord (κύριος) and one other compurgator must appear. The fine for (γ) is 2½ staters, for (β) 10 or 20 staters. The Cretan text of the law runs thus: αἱ δὲ καὶ ποιοῦσι δολασθῆναι [i.e. εἰν δὲ φωνῇ δουλώσασθαι], οὐκ οἶσι τὸν εἰσῆναι τὸ πεντακονταστάτην [τὸ πεντακονταστάτην] καὶ πλῆθος πεντακονταστήν, ἑξ αὐτῶν [ἐαυτῶν] τεσσαρὶν ἐπαρμένων [ἐπαρμένων], τὸ δ' ἀπεταίρω [τὸ δ' ἀπεταίρω] ἑξακοντα αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ φαύκας τὸν πατέρα ἀπεταίρω αὐτῶν, μακίστη' εἰς [μακίστη' εἰς] δολασθῆναι δὲ με [με]. And if he shall plead that (the captor) overmastered him, the captor shall swear—in the case of the 50 staters or more, himself with four others, each imprecating on himself: in the case of a clanless man, himself with two others: in the case of a house-thrall, his lord with one other—(an oath) that he took him in adultery and overmastered him not. See Zitelmann in *Das Recht von Gortyn*, pp. 101—107; and Mr H. L. Koby *The Twelve Tables of Gortyn* in the

τι παράσχηται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τὸν φόνον τῶν αὐτοῦ (V)  
 § 21 συγγενῶν, ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τὸν φεύγοντα. ζητοῦσι δὲ  
 ὅλως οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἀλλὰ τὰγαθὸν πάντες· εἰκὸς τε τοὺς  
 5 πρῶτους, εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινος ἐσώθησαν,  
 ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους, ὥσπερ καὶ  
 λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν, ὥστε ἄτοπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς  
 τούτων δόγμασιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους ἔαν  
 § 22 ἀκινήτους βέλτιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, (p. 44)  
 10 καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατον ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφῆναι·  
 καθόλου γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον γράφειν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις περὶ τῶν 13  
 καθ' ἕκαστον εἰσίν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερόν ὅτι κινή-  
 τέοι καὶ τινὲς καὶ ποτὲ τῶν νόμων εἰσίν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον  
 § 23 ἐπισκοποῦσιν εὐλαβείας ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πολλῆς. ὅταν γὰρ  
 15 ἢ τὸ μὲν βέλτιον μικρόν, τὸ δ' ἐθίζειν εὐχερῶς λύειν τοὺς  
 νόμους φαῦλον, φανερόν ὡς ἐατέον ἐνίας ἀμαρτίας καὶ τῶν

6 ὁμοίως II<sup>1</sup> Ar. || 7 τὸ omitted in II<sup>3</sup> || 8 ἔαν Γ Ar. || 11 γραφῆναι  
 II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

*Law Quarterly Review* II. 1886. p. 142, who prefers the other rendering of δολοσαθ-  
 θαι 'beguiled,' as if from δολοῦν.

§ 21 5 εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν] It is well known that this was the popular view in Greece about the oldest inhabitants of a country, αὐτόχθονες; see Preller *Griech. Mythol.* I. 62 f. Plato makes use of it for his myth *Polit.* 271 ff., cp. *Symph.* 191 B f. In *De Gen. Anim.* III. II. 25, 762 b 28 Aristotle expresses grave doubts on the question whether such a so-called 'generatio aequivoca' should be assumed for men and quadrupeds as well as for lower forms: yet he goes on to inquire how it must be supposed to take place. SUSEM. (272)

εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινος ἐσ.] This agrees with the view explained in *n.* (167) on 5 § 16, and was much more Aristotle's real opinion, as it was the opinion of Plato *Timaeus* 22 C: πολλὰ καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ φθοραὶ γεγόνασιν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἔσονται, πυρὶ μὲν καὶ ὕδατι μέγιστα, μυρίοις δὲ ἄλλοις ἕτεροι βραχύτεροι: *Laus* III 677 A ff. πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονέναι κατακλυσμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχύ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος. SUSEM. (273)

6 ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ] "were much the same as the ordinary silly people" of today: cp. Vahlen *Beiträge* III. 314. οἱ

τυχόντες recurs in c. 9 § 23, 10 § 10, II § 3.

ὥσπερ καὶ λέγεται] Plato makes the same remark *Politicus* 274 B f.: αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρώποι καὶ ἀφύλακτοι γεγονότες διηρπάζοντο ὑπ' αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν θηρίων), καὶ ἔτ' ἀμύχανοι καὶ ἀτεχνοὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρῶτους ἦσαν χρόνους...ἐκ τούτων πάντων ἐν μεγάλαις ἦσαν ἀπορίαις. SUSEM. (274)

Cp. *Protag.* 321 C: man naked and defenceless before the introduction of the arts (Eaton).

8 οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους] Positive law as contrasted with the δόγματα and ἀγραφα νόμματα discussed in §§ 19—21. See VII(VI). 5. 2 τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους. The distinction is best explained by Cope *Introd. to Rhetoric* pp. 239—244.

§ 22 9 ὥσπερ γὰρ...12 καθ' ἕκαστον εἰσίν] See III. 16 § 11 with *n.* (652) f. and *n.* (637) on III. 15 § 4; also III. 11 § 19 *n.* (579): the ruler or rulers are supreme where the laws cannot prescribe exactly διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾶδιον εἶναι καθόλου διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. SUSEM. (275)

10 καὶ (περὶ) τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν] "So too in the political system it is impossible that all things should be prescribed in writing."

§ 23 A sound argument, quite in Bentham's spirit.

νομοθετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἀφελήσεται (V)  
κινήσας, ὅσον βλαβήσεται τοῖς ἀρχουσιν ἀπειθεῖν ἰδιωταῖς.

24 ψεύδους δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν· οἱ  
20 γὰρ ὅμοιον τὸ κινεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἰσχὺν  
οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο  
δ' οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὥστε τὸ βελτίως  
μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους  
25 καινοὺς ἀσθενῇ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν. ἔτι δὲ  
25 εἰ καὶ κινητέοι, πότερον πάντες καὶ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἢ  
οὐ; καὶ πότερον τῷ τυχόντι ἢ τισίν; ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχει μετρί-  
λην διαφοράν.

9 διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφῶμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν (ἄλλων γὰρ  
ἐστὶ καιρῶν)· περὶ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ τῆς VI  
30 Κρητικῆς, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν δύο

17 ἀφελήσεται τις M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ἀφελήσεται <ὁ> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> misled by the translations of William and Ar. || 18 βλαβήσεται ὁ Schneider || ἐπάρχουσιν Bernays, which I should unconditionally accept were it not for the addition of καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων after 17 νομοθετῶν || 21 παρὰ Π<sup>1</sup>, πλὴν corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>o-2</sup>, πλὴν παρὰ Π<sup>o</sup> Bk. || 22 οὐκ P<sup>o</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand altered by corr.<sup>2</sup>) || 25 καὶ before καινῶν omitted by ΓM<sup>1</sup>, [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || κινητέοι Π<sup>2</sup> || καὶ πάντες P<sup>2</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L.<sup>1</sup> Bk. || 28 δὲ... 1273 b 24 ἡσυχίας noticed by Michael of Ephesus

17 οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον κτλ] Comp. *Athen.* i. 13. 12 καὶ Λακεδαιμονίαι παρασοφισθαι εἰς ἱστρίαις (to outdo your doctoi); οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἀσπάρτα τοῦ ἱστρίαι δασι τοῦ ἰδίστου ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἀρχόντι; Thuc. iii. 37 χρεῖται νόμοις ἀσπάρτας χραισμεύειν πόλιν ἀρτίστων ἱστίαι (Lacton). Luc. *Deinde* 971 f. οὐ γὰρ ἀρτίστων νόμοι τοῦ νόμοις | γυγνώσκουσιν χρὴ καὶ μελέτας.

§ 24 19 ψεύδους δὲ κτλ] 'These remarks are very true. This is a difference between the sciences or arts and the laws. In the former only he who follows the science has to act and his action on an improved method proceeds from conviction; whereas, if the laws are altered, all must act according to the new law and though unconvinced of the need for alteration' (Schlosser). SUSEM. (276)

21 παρὰ τὸ ἔθος] 'has no force to secure obedience apart from habit.' The *Critical Notes* show how the 'accidental' reading, καὶ παρὰ, arose.

§ 25 24 ἐτι δὲ 27 διαφοράν] Plato's utterance *Legis* i. 634 D exactly agrees with this: ὁμοῖον μὲν γὰρ (Creteans and Lacedaemonians), εἴτε καὶ μεταβάλλουσιν τὰ τῶν νόμων, εἴ γὰρ ἀλλήλων

ἀν εἴη νόμων μὴ δεῖται τῶν νόμων καὶ ἔθους εἶναι, ποῖα καὶ αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ αὐτῶν ἔθους, ... γέγραπται δὲ ἐφ' οἷς τι ξινοῦσι τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν, πρὸς ἀρχόντι τε καὶ πρὸς ἱκανοῦσι καὶ πρὸς ἑταίροις νόμον ποιῶσθαι τοῖς τῶν νόμων ἀνθρώποις. Oncken, i. 252, strangely alleges this passage of the *Leges* as a proof of an author's design 'to strangle the healthy common sense of men in the name of political order.' SUSEM. (277)

28 νῦν μὲν ἀφῶμεν] See *Introd.* pp. 49, 53. SUSEM. (278)

This implies that the question has to be decided elsewhere in the treatise.

### c. 9 Examination of the Spartan polity.

See *Athen.* p. 106. Since Gortz's *Einleitung*, pp. 463—471 of his edition, this chapter has been most fully treated by Oncken, i. 248—299, ii. 317—375, who writes with especial reference to Gortz's memorable chapter on Lycurgus and, in vol. ii, to the later monographs by Traube *Lykurgos* and Gilbert *Stadion*. See p. 25 note 3. The fragments of the *Politeia* 1257 b 28—1260 a 28 should be compared. See also James *Les institutions politiques à Sparte*.

Handwritten note: *Handwritten note: ...*

εἰσὶν αἱ σκέψεις, μία μὲν εἴ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν (VI) ἀρίστην νενομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἑτέρα δ' εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας.

§ 2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν 2  
35 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολήν, ὁμολογούμενον ἐστίν·  
τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ ῥάδιον λαβεῖν. ἢ τε γὰρ Θετ-  
ταλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς, ὁμοίως  
δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκωσιν οἱ εἴλωτες (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδρεύοντες

33 <ἢ> ὑπεναντίως Scaliger, ὑπεναντίως <ἢ μὴ ὑπεναντίως> Susem. would prefer: but no alteration is needed || αὐτοῖς] αὐτῆς M<sup>s</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), αὐτῶ P<sup>1</sup>, αὐτῷ P<sup>4</sup> (corr.), αὐτῷ Ar. || 34 <πόλει> πολιτεύεσθαι? Madvig || 37 πενεστία M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>4</sup> and P<sup>2,3</sup> (1st hand, altered by corr.<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> and a later hand in P<sup>3</sup>) || 38 οἱ omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> L<sup>s</sup>, [οἱ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

§ 1 31 μία μὲν κτλ] The two points to consider are (1) its absolute, (2) its relative success: "whether its legislation is good or bad in relation to the best system; secondly, whether it is inconsistent with the fundamental assumption and scheme of the constitution proposed," πρὸς=when judged by a given standard.

32 εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν... ὑπεναντίως] sc. νενομοθέτηται. So § 18 ὑπεναντίως δὲ... πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν.

The Helots or Serfs: §§ 2—4.

§ 2 34 ὅτι μὲν οὖν... 35 ὁμολογούμενον ἐστίν] Here we are allowed a very important glimpse of the nature of Aristotle's own ideal state. Cp. also *n.* (192) on 6 § 5; c. II § 10 *n.* (393); IV(VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 8; 10 § 9 with *n.* (813), and *Introd.* p. 22 *n.* (3). SUSEM. (279)

35 τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν] leisure free from imposed labour: I. 7. 3, II. 6. 5.

36 τε followed by 38 δέ.

ἢ τε γὰρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία κτλ] Compare 5 § 22 *n.* (178). Wherever in Greece bodies of serfs stood midway between freedom and slavery, it is well known that the relation invariably arose in consequence of a subjugation of the earlier inhabitants by victorious invaders. Thus the earlier inhabitants of Laconia obtained the freer lot of Provincials (Περίοικοι) or else were forced into a dependent position of this kind as Helots according as they submitted to the Spartans earlier or later, more or less easily, of their own free will or by compulsion. See Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* I p. 191—194, Eng. tr., to whose account of the Helots p. 194—200 it is sufficient to refer (comp. however Gilbert *Studien* p. 76 ff.). The Penestae

were the descendants of that part of the old population of the country occupied by the invading Thessalians, which, instead of emigrating, made a friendly agreement with the conquerors and concluded a treaty, by which for a fixed rent they remained tenants of the land they had formerly possessed and were under obligation to furnish military service, but were not to be sold or driven out of the country or put to death. See Schömann, p. 132, Eng. tr. The authorities quoted by J. G. Schneider are Archemachos *Fr.* I, from Athenaeus VI. 264 A: Βοιωτῶν τῶν τὴν Ἀρναίαν κατοικησάντων οἱ μὴ ἀπάραντες εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν, ἀλλ' ἐμφιλοχωρήσαντες παρέδωκαν ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς Θετταλοῖς δουλεῖν καθ' ὁμολογίας, ἐφ' ᾧ οὔτε ἐξάξουσιν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς χώρας, οὔτε ἀποκτενοῦσιν· αὐτοὶ δὲ τὴν χώραν ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς συντάξεις ἀποδώσουσιν· οὔτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογίας καταμείναντες καὶ παραδόντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐκλήθησαν τότε μενέσται, νῦν δὲ πενέσται; and Theopompus *Fr.* 134 in Ath. VI. 265 B, C: Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Θετταλοὶ φανήσονται κατασκευασμένοι τὴν δουλείαν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν οἰκούντων πρότερον τὴν χώραν, ἣν ἐκείνοι νῦν ἔχουσιν, οἱ μὲν Ἀχαιῶν, Θετταλοὶ δὲ Περγαίων καὶ Μαγνήτων καὶ προσηγόρευσαν τοὺς καταδουλωθέντας οἱ μὲν εἴλωτας οἱ δὲ πενέστας. On the similar relation between the Mariandynians and the people of Heracleia see *n.* (777) on IV(VII). 6 § 8. SUSEM. (280) Plato compares Helots, Penestae and Mariandynians *Laus* VI 776 C, D.

38 ἐφεδρεύοντες] always in wait to pounce upon their misfortunes: Thuc. IV. 80 αἰετὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς τοὺς εἴλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς περί μάλιστα καθεστῆκει.

§ 3 τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσιν)· περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας οὐδὲν  
 40 πῶ τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν. αἴτιον δ' ἴσως τὸ τὰς γειτνιάσας  
 πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμούσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμ-  
 μαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ αὐταῖς  
 κεκτημέναις περιοίκους, τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γειτνιῶντες  
 ἐχθροὶ πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Ἀρκάδες·  
 5 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς Θετταλοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀφίσταντο διὰ τὸ  
 πολεμεῖν ἐτι τοῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Περραιβοῖς καὶ  
 § 4 Μάγνησιν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴδὲν ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ γε τῆς  
 ἐπιμελείας ἐργῶδες εἶναι, τίνα δὲ πρὸς αὐτοῖς ὀμιλῆσαι  
 τρόπον· ἀνιέμενοί τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ τῶν ἰσῶν ἀξιοῦσιν  
 10 ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες ἐπιβουλεύουσιν  
 καὶ μισοῦσιν. δῆλον <δ> οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐξευρίσκουσι τὸν βέλτιστον  
 § 5 τρόπον, οἷς τοῦτο συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν ἀλωτείαν. ἐτι δὲ  
 περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀνεσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πο-

1269 b 3 *περὶ οἴκους* M<sup>a</sup> and apparently P (*fructus circa domus* William) | 5 *ἀφίσταντο* Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin | 6 *περραιβοῖς* P<sup>2</sup> Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup> | 9 *ἀπομύνη* Trieber (perhaps rightly) | 10 *κακοπαθοῦντες* P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, perhaps rightly). γα. κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup> in the margin | 11 <δ> οὖν or γὰρ Sussem., οὖν P<sup>2</sup> H. Ar. Bk. | 12 *ἐτι*...1270 a 8 *πάλιν*] Plut. *Lyk.* 14 quotes similar statements from Aristotle, but, as Heitz (*Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles* p. 30) rightly judges, from his *Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία*

§ 3 40 αἴτιον δ' ἴσως] It might be thought that one very material reason was the much freer and less oppressed position which, according to Aristotle's own evidences § 19 n. (171), the Cretans granted to their dependants (Oncken). Compare also c. 10 § 3 n. (355), § 5 (357), § 8 (364), § 16 (374). SUSSEM. (281)

1269 b 3 περιοίκους] See c. 10 § 3 and Exc. III.

5 τοῖς Θετταλοῖς ἀφίσταντο *incognitum*. ἀφίσταντο *sc. α. πολεῖται*.

§ 4 7 τὸ γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας κτλ] "the task of attending to this; how, namely, we ought to associate with them"—the sentence *τὸν δὲ ἐργῶδες εἶναι* being dependent on the noun *ἐπιμελείας*, just as in IV(VII), 16. 1 *πῶτε χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλωτείαν* is dependent on *ἀλωτείας*. We may render: "It would seem too that apart from everything else there is the irksome task of seeing that we behave to them as we ought: for when allowed their freedom, they grow insolent and claim equal rights with their lords: if treated harshly, they plot revenge and

cherish hatred."

11 δῆλον κτλ] The truth of this remark no one will wish to question. But does Aristotle really know of a remedy? He hopes to get over the difficulty in his own 'best state' by taking men of non-Hellenic race to till the soil, slaves or serfs, if possible; failing this, dependent freemen of different nations but only of the gentler races: IV(VII), 10 §§ 13, 14, n. (840); cp. IV(VII), 8 § 8 (813), and n. (364) with Exc. III. Supposing all this could be so fortunately arranged, would it have been any real remedy? SUSSEM. (282)

*The women of Sparta*: §§ 5—12.

§ 5 13 ἔπερὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀνεσις] So Plato speaks *Leges* I 637 c *ἀνεσις τῇ τῶν γυναικῶν τέρ' αὐτῆς ἀνεσσι*, and Euripides *Androm.* 194 *οὐδ' ἔρ' αὖ βελ- λυρόν τι | πάμπαν γένετο Σπαρτιατικὸς ὄλες* (Eaton). SUSSEM. (268)

πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας] "judged by the intention of the constitution," the second point of view for criticism as mentioned in § 1. The other, the standard of the best constitution, is here

λιτείας βλαβερά καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. ὥσπερ γὰρ (VI)  
 15 οἰκίας μέρος ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνή, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πόλιν ἐγγὺς  
 τοῦ δίχα διηρῆσθαι δεῖ νομίζειν εἰς τε τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν πλη-  
 θος καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὥστε ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις φάυλως  
 ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς πόλεως δεῖ νομί-  
 § 6 ζεῖν εἶναι ἀνομοθέτητον. ὅπερ ἐκεῖ συμβέβηκεν ὅλην γὰρ  
 20 τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι βουλόμενος καρτερικὴν, κατὰ  
 μὲν τοὺς ἀνδρας τοιοῦτος ἐστίν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν  
 ἐξημέληκεν· ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀκολασίαν  
 § 7 καὶ τρυφερῶς. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ 6  
 τιμᾶσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τυχῶσι γυναικοκρα-  
 25 τούμενοι, καθάπερ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ πολε-  
 μικῶν γενῶν, ἔξω Κελτῶν ἢ καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι φανερώς

14 εὐνομίαν P<sup>4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ar. Ald., corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>2-3</sup> and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin (wrongly) ||  
 15 [ἀνὴρ καὶ] Oncken || 16 εἰς τε] ὥστε M<sup>s</sup> and, with εἰς τε written over it, Γ  
 apparently || 18 δεῖ νομίζειν after 19 εἶναι P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 21 τοιοῦτος ἐστίν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>,  
 φανερός ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος ὢν Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. perhaps rightly, φανερός ἐστὶ τοῦτου τυχῶν Bender  
 || 24 τυγχάνωσι. Ald. and corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>2-3</sup>, τύχῳσι καὶ M<sup>s</sup> || 26 [ἦ] Schneider ||  
 φανερώς omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin); [φανερώς]  
 Susem.<sup>1</sup>

called the Wellbeing or Happiness (εὐδαι-  
 μονία) of the state (Congreve). This  
 then, and not εὐνομίαν, is the right read-  
 ing. For the best constitution is pre-  
 cisely that which most contributes to the  
 'best life' or Happiness. See I § I n.  
 (128): I. 2 § 8 n. (21); and especially III.  
 18 § I n. (683), IV(VII). I § I (685), § 2  
 (687), § II: 2 § 2, § 5 (714), 9 § 3 f.  
 (806), 13 § 3. SUSEM. (284)

15 οἰκίας μέρος] So I. 3 § I, 4 § I,  
 13 § 15.

καὶ πόλιν...νομίζειν] "one must regard  
 the state as nearly divided into two."  
 But the construction is not plain: is it  
 ἐγγὺς<οὔσαν> τοῦ δίχα διηρῆσθαι? This  
 would be supported by VI(IV). 6. II;  
 VIII(V). I. 16, where ἐγγὺς is almost an  
 adjective. Or it might also be νομίζειν  
 διηρῆσθαι ἐγγὺς τοῦ δίχα<διηρῆσθαι>.

16 From Euclid *Elem.* I. 10, I. 9,  
 III. 30 it is seen that δίχα διαιρεῖν=to  
 divide into two *equal* parts. Cp. *Nic.*  
*Eth.* v. 4. 8 with Jackson's note.

17 ὥστε ἐν ὅσαις κτλ] From this it  
 is seen, as indeed before from I. 13 § 16  
 nn. (126) (127), that Aristotle intended to  
 introduce into his ideal state a public edu-  
 cation and training for women, although  
 this education was certainly not to be

common to boys and girls. Cp. *Introd.*  
 pp. 49, 52 (2). In the *Latus* VI 781 B  
 Plato had expressed himself still more  
 forcibly: οὐ γὰρ ἡμισυ μόνον ἐστίν, ὡς  
 δόξειεν ἂν, τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀκοσμήτως  
 περιορώμενον, ὅσῳ δὲ ἡ θήλεια ἡμῖν φύσις  
 ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χείρων τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων,  
 τοσοῦτος διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ πλεῖν ἢ διπλάσιον  
 εἶναι. Aristotle however says quite the  
 same thing *Rhet.* I. 5. 6 1361 a 10 ff., ὅσοις  
 γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φάυλα ὥσπερ Λακε-  
 δαιμονίοις, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ οὐκ εὐδαι-  
 μονοῦσιν (quoted by Eaton). SUSEM.  
 (285)

§ 6 20 καρτερικὴν] of hardy endu-  
 rance.

22 ἐξημέληκεν] has disregarded his  
 aim. This picture of luxurious living is  
 indirectly confirmed by Plato *Rep.* VIII.  
 548 A, B; ἐπιθυμηταὶ δὲ γε χρημάτων οἱ  
 τοιοῦτοι ἅτε κεκτημένοι ταμεία καὶ οἰκίους  
 θησαυρούς, καὶ αὖ περιβόλους οἰκῆσεων  
 ἀτεχνῶς νεοπτιὰς ἰδίας, ἐν αἷς ἀναλίσκοντες  
 γυναῖξιν πολλὰ ἂν δαπανῶντο: cp. 550 D.

§ 7 23 ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον] Wealth  
 must needs be in esteem, because the  
 unbridled luxury of women is a very  
 costly business. SUSEM. (286)

26 Κελτῶν] See *Note on the Celts*  
 at the end of B. II. SUSEM. (287)

18 τετιμήκασι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας συνουσίαν. εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ  
 ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συζεύξαι τὸν Ἄρην  
 πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρένων ὁμιλίαν  
 30 ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνονται κατακῶχιμοι πάντες  
 οἱ τοιοῦτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Λάκωσι τοῦθ' ἐπὶ ἤρχιν, καὶ πολλὰ  
 19 διρκεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. καί τινες

28 πρῶτος M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly  
 M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

18 28 ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος] Aristotle imagines that myths, like laws and customs, *μη.* (296) (300) on § 12, § 14, are direct inventions of individuals, who consciously intended by means of them to represent to sense certain ideas and thoughts. Cp. also v (VIII). 6 § 13 *n.* 1078. SUSEM. (288)

29 ἢ γὰρ κτλ] 'In his assertion, that martial races are also the most amorous, Aristotle is supported by the views of modern anthropologists' (Fülleborn). SUSEM. (289)

30 κατακῶχιμοι] easily captivated, with ἐπὶ v (VIII). 7. 4. with *de Nic. Eth.* 8. 9. 31 with *πρὸς* one might say "easily allured to."

31 διὸ παρὰ κτλ] Schömann *Anthologies of Greece* p. 268 Eng. tr. is certainly right in saying that the social position and influence of women in Sparta was not higher than it is amongst the modern peoples of the west, and that the prevailing condition of things with us in this respect would have appeared to an Athenian of the best time to be a species of feminine rule (*γυναικραρχία*), although it does not at all alienate our women from their natural and most appropriate calling of housewives and mothers. But this does not thoroughly answer the question proposed by J. G. Schœdler (see *n.* 293 b) and by Oncken: whether true womanliness can have thriven under so rough a treatment of the marriage relation as was customary at Sparta: whether a family life and true domesticity could be found when the Spartan full-citizen was, as a matter of fact, banished from the family, lived continually with his comrades in arms, ate at the public table, slept in a tent, and only paid stolen visits to his wife; where consequently the household was without a head, the wife without a home of common duty and mutual improvement, where parental duty was removed and the natural field for the wife's activity abolished. If

in the latter respect Aristotle mistook the cause of the evil (as his retention of common messes for the men and his excessive public education prove), does this justify us in assuming that his description of the evil itself is wholly incorrect? In reference to the last question, if it was nothing unusual at Sparta to hand over one's wife to another, if, as Schömann himself thinks, *op. c.* p. 267, a Spartan woman, to whom proposals were made by another man, hardly felt herself insulted by them but referred the issue to her husband, then (as Fülleborn and Schömann after him have remarked) the boast of the Spartans, that adultery was never heard of amongst them, does not amount to much: adultery here only means an intrigue with another man without the husband's permission. The further boast of the Spartan women, that they were in an especial degree good housewives (Schömann *op. c.* p. 268), must accordingly be reduced to its proper dimensions. Plato however connects (*Lysis* VII 805 E f.) that though the Spartan women did not weave and spin, occupations which they left to their female slaves, they yet led an active life: since they had nearly half the responsibility for the management of the household and the education of the children. Certainly there is some exaggeration in the charges of license and love of power brought against them, and this must be moderated from the above points of view: but it is quite as certain that they are not all pure inventions. Oncken refers his readers to the proof given by him *Hellas and Athens* II. 83. Cp. *Introd.* p. 36 n. (1). SUSEM. (290)

32 ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς] during their supremacy. Cp. § 10 *n.* (192): νικητὴς 5. 13 ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀρχῆς. § 14 ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων; and *The Gladiolus* 111. 2 § 7, 300 b 30, ἐπὶ τῆς πολέμου, during the reign of Ison.

τί διαφέρει γυναίκας ἄρχειν ἢ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὑπὸ τῶν (VI)  
 γυναικῶν ἄρχεσθαι; ταῦτ' οὖν γὰρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δ' οὐ- (p. 46)  
 35 σης τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδέν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ' εἴπερ,  
 πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλαβερώταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθ' αἱ τῶν  
 § 10 Λακωνῶν ἦσαν. ἐδήλωσαν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς  
 χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἦσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐτέραις πόλεσιν,  
 θόρυβον δὲ παρείχον πλείω τῶν πολεμίων. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν 8  
 40 οὖν ἔοικε συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Λάκωσιν εὐλόγως ἢ τῶν γυ-  
 § 11 ναικῶν ἄνεσις. ἔξω γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας  
 1270 a ἀπεξενούντο πολὺν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τὸν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους  
 πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσσηνίους·  
 σχολάσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς μὲν παρείχον τῷ νομοθέτῃ προωδο-

35 εἴπερ Π Bk.; ἤπερ Sylburg Susem.<sup>1</sup> misled by William's version *nisi ad bellum*  
 || 36 τοῦθ'] τοῦτον Spengel

1270 a 1 τῆς οἰκείας (οἰκίας ? Γ Ar.) omitted by M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), added by P<sup>1</sup>  
 in the margin || 4 προωδοπεποιημένους Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> by a misprint (corrected by  
 Bender)

§ 9 35 τῶν ἐγκυκλίων] See § 4 n.  
 and I. 7 § 2. SUSEM. (291)

§ 10 37 ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς]  
 'at the time of the Theban invasion'  
 under Epameinondas 369 B.C. SUSEM.  
 (292)

38 χρήσιμοι κτλ] "For they were  
 of no use, any more than the women in  
 other cities, but they caused more con-  
 fusion than the enemy." It is significant  
 that the encomiasts of Sparta, Xenophon  
 (*Hellen.* VI. 5 28 αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες οὐδὲ τὸν  
 καπνὸν ὀρώσαι ἠνείχοντο, ἅτε οὐδέποτε  
 ἰδοῦσαι πολεμίους) and Plutarch (*Ages.* 31  
 καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν οὐ δυναμένων ἡσυχάζειν,  
 ἀλλὰ παντάπασιν ἐκφρόνων οὐσῶν πρὸς τε  
 τὴν κραυγὴν καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῶν πολεμίων)  
 speak much more strongly on this point.  
 Oncken observes quite rightly, that this  
 was the first opportunity the Spartan  
 women had for putting into practice the  
 brave speeches they had been making for  
 centuries; they might at least have dis-  
 played a quiet bearing, even if they were  
 not to be taken at their word. SUSEM. (293)

Bernays renders: 'although the women  
 in other cities are of use' [on such occa-  
 sions]. But is it so? The *Septem* of  
 Aeschylus scarcely bears this out.

Plato must allude to this, *Laws* 806 B.

§ 11 1270 a 1 ἔξω γὰρ κτλ] Accord-  
 ing to Plutarch *Lycurg.* I, in his account  
 of the constitution of Sparta Aristotle  
 placed Lycurgus apparently no earlier  
 than the time of Iphitos, about the begin-

ning of the era of the Olympiads, 776 B.C.  
 (J. G. Schneider). See this passage  
 among the *Fragments* 490, 1558 a 13,  
 Rose=485 in Rose *Aristot. pseudop.*=76  
 Müller. Further compare especially Gil-  
 bert *Studien* 72 ff. 158 ff. SUSEM. (294)

The passage is as follows: οἱ μὲν γὰρ  
 Ἰφίτῳ συνακμάσαι καὶ συνδιαθεῖναι τὴν  
 Ὀλυμπιακὴν ἐκεχειρίαν λέγουσιν αὐτόν, ὧν  
 ἔστι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τεκμήριον προσφέρων  
 τὸν Ὀλυμπίασι δίσκον ἐν ᾧ τοῦνομα τοῦ  
 Λυκούργου διασώζεται καταγεγραμμένον.  
 E. Curtius, *History* Eng. tr. I. p. 191,  
 adopts this date. Even so, there would  
 be a grave chronological difficulty if  
 these Arcadian wars be supposed to pre-  
 cede Lycurgus. The first Messenian war  
 is dated 743—723 B.C. But as to the  
 main fact Aristotle is correct. A long  
 period of camp-life, of war in which the  
 Spartans lived perpetually in the field,  
 must have preceded the complete estab-  
 lishment of the system and the institu-  
 tions which are referred to the Lycurgean  
 legislation\*. Such a period we find in  
 the tedious and difficult conquest of La-  
 conia by its Dorian invaders.

4 προωδοπεποιημένους] Note the dou-  
 ble formation of perfect.

\* I entirely agree with Wilamowitz *Homer-  
 ische Untersuchungen*, Berlin 1884, p. 267 ff., that  
 Lycurgus is only a mythical person, and that the  
 supposed Lycurgean legislation never had an  
 existence; and I also regard the account which  
 he gives of the real state of things as altogether  
 correct. SUSEM.

πεποιημένους διὰ τὸν στρωματωτικὸν βίον (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχον) μέρη τῆς ἀρετῆς, τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας φασὶ μὲν ἄγαν ἐπιχειρῆσαι τὸν Λυκούργον ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς δ' ἀντέκρουον, ἀποσπῆναι πάλιν. αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἵται τῶν γενομένων, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τίμη δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυ-

7 ἐπὶ] ἐπὶ? Koraces § 8 γενομένων M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> | 11 τοῦ] τὰ (Q<sup>1</sup> T<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> in hand), γρ. τοῦ P<sup>1</sup> in the margin

5 πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει μέρη κτλ] Cp. Plato *Λαίω* i. 630 E οὐχ ὡς πρὸς ἀρετῆς τι μόριον καὶ ταῦτα τὸ φαυλότατον ἐτίθει [ὁ Λυκούργος] βλῆσαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίᾳ; Thuc. I. 84. 3 πολεμικοὶ τε καὶ εἰρηστικοὶ διὰ τὸ εὐκόσμον γιγνόμεθα: V. 66. 4 (Eaton). SUSEM. (294 b)

6 φασὶ] As to whether this is an anonymous quotation from Ephorus, or an appeal to oral tradition, see *Introd.* p. 35 n. (3). Cp. also below n. (310) on § 7. SUSEM. (295)

7 ὡς δ' ἀντέκρουον κτλ] Precisely so Plato *Λαίω* vi. 781 A τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας οὐδ' αὖτε ὁρθῶς ἀπομαρτυροῦνται μάλιστα. . . ἀλλ' ὁ καὶ ἄλλως γένει ὅπως τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαθραιότερον μάλιστα καὶ ἐπιλαττότερον ἔφο, τὸ θῆλυ, διὰ τὸ ἀσθενέ, ὡς ὁρθῶς ταῦτα εἰς ἀκρίαν τοῦ νομοθέτου δόξαντες ὁρᾶν οὐκ ἀφίει. This Plutarch must have forgotten, when (*Lycourg.* 14) he attacks Aristotle alone on account of this same remark and tries to refute him. The facts which he adduces with this object prove simply nothing: but directly afterwards (c. 13) he gives a detailed account of the Spartan custom of lending wives, and this does not make the assertion, which he appends to it, very credible: τίς ταῦτα δὲ ἄνθρωποι πρᾶττόμενα φυσικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς τότε τῷ σοφῶν ἀπέειχε τῆς ὕστερον λεγομένης γενέσθαι περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας εὐχερείας, ὥστε ὅλως ἀπίστον εἶναι τὸ τῆς μοιχείας παρ' αὐτοῖς. Even he does not venture to deny the subsequent laxity of the women at Sparta. (J. G. Schneider.) SUSEM. (295 b)

§ 12 § "These then are the causes of the events which happened and therefore clearly of this mistake: but the question before us is not who is, or is not, excusable; but whether as a matter of fact (a legislator) is right or wrong."

9 ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς . . . ὀρθῶς] Thus Aristotle is not unaware that the author of a code or a constitution is by no means able to proceed simply at his own good

pleasure, but is tied down to the given circumstances: cp. § 22 n. (311), 11 § 3 (409); VI (IV). 1 § 3 ff. n. (1116), c. 6, 11 §§ 7, 8, 12 § 1 ff.: VII (V). c. 4. It is only in case these circumstances are highly favourable that he considers his own best constitution possible. But this is still a long way off the knowledge that a nation's constitution and code of laws are in general the product *primarily* of its individuality and history, and only *secondarily* of the legislator's wisdom or unwisdom. Nor does Aristotle omit forthwith to mark precisely the spirit of his own examination in that 'he never purposes to account for the constitution by the circumstances under which it arose, or to fathom the necessities which confronted the legislator. Instead of this, Lycurgus, who left behind him an actual state, is treated like Plato who constructed an imaginary state. Aristotle's criticism neither is nor claims to be historical criticism in our sense of the term, which is more concerned to explain the connexion of the facts than to award praise or blame. He is as one-sided in pointing out the defects of that political structure as the admirers of its excellences had been in earlier times and continued to be later on. Nor could it have been otherwise: for neither he nor they had the requisite historical data for appreciating the personal responsibility of Lycurgus.' Nor have we even now — assuming that we still retain our belief in the existence of such a person as Lycurgus. Moreover in spite of his recognition of the force of circumstances Aristotle shares with Plato 'and all the political theorists of Greece the belief in the omnipotence of positive legislation, as if mighty historical developments which are not of today or yesterday could be simply swept out of the world by a command or prohibition. Besides, he makes Lycurgus responsible for things for which we leg-

ναίκας ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον, (VI)  
οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς καθ'  
αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαι τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν.  
15 \* \*. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν 10  
§ 14 τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμήσειεν ἂν τις. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν συμ-  
βέβηκε κεκτῆσθαι πολλὴν λῖαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ πᾶμπαν  
μικράν· διόπερ εἰς ὀλίγους ἦκεν ἡ χώρα. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ διὰ  
τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως· ὠνεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἢ πωλεῖν  
20 τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν, ὀρθῶς ποιήσας, διδό-

12 ἔοικεν omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 13 αὐτήν M<sup>s</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk., αὐτὰ Ar. || 14 αὐτὰ Ar. ||  
ἀλλὰ <καὶ> Koraes || 15 \* \* μετὰ γὰρ Susem., see Comm.; μετὰ δὲ Zwinger ||  
17 λῖαν omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || τοῖς] τὸν M<sup>s</sup>, τῶν P<sup>1</sup> || 18 ἦκει ? Congreve || 19  
τὸν νόμον M<sup>s</sup> and perhaps Ar. || 20 οὐκ before ἐποίησεν inserted by Π<sup>1</sup> (erased  
by corr. P<sup>1</sup>), οὐσίαν ? Bender

lator can be responsible, and he partly blames him for effects of certain laws, when the *effects* could not be imputed to him even if the laws in question had really been his own work, and that in the sense in which Aristotle attributes them to him' (Oncken). Cp. also *n.* (82) on I. 9 § 8: *n.* (238) on II. 7 § 8; Exc. II on Bk. II; *n.* (339) on § 30 below; (466) on III. 3 § 9; (552) on III. 9 § 8: II. 5 § 8 *n.* (160): IV(VII). I4 § 16 (916). Even that which rests on no express command or prohibition, but simply on the force of popular custom, that is, the so-called 'unwritten law' (cp. *n.* 48 on I. 6. I and Exc. II to Bk. II), is directly attributed by Aristotle, as by Plato, to the authorship of a definite individual lawgiver: this is especially clear from § 14 below, see *n.* (300). Exactly similar is his assumption of a first founder of the state: I. 2 § 15, ὁ πρῶτος συστήσας, *n.* (28 b): or his judgment as to the origin of the conceptions of popular mythology, § 8 above, ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος, *n.* (288).

'In spite of these undeniable weaknesses the whole chapter may lay claim to a full measure of authority, as much as any other of Aristotle's historical statements. It is its merit to have most acutely corrected the aberration from sound intelligence revealed in the adoration paid to the Spartan state, and here also to have confronted romance with criticism' (Oncken). SUSEM. (296)

12 καὶ πρότερον] § 5 ff., see *m.* 284—286. SUSEM. (297)

*The land question and the decline of population: §§ 13—19.*

§ 13 15 μετὰ γὰρ κτλ] Possibly we should alter γὰρ into δέ, as Zwinger proposed, and not assume a lacuna; since as a matter of fact no proof is needed to show why license amongst the women tends to increase the love of wealth: every one can easily imagine the reason for himself. Nor was a reason stated in § 7; the passage where this was touched upon above (καὶ πρότερον, see last *n.*), which is referred to in § 13, see *n.* (286). Yet it may equally have been omitted there in order to be introduced here, when the subject comes up for further discussion: this may have been followed by a transition to the relations of property generally amongst the Spartans, in the form of a remark, to which the passage μετὰ γὰρ κτλ served as reason or explanation. This much is certain that these words are not at present related to what precedes either as reason or as explanation, and if no lacuna be assumed the γὰρ of the text is an inconsistency. SUSEM. (298)

§ 14 16 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. VIII(v). 7 § 10 ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσὶαι ἔρχονται *n.* (1603). SUSEM. (298 b)

20 ἐποίησεν sc. Lycurgus. The name is not mentioned, but this is the only subject which can be understood (from § 11). From this then it follows that Aristotle was not as yet acquainted with the famous story according to which a certain Epitadeus carried the law which allowed the family estate to be given

ναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ἔξουσίαν ἔδωκε τοῖς βουλευμένοι. (22)  
καίτοι ταῦτ' οὐ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνως τε καὶ οὕτως.  
15 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χάρις τὰς  
14 πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων πολλὰν γινομένην.

21 καταλιπεῖν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> | 22 ταῦτ' P<sup>1</sup>, ταῦτα H<sup>1</sup> Bl.<sup>1</sup> | 23 ἐστὶ] ἐν Bender very temptingly, yet ἐστὶ would then be required after τὰς πέντε μερῶν | 24 Susem.<sup>1</sup> wrongly, see Comm. | καὶ omitted by H<sup>1</sup>, [ca.] Susem.<sup>1</sup>: if we read ἐν with Bender, it is not needed | 24 γινομένην Koraes

away or freely disposed of by will: Plutarch *Agis* 4, cp. Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 216 Eng. tr. As far as he knew, this had never been prohibited. Should we expect later writers to be really better informed? Or would it not be as well to consign the said story to the great lumber-room of historical fable which Greek antiquity has bequeathed to us so richly furnished? See further the next note. SUSEM. (299)

ἰσχύουσιν οὐ καλόν] Aristotle implies that Lycurgus never expressly prohibited, by a declaration of illegality and a penalty, the sale of the old plot of ground or the purchase of a new one. When translated into our mode of thought and expression this means that the force of usage and custom was against the practice: it was held dishonourable to sell. 'With this agrees the omission of Sparta, 8 § 6, from the list of states where alienation or enlargement of the inherited estate was prohibited by law' (Usener), as one means of restoring, in a certain sense, equality of possessions: comp. u. (127). (This decisive circumstance was quite overlooked by Gilbert.) Is it not then a fair inference that Aristotle was also unaware of any equal division of property amongst the Spartans, whether by Lycurgus or any one else, with the design that this equality should be perpetual? (This last is the only point here in question with Aristotle.) Otherwise, since such a division amongst those who are actual citizens was also his own ideal, IV(VII), 10 § 9—12 u. (1212)—cp. u. on II. 6 § 2 (102), § 12 (1214)—would he not have expressly appealed to the authority of Lycurgus in support of it, and expressly commended him for this excellent design? Would he not also have expressly blamed him, no less than Plato or Phalaris—6 § 10 ff. (108—111), 7 § 1 (124)—for having neglected, to a still greater extent than these theorists, to take the appropriate means for bringing this about; nay more, for having taken

as good as no means whatever? The τὴν fragment of the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* attributed to Herakleides (Müller *Frug. Ant. Gr.* II. 211) undoubtedly goes back to the Aristotelian work *On the Spartan constitution*, see u. (360) on 10 § 6. But this by no means proves that these extracts must be wholly free from foreign additions, or that τὴν δ' ἀρχαίαις μέραις οὐδὲ θέρων is not one here. Cp. u. (310 \*) on § 17. Gilbert, op. c. 162 ff., attempts in vain to show that it is quite natural that Aristotle should omit this limitation in the present passage. For, if he had known it, it is obvious how much it must have both weakened and again aggravated the blame he has here expressed. For whatever we may make of the 'ancient portions' (ἀρχαίαις μέραις), it would testify to a stronger care on the part of the legislature to preserve the family estates if the sale of this portion was absolutely forbidden by law and declared null and void, at the same time that it would be so much the stronger inconsistency if even this property was to be freely disposed of by will or given away. Besides Gilbert's whole method of explaining this ἀρχαίαις μέραις has already been truthfully, but incorrectly, refuted by Frick in *Zeits. f. Phil.* CV. 1872. 667. SUSEM. (300)

21 διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν] Translated into our language this means: in all ages after Lycurgus usage and custom were often evaded by apparent free gift or by testamentary disposition of land. SUSEM. (301)

22 καίτοι ταῦτ' οὐ συμβαίνειν καὶ] Cp. VIII(VI), 8 § 10 u. u. (1069). SUSEM. (301 b)

§ 15 24 τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο] see note.

τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων καὶ] why the number of houses in Sparta was disproportionately large Aristotle considers it superfluous to show, because it is easily understood that in the many long wars an unusually large number of men fell.

25 καὶ διὰ τὸ προίκας δίδοναι μεγάλας. καίτοι βέλτιον ἦν (VI)  
 μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλίγην ἢ καὶ μετρίαν τετάχθαι. \* \* νῦν δ' ἔξεστι (p. 47)  
 δοῦναί τε τὴν ἐπὶ κληρον ὅτῳ ἂν βούληται· καὶ ἀποθάνη  
 μὴ διαθέμενος, ὃν ἂν καταλίπη κληρονόμον, οὗτος  $\phi$  ἂν  
 § 16 θέλη δίδωσιν. τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίους ἱπ-  
 30 πεῖς τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ ὀπλίτας τρισμυρίους, οὐδὲ  
 χίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν 12  
 δῆλον ὅτι φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην·  
 μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἢ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἀπώλετο  
 § 17 διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δ' ὥς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέ-

25 ἦν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [ἦν] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> doubtfully || 26 \* \* νῦν Bücheler, see Comm. n. (304): νῦν δ' ἔξεστι δοῦναι <ὀπόσῃ ἂν τις θέλῃ· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ ἔξεστι δοῦναι> τὴν κτλ Welldon || 27 τε omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [τε] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 28 ὃν ἂν καταλίπη, <τὴν> κληρονόμον, οὗτος or  $\phi$  ἂν καταλίπη <τὴν> κληρονόμον, οὗτος Koraes || 30 τρισμυρίους] τρισχιλίους P<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 33 οὐδὲ μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν ὑπήνεγκε Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> misled by William's version *nullam enim plagam pertulit* || 34 μὲν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>: [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

(Bender). Aristotle's statement concerning the great wealth of Spartan women is confirmed by Plutarch's from a yet later time *Agis* 4. 7 ἦν δὲ τότε τῶν Λακωνικῶν πλούτων ἐν ταῖς γυναῖξιν τὸ πλεῖστον. (J. G. Schneider.) SUSEM. (302)

The Spartan name for them is ἐπιπάμονες, ἐπιπαματίδες.

25 καίτοι βέλτιον] Here again later authors are apparently better informed of the facts than Aristotle. We are told that dowries had actually been prohibited, and that down to the time of Lysander none were ever given; see Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 265 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (303)

26 νῦν δ' ἔξεστι κτλ] It is obvious that this sentence forms no antithesis to the preceding and thus νῦν δὲ gives no sense. All however is right if one imagines something like the following to have fallen out before νῦν δέ: <'And besides it would have been necessary to prescribe who had the right and obligation of marrying heiresses,> whereas at present every father can marry his daughter to any one he pleases, and if he die without a will his heir at law bestows her upon whom he pleases.' SUSEM. (304)

28 κληρονόμος usually means 'heir': here it must mean the person entitled to the rights of the deceased, the next male relation of full age, or, if there were more than one such, the eldest of them. SUSEM. (305)

This privilege is assigned to the king by Herod. vi. 57: δικάζειν δὲ τοὺς βασιλέας...πατρούχου τε παρθένου πέρι, ἐς τὸν ἰκνέεται ἔχειν, ἣν μὴ περὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὴν ἐγγυήσῃ.

§ 16 29 δυναμένης] Of course Aristotle makes this calculation, as Oncken remarks, with regard to the total population of Laconia, whether Spartan or of non-Spartan descent. In any case it is rather too high an estimate, as this total population amounted to only 400,000 at the most: see Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 195 Eng. tr. But on the other hand the reading, or rather conjecture, τρισχιλίους would not merely give a number far too small, but also one out of all proportion to that of the 1500 cavalry. SUSEM. (306)

30 οὐδὲ χίλιοι] 'In the time of Agis B.C. 241 (Plut. *Agis* c. 5) the Spartans were but 700, and only 100 retained their family allotments' (Eaton). SUSEM. (307)

33 μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν] The battle of Leuctra. Cp. further § 34 n. (345), IV (VII). 14 § 21 n. (916): V (VIII). 4 § 4, § 7 n. (1008). SUSEM. (308)

οὐχ ὑπήνεγκε] The negative to be taken closely with the verb: under one blow the city sank. Cp. Aristoph. *Knights* 1377 δεξιῶς οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, Plato *Phil.* 23 A ἐμφρόνως οὐκ ἀντεποιεῖτο τῶν νικητηρίων: and below *Pol.* VI (IV). 4. 30 οὐ πολιτεῖαν.

34 διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν] Here

35 ρων βασιλέων μετεδίδουσιν τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστ' οἱ γίνεσθαι  
τότε ὀλιγανθρωπίαν πολεμούντων πάλιν χρῆσθαι, καὶ φασὶν  
εἶναί ποτε τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας καὶ μυρίους· οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' εἴτ'  
ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ ταῦτα εἴτε μή, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως  
18 ὠμαλισμένης πληθύνει ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν. ἵππευστίος δὲ  
40 καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθω-

37 τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας *At. Bücheler Sussem.<sup>2</sup>, τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας II Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup> in the text and probably Γ; Thurot first suspected an error*

again of course only Spartans proper are meant, not Provincials (Περίοικοι) and Helots. According to Xenophon, *Hellen.* vi. 4. 15, 1000 Lakedaemonians fell at Leuctra, including 400 out of the 700 Σπαρτιάται who took part in the battle. Xenophon also, *De Rep. Lac.* i. 1, calls Sparta one of the least populous of states (*J. G. Schneider*). *SUSSEM.* (309)

§ 17 34 λέγουσι δ' ὡς κτλ.] 'It would appear as if Aristotle is our only authority for this fact. Herodotus, II. 16, is very positive in his assertion that Themistocles the Eleian and his brother Hegias μάλιστα δὲ πάντων ἀσπράξαν ἐγγύς ποτε Σπαρτιήσιν πολέμῳ' (*Conington*). *Cp. also n.* (311). (*Plutarch Intell. Lac.* 22 speaks somewhat differently. It is there stated that the strangers who submitted to the Lycurgean discipline were by the ordinance of Lycurgus also allowed a share in the 'ancient portion,' τῆς ἀρχαίας διατεταγμένης μίσθης, which they were not permitted to sell. *Cp. n.* 300.) Ephorus however, as Trieber shows, had the following story, *Frug.* 18 found in Strabo viii. 364. The first kings Eurystheneos and Prokles had divided Laconia into four states, besides Sparta and Amyclae, and on account of the paucity of men had authorized the dependent rulers of these four provincial states to admit aliens to the right of citizenship: at that time the περίοικοι were as yet completely on an equality, political and civil, with the pure Spartans. Now it is indeed true that this account cannot have been the authority which Aristotle is here quoting, as Trieber and Sussemihl once supposed; but this being the case the partial agreement of the two accounts is still striking enough to suggest that Aristotle has here cited some other passage of Ephorus. For Herodotus may possibly refer only to historical times, Aristotle to the earlier period, e.g. perhaps only the reigns of the oldest kings. No doubt he is also thinking of such old Spartan families of non-Dorian descent as the Aegidae and

Talthybiadae: see *Schömann* p. 197, 208, 225 f., 249 Eng. tr.; *Gillert* p. 21 ff., 57 ff., 149 f.; *Fick in Jahrb. f. Philol.* cv. 1872. p. 635 ff. It might again be said that Herodotus obviously has in mind only foreigners proper; whereas Aristotle might mean the μίσθης, as they were called, children of Helots brought up as Spartans, who were perhaps invariably the illegitimate sons of Spartan lords by Helot women. But then such μίσθης were not confined to the times of the earlier kings: even Lyander, Gylippos, Kleandridas, for example, belonged to their number, see *Schömann* p. 200 Eng. tr. Ridgeway, again, suggests that the reference is to the νεοδαμῶναι, i.e. Helots enfranchised for their services in war, and to their descendants. But a similar objection may be still more strongly urged: the earliest mention of νεοδαμῶναι is as late as the period of the Peloponnesian war, *Schömann* p. 197 Eng. tr.—*Comp.* § 11 n. (195) and esp. *Introd.* p. 35 n. (3). *SUSSEM.* (310)

35 ὥστ' οὐ γίνεσθαι] 'and that therefore there was then no lack of men although they were at war for a long time.' The indicative would have been used in *οὐκ ἔστιν*: hence εἴ, not εἴη, in *οὐκ ἔστιν*. *Thucyd.* v. 40 εἴη εὐχρησθαι and *Demosth. De falsis leg.* II 166, 167, 351 with *Shillens's Appendix B.*

36 καὶ φασιν εἶναι κτλ.] Evidently here again the pure Spartans are meant. Demaratos in *Herod.* vii. 234 τρέφουσιν them at about 8,000 (*Estlin*). *SUSSEM.* (311)

37 εἴτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ· εἴτε μή] Aristotle himself then doubts it. *SUSSEM.* (312)

38 βέλτιον 39 τὴν πόλιν] 'It is better to fill the city with men by means of an equal division of property than by the admission of aliens.'

§ 18 45 ὑπεραντίος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν] is an *opisthograph* to a correction of those evils of Sparta, viz. by equalization of property. See § 1: for

1270 b σιν. βουλόμενος γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ὡς πλείστους εἶναι τοὺς (VI) Σπαρτιάτας, προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας ὅτι πλείστους ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῖς νόμος τὸν μὲν γεννήσαντα τρεῖς § 19 υἱοὺς ἄφρουρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τέτταρας ἀτελῇ πάντων. καίτοι 5 φανερόν ὅτι πολλῶν γινομένων, τῆς δὲ χώρας οὕτω διηρημένης, ἀναγκαῖον πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πένητας.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως. ἡ γὰρ ἀρ- 14 χὴ κυρία μὲν αὐτῇ τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστίν, γίνονται δ' ἐκ τοῦ δήμου παντός, ὥστε πολλάκις ἐμπίπτουσιν ἄνθρωποι σφό-

1270 b 2 προάγει Spengel || τοὺς πολίτας omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 8 αὕτη Ar., omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup> Welldon || 9 παντός Sauppe (*Epist. crit. ad G. Hermannnum* p. 94 f.), πάντες Γ Π Ar. Bk.

construction. Division of the larger properties would ensure the maintenance of an increased population: the existing law encourages an increase without due regard to their subsistence.

1270 b 2 προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας κτλ] 'stimulates the citizens.' Just the opposite of what Aristotle himself requires. Plato and Phaleas did not go anything like so far, and yet are blamed severely enough by him in this respect. See 6 § 10 ff. *nn.* (208—211), 7 § 5 *nn.* (234, 235). SUSEM. (313)

4 ἄφρουρον] not liable to military service, (ἐμφρουρον: φρουρά is a Spartan word for στρατιά, found frequently in Xenophon *Hellenics*, II. 4. 29 ἐξάγει φρουράν, so IV. 7. 2, V. 2. 3. Xenophon uses the phrase φρουράν φαίνειν = to declare war in III. 2. 23 and some 15 other places. Also in Thucydides II. 25, Βρασίδας φρουράν ἔχων.

τέτταρας] Aelian *Var. Hist.* VI. 6 says 'five' (J. G. Schneider). Further Manso *Sparta* I. 1, p. 128 f., is undoubtedly right in asserting that this law was of a more modern origin, as the state certainly never dreamed of taxing pure Spartans in the olden times, and the remission of military duty as a reward appears to agree but ill with the spirit of ancient Sparta. The measure reveals that the decadence of the national power had already set in (Trieber). Aristotle however does not say that this law came down from Lycurgus: see *n.* (321) on § 21. SUSEM. (314)

§ 19 4 καίτοι φανερόν κτλ] Since the Spartans lived simply and solely on the produce of their estates, this is plain enough. But considering the numerous wars, it is unfortunately not easy to see how decrease in the numbers of fighting

men would be prevented by equality and inalienability of the estates. From the nature of the case the only effectual means to prevent it would have been that which according to tradition was adopted by the early kings, 'to repair gaps in the ranks of the old citizens by the admission of new citizens.' Compared with this effective remedy no great importance attaches to the encouragement given to families of three or four sons by a reward which from its character excited the dangerous surmise, that for distinguished services to the state Sparta had no better prize to offer than release from the honourable duty of serving the state. We know now that no stock which goes on breeding in and in can be preserved from extinction. Significant enough too is the proportionately large number of distinguished men in Sparta who came from the ranks of the *móthakes* (see *n.* 310 on § 17): in whose case fresh blood was imported into the ancient stock. 'The peculiar feature in the social malady of the Spartan state was this, that inequality of property, which we know to be as old as property itself, gained ground here, not as usually, in the train of over-population, but as a consequence of the very opposite condition, viz. depopulation' (Öncken). SUSEM. (315)

*The Ephoralty* §§ 19—24. Amongst other monographs see A. Schäfer *De ephoris commentatio* (Greifswald 1863), H. Stein *The development of the Ephoralty* (Jahresber. des Gymn. in Konitz, 1870), Urlichs in *Rhein. Mus.* VI. 1847. p. 221, G. Dum *Entstehung und Entwicklung des spartanischen Ephorats* (Innsbrück 1878).

8 αὕτη] in itself, simply as such.

9 ἐκ τοῦ δήμου] Thirlwall (IV. 377) supposed the *δῆμος* to include the *ὑπο-*

10 ὅρα πένητες εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, οἳ οὐκ τὴν ἀπορίαν ᾤοντο ἔσσαν. (11)  
 20 ἐδήλωσαν δὲ πολλάκις μὲν καὶ πρότερον, καὶ νῦν δ' ἐν  
 τοῖς Ἀνδρῶσι διαφθαρίντες γὰρ ἀργυρίῳ τιμῇ, ὅσον ἐφ'  
 ἑαυτοῖς, ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν. καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρ-  
 χὴν εἶναι λίαν μεγάλην καὶ ἰσοτύραννον ἐδημαγωγεῖν αὐ-  
 15 τοὺς ἡναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ συν-  
 ἐπιβλάπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν· δημοκρατία γὰρ ἐξ ἀριστο-  
 21 κρατίας συνέβαινεν. συνέχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ  
 ἀρχεῖον τοῦτο (ἡσυχάζει γὰρ ὁ δῆμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς  
 10 μέγιστης ἀρχῆς, ὥστ' εἴτε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἴτε διὰ τὴν  
 τύχην τοῦτο συμπίπτωκεν, συμφερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμα-

10 ἂν εἴσαν? Schneider || 12 Ἀνδρῶσι Ar., ἀνδρῶσι even Bk.<sup>1</sup>, ἀνδρῶσι Γ<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, emended by a later hand), ἀντρεῖσι Γ M<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), ἀνδρῶσι corr. of Γ<sup>1</sup> (τ altered to δ), γρ. ἀνδρῶσι p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 14 [αἰσῶσι] Oncken, αἰσῶσι K<sup>1</sup> Edgway || αὐτοὺς ἡνάγκαζον καὶ τοὺς Susem.<sup>2</sup>, reges ipsos populumque perī confuderant Ar.; reges populum se ipsos confuderant. reges William, whence αἰσῶσι ἡνάγκαζον [αἰσῶσι] καὶ [αἰσῶσι] Susem.<sup>3</sup> || 16 ἀριστοκρατίας P<sup>2</sup> 3-4 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 19 τὴν om. by H<sup>2</sup> Bk.

μῖανεν as well as the ὅμοιοι, and so too K. F. Hermann. The opposite view is taken by Schömann *Antiquities* p. 345 Eng. tr. See Busolt *The Lacedaemonians and their allies* I. p. 21 f. (Leipzig, 1878). For πάντες, not πάντες, see § 22, 10 § 10.

10 ἀρχεῖον=magistracy, board: so § 21, 10 § 10 τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον.

ἄνιοι] See below 10 § 12 n. (375 b) and Thuc. I. 131. 2 & δὲ (Πλουτάρχου) πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλέσκει τὴν διαβολὴν (Eaton); also *Rhet.* III. 18. 6, 1419 a 31 ff.; the Lacedaemonian Ephor called to account for his conduct says οἱ μὲν γὰρ (his colleagues) χρήματα λαβόντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ, ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ (Gottling). SUSEM. (316)

ἦσαν] were often. 'Why this issue? Is it that in Aristotle's time it mattered little whether they were or not?' (Congreve). It is imperfect in § 14 ὅσον. § 16 ὅσον, § 20 ὅσον [ἦσαν, συνέβαινεν].

§ 20 11 ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδρῶσι] what circumstance is meant we do not know. For the expression καὶ νῦν=recently, compare VIII(V). 10 § 31 καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Λακεδαίμονος, II. (1699). SUSEM. (317)

14 καὶ ἰσοτύραννον] Cp. Plato *Lysis* IV. 713 D καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδι δοκεῖ μοι προσοικεῖν [ἢ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τυραννία]· τὴ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων θαυμαστῶς ὡς τυραννίδος ἐκ αὐτῇ γέγονε. See c. 6 § 17 n. (319). SUSEM. (318)

δημαγωγεῖν=to conciliate, flatter an individual like a demagogue, in VIII(V).

6 § 6. 10 § 31. But, as Oncken remarks, it hardly serves to convert the constitution into a democracy that the kings pay court to the Ephors. SUSEM. (319) If therefore αἰσῶσι be retained, it will more conveniently apply to the Spartans themselves as in §§ 16, 19, 24. The kings themselves were compelled to court the favour of the people in order thereby to secure power to counterbalance that of the ephors.

"This seems to me impossible in this context. If then αἰσῶσι is right, Aristotle has, I think, erroneously exaggerated. For I cannot agree with Hume who thinks that Oncken's objection is sufficiently removed by c. 6 § 17. 1165 b 28, δημοκρατεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς ἐφόρους." SUSEM. (320)

16 ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας] See n. (375) on III. 7 § 3. SUSEM. (320)

§ 21 17 συνέχει is the keystone of the constitution.

19 διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην] Not Lycurgus in this case but, on Aristotle's view, VIII(V). 11 § 2, Θεοπόνορος. See n. (314) on § 18. SUSEM. (321)

εἴτε διὰ τὴν τέχνην] Aristotle is not unaware, then, that many good or bad consequences may arise out of legal regulations quite apart from, or even contrary to, the legislator's intention: cp. IV § 3 n. (409). SUSEM. (321 b)

20 συμπίπτωκεν] Cp. ἀπὸ συμπτώματος c. 13 § 3.

§ 22 σιν· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σώζεσθαι πάντα (VI) βούλεσθαι τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ταῦτά· οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοι διὰ τὴν γερούσιαν—ἄθλον γὰρ ἢ ἀρχὴν 25 αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν—, ὁ δὲ δῆμος διὰ τὴν ἐφορείαν—κα- § 23 θίσταται γὰρ ἐξ ἀπάντων—)· ἀλλ' αἵρετὴν ἔδει τὴν ἀρχὴν 16 εἶναι ταύτην ἐξ ἀπάντων μὲν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον ὃν νῦν (παιδαριώδης γὰρ ἐστι λῖαν). ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρίσεων μεγά-

22 ταυτά P<sup>1</sup>, ταῦτα ΓΡ<sup>4</sup>, τὴν αὐτὴν or [ταῦτά] Schneider, <κατὰ> ταῦτά Bernays; either this or τὴν αὐτὴν is right || 24 ἄθλον...ἐστίν] Trieber considers these words to be a gloss from Demosth. *Lept.* § 107; even Giphanius remarks on the agreement of the two passages “valde miror”: see Comm. || 26 ἔδει] ἤδη M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 28 κρίσεων εἰσὶ μεγάλων Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

§ 22 21 δεῖ γὰρ...22 διαμένειν ταῦτά] Cp. VI(IV). 9 § 10 n. (1267), 12 § 1 (1307); VII(VI). 5 § 4 (1434); VIII(V). 9 § 5 (1634). SUSEM. (322)

The order (which Stahr, and apparently Congreve, have mistaken) is δεῖ πάντα τὰ μέρη (subject) τῆς πόλεως βούλεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μ. σ. (object of βούλεσθαι) εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν. If a constitution is to be preserved, all classes in the state must desire its existence and continuance. Hence we are led to Bernays' or Schneider's correction.

23 οὕτως ἔχουσιν=βούλονται τὴν πολιτείαν διαμένειν (Congreve). Comp. 10 § 10, of the δῆμος.

24 καλοὶ κάγαθοι] This expression in Aristotle—see e.g. VI(IV). 8 § 3 ff.—always denotes the more educated and capable men: and this meaning in the present passage is confirmed by the addition ἄθλον γὰρ ἢ ἀρχὴν αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν, which Trieber hardly has sufficient grounds for regarding as an interpolation. Hence Unger in *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1873. p. 370 has rightly protested against the completely mistaken assertion of Gilbert *op. c.* 151 ff., and Frick *De ephoris Spartanis* 28 f. 7, who prefer to understand by it the nobles. From passages like 11 §§ 3, 4 and VI(IV). 7 § 4 (which Gilbert p. 153 incredibly mistakes) any one who reads without preconceived opinion will see beyond all doubt that Aristotle knows nothing of an election of Senators at Sparta, for which only certain families were eligible (as was the case in Crete c. 10 § 10), or of a privileged hereditary nobility within the pale of those pure Spartans who had the right to take part in the popular assembly. Nor can the

opposite of this be inferred from VI(IV). 9 § 9, see n. (1264). But the mode of election may very well have been such that in practice members of certain families were successful time after time: see VII(V). 6 § 21 n. (1586). SUSEM. (322 b)

ἄθλον γὰρ κτλ] To be a member of this body is a reward of special excellence, or at least it should be: see below § 25, Demosth. xx. *Adv. Leptin.* § 107 ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐστι (at Lacedaemon) τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον τῆς πολιτείας κυρίῳ γενέσθαι μετὰ τῶν ὁμοίων: Plut. *Lyc.* 26. SUSEM. (323)

26 καθίσταται γὰρ sc. ἡ ἐφορεία ἐξ ἀπάντων. Cp. 10 § 10 διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, n. (370). SUSEM. (323 b)

§ 23 28 παιδαριώδης κτλ] Here Aristotle calls the whole method of electing the Ephors childish, yet he says of the election to the senate § 27, κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης, it is childish as to the means of ascertaining the results. Consequently the mode of election was probably not the same for the two offices. Plato again describes it in the case of the ephors as approximating to a nomination by lot *Laws* III 692 A, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς δυνάμεως. This points to auspices (Ulrichs *Rhein. Mus.* N. S. VI. 1847. 223). But it is hardly possible to determine whether electors were chosen by the people and then, after observing certain signs, they appointed the new ephors, as Ulrichs thinks: or whether, according to Schömann's conjecture p. 240 Eng. tr., a larger number of persons were nominated by the people, and the five selected from them in accordance with certain auspices. SUSEM. (324)

Schneider had suggested that as in the election of the Senators (see n. 333)

λων εἰσὶ κύριοι, ὄντες οἱ τυχόντες, διόπερ οἷς αἰταγνόμε-  
 30 μονας βέλτιον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοῖς  
 24 νόμοις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ δίαίτα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη  
 τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως· αὕτη μὲν γὰρ ἀντιμένη λίαν  
 ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τῷ φελε-  
 ρόν, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερᾶν ἀλλὰ λάθρα τὴν πόλιν  
 3 ἀποδιοδρᾶσκοντας ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν. ἔχει  
 δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν οὐ καλῶς αὐτοῖς.  
 25 ἐπεικῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πεπαιδευμένων ἱκανῶς πρὸς  
 ἀνδραγαθίαν τάχα ἂν εἴποι τις συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει (καί-  
 τοι τό γε διὰ βίου κυρίους εἶναι κρίσεων μεγάλων ἀμφι-  
 40 σβητήσιμον· ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σώματος, καὶ διανοίας

30 τὰ inserted after κατὰ by H<sup>2</sup> Bk. | 31 πολιτείας Seafinger, probably right | αὕτη H<sup>2</sup> Bk. | 38 εἴποι P<sup>1</sup>, εἴπη M<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (cont.; what the 1st hand wrote cannot be determined), εἴπει Bk.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> (a later hand) and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, *ε* is erased), εἴποι Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand), εἴπειν Bk.<sup>2</sup>

the people voted by acclamation, which would generally favour those who have the right of proposing candidates. Oncken (i. 281 f.) adopts this view. Göttling (p. 468) assumed that the people nominated a certain number of candidates and that from these the Ephors were taken by lot. *Sturm* (p. 20) puts forward a more complicated theory: that electors designated by lot nominated a number of candidates, and that the ephors were elected from the candidates by the same process as the senators.

κρίσεων μεγάλων] The ephors had the greatest part of the administration of justice in private suits, especially in all actions arising from contracts; see III. 1 § 10 τὰ τῶν συμβολαίων «δικαί» δι-κάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλοι ἄλλαι *nn.* (443-4). Schömann *op. c.* 237, 246, 250 f. Eng. tr. *SUSEM.* (325)

30 κατὰ γράμματα] These were the written laws in Sparta; Schömann *op. c.* 251 Eng. tr. *SUSEM.* (326)

Comp. πᾶ κατὰ γράμματα ἄλλ' αὐτὰ γράμματα, 10 § 11.

§ 24 31 οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη] inconsistent with (the design of) the polity.

32 ἀντιμένη λίαν] The ephors had a separate mess-table to themselves, Schömann *op. c.* 245 Eng. tr., and there they were able, so great was their authority, amongst other things to provide a far more elaborate *cuisine* than the ordinary soup, the 'black broth' of Sparta (J. G. Schneider). *SUSEM.* (327)

34 ἄλλα λάθρα ἡδονῶν] Cp. § 12 *nn.* (346-7), IV(VII). 15 § 6 *n.* (397). Thus amongst the Spartan men, too, the much-vaunted strictness of manners had its limits, and the all-important condition was merely not to be detected in excesses. How else would Spartan avarice even be explicable? *SUSEM.* (328)

§§ 25-28 The Senate or *Kilates*.

§ 25 37 ἐπεικῶν ἱκανῶς] 'If only honest men, sufficiently trained to steady excellence, entered the senate.' No doubt this was part of the original design of the institution; but frequently it was not carried out: see § 21 *n.* (311). *SUSEM.* (329)

39 κρίσεων μεγάλων] The Spartan senate had criminal jurisdiction in particular: see III. 1 § 10 *n.* (443 f.), IV(VI). 9 § 9, διὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐφόρων οὐ φεγγήη *n.* (1266). *SUSEM.* (329 b)

40 ἔστι γάρ, κτλ.] In conformity with this principle Aristotle in his ideal state releases very old citizens from the administration of the state and allows them to retire as priests: IV(VI). 9 § 9 *nn.* (316-7). Plato too was of the same opinion on this point. In his state of the *Laws* he prescribes that no one be allowed to be a member of the highest magisterial office, the board of *nomophylakes* (see above *op. cit.* 5 II 12, 24), under 50 or over 70 years of age: *Laws* VI 755 A f. 'Compare also *Plot.* II. 14. 4 διὰ τὸν ὅτι φεγγήη τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀντιπολιτείας: *Herod.* III. 134 ἀντιπολιτείας

1271 a γῆρας) τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὥστε καὶ τὸν (VI)  
 νομοθέτην αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ  
 § 26 ἀσφαλές. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδωροδοκούμενοι καὶ κατα- 18  
 χαριζόμενοι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοινωνηκότες τῆς ἀρ-  
 5 χῆς ταύτης. διόπερ βέλτιον αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀνευθύνους εἶναι  
 νῦν δ' εἰσίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πάσας εὐ-  
 θύνειν τὰς ἀρχάς· τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἐφορείᾳ μέγα λίαν τὸ δῶ-  
 ρον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον λέγομεν διδόναι δεῖν τὰς εὐθύ-  
 § 27 νας. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἣν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων, κατὰ

1271 a 3 δὲ] γὰρ Spengel || 5 ἀνευθύνους Sylburg, perhaps rightly || 9 καὶ  
 ἣν αἵρεσιν ποιοῦνται...κρίσιν or rather κατὰ τὴν...γερόντων ἢ τε κρίσις Bender, much  
 too violently

τῷ σώματι συναύξονται καὶ αἱ φρένες· γηράσ-  
 κοντι δὲ συγγηράσκουσι καὶ ἐς τὰ πρήγματα  
 πάντα ἀπαμβλύνονται, Livy VI. 23 cum  
 corporibus vigere et deflorescere animos,  
 Lucret. III. 445 pariter cum corpore et  
 una crescere sentimus pariterque senescere  
 mentem' (Eaton). SUSEM. (330)

1271 a 1 δὲ answers b 37 ἐπεικῶν  
 μὲν, the intermediate words from καίτοι  
 being parenthetical. Comp. 2 §§ 3, 4  
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῶ...ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ κτλ.

ὥστε...ἀνδράσιν] 'But if they are  
 trained in such a way that even the legis-  
 lator cannot trust them.' Camerarius long  
 since asked how Aristotle came to this  
 conclusion. Presumably from the fact he  
 mentions directly afterwards, § 26, that  
 every senator (as well as all the other  
 officials and even the two kings) was  
 placed under the control of the Ephors.  
 SUSEM. (331)

§ 26 3 φαίνονται δὲ κτλ] Cp. c. 11  
 § 4 μεγάλα βλάπτουσι καὶ ἐβλαψαν ἥδη  
 n. (384). SUSEM. (331 b)

5 δόξειε δ' ἂν κτλ] It might be held  
 (cp. 8 § 18) that the board of Ephors  
 controls all the officials. But this is too  
 vast a trust to commit to the Ephorality  
 and it is not in this sense that we assert  
 the necessity for responsible control.

8 τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον] Because  
 the superintendence and control exercised  
 by the Ephors was far too unlimited and  
 violent (J. G. Schneider). See above  
 § 20 n. (318). SUSEM. (332)

§ 27 9 κατὰ τε τὴν κρίσιν κτλ] "The  
 proceedings are described by Plutarch  
 (*Lycurg.* c. 26) in the following manner.  
 After the assembling of the 'people,' i.e.  
 of all the Spartiatae who possessed the  
 right of voting, some men selected for

the purpose proceeded to a neighbouring  
 building from which no view was afforded  
 of the place of meeting, though the voices  
 of the assembled crowd could easily be  
 heard. Then the candidates for the vacant  
 office passed silently one by one through  
 the assembly in an order fixed by lot, while  
 the people, according to the various de-  
 grees of favour with which they regarded  
 them, made their feelings known by  
 correspondingly loud or feeble acclama-  
 tions. The party confined in the building,  
 to whom the order in which the candi-  
 dates appeared by lot was unknown,  
 observed on which occasion the acclama-  
 tion was the loudest, and the candidate  
 who was thus greeted was regarded as  
 the popular choice.....Aristotle's judg-  
 ment upon these proceedings is quite  
 intelligible in an age in which the man-  
 ners of the people had long degenerated  
 from their ancient purity and simplicity.  
 For obviously there was nothing easier  
 than to turn the whole election into a  
 mere fraudulent farce, and to determine  
 the result beforehand" Schömann p. 231  
 f. Eng. tr. One of the main questions  
 that arise is, how the committee which  
 decided on the loudness of the acclama-  
 tions was itself appointed:—and on this  
 point we have no information (Oncken).  
 Besides, this mode of election is only a  
 peculiar survival of the primitive election  
 of chiefs by acclamation in a rude an-  
 tiquity, retained in a time for which it  
 had long since ceased to be adapted.  
 In general the votes of the Spartans in  
 the popular assembly continued to be  
 taken *viva voce*, by acclamation, *βοῇ*;  
 and only in case of a doubt as to the  
 decision did an actual division of the

10 τε τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης, καὶ τὰ αὐτὸν αἰτῶσθαι  
τὸν ἀξιωθησόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· διὰ γὰρ καὶ  
βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἀξίον τῆς ἀρχῆς.  
25 νῦν δ' ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης  
φαίνεται ποιῶν· φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοῖς πολί-  
15 τας τούτῳ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν γερόντων. οἵτινες  
γὰρ ἂν ἄρχειν αἰτήσαιο μὴ φιλότιμος ὧν. καίτοι τῶν γ'  
ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκουσίων τὰ πλεῖστα συμβαίνει σχεδὸν διὰ  
29 φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. περὶ  
δὲ βασιλείας, εἰ μὲν βέλτιόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν  
30 ἢ μὴ βέλτιον, ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· ἀλλὰ κἂν βέλτιον, \* \* γε  
μὴ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον ἕκαστον

10 τὸ] τὸν Bk.<sup>2</sup>, perhaps through a printer's error | 14 κατασκευάζει: P<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) | 15 τοῖς p<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) | 16 δε omitted by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> | 17 τῶν omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> | διὰ omitted by M<sup>1</sup>, perhaps by P, [διὰ] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> | 19 βέλτιον... 20 μὴ βέλτιον] μὴ βέλτιον... 20 βέλτιον Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. (μὴ over an erasure P<sup>3</sup>) | 20 κἂν Γ, μὴ Π Ar. Bk., μὴ εἰ καὶ Schömann Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> | <βέλτιον γε> or <δεῖ> γε Susem., <συνείκει> γε Schömann | 21 αὐτοῦ Bk. αὐτοῦ Γ Π

assembly take place. See Schömann p. 236 Eng. tr. Further compare § 23, n. (334): SUSEM. (333)

10 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτῶσθαι = (the obligation to) a personal canvass. Schömann and Fülleborn think this a wise arrangement, since otherwise the proposer might nominate whom they liked;—as if it were Aristotle's meaning that any one who aspired to be a senator had the right to canvass, but need not do so unless he liked. But beyond all doubt, as is clear from n. (333), he means that the candidates are obliged to canvass personally. SUSEM. (334)

11 δὲ γὰρ κτλ] This is the principle adopted in its entirety by Plato, in whose ideal state the philosophic rulers only undertake the government against their own inclination, Zeller *Plato* p. 463 Eng. tr. Compare also 11 § 12 n. SUSEM. (335) Add *Act.* 347 n ff., 517 D, 519 C.

28 13 νῦν δ' ὅπερ κτλ] But here the legislator is evidently acting with the same object as in other provisions of his constitution: in the endeavour to make his citizens covetous of honour he has adopted this device for the election of senators (τοῖς τε αὐτὸν αἰτῶσθαι, a personal canvass). See Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* IV. 2.

16 τῶν γ' ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκουσίων] Here the term ἀδικημα is used in a sense

different from that of *Act.* I. 13. 16, 1374 b S ἐστὶ δ' ἀδικημα ὅταν πρὸς τοῖς νόμοις ἀπὸ προήγου τοῦ ἐστί, or the Aristotelian passage *Nl.* *Act.* V. 8. 2 where every ἀδικημα is also ἐκούσιον. SUSEM. (336)

Note esp. *N. E.* V. 8. 2: ἀδικημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἀριστοὶ τῶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἀκούειν· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκούσιον β. φέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδικημα τὸ ἐπαινεῖν· ὅταν δὲ τι ἀδικω μὴ ἀδικω δ' αἰσῶ, δὲ μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προῆρ· also *N. E.* V. 7 § 7, both with Jackson's notes; also the table, p. 109, of his edition of *Nl.* *Act.* V.

17 τὰ πλεῖστα συμβαίνει κτλ] Here Lysurgus would certainly have been able to reply to Aristotle on the same lines as the latter takes in his objection to Plato c. 5 § 9: φέγεται δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀλλαν δ' εἰς - χράματα - φάσιν. Besides as no one could become senator until he was 60 years of age, 'an ambition which is contented with this prospect and then must have a very tedious life, such as is only attained under strict discipline, and cannot easily become dangerous to the state' (Orsini. SUSEM. (337)

The office of senator § 20, 20.

§ 29 20 ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος] 12 n. 14—17. SUSEM. (336)

21 κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον] 'that each king should be chosen in virtue of his life and conduct': an elective monarchy.

§ 30 κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων. ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδ' αὐτὸς (VI)  
 οἶεται δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλοὺς καγαθοὺς, δῆλον· ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν  
 ὡς οὐκ οὔσιν ἰκανῶς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν· διόπερ ἐξέπεμπον  
 25 συμπρεσβευτὰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει  
 εἶναι τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ 21  
 συσσίτια τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια νενομοθέτηται τῷ καταστή-  
 § 31 σαντι πρῶτον. ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνο-  
 δον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Λάκωσιν ἕκαστον δεῖ  
 30 φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀνά-

25 ἐφόρους Götting || 27 φιλίτια II<sup>1</sup> (emended by corr. of P<sup>1</sup>)

§ 30 22 ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης κτλ.] In the developed state Aristotle only recognizes kingship as an actual form of government in the case where the preeminently best man exercises an unlimited monarchy: III. 13 § 13 n. (601), §§ 14, 24 n. (614), § 25; 17 § 5 n. (678): VI(IV). 2 § 1 ff. nn. (1133, 1136—7); 10 § 3 n. (1280), see also the notes on III. 5 § 10 (521), 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), 14 § 15 (633). It is only consistent in him therefore to set up an analogous standard even for a very limited monarchy, and to ignore hereditary descent altogether, except in a family where special capacity may be inherited. Compare II §§ 3, 4 nn. (381—3). But when again, cp. n. (296) on § 12, he treats such a peculiar fact as the dual kingship at Sparta, a fact rendered intelligible only by historical events of a very special nature, exactly as if it had come from the brain of a single legislator, then, as Oncken (I. 287) rightly remarks, here if anywhere is a point of view foreign to historical criticism: and such criticism is hardly anything more than superficial. See C. Wachsmuth *The historical origin of the two kings at Sparta* in the *Fahrb. f. Philol.* xcvii. 1868. 1—9: E. Curtius *History of Greece* I p. 186 ff. Eng. tr.: Schömann *op. c.* 208, 225 f., 541—4 Eng. tr. But when they come to particulars, these authors diverge seriously from one another in their conception of the subject. SUSEM. (339)

24 ἐξέπεμπον κτλ.] Two ephors regularly accompanied the king on an expedition: see Schömann *op. c.* 242 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (340) Cp. Xen. *Rep. Laced.* 13 § 5, πᾶρεσι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐφόρων δύο, οἱ πολυπραγμονοῦσι μὲν οὐδέν, ἣν μὴ ὁ βασιλεὺς προσκαλῇ· ὁρῶντες δὲ ὅτι ποιεῖ ἕκαστος πάντας σωφρονίζουσιν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός. Ten ξύμβουλοι were given to Agis, Thuc. v. 63.

25 συμπρεσβευτὰς] A less forcible word, like *συναποδημούντας*, might have been expected.

26 τὸ στασιάζειν] Grote II. p. 464. Schneider compares Plut. *Agis* c. 12, τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἀρχεῖον (the Ephors) ἰσχύειν ἐκ διαφορᾶς τῶν βασιλέων τῷ τὰ βελτίονα λέγοντι προστιθέμενον τὴν ψῆφον, ὅταν ἄτερος ἐρίξῃ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον.

*The public messes:* §§ 31, 32.

§ 31 27 φιδίτια] The derivation is uncertain: Plut. *Lyc.* 12 guesses wildly. Perhaps √σεδ to sit; if indeed *φειδίτια* is the true form and *φειδίτης* = [ἐ]φ-εδ-ι-τη-s (?), see n. on 1272 a 22. Clearly *ἀνδρεία* is the older Doric name, and *συσσίτια* is only an Attic term.

28 ἔδει γὰρ κτλ.] Cp. 10 §§ 7, 8 nn. (363, 365): IV(VII). 10 § 10 (834). Plato's criticism, *Latius* VIII 847 E, is precisely the same: τροφῆς δὲ καὶ διανομῆς τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐγγὺς τῆς τοῦ Κρητικοῦ νόμου ἔουκεν ὀρθότης ἀν τις γυγνομένη κατὰ τρόπον γίγνεσθαι κτλ. 'But on Spartan ground this was once for all impossible; for Aristotle himself knows best, § 36, that the Spartan state as such (τὸ κοινόν) possesses no property at all, neither in land, nor in money and money's worth' (Oncken): or at least, to put it more correctly, the state treasury for the most part was not well supplied; cp. Schömann *op. c.* p. 291 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (341)

For *σύνδοον* = *πρόσοδον* the lexx. quote Herod. I. 64  *χρημάτων συνόδοισι* = contributions. But here the singular (*σύνδοον*) and the entire phrase *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ* (*sumptu publico*) εἶναι, favour the rendering 'the gathering should have been a state affair.' Cp. VII(VI). 4 § 13, 1319 a 32; τῆς συνόδου ταύτης = τῆς ἐκκλησίας. The original design of public messes was military comradeship: see Schömann pp. 271, 282 Eng. tr.

30 φέρειν = contribute.

λωμα οὐ δυναμένων δαπανᾶν, ὥστε συμβαίνει τοῖναιτίον (V1)  
 32 τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρα-  
 τικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκευάσμα τῶν συσσιτίων, γίνεται δ'  
 ἥκιστα δημοκρατικὸν οὕτω νεομοθετημένον. μετέχουσιν μὲν  
 35 γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον τοῖς λίαν πένησιν, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας  
 οὗτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ  
 33 τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς. τῷ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ναυάρ-  
 χους νόμῳ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἐπιτετιμήκασιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτι-  
 μῶντες. στάσεως γὰρ γίνεται αἴτιος· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι  
 40 οὗσι στρατηγοῖς αἰδίοις ἢ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἑτέρα βασιλεία  
 34 καθέστηκεν. καὶ ὥδὲ δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμή-  
 σαιεν ἂν τις, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἐπιτετίμηκεν

31 συμβαλεῖν, apparently M<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), συμβαίνειν Q<sup>2</sup> T<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 36 αὐτοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν (ἐστὶν M<sup>1</sup>) M<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 37 αὐτῶν P<sup>2</sup>, αὐτοῦ P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, altered by a later hand), αὐτοῖς P<sup>2</sup> || 40 αἰδίοις P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk., ἄλλαι δὲ αὐτοῖς p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 41 καθέστηκεν was apparently omitted by Γ

§ 32 37 μὴ μετέχουσιν] That is, they ceased to be full citizens (ἑμιοί). They were then, in all probability, included under the term ὑπομεινόμενοι, Xen. *Hell.* III. 3. 6. See Schömann *op. c.* pp. 217—220, 270 Eng. tr. Since Aristotle censures the masses as ἀεισταν δημοκρατικῶν, it is not likely that the persons thus disqualified were included in the δῆμος, as Thirlwall supposed IV. 377.

*The office of admiral:* § 33.

§ 33 38 ἕτεροί τινες] See *Introd.* p. 9. n. 1. SUSEM. (342)

39 ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι—in addition to the kings. The command of the army was the most essential feature in the royal power at Sparta: see III. 14 § 3 n. (616), § 14, n. (631), § 15; also n. (381) on II. 11 § 3, (630) on III. 14 § 13. Compare also II. 10 § 6 n. (360). We can hardly follow Oncken (i 293) in assuming that Aristotle's criticism here implies a further reference to Lysander's plans for the entire overthrow of the kingly power, VIII(v). 1 § 10 n. (1498). A design entertained by one distinguished holder of the office, such as Lysander undoubtedly was, cannot be attributed without further ado to the institution of the *eucorpes* as a whole. Certainly a startling anomaly was introduced into the political structure of Sparta by the necessity which gradually arose for the employment of a fleet: and it is significant 'that of four native Admirals (ναυάρχου) in whom Sparta trusted in

the last period of the Peloponnesian war, two, Phrynias and Deinidas, were Provincials (περίουχοι) and two, Lysander and Gylippus, were μέθοκοι' (Oncken). Further compare VII(vi). 8 § 15 n. (1473): Beloch *The office of ναυάρχου at Sparta in Rhin. Mus.* XXXIV. 1879. 117—120. SUSEM. (343) The Spartan government took the same view as Aristotle does here when they nominated Agesilaos to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in order to secure unity in the operations, 395 B.C., Xen. *Hellen.* III. 4. 27: ὅτι δ' αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ περὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ Κλέωνι ἔρχεται ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῦτο [the *ephoroi*] ἄρχουσιν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ὅταν γινώσκουσιν καὶ καταστῆσθαι ναυάρχου δεῖται αὐτοῦ βουλαιτο. τοῦτο δ' ἐποίησαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦτοδε λογισμῷ, ὅτι εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀναστήσκειτο ἀρχεῖν, τὸ τε περὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἔρχομενον εἶναι, καὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀναστήσκειτο, τὸ τε ναυτικῶν, ἐκτετακμένον τοῦ περὶ τοῦτο δέου.

*The military spirit:* § 34, 35.

§ 34 1271 b 1 Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις] 1 615 c—635 n. esp. 620 n. quoted in n. (294 b) on § 11. Compare II 600 B. 606 n. III 688 A f., IV 703 B: on such earlier *Kephalaia* VIII 147 n B. τῷ δὲ περὶ τοῦτοδε τοῖς ναυαρχοῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ ὄντων, ... ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι τε καὶ ἀνακτοράρχοις ἀποκρίσκειν, τοῖς πρὸς πᾶσι μὲν ἄλλοις περὶ τοῦτοδε ἢ πρὸς ἀρχῇ. ... καὶ τοῦτοδε τὸν δὲ τοῦτοδε ἀρχῇ. The same criticism in IV(viii). 2 § 14 § 13—15. 15 § 6 δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχῇ. V(viii). 3 § 2

πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἢ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, (VI)  
 τὴν πολεμικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοι-  
 γαροῦν ἐσφύζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες  
 5 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδ' ἡσκηκέναι μηδε-  
 § 35 μίαν ἄσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τούτου δὲ 23  
 ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον· νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰ-  
 γαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι' ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας, καὶ  
 τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς  
 § 36 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. φαύλως δὲ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ  
 11 κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ  
 τῆς πόλεως ἔστιν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένοις  
 πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσί τε κακῶς· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρ-  
 τιάτῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων

1271 b 3 αὐτὴ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || χρησίμη <μόνον>? Susem. || 5 ἡσκηκέναι] *ad virtutem exercitari* William doubtless on his own conjecture, hence πρὸς ἀρετὴν wrongly inserted by Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 6 τούτο P<sup>1</sup>, τοῦτο P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> Ar., P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, altered by corr.<sup>1</sup>), and perhaps also Γ || 7 μὲν omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup>, perhaps rightly, [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || γίνεσθαι after τὰγαθὰ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 12 ἀναγκαζομένους P<sup>2,3</sup> Ald.

οὔτε πρὸς μίαν...οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην;  
 § 4, § 7, the reference being given in the notes. SUSEM. (344)

4 ἐσφύζοντο μὲν πολ. κτλ] Repeated in substance IV(VII). 14 § 16 ff. τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξεληλεγκται νῦν, § 22 τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν ἀνιάσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες. αἷτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν, 15 §§ 5, 6: V(VIII). 4 § 4 τοὺς Δάκωνας ἴσμεν...νῦν...καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἑτέρων: where references will be found in the notes. Aristotle must have said the same in his account of the Spartan constitution, in the *Πολιτεία*; for, as Eaton remarks, the polemic in Plutarch *Lycurg.* 30 is directed against a similar criticism, though Aristotle is not mentioned as the author: the passage begins θαυμάζω τῶν λεγόντων, ὡς ἄρχεσθαι μὲν ἤδεσαν, ἄρχειν δ' οὐκ ἠπίσταντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι. SUSEM. (345)

ἄρξαντες=after they had won their empire, when they had become a sovereign people.

§ 35 8 τὰ περιμάχητα] i.e. external goods: cp. *Nic. Eth.* IX. 8 § 4, 1168 b 15 ff. οἱ μὲν οὖν...φιλαύτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς...ἐσπουδάκασιν [οἱ πολλοὶ] περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητα ἐστίν: § 9

1169 a 20 f. προήσεται [ὁ σπουδαῖος] καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν. SUSEM. (346)

9 τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς] They are right in thinking valour the means of obtaining external goods: they are wrong in exalting the goods which valour wins above valour itself.

"Cp. IV(VII). 1 § 3 n. (697), 15 § 6 nn. (927—8)." SUSEM. (346 b)

ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κτλ] See above § 24, n. (328) and again IV(VII). 15 § 6 nn. SUSEM. (347)

*The finances:* §§ 36, 37.

§ 36 12 ἀναγκαζομένοις] if they are compelled.

14 τὴν πλείστην γῆν] Only the smaller part of the land belonged to the Provincials (*περὶοικοι*). SUSEM. (348)

οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν...εἰσφοράς] Even at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war Thucydides (I. 80. 4) makes the Spartan king Archidamos say: πολλῷ ἔτι πλεον τούτου (sc. χρυσοῦ) ἐλλείπομεν καὶ οὔτε ἐν τῷ κοινῷ ἔχομεν οὔτε ἐτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν (Vettori). Cp. also what Pericles says (I. 141. 3) αὐτοῦργοι εἰσὶ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς. SUSEM. (349)

37 τὰς εἰσφοράς. ἀποβιβηκέ τε τοῦναντίαν τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ αἰῶ- (VI)  
16 φέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποιήκειν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς  
δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτων.

10 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσού-  
τον εἰρήσθω (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ μάλιστ' ἂν τις ἐπιτιμή-  
10 σειεν)· ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεργος μὲν ἐστὶ ταύτης, VII  
ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἦττον γλαφυ-  
ρῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ λέγεται δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα μεμιῆσθαι  
τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἢ τῶν Λακῶνων· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα

15 τε] δὲ Γ || 16 γὰρ omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Q<sup>1</sup> T<sup>1</sup> | 22 δὲ] τε M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, *quidem* Wil-  
liam, γὰ Γ?

§ 37 16 τοὺς δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημά-  
τους] As early as the first quarter of the  
sixth century B.C. Alcibiades (*Fr.* 30) quotes  
the saying of Aristodemus, a Spartan,  
'money makes the man' as in full force at  
Sparta: *ὅτι γὰρ ὁφθαλμὸς Ἀριστοδῆμου φασι*  
*οὐκ ἀπάλαμμεν ἐν Σπάρτῃ λέγον· ὅτι*  
*χρήματα ὄφρα, πένοντο δ' ὡς οὐδὲ πύλας*  
*ἐσθαι αἰὲς τιμῆς.* Aristodemus well-known  
instances of peculation or corruption  
Eaton quotes Leotychides, Plistonax,  
Antigastion, Kleandridas, Gylhiron, Ty-  
sander: to which he adds Plutarch's own  
admission, *Leucyrr.* 30: *Ἀρχὸς δὲ Πισαδῆς*  
*οὐκ ἀνέστην νόμισμα πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῇ*  
*Σπάρτῃ καὶ μετὰ τοῦ νομισματοῦ Πισαδῆς*  
*καὶ πλοῦτον ἔζηλος ἐπέβη διὰ Λίσανδρον, ὅς*  
*αὐτὸς ὦν ἀνάλωτος οὐδ' χρημάτων ἐνέπλεκε*  
*τὴν πατρίδα φιλοχρηματίας καὶ τρυφῇ.*  
Besides the corruption of the ephors,  
§ 19 n. (316), and senators, § 26 (331 b),  
II § 4 (384). Aristotle might have  
spoken confidently of that of the kings  
and admirals. There was a well-known  
anecdote, ἡ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρτης ὁλεῖ,  
ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν, quoted in Aristotle's *Polity*  
*of Lacadaemon Frag.* 501, 1559 b 28  
(= *Aristot. pseudop.* 496=88 in Muller's  
*Fr. hist. Gr.* II. p. 131), and even  
Tyrtæus (?) seems to have cited it, *Fr.* 3.  
See further Xenoph. *De Rep. Lac.* 14. 3  
and the statement in Ps.-Plato *Alc.* I.  
104 B f., quoted by Eaton: *χρημάτων*  
*καὶ ἀχρήματος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πάσῃ Ἑλληνίᾳ ὅσον*  
*ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ ἰδίᾳ.* This may very well  
be an exaggeration; the writer of the  
dialogue is however generally well in-  
formed on historical matters, see Cobet  
*Monum.* N. S. II. 1874. 369 ff. Compare  
with this the instances of great wealthy  
persons and by Christians, some of which  
have been collected by Grote *Greece* IX.  
231 f., Gilbert *op. c.* 154 f. If the Spar-

tiatac, with the exception of the kings,  
ever were prohibited from possessing  
gold and silver—a statement which H.  
Stein in the dissertation quoted in n. (85)  
on I. 9 § 8 seeks to disprove—It was at  
a very early time that the prohibition  
was removed. For gold and silver money  
were first coined by Pheidon king of  
Argos (whose age is, I admit, very vari-  
ously estimated, 760 or 670 B.C.), and even  
down to the time of Croesus gold and  
silver were scarce in Greece; see n.  
(1653) on VIII (V). 10 § 6 and Hack  
*Public Economy* I. p. 6 f. Eng. tr. H.  
Stein, Oncken, and others would reduce  
this supposed prohibition to the fact,  
that gold and silver money remained un-  
known for a longer time in the secluded  
valley of the Eurotas than in the trading  
districts on the coast; and thus the  
Spartans retained their old iron money  
in use for a long time, first in bars, and  
afterwards as a sort of coinage (see  
Schömann *op. c.* p. 175 Eng. tr.) and  
employed it even later along with gold  
and silver money for internal trade. See  
however Trieler *op. c.* 111. *SUPPL.* (330)  
c. 10 **The Cretan polity.**

Congreve refers to the article *Creta* in  
Smith's *Geogr. Dictionary*. See also  
Schömann's *Antiquities of Greece* I. 104  
—310 Eng. tr.; Oncken II. 377—409;  
Hack *Crete* (Göttingen 1843—9, 3 vols.),  
21 γλαφυρῶς] neatly, 'less finished'  
(Congreve).

21 καὶ λέγεται δὲ] *Epistola Frag.* 64,  
in Strabo X 481? This passage is: *ἀν-*  
*τιπάλαι τὴν πόλιν, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅτι τὰ*  
*πολλὰ τῶν νομισμάτων Κρητικῶν, καὶ τὰ*  
*ἀληθῆ, εἰσφέρονται αὐτῇ ἐν ἑσθίᾳ, ἐνδεδυ-*  
*κέναι δὲ τοὺς Σπαρτιάταις.* Compare also, on  
II 2, 3, 5, 6, 10 below, and esp. *Antiqu.*  
p. 35 n. (31).

§ 2 τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦττον διήρθρωται τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ γὰρ (VI)  
 25 τὸν Λυκούργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν τὴν Χαρίλλου τοῦ  
 βασιλέως καταλιπὼν ἀπεδήμησεν; τότε τὸν πλείστον δια-  
 τρίψαι χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν· ἀποι-  
 29 κοι γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιοι τῶν Λακόνων ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δ' οἱ  
 πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχου-  
 § 3 σαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. [διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν

25 ἐπιτροπίαν P<sup>1</sup> and 1st hand of M<sup>3</sup> P<sup>3</sup> (in P<sup>3</sup>, altered by a later hand) || τοῦ  
 Χαρίλλου P<sup>1</sup> || Χαριλάου Bas.<sup>1</sup>, see Comm. || 26 τότε omitted by I<sup>1</sup> Ar., [τότε]  
 Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 27 περὶ περὶ τὴν I<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 28 Λύκτιοι κρήτες I<sup>1</sup>, ἄλλως λύκτιοι p<sup>1</sup> in  
 the margin || 30 [διὸ.....40 Κάμικον] Susem. see Comm. n. (355) || [οἱ περίοικοι]  
 Spengel

24 διαρθροῦν=quasi per membra et art-  
 us distinguere et certum in ordinem redi-  
 gere (Bonitz): to articulate, *elaborate*  
 (Welldon).

§ 2 24 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Λ.] Ephoros  
*l.c.* (Strabo x. 482) relates that Lycurgus,  
 as guardian of Charilaos the posthumous  
 child of his brother Polydektes, for certain  
 reasons which are stated went to Crete  
 and did not return until Charilaos himself  
 had assumed the government. Compare  
 Plutarch *Lycurg.* cc. 2—5; Trieber *op. c.*  
 p. 65 ff., 100; Flügel *Die Quellen in*  
*Plutarchs Lykurgos* 22 ff. (Marburg  
 1870.) SUSEM. (352)

25 Χαρίλλου] The form is Charilaos  
 in VIII(v). 12 § 12 (see n.): probably we  
 should restore it here, or else read Cha-  
 rillos there. SUSEM. (353)

28 κατέλαβον δ'...κατοικοῦσιν] "And  
 the settlers who had gone out to Lyttos  
 had found the system of the laws estab-  
 lished at that time amongst the inhabit-  
 ants." In just the same way Ephoros (*l.c.*  
 481) replies to those who claim a Lacedae-  
 monian descent for the Cretan institutions  
 on the ground that the Lyttians were a  
 colony from Sparta and that colonists  
 generally preserve the usages of the  
 mother state. He urges that many co-  
 lonies did not do this and that many  
 Cretan towns, not colonies from Sparta,  
 yet had the same institutions as the  
 Spartan colonies in Crete. On these con-  
 siderations of Aristotle and Ephoros,  
 then, the Lycurgeoan institutions at Sparta,  
 so far from being genuinely Spartan,  
 were not even of Dorian origin, but had  
 belonged in the first instance to the pre-  
 Dorian population of Crete; unless in-  
 deed even these earliest inhabitants of  
 Crete are to be regarded as Dorians (as  
 they are by Ottfried Müller *The Dorians*

i. p. 36 ff. Eng. tr.). But this view has  
 been refuted by Trieber p. 81 ff. In  
 opposition to the view of Ephoros and  
 Aristotle, which is in itself improbable,  
 he has sought to maintain the truth of  
 that combated by Ephoros, that Spartan  
 institutions actually passed over into  
 Crete with the Spartan settlers. Compare  
 n. (356) on § 4. Polybios moreover IV. 54.  
 6 describes Lyttos (Λύττος being the read-  
 ing there also) as the oldest of the Cretan  
 towns and likewise as a colony of Lacedae-  
 mon. Trieber has shown conclusively  
 p. 105 ff. as against K. O. Müller that there  
 never really existed any specially 'Dorian'  
 political or social principles, such as are  
 presumed to have found their highest and  
 completest embodiment in Sparta. SU-  
 SEM. (354)

§ 3 30 οἱ περίοικοι] Why mention  
 merely the περίοικοι i.e. the descendants  
 of the pre-Dorian population, if after all  
 the Spartan and other Dorian settlers  
 had accepted the same institutions? Ari-  
 stotle cannot have contradicted himself  
 in such a manner as this, or have written  
 such nonsense. It is much more likely  
 that some learned Peripatetic added this  
 in order to tack on the following remarks  
 about Minos, his maritime power, and  
 his death. He did not however perceive  
 that they are not at all appropriate to this  
 connexion, and that to speak of Crete as  
 favourably situated for maritime supre-  
 macy over the Hellenes agrees but ill  
 with Aristotle's own statements §§ 15, 16:  
 where the remoteness of the island is  
 said to have shut it off from external  
 complications and from foreign dominion.  
 SUSEM. (355)

Grote II. 484 n. 2 has another way  
 out of the difficulty. He takes the word  
 as in Thuc. I. 17, "the neighbouring

31 αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὥς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω (VIII)  
 πρῶτον τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς  
 τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πεφυκέναι καὶ κεῖσθαι καλῶς (p. 91)  
 πάσῃ γὰρ ἐπικείται τῇ θαλάσῃ, σχεδὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων  
 35 ἰδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν πάντων· ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν  
 τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρὸν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριόπιον  
 4 τόπου καὶ Ῥόδου. διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν κατέ-  
 σχεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νήσους τὰς μὲν ἐχειρώσατο τὰς  
 δ' ὤκισεν, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεί-  
 40 τησεν ἐκεῖ περὶ Κάμικον.]  
 5 ἔχει δ' ἀνάλογον ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις πρὸς τὴν Λακωνικὴν. γέ-  
 2 α ωργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἴλωτες τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίοικοι,

32 [τὴν.....νόμων] Stahr || 34 πάσῃ.....35 πάντων noticed by Theodoros Metochit. *Miscell.* p. 644 ed. Klessling || 34 πάσῃ] μέσῃ Bachelier wrongly || 35 τῇ μὲν τῆς] τῆς μὲν Γ<sup>M</sup> || 36 μικρὸν] ὀλίγον before τῆς Πελοποννήσου P<sup>4</sup> || τῆς.....τῇ δὲ omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, added in the margin by a later hand and then again erased) || 37 Ῥόδον II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || 40 Κάμικον Vettori, Κάμικόν Bas.<sup>1</sup> in margin, perhaps rightly, κάμικον Γ<sup>M</sup> P<sup>1-2-4</sup> Ald., κάμικον P<sup>3</sup>, κάμικον Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, *Camerinam* Albertus Magnus and Ar.

1272 a 1 τε omitted by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

states" (7). The words of Ephorus in Strabo X. p. 737 αὐτοὶ δὲ Κρήτας ἀλιγερήσῃ (sc. τῶν νομίμων) κακωθείσων τῶν πολέμων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν Κνωσίων, τῶν πολεμικῶν· μείναι δὲ τινὰ τῶν νομίμων παρὰ Λυκτίοις καὶ Γορτυνίοις καὶ ἄλλοις τοῖς πολυχείοις μάλλον ἢ παρ' ἐκείνοις. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ Λυκτίων νόμιμα ποιεῖσθαι μαρτυρία τοῖς τὰ Λακωνικὰ πρεσβύτερα ἀποφαίνοντα· ἀποίκους γὰρ ὄντας φιλάττειν τὰ τῆς μητροπόλεως ἔθνη· ἐπεὶ ἄλλως γε εἴηδες εἶναι τὸ τοῖς βέλτερον συνεστατάς καὶ πολιτευομένους τῶν χειρόνων ζηλωτὰς ἀποφαίνειν.

34 ἐπικείται = commands the whole (Congreve).

4 After the Dorian invasion Crete lost its fleet and maritime supremacy. Cp. Thuc. I. 4: Ephorus *Fragment.* 64 (Müller I. 350) καὶ γὰρ ναυκρατεῖν πρότερον τοῖς Κρήτας...νῦν δ' ἀποβεβληκέναι τὸ ναυκρατεῖν.

41 ἔχει δ' ἀνάλογον...Λακωνικὴν] Triebel p. 96 ff. shows that, although the points of difference as well as of resemblance are not brought out forcibly enough, yet in the main the whole comparison is just. He tries to make it probable that from its quite peculiar character the similarity can only be explained by a real transference from Sparta to Crete. Oncken on the other hand, II.

177, finds a reason both for the resemblance and the limitations to it in the one point which Aristotle has not mentioned, "the fact that in Sparta as in Crete a dominant race of the same Dorian descent broke in from a foreign land upon an old political order, overcame it by violence, and then directed their whole energies to the task of maintaining themselves uncontaminated and unmolested at the head of their new settlement." Polybius vi. 45, 46 goes still farther and even denies that there were any resemblances at all between the two polities. *SUSEM.* (356)

He insists (1) on the absence of any legal restriction on the possession of land or money, and (2) on the annual tenure of offices (as contrasted with the life-long tenure of Spartan Kings and Gerontes) and the democratic character of the Cretan governments. Undoubtedly as we approach Roman times the power of the *ἐκκλησία* increases; Heck III. pp. 64—97, who supports his case from inscriptions, infers that a democratic revolution had subverted the governments of Aristotle's time.

§ 5 1271 a 1 οἱ περίοικοι] See n. 321 and esp. *Exc.* III. to this book p. 116 ff. *SUSEM.* (367)

καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφοτέροις ἔστιν, καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ (VII)  
 Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεῖα, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἣ καὶ  
 § 6 δῆλον ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις. οἱ  
 5 μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμις τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ  
 καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἔφοροι πέντε τὸν ἀρι-  
 θμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσὶν· οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς γέρουσιν,  
 οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες βουλήν, ἴσοι· βασιλεία δὲ πρότε-  
 ρον μὲν ἦν, εἶτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρήτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν  
 § 7 οἱ κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν· ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέ- 4  
 11 χουσι πάντες, κυρία δ' οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἢ συνεπιψηφίσαι  
 τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς  
 Λάκωσιν (ἐν μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἕκαστος εἰσφέ-  
 15 ρει τὸ τεταγμένον, εἰ δὲ μή, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολι-  
 § 8 τείας, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινοτέρως·

3 φιλτία Γ M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, apparently altered by p<sup>1</sup>) || ἀντρεῖα M<sup>s</sup>, ἀν-  
 δρια Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., ἀλλως ἀνδρια p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 8 βουλήν “a gloss under which  
 lurks a Cretan name” Spengel || πρῶτον Γ Thomas Aquinas and Ar., perhaps  
 rightly || 11 ἀλλη P<sup>3</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>)

3 ἀνδρεῖα=meals of men: or more  
 precisely, clubs or companies of men who  
 messed together: see n. (378) on II § 3.  
 SUSEM. (358)

καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες] The same re-  
 mark is found in Ephoros *l.c.* 482, with  
 the object of proving the same conclusion.  
 Comp. also Plut. *Lycurg.* c. 12. But  
 that Ephoros repeats this argument  
 three times, is a very inexact statement  
 of Trieber, p. 100: for at p. 480 the ex-  
 pression is only ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἀ  
 καλοῦσιν ἀνδρεῖα and p. 483 εἰς τὰ συσι-  
 τια ἄγουσι τὰ ἀνδρεῖα. SUSEM. (359)

This constitution analogous to that of  
 Sparta was the constitution of every inde-  
 pendent Cretan town. We learn from  
 the inscriptions that little places like  
 Hierapytna, Priaios (Praesus), Saxos,  
 Allaria, had each its own κόσμοι, βουλή,  
 and ἐκκλησία.

§ 6 On the analogy between the Ephors  
 and the κόσμοι, see Exc. III. p. 335 f.  
 SUSEM. (360)

7 οἱ δὲ γέροντες] See § II. SUSEM. (361)

§ 7 10 ἐκκλησίας δὲ κτλ] Cp. II  
 §§ 5, 6 with Exc. IV. Although the  
 simple verb ἐπιψηφίζειν does not mean  
 “to vote,” but “to put to the vote,” yet  
 so far as I know συνεπιψηφίζειν is  
 everywhere found in the sense of “vote

approvingly,” i.e. “confirm by a vote,”  
 auctores fieri: Polyb. XXII. 13. 1, Plu-  
 tarch *De Garrulitate* 511 F. Here it can  
 have no other meaning. The only doubt  
 is whether we should take it literally (1)  
 that the popular assembly was bound to  
 ratify by its vote, or (2) that it only had  
 the right, without proper debate and  
 without amendment, simply to confirm  
 or reject the proposal previously decided  
 by others. That question will be dis-  
 cussed in n. (389). SUSEM. (362)

Aesch. *De Fals. Leg.* 35 has the middle  
 voice in the same sense. Compare κατα-  
 σιωπᾶν with both meanings (1) to be very  
 silent, (2) to put to silence (Cope). In  
 the Gortynian inscription the assembly  
 in the market-place and the stone from  
 which the speaker addressed the people  
 are twice mentioned x. 34, ἀμπαίνεθαι  
 δε κατ' ἀγορὰν καταφελμενον τομ πολια-  
 ταν απο το λαο, ο απαγορευοντι, i.e. ἀνα-  
 φαίνεσθαι [he must adopt] δὲ κατ' ἀγορὰν  
 κατεελμένων (Hom.) τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ  
 λάω (cp. Soph. *O. Col.* 196) οὐ ἀπαγορεύ-  
 ουσι, adoption shall be in the market-  
 place, when the citizens are assembled,  
 from the stone where they make speeches:  
 and again XI. 10.

16 εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 31.  
 Cp. n. (341). SUSEM. (363)

ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημάτων (VII)  
των ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ \* \* φέρων οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περί-  
οικοι, τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὰς κοι-  
20 νὰς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ τοῖς συσσιτίοις, ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέ-  
9 φεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἀνδρας πρὸς  
δὲ τὴν ὀλιγοσιτίαν ὡς ὠφέλιμον πολλὰ πεφιλοσόφηκεν ὁ  
νομοθέτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἵνα μὴ  
πολυτεκνῶσι, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας ὁμιλίαν, (20)  
25 περὶ ἧς εἰ φαύλως ἢ μὴ φαύλως, ἕτερος ἔσται τοῦ δια-

18 καὶ ἐκ Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Lambin Bk., perhaps Γ; [ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων] Götting. [ἐκ] Con-  
greve || καὶ <ἀπὸ μορίου τῶν>? or καὶ <ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάτης τῶν>? Susem., see Comm.,  
[καὶ] Lambin, καὶ <ἐκ τῶν> Congreve || καὶ ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων before ἀπὸ πάντων  
or else after ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ by transposition, Schmidt || 21 [καὶ γυναῖκας.....  
26 διασκεψασθαι καιρὸς] Oncken; but see the Comm. || 21 πρὸς δι.....26 καιρὸς  
transposed by Susem.<sup>1</sup> to follow 27 φανερὸν, but wrongly || 24 ποιήσας is corrupt,  
<νομίμην> ποιήσας or something similar? Susem., better πορίσας Schmidt

κοινότη(ρως) ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον of 9 §  
31, in a more public fashion.

18 ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων "from the public  
domain." Zitelmann pp. 139, 140 con-  
jectures that the citizens had the right of  
pasture on this domain-land. By the  
law of inheritance in the Gortynian in-  
scription, certain of the cattle with the  
house in the town pass to the sons as  
*procurum*; but the daughters have a  
share of the land which is cultivated by  
*κληρωταί*.

οἱ περίοικοι] See Exc. III. p. 336 ff.  
SUSEM. (364)

§ 8 19 τέτακται μέρος] Partly on  
this model, partly on that of Hippodamos  
(§ 3 n.), is based the division of the  
land in Aristotle's ideal state, IV(VII).  
10 § 10 n. (834), into property (1) of the  
temples, (2) of the *syssitia*, (3) of private  
individuals, (1) and (2) together forming  
the public land. In the state of the  
*Zetoi* there is no public land, although  
Plato mentions the Cretan institution  
with approval, VII 847 & quoted in n.  
(341) 90 9 § 31. SUSEM. (365)

10 ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ κτλ] If we under-  
stand this as e.g. Schömann does, cf. i.  
307 Eng. II., that the *mensae* main-  
tained the members of the family, wives  
daughters younger boys and slaves, who  
had their meals at home, then the whole  
of Oncken's proof (II. 383), that καὶ γε-  
ναῖσαι καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ ἀνδρας is a spurious  
addition, falls to the ground. Such slight  
inaccuracies of expression, due to exces-  
sive brevity, are no uncommon thing in

Aristotle. The sense might be made  
clearer by a slight insertion thus: "one  
part is set apart for the worship of the  
gods and for the state expenditure, the  
other for the public *mensae*—and the en-  
tire maintenance of the households of the  
citizens>," so that all, men women and  
children, are kept at the public cost.  
Schömann rightly remarks that this ex-  
plains why an Aeginetan stater had to be  
paid for each slave: see Exc. III. p. 337.  
Oncken however gives a different ex-  
planation (II. 387), he makes each of the  
subject population (?) contribute an  
Aeginetan stater. SUSEM. (366)

§ 9 22 ὀλιγοσιτίαν] Our only au-  
thority for a Cretan *diēphōs*, Heraclei-  
des Ponticus, and the writers quoted by  
Athen. IV. 142 f., Diodorus and Pyrgion,  
do not enable us to verify this statement:  
Schömann p. 308. They kept up the old  
practice of sitting at table: *Cretes quantum  
nemo gustavit unquam cubans, Cicero  
pro Muræna* § 74. Their moderation in  
drinking: [Plato] *Ménos* 110 A.

21 πρὸς τὴν διαζεύξιν κτλ] See  
Schömann p. 304 ff. Eng. II. SUSEM. (367)  
Also Zitelmann *Die Zetoi von Gortyna*  
p. 101 and the *hypothesis* itself II. i. 6.  
8, 9.

25 ἕτερος ἔσται τοῦ διασκη καιρὸς]  
Since Aristotle thought it so important  
for his own ideal state to maintain uni-  
formity in the number of citizens (see c.  
6 § 10 ff., 7 § 5; IV(VII). 16 § 13 ff. with  
note), and is not too nice about the  
means of securing that end, it would

σκέψασθαι καιρός). ὅτι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια βέλτιον (VII)  
 τέτακται τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσι, φανερόν, τὰ δὲ  
 § 10 περὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἔτι χεῖρον τῶν ἐφόρων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ  
 ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις  
 30 (γίνονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες). ὁ δ' ἐκεῖ συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν  
 πολιτείαν, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γάρ, διὰ τὸ τὴν  
 αἵρεσιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, μετέχων ὁ δῆμος τῆς μεγίστης  
 ἀρχῆς βούλεται μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐνταῦθα δ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάν-  
 34 των αἰροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ' ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς  
 § 11 γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων, περὶ ὧν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἂν τις  
 εἴπειε λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερόντων (τὸ  
 γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μειζόν ἐστι γέρας τῆς  
 ἀξίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἀρχειν ἀλλ' αὐ-  
 § 12 τογνώμονας ἐπισφαλές). τὸ δ' ἡσυχάζειν μὴ μετέχοντα τὸν  
 40 δῆμον οὐδὲν σημεῖον τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς. οὐδὲν γὰρ λήμ-

26. δὴ Lambin, δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. || 29 τούτων II<sup>2</sup> Bk., τούτῳ ? Sylburg, <τῷ>  
 τούτων Bernays || 34 γενῶν] γερόντων Γ || 35 ἐκ τῶν] ἐκ τινῶν Π<sup>1</sup> || 36 εἴ-  
 πειν P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, corrected by a later hand), εἶποιε M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald., εἶποι P<sup>4</sup> and  
 P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>2</sup>) || τῶν Bas.<sup>3</sup>, ὧν II || γερόντων Congreve, γινομένων Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2,3,4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar.  
 Ald. Bk., γενομένων Q<sup>b</sup> || 37 γέρας] γῆρας Γ || 40 καλῶς. οὐδὲν] καλῶς. οὐδὲ Γ Bk.  
 and perhaps Ar.

have been strange if he had not intended to take this question into consideration when describing the best state. See *Introd.* p. 49 n. 4, p. 53. How he would have decided it, we have no means of knowing. For, taken alone, *Nic. Eth.* VII. 5. 3 hardly justifies an immediate inference that he would have disallowed such means. Thus the grounds on which Oncken, II. 389 ff., tries to prove that § 9, as far as *καιρός*, is interpolated, are wholly untenable: and it is a misapprehension on his part that I bracketed the clause. But he is right in one point, that the introduction of this subject is not very fitting here; we must however put up with it, as it would be still less appropriate in any other part of the chapter. SUSEM. (368)

§ 10 30 γίνονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες] Ephoros *Fr.* 64 (in Strabo p. 482) gives the same statement as Aristotle here, that the senators were chosen from those who had been Κόσμοι but adds that only tried and approved men were selected. There is no divergence in the facts here, but only in the judgment upon them: though it is of such a kind that, as is

stated in Exc. III. p. 336, Aristotle must have depended upon other accounts than those of Ephoros for the facts on which he based his judgment. Furthermore even in Sparta those who had been Ephors must frequently, to say the least, have entered the senate. SUSEM. (369)

32 διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν κτλ.] See c. 9 § 22 n. (323 b). SUSEM. (370)

34 ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν] Called στρατός in the Gortynian inscription v 5 οκ' ο αἰθαλευστартос εκοσμιον οι συν κυλλωι=when it was the turn of the 'troop' of the Aethalians to assume office and Kylllos was κόσμος ἐπώνυμος. Comp. Hesych. στάρτοι (*sic*)=αἱ τάξεις τοῦ πλήθους. Similarly in the oath of Dreros, Cauer *Delect. inscr.* 38, ἐπὶ τῶν Αἰθαλέων κοσμιόντων τῶν σὺγ Κυλῑαι.

35 κεκοσμηκότων] like ὁ ἄρξας, ὁ βασιλεύσας, the aorist being more usual.

§ 11 38 μὴ κατὰ γράμματα] without written rules to guide them. Cp. 9 § 23.

§ 12 See I I § 2.

40 λήμματος] They make no private gains, such as bribes from allies and dependent states, or from hostile powers (comp. Pericles' bribe to the ephor Kleon-

ματός τι τοῖς κόσμοις ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πέρρω γ' (VII)  
 ἀποικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθερούμενων, ἣν δὲ ποιεῖται  
 τῆς ἀμαρτίας ταύτης ἰατρίαν, ὅσπου καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ  
 δυναστευτικὴ. πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινὲς τοῖς  
 κόσμοις ἢ τῶν συναρχόντων αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν· ἔξεστι  
 δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. ταῦτα δὲ  
 πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων βού-  
 λησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὴς ὁ κανὼν. πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον τὸ  
 τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἣν καθιστᾷσι πολλάκις οἱ ἂν μὴ δίκας βούλων-  
 ται δοῦναι τῶν δυναστῶν· ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἔχει τι πολιτείας  
 ἢ τάξις, ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτεία ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δυναστεία μᾶλλον. εἰ-  
 θασι γὰρ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναρ-

41 γ' τ' apparently Ar., γάρ Susem.<sup>1</sup> wrongly, *enim* William, whence nothing is to be inferred about Γ

1272 b 1 διαφερόντων Γ M<sup>a</sup> and perhaps Ar., διαφερόντων P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || 5 δὲ Congreve, rightly, I think || 6 πάντα πάρεστι P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), πάρεστι P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) || 8 of ἂν Koraes, ὅταν Γ II Ar. Schneider Bk. || 9 τῶν δυνατῶν (not here but before 8 ἣν καθιστᾷσι) Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. and p<sup>1</sup> in margin; so transposed, δυνατῶν «τινὲς» or even better «ἐπὶ» τῶν δυνατῶν? Schneider || Heinsius transposes εἰσθασι ... 12 ἀλλήλους before 9 ἢ καὶ δῆλον κτλ. || 11 γάρ Susem. following Bernays' translation, δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> || διαλαμβάνοντες] suspected by Hamitz (*Ind. Arist.* 184 b 6), καὶ λαμβάνοντες Susem.<sup>1</sup>, εἰς λαμβάνοντες Schmidt, possibly if we alter μοναρχίαν into ἀναρχίαν || ἀναρχίαν Bernays, μοναρχίαν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>

dridas, Plut. *Per.* 32). Hence the office is not such a prize as to excite the cupidity of the commons.

41 τοῖς ἐφόροις] Cp. 9 § 19 n. (316). SUSEM. (370 b)

1272 b 1 τῶν διαφθερούμενων goes with πέρρω: at a distance from any who are likely to corrupt them.

§ 13 3 δυναστευτικῇ] A δυναστεία is the worst and most extreme form of Opprobrium, standing nearest to a Tyranny, and, after it, the worst of all forms of government: VI(IV). § 2 ὅταν καὶ ἀντιπαρὸν εἰσὶ καὶ ἀρχὴ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἐκόντες n. (1315); 6 § 11 n. (1328); 14 II 7—9 nn. (1328, 1331); VII(VI). 7 § 3 n. (1447); VIII(V). 3 §§ 3, 4 n. (1509); 6 §§ 11, 12 nn. (1586, 9); 7 §§ 12, 13 n. (1606); 8 § 7 n. (1613), § 11 n. (1617). SUSEM. (371)

Thucles at the time of the Persian war is an instance: Thuc. III. 62. 3.

§ μεταξὺ...ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν] to resign office before their term (of a year) expires. The verb is ἀποστῆναι in the Cretan inscription c. 8' ἀποστῆται—ἐν ἀποστῇ; or (?) ᾗ = ᾗ (after) ἂν ἀποστῇ.

§ 14 8 τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας—the fact of the suspension of the office of Κόσμος, often brought about by cabals of influential families who did not want to have trials against themselves proceeded with.

For the construction cp. Thuc. I. 128 καὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἐλπίδα, ἣν ἐπέθηκε αὐτῷ δουλείαν; II. 42 πενίας ἐλπίδα, ὡς εἶναι ἐπὶ διαφωγῶν αὐτῇ πλουσίαν (Schleto).

οἱ ἂν μὴ κτλ] Oncken (II. 393) is quite wrong in inferring from this passage that even the judicial office probably passed from the kings to the Κόσμοι. From the complete analogy which Aristotle finds between the Spartan and Cretan senators, and between the Ephors and Κόσμοι, in all the essential features of the authority of these offices, it is clear on the contrary that, as in Sparta III. 1. 10 nn. (1447-48), so in Crete, the Senate had criminal jurisdiction over the most serious offenders, and the Κόσμοι appeared, like the Ephors, as accusers in the case of crimes against the state. Where there is no prosecutor there is of course no judge. SUSEM. (372)

11 διαλαμβάνοντες—by forming parties

§ 15 χίαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καί-8  
 τοι τι διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διὰ τινος χρόνου μηκέτι πόλιν  
 εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύεσθαι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; (P.  
 15 ἔστι δ' ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλεις \* \* τοῖς  
 βουλομένοις ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένοις. ἀλλὰ καθάπερ  
 εἴρηται, σφάζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον· ξενηλασίας γὰρ τὸ πόρρω  
 § 16 πεποιήκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιόικων μένει τοῖς Κρησίν, οἱ  
 δ' εἴλωτες ἀφίστανται πολλάκις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς  
 20 κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες, νεωστί τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβέ-  
 βηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὃς πεποιήκε φανεράν τὴν ἀσθένειαν  
 τῶν ἐκεῖ νόμων.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης τοσαῦθ' ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω τῆς πολι-

15 ἐπικίνδυνος] *valde periculosa* William on his own conjecture probably, hence  
 λαν ἐπικίνδυνος Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> wrongly || τῶν βουλομένων and 16 δυναμένων II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk.  
 "because those who wish to attack it can also (easily do so)" Bernays; <δὲντων> τῶν  
 βουλομένων Bas.<sup>3</sup>, <ἀπὸ> τῶν β. Busse. If the dative is right an infinitive has  
 dropped out, as Bücheler saw || 21 φανερόν Bk.<sup>1</sup>, a misprint || 23 εἰρήσθω before  
 τοσαῦθ' P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

from amongst the people and their own friends. SUSEM.

§ 15 17 ξενηλασίας] Acc. plur. 'The distance has kept out aliens as effectually as a formal prohibition.' No foreigner could come to Sparta and live as a resident alien (μέτοικος): strangers stopping there for a time were strictly watched and, as soon as it seemed advisable to the Ephors, dismissed: see Schömann p. 276 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (373)

§ 16 18 διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν π. κτλ] Consult however n. (281) on 9 § 3: where also a different reason, it should be observed, is assigned by Aristotle himself, viz. that the Cretan states, even if at war, assist one another against the revolted περίοικοι. SUSEM. (374)

19 οὔτε γὰρ] It is the isolation, not the strength, of the Cretans that secures their independence; for (1) they are not strong enough to acquire foreign dominion (ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς), while (2) their internal weakness is now patent.

20 νεωστί τε πόλεμος κτλ] There are two events to which this passage, taken by itself, may refer. (1) With Höck, *Kreta* III. 61 f., we may understand it of the Phocian war. Phalaecus, the last leader of the Phocians, after withdrawing from Phocis came at last with his mercenaries to Crete: by a stratagem he conquered Lyktos and drove out the inhabitants who turned to their

mother city, Sparta, for aid. This aid they received under the command of Archidamos, who beat the mercenaries and reestablished the Lyktians in their city. Phalaecus however stayed in the island and fell at the siege of Kydonia B.C. 343. See Schäfer *Demosthenes* II. 339 f. Or (2) we might with Fülleborn (II. 253) refer it to the despatch of Agesilaos with the mercenaries of his brother Agis II, who was allied with the Persians and sent the expedition directly after the battle of Issos (333) to conquer Crete. The Lacedaemonians with their mercenaries effected a landing successfully and met with no material resistance; see Schäfer III. p. 163 f. As therefore both events suit, if, when he wrote the passage, Aristotle had been acquainted with the second he would certainly have spoken of *two* foreign wars, and not of one only: thus it seems as if this passage were composed before the latter of the two events took place. But it need not be inferred from this that the completion of the book, so far as Aristotle did at all complete it, could not have been of a much later date. Aristotle often worked at several of his treatises at the same time. Cp. *Introd.* p. 66. SUSEM. (375)

ξενικός = of mercenaries (Congreve). Better, 'foreign.' For III. 14. 7 ξενικόν as opposed to οἱ πολῖται means a foreign force, though a force of mercenaries.

11 **τείας· πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι καλῶς καὶ VIII**  
 25 **πολλὰ περιττῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δ'· ἔνια παρα-**  
**πλησίως τοῖς Λάκωσιν. αὐται γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τρεῖς ἀλλή-**  
**λαις τε σύνεγγός πάς εἰσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ διαφέρου-**  
**σιν, ἥ τε Κρητικὴ καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ καὶ τρίτη τούτων ἡ τῶν**  
 29 **Καρχηδονίων. καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει παρ' αὐτοῖς**  
 32 **καλῶς· σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης τὸ τὸν ἔημον**  
**ἐκούσιον διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ μήτε στά-**  
**σιν, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, γεγενῆσθαι μήτε τύραννον.**

3 **ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτεία τὰ μὲν συσ-**

24 καὶ καρχηδόνιοι after καλῶς M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 28 ἡ before Λακωνική omitted in M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [η] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || 30 σημεῖον τε? Susem. || <εὖ>- συντεταγμένης Schmalzer, εὖ τεταγμένης Bergk (*Comm. crit. spec.* VI, Marburg 1850), one or other seems necessary; bene institutae Ar.: πόλεως for πολιτείας Bender || 31 ἐκούσιον Sprengel, ἔκουσαν P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk., omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, untranslated by Ar.; ἔκοντα Bergk, ἔκοντα Hamaker, ἐκουσίως W. Wagner (*De Plauti Aulul.*, Bonn 1864 p. 37), all before Sprengel; ἔχ<οντα ἔξ>-ονσαν Sauppe, ἔχουσαν <κύριον>- Bender following Lambin's translation *populum rerum compotem* || ἐν omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, crossed out by P<sup>2</sup>

#### c. 11 The constitution of Carthage.

On this chapter consult Kluge *Aristoteles de politia Carthaginiensium. Accedit Theodori Metochitae descriptio reipublicae Carthaginiensis* (Breslau 1824); Heeren *Ideen* vol. II. pt. 1, *Works* XIII. 108—147; Movers *Die Phönizier* (Berlin 1849) vol. II. pt. I. p. 479 ff.; Mommsen *History of Rome*, vol. II. pp. 15—23 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (376)

§ 1 24 **πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ κτλ**] “are thought (a) to enjoy a good constitution, (b) with many features of unusual relative excellence, and (c) some which most nearly resemble the Spartan constitution.” Of these three points Aristotle adopts two, (c) and (a), in the next two sentences giving more definite reasons for (a) in § 2, and passing on to (c) in § 3. But the farther discussion § 3 ff. proves sufficiently that he also accepted the second point. Isocrates III. 24, and Julian, *Or.* I. p. 14 (Spanh.), also point to a similarity between the Carthaginian and Spartan constitutions which they declare to be the best actually established. Polybius VI. 51 f. and Cicero *De Rep.* II. 23 § 41 ff. compare them both with one another and with the Roman constitution, while Eutrochides (in Strabo I. p. 66) praises the admirable character of the Carthaginian and Roman constitutions. SUSEM. (377)

The exciting struggle with Dionysius for Sicily must have called attention to the government of Carthage: see *note* on

1273 a 36 (Wyc).

§ 2 30 It is a sign that a government is thoroughly <well>-organised when the popular element is attached to the system of its own free will.

31 **διαμένειν**, like *μένειν* 10 § 16, = abide by, remain loyal to, a government.

32 **μήτε τύραννον**] This assertion seems true. For the efforts of Hannibal (about B.C. 344) to make himself tyrant, mentioned by Aristotle himself VIII. 7 § 4, met with no success, see *n.* (1597); while the attempt of Bomilcar was not until after Aristotle's time, B.C. 308. That also ended at last unsuccessfully; see the same *note*. Lastly there was one Malchus between 600 and 550 B.C., who having been banished because he had been defeated in Samnium procured his return by force of arms. He then summoned the popular assembly, justified his conduct before it, and had ten senators put to death, but made no change in the existing constitution. However he fell under suspicion of aiming at tyrannical power; in consequence, and as a punishment for his former violent proceedings, he was executed. Justin. XVIII. 7, so that this instance does not contradict Aristotle's statement. With regard to VIII(V). 12 § 12 see *n.* (1771). SUSEM. (377 b)

§ 3 “The points of analogy to the Spartan polity are the common meals of the clubs like the *gymnaea* at Sparta, and

σίτια τῶν ἐταιριῶν τοῖς φιδιτίοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκατὸν (VI  
 35 καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν τοῖς ἐφόροις (πλὴν οὐ χεῖρον· οἱ μὲν  
 γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσὶ, ταύτην δ' αἰροῦνται τὴν ἀρχὴν  
 ἀριστίνδην), τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον  
 § 4 τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσι καὶ γέρουσιν, καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βασι-  
 λεῖς μῆτε καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος μῆτε τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν, †εἴ τι  
 40 διαφέρουν ἐκ τούτων† αἰρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν. μεγά-  
 λων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστώτες, ἂν εὐτελεῖς ὦσι, μεγάλα βλά-  
 1273 a πτουσιν, καὶ ἔβλαψαν ἤδη τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.  
 § 5 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν διὰ τὰς 3

34 φιλιτίοις Π<sup>1</sup>, corrected by p<sup>1</sup> || τὴν.....35 ἀρχὴν is noticed by Theodoros Metoch. Miscell. p. 667 Kiessl. || 35 <δ>οὐ Bernays || 36 γὰρ omitted by P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. Bernays || 38 ἐκεῖ inserted after τοὺς by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>4</sup> || 39 καθ' αὐτὸ Γ and γρ. p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, κατ' αὐτὸ P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) καυταντὸ M<sup>a</sup> (1st hand), καταντὸ M<sup>a</sup> (correction), κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ II<sup>2</sup> Bk. and p<sup>1</sup> above the line, κατὰ τὸ Ar. (?) || μῆτε before τοῦτο Schneider, μηδὲ II Bk. || εἴ τι Γ, εἴ τε M<sup>a</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, ἢ Ar. and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), εἴ τέ τι Welldon || εἴ τι διαφέρουν ἐκ τούτων is corrupt: \* \* ἐκ τούτων Conring, who first saw that from ἐκ τούτων onwards Aristotle is speaking of the senate and not the kings: but this is true of the whole clause from εἴ τι. With approximate correctness τοὺς δὲ γέροντας τῷ Schneider, τοὺς δὲ γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον J. Brandis (*Rhein. Mus.* XI. 595 f.) which is closer to the mss., εἰς δὲ γερουσίαν ἐκ πλουσίων Bernays. On grammatical grounds I prefer Brandis' suggestion with Bücheler's slight change ἔτι δὲ τοὺς γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον, or better still ἔτι δὲ γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον, though I have not ventured to introduce it into the text

1273 a I καρχηδονίων or καλχηδονίων Γ

the magistracy of the Hundred and Four answering to the Ephors (only with this advantage in its favour that whereas the Ephors are chosen from quite ordinary persons the Carthaginians elect to this office by merit)." See Excursus IV. pp. 340—347. SUSEM. (378-9-81-2)

36 ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων] See c. 10 § 10 n. (369). SUSEM. (380)

§ 4 38 "And it is a further advantage that the kings (at Carthage) are not a distinct royal line and that, too, of not more than average capacity," like the Heracleid royal families at Sparta, whose precise relation to the Dorian Spartiateae is obscure. See Hdt. v. 72, Curtius *History* I. p. 186 ff. Eng. tr. and Schömann *Antiquities* pp. 208, 226, 541—544 Eng. tr.

39 μῆτε καθ' αὐτὸ κτλ] Comp. 9 § 30 n. (339) and p. 344. SUSEM. (383) εἴ τι διαφέρουν] See the *Critical Notes*. The sense required is "and that the senators are elected for wealth and not by seniority."

40 καθ' ἡλικίαν] The unsoundness of the text is felt when this has to be interpreted of the Spartan kings. Congreve renders boldly "elected rather than hereditary": Cope more cautiously "according to age." But there was no limit of age for the kings, though there was for the Gerusiasts, at Sparta.

μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι κτλ] The Spartan senators were venal, 9 § 26 n. (331 b). But the conditional praise here given to the constitution of Carthage is sensibly modified § 8 ff. SUSEM. (384)

41 εὐτελεῖς=cheap, of little worth; intellectually, in *Rhet.* II. 15 § 3; here, in moral character also.

§ 5 1273 a 2 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα κτλ] "Most of the things which might be censured on the score of divergences" sc. from the best type "are common to all the constitutions mentioned." And therefore in reference to Carthage Aristotle passes over all such defects in silence (Kluge). SUSEM. (385)

παρεκβάσεις \* \* κοινὰ τυγχάνει πάντων διὰ τὰς εἰρημίους (τις)  
πολιτείαις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας  
5 καὶ τῆς πολιτείας \* \* τὰ μὲν εἰς δῆμον ἐκκλίνει μᾶλλον,  
τὰ δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν προσάγει \* \*  
τὰ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον οἱ βασιλεῖς κίριοι  
μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἂν ὁμογνωμονῶσι πάντες, εἰ δὲ μὴ,  
6 τούτων καὶ ὁ δῆμος, ἂ δ' ἂν εἰσφέρωσιν οὔτοι οὐ δια-  
10 κοῦσαι μόνον ἀποδιδόασιν τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἀρ-

3 παρεκβάσεις «τὰς τῆς ἀρίστης τάξεως» or something similar Susem., cp. 9 § 1. Fülleborn first suspected a defect || 4 ὑπόθεσιν «ὑπεναντίων» Bernays; cp. also 9 § 1 || 5 πολιτείας «τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις» Susem., ἐκκλίνει «τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις» Thurot, who discovered the lacuna || ἐκκλίνει P<sup>1</sup>, ἐκκλίνει M<sup>1</sup> (corr.) || 6 γὰρ τὰ Morel Bk. Bernays || 7 τὸ δὲ μὴ II<sup>2</sup> Bk. Bernays. In Q<sup>2</sup> τὸ is a correction of τὰ, apparently by the scribe himself || 9 τοῦτων καὶ Susem., καὶ τοῦτων Γ II Bk., καὶ τοῦτον Bernays || εἰσφέρουσιν II<sup>2</sup> (emended by corr.<sup>1</sup> in P<sup>2</sup>) || οὔτοι omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, [οὔτοι] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 10 τὰ δόξαντα τάζαντα M<sup>1</sup>, τάζαντα P<sup>1</sup> (in hand, corrected by p<sup>1</sup>), τάζαντι Γ

4 With τῶν δὲ καμπίρ ἐπισημειώσεων ἀρ., and take πρὸς = when judged by.

τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κτλ.] The whole passage requires to be read in the light of c. 9 § 1 where the two standards of the criticism are more definitely stated: μία μὲν εἰ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην νουνομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἑτέρα δ' εἰ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας. The second, then, which is now under consideration is, how far the Carthaginian constitution, although not the best, that is, a true Aristocracy, nevertheless remains faithful to its own distinctive principle. It is still to be regarded as an aristocracy: i.e. a so-called, or mixed aristocracy: more precisely a combination of aristocracy with oligarchy and democracy: see VI(IV). 2 § 4 n. (1141); 7 § 4 n. (1235), and cp. VII(V). 7 § 4 n. (1597), 12 § 12 n. (1771), § 14 n. (1780); or else at any rate as a polity (πολιτεία) i.e. a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. Now the principle or fundamental ἀνωμαλία (ἐκεί-θεσις) or proper basis of every aristocracy is excellence and capacity: see esp. § 9 τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν αἰρεῖσθαι ἀρ., § 11 μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, VI(IV). 8. § 7 ὅπως ἀρετὴ and n. (536) on III. 7 § 3. Even in a nominal aristocracy, regard at least for those must stand highest: hence the more concessions are made to the oligarchical principle of wealth, or again to the democratic principle, at the expense of excellence or merit, the more the aristo-

cracy departs from its own standard. Polity takes for its standard the complete adjustment and neutralization of Oligarchy and Democracy; hence the more the oligarchical principle on the one hand makes itself felt at the expense of the democratic or the democratic principle on the other at the expense of the oligarchical, the more violently does a Polity diverge from its own principle in the one or the other direction: see VIII. c. 9.

Cato quoted by Servius on Vergil's Aeneid IV. 682, Polybius VI. 31. 2 and Cicero *I. c.* call the constitution of Carthage, less accurately, a combination of monarchy, aristocracy (Cato, *optimatus potestas*; Cicero, *gens optimas*), and democracy. SUSEM. (386)

6. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτλ.] "For the kings in conjunction with the senators have full powers either to bring certain matters before the people or not, provided they are both agreed: otherwise in this case the people, too, have a voice."

8 πάντες «both; viz. the Senators on the one side, the Senators on the other. For this is a genuine Aristotelian use of the word: "παντες ἡμὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀγίτου, i. q. ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ" (*Anal. Pr.*). Comp. *Anal. Pr.* I. 1. 28. 44 b 21 δὲν πάντες ἐπὶ τοῖς "h. c. ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, et maiori termino et minori" (Wall.; also VI(IV). 4. 2. See also *Exc.* IV. 4 δέξαι, p. 347. SUSEM. (387)

Add *Anal. Pr.* I. 1. 27 § 12. 43 b 25. *Metaph.* II. 4 § 1. 339 b 23. IV. 2 § 8.

χουσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς (VI.  
12 εἰσφερομένοις ἀντειπεῖν ἔξεστιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολι-

382 b 17, and *De Anima* III. 6 § 2, 430 b 4 (Vahlen).

§ 6 11 ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν] Here then in reality the final decision rests with the popular assembly; and Aristotle, judging by the standard of Aristocracy or Polity, disapproves of this, which furnishes another indication of the character of his own best state, in so far as that also is Aristocracy: see on 6 § 16 n. (218) and Exc. I to B. III. In keeping with this (he says) in the most moderate democracy the people are best restricted to electing the council and the officers of state and to holding them responsible, VII(VI). 4. 4 n. (1415), perhaps with a share in legislation and the decision upon changes in the constitution VI(IV). 14. 4 f.: at least only the most indispensable meetings of the popular assembly are held VI(IV). 6. 1, the administration being left to the council and the officers of state. Or even the magistrates may be elected by a mere committee of the whole people upon which all the citizens serve by rotation, VII(VI). 4. 4; or it may come to this that no popular assembly is held but it is represented by the aforesaid committee, which moreover has in many cases simply to hear the resolutions of the magistrates, VI(IV). 14. 4 n. (1322). And these are the forms of democracy which Aristotle regards as the best. SUSEM. (388)

12 ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις κτλ] In the Spartan assembly only the kings, the senators, and at a later period the ephors were allowed to take part in the debate: other persons needed special permission in order to do so (see Schömann *Antiquities* p. 235 Eng. tr.). Undoubtedly it was similar in Crete. But when Aristotle says, or seems to say, here that in Sparta and Crete the popular assembly had merely to listen to the resolutions of the government without really having the final decision in its own hands, and 10 § 7 (cp. n. 362) that it had in those states no greater powers entrusted to it than to ratify the decrees of the Cosmi, or the kings, and the senators, all this certainly looks at first sight as if the assembly had not the right to reject these decrees, and indeed many have so understood it [e.g. Höck *Kreta* III. 59 ff., Ridgeway *op.c.* p. 134]. But that these expressions should not be thus pressed is shown by the simple consideration that if the assembly

had merely to "listen to" these resolutions, it would not have been allowed to vote even in ratification of them, and thus Aristotle would have contradicted himself. But he further states that at Carthage the popular assembly, once convoked, possessed far larger privileges than in Sparta and Crete, although in respect of being summoned its rights were smaller because there was no need to convoke it in case the Shofetes and the senate were agreed: whereas in Sparta and Crete it always had to be summoned, in order to ratify the decrees of the two ruling bodies. Now if it had always to ratify or vote affirmatively, where is this greater right? But in fact when nothing might be said in the assembly except by permission of the government, and no amendments might be proposed, there was little reason to fear, so long as the kings, the senators, and the ephors were agreed, that the people would actually use their formal right of rejection. Hence it is that Aristotle uses these strong expressions which quite answer to the actual state of the case. Finally, supposing, it must be conceded to Oncken (I. p. 279 f.) and Gilbert (p. 137 f.) that the obvious meaning of the clause in Plutarch *Lycurg.* 6, which was added to the Spartan constitution (Rhetra) by the kings Theopompos and Polydoros (αἱ δὲ σκολιὰν ὁ δᾶμος ἔλοιτο, τοὺς πρεσβυγενέας καὶ ἀρχαγέτας ἀποστατήρας ἦμεν) is, that it was left to the discretion of the kings and senators whether they should respect a vote in the assembly refusing ratification, or not;—supposing further that Aristotle's language really agrees most easily with this meaning (which is hardly the case, after what has been said), yet the whole hypothesis is simply wrecked by the fact that Gilbert himself explains this to be a quite abnormal *Spartan* institution, while Aristotle asserts that the powers of the Cretan and Spartan assemblies were altogether similar. Thus we are forced to be content with the interpretation of the additional clause given by Plutarch, τοῦτ' ἔστι μὴ κυροῦν, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀφίστασθαι καὶ διαλύειν τὸν δῆμον, ὡς ἐκτρέποντα καὶ μεταποιούντα τὴν γνώμην παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, i. e. the popular assembly was restricted to a simple, unaltered acceptance or rejection of the proposals made by the king and the senate. SUSEM. (389)

7 τείαις οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κυρίας οἷσας πολλῶν  
 καὶ μεγάλων ὑφ' αὐτῶν αἰρετὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐκατὸν  
 15 ταύτας αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχήν, ὅτι ἐκ ταύτας  
 πλέονα ἄρχειν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξεληλυθότες  
 ἄρχουσι καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ  
 μὴ κληρωτὰς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετίον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑτε-  
 20 ρον, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀρχείων δικάζεσθαι πό-  
 25 ρους, καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι.  
 3 παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἡ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδονί-  
 4 ονίων μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατὰ τινα διάνοιαν ἢ  
 συνδοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστινὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 9 πλουτίνην οἶονται δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι τοῖς ἄρχοντας· ἀδύνατον  
 γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν. εἴπερ οὖν  
 τὸ μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι πλουτίνην ὀλιγαρχικόν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀρε-  
 τὴν ἀριστοκρατικόν, αὕτη τις ἂν εἴη τάξις τρίτη, καθ' ἣν  
 14 περ συντέτακται [καὶ] τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τὰ περὶ τὴν πο-  
 λιτείαν· αἰροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες, καὶ μά-  
 20 λιστα τὰς μεγίστας, τοὺς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς.  
 10 δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ὁμάρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρίασασιν αἰσῶν

16 πλέον M<sup>1</sup>, πλείονα P<sup>2-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> (later hand), πλείονας P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand) || 17 μένοντες? Sylburg wrongly || τὸ] τὰς P<sup>4-6</sup> and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, τὰς Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 18 καὶ εἴ.....ἑτερον Kluge thinks interpolated or out of place || 19 τῶν Κοραεῖς (cp. III. 1. 10), τῶν II Ar. Bk., τῶν «αὐτῶν» Vettori: τῶν ἀρχείων τῶντων P<sup>6</sup> Ar. || 20 καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι Bender thinks not genuine || 18 [on.] Susem., untranslated by Ar., καὶ συντέτακται Congreve transposing, καὶ «ταπεινὸν ἦκε» or something similar Thurot

§ 7 13 τὰς πενταρχ(ας) See Exc. IV. p. 348 f. SUSEM. (390)

19 ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀρχείων] Aristotle says "courts" in the plural; see Exc. IV. He regards the separation of jurisdiction from administration as aristocratic provided (1) that the courts are not constituted by lot, and (2) that in electing to them greater attention can be paid to the appointment of the persons best qualified for the office than is the case when different branches of the administration of justice are more appendages to different offices of state. Further cp. III. 1 §§ 10, 11 τὰς δὲ καὶ διαδίσκει κατὰ μέρος...τὰς αὐτὰς δὲ τοῖσιν καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα· πῶσαι γὰρ ἀρχαὶ γινῶσι κατὰ τὰς δίκας, III. (443, 4): also II. (325) on 9 § 23 above, p. 348 and *Introd.* p. 54 n. 3. SUSEM. (391)

20 καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι] On the jurisdiction of the senate and the Ephors cf. *Epist.* see III. (325, 329 b) on 9 §§

23, 25; on that of the kings Schömann p. 229 Eng. tr.; on that of the other magistrates op. l. 230 ff. SUSEM. (391 b)

§ 8 23 ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτίνην] Yet apart from the ideal state—see II. (389) on IV(VII). 13 § 9 τὰς αὐτὰς αἰσῶν—Aristotle himself approves of Solon's moderate census in this respect 12 §§ 5, 6: III. 11 § 8. SUSEM. (392)

§ 9 30 τοὺς στρατηγοὺς] See Exc. IV. p. 349 f. SUSEM. (392 b)

§ 10 31 δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν κτλ.] See 9 § 2 n. (279): compare IV(VIII). 9 § 2, 10 § 9 n. "But if Aristotle demands of the legislator that he is to free the magistrates from all anxieties about their support, this can only be done by paying them. And yet in § 7 above he had himself declared it a better regulation not to combine such offices with payments." (Fullbrook). See however Exc. IV. p. 348. SUSEM. (393)

τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθ' ὅρᾱν ἐστι (VII  
 τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν  
 34 καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἄρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἰδιω-  
 b 6 τεύοντες. <βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν  
 b 7 <ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.>  
 a 35 εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχο-  
 λῆς, φαῦλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὦνητὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν,  
 § 11 τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν. ἔντιμον γὰρ ὁ νόμος  
 οὗτος ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὴν πόλιν (p. 55  
 ὅλην φιλοχρήματον. ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβῃ τίμιον εἶναι τὸ  
 40 κύριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἀκολου-  
 θεῖν τούτοις. ὅπου δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, ταύτην  
 1273 b  
 § 12 οὐχ οἶόν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐθί-  
 ζεσθαι δ' εὐλογον κερδαίνειν τοὺς ὠνουμένους, ὅταν δαπα-  
 νήσαντες ἄρχωσιν· ἄτοπον [μὲν] γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὦν ἐπιεικῆς  
 δὲ βουλήσεται κερδαίνειν, φαυλότερος δ' ὦν οὐ βουλήσεται  
 5 δαπανήσας. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς δυναμένους ἄριστ' ἄρχειν, τούτους  
 ἄρχειν. βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν  
 ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.

32 ταῦθ' Bk.<sup>2</sup>, a misprint probably || 33 βέλτιστον P<sup>2.3</sup>

1273 b 6, 7 βέλτιον.....σχολῆς transposed by Susem., *Introd.* p. 81 f. ||  
 6 εὐπορίαν P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. || 7 ἀλλὰ καὶ Γ possibly

1273 a 35 δεῖ] δὴ T<sup>b</sup> and Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand, corrected by later hand), δὴ δεῖ P<sup>2.3</sup> ||  
 39 ὅ τι P<sup>2</sup>, ὅτι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1.4</sup> Ald. Bk. and perhaps P<sup>3</sup>. || γὰρ Ar., δ' Γ II (for which Π<sup>2</sup> in  
 Susem.<sup>1</sup> is a misprint) Bk. || 40 πολιτειῶν Γ M<sup>s</sup>

1273 b 1 τε.....τὴν] τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 2 δ'] γὰρ Spengel ||  
 τοῦτ' ὠνουμένους Γ M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, corrected by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin), [τοῦτ' ὠνουμέ-  
 νους] Susem.<sup>1.2</sup>, τοὺς ὠνημένους Ramus || 3 μὲν is rightly omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 4  
 ὦν] ἂν Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 5 ἄριστ' ἄρχειν Spengel, ἀρισταρχεῖν Γ II Bk.

35 εἰ δὲ...πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχο-  
 λῆς] "But even supposing that means  
 must be taken into account, in order to  
 secure leisure," i.e. magistrates who can  
 devote their whole time to their duties,  
 "it is a grave defect that the highest  
 offices, like that of Shofete or general,  
 should be purchaseable." Here he takes  
 up the condition postulated and justified  
 above § 8, a 23, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτίνδην κτλ.

36 τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὦνητὰς κτλ] The  
 same thing is said by Polybios VI. 56. 4  
 (Schlosser). SUSEM. (394) Mr Wyse re-  
 fers to Plato *Rep.* 544 D: ὠνηταὶ βασι-  
 λείαι and such like intermediate polities  
 are to be found outside of Greece (περὶ  
 τοὺς βαρβάρους).

§ 11 40 τὸ κύριον] the supreme autho-  
 rity, i.e. the government: III. 6. 1 n. (523).

41 τούτοις=τῷ κυρίῳ. In c. 5 § 15,  
 7 § 8 he has dwelt on the comparative  
 weakness of direct enactments and go-  
 vernment interference. But public opi-  
 nion can be legitimately educated and  
 influenced, and this is τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς  
 τὰς πολιτείας. See VIII(v). 9 §§ 11-15.

§ 12 1273 b 1 ἐθίζεσθαι κτλ] "Nor is  
 it strange that the purchasers of place  
 should be accustomed to make a profit out  
 of it, when it has cost them dear." The  
 article with the participle need not be  
 suspected; the sense is "buying office as  
 they do." Cp. c. 8 § 10 οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ  
 πορίζοντες=if they supply, whereas οἱ  
 πορίζοντες would be 'supplying, as they  
 do'=as they supply (Tyrrell).

5 διὸ δεῖ κτλ] Cp. 9 § 27 n. (335).  
 SUSEM. (395)

- 13 φαῦλον δ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλείονος ἀρχὴς τῶν  
αὐτὸν ἄρχειν ὅπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἐν γὰρ  
10 ὑφ' ἐνὸς ἔργον ἄριστ' ἀποτελεῖται. δεῖ δὲ ὅπως γίνηται τοῦτο  
ὁρᾶν τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ προστάττειν τὸν αὐτὸν αἰεὶς  
14 καὶ σκυτοτομεῖν. ὥσθ' ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ πόλεις, πολιτικώτερον  
πλείονας μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ δημοτικώτερον· κοινώτερον  
τε γάρ, καί, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, κάλλιον ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖ-  
15 ται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θᾶττον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν πολε-  
μικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις διὰ  
πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν διελήλυθε τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι.  
15 ὀλιγαρχικῆς δ' οὔσης τῆς πολιτείας ἄριστα <στάσει> ἐκ-  
φαίγουσι τῷ πλουτεῖν, αἰεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπέμποντες

6 βέλτιον.....7 σχολῇ. See on 1273 a 35. 10 δὲ Sussem., δ' Γ II (de M.) Bk. II 14 καὶ before καθάπερ Sussem., καὶ after εἶπομεν Γ II Ar. Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup>: Bender, with Bernays, accepts Sussemihl's transposition, or else would omit καθάπερ εἶπομεν. 15 τὸν αὐτῶν M<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν? Γ, αὐτῶν William: αὐτῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν? Sussem., τῶν ἔργων Bernays, tempting but not certain: [τῶν αὐτῶν] Bender, as due to the τῶν ναυτικῶν following: not bad. 18 καὶ inserted after οὔσης by P<sup>4</sup>·5 (P<sup>1</sup>·T<sup>1</sup>). «στάσει» Bernays, illud effugient Ar.: Wilamowitz saw an object was required for ἐκφαίγουσι, «τοῦτο» Kluge after Ar., «ἐκφαίγουσι» for ἄριστα Hampke. Cp. II § 2. 19 τῷ πλουτεῖν Sussem.<sup>1,2</sup> following Schenckel, misled by William's rendering *inditando*.

§ 13 Plato's principle of the division of labour, with the stock Socratic examples of shoemaker and flute player: cp. c. 2 § 5, 3 n., Pl. *Rep.* II. 374 C.

§ 14 12 πολιτικώτερον] more to the advantage (or, in the interest) of the state, which is in this way better administered (κάλλιον οὕτως ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν πολιτικῶν).

13 κοινώτερόν τε γάρ] sc. ἐστίν. For thus the government concerns wider interests, is more comprehensive. This is given as the reason for δημοτικώτερον; the next sentence justifies πολιτικώτερον. On this paragraph consult further VI(IV). 15 §§ 5—8 n. (1352). SUSEM. (396).

15 τῶν αὐτῶν] Each of the invariable tasks incident to government is, with a proper division of labour, better and more quickly performed (T. L. Heath).

16 ἐν τούτοις γάρ κτλ.] The commander in chief alone has merely to command; the private soldiers alone have merely to obey; all ranks between have both to command and be commanded (Piccart). SUSEM. (397).

§ 15 19 αἰεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου] Cp. VII(VI). § 9, φίλος ἀκούεται τὸν δήμον.

ἀεὶ γὰρ τινὰς ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιουσίας ποιοῦσιν εὐπρόσπον. The subjects of the Carthaginian rule in Africa may be classified as follows: (1) the so-called Liby-Phoenicians, i.e. the old Phoenician settlements and others recently founded by Carthage: unfortified towns, partly no doubt inhabited by a mixed Phoenician and Libyan population, which had to pay a fixed tribute and furnish contingents. Utica alone escaped a similar fate, and had its independence and its walls preserved to it from the pious feeling of the Carthaginians towards their ancient protector, (2) The agricultural villages of native Libyans who had been transformed from free farmers into fellahs: they had to pay a fourth part of the product of the soil as land-tax (Polyb. I. 71. 2) and were subjected to a regular system of recruiting. (3) The nomadic pastoral tribes (nomads) who had to pay tribute and to furnish contingents. In the histories of the Carthaginian state preserved by Greek writers (3) are called *θῆες*, "tribes," and the villages occupied by (2) are called *πόλεις*, "towns," of subjects (Münchinger II).

- 20 ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις. τούτῳ γὰρ ἰῶνται καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τὴν (VI)  
πολιτείαν. ἀλλὰ τουτί ἐστι τύχης ἔργον, δεῖ δὲ ἀστασιά-  
§ 16 στους εἶναι διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην. νῦν δέ, ἂν ἀτυχία γένηται  
τις καὶ τὸ πλήθος ἀποστῇ τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲν ἔστι φάρ-  
μακον διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἡσυχίας.
- (12) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ Κρη-  
26 τικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων, αἵπερ δικαίως εὐδοκιμοῦσι,  
12 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον· τῶν δὲ ἀποφνημαμένων τι περὶ πο- IX  
λιτείας ἔνιοι μὲν οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ'  
ὠντινωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον, περὶ (p. 5  
30 ὧν εἴ τι ἀξιόλογον, εἴρηται σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων, ἔνιοι δὲ  
νομοθέται γεγόνασιν, οἳ μὲν ταῖς οἰκείαις πόλεσιν οἳ δὲ καὶ  
τῶν ὀθνείων τισί, πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί· καὶ τούτων οἳ μὲν ἐγέ-  
νοντο δημιουργοὶ νόμων, οἳ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οἷον καὶ Λυ-  
κοῦργος καὶ Σόλων· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέ-  
§ 2 στησαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων εἴρηται, Σόλωνα δ' 2  
36 ἔνιοι μὲν οἴονται γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπουδαῖον. ὀλιγαρχίαν

25 περὶ...1274 b 26 αὖν (c. 12) is noticed by Michael of Ephesus op. c. f. 188<sup>b</sup>.  
Göttling pronounced the whole of c. 12 spurious. See Comm. *nn.* (399, 423, 427)  
|| κρήτης M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 26 αἵπερ] εἰ[περ]? Susem. (Γ may have omitted περ, *quae* Wil-  
liam) || 27 τι omitted in Π<sup>1</sup>, hence [τι] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || 32 νόμων inserted after μὲν  
by Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || 33 νόμων] μόνον Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || 36 γενέσθαι after νομοθέτην Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

p. 9 f. Eng. tr.). See esp. Diod. xx. 55. 4. It is the latter which are here meant (ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις). We are not to understand the passage, with Heeren (p. 42) and Movers (p. 358), of the foundation of new colonies; but of appointments like that of governor and assessor of taxes which gave the holders the opportunity of enriching themselves at the expense of their subjects. (See Kluge p. 192 ff., who however incorrectly assumes that such officers were sent to Liby-Phoenician cities, indeed chiefly to them.) It was in accordance with the principles of Carthaginian policy not, as a rule, to give these appointments to decayed nobles (as might be inferred from Mommsen's account II. p. 17 Eng. tr.), but according to Aristotle's explicit statement to plebeians, or citizens who did not belong to the ruling houses. SUSEM. (398)

§ 16 24 φάρμακον τῆς ἡσυχίας] "No spell in their laws to restore peace," i.e. no means of terminating civic strife. Comp. the judgment of Polyb. VI. 51 on the second Punic War.

c. 12 The Solonian Constitution: §§ 1—6.

For the historical bearings of this passage consult especially Grote cc. 11, 31; Schömann *Antiquities* pp. 322—342 Eng. tr. and *Athenian Constitutional History* translated by Bosanquet (Oxford 1878). Also *Case Materials for the History of Athenian Democracy* (Oxford 1874): Oncken *Athen und Hellas* pp. 161—173, *Staatslehre* II. 410 ff.

§ 1 28 οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν κτλ.] see I. 7. 5, II. 7. 1. Here legislation is apparently a branch of practical politics; cp. *n.* on πολιτικός, I. 1. 2.

33 νόμων, οἳ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας] This distinction, which is quite in place here, induced the author of the suspected passage, §§ 6—14, to believe that in Aristotle's opinion a list of mere legislators was a further requisite. Whereas in fact Aristotle intends with these words to dismiss it as irrelevant. Finding no such list drawn up by Aristotle the interpolator supplied the supposed want on his own account. SUSEM. (399)

§ 2 36 ἔνιοι μὲν οἴονται.] *Introd.* p. 20

τε γὰρ καταλῦσαι λίαν ἄκρατον αὖσαν, καὶ δουλείοντα τὴν (12)  
 δῆμον παῦσαι, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστήσαι τὴν πατριαν,  
 μίξαιτα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ  
 40 πᾶν βουλήν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεταὶς ἀρ-  
 3 στοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ δικαστήριον δημοτικόν. εἶκε δὲ Σόλων  
 11 ἐκείνα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλῦσαι, τὴν τε βου-  
 λήν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι.

37 γὰρ omitted by M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 41 τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια H<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk., but see § 4. where  
 Schneider restored the plurals κρίμα...τὰ δικαστήρια...ἀληθεῖα δὲ...ταῖς

n. 1. The context shows that these eulogists of Solon were eulogists of a mixed constitution, and not of Democracy, as Oncken strangely maintains. Such a combination of oligarchical and aristocratic elements they found in the "old-fashioned" Solonian democracy: in other words, not merely a moderate Democracy, but a nominal Aristocracy even, or at least a kind of Polity. **SUSEM. (400)**

Diels *Ueber die Berliner Fragmente der 'Athenaischen' πολιτεία* (Berlin 1885), p. 33, refers to Isocr. *Areop.* 16, *Antid.* 232, 312, for expressions of the current notion that Solon was the founder of Attic democracy; δ Σόλων ὁ παλαιὸς ἦν φιλόδημος τῆς πόλεως.

37 λίαν ἄκρατον] Too unpolished.

38 τὴν πατριαν] The old-fashioned, as distinguished from the modern, democracy (ἡ νῦν δ.). comp. §§ 3, 4; VI(IV). 6 § 5; 14 §§ 7, 11, 12; VII(VI). 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 § 3; VIII(V). 5 §§ 10, 11 (μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος δημοκρατίας εἰς τὴν πεντακτίην) with the references in the notes. Comp. also VII(VI). 7 § 7 n. "modern oligarchies": III. 6 § 9 n. (532). Aristotle quite accepts the distinction, cp. §§ 5, 6: III. 11. 8; VI(IV). 11. 19 n. (1303). For he has no objection to raise against these panegyrist of Solon, except that they referred even the aristocratic and oligarchical elements of the combination to Solon, whereas in fact only the democratic accession was his doing. With the following sentences compare Schömann *The Solonian Heliaea and Ephialtes' coup d'état*, an article in the *Zeitsch. f. Phil.* XCIII, 1866, 268—294: and R. Schall *De iurejuris Attici* p. 10 ff. (Jena 1876). **SUSEM. (400 b)**

"Inter eos qui Solonem laudant, ni fallor, locutionem in Areopagitico intelligi: ut enim loquitur, ut Soloni et aristocrate ἀρχῶν et βουλῆν tribuat, at nihil aliud dicat, ὡς ἀριστοκρατίας" (Spengel).

20 "by a happy blending (of other

elements) in the polity."

39—41 Parallel to the account given, probably by the same writers, of the Spartan polity 6 § 17.

§ 3 On this battleground of contending opinions there are at least three issues. (a) Is Aristotle merely reporting the views of the panegyrist of Solon [Grote, Fränkel], or is he correcting them [Thirlwall, Congreve, Schömann *Ath. Const. Hist.* p. 37 Eng. tr.]? (b) What is the exact sense of the last clause? [See Exc. v. p. 340 ff.] (c) Is the statement it contains historically true? [Grote, Curtius reject it: Thirlwall, Schömann accept it.]

41 εἶκε] Schömann, Fränkel *Die attischen Geschichtswissenschaften* 6:1. (Jena 1877. 8), and others lay far too much stress on this word εἶκε = 'seems', here and below, § 5 l. 15. Aristotle often speaks in a qualifying manner about things of which, in reality, he has not the slightest doubt. Thus εἶκε, l. 15, comes very close to φαίνεται l. 11; the force of which, as often in other writers besides Aristotle, is to express not so much what is merely apparent and probable, as what is obvious, what has come to light. **SUSEM. (401)**

See *Isae.* I. 1. 6, VIII(V). 3 § 16, 9 § 1. "The words express Aristotle's own opinion, because (1) the construction requires it (*Isae. nēc aliter Isae. dē*), (2) the sense requires it; some thought that Solon established a mixed constitution, Aristotle contends that he only added a new element, the democracy" (Case).

1274 a 1 τὴν τε βουλήν] What *panegyrist* Aristotle might ascribe to the council of the Areopagus which Solon found existing and left unaltered, it is not easy to see from this. **SUSEM. (402)**

2 καταστήσαι = add the foundation for the democracy.

τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονται τινες <sup>3</sup>  
 § 4 αὐτῷ· λῦσαι γὰρ θάτερα, κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικαστή-  
 5 ριον πάντων, κληρωτὸν ὄν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἴσχυσεν, ὥσπερ  
 τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν  
 δημοκρατίαν μετέστησαν· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βου-  
 λὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια  
 9 μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον  
 § 5 ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αὐξῶν εἰς τὴν νῦν δη-  
 μοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο <sup>4</sup>  
 προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (τῆς ναυαρ-  
 13 χίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφρο-

1274 a 4 θάτερα Koraes, θατέραν Π<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, θάτερον Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. ||  
 5 ἴσχυεν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 7 μετέστησαν Tegge, κατέστησαν Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 8  
 ἐκώλυσε Γ Ar., ἐκόλυσε Q<sup>b</sup> || [καὶ Περικλῆς] Sauppe, probably rightly, τὰ...  
 9 Περικλῆς omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup>

3 τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων]  
 See Exc. v. p. 350 ff. SUSEM. (403)

μέμφονται τινες] See *Introd.* p. 20  
 n. 1. In representing that these critics  
 of Solon were adherents of the oligarchy  
 Oncken, II. 439, 440 n. (1), goes beyond  
 Aristotle's own words. All that can be  
 fairly inferred is that they were oppo-  
 nents of absolute democracy. But that  
 does not prove them to be oligarchs;  
 they might have been friends of a mixed  
 constitution no less than Solon's panegy-  
 rists noticed just before or, comparatively  
 speaking, Aristotle himself. SUSEM.  
 (404)

4 λῦσαι γὰρ κτλ] For (they think)  
 he neutralized the other forces in the  
 state by making the court of law, a body  
 chosen by lot, supreme over all matters.

§ 4 5 ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ] Cp.  
 VI(IV). 4 § 27 ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος ἄτε  
 μοναρχος ὢν ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ  
 ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός  
 ...καὶ ἔστιν ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυ-  
 ραννίδι, with notes. SUSEM. (405)

6 τὴν νῦν δημοκ.] 'The democracy of  
 the present day' i.e. the extremest and  
 most unfettered species: cp. VI(IV). 4  
 § 25 ff., 6 § 5; 14 § 7, § 11: VIII(V). 5  
 § 10 and the other references given in  
 n. (400 b). SUSEM. (406)

8 Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε] Schömann  
*Antiquities* p. 341 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM.  
 (407)

9 μισθοφόρα] Böckh *Economy of  
 Athens* p. 232 Eng. tr.: also notes on  
 V(VIII). 5 § 23 (1055), VI(IV). 13 § 5  
 (1260). SUSEM. (408)

Aristotle is quoting the opinion of  
 others, but without denying it (Case).

§ 5 11 φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σ.]  
 Thus while Aristotle agrees with Solon's  
 panegyrist in respect of their judgment,  
 but qualifies the historical grounds as-  
 signed for it, n. (400 b) on § 2, he entirely  
 adopts<sup>1</sup> the historical statement of So-  
 lon's critics, but attacks the censure  
 which they inferred from it as not justi-  
 fied. Compare furthermore 9 § 12 n.  
 (296), § 21 (321 b). SUSEM. (409)

12 ἀπὸ συμπτώματος] accidentally,  
 "in the course of events" (Susemihl).  
 ναυαρχία=the supremacy at sea, like  
 ναυκρατία; not found elsewhere in this  
 sense.

13 ἐφρονηματίσθη] acquired over-  
 weening confidence in themselves, be-  
 came aware of their importance. Eaton  
 compares V(VIII). 6. 11 μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ

<sup>1</sup> This is strangely overlooked by Oncken II.  
 440 n. (1). As against Schömann he appeals to  
 the fact that Aristotle only makes these critics  
 speak of Solon as having introduced the appoint-  
 ment of the Heliaea by lot. Oncken does not  
 see that just on this occasion and in the mouth of  
 these censorious critics the form used is the sin-  
 gular, τὸ δικαστήριον, which had given some show  
 to the meaning which Schömann has refuted:  
 see Exc. v. This defence then is fatal to Oncken-  
 en's position. Nor is there any ground for his  
 rash assertion (II. 494) that Aristotle expressly  
 exempts Solon from the reproach of having cre-  
 ated anything like the later Heliaea. On the  
 contrary the writer of this paragraph, whether  
 Aristotle himself or some one else, agrees with  
 Solon's critics and admirers in thinking that it  
 was he who made the Heliaea, but that Pericles  
 introduced the custom of paying them. It is a  
 pity to spend so many words on a matter so clear.

νηματίσθη καὶ δημαγωγούς ἔλαβε φαίλους ἀντιπολιτευο-  
 15 μένων τῶν ἐπισεικῶν], ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε εἶπεν τῆς ἀποσκευ-  
 τάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τότε ἀρχαὶ αἰρε-  
 σθαι καὶ εὐθύειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τοῦτου κύριος ἂν ὁ δῆμος  
 20 δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος), τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρί-  
 μων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατίστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων  
 25 μεδίμνων καὶ ζευγитῶν καὶ [τρίτου τέλους] τῆς καλουμένης

14 ἀντὶ πολιτευομένων Γ<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> At. 16 ἀποδοῦναι? Schneider, perhaps rightly. 17 ὧν ὁ δῆμος κύριος M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>2</sup>, ὁ δῆμος ἂν κύριος [?] Γ<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> 18 [-αὶ δ' ἀρχαί... 21 μετῆν] Susem. *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCIII. p. 331 Diels. 19 ἐκ τῶν P<sup>2</sup> Q<sup>2</sup> T<sup>2</sup> 20 [τρίτου τέλους] Susem. doubtfully. τῷ τέλει Spengel, who afterwards transposed καὶ to follow τρίτου τέλους; [-μετῆν τέλει] and καὶ ζευγитῶν transposed to follow 21 ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς Oncken. But then we should expect καὶ <τῶν> ζευγитῶν and might equally well conjecture καὶ τῆς καλουμένης ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ τρίτου τέλους <τοῦ τῶν> ζευγитῶν

δημαγωγίᾳ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, and VIII(V). 4. 8 πάλιν ὁ ναυτικός ὄχλος γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν, where see n. (1521). SUSEM. (410)

This is why in a fragment of his *Polity of Athens* Aristotle mentioned Themistocles' proposal to create a fleet from the annual profits of the silver mines (see Polyæn. *Str.* I. 30 § 6); Diels *op. c.* p. 34.

14 Here as elsewhere Aristotle's sympathies go with the Athenian opposition to extreme democracy: the Moderates (ἰσχυροί) headed by Aristides, Cimon, Themistocles (ὁ Μετῆσιος), Nicias, and Themistocles (*Strab.* 369, Plut. *Nic.* 2), who opposed the democratic leaders from Themistocles to Cleophon.

15 ἐπὶ Σόλων γὰρ κατὰ] But above, § 3, Aristotle has said that Solon merely allowed the previously established mode of electing the archons to continue. In any case his words are not clear, as Schoemann remarks. Either before Solon's time the archons were elected by the whole body of the people; and then Aristotle himself commits the fault he has censured in Solon's admirers, of inaccurately describing him as the author of an institution which he merely perpetuated. Or else he intends to attribute to Solon the transference of this election from the nobles to the whole body of citizens; if so, he ought to have mentioned this beforehand, amongst the other democratic additions which Solon made to the Athenian constitution. Which of these alternatives is correct cannot be decided.

SUSEM. (411)

17 καὶ εὐθύειν] By this control over the magistrates is meant, that during their tenure of office the magistrates could be brought before a popular court or perhaps even before the popular assembly direct; and more particularly that after the expiration of their term of office they could be brought before a popular court and required to give an account of their conduct. Cp. *Exc.* V.; further III. 11 § 8 n. (569), VII(V). 11 § 19 n. (1203), 14 § 3 (1319), § 6 (1325), § 10 (1331); n. on 16 § 2; and VII(VI). 1 § 4 (1471). SUSEM. (412)

"With this statement of the ἀποσκευτάτα of democracy, compare the summary of the characteristics of true democracy which Herodotus III. 80 puts into the mouth of Otanes: πάντα μὲν ἀρχαὶ ἀρχαί, ἐκείνων δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βασιλεῖα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸν ἀναρρεῖ [n. τὸ πλῆθος]" (Jackson).

μηδὲ γὰρ...δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος] Here again is a substantial contribution to Aristotle's own views on the requirements of a good constitution. SUSEM. (413)

§ 6 18 τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς] The right of electing officers and holding them strictly accountable, which the commons enjoyed, is opposed to the right of office from which they were in part excluded.

19 ἐκ τῶν πεντ. κατὰ] Of these four Solonian classes see Schoemann *Antiquitates* I. p. 319 ff. *Eng.* 21. Further see III. 11. 8 n. (569), VII(VI). 4 § 1 (1471). SUSEM. (414)

The order of the classes is not certain even if we omit the words ἑκαστὸν ὅλον

ἱππάδος· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον τὸ θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετῆν. (IX

[νομοθέται δὲ ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιξε- 5  
φυρίοις, καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις καὶ  
24 ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν καὶ  
§ 7 Σικελίαν. πειρῶνται δὲ [[καί]] τινες καὶ συνάγειν ὡς Ὀνομακρί-  
του μὲν γενομένου πρώτου δεινοῦ περὶ νομοθεσίαν, γυμνα-  
σθῆναι δ' αὐτὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ Λοκρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντα  
κατὰ τέχνην μαντικὴν· τούτου δὲ γενέσθαι Θάλητα ἐταῖρον,  
Θάλητος δ' ἀκροατὴν Λυκούργου καὶ Ζάλευκου, Ζαλεύκου  
30 δὲ Χαρώνδαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν ἀσκεπτότερον τῶν  
χρόνων ἔχοντες· ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος 6

22 [νομοθέται.....b 26 ἄν] Bojesen || 23 αὐτοῦ Γ P<sup>1</sup>, αὐτοῦ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2</sup> || 24 ταῖς  
before Χαλκιδικαῖς Schmidt would omit || 25 καὶ omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Ar. || 27 αὐτὸν  
omitted apparently in Γ, perhaps rightly || κακεῖ or καὶ <ἐκεῖ> Tegge, per-  
haps rightly || 28 μαντικὴν omitted in Γ M<sup>s</sup> || θέλητα (in Γ after ἐταῖρον)  
and 29 θέλητος Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 30 τῶν χρόνων Ar., τῷ χρόνῳ Γ Π Bk. || 31 ἔχοντες  
Susem., λέγοντες Γ Π Ar. Bk., cp. Plat. *Gorg.* 501 C ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονος

or, with Spengel, transpose them to go with *ξευγιῶν*. Cp. H. Landwehr in *Philologus* Supp.-Band v. 1885, pp. 118 ff.

21 Comp. Julius Pollux VIII. 130 οἱ δὲ τὸ θητικὸν οὐδεμίαν ἀρχὴν ἤρχον.

A list of legislators: §§ 6—14.

Many of the arguments with which Götting *Comm.* p. 345 f., impugned the genuineness of the whole chapter were answered by Nickes *De Aristotelis politicorum libris* p. 55 ff., and Spengel, *Ueber die Politik* p. 11 note, *Arist. Studien* III. p. 18 f. Götting was followed by Böckh and Bernays *Ges. Abh.* I. 172. The case must depend mainly on the language.

22 Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιξεφυρίοις] i.e. the Locrians living on the promontory Zephyrion in Lower Italy. The laws of Zaleukos about (?) 664 B.C. are said to have been the first which were committed to writing: see Schömann p. 17 Eng. tr., *Antiq. iur. publ.* 89 n. (8). SUSEM. (415)

23 Χαρώνδας] Mentioned I. 2 § 5 n. (16), VI (IV). II § 15 n., 13 § 10. SUSEM. (416) On his laws see Diod. XII. 15.

24 ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι] i.e. the colonies which Chalcis in Euboea planted in those countries: see E. Curtius *Hist.* I. 436 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (417)

§ 7 25 πειρῶνται δὲ τινες] Ephoros Strabo p. 482; cp. Plutarch *Lycurg.* 4, Trieber *op. c.* 67, 72, 101. SUSEM. (418)

The construction after *συνάγειν*, ὡς and genitive absolute in the one clause balanced by an accusative with infinitive

in the other, is awkward; but it can be nearly paralleled from Plato *Philebus* 16 C: τὴν φήμην παρέδωσαν ὡς ἐξ ἐνὸς μὲν...όντων, πέρασ δὲ...έχόντων. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς κτλ. Cp. *Rep.* II. 383 A λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας, μήτε ἡμᾶς παράγειν.

28 κατὰ with the accus. may mean "for the purpose" κατὰ θέαν ἤκειν, or "in connexion with," almost "practising his mantic art."

Θάλητα.] See Exc. VI. p. 352 f. SUSEM. (419)

29 'To the arguments advanced against the genuineness of this portion of the chapter may be added one derived from the fact that here we have Θάλητος as the form of the genitive, and Θάλητα of the accusative. Aristotle elsewhere uses the proper dialectic form, the Ionic gen. Θάλεω 1259 a 7, the Doric Ἀρχύτα 1340 b 26; comp. also the quotation from Alcaeus III. 14 § 10. Plato on the other hand regularly changes quotations from other dialects into Attic; cp. *Gorg.* 485 E, 505 E, with Dr Thompson's note (Ridgeway *op. c.* p. 135).

30 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κτλ] This criticism is very just. SUSEM. (419 b)

The same date *circa* Ol. 29 or 664 B.C. is the best attested for Thaletas, who comes second, and Zaleukos, who comes fourth, in this succession, with Lycurgus between them whom the latest estimate only brings down to 776!

§ 8 νομοθέτης Θηβαίους. ἦν δ' ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν 11  
 Βακχιδῶν, ἐραστής δὲ γενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νεώτερου  
 Ὀλυμπίασιν, ὡς ἐκείνος τὴν πόλιν ἔλιπε διαμισήσας τὸν  
 33 ἔρωτα τὸν τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκυόνης, ἀπῆλθεν εἰς Θήβας ἐκείνῳ  
 9 τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν ἀμφότεροι. καὶ νῦν ἔτι δεκνύουσι τοῖς  
 τάφους αὐτῶν ἀλλήλοις μὲν εὐσυνόπτους ὄντας, πρὸς δὲ τῶν  
 τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν τοῦ μὲν συνόπτου τοῦ δ' οὐ συνόπτου  
 μυθολογοῦσι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὕτω τάξασθαι τὴν ταφὴν, τὸν μὲν  
 40 Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους, ὅπως μὴ ἄποπτος  
 ἔσται ἡ Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χόματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλόλαον, ὅπως  
 10 ἄποπτος. ὥκησαν μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν παρὰ  
 τοῖς Θηβαίοις, νομοθέτης δ' αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο Φιλόλαος περὶ  
 τ' ἄλλων τινῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδοποιίας, οὓς καλοῦσιν  
 4 ἐκείνοι νόμους θετικούς· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἰδίως ἐπ' ἐκείνους  
 11 νομοθετημάτων, ὅπως ὁ ἀριθμὸς σφύζεται τῶν κλήρων. Χα-  
 ράινδου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν ἰδίον πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶς ψευδο-  
 μαρτυριῶν (πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν), τῇ δ' ἀκρι-

33 βακχιδῶν I<sup>a</sup> M<sup>a</sup> (unless I<sup>a</sup> had βακχιδῶν) βακχιδῶν P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Saem. 14  
 34 Ὀλυμπίασιν Götting, perhaps rightly 35 μυθολογῶσι? Sprengel 36 γένος  
 II<sup>a</sup>, corrected in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>  
 1274 b 1 τὴν omitted by P<sup>2-3</sup> 5 σφύζεται Bucheler 6 οὐδέν ἐστι I<sup>a</sup> Bk.  
 II<sup>a</sup> οὐδέν ἐστι P<sup>4</sup>, ἰδίον μὲν οὐδέν ἐστι P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>a</sup> Ald. Bk. 7 ψευδομαρτυριῶν Saenger  
 and Bentley (*Phalaris* p. 358 Leip. ed.), ψευδομαρτύρων I<sup>a</sup> II Ar. 8 ἐτίσκηψιν Saenger  
 and Bentley, ἐπίσκηψιν I<sup>a</sup> II (in P<sup>3</sup> the scribe's correction conceals the original reading)

§ 8 32-33 τῶν Βακχιδῶν] The ancient royal house at Corinth; see E. Curtius *Hist.* I. 271—277, 434, Eng. tr. Schömann pp. 114, 153 Eng. tr. Compare also *ibid.* (§ 33) on III. 9 § 9, [1648] on VIII (v). 10 § 6. SUSEM. (420)

34 Ὀλυμπίασιν] In the 13th Olympiad B.C. 728. See Grote II. 394.

§ 9 40 ἄποπτος—"away from far" may be used for *εὐθέως*, as here, or *εὐπαίθετος*; but the former in late writers.

§ 10 1274 b 1 ὥκησαν μὲν οὖν κτλ.] The interpolator here explains why he has related the history of Philolaos at such length, namely to make clear how this Corinthian came to Thebes. But if he really considered such a detailed explanation necessary, when its necessity or even utility is not further discoverable, then he ought at any rate *a fortiori* to have shown how a Corinthian stranger came to give laws to the Thebans. SUSEM. (421)

4 θετικούς] laws of adoption. The Cretan term for adoption, we now learn,

was ἀνάγκη, ἀναγκάσθαι.

καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἰδίως κτλ.] Aelian *Var. Hist.* II. 7 relates that at Thebes it was forbidden under penalty of death to expose a child; but in case of pressing poverty the father might bring his child in its swaddling clothes to the magistrates, who then sold it by a regular contract to the lowest bidder (τῷ ταύτῃ ἀναγκάσθαι δόσει), whom it had to serve like a slave when grown up, in return for its maintenance. Perhaps, thinks J. G. Schneider, there is here a survival of the old laws which tended to preserve the original family estates unaltered by means of adoption. Hardly so, for the purchased child is bought as a kind of slave. On the further constitutional history of Thebes see Ex. I to B. VI (v). SUSEM. (422)

§ 11 7 (ἐτίσκηψιν) κ. ψευδομαρτυριῶν (Phalaris says *εὐμαρτυριῶν*) convention for perjury. Euboea quotes Pl. *Laos* XL 917 f. [Theb.] 417a. f.

βεία τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν. (IX)  
 § 12 Φαλέου δ' ἴδιον ἢ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνομάλῳσις, Πλάτωνος δ' ἢ (p.  
 10 τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ  
 τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος,  
 τὸ τοὺς νήφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμι-  
 κοῖς ἄσκησιν ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνονται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην,  
 14 ὥς δέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖν χεροῖν τὴν δὲ  
 § 13 ἄχρηστον. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσὶ, πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρ-  
 χούσῃ τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν ἴδιον δ' ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὐδέν

8 τῶν νόμων omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> Ar., perhaps rightly || 9 φιλολάου Π<sup>1-3</sup> Ar. and 1st hand of P<sup>2-3</sup> (corrected by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || ἀνομάλῳσις Bk., ἀνωμάλῳσις Π, ὁμαλότης Spengel, ὁμάλῳσις Chandler || 12 τὴν.....13 ἄσκησιν] Vettori first observed the harsh construction; either ἢ.....ἄσκησις or <ὁ περὶ> before τὴν would be expected. Schneider proposed to read the former and Schmidt the latter || 13 γίνονται P<sup>2-3-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 14 τοῖν P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. (perhaps right), τὴν M<sup>9</sup> (1st hand)

§ 12 9 Φαλέου δ' ἴδιον κτλ] Even Fülleborn with good reason wonders what we want with Phaleas and Plato here over again, and is surprised that their original ideas are presented so imperfectly and in a manner which agrees so ill with the preceding criticisms. Cp. *note* (425). The interpolator did not reflect that Aristotle himself expressly tells us in § 1, that in the above review of Plato Phaleas Hippodamos he has said enough of the political ideas of mere theorists (εἰρηται σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων): also that in § 1 f. he has given us to understand no less clearly that amongst practical statesmen, who created not merely a code of laws but a constitution, he has only Solon to consider, since Lycurgus has already been taken along with the criticism of the Lacedaemonian constitution. Accordingly if the interpolator, contrary to Aristotle's intention (see on § 1 n. 399), wanted to append a list of legislators simply, this ought at least to have consisted of practical men, who neither changed nor desired to change the constitution in any respect. Both limitations are inapplicable to Plato and Phaleas. From this may be seen what a misconception it would be to deny to Aristotle §§ 1—6 and assign them, with Götting, to the same interpolator as the rest of the chapter. SUSEM. (423)

ἀνομάλῳσις] equalization: Rhet. III. 11. 5 καὶ τὸ ἀνωμαλίσθαι ('read ἀνομαλίσθῃναι; A<sup>c</sup>, our almost unique authority, has ἀνω μάλιστα εἶναι' SUSEM.) τὰς πόλεις ἐν πολλῷ διέχουσι ταυτό, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ

καὶ δυνάμεσι τὸ ἴσον. See Cope's *note*. Not a *fresh* equalization, but a *breaking up* of the present distribution to restore equality; so ἀνανέμειν, ἀναδασμός, ἀναδίδοναι ψήφους.

10 ἢ τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ] Cp. 6 § 2 n. (153); 6 § 5 n. (196). SUSEM. (424)

11 ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην κτλ] *Law* 1 637 ff., 643 ff., 11 664—672, 673 D ff. The fancy is strange enough; and Plato insists so much upon it that there is some justification for adducing it amongst the special peculiarities of his legislation. The next point however is not material enough for this, and much besides would have far greater right to be mentioned: cp. n. (423) just above. SUSEM. (425)

12 καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολ. κτλ] *Law* VII 794 D—795 D. SUSEM. (426)

Fuit auctor, quod ad structuram verborum facit, durior: videbatur enim vel eodem casu, quo prima duo protulit, dicere debuisse καὶ ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκήσις vel plene loqui hoc pacto: καὶ <ὁ περὶ> τὴν ἐν τοῖς π. ἀσκήσιν (Vettori). One of these suggestions was taken up by Schneider, the other by Schmidt. SUSEM.

§ 13 15 πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρχούσῃ κτλ] From n. (423) the irrelevance of this remark is obvious. It would imply that the same statement was not true of Zaleukos Charondas Philolaos, in which case it follows from the explanation given in n. (423) that they should not properly be included here. It may be said that the remark serves to distinguish Draco's laws from those of Phaleas and Plato, which

ἐστὶν ὃ τι καὶ μνείας ἄξιον, πλὴν ἢ χαλεπότης διὰ τὸ τῷ ζῳ. (12) μίας μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιπτακὸς νόμους δημιουργῆσαι ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας· νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοῖς μεθίονται, 20 ἂν τι πταίσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθίοντας ἢ νηφόντας. αὐτὸς πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθίονσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ 14 πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας Ῥηγῖνσι νομοθέτης Χαλκιδεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης, οὐ περὶ τὰ <τά> 25 νικά καὶ τὰς ἐπικλήρους ἐστίν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἰδίῳ γε οἴῳ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἔχοι τις ἄν.]

20 τι πταίσωσι I<sup>2</sup>, τι πταίωσι C<sup>2</sup>, τεπτήσωσι Γ P<sup>1-2-3-4</sup> Q M<sup>3</sup> Q<sup>5</sup> T<sup>5</sup> A<sup>1</sup> A<sup>2</sup> I<sup>2</sup> K<sup>2</sup>, τυπτήσωσι U<sup>2</sup>, τεπήσωσι M<sup>2</sup>, τι ποιήσωσι Baa<sup>2</sup> } ἀποτίνειν Γ (?) A<sup>1</sup>, ἀποτίνω M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1-2-4</sup> Q<sup>5</sup> T<sup>5</sup> A<sup>1</sup> A<sup>2</sup>. ἀποτίνειν P<sup>2</sup> } 21 γὰρ omitted by Γ M<sup>2</sup> } 22 ἀνδροδάμας Γ<sup>2</sup> Q<sup>5</sup> T<sup>5</sup> } 24 <τά> Koraes } 25 ἄλλο Koraes

were made for an ideal state. But this does not mend matters because, as Draco was not the author of a constitution, there is a marked antithesis between them of quite another kind. SUSEM. (427)

17 πλὴν ἢ χαλεπότης κτλ.] Cp. *Rhet.* II. 23. 29, 1400 b 21 καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος· χαλεποὶ γάρ. Suidas l.v. Δράκων (Eaton). Aelian *Var. Hist.* VIII. 10, Plut. *Solon* 17, Gell. XI. 18. 1—4 (J. G. Schneider). On Draco, the Athenian legislator shortly before Solon, see further E. Curtius *History of Greece* I. p. 301 f. 663 n. 115 [Eng. tr. I. 313]. SUSEM. (428)

18 On Pittacus see III. 14. 10 with Exc. II. on B. III. SUSEM. (429)

νόμων δημιουργός has been objected to; but Nickses cites ἀρετῇ δημ. IV(VII). 9. 7.

20 διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους κτλ.] Cp. *Plat.* II. 25. 7, 1401 b 11 ἐστὶν οὖν ὅτι αἰσίων ὁ Π. αἰνετός· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἂν μετὰ τὴν ζῆλον ἐκταταθῆναι ἐὰν τι μεθίων ἀποτίνῃ; *Nic.* *Etib.* III. 8. 8, 1113 b 30 καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν καλῶν καὶ κακῶν, ἐὰν αἰσίων εἴη καὶ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθίονσι ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῷ κατὰ τὸν νόμον μεθίστασθαι (Eaton). SUSEM. (430)

§ 14 24 Χαλκιδεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης.] The inhabitants of the peninsula Chalcidice, which derived its name from its colonization by Chalcia in Euboea. This took place before the settlement of the western colonies of Chalcia, mentioned in § 6 n. (417): see E. Curtius I. 318 E. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (431)

25 Laws of Charonides respecting heiresses are mentioned by Isidoreus XII. 18.

## NOTE ON ARCADIA.

διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλιν ἔθνους, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὥσι κεχωρισμένοι  
τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες: II. 2. 3.

“It is well known that the entire population of Arcadia was divided into a number of city communities politically independent, nor was this altered by the subsequent foundation of Megalopolis (see *n.* 459). They were held together by a tribal league sometimes more loosely, sometimes more rigidly organized, which left the political sovereignty of the various cities pretty nearly intact. Clearly a race or tribe thus organized does not greatly differ from a *συνμαχία*, or league offensive and defensive, and Aristotle is right in remarking that qualitative differences between the members (which are the separate towns) are not required in the one case any more than in the other, but that the essential advantage depends upon something quantitative. To this kind of *ἔθνος*, however, conceived as analogous to a *συνμαχία*, is opposed another which Aristotle excludes from this analogy by the addition of the words *ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὥσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος*, ‘provided their population be not dispersed over a number of villages.’ By the latter he means the *ἔθνος* which forms a political unity (usually with monarchical constitution), which is not divided into a number of city-states, nor centralized in a single city, but where the people live scattered all over the territory in detached villages or unwall’d towns without political independence (*κῶμαι*). In other words it is the organization with which the Greeks became acquainted in most of the neighbouring non-Greek nations: whereas tribal federations composed of separate city-states were a somewhat more Hellenic development. It is obvious that a non-Greek tribal state of the kind certainly bore no analogy to the *συνμαχία*, and that in its case the qualitative distinction between the individual members, the rulers and those whom they ruled (see *n.* 133), was as essential as in the separate Hellenic *πόλιν*.” Dittenberger in *Gött. gel. Anz.* 1874, p. 1382. SUSEM. (132)

To Dittenberger’s explanation of this obscure passage it may be well to append a short conspectus of other interpretations. It has been commonly supposed (1) that there is a reference to some *συννοικισμός* of Arcadians, and that the *πόλιν* is distinguished from *ἔθνος* = *the unorganized race*. Then if it be granted that *ὅταν μὴ ὥσι* = *διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι* or *τῷ μὴ εἶναι*, the words will be rendered: “A city will differ too from a tribe by not having the population scattered over villages but centralized like the Arcadians.” Thus *μὴ κατὰ*

κόμης κεχωρισμένοι will denote the previous condition of Arcadia, the primitive stage of village life, which long lingered there as in Epirus, Aetolia, Acarnania. The analogy between this state of things and the *σπράγῃς* must consist in the isolated independence of the villages: the *ἔθνος* 'Arcadians' being composed *ἐξ ὁμοίων*, of unorganized units, submitting to no central authority. The foundation of Tegea and of Mantinea absorbed eight and five villages respectively: but Megalopolis was the most recent example of centralization and on the largest scale, as it absorbed no less than forty pre-existing townships. After their Great City was settled, it may be argued that there was no part of the Arcadian race which had not reached the stage of city life.

It would appear that, though this interpretation is open to the serious objections enumerated in the note *ad loc.*, it can hardly be directly refuted. Aristotle *may* have interposed at this point the remark that as the *πόλις* differs on the one hand from the larger aggregate, a confederacy of cities, so too it differs on the other hand from those more primitive elements of which it is itself an aggregate. But such an interposition is, on other grounds, unsatisfactory. "No one," says Mr Postgate, "could mistake a disunited and unorganized community, with nothing but race in common, for a state: but when it has received a sort of union and organization, and, so to speak, simulates a state, confusion may arise and discrimination is necessary. In other words, the state, an organized combination of parts for a common end, requires distinguishing from similar combinations, the confederacy and the organized race, but *not* from the non-organized race, which conforms to none of these conditions" (*Notes* p. 3). Yet on the above interpretation of the passage the organized race *is* the *πόλις*; Aristotle has distinguished between race and state where there is no danger of confounding them and has omitted to distinguish them precisely where one may be mistaken for the other.

Another solution is (II) to understand by *ἔθνος* the *organized* race or tribe, as something distinct from the *πόλις*, retaining the reference to the events of 370—369 B.C., but primarily to the rise of the new Arcadian league, or federal state, which is wholly distinct from the contemporaneous foundation of Megalopolis, to serve as the federal capital. The principal references to the constitution of the league are as follows<sup>1</sup>: Xenoph. *Hell.* VI. 5. ὁ τῶν δὲ Τεγεατῶν οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Καλλίβιον καὶ Πρόξενον συνήγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνείηαι τε πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν, καὶ ὃ τι νικῶν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Στάσιππον ἔπραττον ἐάν τε κατὰ χώραι τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι: *ib.* VI. 5. 12 ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίλαος... καταλαβὼν πόλιν ὅμορον οὖσαν Εὐτταίαν καὶ εὐρὼν τοὺς ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ ἡλικίῃ οἱ χρομένοι εἰς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν ὅμως οὐκ ἠδίκησε τὴν πόλιν: *ib.* VII. 4. 2 ὁ Λυσιστράτης πεθεῖ τοῖς νεύουσιν πράττειν περὶ ἀνμαχίας. (Comp. *Haerodot.* p. 280 μέγιστον ἐν Μεγαλῇ πόλει... συνεδριὸν ἐστὶ κοινόν Ἀρκάδων ἀπάντων διελκεται δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ κοινῇ Ἀρκάδων πολιτείᾳ.) Xenoph. *Hell.* VII. 4. 12 συνελθόντες οἱ Ἕλεῖοι Λασιῶσι, τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν αὐτῶν ἄστυ, ἐν δὲ τῇ πόλει

<sup>1</sup> With what follows compare Freeman *Federal Government* pp. 191—192.

συντελοῦντα ἐς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν: § 38 εἰ δὲ καὶ τινες ἐπαιτιῶντο, ἔλεγον [οἱ Μαντινέῃς] ἐπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι ἡ τῶν Μαντινέων πόλις ἐγγυῶτο ἢ μὴν παρέξειν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκαδῶν ὅπόσους τις προσκαλοῖτο: VII. 5. 5 ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἐλογίζετο σφίσιν ὑπάρχειν... Ἀρκαδῶν τοὺς τὰ σφέτερα φρονοῦντας. ἦσαν δ' οὗτοι Τεγεᾶται καὶ Μεγαλοπολῖται καὶ Ἀσεᾶται καὶ Παλλαντιεῖς, καὶ εἴ τινες δὴ πόλεις διὰ τὸ μικραὶ τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν μέσαις ταύταις οἰκεῖν ἤναγκάζοντο.

From these passages it may be inferred that τὸ κοινόν, the League, was a federal state, trenching in some respects upon the autonomy of its constituent members, the individual communities. It had a στρατηγὸς and other officers, an assembly (μύριοι), a federal army (ἐπάριτοι) paid out of a common fund (Xen. *Hell.* VII. 4. 33, 34), and a common foreign policy. It would appear that the League is something distinct from, and politically superior to, its members, not excepting Megalopolis the greatest of them all. It is not impossible then that Aristotle intends here to draw a distinction between the organized race, as illustrated by τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκαδῶν, and the ordinary autonomous canton-state (πόλις), yet this solution does not remove all difficulties, especially those of an historical nature. (1) An Arcadian league of some sort existed from ancient times, as attested by coins. Vague notions of tribal kinship and some degree of unity had been kept up, as in Ionia, by common religious rites. It is true that this secured no real political union, and that the leading states, Tegea and Mantinea, were generally hostile to each other. But in this respect the events of 369 B.C. made no permanent alteration. (2) Within eight years of its formation the new Arcadian league was broken up: after the party strife of the years 364—362 it ceased to exist as a federal union of all Arcadians, who cannot be said to have been ever again one as towards other states. Arcadians fought on opposite sides at Mantinea (362 B.C.) and in the struggle between Agis and Antipater thirty years afterwards (Aesch. III. 165, Quint. Curt. VI. 1. 21). Indeed, not long after Mantinea many of the smaller townships incorporated in Megalopolis demanded autonomy. The Great City would have been dismembered upon the disruption of the League but for the timely interference of 3,000 Thebans under Pammenes, who compelled the seceders to return, Diod. xv. 94. About a century and a half later Philopoemen actually made Aliphera, Asea, Dipaia, Gortys, Pallantion, and Theisoa, independent members of the Achaean league, thus putting an end to their dependence upon Megalopolis (194 B.C.). In the time of Pausanias, all except Aliphera and Pallantion were again reduced to the condition of 'villages' of Megalopolis<sup>1</sup>.

Bearing these facts in view, we proceed to inquire about the meaning to be assigned on this hypothesis to the words κατὰ κώμας κεχωρισμένοι. Since its supporters would probably not take them as Dittenberger has done, they may be presumed to fall back upon the former suggestion that they describe the *unorganized* race, which lives κατὰ κώμας τῇ παλαιᾷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ. And doubtless such was the mode of life of certain districts in the south-west of Arcadia, down to the foundation of Megalopolis. But just as certain

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Philop.* 13; Paus. VIII. 27. 7; Freeman p. 626 n. 4.

The obscurity of the passage is increased by the uncertainty of those who have examined it as to whether the Arcadians are cited as an example of a *πόλις* or an *ἔθνος*. The view cited as (1) makes them both. Victorius<sup>4</sup> and Camerarius apparently consider them adduced as exemplifying the *πόλις*, implying that distribution of the population over villages or 'demes' (*ἐντὶ κάμυς*) was a characteristic feature of the normal Greek state. But apart from other obvious difficulties one fails to see how *any* tribe or region of Greece, whether it had towns or not, can have been without villages.

16. VIII. 27. 7. τῶν κατεσχεμένων  
πόλεων αἱ μὲν ἐς ἅπαν εἰσὶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν  
ἐσθνηται, ταῖς δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ Μεγαλοπολι-  
ται. Ἰόρτυνα, Διποῖται, Οὐσῶται τὴν  
πρὸς Ὀρχομενῶν, Μεσσηνῶν, Τεβρῶν, Κα-  
λλῶν, Ἐλίσσωνται: 12 § 3 Μεσσηνῶν πόλιν  
μὲν οὐκ εἶπε κώμην δὲ ἐς τὸ Μεγαλοπολι-

<sup>4</sup> αἰών [αι, αι δε Ηελασποννησου] are the  
αἰώνι τοῦ παλαιού καὶ τοῦ νέου. "Aet-  
ernitas de deorum." *Thes.* s. v. s. 1487 & c.  
Dr Jackson has supplied this sentence.

## EXCURSUS I.

ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων· εἶναι γάρ τισι τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαίρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. II. 3. 9.

‘Certain of those who have written books of travel round the world assert that this is actually the case: that there are tribes in the interior of Africa who have community of wives, and assign the children that are born to different fathers by their likeness to them.’ From the fragments by writers of this kind anterior to Aristotle nothing of this sort can be adduced; only Herodotos (IV. 130), who is in a way at least to be ranked with this class of authors, tells this story of the Auseans (Αὔσεες) living near Lake Tritonis, west of the Lesser Syrtis. Of later writers Mela I. 8 relates it of the Garamantians (Schlosser), for which compare Pliny v. 8. 45 (Göttling): Nicolaus Damascenus, *Frag.* III. in Stob. *Flor.* XLIV. 41 (Müller *Frag. hist. Graec.* III. p. 458), of the Liburnians<sup>1</sup> (Eaton). Diodoros III. 15. 2 does indeed attribute community of wives to the Troglodytae on the Red Sea, but he says explicitly that they have community of children as well. Herodotos (IV. 104) ascribes to the Scythian race of the Agathyrsi community of wives, but without a distribution of children and for the same object as Plato had in view ‘in order that they might all be brothers,’ ἵνα κασίγνητοὶ τε ἀλλήλων ἔωσι καὶ οἰκήϊοι ἐόντες πάντες μήτε φθόνῳ μήτ’ ἔχθεϊ χρέωνται ἐς ἀλλήλους. The case of the Massagetae, cited by Congreve, Herod. I. 216, is still less in point. Other stories of community of wives and children adduced by Oncken, I. p. 134 f., p. 178 n. 1, border on the fabulous; as those related of the Tyrrhenians by Theopompos *Frag.* 222 in Athen. XII. 517 D, E, Müller *Frag. hist. gr.* I. 315<sup>2</sup>, and of the Scythian Galaktophagi by Nicolaus Damascenus *Frag.* 123 in Stob. *Flor.* v. 73, Müller *Frag. h. gr.* III. 460<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Λιβύρριοι κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας ἔχουσι καὶ τὰ τέκνα ἐν κοινῷ τρέφουσι μέχρι ἐτών πέντε, εἴτα τῷ ἐκτῷ συνενέγκαντες ἅπαντα τὰ παῖδια τὰ ὁμοιότητος πρὸς τοὺς ἀνδρας εἰκάζουσι καὶ ἐκάστῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀποδιδόασιν πατρί.

<sup>2</sup> Θεόπομπος δ’ ἐν τῇ μγ’ τῶν ἱστοριῶν καὶ νόμον εἶναι φησι παρὰ τοῖς Τυρρηνοῖς κοινὰς ὑπάρχειν τὰς γυναῖκας· ταύτας δὲ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι σφόδρα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ γυμνάζεσθαι πολλάκις καὶ μετ’ ἀνδρῶν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ πρὸς αὐτάς·...τρέφειν δὲ τοὺς Τυρρηνοὺς πάντα τὰ γινόμενα παῖδια οὐκ εἰδότας οἱ πατρός ἐστιν ἕκαστον. ζῶσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τοὺς αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς θρεψαμένοις κτλ. The description seems to owe much to Plato’s republic.

<sup>3</sup> εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ δικαιοτάτοι, κοινὰ ἔχοντες

τά τε κτήματα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν πρεσβυτέρους αὐτῶν πατέρας ὀνομάζειν, τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους παῖδας, τοὺς δ’ ἡλικίας ἀδελφούς. [This is the system of nomenclature (in use in Hawaii and Rotuma and other islands of the Pacific), classifying and not describing the person addressed, which Morgan calls Malayan. See *Ancient Society* pp. 401—423. If there is anything fabulous in the account of Nicolaus it must be sought in his further statements παρὰ τοῖς οὐδὲ εἰς οὔτε φθονῶν, ὡς φασίν, οὔτε μισῶν οὔτε φοβούμενος ἱστορήθη διὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου κοινότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην. μάχιμοι δ’ οὐχ ἥττον αὐτῶν αἱ γυναῖκες ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, καὶ συμπολεμοῦσιν αὐτοῖς ὅταν δέη.]

It is worth while to reproduce the remarks of Oncken *l. op.* pp. 179—181. 'Here Aristotle touches the surface of a profound problem. Unquestionably there is a maternal instinct which assures the mother more than any external likeness that the child is hers; and though Aristotle is here looking at the whole matter from the outside, a passage in the *Ethics* shows clearly that at least this is not due to the want of a right conception of the moral dignity of marriage and the inner relationship between parents and children. On the contrary he regards both relationships as altogether moral and spiritual in thoroughly modern fashion. Between man and wife, he tells us, *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 12. 7, 1162 a 16, there is a natural tie of love and friendship; for man is by nature even more designed for fellowship in marriage than in the state, inasmuch as the family is prior in time and more indispensable than the state, and propagation a characteristic common to all living beings, whereas the social life of a community is only found in a few other cases. But in the animal world pairing is restricted to one purpose; whereas human beings do not marry merely to bring children into the world, but to share their lives together. From the outset the functions of man and wife are distinct; by making their different endowments common property they mutually assist each other. Hence such a relationship of love and friendship combines utility with pleasure; and this pleasure, provided both are excellent in their own way, rests on the mutual delight of each in the other's diverse excellence<sup>1</sup>. Children are the bond of union as being the common property of the parents; for what is possessed in common strengthens their union: and this is the reason why a marriage is more easily dissolved when there are no children.

'Further, § 3 of the same chapter, 1161 b 27; parents love their children as themselves; for, owing their origin to their parents, children become by the separation as it were a second self. Children love their parents as the source of their being; brothers and sisters love one another on account of their common origin; for their common relation to their parents unites them to one another, whence the expressions *one blood, one stock*, and the like. Again, § 5, 1162 a 4; the relationship of children to their parents, like that of men to the gods, rests on the feeling of attachment to benefactors and superiors; for they have received from them the best gifts, life, sustenance and education: enjoyment too and utility make this a closer tie than that between strangers, since it has in it a greater and more intimate fellowship in life.' Comp. also Zeller, *op. c.* II. ii. p. 688. 'Hence it is not simply its impracticability that Aristotle urges against community of wives and children. Whereas in Plato's view human marriage is no more than the pairing of animals'—and to use Zeller's apt expression (*Plato* p. 478 Eng. tr.) his proposals 'degrade it to a mere economic breeding of population'—'Aristotle has upheld against him the right and dignity of marriage in its relation to civil life, has shown what is at stake if marriage be abolished, the loss of the most

<sup>1</sup> διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρησιμὸν εἶναι τὰς ἐκείνων ἀπορίας, καὶ χαίρειν αὐτῶν τῇ φύσει. εἴη δ' αὖ καὶ δι' ἀπορίαν, εἰ ἐκτελεσθῇ εὖ. ὅτι

primitive and sacred ties which bind man to man before a state arises to develop out of the family a higher unity<sup>1</sup>. That these considerations do not recur in the *Politics*, when he is expressly refuting Plato, may be partly due to the fact that he did not wish to repeat himself; partly and more especially it is because his object is only to meet Plato with arguments which the latter must himself concede. A thinker who once took such a view of marriage as Plato, could only be opposed with arguments deducible from his own premisses. He who roundly denies that marriage has any but a political aim is safe from attack on the side of its moral purpose.' SUSEM. (142)

[Clearly Oncken, writing in thorough sympathy with his author's conceptions<sup>2</sup>, understands by the family which is the ultimate social unit approximately the modern or monogamous family<sup>3</sup>. From the time of Plato<sup>4</sup> and Aristotle down to the present generation this belief has been almost universal<sup>5</sup>. But two causes combine to render the Aristotelian theory untenable. The comparative study of customs, ceremonies and social usages discloses facts in abundance which will not square with it: while at the same time the extension of the doctrine of evolution from man's physical to his mental and social condition shows us what interpretation to put upon these facts. In short, when Aristotle derives other social forms from the monogamous family, he commits a mistake in scientific procedure: for the family is a *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον*, and what he assumes to be its simple and primary form turns out to be a product of long elaboration.

The facts tell against a primitive monogamous family exactly as they tell against innate moral ideas. Locke showed that in many parts of the world men lived apparently destitute of such ideas. Ethnologists are busily at work collecting notices of varieties of men who are equally without the monogamous family and apparently destitute of the ideas on which it rests. Beginning with the Auseans, Troglodytes, &c. adduced in this Excursus, nearly all the stages of social progress can be illustrated from the ancient world, many of them from facts within the knowledge of Aristotle himself<sup>6</sup>. The phrase *εἶναι κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας* is not likely to have been literally true, or to have had one and the same meaning, in all cases<sup>7</sup>. Few tribes are so

<sup>1</sup> It is well known that Plato was a bachelor, whilst Aristotle had been twice happily married.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Susemihl is in no way responsible for the remainder of this excursus, and he would perhaps consider the subject hardly relevant in an edition of the *Politics*.

<sup>3</sup> But for this limitation of his view Oncken would have observed that maternal instinct, however important in Callipolis, has nothing to do with the Libyan custom in question which attempts, in a rough fashion, to settle paternity.

<sup>4</sup> B. III. of the *Laws* is a most interesting study in the history of civilization.

<sup>5</sup> McLennan's epoch-making work

*Primitive Marriage* is here followed. Down to the year 1857 its author accepted the Aristotelian account of the origin of society. See *Enc. Brit.* (8th ed.) Art. LAW, vol. XIII. p. 255 f.

<sup>6</sup> That is, assuming the reports to be trustworthy. There must have been a rich harvest for a scientific observer in Greece about 330 B.C. How much Aristotle collected in *Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά*, we cannot tell: the few extant fragments are of little value.

<sup>7</sup> What else it may have meant we can conjecture in the light of the fuller information we possess respecting Hawaiians, Nairs, and Tibetans.

backward as to have no rule of incest at all; they mostly follow definite rules, but not our modern ones. Thus over a wide area it is *incestuous* to marry within the group to which one belongs (Exogamy), the 'group' being constituted by all of the same blood who trace their descent through females only from a common ancestor (who is often an animal, a vegetable or inanimate object)<sup>1</sup>. It is quite certain that, under favourable circumstances, the working of this rule conferred great powers upon women. Of such a state of things, known as the Matriarchate, there is evidence in the important place of the Greek female divinities, in certain legends (e.g. of the Amazons and the Lemnian women), in eponyms like Oenone, Thebe, and Messene, in the use of *μηρίς* for 'motherland' by Cretans and Messenians<sup>2</sup>. Down to historical times it was in force in Lycia (amongst a people possibly of Indo-European race)<sup>3</sup> and amongst the Cantabrians of Spain<sup>4</sup>. Athenian traditions assert that children were once named after their mothers; amongst the Locrians nobility came on the mother's side<sup>5</sup>. Kinship is traced through females in Homer and succession to property is so regulated in the legend of Meleager<sup>6</sup>. Exogamy must anciently have been the rule of the Roman gentes<sup>7</sup>. The Attic law permitted a man to marry his half-sister by the father's side. The levirate is found in Sparta and in legendary Troy<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Called a totem in North America and a *kobong* in Australia. Reverence for it is the rudimentary germ to which the worship of animals and plants, of the animal gods and the heavenly bodies, can be traced. The asparagus was the totem of an Attic *γένος*; Plut. Theseus c. 8 § 7 ὅθεν Ἰωξίδας καὶ Ἰωξίσι πατρὸς κατέστη αἵτε δαυθῆναι ἀσπαράγῳ, αἵτε στρυβνὶ καίειν, ἀλλὰ σέβασθαι καὶ τιμᾶν. See 'The Worship of Animals and Plants' in the *Fortnightly Review* Oct. 1869—Feb. 1870.

<sup>2</sup> Plato *Rep.* IX. 575 D, Pausan. IV. 26 § 3.

<sup>3</sup> Herod. I. 173, Nicolaus Damasc. *Frag. Hist. Gr.* III. p. 461 (Muller) Λέκται τὰς γυναῖκας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἄνδρας τιμᾶσι καὶ καλοῦνται μητρίθεν, τὰς τε ἀληθονομίας τὰς θυγατρίας λείπουσι, αὐ τοῖς ὀνόσιν. Comp. the genealogies of Sarpedon and Glaucus, Hom. *Il.* VI. 130 ff.; the daughter's son succeeds before the agnate. The bilingual Etruscan inscriptions prove that Etruscans were named after the mother.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo III. 4 § 18, p. 165 τὸ παρὰ τοῖς Καντάβροις τοῖς ἄνδρας δίδοναι τὰς γυναῖκας προίκα, τὸ τὰς θυγατέρας ἀληθονομίᾳ ἀποκαίονθαι, τοῖς τε ἀδελφοῖς δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐκδιδόνθαι γυναῖκας. ἔχει γὰρ τινὰ γυναικακρασίαν. The couvade among the same people, *ib.* § 17 p. 164 τὸ κοινὸν τε ἀσπασθῆναι τοὺς ἀδελφούς, ἐκτερεῖν αὐτ' ἐαυ-

τοῦν κατακλῆσαι. From Herod. II. 35 matriarchate and female kinship were suspected amongst the Egyptians. This has been confirmed by the evidence of the monuments.

<sup>5</sup> Varro apud Augustin. *De civ. Dei* XVIII. 9: cp. Justin II. 2, Schölas p. 3102. For the Locrians, Polyb. XII. 5 πάντα τὰ διὰ τῶν προγόνων ἴδιον ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, εἴη: Aristotle apud Polyb. XII. 6, 1560 b 8 ff. διὸ καὶ τῆς ἀνομιᾶς τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν εἰσὶν ἐπιθεταὶ καὶ τὴν αἰεσίτητα τὴν κατὰ τὰς γυναῖκας προσποιήσαντες, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰς στραμάχους τὰς προγονίας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀνεκλήναι.

<sup>6</sup> Hom. *Iliad* II. 661 ff. (Tlepolemos), XXI. 95 cp. XXII. 49 (Lykaon). Hyginus *Fab.* 129, 174 implies that Meleager's maternal uncles were his lawful heirs, and hence arose the feud narrated in Homer *Iliad* IX. 562 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch *Quæst. Rom.* § 6 p. 265 ἡ μὴ νενομισμένη συγγενεὶς γυναικὶ ἐπὶ τῷ γάμῳ οὐκ ἐγγίνετο καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. ὡς οὐδὲ τὰς τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἵματος γυναικί, ἀλλ' ὁμοσυνεγγενέας ἀνδράσι γινώσκουσιν: § 108 p. 289 καὶ ἡ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγγυῖ γένεσι αἱ γυναῖκες;

<sup>8</sup> Demophobos is an instance. Lycus declined to take his brother's wife. This is a survival of polyandry which, though

The presumption is, then, that the system of male kinship established in Greece (as amongst other Indo-European peoples) in historical times had superseded an earlier system of female kinship. And if so, the 'stocks' (γένη) and 'brotherhoods' (φρατρίαι) which when we discern them already appear on the point of falling into decay, or made subservient to political ends, are the survivals of the ruder tribal associations, anterior to the rise of the family in our sense of the term, which were formerly the only recognized ties of blood. Their common rites and burial-place, the obligation on all the members to succour and avenge one another, their right (in certain cases) to inherit property, all point to close ties of kinship, though of a rudimentary form. Certainly in no other way is the intermixture of alien blood and alien rites in the same city and local tribe so naturally explained. Aristotle, apparently transferring to ruder times the freedom of communication and voluntary action of his own day, leaves it to be accounted for arbitrarily, by contiguity of residence. Others, not more successfully, bring in the fiction of adoption and artificial extension of homogeneous groups. Unfortunately these questions have been only recently investigated, and in the present state of our knowledge we must be satisfied with provisional results, leaving many matters of detail in uncertainty. The Greeks, when they first become known to us, are so far advanced as to recognise kinship both by males and by females; they have marriage by contract or purchase (see *n.* 271), though traces of the custom which was superseded by purchase, viz. wife-stealing, are particularly well preserved<sup>1</sup>. What interval separated them from the matriarchal period? To what age belong the terms cited from Charondas and Epimenides, *ὁμοσίπνοι* and *ὁμόκαποι* or *ὁμόκαπνοι*? And which is the true form of the latter word? Something of more than usual importance is involved in this *v. l.* The *ὁμογάλακτες* (I. 2 § 6) were undoubtedly united by female kinship; i.e. all the members of a *γένος* (for *ὁμογάλακτες* = *γεννήται*, though Aristotle brings in the term to explain the village community) might be said to be nourished on the same mother's milk. On this analogy the members of a primitive *family* (*οἶκος*: I. 2 § 5) may have been known as 'sharers in one meal-sack and the smoke of one hearth.' This can be supported by two Gaelic words for family, one meaning 'those who eat together' (*coedich*), and 'those who have a common residence' (*teadhloch*)<sup>2</sup>. There is no mention of the blood tie, which is particularly emphasized in *ὁμογάστριος* and *ἀδελφός*, the latter word having superseded in Greek the earlier *φράτωρ*, as we see by the cognate languages. In Greek *φράτωρ* continues to designate a member of the older and ruder association<sup>3</sup>.

outraging all our instincts of decency, is an established institution of semi-civilized tribes, superseding still ruder arrangements and itself gradually decaying as monandry increases. Comp. Polyb. XII. 6 *παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ πατριον ἦν καὶ σύνθηες τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἔχειν γυναῖκα καὶ τέτταρας, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ πλείους ἀδελφοὺς ὄντας, καὶ τέκνα τούτων εἶναι κοινά, καὶ γεννήσαντα παῖδας ἱκανοὺς ἐκδόσθαι*

*γυναῖκά τινα τῶν φίλων καλὸν καὶ σύνθηες.*

<sup>1</sup> The form of capture a marriage ceremony at Sparta, Herod. VI. 65, Plut. *Lyc.* 15, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* I § 5. In Crete, Ephoros apud Strab. X. p. 482 D. The Ionian etiquette (one consequence of capture), Herod. I. 146.

<sup>2</sup> *Studies in Ancient History* p. 123: *Lang Essays* p. 97 n.

<sup>3</sup> This explanation seems the most

Aristotle with his healthy respect for facts would doubtless have modified his own theory, if this line of inquiry had been suggested to him. He had a poor, though just, opinion of the lower varieties of mankind<sup>1</sup>; he has to admit that γάμος, γαμήσις fail to express his own conception of marriage (I. 3 § 2); and he speaks with contempt of the κοινῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου, the different species of which he can hardly have examined with attention. Here, therefore, as upon the question of slavery, while the advanced thinkers of Greece had caught an early glimpse of truth<sup>2</sup>, he is content with a cautious conservative attitude, partly idealizing the actual relations of husband and wife and assuming the social development to have begun from a point where its course was well-nigh complete.]

## EXCURSUS II. 8

## HIPPODAMOS OF MILETUS: II. 7. 1.

Hippodamos, one of the most famous architects of his time, the first to introduce the fashion of laying out towns on a regular plan with broad straight streets, see IV(VII). 11 § 6 n. (850), was born at the earliest about 475 B.C. His oldest work appears to have been the construction, on the plan described, of the port town of Peiraeus, near the fortifications which had already been made by Themistocles. The market-place in the Peiraeus was called after him ἡ Ἰπποδάμιος ἀγορά; Xen. *Hell.* II. 4. 11, Andoc. I. 45, Harpocr. p. 154. Next it was he, in all probability, who directed the building of Thurii 444 B.C., since only a long residence there would account for his being called a Thurian. Considerably later in 406 B.C. he built Rhodes, Strabo XIV. p. 654<sup>3</sup>. Through the outline of his ideal state there runs the same striving after mathematical regularity as in his town architecture, the persistent employment of a threefold division especially. It is quite possible, although by no means so certain as Hildenbrand and Oncken assume, that this was due to Pythagorean influence and that, at least in a certain fashion and to a certain extent, Hippodamos was an adherent

satisfactory, though we might have expected some ruler mark of comradeship, such as tattooing (or better still a common totem) to have come down, rather than the σιπέη, from the times before the idea of blood relationship had arisen. "The apparent bond of fellowship between the members of such a group would be that they and theirs had always been companions in war or the chase—joint-tenants of the same cave or grove." *Studies in Anc. Hist.* p. 102.

<sup>1</sup> See I. 2 § 23, II. 8 § 20 f., and III. 11 § 8 αἰρεῖν τι διαφρονεῖν τῶν τοῦ θύγιος, αἱ τῶν εἰσὶν;

<sup>2</sup> An Orphic poet had described primitive men as cannibals, Sert. *Emp.* 12. 12. Kritias began his famous analysis of the causes which led to the origin of religion thus; ἢν χαίρουσ' ἐν' ἢν δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων φῆναι καὶ θανάτου ἔργον εἶναι, *Frag.* 1, 2 of Kritias, Sert. *Emp.* 12. 54. Cp. Moschion *Frag.* 10. 21 (9) apud Mosch. *Did.* I. p. 28 p. 240 ff. Epicurus pursued further the same line of inquiry: Lucretius V. 922 ff.

<sup>3</sup> δολιχῇ καὶ τῇ Πλευρωμένει καὶ τῇ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἀρχαίοντι, ὡς φασί, ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ ὁ Περικλῆς. [A very cautious statement.]

of the Pythagoreans. During his residence at Thurii he might easily have come into personal relations with the sect, as also with many other philosophers and sophists. At all events this is the easiest explanation of the fact that subsequently two works were ascribed to him, one on Happiness (*περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*) under the name of Hippodamos the Thurian, and one on Government (*περὶ πολιτείας*) under the name of Hippodamos the Pythagorean: we still possess extracts from these works in the *Florilegium* of Stobaeus. Both betray their spuriousness by a frequent use of Plato and Aristotle: and that the second is not the genuine work of Hippodamos which Aristotle criticized may be inferred from the fact that the contents of its fragments cannot be reconciled with Aristotle's statements.

The genuine ideal of a polity set forth by Hippodamos, Henkel (p. 164 f.) rightly places amongst the attempts to effect a compromise between democracy and oligarchy or aristocracy. 'It is a democratic feature to allow the whole body of citizens a share in public affairs' (§§ 2, 7, 9 *nn.* 253, 261, 262), 'to restrict legislation to the negative function of the protection of person and property' (§ 4 s. f. *n.* 255 b) 'and to attach especial importance to the improvement of the administration of justice' (§ 5). 'It is characteristic of aristocracy to adopt the vote instead of the lot as the normal mode of appointment to offices of state' (§ 7 *n.* 260 b), 'to subordinate the popular tribunals to a supreme court of appeal' (§ 4 *n.* 256), 'whereas the genuinely democratic popular tribunals exclude the very idea of an appeal, inasmuch as they are committees and representatives of the highest power in the state. This same tendency to mediate is perhaps discernible even in the regulation of professions. Democracy strives after an economic development of the nation, with which a prolonged service in the army is regarded as more and more incompatible: hence a growing inclination to hand over military service to foreign mercenaries. On the other hand, the warlike character of aristocracy which sees in military service a science and a lifework (Xenoph. *Oecon.* 4 § 3) leads its partizans to arrogate to themselves political rights to the exclusion of the producing classes; the productive labours of peace are considered irreconcilable with the fulfilment of political duties (Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* 13 § 5, Plut. *Pel.* 23). Hippodamos, then, combines the two opposite tendencies by granting political privileges to the labouring and producing classes, and by handing over the profession of arms to an independent military caste in the nation, which is in return to derive its sustenance from the public land and possess no private property.' It may be quite true that in the Greek democracies the state had more and more laid aside its paternal character and had applied itself to the improvement of positive law, in order to safeguard person and property on all sides against attack. Yet it was after all something novel for men like Hippodamos and the sophist Lycophron (III. 9. 8 *n.* 552) to give explicit and conscious utterance to this truth in theory; and, in place of the positive educational function which more or less Laconizing theorists like Xenophon (see Henkel p. 137 ff.) Plato and Aristotle assigned to the law, either to

attribute to it a purely negative function as 'the mere surety of mutual rights' in Lycophron's phrase, or with Hippodamos to reject all laws whose aim is not solely the prevention or punishment of injuries to one's neighbour in honour, property, or life. We do not know for certain whether Hippodamos preceded Lycophron in the declaration of this opinion, but it is highly probable: still less do we know whether he was the first to put forward theoretically this new principle of legislation, which broke altogether with old Greek notions of law and justice; but the supposition that this is so derives support from the fact that he was the first to devise a theoretical scheme for a pattern state at all. If this is the case, then in spite of Henkel's dissent we must credit him, as Oncken does<sup>1</sup>, with originating an important idea when he separated morality from the department of law, although after what has been said we cannot go so far as Oncken, who thinks that by these conceptions Hippodamos had left his age far behind. According to the old Greek notions, to which Socrates Xenophon Plato and Aristotle adhered, 'religious, ethical, and political duties are inseparably blended and united in law: nothing can be immoral that is not also illegal, and nothing can be morally right and yet at the same time illegal.' The later development of democracy had considerably loosened this unity; after which Hippodamos, it would seem, was the first to make its dissolution explicitly a fundamental principle, rendering impossible all such extravagances as those 'in virtue of which Aristotle goes the length of requiring the law to fix an annual budget of children' (II. 6 § 10 ff. cp. *nn.* 209 and 211). After its full and logical development by the Roman jurists, this principle passed over into the modern state, so that in the law 'we see no more than the barrier against disturbances of the social order, and leave to the forces of morality and religion the training of citizens in virtue.' The Greek political theories would be very imperfectly appreciated if, side by side with the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle, we did not recognize the full importance of such ideas as these, which had their origin in democracy. In such spheres of thought there arose that repudiation of slavery as the law of nature which in a certain respect is all the more deserving of admiration for being so premature. In such spheres too, it is true, there arose doctrines and ideas which were not merely instrumental in disintegrating the Greek state, but in their tendency destructive of all political structures; and these were especially employed by Sophists. In opposition to these ideas even we moderns, although we look at the state as a mighty engine for dispensing justice rather than for education, are obliged to range ourselves on the side of Plato and Aristotle in so far as we violate our principle by compulsory education and the universal obligation to military service. It is significant that even Isocrates, the admirer of an idealised ancient Athens, assumes this separation of law and morality: but just for this reason, since he too regards the state as exclusively an educational institution, he thinks but little of a written code of laws: see Henkel p. 149 ff. From the above point of view we see why

<sup>1</sup> *Staatstheorie* I. 214 ff. whose account is in the main followed here, the quotation marks indicating actual citations.

Hippodamos occupied himself so minutely with the improvement of the judicial system (§ 4 f.). And his political theory is essentially distinguished from that of Phaleas 'by its pervading ethical features, while in the scheme of Phaleas socialistic tendencies are prominent' (Henkel): see 7 § 1. SUSEM. (250)

NOTE ON THE CELTAE: II. 9. 7.

On the Kelts see also IV(VII). 2 § 10 n. (722) and 17 § 3 (953) and *Nic. Eth.* III. 7. 7, III 15 b 26 ff. where we are told the Kelts fear nothing, neither earthquakes nor waves of the sea. 'De Celtorum amoribus puerorum testatur etiam Athenaeus XIII. 603 A' (J. G. Schneider). 'See also Ammian. Marcell. XXXI. 9' (Fülleborn). Plato *Laws* I 637 D f. describes them as warlike but fond of drinking. It is known that at this time there were Kelts in Western Europe, whence came mercenaries in the service of Dionysios the tyrant who aided the Spartans against the Thebans 369 or 368 B.C., Xenoph. *Hell.* VII. I. 20. There were others again in Hungary and Servia, who sent an embassy to Alexander the Great, when he had crossed the Danube, Arrian *Anab.* I. 4. 6 ff.: at a later time they repeatedly made incursions into Macedonia and at last sent out a band of immigrants to Asia Minor, which finally remained settled there, in the country called after them Galatia. Hence Aristotle *Meteor.* I. 13 § 18, 350 a 36 ff. makes the Danube rise in Keltic territory in the mountain Pyrene i.e. the Pyrenees. Still greater is the inaccuracy of Herodotos (II. 33) a hundred years earlier; he is only acquainted with Kelts in the extreme west of Europe, but nevertheless makes the Danube rise in their country, and near Pyrene which he turns into a town.

To all appearance Aristotle, like the earlier Greeks, does not as yet distinguish between the Germans and the Kelts. While he mentions the story that the Kelts are not at all afraid of the sea *Nic. Eth.* III. 7. 7, his pupil Eudemos III. I § 23, 1229 b 28 f., speaking more precisely, says that 'the Kelts go forth fully armed to meet the waves of the sea.' The same story was told by Ephoros *Fr.* 44 (see Nicol. Dam. *Fr.* 104, Aelian. *V. H.* XII. 23): Strabo (VII. p. 293) says he told it of the Cimbrians; but here, as Casaubon saw, there is a mistake on Strabo's part. Müllenhoff *Deutsche Alterthums-kunde* I. 231 ff. (Berlin 1870) rightly remarks that this story could only refer to the inhabitants of the coast of the North Sea: he thinks it quite conceivable that 'there, at times of inundation and high tides, when no escape was possible, the men put on their armour, not indeed actually to do battle with the invading waves, but in order that, in their best array, like heroes and warriors, they might meet the death which had not been granted them on the battle field. These stories must have been conveyed to the Greeks through Massalia, Sicily, and Italy.' The first Greek who made his way to the settlements of the Germans was Aristotle's contemporary Pytheas of Massalia: he at any rate recognized that they were different from the Kelts, but at the same

time undoubtedly fell into the other mistake of taking them to be Scythians: see Müllenhoff *op. c.* 474—495. Although Müllenhoff's views in regard to the amber island described by Pytheas and the neighbouring coast of the Teutons, and their position in and on the coast of the North Sea about the mouths of the Eider, allow of considerable doubt, yet this much at any rate seems certain, that in Pliny *N. H.* xxxvii. 35 Pytheas Gutonibus Germaniae genti etc., the words Germaniae genti are an addition by Pliny himself, and the word 'Gutonibus' is wrong. Pytheas himself meant the same tribe 'Tautones' who are mentioned further on in the passage (proximumque Teutonibus). SUSEM. (287)

## EXCURSUS III.

## THE EPHORS AND THE Κόσμοι.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἔφοροι πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσὶν: II. 10. 6.

The resemblance between the Ephors and the Κόσμοι is certainly far less than that between the senators of the two states. For the Ephors are a democratic element; but the Κόσμοι, being elected out of certain noble families, are an aristocratic or oligarchic element, § 10. But the similarity lies in this, that the Κόσμοι too are changed year by year, unlike the senate which sits for life; that after they have resigned office their conduct is subjected to a scrutiny: and that in spite of the restricted election no pains are taken to exclude all from the office but men of especial merit. That the official powers of the two magistracies are (with the exception of the difference afterwards pointed out) the same, we must believe on Aristotle's authority: the only other difference he finds is in their respective numbers. Both indicate a contrast between the proper governmental authority, the activity of the executive or the administration on the one hand, and that of criminal jurisdiction and deliberation on the other: both magistracies share the idea that younger and more energetic force belongs to the former, while the latter is appropriate to the dignity of age. Lastly, while the power of both has grown at the expense of the enfeebled monarchy, only the Κόσμοι have entirely absorbed it, so that the supreme command in war is transferred from the kings to them, whereas the Ephors were content to direct all military operations from home or else to superintend the execution of everything by means of two of their number who were present in the camp: see *n.* 340 and 9 § 30 (Trieber). Compare *n.* (343) on 9 § 33. Yet after all there remains a difference which is by no means unimportant, viz. that the Ephors never come forward as generals or superior officers; all they do is to observe the com-

manders in the field. By the very meaning of the terms themselves the *ἐφοροι* are 'overseers', the *κόσμοι* are 'orderers' (Oncken). Ephoros (Strabo p. 481 f.) also maintains the similarity of the functions of the two, although the offices have different titles: but he diverges from Aristotle in arguing from the similarity between the senators in the two states to that between the Ephors and *Κόσμοι*. It may be that his judgment on the Cretan constitution is that of romantic, uncritical admiration and that Aristotle's is far less favourable and severely critical: still that does not justify us in inferring with Oncken (II. 401) that Aristotle *could* not have derived his facts, for the most part, from Ephoros. Indeed the conclusion that he did, receives decided support from the great similarity, which even Oncken (II. 405) points out, between the account of Crete by Ephoros and that in the so-called *Πολιτεῖαι* which we have under the name of Heracleides<sup>1</sup> of Pontos: for probably these are for the most part excerpts from Aristotle's *Πολιτεῖαι*, as Schneidewin who edited them has shown; and in this instance from his *Cretan Polity*. It is less likely however that he could have taken from Ephoros the facts which stand in strong opposition to the latter's verdict of approval, like most of those in §§ 12—14. SUSEM. (360)

#### THE CRETAN *περίοικοι*.

*φόρων οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι* : II. IO. 8.

It is in itself surprising that Aristotle does not compare the Cretan *περίοικοι* (see *n.* 355) with the Spartan *περίοικοι*, but rather with the Helots (§ 5, cp. *n.* 357); and this becomes still more strange when we learn from two later writers on Crete, Sosikrates and Dosiadas (*Frag.* 6. 2), as quoted in Athenaeus VI. 263 E f., that there were *three* dependent classes of the Cretan population, viz. (1) the slaves or serfs belonging to the state, the *Mnoïtai*, (2) those belonging to private individuals, the *Aphamiotai*, and (3) the *περίοικοι*, with the additional information about these last that the Cretans called them "subjects<sup>2</sup>." Further, in a skolion quoted in Athen. XV. 695 F (in Bergk *Poet. lyr. Gr.* no. 28 p. 1294), the Cretan poet Hybrias boasts that the *Mnoïtai* call him their lord<sup>3</sup>. Kallistratos, the disciple of Aristophanes of Byzantium, as quoted in Athen. VI. 263 E, describes the *Aphamiotai* as

<sup>1</sup> Heracleides was not, as Oncken thinks, a pupil of Aristotle, but of Plato.

<sup>2</sup> *τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρήτες καλοῦσι μνοῖαν, τὴν δὲ ἰδίαν ἀφαμιώτας, τοὺς δὲ περιόικους ὑπηκόους.*

<sup>3</sup> Spear and sword are my great treasure and my goodly shield withal, my body's safeguard: for therewith I sow, therewith I reap, therewith I am called lord of the slave-folk. But whoso durst not carry

spear and sword, all shall fall down and worship (me) addressing me as lord and mighty prince.

*ἔστι μοι πλοῦτος μέγας δόρυ καὶ ξίφος  
καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαισθήιον, πρόβλημα χρωτός·  
τούτῳ γὰρ ἄρῳ, τούτῳ θερίζω,  
τούτῳ δεσπότας μνοῖτας κέκλημαι.  
τοὶ δὲ μὴ τολμῶντ' ἔχειν δόρυ καὶ ξίφος  
... πάντες γόνυ πεπτηῶτες ἄμόν  
... προσκυνεῖν τί (με) δεσπόταν  
καὶ μέγαν βασιλῆα φωνέοντες.*

'the slaves or serfs on the estates, of native birth but enslaved in war, who are also called Clarotae': and earlier still Ephoros (*Frags.* 32 A, in Athen. vi. 263 F) says, not quite correctly, that the Cretans called their slaves Clarotae<sup>1</sup>. It may be conjectured that the estates in the private possession of the Dorian masters were called *ἀφάρμια*, as well as *κλῆροι*, which is the ordinary term for allotments of land: see Schömann *Antiquities* p. 295 Eng. tr. Accordingly we should expect Aristotle to compare with the Spartan HeLOTS either (α) both the clarotae and mnoitae; or (β) the mnoitae, the villeins who tilled the state land or public domain; or lastly, if this seemed inappropriate because at Sparta there was no public domain, (γ) the clarotae alone, as being the serfs on private estates. And a closer investigation unquestionably shows that this last is what he has actually done. He has used the term *περίονοι* in a somewhat different sense from Sosikrates, not for the inhabitants of dependent Cretan towns liable to pay tribute, but for the clarotae. It could not possibly be said of the former that they tilled the land of the Cretans: nor could Aristotle possibly have believed (§ 8) that the cost of the mess was defrayed by the state out of the public domain and the tributes of their subjects (which is the meaning that the words *φόρων οὐς φέρουσιν οἱ περίονοι* would then have) but that private individuals contributed nothing to them from their own estates. Moreover, a passage of Dosiadas (*Fr.* 1) in Athen. iv. 143 A, which has unfortunately been rendered obscure by the inaccuracy of the epitomist and has probably come down to us in a corrupt text, unquestionably attests this fact at least, that at Lyktos every citizen was bound to contribute the tenth part of the produce of his estate towards the mess-table to which he belonged. The remainder of the passage<sup>2</sup> I interpret to mean that out of its own revenues the state assigned a fixed portion to every family of citizens and accordingly distributed these its contributions amongst the various mess-associations; and lastly, we read, each slave had to pay a poll-tax of an Aeginetan stater. Putting on one side this last point (see n. 36 on § 8 *ext.*), Aristotle's account in the main agrees with this, as soon as we assume him to mean by his *περίονοι* the clarotae. Only his text too, as it has come down to us, is evidently not sound. For if *φόρων οὐς φέρουσιν οἱ περίονοι* can only mean that part of the produce of the estates cultivated by the clarotae which they pay to their lords as rent in kind, it is unreasonable to suppose that the citizens should have been obliged to pay away the full rent, from which they had to provide all other necessities of life, to the state in order to defray the cost of the mess, the worship of the gods, and the public burdens. Dosiadas says that only a tenth part went towards the

<sup>1</sup> καλοῦσι δὲ οἱ Κρήτες τοὺς μὲν κατὰ πόλιν οἰκίστας χρηστέσθους, ἀφάρμιας δὲ τοὺς κατ' ἀγρόν, ἐγχαρίους μὲν ὄντας ἀφάρμιας δὲ κατὰ πόλιν· διὰ τὸ εὐγενοῦναι ἢ κλαυδοῦναι.

<sup>2</sup> καλόντες Κρήτες καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ τοῦ γυναικῶνος περὶ αὐτῶν κλῆρον.

<sup>3</sup> I read: δούλους τῶν γυναικῶνος κατὰ τὰς πόλιν οὐς ἑαυτῶν εἰς τὴν ἐστίασιν, καὶ οἱ τῶν πόλεων κρητικῶν [i.e.] δουλοῦνται.

οἱ προσετιμῆρες τῆς πόλεως διὰ τὴν ἐστίασιν ὁμοῦ μετὰ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν καὶ τοῦ γυναικῶνος κατὰ τὰς πόλιν οὐς ἑαυτῶν εἰς τὴν ἐστίασιν, καὶ οἱ τῶν πόλεων κρητικῶν [i.e.] δουλοῦνται. Cf. with Haase (Mancoll. Philol. prefixed to the Breslau *Wochenschrift* 1890—191), being unable to accept either the interpretation of the passage which Schömann doubtfully advances, for the reasons given by Haase, or Haase's own explanation of his conjecture, for the reasons advanced by Schömann p. 307 n. 3 Eng. tr.

common meals, but the extract is our sole authority for this statement. And on grammatical grounds merely the assumption of a lacuna before *φόρων* is unavoidable, whether we supply <ἀπὸ μορίου τῶν>, or in agreement with Dosiadas <ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάτης τῶν> *φόρων*.

The term *περίοικοι* is adopted by Aristotle in order to characterize the freer position which these peasants occupied (cp. II. 5 § 19 n. 171, 9 § 3 n. 281) as compared with the Spartan Helots, since they were not obliged to contribute to their landlords anything beyond the rent before-mentioned, and in particular they had no personal service to render. For this latter purpose, in fact, the Cretan Dorians in the cities made use of purchased slaves: Schömann p. 298 Eng. tr. In IV(VII). 9 § 8, 10 § 13 (cp. III. 815, 840 and 282 on II. 9. 4) Aristotle expressly draws a distinction between the two cases when the land is cultivated by *δοῦλοι* and by *περίοικοι*: and this would be a reason for invariably rendering the term *περίοικοι* by 'villeins' or 'vassal-tenants', which is just what the Cretan *περίοικοι* are, whereas the Helots are *δοῦλοι* pure and simple<sup>1</sup>. The former might very well get the name *περίοικοι*, i.e. "dwellers around", from living in the flat country round the cities which the ruling Dorians inhabited; as Schömann suggests p. 229 E. tr.<sup>2</sup> And seeing that Aristotle never mentions the Laconian *περίοικοι*, the attentive reader will be less likely to misunderstand him as meaning by the Cretan *περίοικοι* a class corresponding to them. SUSEM. (364)

[The discovery of the civil code of a Cretan state (for so the Gortynian inscription copied in 1884 by Halbherr and Fabricius may roughly be described) has thrown fresh light upon these problems<sup>3</sup>. It is gratifying to find the conclusions of the Excursus confirmed by most unimpeachable authority<sup>4</sup>. We recognise the *περίοικοι* of whom Aristotle speaks in the *Φοικέες* of the code<sup>5</sup>, and the *περίοικοι*=*ὑπήκοοι* of Dosiadas and Sosikrates in the *ἀφέταιροι* of the code, both these classes of the population being legally distinguished from the full citizens (*πολιταί*) and from purchased slaves<sup>6</sup>: of the *μνοῖται* the inscription says nothing. Thus the threefold

<sup>1</sup> [Blackstone himself compares un-emancipated villeins with the helots, *Commentaries* B. II. c. 6 vol. II. p. 92. Prof. Susemihl renders *δοῦλοι* by Leibeigene, *περίοικοι* by Hintersassen. The Gortynian *οἰκέες*, though a specially privileged class of villeins, are nevertheless called *δῶλοι*: *vid. infra*.]

<sup>2</sup> But when Schömann continues "and are actually once so called by Aristotle," he should have dropped the "once", for the term occurs three times, viz. 10 § 5, § 8, § 16 as well as in the interpolated passage § 3 [also in c. 9 § 3]. It is only in c. 5 § 19 that Aristotle calls them *δοῦλοι*. Höck (*Kreta* III. p. 28) should not have censured Aristotle; he had simply his own misapprehension to complain of: and, as a climax, the mistakes of Oncken II. 381 f. 387 ff. may be taken

to be sufficiently refuted by the above.

<sup>3</sup> The text with English translation and commentary was published by A. C. Merriam in the *American Journal of Archaeology* I. pp. 324—350, II. 24—45.

<sup>4</sup> "Susemihl rightly recognised that Aristotle's *περίοικοι* are not the *περίοικοι* of Dosiadas and Sosikrates, but on the contrary the *κλαρῶται*: i.e. those who in the code are called *Φοικέες*." Zitelmann in *Das Recht von Gortyn* p. 63 n. 56.

<sup>5</sup> We find *οἰκέες* for *οἰκέτης* in Homer, Sophocles, and an Attic law quoted by Lysias x. 19, *οἰκῆος καὶ δούλης* (Bücheler). Comp. Kallistratos as cited above p. 337 n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> The *ἐνδοθιδία δῶλα* or "maidservant that is within the house," mentioned in the code II. 11, is obviously a 'purchased slave' (*χρυσώνητος*): Zitelmann *ib.* p. 64.

distinction of *πολιταί*, *ἀφένταιροι*, *Φοικίς*, answering to that of *Σπάρτατοι*, *περίοικοι*, *ἐλωτες* at Sparta, is vindicated against the doubts of Hock, Grote, Oncken, and others.

The full citizen of this Cretan city was necessarily a member of an *ἐταιρία*; he lived in his house in the town, this house and certain cattle (*τὰ καρταίποδα*<sup>1</sup>, *Code* IV. 36), which he pastured doubtless on the common lands (*δημόσιοι*), passing at his death to his sons. He had besides an estate (*κλῆρος*) outside the town, consisting of a certain allotment of land and the *Φοικίς* who tilled it. To these *Φοικίς* he stood in the capacity of *πάτρις*, 'lord' or *patronus*. The rent in kind which they paid him secured him leisure to devote to the civil and military duties of political life.

The *ἀφένταιρος* was also a freeman like the *πολιτὴς*, but his name implies that as he did not belong to any *ἐταιρία*<sup>2</sup>, he was excluded from the citizenship. The law ordained that the money-fine which he was to receive in compensation for an offence committed against him was only one-tenth that of a full citizen, but four times that of a *Φοικίς* (100 staters, 10 staters, 5 drachmai =  $2\frac{1}{2}$  staters, *Code* II. 3—9: in other cases the proportion between the serf and the freeman is 1 : 2 and 1 : 5, Zitelmann p. 102 n. 5).

The *Φοικίς* were not free men: *Φοικίς* and *δούλος* are used indifferently in the code<sup>3</sup>, and the terms *ἀφαιμῶται* and *κλαρωταί* do not occur. The Cretan peasants were in a state of villenage or serfdom, but assuredly their condition was far superior to that of the ordinary bondman or slave<sup>4</sup>. They were annexed to the lands which they cultivated, on which they had houses: they are accounted as part of the household and together with the lands which they tilled are entitled *κλῆρος*<sup>5</sup>. They could acquire property and are assessed at a money-fine for the offences they commit. Strange as it may appear, a villein possessed a subsidiary right of inheritance to his lord's property in default of nearer heirs<sup>6</sup>. His family rights were legally protected, and he could marry without his lord's consent. He could even marry a free woman, and if he was received into her house the children of the marriage were free<sup>7</sup>. In legal proceedings he was represented by his lord. Thus his status was something altogether far removed from that of the *servus*, if indeed it be not that of the *colonus*, at Rome.]

<sup>1</sup> By the 'strong-footed' may be meant (1) all large beasts, as opposed to sheep and goats; or (2) oxen (cp. *Psalm*, OL. XII. 81, where the scholiast says the word means a bull in the *Doljdic* speech); or (3) horses and mules, like *μασέχαι ἵππων*.

<sup>2</sup> It is probable that the *ἐταιρία* as a division of the *φολή* answered to the *Αἰεὶ φάτρας*, and that admission to it was an indispensable condition before any one could become a full citizen. See *Athen.* IV. 18 p. 143; Zitelmann pp. 33, 161. In the *Dreros* inscription lines paid by the *Κάτωροι* are to be divided amongst the *ἐταιρία* (p. 337). At the foundation

of these close mesa-companies lay, no doubt, an earlier and wider tribal association (p. 330 f.); cp. Hock *Zeits.* III. p. 126.

<sup>3</sup> In the code, as by Aristotle, *δούλος* is used to include any form of servitude.

<sup>4</sup> Their tenure of the land might almost be compared with that of the privileged villans who by gradual emancipation are on their way to becoming *villeins*.

<sup>5</sup> *Code* V. 26 *ἐν τῷ κλῆρῳ τοῦ κυρίου ἔστιν ὁ δούλος* (= *de ser*) & *κλῆρος*.

<sup>6</sup> V. 27, Zitelmann pp. 64, 144.

<sup>7</sup> VII. 11; Zitelmann p. 68 f. That the children follow the status of the mother is probably a survival of the matrilineal and female kinship; see above p. 319.

## EXCURSUS IV.

THE CONSTITUTION OF CARTHAGE: II. II §§ 3—8.

τὰ συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιριῶν.

Movers tries to show that the class of full citizens at Carthage—patricians, nobility, optimates—was divided into three tribes and thirty gentes, the former answering to the Greek φυλαὶ and the three ancient Roman *tribus*, the latter to the Greek φρατρίαι and the 30 Roman *curiae* (see below on γερονσία, and compare III. 2 § 3, 9 § 13). According to him it is these latter divisions or ‘gentes’ that are here called ἑταιρίαι, ‘mess-associations’.

This explanation has the great advantage of presenting a real similarity with the φιδίτια in the Spartan state, although it is altogether a false opinion of Movers that the ὠβαί, the sub-divisions of the Spartan tribes (see Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* I. p. 211, p. 231 Eng. trans.), were called συσσίτια: we are unable to suppose the existence of any systematic organization of the separate Spartan mess-tables ‘in accordance with tribal divisions, or districts and places of residence’ (*ib.* p. 271 E. tr.), and probably the same is true of the ἀνδρεία in Crete. It might indeed have been the case, as Movers himself observes, that the dinners of the Carthaginian associations were not held every day; yet they must have taken place frequently and at fixed times and were attended by all the members of each association, out of whose common property the costs were undoubtedly defrayed. ‘In the ancient world feasts which were held at stated times by whole families or by political corporations acquired a politico-religious character and are to be connected with the sacrificial feasts celebrated by every family at stated times which are mentioned even in early Jewish history (1 Sam. c. 20. 6, 29: c. 9. 12, 23: 1 Kings 1. 9). In this respect we shall most suitably compare the συσσίτια of the Carthaginian associations with the banquets likewise held on certain festal occasions by the *curiales* in their places of assembly or *curiae*.’ It is also to be remembered that ἑταιρία was actually the name in Crete for any division of the citizens who dined together at the same table: at least Dosiadas specially used the term in reference to the Lyctians, διήρηνται δ’ οἱ πολῖται πάντες καθ’ ἑταιρίας, καλοῦσι δὲ ταύτας ἀνδρεία (*Frag.* 1 in Athenaeus IV. 143 B). Mommsen too takes the Carthaginian clubs to have been at least public corporations, though not composed of the privileged citizens; ‘probably guilds under oligarchical management’ (II. p. 17 Eng. tr.). But the συσσίτια at Sparta, with which Aristotle compares them, consisted of none but full citizens.

Kluge, Heeren, and most of the other commentators prefer to understand by this phrase the banquets of the political party-clubs, since such oligarchical clubs were certainly called ἑταιρίαι in Greece (cp. *n.* 157). If we were obliged to share this view, Aristotle, who is professedly comparing the public institutions of the two states, would be convicted of the huge mistake

of having compared a Spartan *public* institution with the arrangements of merely *private* associations at Carthage, two things moreover in which one does not at all see how there can be any similarity.

The *circuli* and *convivia* at Carthage are further mentioned in Livy XXXIV. 61 § 5; their 'meetings' (*αἵρεσες*) also in Theodorus Mommsen's *Hypomn.* c. 104 § 11 (cited by Kluge p. 215): but from neither passage can more exact information about them be obtained. SUSEM. (378)

ἡ τῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχή.

Kluge and Heeren incorrectly hold that this is a different board from that of 'The Hundred' mentioned § 7. The latter however is only the shorter and less exact form: or possibly, as Movers conjectures, p. 552, the number of members proper was really only a hundred (he conjectures more precisely, 10 from the larger, 90 from the smaller senate: but is this right?): to these were added the highest magistrates, the two *Shofetes* (see below *Βασιλεῖς*) and perhaps the two high-priests. It is not true that Aristotle's statements about the Hundred in any way oblige us to distinguish them from the Hundred and Four: if they were elected by the Boards of Five, why should this exclude the latter from taking account of personal merit? Now we learn from Justin XIX. 2 that the Hundred was not an original element of the Carthaginian constitution, but was introduced as a protection against the dynastic government of a few families or the usurpation by a single family of despotic power, about 450 B.C., when the house of Mago, which had laid the foundations of the Carthaginian power and had exclusively filled the office of general for three generations, had become so overbearing as to threaten the liberty of the state. For this reason, as Justin tells us, a hundred judges were chosen out of the number of the Senators, to demand an account of their proceedings from the generals on their return home, in order that the latter, thus possessed with a wholesome fear, might in their command abroad keep before their eyes the laws and the tribunals awaiting them at home: *dein cum familia tanta imperatorum gravis liberae civitati esset omniaque ipsi agerent simul et iudicarent, centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur, qui reversis a bello ducibus rationem rerum gestarum exigerent, ut hoc metu in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi iudicia legesque respirerent.* Thus it was, as Heeren says, a high political tribunal exercising powers of police for the maintenance of the existing constitution, which however from the nature of the case soon degenerated into espionage and tyranny: hence he in every respect rightly compares it with the Council of Ten at Venice, and the political inquisition connected with it. Before long the power of the Hundred rose above that of the senate, so that Aristotle § 7 calls it the highest magistracy of all, since it summoned not only the generals 'but beyond doubt the *Shofetes* [kings] and *Gerusiasts* [senators] also, when circumstances required, on resigning their office to give an account of their stewardship, and even, if they thought fit, inflicted capital punishment, often with the most reckless

cruelty,' comp. Diod. xx. 10. 3: since moreover as a general rule, 'in this as in every instance where administrative functionaries are subjected to the control of another body, the reality of power was transferred from the controlled to the controlling authority; and no doubt the latter came to interfere in all matters of administration,' so that 'the fear of the board of supervision at home, which regularly meted out its award according to success, hampered the Carthaginian statesman and general in council and action,' Mommsen II p. 17 Eng. tr. But there is no authority for Mommsen's assertion (*ibid.*) that the Senate submitted important despatches first to the Hundred and then to the people; and Heeren is decidedly wrong in thinking that generally the most important state affairs were first discussed in this committee (so to speak) of the larger senate<sup>1</sup>: see below *γερονσία* and *n.* (387) on § 5. During the second Punic war and the period immediately following, Livy (xxxiii. 46) even goes so far as to describe these 'judges' as, properly speaking, the supreme body in the state, whose arbitrary power respected neither the laws nor the magistrates and extended to the property the reputation and the lives of all, while its members were so closely united that whoever offended one had to face the hostility of all. Thus the state treasurer (*quaestor*) 195 B.C., because he would be elected to this board after the expiration of his term of office, ventured in a spirit of defiance to disregard the summons of Hannibal who was then *Shofete* and probably invested with extraordinary powers (*praetor*, cp. Justin xxxi. 2. 6, *tum temporis consulem*: see below). This induced Hannibal on his side to appeal to the popular assembly and to carry a law, that these 'judges' instead of serving for life, as formerly, should only be elected for a year, and that no one should be 'judge' two years in succession: *iudicum ordo Carthagine ea tempestate dominabatur, eo maxime, quod idem perpetui iudices erant. res fama vitaeque omnium in illorum potestate erat. qui unum eius ordinis obfendisset, omnis adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infensos iudices deerat. horum in tam impotenti regno...praetor factus Hannibal vocari ad se quaestorem iussit. quaestor id pro nihilo habuit, nam...quia ex quaestura in iudices, potentissimum ordinem, referebatur, iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebat. enimvero indignum id ratus Hannibal viatorem ad prendendum quaestorem misit subductumque in contionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicum, prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam esset neque magistratus, accusavit. et ut secundis auribus accipi orationem animadvertit et infimorum quoque libertati gravem esse superbiam*

<sup>1</sup> In Diod. xiv. 47. 2 the declaration of war which the elder Dionysius sent to the smaller senate, was not read as Kluge states, p. 103, first there, then in the larger senate, and then in the popular assembly; nor, as Mommsen seems to suppose, first in the Council of the Hundred and Four and then in the popular assembly. On the contrary, the words are: *ἥς ἀναγνωσθείσης ἐν τε τῇ συγκλήτῳ καὶ μετὰ ταύτ' ἐν τῇ δῆμῳ*, and *σύγκλητος* is therefore the same as *γερονσία*, the

smaller senate of thirty (see below), just as the Roman senate is frequently called *σύγκλητος* by Polybios. Consequently the smaller council first deliberated upon the document, and then laid it before the popular assembly. As to Polybios' general usage (when he is speaking more exactly) of *γερονσία* for the small council and *σύγκλητος* for the Great Council of Carthage, see below (*n.* 382). But the council of the Hundred and Four is never called *σύγκλητος*.

corum, legem exemplo promulgavit pertulitque, in singulis annis sedes legerentur, neve quis biennium continuum index esset. After all this, the points of resemblance between this board and the Spartan ephors are so great that it would be quite inexplicable if, notwithstanding, Aristotle had compared another Carthaginian magistracy with the ephoracy. The only remaining point which could render another comparison possible would be the civil jurisdiction of the Ephors (9 § 23 *v.* 325): and as such civil judges the Hundred and Four are regarded by Kluge and Heeren, who insist that they should be distinguished from the Hundred and existed before them. But their own admission, that there was no further similarity between the Hundred and Four and the Ephors, is sufficient to refute their hypothesis. To make matters superfluously clear, the Ephors are called the highest office in the state (μεγίστη ἀρχή, 9 § 21) in precisely the same words as are used of the Hundred, 11 § 7 (comp. also 9 § 19 ἡ γὰρ ἀρχή κυρία τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστί). In particular what is said of the Ephors, 9 § 26, that they control to some extent all other magistrates (δόξετε δ' ἂν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πᾶσαι ἐπιβύου τὰς ἀρχάς), is exactly applicable, as we have seen above, to the Hundred. Even the remark (9 § 20) that in order to find support and protection against the Ephors, the kings themselves had been forced to flatter the people, reminds us forcibly of Hannibal's procedure on the above occasion, when he had recourse to the popular assembly. In Aristotle's time, moreover, the members were not as yet chosen for life, since according to his statement the Boards of Five exercised their powers longer than any other officials: thus we should be obliged to assume that the nomination for life was of later introduction. But even Livy's account allows of no other interpretation than that the quaestor had previously belonged to the Hundred and Four and after resigning his office again entered this body or at least (see below) had the right to enter it: and, as the number of members was strictly limited, this can only be reconciled with their holding office for life by the assumption that in such cases a substitute was appointed for the intervening time. Probably then Livy's statement simply means, as Mommsen assumes, that for the most part the same individuals were always on this board, because each retiring member could be immediately re-elected, and that Hannibal's reform only provided that no member of this Council of the Hundred could be elected to hold office for two consecutive years. SUSEM. [379.]

### οἱ βασιλεῖς.

Greek and Roman writers as a rule call these officers 'kings' and seldom by their proper official title shofetes (suffetes), i.e. Judges, the title borne by the heads of the Israelites before the establishment of the monarchy. That there were two shofetes is expressly attested by Cornelius Nepos alone (*Hannib.* 7. 4), but it may be inferred from the comparison with the consuls at Rome (Livy XXX. 7. 5; Festus p. 309 b 29, Orosius V. 11, Nep. l.c., cp. Justin XXXI. 2. 6): and Polybios also VI. 51. 2 speaks at least more vaguely of kings at Carthage in the plural, as does Livy of shofetes at Gades

(xxxviii. 37. 2), remarking that this is the highest office amongst all the Phoenicians. All the more apposite is the comparison made with the dual kingship at Sparta. But that these two Shofetes were elected from different families, is a statement which Movers through a strange mistake attributes to Aristotle, who only says, that while at Sparta the royal dignity was hereditary in the same family, that of the Heracleidae, which moreover was not distinguished by any special excellence above all the other Spartan families, the Shofetes at Carthage could be taken from any of the gentes of the citizens with full civic rights. Comp. 9 § 30 *n.* (339). Further, Movers thinks that the consistent mention in historical narratives of only one Carthaginian king, even in notices of the annual election 'of a king' (Zonaras *Ann.* viii. 8) in ancient writers must be explained from the fact that the second Shofete was to a certain extent subordinate to the first and appointed more to act as a check upon him, and for that reason mostly elected out of another, and preferably a hostile, family: an opinion which may indeed be correct but cannot actually be proved, though this kind of policy would be in further accord with the Spartan belief that discord between the two kings was advantageous for the state (9 § 30) and was largely put into practice at Carthage on other occasions also (Diod. xx. 10. 1 *n.* 1597; comp. however on the other side Diod. xiii. 80. 2)<sup>1</sup>. It is readily intelligible that only one of the two Shofetes conducted the business referred to in the above historical narratives; besides, it frequently happened that one of them was absent, because employed in the service of the state abroad<sup>2</sup>. It is indeed very surprising that Aristotle should designate the command in war as a distinguishing prerogative of the Spartan kings and of the ancient kings in Crete (10 § 6)—see the parallel passages given in *n.* (343) on 9 § 33—while at the same time expressly noting that the generals at Carthage were distinct from the kings (11 § 9, § 12), so that here, generally speaking, civil and military powers were dissevered. However it was not infrequent, especially as the accumulation of several offices in the same hands was customary (§ 13), for one of the two Shofetes to be invested with the generalship at the same time; but then the supreme command had to be conferred upon him expressly by the senate (Justin xxii. 7. 7, Diod. xiii. 43. 5, xiv. 54. 5<sup>3</sup>, xv. 15. 2, xx. 29. 2, cp. 33. 2, Polyæn. 1. 27. 2). The office of Shofete was held by the celebrated Hanno who at the command of the state undertook a voyage, with 60 ships and 30,000 persons of both sexes, to the west coast of Africa to found settlements of Liby-phoenicians, and wrote a narrative of this voyage which we

<sup>1</sup> It is a curious parallel that Xenophon in his pamphlet *De Rep. Laced.* speaks throughout of the king in the singular, except once, c. 15 § 5 (Wyse).

<sup>2</sup> Only the incorrect statement of Zonares l.c. remains without justification on this view: but in fact neither is it justified upon the hypothesis of Movers.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Oros. iv. 6. The words *κατὰ νόμον* added to the title of King in these passages of Diodoros (*κατὰ νόμους τότε*

*βασιλεύοντα* and *βασιλέα κατὰ νόμον*) have been wholly misunderstood by Kluge p. 92, and Heeren p. 136. They denote an elected king as distinguished from an hereditary king *βασιλεὺς κατὰ γένος*, as is clear from pseudo-Plato in Diog. Laert. iii. 82 f. *τῆς δὲ βασιλείας ἥ μὲν κατὰ νόμον, ἥ δὲ κατὰ γένος ἐστίν. ἥ μὲν οὖν ἐν Καρχηδόνι, κατὰ νόμον· πολιτικὴ γάρ ἐστιν. ἥ δὲ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ καὶ Μακεδονίᾳ, κατὰ γένος.*

still possess in a Greek translation. The points of resemblance to the Spartan kings were as follows: (1) the Carthaginian Shofetes may be assumed to have had like the kings (III. 14. 3<sup>1</sup>) a sort of priestly office: (2) in any case they had, as their title denotes, a kind of supreme judicial office; although after the appointment of the council of the Hundred and Four,—whose members were also called "judges" or shofetes (see above, also CAHO as cited by Festus s. v. *maxime*), but no doubt, with some distinguishing addition,—this would be mainly restricted to the duty of presiding at that board (which though not expressly attested can hardly be doubtful) and in the full session of the ordinary courts (see below): further, (3) they held meetings of the senate and the popular assembly, and one of them directed the business of these meetings (Polyb. III. 33. 3, Livy XXX. 7. 5, 46. 5 f.). Mommsen asserts that the Roman writers also called the kings praetors: but without laying stress on the fact that Nepos l.c. expressly distinguishes the Praetor at Carthage from the King in a passage which it, it is true, in the last degree confused<sup>1</sup>, we find that the term praetor is only used by Livy and Nepos in reference to the appointment of Hannibal B.C. 195 and thus in any case denotes, as Heeren and Kluge assume, the devolution of extraordinary official powers, although only in combination with the dignity of shofete (Justin XXXI. 2. 6 *tum temporis consulem*, Zonar. IX. 14 s. f. τῆς μεγίστης τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀρχῆς). According to Cicero's statement, *De Rep.* II. 23. 42, if indeed this is really what he means to say, one could easily suppose with Heeren that the shofetes were elected for life: but this is disproved by what Aristotle says of the Boards of Five (§ 7)<sup>2</sup>; and not merely Zonaras VIII. 8, as was already said, but Nepos also l.c. definitely states that the election was made annually, although it is very surprising that Aristotle has not emphasized such a pronounced deviation from the Spartan kingship. SUPREM. (381).

### ἡ γερουσία: § 3.

Mommsen says (II. p. 15 Eng. tr.), it is doubtful whether along with the senate there existed a larger one, as Heeren and others assume. But at any rate Livy XXX. 16. 3 says unambiguously that thirty leading senators formed a smaller council which had the real direction of the senate: *triginta senatuum principes, id erat sanctius apud illos concilium maximaeque ad ipsum senatum regendum vis*. It may be conjectured that one of these thirty was chosen from each of the thirty Carthaginian families (see above). And as Mommsen himself actually limits the number to thirty on the authority of this very passage, there must have existed another larger senate, because the Hundred were elected out of the number of the senators (see above). Such a larger council is usually called συνέλευσις, even by Aristotle II. i. 10 (cp. *N.* 442), and although the terms γερουσία, σιγάλευσις, and συνέ-

<sup>1</sup> Praetor factus est, postquam rex erat annis secundo et vicesimo. Heeren, p. 418 n., proposed to alter rex into rex, but that here also rex denotes the shofete and that the alteration is there-

fore unnecessary is shown, apart from all other reasons, by the very next words: ut enim Romae Comites sic Carthagine quatuordecim annis unus rex creabatur.

<sup>2</sup> πέντεκα ἀρχαὶ χρονοῦ εἰς ἀλλήλους.

δριον are indifferently used with the same meaning for even the smaller senate at Carthage<sup>1</sup>, yet Polybios expressly distinguishes the smaller and the larger senate by the terms *γερουσία* and *σύγκλητος* X. 18. 1 *δύο μὲν...τῶν ἐκ τῆς γερουσίας, πέντε καὶ δέκα τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου* and XXXVI. 2. 6 *τριακοσίου ὁμήρους...τοὺς υἱοὺς τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου καὶ τῆς γερουσίας*. Possibly from the last passage we may infer with Movers that both senates together consisted of 300 members, so that the 30 gentes were again divided into 300 families, the heads of which—if this supposition is correct—were life members of the full senate, and presumably elected from amongst themselves (and probably only for a year) the smaller senate and the shofetes, unless we prefer to assume with Mommsen that the popular assembly had the right to elect the members of both senates and the shofetes out of the privileged gentes (see below). At any rate if we except this point, Mommsen is right in observing that the larger senate was not of much importance; and accordingly Aristotle evidently does not notice it, but in his comparison with Sparta is thinking of the smaller senate, especially as the number of members either tallied exactly, if we follow Mommsen in the assumption (which is however wholly unsupported) that the two shofetes were included in the thirty as the two kings were at Sparta<sup>2</sup>; or at any rate corresponded approximately, supposing the shofetes to have been added to this number. 'It was this senate of Thirty which mainly transacted the business of the state, making for instance the preliminary arrangements for war, directing levies and enlistments, nominating the general<sup>3</sup> and assigning to him a certain number of Gerusiasts [senators] from whom'<sup>4</sup> probably, see Polyb. I. 21. 6, 'the subordinate commanders were taken; to it despatches were addressed' (Mommsen II. p. 15 E. tr.), 'to it reports were made through the shofetes, and it received foreign ambassadors' (Heeren). If it agreed with the shofetes, see II § 5, n. (387), it undoubtedly possessed full legislative powers and even the power to decide upon war and peace (n. 387), although in this respect it might seem advisable often, if not in most cases, further to lay the question before the popular assembly. Lastly, it certainly had the control of the financial administration. Over and above the common baths for the citizens there were at Carthage special baths for the senators<sup>5</sup> (Valer. Max. IX. 5. 4 *ext.*

<sup>1</sup> As in the passages which Kluge pp. 103, 105 f. has misunderstood, viz. Diod. XIV. 47. 2 (see p. 342 n. 1) and XX. 59. 1 *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς γερουσίας ἐν Καρχηδόνι βουλευσαμένης περὶ τοῦ πολέμου [καλῶς] ἔδοξε τοῖς συνέδροις τρία στρατόπεδα... ἐκπέμψαι*. The *συνέδροι* are the members of the *γερουσία* itself: the transaction takes place in the *γερουσία* alone and not, as Kluge thinks, first in the smaller senate and then in the two senates combined. The word *συνέδριον* is not found at all in the sense of such a full sitting of the two senates, as he asserts; when applied to Carthage it everywhere denotes the smaller senate only.

<sup>2</sup> Duncker (*Hist. of Antiquity* II. p. 185, ed. 4, 1875) formerly agreed with Mommsen. But in the English translation of Duncker, Vol. II. p. 275 (which follows the 5th German edition), this assumption is withdrawn and 30 is given as the number of senators *exclusive of the kings*.

<sup>3</sup> See above n. (381), also n. (392 b) below.

<sup>4</sup> Whether it was so "regularly", a Mommsen writes, can hardly be proved.

<sup>5</sup> For the senators Mommsen (II. p. 16, E. tr.) arbitrarily substitutes the judges, namely the Hundred and Four although it may certainly be quite true

insolentiae vero inter Karthaginiensem et Campanum senatum quales assu-  
lato fuit : ille enim separato a plebe balneo lavabatur ; (cp. Juven. V. 94  
propter quod Romae cum Bocchare nemo lavatur, also Movers p. 501 n. 57).  
The deputies of the senate (*σύνεδροι*) with the army formed part of the  
general's council of war, Polyb. III. 71. 5; and in the oath ratifying the  
treaty concluded with Philip, next to 'Hannibal the general' and his three  
lieutenant-generals mentioned by name, all the senators in his camp and all  
the Carthaginians serving under him are introduced without mention of  
their names, *καὶ πάντες οἱ γεροντισταὶ Καρχηδονίαν μετ' αὐτοῖ καὶ πάντες*  
*Καρχηδόνιοι οἱ στρατευόμενοι μετ' αὐτοῦ*, Polyb. VII. 9 § 1, § 4. Movers, p. 498,  
prefers to understand members of the smaller council by the three former  
names, and only members of the larger council by the *γεροντισταὶ*; but this  
title is not suitable for the latter, nor can it be shown to have been given to  
them anywhere else. It is perfectly arbitrary for Movers to assume (p. 522  
n. 308) that these plenipotentiaires of the senate also belonged to the  
Hundred. These deputies strongly remind us of the ephors sent into the  
field along with the Spartan king (cp. *nn.* 340, 360). SUSEM. (382)

### ὁ δῆμος.

<sup>1</sup> The kings and the senate, if both are agreed, have it wholly in their  
own power to bring any given question before the people or not : if however  
they are not agreed, the popular assembly must decide the question. But  
whatever is submitted to the assembly, the people are not merely allowed to  
listen to the resolves of the government, but have the supreme decision, and  
any citizen who likes may oppose the propositions submitted, which is not  
allowed under the other constitutions,' at Sparta and in Crete: §§ 5, 6.

Kluge was mistaken in supposing the passage to mean that unless the  
whole body of the senators was unanimous, a question had to be brought  
before the popular assembly ; that this was not the case may be seen from  
Livy XXI. c. 3 f., c. 9 § 3—11 § 2, XXIII. c. 12 ff. However the senate and  
the *thofetes* might often find it advisable, as was remarked above (n. 382),  
to bring important and critical matters before the people of their own free  
will. Gradually this would become more and more frequent, so that at the  
time of the second Punic war, according to Polyb. VI. 51. 6, the popular  
assembly at Carthage already had the greatest influence on deliberations,  
 whilst the senate held this position at Rome (*τὴν πλείστην δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς*  
*Καρχηδόνιοις παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίοις ὁ δῆμος ἤδη μετελήφει, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις*  
*ἀρχὴν εἶχεν ἡ σύγκλητος*). And yet even this very war was decreed by the  
 *thofetes* and the senate alone, Polyb. III. 33, Livy XXI. 18. SUSEM. (387)

that the latter are also called "senators" being elected, as a matter of fact, from  
by the Greek and Roman writers, as the (smaller and larger) senate.

## αἱ πενταρχίαι.

This is all we know of these Boards of Five ; we are therefore reduced to uncertain conjectures respecting them. But above all nothing should be read into this passage which is not contained in it. Now it says that there was not merely one such corporation, as Movers makes out (p. 499 f. *n.* 53), but a number of boards : it does not say, as Kluge and others state, that the members of these boards afterwards *entered* the council of the Hundred, but only that they *elected* that council : nor does it say that before entering upon office they had invariably filled another office, and after the expiry of their term again filled such an office, but on the contrary that they discharged the duties of the same office as members elect beforehand and as members retired for some time afterwards, probably in the capacity of assistants, substitutes, or assessors.

Further Heeren has shown that the government of the provinces did not belong to this office, as Kluge assumed : but Kluge and Heeren agree in thinking that the total number of the officers requisite for the special administration of Carthage itself were included in them : consequently the state-treasurer (see above p. 342), who is mentioned along with the shofetes at Gades and therefore as one of the highest officers of state (Livy XXVIII. 37. 2), and the censor (praefectus morum : Nep. *Hamilc.* 3. 2) would have belonged to them. And then certainly by *principibus quibusdam et magistratibus* mentioned by Livy in the course of his narrative of the events of B.C. 195 (cited above p. 342),—*vectigalia publica partim negligentia dilabebantur partim praedae ac divisui principibus quibusdam et magistratibus erant*, XXXIII. 46. 8—we should understand with Movers the magnates of Carthage employed upon the Boards of Five.

But there is at least as much probability in another conjecture, to which we are led by the fact that the Boards of Five elect the Hundred. According to Aristotle's own statement (II § 7 s. f., III. I § 11 cp. *nn.* 391, 444) there was more than one board of judges at Carthage, and thus far there is some truth in Heeren's and Kluge's mistaken severance of the Hundred and Four from the Hundred (see above, p. 341). The Hundred was one such board and it is easy to conjecture that the Boards of Five constituted the others ; that they had exercised high political jurisdiction before the introduction of the Hundred for the loss of which they were compensated by being at least allowed to elect the members of the new court of justice, while they retained the ordinary criminal, as well as the entire civil, jurisdiction, its different branches being assigned to different committees each of five men, while cases of special importance were no doubt definitively decided in full session under the presidency of one of the two shofetes as chief justice. This conjecture further receives considerable support from the fact that it is only these Boards of Five that are said to have discharged their duties without pay and not to have been chosen by lot, which is not easily intelligible except as in contradistinction to the popular courts in democratic states. Also immediately after (I) the Boards of Five and (II) the Council

of the Hundred Aristotle goes on to treat of the exclusive administration of justice by boards appointed expressly for this purpose; and this fact favours the supposition that these boards were simply and solely the two already mentioned together with the two *shofetes* or chief judges. Moreover in their election of the Hundred and Four the Boards of Five were by no means entirely free, but obliged at least in part to select from certain officials of the previous year: at any rate it appears to follow from Livy's account (see above *n.* 379), that the state treasurer had a right to be elected to the Hundred and Four in the following year, and the Boards of Five could only pass him over for very special reasons. But they evidently could not elect members of their own body to the Hundred and Four, as would else have happened frequently; and the reason for the prohibition may perhaps have been that in the following year they had to continue to discharge their own official duties, as described above: unless we are bound to suppose, that here too the principle of concentrating various offices upon one person (§ 13) was applicable. SUSEM. (390)

οἱ στρατηγοί.

The powers of the Carthaginian generals must have been very considerable and in purely military matters perhaps unlimited, although they were also in the habit of consulting the council of war (see above *n.* 382). But state affairs were undoubtedly managed by the general in conjunction with the plenipotentiaries of the Senate, and alliances were likewise concluded (as above *n.* 382) by him in the name of the Senate (Heeren). Isocrates (III. 24) says that the Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians had an oligarchical government at home but a monarchical government in the field: which means of course, that the generals, not the Carthaginian 'kings', exercised such a government: whereas Movers (p. 540) takes it to mean that 'the *Shofetes* were not held to be kings, unless they were also generals.' The Carthaginian generals are moreover called dictators by the Romans, Justin XIX. 1. 7<sup>1</sup>, Cato cited in Gellius X. 24. 7, Frontin. *Strateg.* II. 1; as well as that one of the generals who discharged his duties in Carthage itself as director of the entire military administration, or war minister, Livy XXIII. 13. 8<sup>2</sup>. The fact that state appointments at Carthage, in particular the offices of *shofete* and general, could be bought, which is likewise attested by Polyb. VI. 56. 4, seems to point to a right of election or confirmation by the popular assembly; yet possibly the smaller or the larger senate may not have been inaccessible to bribery, in spite of the fact that, in order to guard against it, only the richest citizens were, as a rule, elected into the smaller senate (§ 4). This much seems certain, that the election of the generals rested with the smaller

<sup>1</sup> There is no ground for assuming with Kluge, p. 92 f., that the term dictator was especially applied to those who were at once *shofetes* and generals, or

that the *Hastribul* in question filled both offices in conjunction eleven times.

<sup>2</sup> At least I take this to be the most probable view.

senate: see Diod. XIII. 43. 5 (κατέστησαν; cp. above *n.* 381), XX. 10. 1 (ἡ γερουσία...στρατηγούς...ἀπέδειξε). But it may be conjectured that the election required to be confirmed by the popular assembly. At least when Hannibal was elected by the army the Senate was not satisfied with an approval of the act on its own part, but invited the popular assembly to confirm it, Polyb. III. 13. 4; and such a confirmation may have been requisite for the appointment of the senators and shofetes, in case it did not entirely rest with the popular assembly to elect them (see above *n.* 382). SUSEM. (392 b).

## EXCURSUS V.

## THE SOLONIAN CONSTITUTION: II. 12, 3.

ἔοικε δὲ Σόλων...τὸν δῆμον καταστῆσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων.

The question whether in reality there is no sufficient ground for doubting this statement, as Schömann tries to show<sup>1</sup>, must in this place be left undecided. Here we are only concerned with the meaning of the words and the question whether they are really by Aristotle. In the first place Schömann has sufficiently refuted the monstrous construction which Em. Müller and Oncken<sup>2</sup> have put upon the singular form τὸ δικαστήριον here twice used, as if it did not mean the Heliaea, but the whole community assembled to demand an account of their stewardship from the retiring officials—‘a general assembly of the people before which the judicial authorities were brought to render an account of their office, appeals were entered against their decisions, and these decisions cancelled confirmed or amended at pleasure.’ It is another matter when Fränkel *The Attic δικαστήρια* p. 63 f. infers from III. 11. 8 that the genuine Aristotle did not intend to ascribe the establishment of the tribunal of the Heliaea to Solon, but regarded the matter essentially in the same light as Fränkel himself, who was partially anticipated by Em. Müller and Oncken. His view is that in certain cases Solon gave the assembled community the right of rejecting the sentence pronounced by their magistrates; that he compelled the magistrates, when their commission expired, to render an account of it publicly to the people in their assembly, where it was open to the people to bring a charge against them which the Areopagus had to decide. Now this hypothesis respecting Solon’s legislation may be correct or not; but at any rate let the critics take upon themselves the responsibility for it, and leave Aristotle out of the question. Even he was by no means infallible in matters relating to Athenian constitutional history. Had Fränkel not severed the passage in B. III. from its context, he would have seen that there Aristotle is saying

<sup>1</sup> This exposition Fränkel has not quite fairly passed over.

<sup>2</sup> The refutation has not prevented Oncken from simply repeating his asser-

tions over again. Cp. *n.* (409). I do not defend everything which Schömann has stated, as is clear from the sequel.

precisely the same thing as here, only in fewer words. There he says that the people must be suffered to participate in the deliberative (or deciding) and the judicial functions, and these only; and therefore Solon rightly ordained that it should merely elect officers of state and require them to render an account<sup>1</sup>. Here he says that Solon allowed the people these two most indispensable rights and accordingly instituted tribunals taken from the whole people with jurisdiction over all matters without exception. If then, as Fränkel thinks, it is really a contradiction to say both in one breath, at least the mistake has been committed not merely by the assumed interpolator, but by the genuine Aristotle. Furthermore, if Fränkel's explanation be consistently applied to VI. IV, 14 § 3, § 6, § 10 (see *ibid.* 1319, 1325, 1332) it must lead to this absurdity; that wherever a popular assembly took into its own hands the control of responsible officers of state Aristotle was only acquainted with two results, one of which invariably followed, either condemnation by the assembly itself or a reference to the Areopagus or some similar board; and that in no case was the matter referred to a popular tribunal. And since Aristotle regards those two fundamental rights as the most indispensable concessions to the democratic principle, without any indication that they should be limited, it is in itself scarcely conceivable that he should nevertheless have tacitly introduced the limitation that it is sufficient for the people to frame the resolution of accusation without either proceeding themselves to give a verdict or to procure the verdict of condemnation through a popular court; but that the case must be referred to a non-democratic board neither taken from the whole people nor even directly elected by the people. But if he regarded those two concessions in the sense explained above, it is not only not 'obscure', but from this point of view even strictly consistent that the gradual development of absolute democracy should be characterized as their result in Athens, brought about not through Solon's fault but by the course of events<sup>2</sup>; though Fränkel may again object, rightly or wrongly, from his point of view<sup>3</sup> that to entrust popular courts with power must be regarded as the consequence and not the cause of the democratic state principle. Lastly, the Athenian Heliæa consisted, as Fränkel very ably proves (pp. 1—21), of all Attic citizens over 30 years of age with full civic rights, not legally hindered by other employment from entering their names in the list of judges for the year, who had actually had their names so entered and (p. 51 ff., esp. pp. 21—51) not only this Heliæa as a complete body but even each separate court of justice formed out of it was similarly regarded as another *ἡλιεῖα*<sup>4</sup>, as

<sup>1</sup> Fränkel himself observes (p. 47) that in the treaty of peace with Chalcis (445 B.C.) *αἰθεναὶ* has the wider sense of "trials" generally, and not the later, narrower sense of "trials" of state officers because when presenting their accounts they have not been granted a discharge: Wilamowitz *Antike Kyrenaika* p. 381. shows that the word has not even the former

sense in that place but means "punishments."

<sup>2</sup> *ἀπὸ ἐκταραχῶν*.

<sup>3</sup> For in any case it is not from such point of view that we can decide what Aristotle may or may not have said.

<sup>4</sup> It is indeed more than questionable whether *ἄλλα ἡλιεῖα*, popular assemblies, is really only a shorter form of *πληθὺς ἡλιεῖα*.

a representation of the popular assembly<sup>1</sup>. All the more readily and fittingly could Aristotle, if he ascribed their foundation to an author so early as Solon, characterize them as a boon granted to the people itself and to democracy<sup>2</sup>. All this however does not exclude the *possibility* that on Aristotle's view even Solon at the same time granted to the popular assembly also certain plenary powers with reference to the deposition, punishment, and control of the officers of state: indeed on the analogy of VI(IV), 14, 6 (*n.* 1325) there is a certain *probability* even, that by his remarks in II. 12 § 5 Aristotle intends to refer back to Solon the right of laying complaints or information, brought against officers of state during their time of office, directly before the popular assembly for immediate decision or with a view to further proceedings<sup>3</sup>. SUSEM. (403).

## EXCURSUS VI.

## THALETAS: II. 12. 7.

Thaletas or Thales was in reality a lyric poet (as indeed we are told in Plutarch) and musical composer of Gortyn (or according to Suidas, of Elyros) in Crete, younger than Archilochus; the first to introduce the paeonian and cretan rhythms into artistic lyric poetry and vocal music (Glaukos cited in Plutarch *De Music.* 10. 1134 D, E, Ephor. in Strabo p. 480 f.). These he borrowed from the sprightly native dance tunes sung to the dance in the worship of Apollo in Crete (Athenae. v. 181 B), which were called Paeans and Hyporchemes, and it was songs of this kind which he himself wrote and set to music and brought to their artistic perfection (Heracleid. Pont. quoted in Plut. *De Music.* 9. 1134 C, Schol. on Pind. *Pyth.* II. 127), availing himself in them not only of paeonian rhythms and metres, but probably of dactylic rhythms and rhythms compounded of successions of dactyls and trochees. According to the story which dates from so early a writer as Ephoros, Lycurgus while staying in Crete despatched Thaletas, a man well versed in politics, to Sparta, in order that he might by means of his songs spread the spirit of political harmony there and thus pave the way for the Lycurgean reforms in the constitution. But another and far more credible legend informs us that Thaletas was summoned to Sparta by the order of the Delphic oracle in order to assuage a pestilence by his musical art (Pratinas *fr.* 8 in Plut. *De Music.* 42. 1146 C, Plut. *Philos. cum principibus* 5 p. 779 A, Aelian. *Var. Hist.* XII. 50; cp. Strabo p. 482). It can hardly be decided whether the only signification

or indeed whether the two words are at all connected in their derivation: see Wilamowitz *op. c.* pp. 87—94.

<sup>1</sup> Fränkel, pp. 21—27, endeavours to show that the Heliaea possessed important functions besides those of a judicial nature, but he can hardly be said to have succeeded.

<sup>2</sup> And that they were at least earlier than Cleisthenes, and may thus very well have existed in Solon's times or even before them, is shown by Wilamowitz, pp. 94—96.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. to induce the assembly to depose the magistrate.

underlying these legends is one which belongs to the history of literature, symbolizing the healing and soothing powers of poetry and music, or whether Thaletas was actually a priest wielding expiatory powers like Epimenides (Exc. I to B. 1): the latter explanation is supported by the fact that at his home of Gortyn there was really a shrine of Apollo, to which embassies were sent from foreign states, to obtain aid in case of pestilence (Stephanos of Byz. s. v. Γόρτυρ). In any case Thaletas was also employed in Sparta, perhaps about 665 B.C. (?), and introduced the Cretan paeans and hyporchemes there also: the Laconian Sosibios, *frag.* 5 in Athenae. xv. 687 c, relates that his songs were sung even at a later time at the Gymnopædia along with those of Alcman. In Crete he composed in Knosos as well as in his native town: for in all probability he was the same as the Knosian rhapsode Thaletas from whom he is distinguished in Suidas (Suidas asserts that Thaletas of Gortyn lived before Homer), and the same as the Thales who is said by Demetrios of Magnesia, in Diog. Laert. i. 38, to have been contemporary with Homer, Hesiod, and likewise Lycurgus. See on Thaletas Litzinger *De Thaletæ poeta* Essen 1851. 4, Höck *Kreta* III. 339 ff., Bernhardt *History of Greek Literature* 3 ed. i p. 378, Christ *Metrik* p. 413 ff., also E. Curtius *History of Greece* i p. 182 Eng. trans. SUSEM. (419)

# Γ.

1274 b 27 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς  
 28 ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημένας, ἔστω τεθεωρημένα τὸν τρίπον τοῦ-  
 32 § 1 τον· τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ  
 ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τί ποτέ  
 ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἳ μὲν φάσκοντες  
 35 τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πρᾶξιν, οἳ δ' οὐ τὴν πόλιν ἀλλὰ  
 τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον· τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ  
 νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὔσαν περὶ πόλιν,  
 ἢ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τίς.

In the notes to this book fr. denotes the palimpsest Vat. gr. 1298, collated by Heylbut in *Rhein. Mus.* XLII. 1887. p. 102 ff. See Exc. III. p. 454. As a rule it is without accents or breathings, nor are the words in a sentence separated.

1274 b. The first sentence, 27 τὰ μὲν οὖν..... 28 τοῦτον, was by all previous editors appended to B. II || 28 εἰρημένας Koraes; cp. II. I. I, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* 1368 f. || τοῦτον \* \* Thurot; τῷ <δὲ>? Susem. This δὲ is all that we require; whether its loss is due to the copyists or to some ulterior cause is uncertain, see *Introd.* p. 14 n. 3 || 32 καὶ before τίς ἐκάστη omitted in Γ Ar., perhaps rightly || 38 ἢ τε? Susem. || ἐστὶν (ἐστὶν P<sup>1</sup>) after τάξις τις M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

B. III includes two parts: a statement of **General Principles**, cc. 1—13, followed by a review of **Monarchy**, cc. 14—18, the first of the forms of government examined in detail. See *Analysis* p. 108 ff., *Introd.* 37 ff. The former part is the most valuable exposition of Aristotle's positive political theory to be found in the whole work. Comp. Oncken II pp. 117—174.

cc. I, 2. *The definition of constitution to be obtained by reference to a city and citizen: §§ 1, 2. Neither (i) residence, § 3, nor (ii) the enjoyment of legal rights, § 4, constitutes citizenship, but a share in executive functions §§ 5—7. The definition applies to a varying extent in different states: §§ 8—11. Remarks on a rough mode of defining citizens by descent I § 12—2 § 3, and on the exercise of civic rights by persons not entitled to them: 2 §§ 3—5.*

Mr A. C. Bradley has some valuable remarks on Aristotle's conception of citizenship in *Hellenica* pp. 212—218.

1274 b 27 κυρίας] Constitution "proper," i.e. those actually in force or 'valid' in existing states as opposed to schemes on paper. So κυρίως with ἐπίστασθαι, to know properly or unconditionally, is opposed like ἀπλῶς to ἐνυποθέσεως.

35 ἀλλὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν] "that it is not the state which has done this or the other but the oligarchy." Comp. Thuc. II 62 § 4 (Eaton) and n. (455) on c. 3 § below. SUSEM. (432)

36 πολ. καὶ τοῦ νομ.] See above c. I. I. 2, II. 12. I.

38 τάξις τις] "a certain ordering of the inhabitants." The character of the organization is explained 6 § 1 πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων, n. (522). Comp.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ πόλις τῶν συγκειμένων, καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὁλοῶν  
 μὲν, συνεστώτων δ' ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, ἔηλον ὅτι πρότερον  
 ὁ πολίτης ζητητέος· ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος ἐστίν.  
 ὥστε τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστὶ σκε-  
 πτέον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλάκις· οὐ γὰρ  
 τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην· ἐστὶ γὰρ τις  
 ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὢν ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολλάκις οὐκ  
 ἐστὶ πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλως πῶς τυγχάνοντας ταύ-

της τῆς προσηγορίας, οἷον τοὺς ποιητοὺς πολίτας, ἀφετέον  
 ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν πρὸς πολίτην ἐστίν (καὶ γὰρ μέ-  
 ταικοὶ καὶ δοῦλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκῆσεως), οἷδ' οἱ τῶν  
 δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικά-  
 ζεσθαι (τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινω-

1275 a 10 καὶ τοῖς «μεταίοις καὶ τοῖς» Bueheler, most likely right.

(IV). 1. 10 τάξις ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαί, τὰς τῶν κέντηται, καὶ τὴν τὸ κίριον καὶ, n. (1129), VI(IV). 3. 5 n. (1156). SUSEM. (432 b)

§ 2 39 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ] "Since the state is an aggregate of individuals, like any other whole made up of parts" (Jebb).

41 τι πλῆθος] "a body of citizens": namely, a body numerous enough for independence of life, *ἱκανὸν εἰς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς*, § 12 (Eaton). See notes (434), (447). SUSEM. (433)

1275 a 1 ὥστε τίνα κτλ] Schlosser's assumption of Aristotle is not altogether without reason. The synthetic method which was applied before, I. 1 § 3 n. (4), § 5 i (19), § 8 i (66), is certainly out of place here. "There is far more truth in the remark at I. 2 § 12" where see note "that the conception of the state must precede that of its members. It cannot be said that we have to define *πολις* by reference to *πολίτης*; on the contrary, the relative conception of the citizen must be explained by reference to that of the state" (Schlosser I. 410). In reality it is the latter course which Aristotle adopts. He takes the conception of the state obtained in c. 1, 2 as the foundation for his definition of the citizen, as Schlosser justly observes: so that he is involved in a formal circle, when he afterwards defines the state (see III. 1. 12 n.) as a body of citizens adequate for independence of life, i.e. comprising I. 2. 8 n. (21), *adequate for the end of the state*. And just because this

is so, in spite of the grave formal blunder, the definition of the citizen has not in any way suffered. Schlosser assumes that it is only applicable to the most advanced democracy and not to the best constitution, and that it restricts the notion of the state obtained in I c. 1, 2. But this is a misapprehension. On the contrary, Aristotle is of the opinion that the ideal exactly answering to this conception is never completely realized until all who are actually citizens have equal rights and duties. Herein he is certainly right: the error is in looking for any such realization, because facts never do completely answer to conceptions. See note (440) (441) on § 10 below. SUSEM. (434)

§ 3 6 τοὺς ποιητοὺς] "honorary citizens" (Susemihl). But probably cases like those of § 7, 8 are contemplated: "those on whom the franchise is conferred." [Demosth.] i. *Νόμος*, 1376, 13, *τῇ παύσει πολίται*.

7 οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν πρὸς] "Domicile does not make a citizen." Comp. on the one hand § 12, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτὶς κατοικία τόπου*, with n. (357); on the other § 10 n. (354). SUSEM. (434 b)

§ 4 8 οὐδ' οἱ τῶν δικαίων] "not the advantages of common jurisdiction, in the sense of the capacity to bring, or defend a civil action": *δικαιοσύνη*.

10 τοῦτο] these civil rights, *δικὰν ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι*.

τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων] "the parties to a commercial treaty." More fully explained below § 6, 7 (Schlosser, note 349, 350. SUSEM. (435)

νοῦσιν—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει—· πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμειν § 5 ἀνάγκη προστάτην, ὥστε ἀτελῶς πῶς μετέχουσι τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας), ἀλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ παῖδας τοὺς μῆπω δι' 15 ἡλικίαν ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους φατέον εἶναι μὲν πῶς πολίτας, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λίαν ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει· δῆλον γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον). ζητοῦμεν δὲ τὸν ἀπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα 20 τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἔστι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ διαπορεῖν καὶ § 6 λύειν. [πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν [κρίσεως καὶ] ἀρχῆς.] τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν αὐτὸ μὲν εἰσι διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὥστ' ἐνίας μὲν ὅλως δις

11 καὶ γὰρ.....ὑπάρχει omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> Ar.: [γὰρ] Götting, [καὶ γὰρ.....ὑπάρχει] Susem.<sup>1</sup>: Thurot proposed to transpose the words to follow 12 μετέχουσιν. Bender considers the whole passage 11 καὶ γὰρ.....22 λύειν spurious || μὲν οὖν here, as in IV(VII). 10 § 7, in the sense of μέντοι, which Schmidt proposed. This makes Bücheler's insertion all the more necessary || 12 ἀλλὰ νέμειν..... 13 μετέχουσι omitted in Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, inserted in the margin) || 13 ὥστε] διὸ Vettori Bk. || 16 λίαν untranslated by Ar., [λίαν] Koraes, πολίτας Spengel, πλὴν Götting (in his lectures). Schmidt would transpose λίαν to follow 17 τοὺς δὲ. Possibly due to a variant πλὴν of ἀλλά: yet I do not venture to decide against λίαν ἀπλῶς='quite absolutely' || 17 ἀτελεῖν P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || \* \* ἢ Thurot Susem.<sup>1</sup>: Conring assumed a lacuna higher up before 14 ἀλλὰ, Spengel proposed to omit καθάπερ there: but see Vahlen *Poetics* p. 276 ed. 3, cp. Comm. || 19 δὲ Ar. Conring, γὰρ ΓΠ (including fr.) Bk. || 23 κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς] πολιτικῆς Stobaeus p. 328, [κρίσεως καὶ] Thurot || 24 διηρημέναι ΓΠ Bk., διωρισμέναι Scaliger, Susem.<sup>2</sup>, probably right: *determinatae* Ar. ||

The treaties would contain provisions as to the mode in which charges might be brought and cases tried when disputes arose between members of the different contracting states: such perhaps as μὴ εἶναι μῆθ' εἰρξάμην τε δῆσαι ἐλεύθερον, Pseud-Andoc. 4. 18. See [Demosth.] *De Halonneso* §§ 9—13, Pollux VIII. 63, 88; Harpocration s.v. and Aris. *Frag.* 380, 1541 b 1: whence some infer that αἱ ξυμβολαῖαι πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαι of Thuc. I. 77 are analogous, but this is denied by Boeckh *Publ. Econ. of Athens* pp. 40, 403 Eng. tr. and Grote c. 47 VI. 57 n. See also Cope's note on *Rhet.* I. 4. 11, and W. W. Goodwin in *Amer. Journal of Phil.* 1880. I. pp. 3—11.

12 νέμειν ἀνάγκη προστάτην] "they must procure a patron." So at Athens: Meier and Schömann *Att. Process* p. 315 ff.,

561, 572: Schömann *Antiquities* I. p. 353 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (436) Cp. Harpoc. τῷ προστάτην μὴ νεμόντων μετοίκων (Wyse).

§ 5 13 τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας = a franchise limited to participation in legal rights.

14 καθάπερ καὶ παῖδας κτλ] It is the same with common jurisdiction as it is in the cases adduced, viz. children too young to be enrolled, and superannuated old men exempt from service: those who can bring or defend a civil action may in a certain approximate and restricted sense be termed citizens, but only with a qualification. SUSEM. (437)

17 τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς] Cp. 5 § 2, n (505). SUSEM. (437 b) Add I. 13. 7.

20 ἔγκλημα διορθώσεως δομ.] flaw or defect requiring correction, viz. by a added qualification, as citizen *under age*

τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τινῶν ὀρισμένων χρό-  
νων ὃ δ' ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστὴς καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής. τάχα  
μὲν οὖν ἂν φαίη τις οὐδ' ἄρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιοῦτους,  
οὐδὲ μετέχειν διὰ ταῦτα ἀρχῆς· καίτοι γελοῖον τοῖς κυριωτά-  
τους ἀποστερεῖν ἀρχῆς. ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδὲν περὶ ὀνόματος  
γὰρ ὁ λόγος· ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ  
ἐκκλησιαστοῦ, τί δεῖ ταῦτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν. ἔστω δὲ διορισμὸς  
χάριν ἀόριστος ἀρχή. τίθεμεν δὲ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτω μετέ-  
χοντας. ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστ' ἂν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης ἐπὶ πάν-  
τας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδὸν τοιοῦτος ἐστίν· δεῖ δὲ  
μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα

ἀν omitted by Γ, perhaps rightly, unless it be changed to ἦ with Spengel: Ar. leaves it untranslated. 27 ἂν φαίη Γ P<sup>1</sup> 4-6 fr., φαίη M<sup>1</sup>, ἀντιφαίη Γ<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>2</sup> T<sup>2</sup> Ald., ἂν ἀντι-  
φαίη? Gottling. 28 καίτοι..... 29 ἀρχῆς omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, added by corr.<sup>2</sup> in the  
margin of P<sup>1</sup>. 32 οὕτω] τοῦτων or ταύτης? Spengel. 34 πολίτας «λόγος»?  
Schneider.

§ 6 26 δ δ' ἀόριστος sc. ἀρχων: in other cases the officer holds an undefined office; i.e. one of uncertain or indefinite duration and frequency. The context would be equally well suited by 'life-long' or 'perpetual': but from c. 11 § 13 f., § 18 f., we learn that even when discharging judicial or legislative functions no one would regard the δικαστὴς and ἐκκλησιαστής as themselves ἀρχοντες but only as parts of the complex ἀρχων, the δικαστήριον or ἐκκλησία. A fortiori, the mere qualification for discharging these intermittent functions cannot make an ἀρχων when the actual discharge of them is not enough (Shute). In Aristophanes ἀρχων = διδάσκειν, e.g. *Plutus* 916, οἷον δικαστὰς ἐξετίτηδες ἢ πόλις ἀρχεῖν καθίστησιν; cp. *h.* (438).

§ 7 18 οὐδὲ... διὰ ταῦτα] that to serve as a court of justice or as member of the legislature does not constitute office; and yet it seems absurd to deny to those who hold the highest authority a claim to hold office.

καίτοι γελοῖον] Comp. Plato *Leges* 167 A, B: "in a certain sense to appoint courts of justice is to choose officers of state. For every member of the executive must needs be a judge of sundry matters, and a dikast, without really holding office, does virtually assume an office of no mean importance on the day when he decides the suit he is trying (δικαστὴς δὲ οὐκ ἀρχων καὶ τινα τρῶ-  
μα ἀρχων οὐ πάνυ φαῖλοι γίγνεται τῇ

τῷ ἡμέραν, ὅπερ ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν τὴν δίκην ἀπο-  
τελεῖ). Hence the dikasts may also be regarded as holders of office." For "at Athens the obligation to render an account of his conduct was necessarily presupposed in the case of every state official (cp. Aeschines III. 17), but the heliast is not obliged to render an account (Aristoph. *Plutus* 287 καὶ ταῦτ' ἀνεπεύθετοι δρῶμεν τῶν δ' ἄλλων εὐ-  
δεῖν ἀρχῆς). Again, no one could hold an office for two terms in succession, as in that case he must have been re-elected before he had rendered his account, which was illegal; whereas the heliast could go on discharging his functions time after time, uninterruptedly" (Frankel p. 21 f. A. SUSEM. (438).

29 ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω κτλ] "But let us waive the point, which after all is verbal, since we can find no common term applicable alike to the judge and the ekklisiast. For the sake of distinction, we will call theirs an 'indefinite' magistracy" (Jebb).

§ 8 32 ἐφαρμόσας is intransitive. "Such then is [the notion, or definition of] the citizen which best applies to all who are so called." We find *ἐπὶ* with gen. after this verb, 1 § 3 and 11 § 3 below; but the dat. (4 § 2) or *πρὸς* with acc. is more usual.

33 τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς κτλ] "Where classes of things (like πολῖται) contain individual members distinct in species" i.e. essentially different, like the several

διαφέρει τῷ εἶδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ  
 δεύτερον τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδ' ἔνεστιν, ἢ  
 § 9 τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλίσχρως. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν  
 εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ  
 1275 b προτέρας οὐσας· τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκυίας  
 ἀναγκαῖον ὑστέρας εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων (τὰς δὲ παρεκ-  
 βεβηκυίας πῶς λέγομεν, ὕστερον ἔσται φανερόν). ὥστε καὶ  
 4 τὸν πολίτην ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἐκάστην πολι-  
 § 10 τεῖαν. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατία μάλιστ' ἐστὶ  
 πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μὲν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγ-

37 οὐδ' ἔνεστιν Madvig, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν Γ II Ar. Bk., ουδενεστιν fr. || [ἢ τοιαῦτα] Bas.<sup>2</sup>

πολιτεῖαι and, consequently, the πολίτης as determined in each of them, "one of these being primary, another secondary, a third yet more subordinate, in such cases the generic attribute, in right of which they belong to the class [lit. are such], is either altogether lost or barely seen." If altogether lost, the things are, in technical phrase, ὁμώνυμα. Here however πολίτης is probably παρώνυμον, like ἀγαθόν in *Nic. Eth.* I. 6 §§ 8—12, where also it is explained that there is no common attribute in virtue of which all the things denoted as 'good' are such. See Zeller *Plato* p. 259 n. 103 Eng. tr. In *Ind. Ar.* ὑποκείμενα is explained (1) res singulae quae continentur notionis alicuius universalis ambitu, (2) vel ad quas ea notio refertur et a quibus suspensa est: e.g. *Met.* A. 2. 4, 982 a 23, ὁ τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχων οἰδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα. But Bonitz adds: τῶν πραγμάτων (ut πολίτου) ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα (singulae πολιτεῖαι ad quas refertur τοῦ πολίτου notio) διαφέρει.

35—38 "See *Categ.* I. 1 f.: things are said to be homonymous or equivocal when they have merely the same name, the sense or meaning attached to the name being different (ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἕτερος). Things are said to be synonymous or univocal when they are not only called by the same name, but also in the same sense (J. G. Schneider). Comp. Waitz *ad loc.*, Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. ὁμώνυμος [*Grote Aris.* I. 81 f.]: also I. 2. 13 above n. (28)." SUSEM. (438 b) Hence obviously πράγματα 'things' must be taken in the not uncommon sense of 'classes': comp. *De Interpret.* c. 7 § 1, 17 a 38, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον. Any general notion,

however loose the connexion between the particulars which come 'under' it, is treated as a whole or 'thing,' if it is denoted by a single term.

§ 9 39 ὑστέρας...προτέρας] Logically 'posterior' and 'prior.' Not 'later' and 'earlier' in time or historical development, but 'lower' and 'higher' in the order of thought and of real existence: the former less really, the latter more really a form of government. See I. 2. 13 n. (27). SUSEM. (439)

1275 b 1 ἡμαρτημένας] Plato's word *Rep.* v 449 A, VIII 544 A. The participle 'perverted' has been converted into an adjective 'wrong, perverse': cp. 6 § 11, VIII(v). 1, 5, *N.E.* IV. 9. 35, VIII. 10. 4. In VIII(v). 1. 15 it is a true passive participle. Compare ἀπονενοημένος = desperate.

3 ὕστερον] cc. 6, 7. Comp. 3 § 2 n. (456). SUSEM. (439 b)

§ 10 5 ὁ λεχθεὶς] The citizen as thus defined.

ἐν μὲν δημοκρατία κτλ] But democracy is one of the degenerate forms. If then Aristotle's conception of the citizen is particularly applicable to democracy, then clearly under the best constitution the position of the citizens will be just the same as under a democracy, and all will enjoy equal rights amongst themselves. See 13 § 12 nn. (598, 599): IV(vii). 9 §§ 7—9, 13 § 9, 14 §§ 3—5 with nn. (816, 817, 885). Aristotle cannot make his meaning clear by reference to the best constitution because he has not yet determined in what it consists; thus he is compelled to take an illustration from democracy. Cp. also 5 §§ 4, 5 nn. SUSEM. (440)

6 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις] With the tacit exception of the best constitution, which

καὶ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὸς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φορτικὰς. ἑτέρα δ' ἴσως ἀρχὴ τις ἑτέρας. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα· πᾶσας γὰρ ἀρχαί τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας. ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀρίστος ἀρχῶν ἐκκλησιαστής ἐστὶ καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀρισμένος· τοῦτων γὰρ ἡ πᾶσιν ἡ τισὶν ἀποδίδεται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν. τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν (ὃ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνοῦν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἤδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύ-

1275 b 7 <ἐν> Koras 11 <οὐ> τὸν? Schneider (afterwards rejected by him), Koras, Trieber; [καί] Trieber. But see Comm. n. (444) 13 γὰρ after ἔχει omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Q<sup>b</sup>, possibly by Γ; erased in P<sup>4</sup> 16 ἀποδίδεται Γ, perhaps right βουλευθαι Π<sup>2</sup> (emended by corr. of P<sup>4</sup>) fr. 17 περὶ before τινῶν omitted by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup>, perhaps rightly 19 καὶ Ar. Spengel, ἢ Γ II (including fr.) Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> (in text)

would otherwise not become perfectly adjusted to the real nature of its citizens, as however it must be in order to be actually "the best." SUSEM. (441)

§ συγκλή[τους] Meetings of a great council specially convened upon extraordinary occasions. It may be shown, as in Exc. IV to B. II p. 345 f., that there existed at Carthage a great council of this kind, side by side with the smaller council and the popular assembly. SUSEM. (442)

κατὰ μέρος] not "in turn" but "by portions."

καὶ τὰς δίκας κατὰ μέρος] "They try cases before special courts." Thus of the two 'indefinite magistracies', the popular assembly and the popular courts of justice, neither is here found: the larger council specially convened. [συγκλήτου] replaces the one, and the other is superseded by the conversion of the judiciary into a special government department. SUSEM. (443)

ἢ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι] Comp. II. 9. 25, VI (IV). 9. 9 n. (329 b), (1266). SUSEM. (443 b)

τῶν συμβολαίων] II. 5. 11. Cp. Cope's note on Hec. I. 1. 10, "any private every-day transactions as opposed to *σέμελα* which are *κεῖρα*." *δίκας τῶν συμ.* = *οὐκ ἰσχύει*, nisi prius cases.

§ 11 13 Καρχηδόνα] If we bear in mind what is said in n. (443) we shall

discover that there is no contradiction between this passage and II. 11. 7, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀρχῶν διατελεῖται πᾶσας καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ἢ τὸν ἄλλον, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι (cp. Exc. IV. p. 348 f. and n. 391, 391 b). The more subtle distinction that at Sparta the administration of justice was distributed over the different branches of the executive, while at Carthage it was separated from them all and entrusted to a special judicial department, is not here taken into account, but merely that which is equally a feature of both systems, viz. the jurisdiction of special boards as distinguished from that of *δικασταί* annually chosen for this purpose as a committee of the entire civic body. See further II. 9. 23 n. 314. SUSEM. (444)

15 ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀρισμένος] "the officer defined by his tenure of the office" (of judge or legislator). And therefore in such states Aristotle regards as citizens only those who have the unrestricted right of being elected to these definite offices. (Nothing can be more erroneous than Oudon's assertion, II. p. 121 n. 1, that presumably Aristotle has in mind the division of responsibility in the Athenian democracy between *ἐκκλησία* and *βουλὴ* on the one hand, *ἡγεμῶνα*, *νομοθέται*, and *ἀποκριγῶνα* on the other.) SUSEM. (445)

§ 12 15 ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς

20 τῆς τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλήθος ἱκανὸν  
 2 πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν· ὀρίζονται δὲ πρὸς  
 τὴν χρῆσιν πολίτην τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν καὶ μὴ  
 θατέρου μόνον, οἷον πατρός ἢ μητρός, οὐ δὲ καὶ τοῦτ'  
 ἐπὶ πλέον ζητοῦσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους.  
 25 οὕτω δὲ ὀριζομένων πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροῦσί τινες τὸν  
 § 2 τρίτον ἐκείνον ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολίτης. Γοργίας μὲν  
 οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος,  
 ἔφη, καθάπερ ὄλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλμοποιῶν πεποιη-

21 δὲ Γ Ar., δὴ II (including fr.) Bk. || 23 τοῦτ' ἐπὶ] τούτου ἔτι? Koraes ||  
 24 ἐπιπάππους P<sup>2</sup> and corr. of P<sup>3</sup>, ἔτι πάππους Camerarius, accepted by Schneider  
 and Koraes || 25 δὴ P<sup>3</sup> II<sup>3</sup> Ar. Bk. || παχέως Camerarius, apparently right:  
 πολιτικῶς, ταχέως ἀποροῦσί Spengel

κῆς] "He who is entitled to a share in legislative or judicial office." But this is not quite exact, for by what precedes Aristotle ought to include "executive office," as in fact he does virtually in § 7 (ἀόριστος ἀρχή). SUSEM. (446)

ἡδη is simply untranslatable: without going further, without anything more being necessary.

21 πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς] "a body of such citizens adequate to secure independence of life." Cp. *n.* (21), II. 2. 8 *n.* (136) and the passage there cited. SUSEM. (447)

c. 2 πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν] "for practical purposes." This definition was adopted by Pericles, according to Plutarch, for the famous law which disfranchised 5,000 out of 19,040 citizens: νόμον ἔγραψε μόνους Ἀθηναίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ θυεῖν Ἀθηναίων γεγονότας.

25 πολιτικῶς] Like our word 'popular' or *popularis* in Cic. *De fin.* IV. § 24, v. § 12: i.e. superficially. Comp. for the emendation παχέως, pingui Minerva.

§ 2 26 Γοργίας] The celebrated orator and nihilistic philosopher, already referred to I. 13. 10 (cp. *n.* 118), who lived between 483 and 375, visited Athens on an embassy from his native city Leontini in 427, and a second time soon afterwards. There he enchanted every one with his florid and rhythmical periodic eloquence and gave a great impulse to the formation of an Attic prose style: at a later period he lived, and perhaps died, at Larisa in Thessaly. Isocrates went to Larisa to hear him. He trained a considerable school of rhetors, which subsequently had rivals in the schools of Isocrates, of Polycrates, and of the Cynics:

Alkidamas (*n.* 31), Polos, Likymnios, Protarchos and Lycophron (*nn.* 297, 552) were its most eminent names. See Foss *De Gorgia Leontino* (Halle 1828), Frei in the *Rhein. Mus.* VII. 1850. 527 ff., VIII. 1853. 268 ff., Zeller *Pre-Socratics* vol. II. pp. 412—416 Eng. tr., Blass *Die attische Beredsamkeit* (Attic Oratory) I. p. 44, III. 2. 323 ff. Susemihl *Gorgias and Attic prose* in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXV. 1877. pp. 793—799, *De vitis Tisiae* etc. (Greifswald 1884) p. xx ff., Diels 'Gorgias and Empedocles' *Sitzungsber. der Berliner Akad.* 1884. p. 343 ff. SUSEM. (448) Also Cope in *Journal of Sacred and Class. Phil.* III. 65—80.

The following passage, II. 26—30, is elaborately treated by Prof. Ridgeway, in *Transactions of the Camb. Philological Soc.* vol. II pp. 135—138. His results are here accepted. He further suggests (*Journal of Philology* XV. p. 164) that the particular occasion of creating new citizens, which called forth this jest, was a defeat of the Larisaeans by Lycophron of Pherae in 404 B.C., as related by Xenophon *Hellen.* II. 3. 4.

27 εἰρωνευόμενος=ironically, though the word could have the meaning "jestingly." But we are told *Rhet.* III. 7. 11, 1408 b 20, ἢ μετὰ εἰρωνείας ὅπερ Γοργίας ἐπολεῖ, that Gorgias used to be ironical in his speeches. SUSEM. (449)

28 ἔφη καθάπερ ὄλμους κτλ.] "said that mortars were the staple manufacture of the place and freemen of the magistrates." This untranslatable play upon words turns on the double sense of *δημιουργοί*, which was (1) the title for the chief magistrates in many places (cp. *n.* 1586), thus answering to 'mayor' or

οὐ μένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιη-  
 μένους[· εἶναι γὰρ τινὰς λαρισσοποιούς]· ἔστι δ' ἀπλοῦν, εἰ  
 γὰρ μετεῖχον κατὰ τὸν ῥηθέντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας, ἦσαν  
 [ἀν] πολῖται· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δυνατόν ἐφαρμόττειν τὸ ἐκ πολίτου  
 ἢ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οἰκησάντων ἢ κτισάντων.

ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκείνο μᾶλλον ἔχει ἀπορίαν, ἔσοι με-  
 τίσχον μεταβολῆς γενομένης πολιτείας, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν  
 ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολήν· πολ-  
 τοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους, τὸ δ'

29 λαρισσαιοὶ fr., λαρισαίους not λαρισσαίους Bk.<sup>2</sup> (so throughout) | τῶν omitted  
 by M<sup>1</sup> T<sup>b</sup> | 30 [εἶναι.....λαρισσοποιούς] Ridgeway | λαρισσοποιούς Camerarius,  
*ἐπιδημιόεσσι factores* Ar., λαρισσοποιούς ΓΠ (including fr.) Bk.<sup>1</sup> | 31 ἦσαν ἂν  
 P<sup>1-2</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Bk., ἦσαν Π<sup>1</sup> fr. Ald. and, over an erasure, P<sup>4</sup>, ἡ δὲ U<sup>b</sup> | καὶ γὰρ  
 αὖ P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Bk., οὐδὲ γὰρ Susem.<sup>1</sup> misled by William's translation *per se enim* |  
 32 ἐκ omitted by P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps by Γ, [ἐκ] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, perhaps rightly | αἰσάντων  
 [ἡ κτισάντων] Bender | 34 ἐκείνο Vettori (ms. correction in the Munich copy of his  
 1st ed.) and an unknown hand in the margin of the Albine at Munich, ἐκείνη P<sup>4</sup>  
 and, with an erasure over α, P<sup>1</sup>: ἐκείνη Susem.<sup>1</sup> in text and perhaps M<sup>1</sup>, ἐκείνη  
 P<sup>1-2</sup> QM<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>3</sup> (corrector), probably also M<sup>1</sup>, accepted by Bender;  
 ἐκείνη apparently P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand): Γ uncertain, *illi magis habent* William, whence  
 ἐκείνη .....έχουσι the editors from Vettori and Morel to Bekker | 35 οὕτω «δ»-  
 Chandler | 37 δούλους καὶ ξένους M<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) and Valckenaeer (notes on Herod.,  
 p. 404) | καὶ δούλους «καὶ» μετοίκους Ar. Bk.<sup>2</sup>, καὶ [δούλους] μετοίκους or καὶ πολλοὺς  
 μετοίκους? Göttling, μετοίκους καὶ δούλους Niebuhr (II. 305 n. 2, Eng. tr.), μετοίκους  
 ξένους Brongel. See however Meier *De gentil. Att.* p. 6, Bernays *Herod. Critica*  
 p. 115 f., and on the other side c. 5 § 2 with n. (503)

'burgomaster,' and as this was so in  
 parts of Thessaly (see Schömann *Antiq.*  
*eur. publ.* p. 84 n. 10, *Antiquities of*  
*Greece* p. 142 Eng. tr.) it may have been  
 also at Larissa, while (2) at the same time  
 in Attica, and the common language  
 generally, it was the term for workmen  
 or mechanics (J. G. Schneider). The  
 jest, when cited in this context, raises a  
 presumption that the magistrates of Larissa  
 bore this same title at the foundation  
 of the city and had full powers to make  
 citizens of whom they pleased; yet who  
 in the world would spoil such a joke  
 or pun by inquiring whether this was  
 historically true? (But the jest would  
 lose all its point if δημιουργοὶ be taken,  
 as Oudert suggests, to mean the founders,  
 not the magistrates, of Larissa. For  
 every town has its founders, and not  
 merely Larissa and certain towns like it;  
 nor does the word bear this meaning  
 unless some more precise phrase be  
 added.) Further comp. VIII(V), 6 § 6 n.  
 (1873), 10 § 5 n. (1651): VI(IV), 4. 16 n.

(1188). SUSEM. (450) Cp. Thuc. I. 56  
 ἐπιδημιόεσσι.

30 εἶναι γὰρ τινὰς λαρισσοποιούς]  
 "For (he said) some [of them] are Laris-  
 s-makers," i.e. hardware manufacturers.  
 Why should Gorgias interpret his own  
 joke? It is far more likely that this is a  
 gloss by some one who did not see that  
 δούλος goes with Λαρισσαίους above; or  
 perhaps believed that λαρεσα, λαρεσι meant  
 'a kettle' on the analogy of τῶστος,  
 τασσῆσι. In Anthol. Pal. VI. 305, τῶν  
 Λαρισσαίων ἀπογέγονται ἐφεστίται, Λαρι-  
 σαῖος is an adjective, and this makes  
 against its supposed use as a substantive,  
 and therefore against the emendation of  
 Camerarius (Ridgeway).

§ 3 30 ἀπλοῦν] a simple question,  
 αὐτὸν πᾶσι λαῶσι.

37 πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ  
 δούλους μετοίκους! "For he admitted  
 into the tribes many resident aliens of  
 foreign and servile extraction" (δούλους =  
 freedmen). It is well known that Cleis-  
 thenes abolished the four ancient tribes

ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότε-  
 ρον ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως. καίτοι κὰν τοῦτό τις ἔτι προσαπορή-  
 1276 a σειεν, ἂρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ὥς ταῦτό δυνα-  
 § 5 μένου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς.) ἐπεὶ δ' ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἄρ-  
 χοντάς τινας ἀδίκως, οὓς ἄρχειν μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλ' οὐ δικαίως,  
 ὁ δὲ πολίτης ἀρχῇ τινὶ διωρισμένος ἐστίν (ὁ γὰρ κοινωνῶν  
 5 τῆς τοιαύδε ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστίν, ὥς φαμέν), δῆλον ὅτι πο-  
 3 λίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἢ  
 μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφι-  
 σβήτησιν. ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πόθ' ἢ πόλις ἔπραξε καὶ πότε  
 9 οὐχ ἢ πόλις, οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται  
 § 2 δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνιοι βούλονται  
 διαλύειν, ὥς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος,

39 κὰν Bk.<sup>2</sup>, καὶ ΓΠ Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup>, προσαπορήσειεν <ἂν> Götting, τις <ἂν> Spengel  
 || τοῦτό W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. Bk., τοῦτο M<sup>s</sup> (1st hand), τοῦτω Γ Π<sup>1-2-3-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> M<sup>s</sup> (corr).

1276 a 5 τῆς omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [τῆς] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || ἔφαμεν P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || 7  
 συνάπτειν? Koraes || 9 γίνηται Γ Ar.

(see p. 340) and established in their place ten local divisions, for which he retained the name *φυλαί*: Curtius *Hist.* i pp. 382—387 Eng. tr., Schömann pp. 336, 365 Eng. tr. Comp. n. (588) on 9 § 13, VII(VI). 4. 19 n. (1427). SUSEM. (451)

Congreve supports the reading of Bekker<sup>2</sup> and Thirlwall (II. 74) by a comparison of IV(VII). 4 § 6 δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων, § 14 ξένοις καὶ μετοίκοις. But this is nullified by Aristoph. *Ach.* 503—8, *Eg.* 347 εἰ που δικίδιον εἶπας εὐ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου, Pax 297 μέτοικοι καὶ ξένοι. That δούλος may be used of freedmen is capable of abundant proof: Athenaeus VI. 93, 267 B, C διαφέρειν δὲ φησι Χρυσίππος δούλον οἰκέτου γράφων ἐν β' Περὶ ὁμονομίας, διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀπελευθέρους μὲν δούλους ἔτι εἶναι, οἰκέτας δὲ τοὺς μὴ τῆς κτήσεως ἀφειμένους: Lysias c. *Agora*. § 64 δούλος καὶ ἐκ δούλων ἐστίν (of a citizen): Isaeus VI § 49, οὕτως ὁμολογουμένη οὖσα δούλη (of a freedwoman): Harpocration s. v. μετοίκιον, cp. Boeckh *Publ. Economy* p. 48 Eng. tr. (the freedmen paid this tax). The proceeding of Cleisthenes was not more violent than that of Euphron at Sicyon: Xen. *Hell.* VII. 3. 8 ὃς δούλους μὲν οὐ μόνον ἐλευθέρους ἀλλὰ καὶ πολίτας ἐποίει: and the two commonest sources of an artizan population are cited side by side, *infra* c. 5 § 3 παρ' ἐνίοις ἦν δούλον τὸ βάνανσον ἢ ξενικόν. There

is no authority for δούλους μετοίκους and if any change were needed Niebuhr's would be the simplest. See also Grote IV. 170 n. 1, Schömann *Constitutional History* p. 69 f. Eng. tr.

§ 5 1276 a 6 καὶ τούτους] Even those who have received the franchise in consequence of a revolution. SUSEM. (452)

7 πρότερον] I § 1 n. (432). SUSEM. (453)  
 c. 3 The identity of the state depends not upon its territory but upon its constitution.

§ 2 10 ἔνιοι] Possibly writers who advocated repudiation are meant: *Introd.* p. 20 n. 1. SUSEM. (454)

II διαλύειν=discharge, pay in full.  
 ὥς οὐ τῆς πόλεως κτλ] "on the ground that it was a loan to the tyrant and not to the state." This question was really raised in B.C. 403, when after the expulsion of the thirty, the Athenian state debated whether it was obliged to repay a loan of 100 talents borrowed by them from the Spartans, Demosth. xx. 11 f., Isocr. VII. 68 f. (Vettori). The converse case, viz. that the credit of a service rendered by the expelled tyrants was claimed by the state, arose, when the Corinthians after the expulsion of the Cypselidae demanded that the offerings dedicated by this family at Delphi and Pisa should be inscribed with the name of the town, and the acts of their tyrants be thus regarded as acts of the state.

οὐτ' ἄλλα πολλά τῶν τοιούτων, ὥς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτικῶν τῷ (1)  
 κρατὶν οὐσας, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. \* \*, εἶπερ οὖν (2)  
 καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται τινες, κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁμοίως  
 <οὐ> τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι [ταύτης] τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταί-  
 της πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.  
 3 ἔοικε δ' ὁ λόγος οἰκείος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς  
 ποτὶ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐ-  
 τὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιότατη τῆς ἀπορίας (3)  
 4 ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν· ἐνδέχε-  
 ται γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι [τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους], καὶ  
 τοὺς μὲν ἕτερον τοὺς δὲ ἕτερον οἰκῆσαι τόπον. ταύτην μὲν οὖν

12 πολλά omitted by Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand, added in the margin) | - (εἶπερ) τῷ  
 Lindau | 13 συμφέρον. «ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία οὐ σκοπεῖ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον» - or  
 something similar? Susem. | 14 καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται] κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ἐστράτευτο  
 Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> following William's incorrect version in *democratiam veritas fuerunt* | 15  
 «οὐ» Hayduck | "ταύτης is pleonastic" Eaton; [ταύτης] Thurot; τῆς αὐτῆς  
 Kottow (with mark of interrogation after 16 τυραννίδος and a comma after 14 ταύτης  
 instead of before κατὰ) | 17 ὁ λόγος after οἰκείος P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. | [πῶς] τότε Spengel  
 Susem.<sup>1</sup>, see § 5 | 21 [τὸν.....ἀνθρώπους] Susem., dittography from 20, [τὸν τότε  
 καὶ] Bücheler

The Delphians admitted the claim, the  
 Athenians rejected it: see Plut. *De Pythia*.  
 13. 400 E (Schlosser). Comp.  
 further n. (432) on 1 § 1. SUSEM. (455)

Broughton (p. 171) cites the case of  
 the United States and the bonds issued  
 by the abortive Confederate government.

λαβόντων] Comp. Thuc. III. 81 ἀπέ-  
 θανον...ἄλλοι (ἐνεκα) χρημάτων σφίσι  
 ἐπολαίεον ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων (τῶν  
 κατασφάλλοντων Schol.).

11 ὥς ἐνίας κτλ] "for some forms of  
 the state rest upon superior force and are  
 not due to public expediency." This is  
 the second time that Aristotle refers be-  
 lievably to his doctrine of 'degenerate'  
 forms of government, more precisely laid  
 down in c. 6: see above nn. (439 b, 440).  
 SUSEM. (456)

12 συμφέρον. \* \*] The lacuna may  
 perhaps be thus supplied: «But de-  
 mocracy also is a government of this  
 sort.» SUSEM. (457)

14 δημοκρατοῦνται] Ridgeway sug-  
 gests that William of Moerbeke took this  
 word to come from δημοκρατία, and  
 hence his rendering: in *democratiam*  
*veritas fuerunt*.

§ 3 17 εοικε δ' κτλ] But the true  
 grounds of this controversy lie deeper in  
 another question which now needs to be  
 investigated. SUSEM. (458)

20 ζήτησις] The most obvious mode  
 of investigation is concerned with the  
 place and the inhabitants.

21 διαζευχθῆναι] "disjoined," "sepa-  
 rated." Aristotle has in view the mea-  
 sure which the Greeks called *disoikion*, cp.  
 VIII(V). 10. 11 n. (1668), when a town  
 was destroyed by its conquerors and the  
 inhabitants were driven to seek new  
 homes in the neighbourhood in a number  
 of unwall'd villages and hamlets, as was  
 done to Mantinea by the Spartans in  
 385 B.C. This was an oligarchical mea-  
 sure: for the custom of living together  
 in a walled town was usually favourable  
 to democracy. The opposite and de-  
 mocratical procedure, the union of several  
 country places, hitherto unwall'd, in a  
 single town was *euseoikion*: and directly  
 after the battle of Leuctra this was done  
 by the Mantineans who rebuilt their city  
 B.C. 370 and moreover gave the impulse  
 to the foundation of a common capital  
 of all Arcadia, namely Megalopolis. See  
 Curtius *Hist.* IV. pp. 503, 517 ff. Eng. tr.,  
 Schomann *Antiq.* p. 171 Eng. tr. Cp.  
 also I. 2. 8 n. (201b). SUSEM. (459)

§ 4 21 ταύτην μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαν]  
 In this form the problem must be re-  
 garded as easier to solve, for the variety  
 of meanings of the word 'state' facilitates  
 a solution.

πραoτέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν (πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως (I) λεγομένης, ἐστὶ πῶς εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως). ὁμοί- 12  
 25 ὡς δὲ καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν κατοικούντων ἀνθρώπων πότε  
 § 5 δεῖ νομίζειν μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχε-  
 σιν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἐν τείχῳ. τοιαύτη  
 δ' ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἥτις ἔχει περιγραφὴν  
 29 μᾶλλον ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως· ἥς γέ φασιν ἐαλωκυίας τρίτην  
 § 6 ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν  
 ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἢ σκέψις  
 (περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πόσον καὶ πότερον  
 ἔθνος ἐν ἣ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τὸν πολι-  
 τικόν). ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, 13  
 35 πότερον ἕως ἂν ἦ τὸ γένος ταὐτὸ τῶν κατοικούντων, τὴν  
 αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομέ-

23 πρoτέραν Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, Spengel thinks the word corrupt || 25 αὐτὸν τόπον P<sup>4-6</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>; perhaps also Γ, *eundem locum* William || 26 εἶναι μίαν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 26 δὴ) δεῖ P<sup>1</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> || 27 πελοποννήσῳ Γ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>3</sup> || 28 καὶ πᾶσα.....29 πό-  
 λεως transposed to follow 30 πόλεως Ramus || 32 ποσὸν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 33 ἔθνος omitted  
 by Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. and in P<sup>1</sup> where a lacuna of twice its length is left

23 **πολλαχῶς λεγομένης**] As in Greek there is only the one word *πόλις* for 'city' and 'state,' in such a case as that just cited in *n.* (459) it might well be asked, whether the *state* of Mantinea continued to exist at all in the interval between the destruction and the rebuilding of the *city*. In fact, the dispute did not merely turn upon different meanings of the word *πόλις*, as Aristotle thinks: but the imperfection of the Greek conception of the state, which even Aristotle has not surmounted (*Introd.* p. 22), is brought clearly to light. See however 9 § 10 *n.* (554). SUSEM. (460)

Unquestionably it would be a great gain if we could keep this limited conception always before us, and the translation of *πόλις*, *πολιτικός*, by 'city' 'civic' rather than 'state' 'political' is in many cases desirable on that account. But one uniform rendering is clearly impossible. To bring home the fact that the citizens of Rome formed what we may call a 'municipal corporation' we cannot be always styling them the 'burgess-body.'

§ 5 26 οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχεσιν] Editors compare Thucyd. VII. 77. 7 *ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις καὶ οὐ τεῖχη οὐδὲ ναῦς*; Soph. *Oed. Rex* 56 *ὡς οὐδὲν ἐστὶν οὔτε πύργος οὔτε ναῦς ἔρημος ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐνοικούντων*

ἔσω; Tac. *Hist.* I. 84 *quid? vos pulcher-  
 rimam hanc urbem domibus et tectis et  
 congestu lapidum stare creditis?* SUSEM. (461)

27 **Πελοποννήσῳ**] Cp. Pseudo-Lysias II (ἐπιτάφιος) § 45, *περὶ ἅπασαν τὴν Πελο-  
 πόννησον τεῖχος περιβαλεῖν*, viz. the wall  
 across the isthmus proposed in the Per-  
 sian wars.

28 **ἔχει περιγραφὴν**] has a circumfer-  
 ence of a nation; i.e. encircles a nation  
 rather than a state.

29 **μᾶλλον ἔθνους**] Comp. *n.* (11)  
 and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (463)

**ἥς γέ φασιν ἐαλωκυίας**] The capture  
 by Cyrus is meant: Herod. I. 178, 191.  
 Nothing is there said however of an  
 interval of three days, but we are told  
 that when the extremities of the town  
 were captured the Babylonians who lived  
 in the centre had not yet discovered that  
 it was taken. See also II. 6. 6 *n.* (200).  
 SUSEM. (462)

§ 6 31 **εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν**] The size is  
 discussed in IV(VII). c. 4; the uniformity  
 of race in VIII(V). 3. 11 f.: cp. *n.* (1531).  
 See however *Introd.* p. 56. SUSEM. (464)  
 Comp. for the phrase *solvere in alium  
 diem*.

των τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμούςς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν (1)  
 τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ αἰὲ τοῦ μὲν  
 ἐπιγινομένου νάματος τοῦ δ' ὑπεξiónτος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώ-  
 πους φατίον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν  
 δὲ πόλιν ἑτέραν; εἴπερ γὰρ ἐστὶ κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἐστὶ δὲ  
 κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γινομένης ἑτέρας τῷ εἶδει καὶ  
 διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δοῦναι αὐτῇ καὶ  
 τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ὅτι  
 μὲν κωμικὸν ὅτε δὲ τραγικὸν ἕτερον εἶναί φασιν, τῶν αὐ-  
 τῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν ἀλ-  
 λην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἑτέραν, ἂν εἶδος ἕτερον τῆς  
 συνθέσεως ᾗ, οἶον ἁρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἑτέραν εἶ-  
 ναι λέγομεν, ἂν ὅτε μὲν ἢ Δώριος ὅτε δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὲ τοῦ-

1276 b 2 "πολιτείας is pleonastic or the text is corrupt" Eaton, *πολιτεία* Congreve,  
 [πολιτῶν]? Susem. | 3 ἂν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, δόξειε M<sup>1</sup> | 6 ἀνθρώπων omitted by  
 P<sup>1-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> | The punctuation (comma for full stop after ὄντων) Wellslon | 7 ἢ τῆς  
 συνθέσεως Π<sup>2</sup> Bk | 8 εἶναι omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) | 9 λέγομεν  
 Albert Ar. Morel, λέγομεν I II

37 ποταμούς] The allusion is to the  
*dicta* of Heraclitus ποταμοῖσι δις τοῖσι  
 αἰετοῖσι οἰκ' ἂν ἐμβαλεῖ, *Frag.* 41, 42, 81  
 ed. Bywater (Eaton, Ridgeway).

§ 7 1276 b 2 κοινωνία πολιτῶν πο-  
 λιτείας] Ridgeway rightly defends this,  
 translating "For if the state is a kind of  
 community, but it (ἡ πόλις) is in fact a  
 community possessed by citizens in a  
 constitution," and adducing the MS. text  
 of 9 § 14 as another instance of the  
 double genitive with *κοινωνία*. If any  
 change is to be made at all, we should  
 omit *πολιτῶν*, which, though grammati-  
 cally unobjectionable, is superfluous and  
 somewhat obscures the sense. Usually  
*κοινωνία πολιτῶν* or *κοινωνία* has been  
 made the subject of the second sentence,  
 and *κοινωνία πολιτείας* or *πολιτεία* its pre-  
 dicate, "and fellowship (of the citizens) is  
 fellowship in a constitution" or "consists  
 in a constitution." SUSEM.

§ 8 7 εἶδος ἕτερον τῆς συνθέσεως]  
 "if the kind of combination be different,"  
 i.e. if the elements be differently  
 combined.

8 ἁρμονίαν] See Exc. IV on B.  
 7(VIII). SUSEM. (465)

In these two modes the notes (*φθόγγαι*)  
 are the same: but the Dorian mode is  
 from E to e, and b natural is μέση or  
 μέση; while the Phrygian mode is  
 from D to d and a is μέση. Comp. Dio  
 Chrysost. II. p. 21 ἁρμονία Δώριος καὶ

Φρύγιος ἄλλη καὶ Αἰόλιος.

§ 9 9 εἰ δὲ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον]  
 "On these principles then it is plain that  
 we must affirm the identity of the city by  
 a reference to its constitution." It would  
 be unjust to Aristotle to apply to this  
 conclusion\* in its literal sense his assertion  
 6 § 1 n. (523), 7 § 2 (525), 13 § 5 (590),  
 that the constitution is nothing but the  
 form of government, *πολιτεία, ἡ μορφή*.  
 For the truth is that, like Plato, he  
 includes under *πολιτεία* all which goes to  
 condition the form of government as well  
 as all that is directly conditioned by it.  
 Thus, as Zeller II ii p. 551 rightly  
 observes, he includes "even the main  
 'features of the commonwealth which  
 'find expression in the spirit of the state  
 'administration and in the mode in which  
 'the end of the state is conceived': see  
 IV(VII). § § 5 n. (800), § § 3 (806). Thus  
 his notion of a polity or *πολιτεία* is not  
 narrower but wider than our notion of a  
 constitution. For when we speak with  
 scientific precision the term 'constitution'  
 usually denotes only the particular form  
 which the political organism assumes, or  
 the sum total of the rules regulating the  
 distribution of political functions—all,  
 though no doubt, as a matter of fact,  
 the text of a modern constitution does

\* Chalcidius (II. 121—126) considers to him, as his  
 real view, almost the exact opposite of this con-  
 clusion.

10 τον ἔχει τὸν τρίπον, φανερόν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν αὐ- (I)  
τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν (p.)  
ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτόν ἐξέστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν  
καὶ πάμπαν ἑτέρων ἀνθρώπων. εἰ δὲ δίκαιον διαλύειν ἢ μὴ  
διαλύειν, ὅταν εἰς ἑτέραν πολιτείαν μεταβάλλῃ ἢ πόλιν, λό-  
15 γος ἕτερος.

4 τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν ἐπισκέψασθαι II

14 μεταβάλλῃ πολιτείαν II<sup>2</sup> Bk, μεταβάλλῃ II<sup>3</sup> Bk.

not fully or exclusively contain constitutional rules answering to the definition just given; but admits all those laws in general which, as the fundamental laws of the state, appear to demand special guarantees. Hence it is that to Aristotle no less than to Plato the regulation of education in the spirit of the constitution is eminently and essentially a part of the constitution: see V(VIII). I § I f. n. (973), VIII(V). 9 § II (1641). Thus he by no means ignores a state of things in which the prevalent morality and education are out of harmony with the existing constitution, but where such is the case he firmly maintains that this existing constitution has not yet been fully realized, VI(IV). 5 § 3, n. (1216). Again, that he includes under the 'constitution' the regulation of property relations, is perfectly clear from IV(VII). c. 9, 10 § 9. Consult also n. (190).

But even when these admissions are made, our judgment must be that in coming to this conclusion he has again (see nn. 82, 296, 339) left too much out of sight, nay utterly rejected, 'the conception of the nation as a natural whole,' to use the words of Hildenbrand p. 416. However the union of a people into one state may have been brought about, whether there is mixed nationality, or all are of the same stock, we shall never cease to regard its constitutional history as simply a main element of its history as a people: and therefore we shall always find it impossible to separate e.g. the English constitution from the English nation. To us the sentiment here expressed will appear outrageous:—that the English nation might be superseded by another race and yet that so long as the same constitution was preserved, there would still remain the same state. See further Isocr. VII § 14, who calls the constitution the soul of the state. SUSEM.(466)

13 εἰ δὲ δίκαιον...λόγος ἕτερος] 'But whether justice requires us to discharge or to repudiate our obligations (§ 2) when

the state changes to another constitution is a different question.' The point is not resumed in the sequel.

"This shows at once the defectiveness of Aristotle's decision. He feels himself that after so deciding he could only consistently answer the present question by affirming the justice of repudiation and guards himself against doing so because at the same time he does not want to say this right out. But in order to have a scientific justification for this course he should at least have indicated other instances favouring the other side of the question." SUSEM. (467)

cc. 4, 5 *Is the virtue of the good man identical with that of the good citizen?* See *Anal.* p. 109, and Thurot *Etudes* pp. 105—117.

Plato's identification of them is a fundamental principle of the *Republic*, implied in the analogy of the state and the individual and particularly evident in the treatment of imperfect states and imperfect individuals, B. VIII, IX. Aristotle admits it *in some cases* (4 § 9), i.e. in the perfect state; and he no less precisely asserts that in most constitutions they are distinct (6 § 1), the identity of the goodness of the man and of the citizen being only coextensive with the active exercise of the administrative powers which he enjoys. This is in accord with *N. E.* v. 2. 11: οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταῦτόν ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί, on which see Jackson's *note* which disposes of Grant's strange view that the author of the 'Eudemian' Book v used, with essential discrepancies, the present chapter and other sections of the *Politics*.

16 τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων...18 μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν] Schlosser's assertion that this is out of place is quite groundless. On the Aristotelian conception, the state is an institution for educating a human being, or more especially a man (see n. on § 3), at once for happiness and for the greatest possible fitness or excellence. Hence to

πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαιοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ μὲν εἴ γε τοῦτο τεχνεῖν δεῖ ζητήσεως, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τίπῳ τινὶ πρώτῳ λεγέμενον. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἰς τις τῶν κοινοῶν ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν πολίτην φαμὶν. τῶν δὲ πλωτῆρων καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐρίτης, ὁ δὲ κυβερνήτης, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος, ὁ δὲ ἄλλην τινὰ ἔχων τοιαύτην ἐκωνυμίαν) δῆλον ὥς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἑκάστου λόγος ἴδιος ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμόσεται πᾶσιν. ἢ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν πάντων· τούτου γὰρ ἕκαστος ὀρέγεται τῶν πλωτῆρων. ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἢ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία· διὸπερ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οἶν ἐστὶ πλείω πολιτείας εἶδη, δῆλον ὥς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τε

17 ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρός M<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>12</sup> and perhaps Γ 19 πρώτον omitted in P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, added by corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin), πρότερον? Spengel needlessly 1 20 αὐτῶν Π<sup>1</sup> 23 τὴν τοιαύτην fr. 25 ὁμοίως Vettori 28 καὶ omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup> 30 δὲ P<sup>3</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.

inquire how far, under any constitution, the state can reach this goal touches a fundamental point in constitutional theory of the utmost generality; and constitutions may be classified as (1) better or best, (2) worse or worst, according as they are more or less adapted to this end. The present inquiry accordingly serves as the basis of the classification of constitutions in order of merit which follows in c. 6, and of the entire theory of the separate constitutions. This then, and this alone, is precisely the right place for c. 4, 5. That they have defects in the execution we are not prepared to deny, since Aristotle must have himself intended materially to recast them subsequently (see *n.* 471; compare *nn.* 473, 478); but this intention was never carried out. SUSSEM. (468)

One glaring defect in the execution is the frequent violation of the rule forbidding the hiatus, which is fairly well observed in the rest of B. III. There are 40 bad cases in c. 4 alone out of a total of 90 odd for the whole of the book.

10 τύπῳ τινί] in outline. A frequent expression: IV (VII). 16. 12, V (VIII). 7. 2, VII (VI). 8. 24, VIII (V). 2. 1: *Λοκ. Ζῆλ.* 1. 3. 3 § 4 παρὰ τὴν καὶ τύπῳ.

30. The simile of the crew is much

used by Plato: *Rep.* vi. 488 A B., *Politeia* 297 E, E B.; in the latter passage joined with that of the physician which is perpetually recurring in B. III.

2 22 τὴν δύναμιν] an adverbial accus. See *n.* on *φίσιον* I. 12. 2.

23 κυβερνήτης] steersman, or pilot, answers in some respects more to the ship's captain, as he is skilled in navigation (Plato *E.* 12.) and responsible for the course of the vessel. Whereas the ναύκληρος or skipper, usually the owner of the ship, although nominally in command, need not be a practical seaman.

§ 3 27 ὁμοίως τοίνυν κτλ.] Some of the citizens take part in the administration of the state merely as members of the popular assembly, others merely as judges in the law courts or members of the council; others again in a higher degree by filling various official posts. (Schlosser has strangely mistaken the sense: he thinks that the skill of the captain, helmsman, helmsman's assistant in the simile answers to the excellence of the man; and the performance of a successful voyage to civic excellence.) SUSSEM. (469)

28 ἡ σωτηρία τῆς αἰῶν] the maintenance of the (political) union.

30 πρὸς] relative to. Compare *n.* 13 § 13.

λείαν· τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμέν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι (I  
 § 4 τὴν τελείαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον  
 35 μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ, φανερόν·  
 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἔστι διαπορούντας· ἐπελ- 3  
 § 5 θεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ

33 τὸν δ'.....34 τελείαν omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>3.6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ald. and P<sup>2.4</sup> (1st hand, added by corr.<sup>3</sup> of P<sup>2</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>, and there τὴν is also above the line) || μίαν omitted by Albert Ar. (?) Bk. (who writes κατ') || εἶναι κατὰ Γ Bk. || 34 τὴν omitted by Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by corr.<sup>1</sup>), for P<sup>4</sup> see above || 36 ἀλλὰ omitted in fr. II<sup>1</sup> (added by p<sup>1</sup>) || 37 παρὰ? Susem., <κατὰ τὸν> περὶ Schmidt

33 τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα] Aristotle speaks here continuously of the virtue and fitness of the man (ἀνὴρ) rather than of the human being, because he regards the ἀρετὴ of the woman as inferior and belonging to a separate species: see 4 §§ 15—18 *nn.* (491, 495): I. 13 §§ 9—11, *nn.* (114 b, 117, 119). SUSEM. (470)

§ 4 36 ἐπελθεῖν τι or περὶ τινος are separately found: while VIII(v). 10. 1 ἐπελθεῖν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας ἐξ ὧν φηλεται is equivalent to a conjunction of the two. The meaning would then be "to review the same question in the case of the model state." Spengel takes περὶ with διαπορούντας; "by raising objections to the possibility of the model state." "But the sense seems to require that ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον should mean here 'to arrive at the same result'; and if so, παρὰ might be necessary = 'starting from the best constitution' or 'from the point of view of the best constitution'." SUSEM.

§ 5 37 εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον] "For if it be impossible that a state should contain none but virtuous men, since it is impossible for its citizens to be all alike." But how does this agree with the passages quoted in *n.* (133) on II. 2. 4, according to which at least approximate equality of the citizens must be assumed in the best state? Further (as Thurot p. 108 rightly observes) we are told at c. 18 § 1 that it had been shown at the outset of the discussion (ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις) that the virtue and excellence of the man and of the citizen of the best state is necessarily the same, and the reference can only be to cc. 4—6 § 1; see *n.* (684) on 18 § 1. We might try to get over the contradiction by assuming that at this present stage of the discussion, 4 § 5, the arguments *pro* and *con* had not all been weighed dialectically and the final correction, to which c. 18 § 1 refers us back,

may have fallen out either at the end of c. 4\* or in the lacuna at c. 13 § 6 (see *Introd.* p. 43 ff. *n.* 599). But at c. 6† § 1 the statement here made is expressly set down as a part of the final result, while 13 § 6 is too near to 18 § 1 to be meant by the words ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. Should we then rather believe that Aristotle's genuine discussion is wholly or for the most part lost and that cc. 4, 5, which replace it, are wholly or in part a spurious interpolation? Sober inquiry will not easily be reconciled to such a desperate and violent step, although there is certainly much besides that points in this direction: see § 6 *n.* (473), § 8 (478), § 16 (491), § 17 (496); 5 § 1 (501). But then the only possible alternative is to assume that when Aristotle wrote this he was not yet clear about his model state, and that when making the reference in 18 § 1 he had in view not the part at present executed but a revised version which he intended to make subsequently but never actually completed. For 18 § 1 is in agreement with his repeated declaration subsequently IV(VII). 9 § 3, 13 §§ 9, 10, 14 § 8: VI(IV). 7. 2 (*nn.* 684, 808 and *Introd.* p. 51), that in fact the best polity is that in which the virtue of the citizen coincides with the virtue of the man, and the citizens are not merely virtuous when judged by the standard of their polity, but absolutely virtuous and excellent men: and this alone is reasoned out logically (see *n.* 468). This of course does not at all affect the proposition that in the best state, as elsewhere, the citizens are not

\* Not directly after 4 § 5, as Thurot thinks, for the rest of chapter 4 from § 7 to the end would not agree with that supposition. Then it is presupposed that hitherto the two sorts of excellence have been declared to be not absolutely the same even in the ideal state.

† As suggested by Susemihl in *Compos. der arist. Pol.* p. 24 f. *n.* (24).

ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀπάντων σπουδαίων ὄντων εἶναι πόλιν. διὰ δ' ἑαυτοῦ  
 τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔργον εἰ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς. ἐπει-  
 δὴ ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοῖς πολίτας, <διὰ δ' ἑκα-  
 ττον τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔργον εἰ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς> ἄν-  
 ῃ ἀρετὴ μία πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ  
 σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ἐπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀρίστην  
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγα-  
 θοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τοῖς  
 ἐν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας. [ἔτι ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πό-  
 λις, ὥσπερ ζῶον εὐθύς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῇ ἐκ  
 λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως καὶ οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρὶς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ  
 κτησίς ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πό-  
 λις ἐξ ἀπάντων τε τούτων καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐξ ἄλλων ἀνομοίων

38 δυνατὸν Bernays δει δ'.....39 ἀρετῆς transposed to follow 40  
 πολίτας Thurot 40 ἐπειδὴ δὲ P<sup>1</sup>, ἐπεὶ δὲ P<sup>2</sup> fr. Ar., ἐπεὶ δ' Bk. Bernays, ἐπεὶ  
 ἐπειδὴ Bernays ὁμοίως P<sup>1</sup> & Q<sup>1</sup> T<sup>1</sup> 39 αὐτὸν P<sup>2</sup> Bk., αὐτὸν Γ, αὐτὸν fr.  
 1277 a 1 μία ἀρετὴ P<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. πολίτου <τε σπουδαίου> Schmitt 3 πολίτας  
 (1st hand), perhaps right: γρ. πόλιν corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin of P<sup>1</sup> 4 ἀνδρῶν  
 ἀγαθῶν? Susem., ὁμοίους Bernays, perhaps right 5 πολίτας \* \* Thurot; but see  
 Comm. n. (471) and (471 \*) [ἔτι ἐπεὶ 12 παρὰ σφάδρον] Susem.; see Comm. n.  
 (471). Thurot suspected the § 8 [κτῆσις] Bernays, [κτῆσις ἐκ] Welldon

all equally virtuous men, but it does  
 effect the much more illogical inference  
 that the inferior citizens of the best state  
 have only civic virtue. On the contrary  
 the degree of civic excellence also  
 must be regulated by that of individual  
 excellence, and the special nature of the one  
 by the special nature of the other: and one  
 consequence of this is that which Aristotle  
 in complete accordance with the facts  
 lays down as a criterion of the best state,  
 viz. that in its administration each is  
 employed according to his special faculties  
 and capacities and assigned to his right  
 place. It may thence be inferred that  
 Aristotle had no intention of permitting  
 all the members of the governing civic  
 body in the pattern state to fill all the  
 various public offices in rotation, but  
 that he assumed that this most virtuous  
 civic body would always elect in par-  
 ticular state offices the fittest and most  
 virtuous of its members. Cp. II § 8 n.  
 (69). Consequently it must be allowed  
 that the officers of state in the perfect  
 city do not represent the union of the  
 state of the citizen and of the man,  
 as is here stated, but rather that they  
 represent the highest and most perfect  
 grade of this union; and so far from

being erroneous it is quite correct to say  
 that Aristotle includes in this polity  
 those who are not yet elected but are  
 still eligible to such a position. Only they  
 do not actually attain a complete con-  
 firmation of this highest individual virtue  
 (which is at the same time the highest  
 civic virtue) until they are elected to  
 office: cp. further n. (521) on III. 5. 10.  
 Nor should we forget that at IV (VII). 14.  
 8 n. (902) Aristotle makes only the  
 virtue of the ruler (πολιτικὴ καὶ ἀρχου-  
 ρον) equivalent to the virtue of the man;  
 in the best state the rulers are primarily  
 the popular assembly composed of the  
 elder citizens, but in a still higher degree  
 the men selected out of it who are elected  
 to offices of state. SUSEM. (471)

40 ὁμοίους] See n. on II. 2. 3. 1261 a 24.  
 § 6 1277 a 6 εὐθύς for instance, like  
 ἀντίκτα. The first instance that comes to  
 hand.

7 ὀρέξεως] Appetite, or impulse, here  
 put for the irrational part of the soul in  
 general (Eaton). See n. (401) on I. 3. 6.  
 SUSEM. (472)

9 ἐξ ἀπάντων τε εἰδῶν] But these  
 constituents are not all citizens in the  
 sense of the definition given c. 1 § 2, and  
 yet this alone is material here (Eaton).

10 συνέστηκεν εἰδῶν· ἀνάγκη μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν  
πάντων ἀρετὴν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν, κορυφαίου καὶ  
§ 7 παραστάτου.] διότι μὲν τοίνυν ἀπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ, φανερόν

ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε  
σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν  
15 σπουδαῖον εἶναι \* \* ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν  
§ 8 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθύς ἐτέραν εἶ-  
ναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων  
υἱεῖς ἵππικὴν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδευόμενοι, καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ

μή μοι τὰ κομψὰ....,

ἀλλ' ὦν πόλει δεῖ,

§ 9 ὥς οὐσάν τινα ἄρχοντος παιδείαν. εἰ δὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄρ-  
21 χοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἔστι καὶ  
ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἂν εἴη ἀπλῶς πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός,  
τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου,

12 λαυροστάτου? Schmidt || ἀπλῶς omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 15 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.  
|| <ἄνδρα> ἀγαθὸν Bücheler, which I accept || τὸν τε Susem. || πολιτικὸν]  
πολίτην οὐκ Congreve, followed by Bernays || 17 τοῦ added before ἄρχοντος by  
Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 18 πολεμικὴν] πολιτικὴν Götting || 19 κομψὰ..... Spengel, κόμψ' Π<sup>2</sup> fr.  
Bk. || 20 δὲ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk., εἰ δὲ αὐτὴ fr. || ἀρετὴ omitted in Π<sup>1</sup> || 22 ἀπλῶς ἂν εἴη  
Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 23 τοῦ δυναμένου ἄρχειν μόνου inserted after μέντοι by Γ M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup>  
(1st hand, but μόνου is added by corr.<sup>1</sup>, and the whole erased by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin),  
γρ. τοῦ δυναμένου ἄρχειν μόνου P<sup>4</sup> in the margin. Evidently a gloss

In fact this whole argument is so absurd that I cannot bring myself to attribute it to Aristotle. In the case treated in *n.* (501) on III. 5. 1, there is an essential difference. The interpolation may be due to a gross misapprehension of II. 2. 3: comp. *n.* (133). SUSEM. (473)

§ 7 13 ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς-κτλ.] "Shall we say then that there is a particular case in which there is the same excellence in a good citizen and a good man?"

15 ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον] As distinguished from φρόνιμος, ἀγαθός refers to moral virtue (cp. *n.* 40). Just in the same way at II § 2 we have ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως in combination; where ἀρετή is 'virtue' simply, i. e. moral virtue. Cp. *n.* (565) and *n.* (703) on IV(VII). 1. 10. On the relation of φρόνησις (Prudence, Insight) as the virtue of the practical intellect to the moral virtues see *nn.* (45, 112, 115). Further comp. III. 4 § 10 with *nn.* (493, 497, 498). SUSEM. (474)

16 φρόνιμον] Cp. *Nic. Eth.* VI. 5. 5, διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους φρόνιμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δυνανταὶ θέρπειν,

εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς: *ib.* VI. c. 8, which treats fully of φρόνησις or Practical Wisdom: Plato *Politic.* 292 D, 294 A ἄνδρα τὸν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικόν (Eaton). SUSEM. (475)

§ 8 17 λέγουσί τινες] Whether these were authors, is doubtful. SUSEM. (476) Mr Wyse finds the reference in Ps.-Plato *First Alc.* 121 D ff.; the special education of the Persian and Spartan kings.

18 Εὐριπίδης] In the *Aeolus, Frag.* 16 Nauck. Further comp. IV(VII). 14. 1, *n.* (891). SUSEM. (477)

19 τὰ κομψὰ sc. ποικίλοι γενοίαιτο] let them not become versatile in accomplishments.

§ 9 20 εἰ δὴ ἡ αὐτὴ κτλ] Far more just is Aristotle's admission VIII(V). 9. 1 that the moral virtue of the ruler also varies with the different constitutions, so that except in the best state he does not possess the single absolute moral virtue of the man, but only a virtue conditioned in such and such a way, ἐν ἐκάστη πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (Thurot). Cp. *n.* (1630). SUSEM. (478)

23 τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου] 'but in a

καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως Ἰάσων ἔφη πεινῆν ὅτε μὴ τυραννῶι, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὲν ἐπαινῶνται γε τὸ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου ἢ ἀρετῆ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἄρχικὴν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἄμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινέτῃ ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτε δοκεῖ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ οὐ ταῦτ' αὖτε τὸν ἄρχοντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφοτέρ' ἐπι-

24 ἴσως omitted in IP (added by the corrector of P<sup>1</sup>). [ἴσως] Susem.<sup>1</sup> | τυραννῶι IP and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, altered by corr.<sup>1</sup>) | 26 δοκίμου ἢ δοκεῖ ἢ Giphanius, δοκεῖ ἢ Zwinger, δοκεῖ σου ἢ Welldon following Jackson, δοκεῖ αὐτῇ Rassow (cp. 15, 1277 b 15), δοκεῖ δοκίμου ἢ Bernays. On this whole paragraph cp. *Quaest. crit.*, II, p. 387 f. | 27 οὖν δέ? Susem. | 29 ἐπεὶ ἔως Schlosser, ὅτι Κοραεῖ, εἰ μὲν Rassow, εἰ? Susem. Yet ἐπεὶ may be right, if the lacuna after 32 ἀμφοῖν is much larger than the mere loss of τοῦτο νῦν σκοπῶμεν or something equivalent; or if Welldon's conjecture below is right | 30 ποτε δοκεῖ κτλ.] apparently corrupt. Bernays translates as if he read ποτε μὲν δοκεῖ.....31 ποτε δὲ τὸν πολίτην κτλ.; ἐπαινεῖσθαι δεῖ? Susem.<sup>2</sup> doubtfully; <ποτε> οὐ ταῦτ' αὖτε Welldon, much more probably, if 29 ἐπεὶ is right | ἀμφοτέρω] ἕτερα Κοραεῖ, ἄμφω ἕτερα Bernays, highly probable | καὶ] κἀν Schlosser | [οὐ] Rassow, [καὶ] Spengel: if καὶ, αὖτε in place of τὸν δέ | 31 ἀμφοτέρω P<sup>1-3-4</sup>, ἀμφοτέρων Q<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup>

the citizen.' The gloss fairly gives the sense.

24 Ἰάσων] The famous tyrant of Thessaly in Thessaly, who attempted to carry out a policy in Greece similar to that afterwards followed by Philip of Macedon. He came to the throne before B.C. 378 and was assassinated in 370. See Curtius *Hist.* IV, pp. 443—451 E. tr., and Krafft's *Art. 'Jason of Pherae' in Pauly's Real-encyclopädie*. Gottling recalls another saying of his cited by Aristotle *Rhet.* I, 13, 35, 1373 a 25, that he must do some wrong in order to have the power to do much right. SUSEM. (479)

ἔφη] Not φησὶ, as it would be, if the quotation came from a tragedy.

παντῆν...ἰδιώτης εἶναι] "he must starve if he were not on the throne, implying that he had never learnt the trade of being a subject." Eaton compares the saying of Aesopos to Harpagos, and of Democritus to Leontichides Herod. I, 19, VI, 67 and what is related of Theras *ibid.* IV, 147; and Aeschyl. *Agam.* 926; but in all these cases the point is essentially different. SUSEM. (480) Even Grote is caught up here, for he represents Jason as saying that he felt hunger until he became despot (III, p. 36 n.).

§ 10 25 ἀλλὰ μὲν...27 καλῶς] Eaton compares Pl. *Zenon* I, 643 E: τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παιδῶν παιδείαν, τοιοῦτον ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτη γενέσθαι τέλειον, ἄρχων τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δικῆς. SUSEM. (481)

27 εἰ οὖν...29 οὐκ ἂν ᾔη ἄμφω ἐπαινέτῃ ὁμοίως] "If then we lay down that the excellence of a good man is that of rule, while the excellence of a citizen is that of both," ruling and being ruled, "they cannot both be equally praiseworthy." It is the virtue of the good man which alone is one and perfect, § 3 τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα φαμέν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τέλειαν. Of civic virtue this is true *only in so far as* it denotes the excellence of rule (here declared to be *the* excellence of the citizen), but not in so far as it is the excellence displayed in due obedience. This latter then is a subordinate excellence. SUSEM. (482)

§ 11 Welldon, reading 29 ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτε δοκεῖ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ <ποτε> οὐ ταῦτ' αὖτε κτλ., translates "Since then it seems that there are some cases where ruler and subject ought to learn both (rule and subjection) and other cases where they ought [each] to learn only one." But this strains at τὰῖα = not both the same.

στασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, \* \* κἀντεῦθεν ἂν κατίδοι τίς. ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική· ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα  
 34 λέγομεν, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον,  
 § 12 ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον· θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδώδες. λέγω  
 δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακονικὰς  
 πράξεις. δούλου δὲ εἶδη πλείω λέγομεν· αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι  
 πλείους. ὧν ἐν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνήτες· οὗτοι δ'  
 εἰσὶν, ὥσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τὸννομα αὐτούς, οἱ ζῶντες ἀπὸ  
 1277 b τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βάνανσος τεχνίτης ἐστίν. διὸ παρ'  
 ἐνίοις οὐ μετέχουν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν  
 § 13 δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἀρχο-  
 μένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ [τὸν ἀγαθὸν] οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ  
 5 τὸν πολίτην [τὸν ἀγαθὸν] μαυθάνειν, εἰ μὴ ποτε χρείας χάριν  
 αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τοτὲ μὲν

32 κατένθεν M<sup>s</sup>, τούντεῦθεν Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Ar. Bk. Bernays—evidently a mistaken conjecture for κἀντεῦθεν obliterating the clear traces left of a lacuna; ἐντεῦθεν Koraes Rassow || 33 [ἔστι..... 1277 b 8 ἐλευθέρων] Congreve || 34 λέγομεν ᾧ Lambin, λεγόμενα Γ' Π Ar. || 38 χερνήται p<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (corrector) || 39 αὐτὸς P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, emended by a later hand), αὐτῶν or αὐτὸ Montecatino

1277 b 4 ἀγαθὸν] ἄρχοντα Rassow, [τὸν ἀγαθὸν] Sussem.<sup>4</sup>, [ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸν] Sussem.<sup>3</sup> οὔτε πολιτικὸν οὔτε πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν Spengel, [οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν] Thurot || 5 [τὸν ἀγαθὸν] Welldon Sussem.<sup>4</sup> || 6 γὰρ ἔτι] γὰρ τοι Riese || τοτὲ .....7 τοτὲ Riese, τὸν.....τὸν Γ' Π Ar. Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup>, cp. the variants IV(VII). 14 § 5 1332 b 37, τῶν.....τῶν Lindau, wrongly

32 \* \* κἀντεῦθεν κτλ] Quite apart from the distinct possibility of a longer omission, we may eke out the sense as follows: "but the citizen's knowledge and experience of both <is now the question before us, > and may be understood from what follows." SUSEM. (483)

33 ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική] Not 'despotic' rule, which would mean in English rule over a state. "For there is a rule of master over slave and this we say is concerned with the drudgery which the ruler need not necessarily know how to perform, but rather to employ: the former would even be degrading. I mean by the former the ability actually (καὶ=even) to serve in domestic functions."

τὰ ἀναγκαῖα] More clearly expressed II. 6 § 5, τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα: cp. I. 7 § 3.

35 ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον] Cp. I. 7 §§ 3, 4, 8 § 2 *nn.* (63, 68): also Xen. *Oecon.* c. 12. SUSEM. (484)

Plato *Politic.* 259 c ὡς βασιλεὺς ἅπας χερσὶ καὶ ἑξυμπαντὶ τῷ σώματι σμικρὰ ἅττα

εἰς τὸ κατέχειν τὴν ἀρχὴν δύναται πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σύνεσιν καὶ ῥώμην.

θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδ.] The other (the former) would inspire the servile spirit mentioned in *n.* (43) on I. 5. 8. See III. 5 §§ 2, 3. SUSEM. (485)

§ 12 38 ὧν ἐν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνήτες] Cp. I. 13 §§ 12, 13 with *nn.* (103, 122) and III. 5 § 4 with *n.* (507). SUSEM. (486)

1277 b 2 τὸ παλαιὸν] An adverbial accus. of time, as τὸ ἀρχαῖον I. 2 § 7. This was the state of things at Athens under Solon's constitution.

3 δῆμον τὸν ἔσχατον] The most advanced democracy which by gradual development was usually the final outcome of the more moderate democracy: see II. 12. 3 *n.* (406) and the passages cited in *nn.* (400, 406). SUSEM. (487)

§ 13 5 εἰ μὴ ποτε χρείας κτλ] "except in certain cases for his private use." Comp. IV(VII). 14. 7 with *nn.* (900, 901) and V(VIII). 2. 6 with *n.* (983). SUSEM. (488)

6 οὐ γὰρ ἔτι] for (if he learns them

δεσπότην τότε δὲ δοῦλον. ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ καθ' ἣν ἀρχεῖ (11)  
τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην γὰρ λέ-  
γομεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἀρχοντα ἀρ-  
χόμενον μαθεῖν, οἷον ἱππαρχεῖν ἱππαρχηθέντα, στρατη-  
γεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα.  
οὗτο λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς, ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἀρξαι μὴ  
ἀρχθέντα. τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην  
τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχι-  
σθαι, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρ-  
χήν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ ἀγαθοῦ ἀμφω.

7 «καί»-τις? Sussem.  
10 καὶ before στρατηγεῖν Sussem.<sup>1-2</sup>, misled by the ver-  
sions of William and Ar.

10 καὶ before στρατηγεῖν Sussem.<sup>1-2</sup>, misled by the ver-  
sions of William and Ar.  
12 διὸ «καί»- P<sup>1</sup> (Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Bk).

for his private use) the objection that he is at one moment master and at another slave no longer applies.

8 ὁμοίων τῷ γένει = his peers, his equals by birth. This healthy conception of πολιτικὴ ἀρχή is in accord with the sanest traditions of Greek political life and the presupposition of the free state or republic in the widest sense.

§ 14 10 ἱππαρχεῖν κτλ] In Athens (and here too Aristotle has before him especially the circumstances of the Athenian state) the infantry of the city militia consisted of ten τάξεις, one from each φυλὴ (see n. 451), and perhaps themselves called φυλαί. They corresponded to our battalions or regiments, and were each under the command of a ταξίαρχος. Each such τάξις was divided into λόχοι or companies, as we should call them, and their commanders were called λοχαγοί. The command of the cavalry was given to two ἱππαρχοί, and under them were ten ὑποἱππαρχοί, one for each tribe. The generals, στρατηγοί, were ten in number elected annually. Originally they commanded the ten τάξεις: but between 460 and 455 B.C. they took a wholly different position and became from that time the highest executive politico-military officers. Evidently it was at the same time that the ταξίαρχοι were created, to assume what had been earlier the functions of the στρατηγοί: of whom after this period only a few took the field, one having the supreme command, if it was not divided amongst them: or one might rely on war in one district, another in another. Subsequently as a rule only one took the field each year. See Schömann *Antiquities* p. 420 f., 422, 424 f.

J. G. Droysen *Observations on the Athenian στρατηγοί* in *Historia* 18. 1874. pp. 1-24, v. Wilamowitz *Ant. Archaischen* pp. 57-67, and VII(VI). 8. 13 n. (1473), SUSSEM. (489)

12 λέγεται κτλ] Comp. IV(VII). 14. 6 f. n. (898) ff. This saying is attributed to Solon by Apollodorus in *Diog. Laert.* 1. 60, Stob. *Flor.* XLVI. 22 (Haton), but hardly on good evidence. SUSSEM. (490)

§ 16 16 καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ κτλ] Both belong to a good man, because individual excellence is one with the political excellence of the ruler: but this cannot be attained without the previous acquisition of excellence in obeying as a subject. But, Thurot objects, in that case the excellence of the man coincides with the complete excellence of the citizen. And it is meant to be so, and the best constitution tends to this end: only here, according to Aristotle's view, the virtue of the citizen who is governed is as such in all cases a civic virtue and yet does not amount to true individual virtue. It was shown in n. (471) that this latter is an untenable position, given up by Aristotle himself in the course of his exposition: but the censure which may be properly pronounced upon him here is also confined to this. This mistake is closely connected with the fact that Aristotle, going in truth beyond his own real opinion (see n. 120) represents the specific difference between the lower virtue of the woman and the higher virtue of the man, i. 12 §§ 7, 9, 10. see. (114 b, 117, 119) as so to imply that the former is shown exclusively in obeying and serving, and the latter in ruling and commanding. Comp. n. (170). SUSSEM. (491)

καὶ εἰ ἕτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς  
καὶ [γὰρ] ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δέ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία  
ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετή, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἶδη  
20 ἔχουσα καθ' ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυν-  
§ 17 ναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία (δόξαι γὰρ ἂν εἶναι  
δειλὸς ἀνὴρ, εἰ οὕτως ἀνδρείος εἴη ὥσπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρεία,  
καὶ γυνὴ ἀκόλαστος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγα-  
θός, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· τοῦ  
25 μὲν γὰρ κτᾶσθαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν)· ἡ δὲ φρό-  
νησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔοικεν

18 [γὰρ] Götting, τῆς? Susem., γὰρ <ἀρχοντος καὶ> Bernays. The latter following all previous editors, except Götting, punctuates with a comma after 16 ἄμφω and a colon after 17 ἀρχικῆς || 19 τοῦ ἥθους Susem., τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ Γ (before δῆλον ὅτι) II Ar. Bk., καὶ ἄρχοντος Rassow || 20 ὡς γὰρ Π<sup>1</sup>, ἄλλως ὥσπερ P<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 23 ἀκόλαστος Susem., Trieber independently, apparently also Ar. *inhonesta*: see Bonitz *Zeitsch. f. Gymnasialw.* xxvi. 1872. 893—895, Susem. and Bonitz *ib.* xxvii. 1873. 797; ἄλαλος P<sup>4</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> (in the text), λάλος Π<sup>1</sup> Bk., ἄλλος P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, ἄλλως Ald. Schmidt saw that the text was corrupt, and what sense the context required: see Comm. and Susemihl *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 389

17 σωφροσύνης] See n. (206 b) on II. 6. 9. SUSEM. (492)

19 τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετῇ] Moral virtue as distinguished from the practical wisdom of § 17. See on I. 5 § 6 n. (40), § 9 (45), 13 § 6 (112), § 18 (115): III. 4 § 7 (474 ff.). SUSEM. (493)

εἶδη ἔχουσα κτλ.] "Clearly there will not be simply one form of a moral virtue like justice but it will have branches, one to regulate ruling and the other to regulate being ruled." A distinction quite correct in itself (Schlosser). SUSEM. (494)

The adoption of Bernays' suggestions would slightly modify the translation of § 16: "And both, viz. to rule and to be ruled, belong to the honest man, although a different sort of temperance and justice is shown in ruling <and in being ruled>. For it is clear that a virtue, e.g. justice, is not one and the same in the ruler and the free-man who is subject to rule (καὶ γὰρ <ἀρχοντος καὶ > ἀρχομένου), but has branches which regulate rule and obedience, just as temperance and courage are distinct when shown in man and in woman." Antisthenes maintained the contrary: that the virtue of both is identical.

§ 17 21 σωφροσύνη here = parsimony, like σωφρόνως II. 6 §§ 8, 9. So also 23 κοσμία 'orderly' = parsimonious, frugal, and ἀκόλαστος (the opposite quality) = prodigal, extravagant.

23 οὕτω κοσμία] "only just as frugal." It follows that the difference of degree between the virtue of the man and of the woman (see on I. 13. 7 n. 114 b, III. 4. 3 n. 470) is not of such a kind that all particular moral virtues are less developed, or need to be less developed, in the woman but such that in some cases the woman must possess a larger share than the man. SUSEM. (495)

24 οἰκονομία ἑτέρα] It is only with difficulty that this assertion can be harmonized with B. I. cc. 8—10: see Exc. III. to B. I. p. 210. "See also Xenoph. *Mem.* II. 7. 12—14, *Oecon.* 7" (Eaton). SUSEM. (496)

25 ἡ δὲ φρόνησις] By this must of course be understood simply skill in governing: that is, practical wisdom only so far as it has to do with life in the house, a community or a state, to the exclusion of the private life of the individual. There can be no moral virtue in social life without this kind of intellectual virtue (Schlosser). See I. 5. 9 n. (45), I. 13 § 6 (112), § 8 (115): III. 4. 7 n. (474—5). Comp. *Nic. Eth.* vi. 10. 2 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον; also n. (498): VI. 4. 14 n. (1186), and *Rhet.* I. 11. 27, 1371 b 27, ἀρχικὸν τὸ φρονεῖν. Further references are § 8 of this chapter and IV (VII). 9. 5 n. (810). SUSEM. (497)

ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν (11)  
ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, καὶ οὐ  
ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθῆς· ὡσπερ γὰρ αὐλοποιὸς ὁ ἀρχόμε-  
νος, ὁ δ' ἀρχων αὐλητῆς ὁ χρώμενος. πότερον μὲν οὖν  
ἡ αὕτη ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ  
ἐτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὕτη καὶ πῶς ἐτέρα, φαινερὸν ἐκ τού-  
των· περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην ἔτι λείπεται τις τῶν ἀποριῶν. III  
ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πότερον πολίτης ἐστὶν ὃ κοινωνῶν ἔξ-  
εστιν ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον; εἰ μὲν  
οὖν καὶ τούτους θετέον οἷς μὴ μέτεστιν ἀρχῶν, οὐχ οἷον  
τε παντὸς εἶναι πολίτου τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν (οὗτος γὰρ πο-  
λίτης)· εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων πολίτης, ἐν τίνι μέρει θε-

29 αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ P<sup>23</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) 37 οὗτοι γὰρ πολῖται  
untranslated by Ar., suspected by Schneider; οὗτοι γὰρ πολῖται· ἀγαθοὶ ὁ ἀναγκα-  
στὶς ἀρχεῖν· or something equivalent Thurot

§ 18 29 δόξα ἀληθῆς] 'Right opi-  
nion' here denotes more precisely the  
capacity of rightly apprehending the  
unlike given in order to execute it aright,  
for which the person who executes it is  
always obliged to discover the ways and  
means either wholly or in part for him-  
self. 'Right opinion' of this sort does  
not by any means correspond, as Eaton  
thinks, with that to which Plato applies  
the term, simply because the φρόνησις to  
which Plato often opposes it (as in *Λοίπῃ*  
*ἐξ ἧς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη*) coincides with philosophical know-  
ledge. Hence Plato would not concede  
to right opinion, as Aristotle does *Nic.*  
*Eth.* VI. 10. 3, that *σύνεσις* consists in the  
right application of opinion so as to judge  
upon the report of another a matter com-  
ing within the sphere of prudence, *ἐν τῷ*  
*κρίναι καὶ ἐπὶ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τῷ κρινεῖ καὶ τούτῳ*  
*περὶ τοῦ ἢ φρόνησις ἐστίν, ἄλλον λέγοντος.*  
Comp. the last note. See further I. 13.  
8 n. (1113). SUSEM. (498)

αὐλοποιὸς] This comparison is taken  
from Plato *Rep.* X. 601 D. Cp. II § 14 n.  
(374). SUSEM. (499)

§ 1 33 περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην  
καὶ δ.] 'It is an erroneous assumption to  
think, as Thurot and others do, that this  
is an altogether different question from  
the one discussed in the last chapter.  
These opening words at once prove that  
Aristotle looks upon the discussion of  
c. 3 as most closely connected with the  
chapter preceding. There it was decided  
that the virtue of the citizen in republican  
states consists in his being qualified both

to rule and to be ruled: but in fact a re-  
striction was needed in those cases where  
full participation in civic rights is granted  
to the lowest classes of the people, who  
live by manual labour, the mechanics and  
day-labourers. Aristotle's theory is that  
owing partly to their want of leisure,  
partly to their degrading occupation, they  
cannot raise themselves to a higher life  
of virtue: and that therefore they are just  
as unqualified to rule as they are unable  
to claim, in the full sense of the words,  
the title of ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, virtuous and  
capable men. To append this restriction  
is the main object of c. 3, and goes more  
diffusely into details, §§ 4—7, respecting  
the position of this class' (Ransom *Stoicism*  
*Lection* p. 10 f.). SUSEM. (500)

34 ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ] 'whether he really  
is really a citizen who has the right to  
share in office or whether the working  
men also ought to rank as citizens'; as  
was indeed the case at Athens.

πότερον πολίτης] It is true that Aristo-  
tle ought not to have raised the question  
in this form after deducing the definition  
of the citizen given in I § 2 ff.; comp. 4  
§ 6 n. (473). But in the following dis-  
cussion he has taken care that no material  
disadvantage results from this formal de-  
fect. SUSEM. (501)

35 οἷόν τι αὖ ἐστίν.

37 τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν] τὴν πολι-  
τικὴν, including τὴν ἀρχεῖν, to command  
as well as to obey.

οὗτος = ὁ βαναύσος, here would be the ex-  
istence of a citizen not qualified to govern.

§ 2 τέος ἕκαστος; οὐδὲ γὰρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος. ἡ διὰ γε τοῦτον (III)  
 1278a τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ  
 δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδ' οἱ ἀπελευθέροι. τοῦτο 2  
 γὰρ ἀληθές, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη  
 πόλις, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες ὡσαύτως πολῖται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ'  
 5 οὐ μὲν ἀπλῶς οὐδ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως πολῖται μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν,  
 § 3 ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνίοις  
 ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάνανσον ἢ ξενικόν, διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦ-  
 τοι καὶ νῦν ἢ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσῃ βάνανσον πολί-  
 10 την. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πολίτου ἀρετὴν ἦν εἴπομεν  
 λεκτέον οὐ παντός, οὐδ' ἐλευθέρου μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅσοι τῶν ἔρ-  
 § 4 γων εἰσὶν ἀφειμένοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τῶν δ' [ἀναγκαίων] οἱ μὲν 3

39 οὔτε.....οὔτε Spengel

1278 a 5 ἐκ προθέσεως Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin, ἐκ προσθέσεως Casaubon || 9  
 πολίτην \* \* Oncken, wrongly || 11 δ' [ἀναγκαίων] Susem.<sup>3</sup>, δὲ μὴ ἀφειμένων?  
 Congreve, δ' αὐτουργῶν Schmidt, δὲ <μὴ ἀφειμένων τῶν> ἀναγκαίων or simply  
 δὲ <μὴ>? Susem., δ' ἄλλων Bernays (perhaps rightly). The text may be defended  
 (τῶν ἀναγκαίων neuter, Postgate)

39 ἕκαστος] each native artizan.  
 "What are we to call him if we exclude him from the franchise? Even then he need not be classed as a resident-alien or a foreigner," in so far as he may still retain the right to speak and vote in the assembly, and to sit in the dicasteries, as under Solon's constitution: see II. 12 § 2, § 5; III. 11 § 8. SUSEM. (502)

§ 2 This question may however be said to involve no difficulty; for neither slaves nor freedmen come under the above mentioned classes (of aliens and foreigners). The indispensable elements of a state (ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις) need not be all *citizens*.

1278 a 1 οὐδὲ γὰρ κτλ] This reason is not altogether satisfactory. The slaves cannot come into the question: while the freedmen were regarded (and with good reason) as a special class of the resident aliens: see Schömann p. 351 of Eng. tr. And so Aristotle himself considers them, if the reading is correct, c. 2 § 3. "But in the strict sense of the term, in accordance with its etymology μέτοικος denotes only a permanent resident in a town of which he is not a citizen, though he *is* a citizen somewhere else [cp. Eur. *Hel.* 892]: and this condition is not fulfilled in the case of the freedmen" (Dittenberger). SUSEM. (503)

2 τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, κτλ] "For this is quite true that not all who are indis-

pensable to the city ought to be classed as citizens." A very important point for our view of Aristotle's ideal state: see IV(VII). 8 § 1 ff. n. (795). SUSEM. (504)  
 4 ὡσαύτως καὶ] equally with. See on II. 8. 21 ὁμοίους καὶ.

5 οἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς] the one, viz. adults, are citizens in an unrestricted sense; the others, viz. children, only in a qualified sense; i.e. on the supposition that they grow up.

6 ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς] "but under age." See c. 1 § 4 n. (437 b). SUSEM. (505)

§ 3 Formerly the mechanics in some places were slaves or foreigners. But see Herod. II. 167, where contempt for handicrafts is said to be common to Egyptians, Persians, Lydians, and Thracians, and to have been 'learnt' from them by the Greeks.

8 ἢ δὲ βελτίστη κτλ] Comp. IV(VII). 9 § 3, § 7, n. (809). SUSEM. (506)

9 εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης] "But if the artizan too is a citizen, then the virtue of the citizen, as defined by us, must not be affirmed to belong to every citizen, nor even to the free man as such, but to those only who are released from menial functions" [including free artizans].

§ 4 11 τῶν δ' [ἀναγκαίων] οἱ μὲν κτλ] Postgate (p. 26) treats ἀναγκαίων as neuter (in support of this use see II. 9 § 2 τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν, and I. 7. 3, II. 6. 5): 'in respect of compulsory work'

ἐνὶ λειτουργούντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινῇ βάνανσαι (11)  
καὶ θῆτες. φανερόν δ' ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψάμενοις πῶς  
ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὸ γὰρ φανέν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ δῆ-  
λον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ πολιτεῖαι, καὶ εἴδη πολ-  
του ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλείω, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου  
πολίτου, ὥστ' ἐν μὲν τινι πολιτείᾳ τὸν βάνανσον ἀναγκαῖον  
εἶναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα πολίτας, ἐν τισὶ δ' ἀδύνατον, οἷον εἰ  
τίς ἐστὶν ἣν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ᾗ κατ' ἀρετὴν  
αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἐπιτηδεύ-  
σαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάνανσον ἢ θητικόν. ἐν δὲ  
ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις θῆτα μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι πολίτην (ἀπὸ  
τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν αἱ μεθίξεις τῶν ἀρχῶν), βάναν-  
σον δὲ ἐνδέχεται. πλουτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ [οἱ] πολλοὶ τῶν

12 κοινὰ II<sup>2</sup> Bk. § 14 φανέν untranslated by Ar., suspected by the author of the erroneous conjecture «δ φανερόν» φανέν in the margin of Bas.<sup>3</sup>, and by Schneider. Bernays, "at the first glance": but can it mean this? ἐπ' αὐτῷ? Susem., «ὡς φαίνεται» would be less alteration, but hardly right: «τὰ» φανέν ex τὰ γὰρ φαίνεται Schmidt § 24 [οἱ] Schneider

those who perform such services for an individual are slaves, but those who serve the public are mechanics and labourers: οἱ τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζόμενοι of II. 7 § 23.

12 οἱ δὲ κοινῇ] Comp. I. 13 § 13: ὁ μὲν δοῦλος κοινωνὸς ζῶντος, ὁ δὲ πορρωτέρου· ὁ γὰρ βάναντος τεχνίτης ἀφωρισμένος τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν, with n. (122); I. 11 § 6 n. (103), III. 4 § 12 n. (486). SUSEM. (507)

13 θῆτης = ἐλεύθεροι διὰ πενίαν ἐπ' ἀργυρίου δουλεύοντες Pollux III. 82.

φανερόν δ' ἐντεῦθεν] "In what position the aristocrats stand becomes clear upon slight reflexion from the following consideration": viz. that a variety of 'citizens' is implied by c. 1 § 8.

14 αὐτὸ τοῦ λεχθὲν] Apparently this is the nom. Those who defend φανέν take it as = εἰδὼν φανῆ; "if seen" (i.e. understood) "even our former statement makes (the matter) clear." δῆλον ποιεῖν absolute, as in c. 8 § 6, 1279 b 35; so φανέν ποιεῖν c. 13 § 9, 1283 b 28. "Yet in both passages a clause with εἰ follows equivalent to a substantive" (T. L. Heath).

§ 5 15 καὶ εἴδη πολλ(του)] "There must also be several species of citizens." See c. 1 § 8—11. SUSEM. (508)

18 οἷον εἰ τίς ἐστὶν ἣν κτλ.] Here Aristotle purposely avoids saying that this is the constitution of the best state, in order not to anticipate (see n. 440 on

c. 1 § 10), although he has adopted the same rule for it too in § 3, with which compare 4 § 5. See below c. 7 § 3 n. (536), § 4 n. (538); c. 13 § 8 n. (593). SUSEM. (509)

19 οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ] See again n. (103). SUSEM. (510)

If we grant Aristotle's premises, no fault can be found with his exclusion of the labouring classes from political rights. It is simply true that, as a body, they could not have possessed the qualities he demands in the citizen, even if they had found the leisure for military, political, and judicial duties. Nor again is the idea that such culture depends upon lower labour false. The existence of those excellences in which Aristotle finds the end of life and the virtues of the citizen, rests upon a mass of mere work as its necessary condition (A. C. Bradley). Congreve well remarks that "if by the arrangement of society the reason ceases to hold good" Aristotle would cease to require the exclusion of the industrial population from the citizenship.

§ 6 23 τιμημάτων μακρῶν = ἐξ ἐξ ὑπο-  
πληροῦς. Comp. VII (IV). 4 § 3  
μακρὰν αἰώναν.

§ 7 At Thebes there was a law that no one might take part in the government until he had retired ten years from the market-place.

§ 7 τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τὸν δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀπε- (III)  
 26 σχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ  
 πολιτείαις προσεφέλλεται καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος· ὁ γὰρ  
 ἐκ πολίτιδος ἔν τισι δημοκραταῖς πολίτης ἐστίν, τὸν αὐτὸν 5

25 τὸν] τῶν Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 26 ἀρετῆς Γ M<sup>s</sup> ||  
 27 προσεφέλλεται καὶ] προσεφέλλει τινας? Riese. See my critical edition for other  
 emendations, of which τοὺς ξένους (for τῶν ξένων) P<sup>4</sup> is the oldest

25 ἐν Θήβαις δὲ] Judging from an oligarchical standpoint, Aristotle commends this regulation VII(VI). 7 § 4, n. (1496), and justly too, as Schlosser long ago remarked. After this period of waiting the law really opened the door to merchants and tradesmen who had grown wealthy: on the other hand the long delay gave some security that the existing body of citizens would not be 'flooded' with alien or upstart elements. Further compare VIII(V). 3 § 5 n. (1512). But in Aristotle's own ideal state there is no means by which one who had formerly been engaged in trade could ever attain civic rights: nor indeed on his principles is it intended that there should be. "In another work he is disposed to pay respect to the merit which owes all to itself and little or nothing to the favour of fortune, *Rhet.* I. 7. 32, 1365 a 19: but his *Politics* nowhere exhibits any appreciation of social phenomena of this sort. Indeed he refuses every claim made on behalf of the man who is working his way up, if not supported by ancestry, by the formula that industrial occupations *invariably* incapacitate men for becoming truly virtuous or politically intelligent citizens. He ignores the important change in the social status of the same man, as soon as he ceases to perform the 'rough labour' of industry himself and is in a position to have it performed by others. In this respect he is but in the same case with all Greece and the Greek language which is devoid of any special word to denote the large manufacturer, the employer of labour or contractor (entrepreneur)." Such people do not lack the indispensable "leisure" which he demands; but in Greece they are still termed base mechanics (βάνανσοι) "at whom the polite world looks askance" (Oncken).

On the other hand Bradley, *Hellen.* p. 216, very justly remarks that "no honest observer will deny that there is a moral βάνανσία which besets some of the occupations included under that term. Aris-

totle himself has laid down with the greatest clearness that even the most menial services need not be ignoble, and that the slavishness of a pursuit lies not in the things that are done, but in the spirit in which they are done, and in their object. And for this reason he would have some of such services performed by the youthful citizens" of the best state IV(VII). 14 § 7; cp. V(VIII). 2 § 6 *nn.* (982 a—3). "And yet he seems hardly to ask himself whether work which is rewarded in money may not be done for its own sake: and, with ideas of art hardly less exalted than Plato's, he utters no word of protest against the identification of the artist with the βάνανσος. Nor, again, can it be said that these old prejudices are wanting in vitality at the present day. What 'society' thinks of 'persons in trade,' not to speak of the 'lower orders,' no one can help knowing. But there is a difference between this sentiment and Aristotle's. If he shares our prejudice, he does not share our ideal. The leisure which he thought indispensable for a citizen was not leisure to be stupid, idle, or busy only in amusement. The strenuous exercise of the highest powers of body and mind in defending and governing the State, and in striving to quicken the divine reason in the soul,—this is the kind of 'high life' with which βάνανσία is contrasted, and the citizenship of which it is declared incapable." SUSEM. (511)

26 τῆς ἀγορᾶς] Hence ἀγοραῖος βλος IV(VII). 9 § 3, δῆμος VI(IV). 3 § 2, ἀγοραῖον πλῆθος 4 §§ 10, 21 (Eaton).

27 προσεφέλλεται] drags in some aliens as well to citizenship. Themistocles, Cimon, Thucydides, Antisthenes, Iphicrates, Timotheus were sons of Thracian mothers; the mother of Demosthenes, though the daughter of a citizen, had Scythian blood in her veins.

ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολίτιδος] Whoever is born of a citizen mother, whether his father be a freeman or a slave: see § 8 n. SUSEM. (512)

8 οὐκ ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόθους παρὰ πολλοῖς. αὖ (111)  
 30 μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν γνησίων πολιτῶν ποιοῦνται  
 πολίτας τοὺς τοιοῦτους (διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὕτω χρῶν-  
 ται τοῖς νόμοις), εὐποροῦντες δὴ ὄχλου κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦν-  
 ται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης, εἴτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν,  
 19 τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφῶν ἀστῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν  
 25 οὖν εἶδη πλείω πολίτου, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μάλι-  
 στα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν  
 ὡς αἱ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην  
 ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. ἀλλ' ὅπου  
 τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοι-  
 40 καίωντων ἐστίν.

31 τοιοῦτοις [διὰ] παρ' Bernays (without parentheses) | 32 ἀποροῦνται Γ Μ' |  
 δὴ Susem.<sup>3</sup>, δ' II (including fr.) Bk., untranslated by William Ar., [δ'] Syllburg  
 Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, γ' Susem. | 34 ἀστῶν fr. Perizonius (on Ael. F. II. VI. 10), αὐτῶν  
 Γ and all other mss. | 36—40 The right order given only by corr.<sup>1</sup> of I<sup>9</sup>; 36  
 ὥσπερ..... 38 μετέχων after 40 ἐστίν fr. P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) and P<sup>4</sup> (corrector), 37 αὖ εἰ.....  
 38 μετέχων after 40 ἐστίν P<sup>2,3,6</sup> Q<sup>5</sup> T<sup>6</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), 38 ὥσπερ..... μετέ-  
 χων after 40 ἐστίν Γ Μ' | 38 ἐστίν ὅπου Bernays, omitting ἐστίν before 39 ἀπάτης  
 and after συνοικούντων; not rightly

29 τοὺς νόθους] Under this name were included not only those children whose mother was not a citizen, but also the children of a citizen mother if she were not lawfully married to the father. The latter were always accounted citizens at Athens at least, but perhaps Aristotle is only thinking of the former. See Schömann pp. 356—8 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (513)  
 § 8 "But as the admission of such persons to the franchise is due to a dearth of citizens of legitimate birth, as population increases they gradually pare off from the roll of citizens, first, the children of slave fathers or slave mothers."

33 τοὺς ἐκ δούλου.....δούλης] See preceding para. SUSEM. (514)

εἴτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν] This remark has been rightly adduced to show that at Athens even in those times in which the bastard children of citizen fathers became citizens in their turn (n. 516) the children of a citizen mother by a father who was not a citizen were not reckoned citizens. The child followed the status of the father in both cases, although the former case was restricted to the periods in question. See Philippi *Contributions to a History of Athenian citizenship* p. 64, Schömann p. 358 Eng. tr. (where the reference in n. 6, incorrectly given, is to the present passage). Compare too 9

§ 13 n. (558) and VII(VI).4 § 16 n. (1425). SUSEM. (515)

34 τέλος δὲ κτλ] This was done at Athens by a law of Pericles about 460 B.C., and by a law of Aristophon in 441 Schömann p. 357 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (516)

§ 9 36 Ὅμηρος] *Iliad* IX. 648, XVI. 59. SUSEM. (517)

37 "Like some unfriended outlander," i.e. settler from abroad. But in Homer the meaning of ἀτίμητος is probably "without any τιμή" or blood price attached to his life, i.e. one who may be killed with impunity, rather than "without τιμή" in the sense of civic privileges (Jackson).

38 ὥσπερ μέτοικος κτλ] 'For he who does not share in the privileges (of citizenship) is no better than an alien settled in the place. But where such a principle is disguised, it is for the purpose of deceiving the joint settlers.'

ὅπου...ἐπικεκρυμμένον] i.e. where the poorer citizens and the lower classes of people are nominally eligible (i.e. have not been formally deprived of the right of being elected) to the special offices of state; but precautions are taken by various means to secure that such persons are not easily elected to any of them: cf. VII(IV). 13 §§ 1—4. SUSEM. (518)

39 τῶν συνοικούντων] Ridgway proposes to take this in a narrower sense, as

§ 10  
1278 b πότερον μὲν οὖν ἑτέραν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν <ἀρετὴν> θετέον, καθ' ἣν (III)  
ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶ καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν  
εἰρημένων, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ' ἕτερος,  
κάκεινός δ' οὐ πᾶς ἀλλ' ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἢ δυνά-  
μενος εἶναι κύριος, ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων, (τῆς τῶν  
6 κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας) ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ IV  
ταῦτα σκεπτέον, πότερον μίαν θετέον πολιτείαν ἢ πλείους,  
καὶ εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφοραὶ τίνες αὐ-  
τῶν εἰσίν. ἐστὶ δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων

1278 b 1 <ἀρετὴν> Schneider Susem. following Ar., ἑτέραν <ἀρετὴν> Spengel, less probably, θετέον <ἀρετὴν> an unknown scholar in the margin of the Munich Aldine || 2 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (added in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>), [ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 3 <πῶς ἢ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, καὶ> ὅτι <βάνανσος καὶ πολίτης>, or something similar, Thurot: see however Comm. n. (500) || 4 κάκεινός P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), κάκείνος Γ M<sup>s</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) and corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup> (κάκείνος changed to κάκεινός and ο again written over η) || δ' omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || ἡ..... || 5 κύριος omitted in Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>3-4</sup> (1st hand: added in the margin, but in P<sup>3</sup> again erased) || 8 καὶ εἰ Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk., probably right (καὶ εἰ πλείους omitted by M<sup>s</sup>)

'joint settlers of alien blood at the establishment of an ἀποικία': and he quotes in support of this view VIII(V). 3 §§ 11, 12, διὸ ὅσοι ἡδὴ συνοῖκους ἐδέξαντο ἢ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλείστοι διεστασίασαν οἶον... ἐν Θουρίοις Συβαρίται τοῖς συνοικήσασιν. It may however be sarcastically used, as Wyse suggests: the σύνοικοι are really μέτοικοι.

§ 10 1278 b 3 ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς] that is, primarily in the states which in some sort share in the best constitution: secondarily in those which approximate to it in some degree, and the more completely the more they approximate to it. See on c. 4 § 5 n. (471). SUSEM. (519)

τινὸς δ' ἕτερος] The two coincide the least, or not at all, in the worst of the depraved forms of government; viz. (1) the advanced democracy which elevates all mechanics and day-labourers to the citizenship, (2) the most extreme oligarchy which is an even closer approximation to tyranny (δυναστεία), and (3) tyranny itself. In these forms of government there is the slave-master's rule (ἀρχὴ δεσποτική) which in c. 4 § 11 was distinguished from the genuine political rule (Rassow). Compare also c. 6 § 11 below. SUSEM. (520)

4 κάκεινός δ' οὐ πᾶς] "And in the former state, not in every case, but only in the statesman who is supreme over, or qualified to be, either by himself or along with others, supreme over, the public administration."

5 ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων] This is said in order to allow for the exceptional case where the best constitution does not present itself as an aristocracy but as an "absolute monarchy" under the pre-eminently best citizen: see cc. 13, 17. SUSEM. (521)

c. 6. Is there one constitution or more than one? And in what do they differ?

Compare A. C. Bradley *Hellenica*, pp. 222—230.

§ 1 9 πολιτεία = an order of the city in respect of the magisterial offices in general, and especially the sovereign power. "Comp. c. 1 § 1 τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων τάξις τις; VI(IV). 1 § 10 τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμνεται, (that distribution of public rights and duties which justice demands) καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν: 3 § 5 with notes." SUSEM. (522)

Zeller has remarked (n. 466) that 'constitution' is not a term wide enough to express πολιτεία, which is inseparable from the nature of the people who live under it, and is in fact the 'form' of the organism, constituting, as we saw (c. 3 s. fin.) its identity. "An imperfect constitution is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Given a population of a certain kind and in a definite degree of civilization, and there is a form or order naturally fitted for it: no better order would fit it. And yet for all this one

ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων. κύριον μὲν γάρ (14)  
 πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δὲ ἔστιν  
 ἡ πολιτεία. λέγω δὲ οἶον ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς  
 κύριος ὁ δῆμος, οἱ δ' ὀλίγοι τοῖναντίον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις  
 φαμέν δὴ καὶ πολιτείαν ἑτέραν εἶναι τούτων. τὸν  
 αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον ἐροῦμεν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ὑποθετέον δὴ πρῶτον τίνος χάριν συνέστηκε πόλις, καὶ  
 τῆς ἀρχῆς εἶδη πύσα τῆς περὶ ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τὴν κοινω-  
 ρίαν τῆς ζωῆς.

εἴρηται δὲ κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, ἐν οἷς περὶ  
 οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας, καὶ ὅτι φύσει μὲν ἔστιν  
 ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν πολιτικόν. διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς  
 παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας [οὐκ ἔλαττον] ὁρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν· οὐ  
 μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνήγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει  
 μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἔστι τέλος, καὶ

12 δημοκρατίας P<sup>4</sup>, δημοκρατίας Sylburg, most likely right | 14 δὴ Spengel,  
 δὲ P<sup>1</sup> II (including fr.) Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text | 15 δὲ] δὴ? Casaubon wrongly |  
 16 δὲ Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand, corrected by the same hand) Bk. | 17 κατὰ Bernays, καὶ P<sup>1</sup> II  
 Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> in the text | 19 δὴ P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ald. Bk. | καὶ added after  
 δὲ by P<sup>1</sup> Bk. P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) and, if this may be inferred from Bekker's silence, Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> |  
 20 καὶ before ὅτι omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Bk. and all editors except Gottling and Susem. |  
 21 ὁ omitted by II<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. | 22 παρ'] περὶ M<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> fr. and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) | πολι-  
 τείας P<sup>1</sup> M<sup>1</sup> fr. | οὐκ ἔλαττον omitted by II<sup>1</sup> fr., in P<sup>1</sup> added by corr.<sup>1</sup> on the margin

constitution may be superior to another" (Bradley).

τῶν ἀρχῶν] This genitive may be paraphrased 'an order regulating the assignment of offices' as the parallel passages just cited sufficiently prove.

11 τὸ πολίτευμα] 'the ruling class' or 'government' of the city. "This Greek word cannot always be uniformly translated, as here and in c. 7 § 2 n. (534); but it denotes that individual man or that body of men, in whose name the state is governed, and hence the sovereign (ἄριστος). So far as we know Aristotle was the first to introduce the notion or, to be more precise, this correct notion of sovereignty. See also n. (466) on c. 2 § 9 and c. 13 § 5 n. (501)." SUSEM. (523)

πολίτευμα δὲ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτεία] 'the constitution or the ruling class': an emphatic way of stating, in Greek as in English, that the character of the constitution is determined by the holders of sovereign power, who make the form of government what it is. The 'constitution' varies with

the 'government' or governing class.

§ 2 14 φαμέν δὴ κατὰ] 'Accordingly we say that in these cases' (a democracy and an oligarchy) 'the constitution is different. And we shall apply this same principle to all other cases.'

16 ὑποθετέον δὴ] We must therefore determine, as our fundamental principle in this investigation, the end for which the city is formed and the various ways of governing man in common life.

"See n. (530) on § 7." SUSEM. (524)

§ 3 19 κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους] In Book I, c. 2 § 9 ff. SUSEM. (523)

For the prepos. 'in' cp. c. 18 § 1, ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις (Postgate).

23 καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ] 'to the extent to which each man is concerned in noble life.' μέρος nom. to ἐπιβάλλει, which is not used impersonally but as in II. 6 § 22, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει σκέψαι, and I. 13 § 13 (where however see note).

24 τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς] See n. (21) on I. 6 § 8. SUSEM. (526)

25 κοινῇ πᾶσι καὶ χωρὶς· συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ (IV)  
καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. ἴσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι τοῦ  
καλοῦ μῦθον καὶ κατὰ τὸ (ζῆν) αὐτὸ μόνον, ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς  
§ 5 κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λίαν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καρτεροῦσι πολ-  
λὴν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν,  
30 ὡς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς.  
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ῥά-  
διον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διο-  
§ 6 ριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία,  
καίπερ ὄντος κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε φύσει δούλῳ καὶ τῷ  
35 φύσει δεσπότη ταύτου συμφέροντος, ὅμως ἄρχει πρὸς  
τὸ τοῦ δεσπότη συμφέρον οὐδὲν ἥττον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ  
δούλου κατὰ συμβεβηκός (οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου  
§ 7 τοῦ δούλου σφῆξσθαι τὴν δεσποτείαν). ἡ δὲ τέκνων ἀρχὴ καὶ  
γυναικὸς [καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης], ἣν δὲ καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικὴν,

25 χωρὶς <ἐκάστῳ> Spengel || 26 καὶ συνέχουσι.....κοινωνίαν follow 27 μῦθον in Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Bernays and P<sup>1</sup> (corrector) the order of the text in Π<sup>1</sup> fr. || 28 ὑπερβάλλει P<sup>1-4</sup>, ὑπερβάλλῃ P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. || δ' γὰρ or γ' or (with only a comma before δῆλον) θ'? Susem. || 31 γε is added after ἀρχῆς by P<sup>2-3</sup> fr., perhaps rightly || λεγομένους] ἐνδεχομένους? Susem. || 32 διωριζόμεθα Q<sup>b</sup> and perhaps Ar. || 39 [καὶ...πάσης] Susem., who also suspects ἦν...οἰκονομικὴν; see Comm. n. (529)

§ 4 25 χωρὶς] to each separate individual.

26 συνέχουσι τὴν π. κοινωνίαν] Comp. Plato *Politicus* 301 E f.

ἴσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι κτλ.] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* IX. 9. 9, 1170 a 25, εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ; X. 4. 10 f. 1175 a 16, ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ, οὐ ὀρέγονται...πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω. συνέχευχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται (Eaton). SUSEM. (527)

27 κατὰ τὸ ζῆν] in life, a vague use of the preposition, as above 19, and again 28 κατὰ τὸν βίον.

ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κτλ.] The imperfect forms of civil society, missing the true end, and replacing it by such subordinate ends as freedom or wealth which fall short of man's true development, lead a feeble hazardous life and inflict great hardships on their members. Yet even in them mere living, provided it be not too painful a struggle, has something noble in it.

§ 5 31 τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους] Bonitz: the usual modes, *Ind. Ar.* 424 b 43: i.e. the modes (usually) stated [cp. κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι

*Meta.* I. 9 § 11]. But what we require is 'all the possible modes,' and so Bernays 'the modes in question.' This is supported by τὸ λεγόμενον I. 1 § 3, τὰ λεγόμενα ὄργανα 4 § 4. The modes of government in question = the modes of governing men. But even so we should rather expect τῆς λεγομένης ἀρχῆς τοὺς τρόπους: see *Critical Notes* and *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXIX. 1884, p. 271 n. (23). SUSEM.

32 διελεῖν] distinguish. Comp. II. 2 § 1 n.

ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς]. See Excursus I. to B. IV (VII). SUSEM. (527 b)

διοριζόμεθα] not necessarily of accurate distinction.

§ 6 33 ἡ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία] See I. 2. 3 n. (7), I. 6 §§ 9, 10 n. (57) and on the other side I. 4. 5. SUSEM. (528)

35 ὅμως ἄρχει] Nevertheless the slave-owner's rule is primarily to the interest of the owner, though incidentally (or relatively, or in a derivative manner) 'to the interest of the slave.'

36 οὐδὲν ἥττον = μᾶλλον, predominantly.

37 φθειρομένου = while the slave is becoming useless, spoilt.

§ 7 39 καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης] This

40 ἦτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν ἔστιν ἡ <εἰ> κοινοῦ τινός ὁμοίον. (IV)  
καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ὡς ὁρώμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας  
τέχνας, οἷον ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς  
δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸν παιδοτρίβην ἕνα  
τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐνίστ' εἶναι καὶ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερ-  
νήτης εἰς ἔστιν αἰὲ τῶν πλωτήρων· ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτρίβης (p. 40)  
ἡ κυβερνήτης σκοπεῖ τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀγαθόν, ὅταν δὲ  
τούτων εἰς γένηται καὶ αὐτός, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχει  
τῆς ὠφελείας. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πλωτὴρ, ὁ δὲ τῶν γυμναζομέ-  
νων εἰς γίνεται παιδοτρίβης ὢν. διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς  
ἀρχάς, ὅταν ᾗ κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ

40 εἴτε for ἦτοι Lindau | <εἰ> Susem., fr. omits ἡ <εἰ> | 41 ὥσπερ II<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.

1279 a 1 ἰατρικὴν] ἱερτικὴν Lindau | 2 [ἕνα] Susem.<sup>14</sup> mistaking William's version, εἶναι II<sup>2</sup> omitting 3 εἶναι | 6 κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>2</sup> T<sup>b</sup> | 7 ὠφελείας] ἀγαθίας Q<sup>2</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) | 8 διὸ..... 10 ὁμοίότητα probably quite sound: \* \* διὸ Conring, ὡς..... συνεστηκυῖα Ar. Ramus, τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν Spengel, Schlosser thought πᾶσι had been dropped, ὁμοίότητα <ἡ πολιτεία> Schneider, but if the word has been lost it would be more likely to drop out after πολιτεία

addition appears contradictory and un-Aristotelian: for it would include once more the rule of a master over his slaves to which the rule in question is held to be opposed. Nor are the words ἦν δὲ καθάπερ οικονομικὴν free from suspicion, for the rule of the householder again includes a rule over slaves. We must therefore understand *οικονομικὴν* in a narrower and more special sense 'emphatically' (as Congreve says) to mean the rule of the householder over the free members of his family as contrasted with his rule over slaves I. 13 §§ 1, 2. But even then it is very doubtful whether *οικονομικὴ* and *δεσποτικὴ* can be so opposed in Greek; nor is this proved by I. 1. 2. SUSEM. (529)

40 ἦτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν] Comp. τὸ οικονομικὸν δίκαιον N. E. v. 6. 9 and Jackson's *n.* But in the state this good of the subjects ruled, and common good of rulers and subjects, consists in the 'real' of the state mentioned, or rather recalled to our memory, in §§ 3—5 viz. the highest possible life, εὖ ζῆν. This is the reason why the recapitulation of the facts in §§ 3—5, of πρῶτοι λόγοι, had to be prefixed to this passage. SUSEM. (530)

41 καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ] essentially... incidentally.

καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας] Comp. Pl. *Politicus* 197 B: εἰς δὲ τὰς εἰσέτας ἐναίσιμους

μὲν πάλιν, αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι ἀπεικάζουσιν αὐτοὺς βασιλικοῖς ἀρχόνται... τῶν γενομένων κυβερνήτην καὶ τὸν ἐνέμων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον ἱατρῶν (Eaton): and earlier still, Socrates Xen. *Memorab.* III. 9. 41 (Henkel). See further below c. 12 § 4 n. (638), c. 16 §§ 6—8: IV (VII). 2 § 13 n. (726), 13 § 2 n. (870); and above II. 8. 18 n. (170). SUSEM. (531)

1279 a 2 αὐτῶν] i.e. αὐτῶν τῶν ἀρχόντων, cp. n. on I. 6. 6 αὐτοῖς. With this summary justification of *δεσποτία* (§§ 6, 7) compare Plato's in *Akr.* IX. 590 D; ἕνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος (ὁ ὡςθεὶς ἐστίν) ἔχων τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἶδος ἐπὶ ὁμοίᾳ ἀρχεται οἷον περ ὁ βελτίστος, δοῦλος αὐτοῦ φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι δεῖναι τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἀρχόν, οἷα ἐπὶ βελτίστῃ τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ οἰκίᾳ δεῖν ἀρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θεασάμαχος ᾤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀμεινον ἐν παντί ἐπὶ θεῖον καὶ φρονίμων ἀρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκίᾳ ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔξωθεν ἐφροσῶνται.

§ 8 7 δ μὲν, sc. ὁ κυβερνήτης, πλωτὴρ (γίνεται).

§ 9 8 διὸ κατὰ] "Hence too with civic offices, when the city is framed upon the equality and similarity of the citizens, their claim is to hold office in turn."

9 ὅταν ᾗ κατ' ἰσότητα... καὶ καθ' ὁμοίτητα... ὅταν ᾗ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ sc. ὁ πόλις, supplied from πολιτεία.

"Although this is the case not only in

- 10 καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν ἄρχειν, πρότερον μὲν, (I)  
 ἢ πέφυκεν, ἀξιοῦντες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινα  
 πάλιν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἄρχων ἐσκό-  
 § 10 πει τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον· νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας τὰς  
 ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς  
 15 ἄρχειν, οἷον εἰ συνέβαινεν ὑγιαίνειν αἰεὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι νοσα-  
 κεροῖς οὖσιν. καὶ γὰρ, ἂν οὕτως ἴσως ἐδίωκον τὰς ἀρχάς.  
 § 11 φανερόν τοίνυν ὥς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον τ  
 σκοποῦσιν, αὗται μὲν ἰρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ  
 ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων,  
 20 ἡμαρτημέναι καὶ πᾶσαι παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν·

12 τὸ] τοῦ P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || αὐτοῦ P<sup>1</sup> Ald., αὐτοῦ Γ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2-3,4</sup> || 13 κεινου fr., ἐκείνω  
 Schneider (not necessary), κοινῇ Sylburg, κοινὸν Bojesen (wrongly), [συμφέρ-ν] Bernays  
 || 18 αὗται P<sup>1</sup> apparently, αὗται Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 20 πᾶσαι καὶ Π<sup>3</sup> Bk.

Democracies, but also in Aristocracy and in most Polities, yet Aristotle has principally in view the contrast between democratic Athens of the old and the new period." SUSEM. (532)

10 πρότερον μὲν κτλ.] "in early times, as is natural, they required men to serve the state in rotation, and that some one else should, in return, look after your interest as you formerly when in office looked after *his*: but in our day the advantages derived from the public treasury and from office make them desire to hold it uninterruptedly; one might suppose that though of sickly constitutions, they were always well in office, for then too they would no doubt hunt as eagerly after places."

11 λειτουργεῖν] of the onerous task of the magistrate *e.g.* in old Athens: munus publicum dum gerit, commodum civium inservit cum damno etiam rei familiaris.

τινα and 12 αὐτοῦ] It is an error to understand these to refer to the same person. They are really A and B, two holders of office, A in succession to B. Comp. II. 2 §§ 6, 7 (where διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ἵσους εἶναι πάντας reechoes the ἢ πέφυκε of the text here) and I. 1 § 2 where this rotation or exchange of functions is the external mark of πολιτικός, even if his essential identity with βασιλικὸς be assumed.

§ 10 15 οἷον εἰ... 16 ἀρχάς] Comp. Isocr. VII. (*Panegyricus*) 24, 25: αἰτίον δ' ἦν τοῦ μὴ περιμαχῆτους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅτι μεμαθηκότες ἦσαν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, καὶ μὴ... ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν διοικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστοις ὑπαρχόντων,

εἴ ποτε δεήσεις, τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐπαρκεῖν. οὕτω δ' ἀπείχοντο σφόδρα τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὥστε χαλεπώτερον ἦν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις εὑρεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἄρχειν ἢ νῦν τοὺς μηδὲν δεομένους· οὐ γὰρ ἐμπορίαν ἀλλὰ λειτουργίαν ἐνὸμιζον εἶναι τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν. SUSEM. (532 b)

§ 11 obviously goes with c. 7.

17 τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον] This is τὸ δίκαιον and the 'good' or 'end' of civil society: c. 12 § 1.

18 ὀρθαί] normal, as opposed to the perverted forms. Note that in the *Politicus* Plato regards only the best state as 'normal.' Before he divides the others into three better and three worse (much as Aristotle does here) he asks 302 B τίς οὖν δὴ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν τούτων ἡκιστα χαλεπὴ συζῆν, πασῶν χαλεπῶν οὐσῶν, καὶ τίς βαρυτάτη; Comp. τὴν ὀρθήν (*i.e.* the ideal state) χωρὶς ἀποκρίναντες τούτων ἐβδόμην, *ib.* 302 C. What Aristotle calls ὀρθαί, are the κόσμιοι καὶ ἐννομοὶ of the *Politicus*, just as his παρεκβάσεις are the παράνομοι and ἀκόλαστοι of Plato.

κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον] As opposed to τὰ καὶ τισὶ δίκαιον.

19 τὸ σφέτερον explained by τῶν ἀρχόντων = τὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν: a usage common in Thucydides, *e.g.* IV. 114, VIII. 46.

20 παρεκβάσεις] 'perversions'; departures from, or corruptions of, the normal constitutions. The verb παρεκβαίνειν is both intrans. and trans. = to violate, *e.g.* VIII(V). 10. 5. The noun = error in *Metaph.* XIV(N). 2 § 13, 1089 b 4. This is nearer to the sense in other writers; a digression, Isaeus p. 62. 13, and so *Nic. Eth.* I. 5. 1.

δεσποτικά γάρ, ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστίν. (IV)  
 7 **ἑωρισμένων** δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπι-  
 σκέψασθαι, πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶ, καὶ πρῶ-  
 1 του τὰς ὁρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἔσονται  
 2 φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεῖσων. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ  
 πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταυτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον  
 τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἓνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς  
 πολλούς· ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοι-  
 νὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὁρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι  
 3 τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλί-  
 γων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις. ἡ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φάτεον  
 εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἡ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος.  
 4 καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν  
 ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν  
 5 πλειόνων δὲ ἐνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν (ἡ διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἄρ-

25 δὲ] δ' ἢ Welldon || τὸ II<sup>1</sup> fr. (omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Bk.) || 27 ὀλίγων I<sup>1</sup> M<sup>1</sup> || 32 «μή»  
 μετέχοντας Bernays || 34 τῶν omitted by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [τῶν] Susem. I<sup>2</sup> || ὀλίγων] οὐτων fr.

21 **δεσποτικά]** like the sway of a master over slaves.

cc. 7, 8 (with c. 6 § 11) *Threefold classification of normal and degenerate constitutions according as (α) one man, (β) a few, or (γ) the many, are supreme.*

§ 1 23 **πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶ**] See EXCURSUS I. to B. III. p. 447 ff. SUSEM. (533)

§ 2 23 **ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ**] See c. 6 § 1 n. (533) also n. (466) on c. 3 § 9. SUSEM. (534)

26 **σημαίνει ταυτόν**] For constitution we may substitute 'ruling body.'

**πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων**] Cities contain a variety of parts or elements. Each class contributes something to the city, and so has a certain claim to political rights. The relative strength of these elements determines the question where the supreme power or 'sovereignty' lies, and settles what the constitution of the city shall be. In England to-day the *πολίτευμα* includes the sovereign, the lords, and the electoral body among the commons.

27 **ἀνάγκη δ'... ἢ τοὺς πολλούς**] But as early as § 4 ff. it is seen that this merely numerical standpoint is only preliminary and by no means exhaustive: see *nn.* (538, 540, 543). SUSEM. (536)

Eaton compares Cic. *De Rep.* I. § 47, *Id.* *Ann.* IV. 53, and for the dependence of the constitution upon the magistrates Cic. *De Legg.* III § 13.

28 **ὅταν... πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι**] But how, a Platonist might ask, can they so govern, unless they have absolute knowledge, and not merely right opinion, regarding the common weal?

32 **τοὺς μετέχοντας**] sc. *τῆς πόλεως*. They may still be indispensable elements, c. 5 § 2 *ὡς ἀνευ οὗκ ἂν εἴη πόλις*.

ἡ δεῖ κτλ] If they are to be called citizens, the inhabitants must share in the 'weal' which is the end of the city; *N. E.* VIII. 9 § 4 ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελεῖν καὶ διαμεμεν.

§ 3 33 **μοναρχιῶν**] A neutral word, convenient as including the two species *βασιλεία* and *τυραννίς*, Plato *Politic.* 305 D, E. In no single case of all the six is the use of the corresponding designation applied to modern states (monarchy, aristocracy, &c.) other than misleading, even when the qualifications are supplied. The most democratic of Greek democracies we should call an oligarchy.

35 **ἡ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχαν, ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀριστον**] Undoubtedly Aristotle himself has both reasons in view in adopting this term: but preeminently the former. It has been already explained, *n.* (386) on II. 11. 5, that he regards merit as the principle of Aristocracy; and he uses the word widely in this sense alone: II. 6 § 16 *n.* (218), 9 § 20 (320), 11 § 2 ff. (280); III. 5 § 5 (509), 13 § 8 (593), 15 § 10

χειν, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦ-  
 σιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύη-  
 38 ται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πόλι-  
 § 4 τειῶν, πολιτεία. <καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι  
 <τὰ ὅπλα.> συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως. ἓνα μὲν γὰρ δια- 3  
 40 φέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλε-  
 1279 b πὸν ἡκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολε-  
 μικήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην  
 τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν. καὶ μετέχουσιν

37 <πολεμικὸν> πλῆθος Zeller (*Griech. Phil.* II. ii. 714 n. 1) || The trans-  
 position of b 3 καὶ μετέχουσιν.....4 ὅπλα to follow a 39 πολιτεία by Schmidt  
 (see *Introd.* 82) || 39 <οὐκ> εὐλόγως? Spengel who first saw that the text was  
 unsound; \* \* συμβαίνει Thurot, afterwards accepted by Spengel || μὲν omitted by fr.

(655), 17 § 6 (680), VI(IV). 2 § 1 (1133),  
 2 § 5 (1142), 7 § 2 (1233 ff.), 8 §§ 4—  
 10 (1245), 15 § 10 (1356); VII(VI). 2 § 7  
 (1402). Other references in n. (471) on  
 III. 4. 5. SUSEM. (536) In *Rhet.*  
 I. c. 8 he adopts the former derivation.

39 πολιτεία] a constitutional govern-  
 ment, a polity: a republic of the middle  
 classes (so far as any Greek city can be  
 so called). In this work without any  
 other distinctive name, like the English  
 Commonwealth; but in *N. E.* VIII. 10  
 called τιμοκρατία: see Exc. I.

§ 4 1279 b 4 οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα]  
 “Here it is the possessors of arms that  
 share in the government”: more pre-  
 cisely, the heavy-armed; i.e. those who  
 are in a position to equip themselves at  
 their own cost with heavy armour and (as  
 Zeller remarks II ii 748 n. 7) to undergo  
 the gymnastic training requisite for this  
 species of military service, to which time  
 and leisure and also a certain material pro-  
 sperity were essential. Accordingly this in-  
 volves a moderate property qualification.  
 Comp. Exc. I. to B. III.; II. 6. 16 with  
 n. (216), VI(IV). 13 § 4 (1259), § 7 (1268);  
 VII(VI). 7 § 1 n. (1452). From this point  
 of view the Four Hundred at Athens  
 restricted the franchise to 5000 citizens,  
 Thuc. VIII. 97. 1 (Eaton). SUSEM. (537)  
 From 411 to about 409 (or 408) Athens  
 was a Polity in this sense, and again  
 from 321 to 317 B.C.

1279 a 39 εὐλόγως) (παράλογως, al-  
 most=εἰκότως, with good reason. See  
 p. 82.

40 πλείους δ' ἤδη...πολεμικήν] But  
 when we come to the case of a larger  
 number, it is hard for them to be per-  
 fectly trained in all excellence: (ἀλλὰ

but on the contrary) at the most they can  
 be trained in military excellence alone.

1279 b 2 διόπερ...3 τὸ προπολεμοῦν]  
 The military character of Polity is also  
 emphasized by the author of the interpo-  
 lated passage, c. 17 § 4. Yet in the na-  
 ture of this form of government itself, as  
 Aristotle elsewhere describes it, scarcely  
 any cogent reason can be found for  
 making this such an inseparable and  
 essential feature. He may have dimly  
 perceived that the description of Polity  
 as a mere blending of democracy and  
 oligarchy without the addition of aristo-  
 cratical elements,—as distinguished from  
 those spurious aristocracies which, like  
 Carthage, combine in themselves these  
 three elements, VI(IV). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 § 9  
 (cp. II. II. 5 n. 386)—by no means  
 agrees with the recognition of Polity as  
 one of the three normal constitutions, as  
 defined by him; but that on the contrary  
 (as was remarked *Introd.* p. 62) if this  
 recognition is to remain valid, some ac-  
 count must be taken of merit also even in  
 a Polity, and it must be presumed that a  
 certain amount of excellence is spread  
 generally amongst the citizens. And in  
 accordance with the view here expressed  
 about military excellence this may have  
 induced him to transfer the warlike spirit  
 of the Spartan system not so much to the  
 other mixed aristocracies as to the re-  
 maining constitutions, which are most  
 akin to it, viz. the Polities, in order in some  
 measure to bridge over the chasm; for  
 indeed he cites Sparta VI(IV). 9 § 6 f. n.  
 (1262), as an example of a successful  
 blending of democracy and oligarchy in  
 Polity, though this involves him in in-  
 consistency. At the same time by this

5 αὐτῆς οἱ κικτημένοι τὰ ὄπλα. παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρη-  
 5 μένων τυραννίς μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας,  
 δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μοναρχία  
 πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ' ὀλιγαρχία  
 πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμ-  
 10 φέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιστελοῦν αἰ-  
 δεμία αὐτῶν.

8 δεῖ δὲ μικρῷ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τίς ἐκάστη τού-  
 των τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῇ  
 δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀπο-  
 βλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδὲ  
 3 τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀλήθειαν.  
 2 ἔστι δὲ τυραννίς μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἴρηται, δεσπο-  
 τικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν ὥσι κύ-

1279 b 6 οὐκ possibly Γ. ἰgitur William 13 ἕκαστον (or ἐκάστων) μεθόδῳ?  
 Koraes 14 μὴ] μηδὲν? Schneider, perhaps rightly if 15 τι, which is not in Π<sup>1</sup> Ar.,  
 should be omitted 16 δὲ] δὴ or γάρ? Spengel, perhaps rightly 17 δεσποτικῇ?  
 Sylburg

immediate emphasis on the fact that Polity is an inferior constitution, as compared with monarchy and aristocracy, the germ of dissolution has already unob-  
 served found its way into this whole theory of three normal constitutions and their corresponding perversions. For then in fact only monarchy and aristocracy proper are really good forms of government; while mixed constitutions—and indeed not merely politics but even spurious aristocracies—are forms intermediate to them and the perversions proper, combining good and evil elements just as the corresponding *τυμοκρατία* in Plato's *Republic* (Excursus 1.), and this assertion is made point blank by Aristotle himself later on, VI(IV). 8 §§ 1, 2, *n.* (1239). Comp. Zeller II ii 713 f., 748. But even at this point, by thus restricting the excellence of Polity and adding to the definition its military character, Aristotle begins to transcend the merely numerical point of view to which he has hitherto adhered c. 7 §§ 2, 3. Cp. *n.* (531). SUSEM. (538)

§ 5 6 ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς] Earlier still Thucydides, I. 17, accuses the Greek tyrants of such complete selfishness. This view, which in later times was universal amongst the Greeks, can hardly be quite correct. SUSEM. (539)

7 ἡ δ' ὀλιγ... 9 ἀπόρων] Here then

the numerical standard completely disappears, see *nn.* (535, 538): as is quite clear from the further explanation in c. 8. See *n.* (544). SUSEM. (540)

c. 8 § 1 11 δεῖ δὲ... 12 ἐστίν] Not to be understood as meaning that this is intended to be done merely in the immediate context, where the description is by no means complete; the whole remaining part of the *Politics*, except Bk. VIII(V), has no other object. SUSEM. (541)

13 τῷ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι] Comp. c. 13 § 14 *n.* (601), VI(IV). 15 § 4 *n.* (1350); also *Introd.* p. 70 f. SUSEM. (542)

Further see VI(IV). 10. 1, V(VIII). 3, 12. Here μέθοδοι=branch of inquiry, study, department of science: almost as in II. 1 § 2 (a nearer parallel is *Nic. Eth.* I. 1 § 1, 3 § 1, 1094 b 11).

14 ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν] But in *Nic. Ethics* this is the supreme end of theory: οὐ γινώσκει ἀλλὰ πράζει, καὶ γὰρ ὅσα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἢ ἀρετὴ σκοπεῖται, μὲτα, ἀλλ' ὅς' ἀγαθὰ γινώσκμεθα.

μη παρορᾶν μηδὲ τι καταλείπειν] "not to overlook or omit anything." Cf. *The Part. Animals* I. 5 § 4. 645 a 5, μηδὲ παραλείποντας εἰς διάνοιαν μὴτε ἀναισθητοῦ μὴτε τυμωτέρου.

§ 2 16 δεσποτικῇ κτλ] ruling civil society like a slaveholder.

ριοι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ (V)  
 19 τοῦναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλήθος οὐσίας ἀλλ' ἄποροι.  
 § 3 πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἴεν οἱ  
 πλείους ὄντες εὐποροὶ κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δὲ ἐστίν  
 ὅταν ἢ κύριον τὸ πλήθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κὰν εἴ που συμ-  
 βαίνει τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐπόρων, κρείτ-  
 25 ριον πλήθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναι φασίν· οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν  
 § 4 διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κὰν <εἴ> τις συν- 6  
 θεὶς τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῇ δ' ἀπορίᾳ τὸ πλήθος (P.  
 οὕτω προσαγορεύει τὰς πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν μὲν ἐν ἣ τὰς  
 ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὐποροὶ ὀλίγοι τὸ πλήθος ὄντες, δημο-  
 30 κρατίαν δὲ ἐν ἣ οἱ ἄποροι πολλοὶ τὸ πλήθος ὄντες· ἄλλην  
 § 5 ἀπορίαν ἔχει. τίνας γὰρ ἐροῦμεν τὰς ἄρτι λεχθείσας πολι-  
 τείας, τὴν ἐν ἣ πλείους εὐποροὶ καὶ ἐν ἣ ἐλάττους οἱ  
 ἄποροι, κύριοι δ' ἐκάτεροι τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ μηδεμία  
 § 6 ἄλλη πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστίν; ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ 7  
 35 λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγους ἢ πολλοὺς εἶναι  
 κυρίους συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς  
 δημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ὀλίγους, πολλοὺς  
 δ' εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διὰ> τὰς

19 [πλήθος] Spengel, perhaps rightly || 20 <τοῦτον> τὸν? Susem. || 21 πο-  
 λιτείας Schneider, perhaps rightly || 22 ἢ] εἴη M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || συμβαίνει Γ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup>  
 T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup>, συμβαίνει Schneider, συμβαίη Sylburg || 25 δόξειε Π<sup>1</sup> || 26 κὰν  
 <εἴ> Susem., κὰν P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk., ἐὰν (?) Γ M<sup>s</sup> (?) Ar., *si quis* William || 28 προ-  
 αγορεύει Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ald., προσαγορεύη Morel Bk. || 32 <οἱ> εὐποροὶ Sylburg Bk. || 34  
 παρὰ] περὶ P<sup>3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 38 <διὰ> τὰς ῥηθείσας Susem., if 39 διαφορὰς is right

18 οὐσίας] property (in plural).

§ 3 20 πρώτη δ' ἀπορία] "The first difficulty affects the definition," i.e. affects the question how we are to define. Another series of ἀπορίαι affects τὸ δίκαιον (Wyse).

§§ 4, 5 Are both features essential? Is democracy the government of the needy majority, oligarchy that of the wealthy few? [This view reappears in the double characteristics of VI(IV). 4 § 6 οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι πλείους ὄντες, οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενέστεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες.] How are we then to classify the exceptional cases where these features are not combined?

§ 6 34 ἔοικε τοίνυν κτλ] "Our argument seems then to show that the fewness or multitude of the sovereign body is an

accident, in the one case of oligarchy, in the other of democracy." Here as elsewhere he is in search of the true nature and end; essential qualities [cp. c. 9 § 1 n. on ὁρὸς] are severed from such as are purely external and quantitative; for τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὀρισμένων. So in I. I. 2, IV(VII). 4. 4 ff. he denies that these quantitative distinctions are essential.

38 διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διὰ> τὰς ῥηθείσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορὰς] A διαφορὰ or 'specific difference' is an essential quality, by the presence or absence of which two species of a genus, here two constitutions, differ (ὧ διαφέρουσι) and can therefore be classified. The question in this sentence is, whether

ῥηθείσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορῆς], ᾧ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἢ τε (V)  
 40 δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πλεία καὶ πλουτῶν  
 41 ἔστιν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλείους ἂν  
 42 τ' ἐλάττους ἂν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου  
 43 δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπο-  
 44 μεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς. εὐποροῦσι  
 45 μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες· δι' αὐ-  
 46 αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.

9] ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας  
 καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ

39 διαφορᾶς Γ, accepted by Koraes Bk. Bernays etc. Then αἰτίας is predicate and πολιτείας must be understood with ῥηθείσας or else inserted; thus ῥηθείσας = πολιτείας:- Bernays: ῥηθείσας = ἀπορίας:- Koraes wrongly, see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 391 f.

1280 a 6 πολιτείας \* \* Conring, perhaps rightly; a transitional clause is needed

αἰτίας goes with τὰς ῥηθείσας, or whether it is a predicate. In the former case, we expect <διὰ> τὰς ῥηθείσας αἰτίας, as § 8, δι' αὐ αἰτίας. "And for this reason too it follows that differences between constitutions do not arise on account of the reasons mentioned"—the mere numbers of the governing class. Otherwise Bernays (with some inserting διὰ, but making αἰτίας διαφορᾶς the predicate): "it follows that the constitutions mentioned, τὰς ῥηθείσας sc. πολιτείας, are not causes of specific difference."

Although from distinct points of view various causes seem to be assigned for the existence of different forms of government, yet the new principle of wealth and poverty is maintained through the rest of the treatise (with certain exceptions). But ultimately these different forms are traced back to differences in social conditions, and each represents a certain state of equilibrium or relative preponderance amongst the competing social elements. See *Introd.* pp. 60 f., 63; c. 7 § 1 n., c. 15 §§ 10—13, VI(IV). 9 § 10, VI §§ 9—11, §§ 16—18, 13 §§ 10, 11, VIII(V). 9 § 8, 9. Also Bradley *Hellenica* p. 225 ff.

§ 7 1280 a 1 ἂν τ' ἐλάττους ἂν τε πλείους] Here is a plain statement that any government whatever by the rich majority would be an oligarchy, any whatever by the needy minority a democracy. Yet the writer of the interpolated passage VI(IV). cc. 3, 4 has failed to understand this: see n. (1164) and VI(IV). 4 §§ 5, 6. SUSEM. (643)

§ 8 5 δι' αὐ αἰτίας] 'on which

grounds both parties claim to be citizens," viz. in an oligarchy because they are wealthy, in a democracy because they are free-born.

c. 9 *Right, or justice, in an oligarchy and in a democracy: their conflicting claims judged by the standard of perfect justice.*

Oncken i. pp. 30—33 has treated this chapter as a typical example of Aristotle's analytical method.

§ 1 7 Properly ὅρους = definitions, like ὁρισμοί. Better, standards or determining principles; that which gives its special character to Oligarchy or Democracy; id quo alicuius rei natura constituitur et definitur (*Ind. Ar.*), οἷς δοκεῖ ἀρίστης [ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία] VII(V). 9 § 14. The word was so used by Plato *Rep.* VIII 551 c (comp. 562 n δ πρῶτον ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι' οὗ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καθίστατο = ἰστέφανου, ... ὁ δημοκρατία ὁρίζεται ἀγαθόν = εὐδαιμονία). We have had it before II. 6 § 9, 9 § 32 and it occurs about sixteen times in the sequel. Grant's argument *Aristotle* i. p. 61 f., that Aristotle adopted the term in the interval between writing the *Ethics* and the *Politics*, is disproved by its occurrence in the *Republic*.

All the various elements of the city contribute something in virtue of which they claim a share of political privilege. The predominant element (§ 2) or class fixes its own contribution as the qualification for citizenship, or standard. This again may be viewed as the end which the citizens pursue.

8 τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ] The state is a realisation of *justice*

δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἄπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ (V)  
 10 μέχρι τινός προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως  
 δίκαιον. οἶον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ'  
 § 2 οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις· καὶ <γὰρ> τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον  
 εἶναι, καὶ [γὰρ] ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίστοις·  
 οἱ δὲ (τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι,) τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ'  
 15 αἷτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι κριταὶ  
 § 3 φαῦλοι περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ 9  
 διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς,  
 καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ  
 πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, (p. 72)

11 τὸ ἴσον δίκαιον? Vettori || 12 καὶ <γὰρ> Bas.<sup>2</sup> || 12 καὶ...13 ἀνίστοις omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 13 καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., γὰρ transposed to come before 12 τὸ ἄνισον Bojesen, [γὰρ] Schneider || 15 κριταὶ after 16 φαῦλοι Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.

justice, in so far as public offices, rights and privileges, are assigned to the citizens in proportion to their worth, κατ' ἀξίαν: so that the contributions of all to the state meet with a proportionate return, and all are justly treated by the constitution. But an oligarchy or democracy, while fairly applying this law of proportion, may set up a false or one-sided standard of worth, as *wealth* or *free birth* in place of capacity and merit. In such a case the justice of the state is a departure from perfect or natural justice and may be called an oligarchic or democratic justice, as the case may be (A. C. Bradley).

9 πάντες] Here again ἀμφότεροι might be expected. Comp. II. 11 § 5 n. (387) and *Rhet.* II. 9 § 3 ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν = all who are envious or righteously indignant, 'both classes' (Shilleto).

ἄπτονται δικαίου τινός] The partial truth in these one-sided conceptions is fully recognized. The ἀξία which oligarchy or democracy take as the qualification for political privileges, although not the true one, still has a subordinate importance for the state. It is justice *in some measure*. See § 3, § 15; VIII(v). I § 5.

10 καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν κτλ] They do not state absolute justice in its full extent.

11 οἶον δοκεῖ κτλ] 'Thus justice, or right, is thought (by the upholders of democracy) to be equality.' They grasp the fact that all citizens are on a level in respect of freedom, and taking this partial

equality for absolute equality they give everybody equal rights; i.e. they give equals to unequals.

§ 2 14 οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι... κακῶς] But they omit the qualification for *whom* equality or inequality is right, and form a wrong judgment.

15 σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι κτλ] Comp. c. 16 § 8, n. (642). SUSEM. (544)

§ 3 16 ὥστ' ἐπεὶ κτλ] "Hence since right means 'right for given persons,' and there is the same difference between them as between the things they are entitled to."

18 ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς] N. E. B. v. c. 3 (Bekker's c. 6) esp. §§ 4—6, § 10 διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ἄ. Comp. n. (584), also VIII(v). I. 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (545)

This reference was suspected, or rather condemned, as an interpolation by Grant *Ethics* I. p. 53, but see Jackson's commentary on B. v. p. 77—81.

τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος κτλ] They agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing, but not as to that of the persons to whom it is assigned.

"This is in fact true of both oligarchs and democrats: for equality of political rights amongst themselves is also the demand of the oligarchs, but only for the rich, while the democrats admit it as far as possible for all citizens. The one demands equality for all who are equal or alike in wealth: the others demand it for all who are equal or alike in freedom. Cp. VIII(v). I. 2 f. n. (1493)." SUSEM. (546)

20 μάλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουνσι τὰ περὶ (V)  
αὐτοὺς κακῶς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἑκατέ-  
4 ρους δίκαιόν τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον λέγειν ἀπλῶς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ  
ἂν κατὰ τὶ ἄνιστοι ᾖσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἷονται ἄνι-  
21 σοι εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατὰ τὶ ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερία, ὅλως  
5 ἴσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτη-  
μάτων χίριν ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ συνῆλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι  
τῆς πόλεως ὅσον περ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὥσθ' ὁ τῶν ὀλι-  
γαρχικῶν λόγος δόξειεν ἂν ἰσχύειν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον  
μετέχειν τῶν ἑκατὸν ταλάντων τὸν εἰσενεγκόντα μίαν μνᾶν τῷ  
22 εἶναι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγίνο-  
6 μένων). εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν μόνον ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ  
εἶναι ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δοῦλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζφῶν ἦν πό-  
λις· νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ  
τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μήτε συμμαχίας ἔνεκεν, ὅπως  
ὑπὸ μηδεὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν

22 νομίζουσι «τὰ» δίκαιον Spengel, perhaps rightly | 24 ἐλευθερία Vettori,  
ἐλευθερία (or -η) Γ Ar., ἐλευθερία Μ, ἐλευθέρια Η<sup>2</sup> fr. (the first iota above the line),  
ἐλευθέρια Π<sup>1</sup> | 27 ὀλιγαρχικῶν Ρ<sup>4</sup> (Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>) | 29 ταλάντων Γ μνᾶν Η (including fr.)  
Ar. Bk. (in Ρ<sup>4</sup> μν over an erasure) | εἰσενέγκοντα Η<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. | 30 δ' ὅτι Μ<sup>1</sup> Ρ<sup>4</sup> T<sup>b</sup>  
| 31 μόνον ἔνεκεν Η<sup>2</sup> fr., omitted by Ρ<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin) |  
34 ἔνεκα Μ<sup>1</sup> Ρ<sup>4</sup>

21 μέχρι τινός] See on § 1 above.  
'Because each side contends for a partial  
justice, but thinks it is contending for an  
absolute justice.'

24 οἱ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Comp. v. 12  
§ 2, and VIII(V). 1 § 2 f. *nn.* (584 b,  
1493). SUSEM. (546 b)

25 κυριώτατον] what is most im-  
portant; viz. the grand aim and object of  
a city.

26 τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι κτλ]  
'they have a stake in the city propor-  
tionate to their share of the property.'

29 ταλάντων] A talent=47½ Ger-  
man marks=£231 2s. 6d., a mina=78½  
German marks=£3 17s. approximately;  
Hultsch *Greek and Roman Metrology* p.  
172 f. SUSEM. (547)

30 οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς... ἐπιγινομένων]  
'ought not to have an equal share of the  
principal nor of the profits accruing.'  
Compagere however suggests that the par-  
ticiples may be masculine, and so Bernays,  
with a different sense: 'either of those  
who originally contributed or of a sub-  
sequent generation of shareholders.' This  
can hardly be right. SUSEM.

§ 6 33 νῦν δ' οὐκ κτλ] Comp. 1.

2. 8 and the further passages cited in *n.*  
(21). Also *Nik. Eth.* x. 6. 8, 1177 a 8  
εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῃ μεταδί-  
δωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον, and x. 7. 6, 1177 b  
4, where happiness is made to consist in  
leisure, ἐν τῇ σχολῇ. But that slaves have  
no leisure, is stated *Pol.* iv(vii). 15. 2  
(Eaton). Cp. too *nn.* (925, 926) at that  
passage. SUSEM. (548)

34 διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν  
κτλ] "for commerce and mutual inter-  
course." Here the sentence breaks off,  
the parenthetical example being elabo-  
rated and supported by other subordinate  
illustrations until the end of the chapter.  
Moreover the manner in which the true  
end of the state comes to light is not  
stated in antithesis to the false end re-  
jected, but is an incident of this elaborate  
treatment of the one false view, that the  
end is commercial intercourse: viz. *περὶ δ'*  
*ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐαίας διασπορεύειν*, § 8. There-  
upon the mention of the true end leads  
to its severance from some necessitous  
though indispensable conditions (*κοινωνία*  
*τόσον, περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις*, §§ 9—12); and  
this is followed by the formal definition of  
the true end of the state, § 13, from which

χρήσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους — καὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρ- (V)  
 χηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὥς  
 § 7 μῖας ἂν πολῖται πόλεως ἦσαν. εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθήκαι 11  
 περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν  
 40 καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας. ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ  
 1280 b τούτοις κοιναὶ καθεστᾶσιν, ἀλλ' ἕτεραι παρ' ἐκατέροις, οὔτε  
 τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ φροντίζουσιν ἄτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους,  
 οὐδ' ὅπως μηδεὶς ἀδικὸς ἔσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας μηδὲ  
 μοχθηρίαν ἔξει μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδική-  
 5 σουσιν ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας [πολιτικῆς] δια-  
 § 8 σκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ἥ καὶ φανερόν ὅτι

36 ἀλλήλους—] Thurot and Bonitz, to mark the anacoluthon. As far as the sense goes, the apodosis is at 1281 a 4 ff. διόπερ κτλ. || τυρρηνοὶ P<sup>4</sup> fr., τύραννοι P<sup>2.3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand) || 38 συνθήκαι] σωθῆναι P<sup>2.6</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand), apparently P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), as συνθῆκαι is written over an erasure || 39 καὶ omitted by P<sup>6</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and the 1st hand in P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> (added by a later hand in Q<sup>b</sup>) || 40 ἐπὶ πᾶσι Schneider transposing 1280 b 1 ἐκατέροις] ἐτέροις Ar. Koraes, perhaps rightly || 2 τοῦ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> fr., hence [τοῦ] Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> || ἕτεροι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps Γ || 4 ἔξειν P<sup>2.3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand) || ἀδικήσουσιν Morel, ἀδικήσωσιν Γ Π (including fr.) Ar. || 5 [δὲ] Koraes, as if the apodosis began here || πολιτικῆς omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (added after ἀρετῆς by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || διασκοποῦσιν P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, emended by p<sup>1</sup>), διακο- νοῦσιν Γ M<sup>s</sup> fr. || 6 εὐνομίας <πόλεως μίας> Bernays

the real measure of political rights is a deduction made in § 15. Were the digressions dismissed, and the anacoluthic period rewritten, it would perhaps run as follows: εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἔνεκεν (κοινωνοῦσι) ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εὖ ζῆν, μήτε συμμαχίας ἔνεκεν ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρήσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλὰ ζωῆς ἔνεκα τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους καὶ τῶν καλῶν πράξεων χάριν θετέον τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτους προσήκει πλείστον μετέχειν πόλεως. Bonitz *Studien* III. pp. 139—141 (105—107).

36 Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχ.] This maritime alliance between Carthage and the Etruscans, which was formed soon after the beginning of the sixth century, B. C., to drive out the Greeks and keep them away from the western half of the Mediterranean, is noticed by Herodotus I. 166, Mommsen I. p. 153 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (549)

37 οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα] Comp. c. 1 § 4, n. (435). SUSEM. (550)

ὡς] as it were, like ὥσπερ.

§ 7 38 συνθήκαι...σύμβολα...γραφαί] Usually συνθήκαι=a general term for

a treaty or convention, usually of a public nature between two states, but also all private covenants: σύμβολα=a special kind of contract, viz. international commercial treaties (so § 6): see Meier u. Schömann *Attisch. Process* p. 494 n. 49. Here συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων are commercial treaties in general: σύμβ. περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν=special articles which made provision against the infliction of damage, or established a system of compensation for mutual injury (Cope).

40 ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις κοιναὶ] magistrates common to them all appointed to secure these ends.

1280 b 2 τοῦ ποίους τινὰς κτλ] nor does the one state care what the character of the citizens of the other state should be.

3 τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας] those who come under the treaty.

4 ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως κτλ] The modest aim to which the modern state is restricted.

§ 8 6 εὐνομίας] "good government," the goal and end of all political science; *Nic. Eth.* III. 3. 11, 1112 b 14 (Eaton): οὔτε πολιτικὸς (βουλευέται) εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους. SUSEM. (551)

δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῇ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἱνομαζο- (V)  
 μένη πόλει, μὴ λόγου χάριν. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωρία συμ-  
 μαχία τῶν ἄλλων τίπῳ διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἀποθεν  
 10 συμμαχιῶν, καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καὶ, καθάπερ Ἴφη Λι-  
 κόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' οὐ  
 οὐχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας. ὅτι διὰ  
 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ συναγαγοί  
 τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἓν, ὥστε ἄπτεσθαι τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ  
 15 Κορινθίων τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις. οὐδ' εἰ πρὸς  
 ἀλλήλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο· καίτοι τοῦτο τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς

7 ἐπιμελὲς] ἐπιμέλειαν P<sup>1</sup>, ἐπιμε<sup>λ</sup> M<sup>1</sup> § 9 ἀποθε fr., ἀποθεν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1-3-4</sup> Q<sup>5</sup> T<sup>6</sup> Ald.  
 Bk.<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.) 10 συμμαχιῶν Conting., συμμάχων Γ II  
 (including fr.) Ar. Bk. 13 συνάγοι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

7 ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι κτλ] "the city which truly and not in mere pretence deserves the name must give its attention to virtue." See A. C. Bradley *Hellenica* pp. 193 f., 210 f.

8 γίνεται κτλ] For else the society is transformed into an alliance differing from all other leagues, whose members dwell apart, in locality alone: the law too is transformed into a compact and 'a guarantee of mutual rights' in the words of Lycophron, not calculated to make the citizens virtuous and just.

10 Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής] See Exc. II. to B. II. p. 333 and *Introd.* p. 35. To all appearance Lycophron belonged to the school of Gorgias (*n.* 448): perhaps, as v. Wilamowitz conjectures *Herwerden* XIV. p. 173, he was the same as the erotic poet Lycophronides (Bergk *Poet. Gr.* III.<sup>4</sup> p. 633 f.). He is specially known to us elsewhere only as the composer of an eulogy on the lyre, and as maintaining that one thing cannot at the same time be many and that therefore every combination of a predicate with the subject by means of the copula is inadmissible: also that nobility is only an imaginary good. Comp. Vahlen *The Sophist Lycophron in Rhein. Mus.* XXI. 1865, p. 143 ff., Zeller *Pre-Socratics* vol. II. pp. 425, 477 Kög. fr. A sophist was originally any man of intellectual importance, who also made it his profession to acquire education and knowledge and impart them to others: hence the seven sages are also called the seven sophists. At a later time, after the age of Pericles, the name was given in a narrower sense to paid professional teachers of rhetoric and other

departments of an encyclopaedic education. They delivered single lectures and discourses of an instructive or amusing kind (ἐπιδείξεις), charging a fee for admission, or perhaps published them in writing; in some cases they appeared as experts in argument. In this sense the word occurs here. At the same time it received the odious connotation in which we exclusively use it at the present day, in consequence of the many subtleties, the pettifoggish quibbles, and paradoxes in which this class of people was often involved; although the movement towards freethinking\* and critical scepticism, which they originated, and their bold innovations had much to justify them, and were in part of epoch-making importance. Cp. *n.* (31) on I. 3 § 4. SUSEM. (352)

See Cope in the *Journal of Sacred and Classical Philology* vol. II. pp. 140—143; also his note on *Rhet.* III. 3. 1.

§ 9 It will be remembered that Corinth and Argos were for a short time, 393—387 B.C., united ostensibly as one state, to the intense indignation of the philo-Laconian party. See Xen. *Hellen.* IV. 4 § 6 ἀισθανόμενοι δὲ ἀφανισσομένην τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ καὶ ὅπου ἀναστῆσαι καὶ Ἄργος ἀπὲρ Κορίνθου τὴν πατρίδα αὐτοῖς ἀναμίσγεσθαι: V. 1 § 34, § 36.

16 ἐπιγαμίας] Usually a lawful marriage could only be contracted between two citizens of the same Greek state: but the privilege was occasionally granted to individual strangers as to an alien community as a whole; and special treaties

\* [A negative 'enlightenment' or 'illumination,' Aufklärung.]

- § 10 πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων ἐστίν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' εἴ τινες οἰκοῖεν (V)  
χωρὶς μὲν, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἄπωθεν ὥστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν,  
ἀλλ' εἶησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν περὶ  
20 τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἴη τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς  
ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλήθος εἰεν  
μύριοι, μὴ μέντοι κοινωνοῖεν ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων,  
§ 11 οἷον ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδ' οὕτω πω πόλεις. διὰ 13  
τίνα δὴ ποτ' αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς  
25 κοινωνίας. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἕκαστος  
μέντοι χρῶτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς  
ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὔσης, βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικούντας μόνον,  
οὐδ' οὕτως ἂν εἶναι δόξειε πόλεις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἴ-  
§ 12 περ ὁμοίως ὁμιλοῖεν συνελθόντες καὶ χωρὶς. φανερόν τοίνυν  
30 ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς  
αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγ-  
καῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων

18 ἄπωθεν fr. Bk.<sup>2</sup>, ἄποθεν II Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 19 εἶησαν P<sup>1</sup> Ar., εἰ ἦσαν Γ M<sup>s</sup> II<sup>2</sup> || 20 εἰ omitted by II<sup>3</sup> || 22 μύριοι Ald. Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 23 πω Ar. (apparently) and Bk., πως possibly Γ (*quidem* William), που II (including fr.) Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 30 ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι II<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.

secured the right of intermarriage between different cities: Schömann pp. 101, 306, 356 Eng. tr. How far it was prohibited between members of the ruling and subordinate families when such a distinction was made within the limits of the same community, is not known. The Bacchiadae of Corinth (II. 12. 8 n. 420) married almost exclusively amongst themselves, Herod. v. 92; and the prohibition of intermarriage with the former ruling families of Samos, after the popular insurrection in 412, forms an especially odious measure, Thuc. VIII. 21 (Eaton). The two royal families at Sparta seem never to have intermarried. SUSEM. (553)

τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς π. κοινωνημάτων] 'one of the means of combination peculiar to cities.'

§ 10 17 οὐδ' εἴ τινες οἰκοῖεν χωρὶς] Aristotle does not mean that civil society is not in itself quite possible between several contiguous villages and hamlets, without the inhabitants being concentrated into one city: c. 3 §§ 3, 4 *iii.* (459, 460). In fact Sparta itself consisted of five such neighbouring villages, so close together, however, that as distinct from the district around them they were designated the 'city.' This was, it is true, an isolated and abnormal phenomenon: see Schö-

mann p. 123, p. 207 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (554) "Is not Aristotle taking an imaginary case: the elements of society (such as γεωργὸς) which are necessary πρὸς τὸ ζῆν μόνον i. living apart but exchanging products (μεταδόσεις) ii. living together and connected by a defensive league, § 11?" (Wyse).

20 οἷον εἰ κτλ] That is, supposing they belonged to these different crafts without which the state could not exist at all: see IV(VII). c. 8. SUSEM. (555)

21 καὶ τὸ πλήθος εἰεν μύριοι] i.e. not at all too many even for a 'city' according to Greek ideas, as distinguished from a race or tribe: cp. IV(VII). c. 4, also *n.* (11); and II. 6 §§ 4—6, 9 §§ 15—17, *iii.* 198—201, 306, 307, 309, 311. SUSEM. (556)

§ 11 24 διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς κοινωνίας] because they did not live near enough to each other.

25 ἕκαστος μέντοι κτλ] Each making his own house his 'castle.'

29 συνελθόντες καὶ χωρὶς] after their union and when they lived apart.

§ 12 φανερόν τοίνυν κτλ] Comp. c. I § 3 *n.* (434 b). SUSEM. (557)

32 οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων κτλ] "yet not even if all these conditions are present is it then actually (ἤδη) a city, but (a city is) the union of families and clans

τούτων ἀπάντων ἥδη πόλιν, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρ-  
3 κους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἓνα κατοικοῦν-  
των τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διὸ κηδεῖαί τ' ἐγέ-  
ροντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ δια-  
γωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ  
συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν,  
4 ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν  
κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους <χάριν>. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν,  
ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πρῶ-  
τερον [χάριν] θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ  
5 τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύ-  
την κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλεῖον ἢ τοῖς  
κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μείζοσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν  
πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίστοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλούτον ὑπερέχουσι  
κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένοις.

0 ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀμφισβητοῦν-  
34 τελείας II<sup>2</sup> Bk. 35 καὶ] η fr. 38 τῷ συζῆν Koraes 40 δὲ ἡ αἰ δὲ  
Susem., δὲ ἡ I<sup>2</sup> II (including fr.) Ar. Bk.

1281 a 1 <χάριν> Scaliger, ἐκεῖν Koraes, see next note 3 χάριν omitted by  
I<sup>1</sup> (added in I<sup>1</sup> by corr.<sup>1</sup>), [χάριν] Scaliger. This justifies the insertion of χάριν in  
line 1, rather than ἐκεῖν 5 τοῦτοις omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and I<sup>4</sup> (1st hand)

in noble living, to the end that they may  
attain a perfect and independent life.  
This however will not be secured unless  
they dwell in the same place and have  
the right of intermarriage."

§ 13 36 κηδεῖαι = ties of affinity.  
37 φρατρίαι] See II. 3 § 5. 5 § 17,  
VII(VI). 4 § 19 *nn.* (141, 169, 1427 b).  
Anomalous the Greeks these "brother-  
kinds" were [or appeared to be] the next  
subdivision of the old tribal stocks (φύλαι)  
having a number of clans (γένεα) included  
under them. SUSEM. (558)

θυσίαι] Clubs which met to sacrifice.  
διαγωγαι] Cp. IV(VII). 15. 2. *n.* (921).  
SUSEM. (558 b) 'The recreations of a  
life in common which depend on φύλα'  
would include much, e.g. the commerce  
of disciple and friend as well as the plea-  
sures of social reunions (Wyse).

38 τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον κτλ] Comp. *Nic.*  
*eth.* VIII. 3 § 5 1150 b 4, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν  
ἐστὶν φύλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν § 3. 1157 b 19,  
6 § 4, 1158 a 23, IX. 9 § 10 1170 b 10, 10  
§ 4 1171 a 2, 12 § 1 1179 b 20 (Eaton).  
SUSEM. (559)

40 ταῦτα] all these minor associations,  
ἐξῆται, φρατρίαι, &c., are necessary means

to the end, and that is why they came into  
existence (36 δὲ). "This certainly looks  
as if to Aristotle the φρατρίαι were some-  
thing posterior to the origin of a πόλις by  
συνοικίσαις of κώμαι" (Wyse).

§ 14 πόλις δὲ κτλ] "Therefore a  
city is the union of clans and villages (to  
attain) a perfect and independent life."  
Ridgeway defends the double genitive:  
"the fellowship of clans and villages in a  
perfect and independent life."

1281 a 1 τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους] Cp.  
I. 2 § 8 *nn.* (20 b, 21): further *nn.* (459,  
460) on III. 3 § 3: also III. 1 § 12 *n.*  
(447): IV(VII). 4 § 11 *n.* (579), 5 § 1 *n.*  
(764), 8 § 8 *n.* (804) and *n.* (136). SUSEM.  
(560)

2 τῶν καλῶν...πράξεων] With re-  
gard to this conclusion, see *n.* (708) on  
IV(VII). 1 § 11. SUSEM. (560 b)

§ 15 The citizens have a stake in the  
city in proportion to their contributions  
towards civic fellowship, in the sense just  
given to the term. Superior contribu-  
tions to other objects (wealth, birth) are  
of no avail to confer a greater share of  
civic rights.

c, 10 *Where ought sovereignty to reside?*

10 τες μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσι, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέ- (V  
νων· ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν, τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. VI  
ἢ γάρ τοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἢ  
τὸν βέλτιστον ἓνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα  
ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. τί γάρ; ἂν οἱ πένητες διὰ τὸ  
15 πλείους εἶναι διανεμῶνται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἄδικον  
§ 2 ἐστίν, ἔδοξε γὰρ [ἂν] νῆ Δία τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως· τὴν οὖν ἀδι-  
κίαν τί δεῖ λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην; πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων,  
οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἂν διανεμῶνται, φανερόν ὅτι  
φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ  
20 ἔχον αὐτήν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν· ὥστε δῆλον  
§ 3 ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι δίκαιον. ἔτι καὶ 2  
τὰς πράξεις ὅσας ὁ τύραννος ἔπραξεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσας  
δικαίας· βιάζεται γὰρ ὢν κρείττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλῆ-  
θος τοὺς πλουσίους· ἀλλ' ἄρα τοὺς ἐλάττους ἄρχειν δίκαιον  
25 καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἂν οὖν κακῆνοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι καὶ διαρ-  
πάζωσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἀφαιρῶνται τοῦ πλῆθους, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ  
§ 4 δίκαιον; καὶ θάτερον ἄρα. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ὅτι φαῦλα πάντα  
καὶ οὐ δίκαια, φανερόν· ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄρχειν δεῖ 3

13 [ἢ τύραννον] or change to ἢ τὸν νόμον Spengel (not bad) || 16 ἂν omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Ar. Bk. || 17 δεῖ] χρῆ Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || πάλιν.....ληφθέντων corrupt according to Oncken: see Comm. n. (561) || 19 φθερεῖ Γ || 24 ἄρα Π<sup>2</sup> and M<sup>s</sup> (1st hand) || δίκαιον ἄρχειν Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 25 ταῦτα Vettori and Lambin in their translations, ταῦτα Γ Π Ar. || 27 πάντα φαῦλα Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 28 δίκαια] σπουδαῖα Π<sup>1</sup>

In particular, (c. 11) *Should it rest with the Many or the Few?*

The modern doctrine of sovereignty is best expounded by Austin *Jurisprudence* Lect. VI. pp. 226—255, ed. 3.

§ 1 12 ἢ γάρ τοι κτλ.] It must either be (1) the masses, or (2) the wealthy, or (3) the virtuous, or (4) the one preeminently good man, or (5) a despot.

16 ἔδοξε γὰρ κτλ.] Ironical. "It is not unjust, for, by heaven, it was justly passed by the supreme body. Then what (but this) deserves to be called the utmost injustice?"

§ 2 17 πάλιν τε κτλ.] And further, after all has been taken away, if the majority begin afresh to distribute amongst them the property of the minority, manifestly they destroy the city. SUSEM. (561) The principle is self-destructive.

19 οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρετῇ] Cp. II. 2 § 7 n. (135 b). On the contrary, the proper excellence of any object is that which

qualifies it for the fulfilment of its end or the performance of its special function: *Nic. Eth.* II. 6. 1, 1106 a 15 (Congreve): whereas, its vice is that which corrupts its true principle, ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς *N. E.* VI. 5. 6, 1140 b 19 (Eaton). SUSEM. (561 b) Cp. *Pl. Rep.* X. 608 E: if moral evil, which is *the* evil of the soul, does not destroy it, then it is indestructible.

20 οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον...φθαρτικόν.] Comp. I. 2. 16 n. (28 c), II. 2. 4 n. (133), III. 12 § 1 n. (583), § 9, 13 § 3 n. (590). SUSEM. (562)

§ 3 24 ἀλλ' ἄρα κτλ.] Passing to (2), the claims of the wealthy few.

27 καὶ θάτερον ἄρα.] (If so,) then so also is the conduct of the majority justified.

§ 4 The claim of the virtuous (ἐπιεικεῖς) is very feebly opposed as involving the disfranchisement of all who are not virtuous. This is implied in the very name of aristocracy διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν.

καὶ κυρίους εἶναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους (VI)  
 3 ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρ-  
 χαῖς· τιμὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ὀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δ'  
 5 αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἀλλ'  
 ἓνα τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν βέλτιον; ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτο ὀλι-  
 7 γαρχικώτερον· οἱ γὰρ ἄτιμοι πλείους. ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις ἂν  
 9 τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα  
 πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον, ἂν οὖν ἡ νό-  
 11 μος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικὸς δὲ ἡ δημοκρατικὸς, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν  
 ἠπορημένων; συμβήσεται γὰρ ἰμοίως τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον.

11 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστω τις ἕτερος λόγος· ὅτι  
 13 δὲ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλήθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν  
 15 ὀλίγους δέ, δόξειεν ἂν λίσσθαι καὶ τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν,  
 17 τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀλήθειαν. τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς, ὧν ἕκαστός ἐστιν  
 19 οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ, ὅμως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελ-  
 21 τίους ἐκείνων, οὐχ ὥς ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὥς σίμπαντας, οἷον τὰ  
 23 συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων·  
 25 πολλῶν γὰρ ἄντων ἕκαστον μόνον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρο-

35 ἔχοντα..... 36 ψυχὴν after 36 φαῦλον P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. 37 διοίση P<sup>1</sup> Q<sup>1</sup> T<sup>1</sup> 41 λίσσθαι..... 42 ἀλήθειαν. That the text is unsound was seen by Cameronius, λίσσθαι <δεῖν>? Schneider, [λίσσθαι] Goutling, [λίσσθαι καὶ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> (λίσσθαι a variant on ἀλήθειαν), τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ καὶ λίσσθαι κατ' ἀλήθειαν Thucot, <οὐχ ἱκανῶς> λίσσθαι Shute || τιν' ] τινος Γ M<sup>1</sup> || ἔχει M<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || εἴπο-  
 19 ρίαν Koraes, accepted by Bernays and by Susem.<sup>2</sup> as less violent than the other proposals, cp. *De caelo* II. 12 § 1, 291 b 27, εἴ τις διὰ τὸ φιλοσοφίᾳ διψῇ καὶ μακρὰς εὐνοίας ἀγαπᾷ περὶ ὧν τὰς μελίστας ἔχουσιν ἀπορίαν.

1281 b 1 οὐ P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup> Ar., δ P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>1</sup> T<sup>1</sup>

31 ἀρχόντων δ' αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ] This is the reason why the same feature in Plato's government is called dangerous (*ἐπισημαίνε*), though unavoidable, II. 5 § 25 n. (181).

§ 5 Similarly the claim of the one pre-eminent citizen (the alternative form of Aristotle's 'best state') is reduced to a case similar to the last, which leaves a still larger number disfranchised.

34 ἀλλ' ἴσως κτλ] Cp. c. 15 § 4, c. 16 § 5 ff. n. (641). SUSEM. (562 b)

36 φαῦλον] sc. εἶναι predicate, "that a human being, whoever he may be, with human passions in his soul should be supreme instead of the law, is a mistake."

ἀν οὖν κτλ] The law itself may have a bias in favour of oligarchy or democracy; and if so, the fault remains uncorrected.

c. 11 § 1 39 ἴστω τις ἕτερος λόγος] cf. 11—17 and II. VI(IV), II. XI(VI),

comp. *Introd.* p. 43. SUSEM. (563)

40 μᾶλλον τὸ πλήθος ἢ κτλ] This is a defence of the claims of (1) as against (3). In c. 15 the claims of πλήθος and βέλτερος are compared.

§ 2 42 τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς κτλ] Comp. c. 15 § 7 n. (646); also c. 11 § 9 below, Thuc. VI. 18. 6 δεῦρ δὲ (νομίσαι) τὸ τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀνρῶν ἂν συγκραθῇ μάλιστ' ὅς ἐσθλόν, with Herod. III. 80 1. βλ. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πολλῷ ἐστὶ τὰ πάντα (Eaton). SUSEM. (564)

This is the one distinctively original thought of Aristotle, foreshadowed in his definition of citizen, c. 1 § 8.

1281 b 2 οὐχ ὥς ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὥς σίμπαντας] See II. 3 § 2 and note.

3 συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα] 'public dinners' to which many contribute.

4 πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων κτλ] Cp. c. 4

5 νήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ὥσπερ ἓνα ἄνθρωπον (V)  
 τὸ πλῆθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντ'  
 § 3 αἰσθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ  
 καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἔργα  
 9 καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μῦθον, πάντα δὲ

5 καὶ <ὥς> or καὶ <ὥσπερ>? Susem., following Thurot hesitatingly || συνελθόντας P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>2-3</sup> || [ὥσπερ] ἓνα Thurot || 7 τὴν] περὶ τὴν M<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> and perhaps Γ || 8 κρίης Γ M<sup>s</sup> (et *kries melius* William)

§ 7 n. (474): also IV(VII). I §§ 10, 11 n. (703). SUSEM. (565)

Hobbes' Leviathan, the body politic, is similarly an *artificial* body.

5 καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων...7 διάνοιαν] Trendelenburg in his "Law of Nature" (*Naturrecht* p. 463) rightly objects that 'in works of art man is essentially a free, unprejudiced spectator: in politics he is a partizan fellow-actor. There is a fallacy in an argument from analogy which draws an inference from the *universal* common to all the cases compared, when in fact it is the *difference* between them which is decisive.' But he proceeds to argue, that the comparison leaves out of account the desires and passions which in the case of the multitude dull the intelligence and pervert the will; that the truth brought together by their collective wisdom is materially prejudiced and hampered by the falsehood collected along with it; that the supplementing of the truth from various sides is hindered or frustrated by the resistance of errors and self-seeking. In reply to this we must inquire, whether when the public at large judges and enjoys works of art, only healthy popular inclinations and instincts are brought together: whether they are not blended with others which are unhealthy and misleading. Aristotle at least is of this latter opinion V(VIII). 6 § 16 n. (1080), 7 § 7 n. (1097), and certainly he is right. Further is there no fallacy in the criticism which overlooks the true analogy in the difference?

On the other side it is not to be forgotten, that where our own interest is concerned, although passion no doubt is inflamed and the critic is converted into a judge in his own cause (c. 9 §§ 1, 2, 16 §§ 8, 9), yet at the same time the intellect is sharpened: thus in accordance with the analogies applied in § 14, (whose correctness even Trendelenburg has not questioned,) in practical questions, where his own weal and woe are at stake, the

uneducated man approximates to an expert still more closely than in art criticism. If it were not so, art critics might be appointed by the popular vote, but not even the most indirect choice of its representatives should be left to the people, although our procedure is now universally the reverse and we believe it to be justified. Trendelenburg's objections (p. 147) to too numerous executive or decreeing assemblies are quite in point. But he forgets that in §§ 8, 9 Aristotle, if we take him literally, only allows the popular assembly to elect the officials: and that in any case (see Exc. IV. to B. II. n. 388) he restricts the decision of the people to a few definite questions. Had he been acquainted with the representative system, he would have judged more correctly: he would then most likely have referred to the council all matters which call for a full deliberation and responsible decision rather than a vote. That not merely capacity but prejudice also and ignorance are collected in the popular assembly is moreover expressly laid down by Aristotle in §§ 6, 7 (though Trendelenburg has altogether overlooked this); but he holds that the danger arising from the passions of individual sovereigns is the greater of the two (15 § 8 n. 647), whereas in a capable nation he maintains that the force of truth will finally triumph over falsehood. This is the thought upon which, as we know, his conception of rhetoric is based: see Zeller II. ii. 755. It may be that this is not capable of strict demonstration, but to a large extent remains merely a matter of belief. Yet this much is certain, that whoever does not cherish this belief has lost faith in humanity generally. See also n. (577) on II § 19. SUSEM. (565 b)

§ 3 8 κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ] Both music and poetry are well able to illustrate this maxim. The present century is rich in good work which has won its way in spite of the critics.

πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν  
 ἕκαστοι τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλοὺς  
 φασὶ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνη-  
 χθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἓν, (ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε  
 κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τουτοῖ μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐτέ-  
 ρου δέ τινος ἕτερον μόριον.) εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα δῆμον  
 καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος ἐνδέχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν διαφο-  
 ρὰν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους σπουδαίους, ἁδελον,  
 ἴσως δὲ νῆ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς  
 ἐνιοὶ τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν); ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν πλῆθος  
 οὐδὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότε-  
 ρον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἂν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ τὴν  
 ἐχομένην αὐτῆς, τίτων δὲ κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους  
 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν ὅσοι μῆτε  
 πλούσιοι μῆτε ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδέν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
 μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές (διὰ  
 τὴν γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη· τὰ δ'

11 ἕκαστοι Thurot, ἐκάστου F H Ar. Bk. 12 ὥσπερ] ὥστε Vettori in the margin  
 of his Munich copy 13 [καὶ τῶν μὴ.....12 φασί] Oncken 13 κεχωρισμένων F  
 Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, καὶ χωρισμένων M<sup>3</sup> 14 γε<οὐδὲν κωλύει>? Spengel 14 ἔχει P<sup>4</sup> and  
 perhaps Ar. <ἐστιν ἔχειν>? Susem., but no change is needed 15 περὶ ἐπὶ Syl-  
 burg, perhaps rightly 16 ἐνίων Spengel, which would also do, ἐνίοις Schneider (bad)  
 17 24 μῆτε πλούσιοι omitted by F M<sup>3</sup> 25 μηδὲ ἐν? Susem., μηδὲ ἐν P<sup>4</sup>, μὴ δὲ ἐν  
 M<sup>3</sup>, μηδὲν P<sup>2,3</sup>, μηδ' ἐν P<sup>4</sup>, μηδὲν Ald. 27 ἀνάγκη Rassow, ἀν' F H Bk. Schnei-  
 der first saw the text to be unsound and violently changed ἀδικεῖν into ἀδικεῖσθαι and  
 ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτοὺς into ἀμαρτάνουσιν

§ 4 12 τὰ γεγραμμένα κτλ] Comp.  
 what Socrates says, Xen. *Memor.* III. 10.  
 2 καὶ μὴν τὰ γε καλὰ εἶδη ἀφομοιοῦντες,  
 ἐπειδὴ οὐ ῥῆδιον ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπῳ περιεχεῖν  
 ἀνέκτα πάντα ἔχοντι, ἐκ πολλῶν συνά-  
 γασται, τὰ ἐξ ἑκάστου κάλλιστα, οὕτως ὅλα  
 τὰ σπουδαῖα καλὰ ποιεῖτε φαίνεσθαι. Zeuxis  
 adopted this procedure, when he paint-  
 ed his Helen. To make it a masterpiece  
 of female beauty, he took as models the  
 five most beautiful maidens in the city  
 in order that he might unite in the pic-  
 ture the special excellences of each; see  
 Brown *History of the Greek artists* II.  
 pp. 80, 88 (Vahlen). Comp. n. (64) in  
 Samml's edition of the *Poetics*, c. 6 § 11.  
 SUSEM. (366)

13 κεχωρισμένων γε] With the brief  
 gen. abs. comp. N. E. VIII. 13 § 2 ἀμεινω-  
 μένων, 15 § 4 ἀντιθέλλωνται.

§ 5 16 τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν π. πρὸς

τοὺς ὀλ.] the difference between the  
 many and the few. So διίστασι, Nic.  
*Eth.* IX. 3. 4.

18 ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς...ἀρμόσει λόγος] For  
 the same argument would apply to the  
 animals.

19 τί διαφέρουσιν] Comp. 1. 5 § 8 n.  
 (43), and n. (54) on 1. 6 § 8. SUSEM. (367)

20 περὶ τὴν πλῆθος] in a certain (given)  
 population.

§ 6 21 τὴν πρότερον εἰρημ. ἀπ.]  
 Naturally: who is to possess the sovereign  
 power? Comp. also § 19 n. (578). SUSEM.  
 (368)

23 τίτων δὲ κυρίους κτλ] This next  
 problem (§§ 6—14) is: how far does the  
 sovereignty of the freemen, the mass of  
 the citizens, extend? This was provi-  
 sionally decided c. 1 § 8.

§ 7 27 ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη] There should  
 be an independent causal sentence here.

ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτούς). τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδεμιῶν ἀρχῶν (V  
 29 φοβερόν (ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχῳσι, <sup>am.</sup>  
 § 8 πολέμιων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην). λεί- <sup>hmn</sup>  
 πεται δὴ τοῦ βουλευέσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς.  
 διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν τάττου- <sup>ι</sup>  
 σιν ἐπὶ τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνas τῶν ἀρχόν-  
 § 9 των, (ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας) οὐκ ἐῷσιν. πάντες μὲν γὰρ  
 35 ἔχουσιν συνελθόντες ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς  
 βελτίοσι τὰς πόλεις ὠφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἡ (μὴ καθαρὰ τροφή <sup>αὐτῶν</sup>  
 μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλί-  
 § 10 γης· χωρὶς δ' ἕκαστος περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἀτελὴς ἐστίν. ἔχει

28 μηδεμιῶν ἀρχῶν Böcker, μηδὲ μετέχειν Γ II Bk. || 38 ἀτελὴς περὶ τὸ κρίνειν  
 II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

something standing to τὸ μὲν μετέχειν  
 ...οὐκ ἀσφαλές as the clause ὅταν γὰρ  
 ...ὑπάρχῳσι, πολέμιων ... ταύτην below  
 stands to τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι...φοβερόν.  
 With Rassow's conjecture, ἀνάγκη (ἐστὶ),  
 there is such a verb; without it there is  
 no verb on which the infinitives ἀδικεῖν  
 ἂν and ἀμαρτάνειν can depend.

29 ὅταν γὰρ κτλ.] Cp. VII(VI). 5  
 § 4 n. (1434). SUSEM. (568 b)

This is presumably the sequel of the  
 objections raised in c. 10 §§ 4, 5. The  
 further development would be in the  
 form of Plato's well-known simile of  
 the drones in his criticism of oligarchy  
*Rep.* VIII. 551 D, 552 A—E, 555 D.

§ 8 It remains for them to take part  
 in deliberation and in trials.

32 διόπερ καὶ Σόλων ... 34 ἐῷσιν]  
 Comp. II. 12 § 3 (Exc. v. p. 350 f.), § 5 nn.  
 (412, 413): VI(IV) II § 19 n. (1303), VII  
 (VI). 4 § 4 n. (1415). Such a constitu-  
 tional restriction is not admissible, cer-  
 tainly, for the citizens of the ideal state  
 who have the best nature and education  
 and are in the possession of a fixed amount  
 of land. There suitable elections of offi-  
 cials must be assumed without such a  
 restriction; there all the citizens have  
 equal rights (cp. nn. 440, 885). But  
 nevertheless, as was inferred in the *Introd.*  
 p. 54 from II. 11 § 6 (cp. n. 388), there  
 can be hardly any doubt that even in the  
 ideal state Aristotle intends to restrict  
 the activity of the whole body of full citi-  
 zens to the election of the officials, to-  
 gether with the final decision upon legisla-  
 tion as well as upon questions of war and  
 peace and treaties with foreign states.  
 Comp. III. 4 § 5, 6 § 1 n. (471). SUSEM.  
 (569)

*unrealized to judge*

33 'set them over,' i.e. 'assign to  
 them' the election of the magistrates and  
 the scrutiny of their conduct (when they  
 retire from office).

ἐπὶ after τάττουσιν. Other construc-  
 tions are εἰς, κατὰ and ἐπὶ with dat.

§ 9 35 ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν] 'sufficiently  
 clear sight' or 'enough discrimination.'  
 The terms αἰσθησις and αἰσθάνεσθαι in  
 Aristotle often go beyond the notion of  
 mere sensation and sense perception to  
 which Plato in the *Theaetetus* restricts  
 them. Thus αἰσθάνεσθαι = to understand  
 another's command in I 5 § 9 (cp. n. 45  
 b). Like Plato himself at an earlier time,  
*Phaedr.* 271 E, even where the terms ex-  
 press that notion, Aristotle always has  
 in view the discrimination of the sensible  
 individual by sense, the *judgment* of  
 perception, so that he calls it a discrimi-  
 nating and judging faculty (δύναμις κριτική,  
 cp. n. 497): *Anal. Post.* II. 15 § 5, 99  
 b 35, *De Anima* III. 9. 1, 432 a 15.  
 Thence by a very natural transition he  
 applies these terms to denote the dis-  
 crimination of the individual and par-  
 ticular generally, and the decision as to  
 what is right and wrong in relation there-  
 to in practical life:—an instinctive pro-  
 cess, so to speak, or at all events one  
 which rests merely upon observation and  
 experience, *Nic. Eth.* II. 9. 8, 1109 b 20,  
 IV. 5, 13, 1126 b 3 ff. SUSEM. (570)

36 καθάπερ ἡ μὴ κ.] "as innutritious  
 food when mixed with the nutritious  
 makes the whole a better diet than the  
 scanty supply" (of nourishment alone),  
 § 2 n. (564). SUSEM. (571)

38 χωρὶς] alone, by himself.

ἀτελὴς] Properly 'immature' or 'un-  
 developed' or 'incomplete': thence 'un-

ὁ ἡ τάξις αὕτη τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρώτην μὲν ὅτι (17)  
δόξειεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρίναι τίς ὀρθῶς ἰατρεύειν,  
οὔτερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἐν γὰρ τὸν κἀμνητα τῆς  
νύσου τῆς παρούσης· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἰατρός. ὁμοίως δὲ  
τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. ὥσπερ οὖν  
ἰατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνas ἐν ἰατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλ-  
λους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἰατρός δὲ ὁ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἄρχι-  
τεκτονικός καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσι-  
γὰρ τινες καὶ τοιοῦτοι περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀπα-  
δίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίναι οὐδὲν ἦττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς  
εἰδόσιν. ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν δό-  
ξειεν ἔχειν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλέσθαι ὀρθῶς τῶν εἰδό-  
των ἔργον ἐστίν, οἷον γεωμέτρην τε τῶν γεωμετρικῶν καὶ  
κυβερνήτην τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἐνίων ἔργων  
καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλ' οὔ τι τῶν  
εἰδόντων γε μᾶλλον. ὥστε κατὰ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ

42 ὁ omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Bk. § καὶ added after ὁμοίως δὲ by I<sup>1</sup> M<sup>1</sup>

1281 a 5 τοιοῦτοι καὶ II<sup>2</sup> Bk., καὶ untranslated by William, Ar. § 7 καὶ omitted  
by II<sup>1</sup>, hence [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> § 9 τε omitted by I<sup>1-4</sup> § 10 [περὶ] or [περὶ ἐνίων]  
Spengel (the former perhaps right) § 11 καὶ before τῶν ἰδιωτῶν omitted by I<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>2</sup> T<sup>2</sup>  
οὐ τοι Koraes Bk.<sup>2</sup>

qualified to judge.' The word was used  
in I. 13 § 7, § 11, to characterize the  
boy's powers of reflection and 'virtue'  
(Congreve). Cp. also *n.* (875) on IV(VII).  
13. 5. SUSEM. (572)

§ 10 A difficulty: only the physician  
can properly judge a course of treatment  
and pronounce with authority that it has  
been successful.

39 ἀπορίαν πρώτην] 'Certainly this  
mode of ordering the constitution involves  
a difficulty—in the first place that &c.';  
followed § 15 by ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐχονμένη  
καύτης; cp. *Analysis* p. 111. SUSEM. (573)

1282 a 1 ὥσπερ οὖν κτλ] Compare  
Plato's illustration of the physician tried  
by boys at the accusation of the cook,  
*Gorg.* 321 B.

§ 11 3 ἰατρός δὲ κτλ] 'Physician'  
may mean (1) the practitioner in ordi-  
nary cases, (2) the scientific student who  
has mastered the whole field of medicine,  
(3) the educated layman who has ac-  
quired his knowledge of medicine only  
out of scientific interests generally.

§ 11 5 τινες καὶ τοιοῦτοι κτλ] 'For there  
are even some such' viz. amateurs 'in  
nearly all the arts, and we assign the

right to judge to the educated layman as  
much as to the profession.' With the  
order of II<sup>2</sup>, τοιοῦτοι καὶ, Bernays and others  
must translate "in almost all other arts  
as well," which is a misplaced emphasis;  
Camerarius compares the first words of  
the treatise *De partibus animal.* περὶ  
πάσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον... ὅσοι φαί-  
νονται τρόποι τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν  
ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει  
προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' ἄλῃ παιδείαν τινά.  
πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ τρόπον τὸ  
δύνασθαι κρίναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ  
καλῶς ἀποδιδῶσιν ὁ λέγων. SUSEM. (573 b)

§ 12 7 ἔπατα further, not answer-  
ing πρώτην; but rather completing so  
much of the problem as is expressed in  
§§ 10, 11 viz. περὶ τὴν κρίσιν.

περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν] in the election of  
magistrates, § 13 ἀρχαιρεσίῳ.

8 τῶν εἰδόντων] experts in statecraft,  
answering to the geometers and pilots,  
Plato *Politicus* 301 A, B, ὁ ἐπιστήμων.

11 If περὶ is retained, μετέχουσι  
μετέχουσι τῆς αἵρεσεως virtually; 'have a  
voice in the election.'

§ 13 13 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον] Cf.  
II. 3 § 1 n.

ἂν εἴη τὸ πλῆθος ποιητέον κύριον οὔτε τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν οὔτε (VI)  
 § 14 τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς 10  
 15 διὰ τε τὸν πάλαι λόγον, ἂν ᾗ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδρα-  
 ποδῶδες (ἔσται γὰρ ἕκαστος μὲν χείρων κριτῆς τῶν εἰδόντων,  
 ἅπαντες δὲ συνελθόντες ἢ βελτίους ἢ οὐ χείρους), καὶ ὅτι  
 περὶ ἐνίων οὔτε μόνον ὁ ποιήσας οὐτ' ἄριστ' ἂν κρίνειεν,  
 20 οἰκίαν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γινῶναι τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλ-  
 τιον ὁ χρώμενος αὐτῇ κρινεῖ (χρήται δ' ὁ οἰκονόμος), καὶ  
 πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονος, καὶ θοίνην ὁ δαιτυμὼν ἀλλ'  
 § 15 οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δόξειεν  
 τις ἂν οὕτω λύειν ἱκανῶς. ἄλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης.  
 25 δοκεῖ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἶναι κυρίους τοὺς φαύ- 11  
 λους τῶν ἐπιεικῶν, αἱ δ' εὐθυναὶ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰρέ-  
 σεις εἰσὶ μέγιστα. ἃς ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται,  
 τοῖς δήμοις ἀποδιδόασιν. ἢ γὰρ ἐκκλησία κυρία πάντων  
 § 16 τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. καίτοι τῆς μὲν ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσι καὶ  
 30 βουλευούσι καὶ δικάζουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς  
 τυχούσης ἡλικίας, ταμιεύουσι δὲ καὶ στρατηγοῦσι καὶ τὰς  
 μεγίστας ἀρχὰς ἀρχουσιν ἀπὸ μειζόνων. ὁμοίως δὴ τις ἂν 12

17 ἢ before βελτίους omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [ᾗ] Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> || 18 μόνος Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> (*solus*  
 William, Ar.) || 21 αὐτῇ] αὐτοῦ P<sup>2.3</sup> Ald. || κρίνει Π<sup>1</sup> Ar. || 26 εὐθύναι M<sup>s</sup> Ald.  
 || 27 μέγιστα Γ, μέγισται P<sup>1.4</sup>, μέγιστοι M<sup>s</sup>, μέγιστον P<sup>2.3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. || ἐν  
 omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 30 διδάσκουσι P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), γρ. δικάζουσιν in the margin of P<sup>4</sup> ||  
 32 ἀρχουσιν M<sup>s</sup>, ἔχουσιν Π<sup>2</sup> || μεγάλων Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || δὲ Spengel, δὴ Γ Π Bk.

13 κύριον οὔτε...οὔτε] The two *minima*  
 without which it is reduced to virtual  
 dependence on its rulers (δοῦλος ἂν εἴη  
 καὶ πολέμιος II. 12. 5).

§ 14 The reply to the objection of  
 § 10: (a) the collective judgment of a free  
 people may be even superior to that of  
 the experts: (b) the users of the laws  
 may be better practical judges of them  
 than their makers: the expert's know-  
 ledge is not always an advantage.

15 διὰ τὸν πάλαι λόγον] for the rea-  
 son stated above, §§ 2—4. πάλαι as in  
 § 20; so II. 4 § 10.

μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες] answering to  
 περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον of § 5.

17 καὶ ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων κτλ] The user  
 may be in a higher position than the  
 maker: c. 4 § 18 ὁ αὐλητῆς ὁ χρώμενος  
 )(ὁ αὐλοποιός. n. (499). SUSEM. (574)

19 ὅσων τὰργα κτλ] viz. all those  
 subjects in which the products (?) are

understood, even by such as are unac-  
 quainted with the art.

§ 15 Second objection (see § 10).  
 The least capable citizens have the most  
 authority: sovereignty resides with them.

27 ὥσπερ εἴρηται] § 8. 'Solon and  
 some other legislators.' SUSEM. (575)

§ 16 31 ταμιεύουσι...32 μειζόνων]  
 "But for the treasurership and the mini-  
 stry of war and the highest offices men of  
 higher property qualification are re-  
 quired." Even at Athens the "Treas-  
 urers of the Goddess" as they were  
 called, and the treasurers of the other  
 temples, though appointed by lot, were  
 always taken from the highest class only:  
 Schömann p. 418 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (576)

The reply. Strictly speaking no single  
 ecclesiast or dicast is a magistrate: he  
 is only a fraction or element of the com-  
 posite magistrate or public official, the  
 assembly and the law court.

λύσειε καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν. ἴσως γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταῦτ' (VI) ὀρθῶς. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδ' ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐκκλησιαστὴς ἄρχων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος· τῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἕκαστος μόνιον ἐστὶ τοιούτων (λίγω δὲ μόνιον τὸν βουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστήν καὶ τὸν δικαστήν). ὥστε δικαίως κύριον μειζόνων τὸ πλῆθος. ἐκ γὰρ πολλῶν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον. καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ πλείον τὸ τούτων πάντων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ' ἓνα καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω

τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία ποικί φαινερὸν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἕτερον ὥς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυρίους· κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δέ, ἂν τε εἰς ἂν τε πλείους ᾧσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὧν ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι καθύλου διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. ὁποίους μέντοι τινὰς δεῖ εἶναι τοῖς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδὲν πω δῆλον, ἀλλ' ἔτι μένει τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμοίως ταῖς πολιταίαις

40 τὸ before τούτων omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, hence [τὸ] Sussem.<sup>1,2</sup> || πάντων τούτων II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 41 ἐχόντων II<sup>2</sup>

1282 b 1 τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 6 διορίσαι δηλῶσαι II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || εἶναι δεῖ P<sup>2</sup> Bk. 8 ἀλλὰ γὰρ.....10 ἀδίκους transposed to follow 11 νόμους by Congreve; to follow

33 καὶ ταῦτα] ἡ τάξις αὕτη τῆς πολιτείας, § 10.

§ 18 39 καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ κτλ] Moreover the amount of property at which all these are rated is far greater collectively than the property of individuals in high offices and of the members of small families.

§ 19 41 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κτλ] Trendelenburg thinks that we do not quite clearly see whether Aristotle is only settling up his analogies dialectically or defending them as his own opinion. There can be no doubt, however, especially after such an explicit explanation as is here given, that the latter is the case: nor can any reason be discovered, even on other grounds, for a doubt of this kind. Sussem. (577)

1282 b 1 ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία] This is the question treated in c. 10, and then partly decided in c. 11 §§ 1—5, viz. who is to possess supreme authority? (Comp. § 6 n. 568.) The answer was "the whole of the burgess body in every state which has any degree of excellence"; and on the basis of this decision, the point which came up at c. 10 § 3 is now

settled by the addition of the qualifying clause "but in accordance with the laws," and in such a way that the greater or less degree of excellence and correctness of the laws is determined by that of the constitution to which they correspond. This raises the question of the relative merit of the normal constitutions which we proceed to answer in cc. 12, 13; see however *Introđ.* p. 41 f. Sussem. (578)

3 καί μιν ὀρθῶς] if they are good laws.

τὸν ἄρχοντα δὲ κτλ] "and the ruler, be he one or many, must only be sovereign in such cases as the laws are quite unable to lay down precisely, because of the inherent difficulty of framing general rules applicable to all cases. Comp. c. 15 § 4 ff. c. 16 §§ 8, 11, with nn. (637, 652, 653): *Nic. Eth.* v. 10. 4, 1147 b 13. Here again Aristotle is following Plato, *Politeia* 294 A—205; see n. (637) on c. 15 § 4. Sussem. (579)

To these references *Law* ix 875 c may be added (Jackson *ad loc.* *Nic. Eth.*) also *Pol.* 11. 8 § 22.

§ 20 8 πάλαι] At c. 10 § 3; comp. n. (578). Sussem. (580)

- 9 ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δι- (VI)  
 § 21 καλοὺς ἢ ἀδίκους. πλὴν τοῦτό γε φανερόν ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν  
 πολιτείαν κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους. <ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμοίως ταῖς  
 9 <πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι  
 <καὶ δικαίους ἢ ἀδίκους.> ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι  
 12 τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δικαίους  
 τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας οὐ δικαίους.  
 12 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις VI  
 15 ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριω-  
 τάτῃ πασῶν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις. ἔστι δὲ  
 πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ) τὸ κοινῇ συμ-

13 δικαίους by Schneider (who however brackets the sentence), and Schmidt (who then emends <τί> γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο <ἢ> ὁμοίως.....ἀδίκους;), while Thurot omits ἀλλὰ γὰρ and transposes 8 καὶ ὁμοίως..... 10 ἀδίκους to follow 11 δῆλον ὅτι. A double recension, 8 ἀλλὰ γὰρ..... 10 ἀδίκους = 10 πλὴν τοῦτο..... 11 τοῦτο, wrongly assumed by Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || καὶ before ὁμοίως II<sup>2</sup> Bk. Schneider Rassow Thurot Bernays, <εἰ> καὶ Koraes, ἂν Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> (si similiter William) || On cc. 12, 13 see *Introd.* 41 ff. || 15 δὲ II<sup>2</sup> Bk. Scaliger Bonitz Spengel || 16 ἔστι δὴ Scaliger || 17 <τὸ> Susem.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμοίως] 'for relatively to the constitutions the laws, too, must necessarily be bad or good, just or unjust.' Comp. VI(IV). I § 9 n. (1128), Isocr. VII. 14. SUSEM. (581)

In cc. 12, 13 true constitutional principles take a more definite shape. In a note to his Translation, p. 172, Bernays remarks that these two chapters "contain a separate sketch for the discussion of the same questions which are partly treated in cc. 9—11, partly in cc. 16, 17. As the sketch presents some peculiarities, e.g. the mention of ostracism, c. 13 § 15 ff., those who arranged Aristotle's papers thought it ought to be preserved; and the place they assigned to it seemed recommended by the close connexion of its contents with the neighbouring chapters. Where the tautologies thus arising appeared too obvious, the attempt was made to lessen them by formulae like εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον 13 § 1, § 2. According to Aristotle's intention, the beginning of c. 14 should join on directly to the close of c. 11": the reason assigned being that the words φαμέν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην, 14 § 1, find no connexion at the close of c. 13, but refer back to the words κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας of 11 § 22. This view has been already examined, *Introd.* pp. 42, 43.

c 12 § 1 14 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις] Comp. I.

§ 1 n. (1), *Nic. Eth.* I. 2 § 4, 1094 a 26. SUSEM. (582)

The structure of this sentence is disputed. Scaliger, Bonitz (*Arist. Stud.* III. p. 94), Spengel treat it as all one period from 14 ἐπεὶ to 22 λαμβάνειν. But this requires δὲ in line 15, whereas δὴ is the reading of II<sup>1</sup>.

16 δύναμις] Joined with αἱ τέχναι, II. 8 § 18; so *Rhet.* I. 2 § 1, ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐτέρας ἐστὶ τέχνης ἔργον.

ἔστι δὲ...17 δίκαιον] 'The good for the state, i.e. the interest of the commonwealth, can only be justice.' πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν is the subject and τοῦτο refers to this: while τὸ δίκαιον, defined in the next sentence, is predicate. See c. 10 § 2 and the references given in n. (562). SUSEM. (583)

It is convenient at this place to reproduce, from *Nic. Eth.* v. 6 § 4, the fuller account of πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, the embodiment of 'right' or 'justice' in civil society: τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ κοινωνῶν βίον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν, the justice of free and (proportionately or actually) equal citizens living together with a view to the satisfaction of wants. When this is not the case there is only an analogical sort of justice, τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοίτητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς

φέρων. δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι (VII) γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς διώριστα περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν (τὴ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἴσοις ἴσον εἶναι φασίν). ποίων δ' ἰσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ποίων ἀνισότης, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κατὰ πάντων ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνίστως νενεμησθαι τὰς ἀρχάς, εἰ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέρειεν ἀλλ' ὅμοιοι τυγχάνοιεν ὄντες. τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἔσται καὶ κατὰ χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ' ὅτιοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. ἢ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος; φανερόν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων. τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν

19 [ἐν οἷς.....ἠθικῶν] Stahr || 21 δ'] omitted by P<sup>4</sup> C<sup>6</sup>, [δ'] or else τ' Spengel, δὲ Bonitz || 21 ἴσως... 1283 b 32 δίκαιον noticed by Pseudo-Plutarch de nobil. c. 8, p. 937 A ff. || 27 [καὶ] Schneider, [τὸ] Ramus || 30 δ'] γὰρ Spengel

ἀνθρώποις νόμος δ' ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ δίκη ἀρετὴ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου... τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νύμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἐλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. See further Jackson's admirable comments, pp. 101—103 of his edition.

18 [ἴσον τι] 'All hold that justice is a species of equality.' So also in *Nic. Eth.*, see n. on 9 § 1.

19 τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις] Strictly scientific or philosophical discussions as contrasted with such as are merely dialectical, *Topic.* i. 14 § 6, 105 b 30, and with the exoteric discussions carried on from the standpoint of the ordinary or 'envisaging' consciousness, *End. Eth.* i. 6 § 4, 1217 b 22, ἐπισκευτάι δὲ... καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐξηγεῖται λέγουσι καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. Comp. c. 6 § 2; iv (vii). i. 11 § 2, 3 and Excursus to B. iv (vii). τῶν ἠθικῶν] *Nic. Eth.* v. c. 3 which is similarly cited c. 9 § 3; see n. (545). Cp. viii (v). i. 1 § 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (584)

20 τὴ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ] 'For justice is held to be something assigned to certain persons, and must be equal for equals.' One's rights, one's just share, is the nearest English for the concrete δίκαιον. Cf. as Mr A. C. Bradley puts it, here is the nearest approach to our modern notion of a 'right.'

22 21 ποίων δ' ἰσότης] Comp. c. 9 § 4, κατὰ τὴν οὐρανὴν χρῆμασιν, οὐρανὸν ἐλευ-

θερίῳ, n. (546 b); viii (v). i. 1 § 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (584 b)

22 [ἔχει... 23 φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν] 'Here lies a difficulty, and a stimulus to research in political science.' SUSEM.

23 κατὰ πάντων ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ] on the ground of superiority in any advantage. This is one of the phrases used in i. 6 § 3. Here certainly external goods: see line 28.

26 τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν] 'For (they would say) people who differ have different rights and their relative merits are different.' The correction of Ramus, καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν, changes the sense, 'and their different rights go according to merit.' See n. (1493). SUSEM.

§ 3 On this view superiority in colour (white and dark races?) or size (cp. iv [vii]. 14 § 3) or in any other external good would confer a larger share of political rights. The falsity of this is seen from the other arts.

Eaton compares *Nic. Damasc.* (s. voc.) 'Ἀλλήλοις ἄλλοις τοῖς ταχισταῖσι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποδίδεται βέλτεροι.

§ 4 31 αὐλητῶν] A partitive genitive with ἀγνοοῦνται. The comparison between αὐλητῶν and πολιτικῶν ἀρετῶν is best known from the discourse of Protagoras in Plato's dialogue 327 A (cp. 323 n). It is doubtless Socratic. Cp. c. 4 § 18.

τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέ-  
 ροις· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον, δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔρ-  
 γον ὑπερέχοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν.  
 35 εἰ δὲ μήπω δῆλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγα-  
 § 5 γοῦσιν ἔσται φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ εἴη τις ὑπερέχων μὲν κατὰ  
 τὴν αὐλητικήν, πολὺ δ' ἐλλείπων κατ' εὐγένειαν ἢ κάλ-  
 λος, εἰ καὶ μείζον ἕκαστον ἐκείνων ἀγαθὸν ἔστι τῆς αὐλη-  
 τικῆς (λέγω δὲ τὴν τ' εὐγένειαν καὶ τὸ κάλλος), καὶ κατὰ  
 40 τὴν ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχουσι πλεον τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος  
 κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν· ὅμως τούτῳ δοτέον τοὺς (διαφέροντας  
 1283 a τῶν αὐλῶν.) δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπερ-  
 οχήν καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας, συμβάλλονται δ'  
 § 6 οὐδέν. ἔτι κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν πρὸς πᾶν  
 ἂν εἴη συμβλητόν. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως

33 οὐδὲ Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 35 εἰ δὲ.....1283 a 3 οὐδέν is regarded as an interpolation by Riese, who wrongly thinks the inferiority of αὐλητική to nobility and beauty to have been previously stated

1283 a 4 [μᾶλλον] Ridgeway, ἐνάμιλλον? Ingram

32 τὴν τέχνην] Adverbial accus. after ὁμοίον, as after ἵσος II. 2 § 6, ἐξ ἴσου I. 12 § 2; and so πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ in line 25.

33 δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον κτλ] So that the only superiority which constitutes a claim to power is superiority in virtue or capacity for serving the state, to which power is instrumental.

34 καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν= the superiority also in instruments i.e. superior instruments as well, just as πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν=advantage in respect of flutes.

35 προαγαγοῦσιν] "if we advance a little further." Intrans. as in *Phys.* I. 1 § 2, 184 a 19, προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφιστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα, *Poet.* 4 § 7, 1448 b 23, κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες. It appears then that αὐτὸ is a nom., as 5 § 4: 'of itself.'

§ 5 38 εἰ καὶ...41 αὐλητικήν] "even granting that each of them (good birth and beauty) is a greater good than skill with the flute and proportionately superior to flute-playing in a degree far exceeding his superiority as a flute-player, nevertheless we must assign to him the superior flutes." I once conjectured that the text was unsound; but these words give a correct sense if, with Bernays, we understand ἐκεῖνα from what precedes as the subject of ὑπερέχουσι. Riese treats the

entire passage 35 εἰ δὲ μήπω δῆλον...1283 a 3 οὐδέν as an interpolation; but he proceeds on the incorrect assertion that the remark 'although flute-playing in itself is something less important than nobility or beauty' has already occurred in the context. See moreover Vahlen *Beiträge zu Arist. Poet.* II. p. 71 (159) f. SUSEM.

Vahlen is there noticing Aristotle's constant striving after a clearness and precision which to us seems unnecessary, and amongst other instances cites c. 11 § 17 λέγω δὲ...δικαστήν, *Rhet.* I. 11 § 26, 1371 b 20, *ib.* III. 2 § 6, 1404 b 32. Vahlen also urges this in defence of καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τοῦτοις ὑπάρχει in c. 1 § 4 of the present book of the *Politics*.

1283 a 1 δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον] If the claim of wealth and good birth is valid they ought to contribute to the better performance of function, which they certainly do not.

4 συμβλητόν=commensurable. See *De gen. et corr.* II. 6 §§ 1, 2 εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν (συμβλητά), ἀνάγκη ταῦτό τι εἶναι ὑπάρχον ἅπασιν τοῖς συμβλητοῖς ὥς μετροῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἐξ ὕδατος κοτύλης εἶεν ἀέρος δέκα.

§ 6 εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος] 'For if a given bodily stature (confers political privileges) more than' i.e. in preference to—here we must supply 'a certain amount of wealth or good birth.'

5 ἂν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς (VII)  
ἐλευθερίαν. ὥστ' εἰ πλεῖον ὁδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ  
ὁδὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ πλεῖον ἀρετῆς μέγεθος ὅλως ὑπερ-  
εἶχειν \* \*, εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ πάντα. τοσόνδε γὰρ [μέγεθος] εἰ  
7 κρεῖττον τοσοῦδε, τοσόνδε δῆλον ὡς ἴσον, ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύ-  
ο νατον, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ  
πᾶσαν ἀνισότητ' ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν (εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν  
βραδείς οἱ δὲ ταχεῖς, οὐδὲν διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖον  
τοὺς δ' ἔλαττον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἢ τού-  
8 των διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμὴν). ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πόλις συν-  
5 ἴστηκεν, ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν.  
διώπερ εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ πλού-  
σιοι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι. δεῖ γὰρ ἐλευθέρους τ' εἶναι καὶ τίμημα  
φέροντας (οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη πόλις ἐξ ἀπόρων πάντων, ὥσπερ

§ 4. ....ὑπερέχειν omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> || 7 <εἰ> καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει δλως ἀρετῇ  
μεγέθους Bernays || ὑπερέχειν δλως ἀρετῆς μέγεθος P<sup>2-3-4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Plutarch Bk. ||  
ὑπερέχειν <ἐνδέχεται>? Susem., ὑπερέχει Ar. Plutarch Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (corrector)  
and perhaps P || 8 [πάντα] Bernays || [μέγεθος] Susem. || 10 καὶ omitted by  
Π<sup>1</sup> Ar., [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || 11 ἀνισότητα P<sup>4</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and Plutarch, ἰσότητ' Γ Μ', ἰσότητα  
P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 16 περὶ τῆς P<sup>4-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || ἐπιεικεῖς Susem., ἐγγεκεῖς Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2-3-4</sup> Ar.  
Ald. Plutarch Susem.<sup>1</sup> (in the text), συγγεκεῖς Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>. Cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 393  
|| καὶ πλούσιοι after 17 καὶ ἐλεύθεροι Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Plutarch Bk. || 17 τ' omitted by M'  
P<sup>1</sup>, hence [τ'] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>

5 ἐνάμιλλον εἴη = would enter the lists  
with, be comparable to.

6 ὥστ' εἰ πλεῖον κτλ] 'Hence if  
A's superiority in stature exceeds B's  
superiority in merit, and (if) in general  
stature can exceed merit, evidently every-  
thing is comparable with everything else'  
—*ut* represents the ἐνδέχεται con-  
jectured to stand after ὑπερέχειν. Bernays  
takes <εἰ> καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει δλως ἀρετῇ  
μεγέθους, εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ as all belonging  
to the apothemis: "then, although virtue  
in itself is more excellent than bodily size,  
yet a common measure can be found."

8 τοσόνδε γὰρ εἰ κρεῖττον κτλ] If a  
cubic inch of gold is superior to a cubic  
inch of silver, then clearly a certain  
amount of gold is equal to a cubic inch of  
silver. But this being impossible in the  
case where wealth, or bodily strength,  
competes with virtue, it follows that "in  
politics as well as (and) the other sciences  
or faculties (§ 3) it is not every kind of  
inequality on which men ground their  
claims in public office, and this for good  
reason." μέγεθος, except in line 8, =  
quantity, not 'amount.'

§ 8 14 ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πόλις συνίστηται]  
But it is on the ground of the elements  
of which a city is composed that they  
necessarily contend for state offices. κατὰ  
τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντας § 4. Of these  
'elements' of the city, the various factors  
or sections of society whose preponderance  
fixes the constitution and the nature of  
the qualification for political power, he  
enumerates three; merit, wealth, and free  
birth. Comp. *nn.* on 7 § 2, 9 § 1; also  
VI(IV). 8 §§ 7—9.

17 τίμημα is the rated valuation of  
taxable property, upon which taxes were  
levied. Generally speaking, it was greatly  
below the true, or selling, value. Thus  
τίμημα φέρειν or εἶχειν = to have property  
so estimated, to be a taxpayer, *δικαιω*  
returning a rateable value of property.  
So in VI(IV). 13 § 2, τοῖς μὲν εἶχοντι  
τίμημα and τοῖς ἀπόροι are found opposed,  
and II. 6 § 2, κτῆσθαι τὸ τίμημα τὸ δικαιο-  
μέρες. But in itself τίμημα does not mean  
taxes.

18 οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀπόρων... 19 δοῦλων] A  
body of needy paupers would not have  
the necessary leisure. II. 9 § 2. A body

§ 9 οὐδ' ἐκ δούλων). ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τούτων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ 6  
 20 δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ τού-  
 των οἰκεῖσθαι πόλιν δυνατόν· πλὴν ἄνευ μὲν τῶν προ-  
 τέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι κα-  
 13 λῶς. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἢ πάντα ἢ  
 ἐνιά γε τούτων ὀρθῶς ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγα-  
 25 θὴν ἢ παιδεία καὶ ἢ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισβη- (p. 8  
 τοίησαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ' οὔτε 7  
 πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν δεῖ τοὺς ἴσους ἐν τι μόνον ὄντας οὔτε  
 ἄνισον τοὺς ἀνίσους καθ' ἓν, ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τὰς  
 § 2 τοιαύτας πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρό-  
 30 τερον ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως πάντες,  
 ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ πάντες δικαίως. οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὅτι πλεῖον  
 μέτεστι τῆς χώρας αὐτοῖς, ἢ δὲ χώρα κοινόν, ἔτι πρὸς τὰ  
 συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν· οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι

20 πολιτικῆς P<sup>4</sup> and Plutarch || 25 δικαίως] ἀναγκαίως P<sup>4-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 27 ἴσων  
 P<sup>2</sup> (apparently), P<sup>3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand, corrected by a later hand)  
 and p<sup>1</sup>, ἴσων ἴσον Ar. and corrector of P<sup>1-4</sup> in the margin:—in P<sup>1</sup> another ἴσον is added  
 in the margin after the ἴσον altered by p<sup>1</sup> into ἴσων || 32 τὰ omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>,  
 hence [τὰ] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>

of slaves would be without natural rulers, I. 2 § 4. It would seem that Aristotle could not consistently allow that any barbarian *ἔθνος* constituted a 'city.' The monarchy which is one of his normal governments is not monarchy over barbarians.

§ 9 21 ἄνευ τῶν προτέρων] These indispensable factors or elements, ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις, c. 5 § 2, IV (VII). 8 § 1. But justice and virtue are equally indispensable if the city is to live properly.

c. 13 § 1 These claimants for power (ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, 12 § 7) stand on a different footing according as we look (1) to civil society of any sort, or (2) to the highest life, which is nowhere realized save in the ideal state.

23 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι] 'In view of the bare existence of a city,' as contrasted with εὖ ζῆν, see c. 6 §§ 4, 5. τὸ πόλιν εἶναι = τὸ συζῆν of 6 § 3, 9 §§ 13, 14.

24 πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν κτλ.] Comp. I. 2 § 8 n. (21). SUSEM. (585)

25 ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ] καὶ explicative. Education (culture) and virtue are words which Aristotle uses interchangeably in this connexion. We may add merit, κατ' ἀξίαν = κατ' ἀρετήν, 5 § 5 (Bradley). See also *Rhet.* I. 8 § 4 with

Cope's note p. 156 f.

26 καὶ πρότερον] In c. 9. Compare *Introd.* p. 42. SUSEM. (586)

27 πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν κτλ.] 'that those who are equal in some one thing only (cp. 9 § 4 κατὰ τι ἴσοι) should have an equal share of everything.'

29 τοιαύτας] All states based on such equality and inequality (Congreve).

§ 2 καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 1. It was said, *Introd.* p. 42, that this reference cannot be dislodged from its place so easily as the preceding one, as Bernays' suggestion (*n.* on c. 12 § 1) requires. SUSEM. (587)

31 ὅτι πλεῖον... 32 κοινόν] "that they are larger landowners and that the land is a public concern." A national interest; one to which we can widely or generally appeal: quod ad communem salutem et utilitatem pertinet, Bonitz s.v. See also Cope on κοινότερον, *Rhet.* I. 1 § 10. But Bernays renders 'is a common foundation of the state'—which can hardly be right.

32 ἔτι πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια κτλ.] "Further (that) for the most part they are more trustworthy for the transactions of life," as they have not the temptations of the poor.

33 "The claims of the free born and

καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἔγγυς ἀλλήλων (πολύται γὰρ μάλλον οἱ [VII]  
 35 γενναιότεροι τῶν ἀγεννῶν, ἢ δ' εὐγένεια παρ' ἑκάστοις  
 3 οἴκοι τίμιος· ἔτι διότι βελτίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιόνων,  
 εὐγένεια γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ γένους)· ὁμοίως δὲ φήσομεν ἐι-  
 καίως καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀμφισβητεῖν \* \*, κοινωνικὴν γὰρ  
 39 ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ἣ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον  
 4 ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς  
 ἐλάττους, καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιώτεροι καὶ βελτίους  
 εἰσὶν, ὡς λαμβανομένων τῶν πλειόνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους.  
 5 ἄρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, λέγω δ' οἶον οἱ τ'  
 ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πλεῖθος ἄλλο τι  
 πολιτικόν, πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις ἔσται τίνας ἄρχειν εἶναι, ἢ

35 δ'] τ' Zwinger, τ' or γὰρ Susem. § 37 δὲ Plutarch Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> and apparently Γ (ante William):—perhaps right. But see Vahlen *Phetie* p. 191 ed. 3 (p. 161 ed. 2)  
 38 ἀμφισβητεῖν < καὶ μάλιστα τὴν δικαιοσύνην > or something similar Susem. § 40  
 ἀλλὰ λαμβανομένων? Stahlr, συμβαλλομένων Koraes

1283 b 2 τι omitted by II<sup>1</sup> (ἀλλ' ὅτι I<sup>4</sup>), hence [τι] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>

of the nobles are closely related." Supply  
 ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. ἔγγυς is nearly equivalent to an adjective, see *n.* on II. 9 § 5.

34 ὡς ἔγγυς ἀλλήλων] From time immemorial, as noble birth stands to merely free birth so free birth and descent from citizens have been opposed to the status of slaves and freedmen: see I. 6 § 7, 8, a passage which should be compared with the following words also. SUSEM. (588)

34 ff. This is confirmed on two grounds: (1) the nobles are the truest citizens, and (2) the cream of the citizens. Properly speaking, it is only in a republic that a real aristocracy can exist. Comp. Freeman, *Comparative Politics*, Lect. VI. pp. 146—170.

35 The use of γενναιότεροι and ἀγεννῶν does not bear out the distinction made in *Rhet.* II. 15 § 3, εὐγενεῖς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετὴν, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως.

36 οἴκοι τίμιος] Cp. I. 6 § 7, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους νομίζουσιν οἴκοι μόνον εὐγενεῖς, *n.* (52). SUSEM. (588 b)

βελτίους εἰκὸς] Ambition to win fresh honours is a trait of good birth, τὸ φιλοτιμότερον εἶναι τὸν κεκτημένον, *Rhet.* II. 15 § 3.

§ 3 37 ἀρετὴ γένους] Comp. *nn.* (84, 55) on I. 6 § 7, VI(IV). § 9 \* (144), VII(V). I § 7 κρείττους ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος, *n.* (1496). SUSEM. (589)

ὁμοίως δὲ...δικαίως...ἀμφισβητεῖν] As the claim of (a) the wealthy *line* 31, (b) the free born and the nobles, so now that

of (c) merit, is pronounced to have a partial justification.

With δὲ in enumerations Vahlen, commenting on *Phet.* 18 § 3, 1455 b 31, compares II. 3 § 2, VII(V). 3 § 16, 4 § 10: often strengthened at the close of a list, as καὶ ὅλως δὲ, καὶ καθόλου δὲ.

38 κοινωνικὴν] 'justice especially; for justice is, as we affirm, a virtue essential to civil society (κοινωνία), on which all the others must necessarily attend': i.e. justice in the sense of obedience to the laws as is more fully explained in *Nic. Eth.* v. 1. 12—20, 1129 b 11, ff. [where see Jackson's notes]. Compare too *N. E.* VIII. 1 § 4, 1135 a 22, 9 § 1 ff. 1139 b 25 (Eaton). See also above c. 10 §§ 1, 2 and the references cited in *n.* (562). SUSEM. (590) A remarkable reason for the claim of ἀρετὴ, after all we have been told (Wysc).

§ 4 40 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους] *sc.* δικαίως ἀμφισβητοῦσι. The justice of this claim has been argued in c. 11.

41 καὶ γὰρ κρείττους κτλ] Comp. Plato *Gorgias* 488 D οἴκοις οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσι κατὰ φύσιν; (Linton). SUSEM. (591)

42 ὡς λαμβανομένων] Comp. c. 10 § 2, πάντων ἀρραβάνων: "if the many are taken in a body and compared with the few in a body" (Congreve).

1283 b 1 λέγω δ' οἶον] I mean, namely.

3 πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις κτλ] The question raised in c. 10.

§ 5 οὐκ ἔσται; καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων 9  
 5 ἀναμφισβήτητος ἢ κρίσις τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ (τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις  
 διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἢ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἢ δὲ τῷ  
 διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη  
 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον). ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν  
 § 6 αὐτὸν ταυθ' ὑπάρχη χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον. \* \* εἰ δὴ τὸν 10  
 10 ἀριθμὸν εἰεν ὀλίγοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα  
 δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον; ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκο-  
 πεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος  
 ὥστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἅπαν-  
 § 7 τας τοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν. δό-

8 σκοποῦσι μὲν Ald., σκοπήσομεν? Sylburg, σκοπῶμεν Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin, *con-*  
*siderandum est* Ar. || 9 ὑπάρ<sup>χ</sup> M<sup>s</sup>, ὑπάρχει P<sup>1</sup> || εἰ δὴ.....13 αὐτῶν; trans-  
 posed by Thurot to precede 1284 a 4 εἰ δέ τις; see *Introd.* p. 82 f.

§ 5 4 καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν κτλ]  
 “Under each one of the constitutions mentioned there will be no dispute as to the proper holders of office: for (these constitutions) differ in their sovereigns, e.g. the one by being in the hands of the wealthy, another by being in the hands of the good, and similarly with each of the others.” τὰ κύρια is the plural of τὸ κύριον the ‘sovereign,’ a supreme authority: also found in *Rhet.* I. 8. 2, 1365 b 27 τὰ δὲ κύρια διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας, ὅσαι γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύριά ἐστιν, and Demosth. *Falsa Leg.* § 259 p. 424, 11 οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ καὶ τὰ κύρι' ἅττα ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν πόλεων. Cope compares *N. E.* III. 8 § 15, 1116 b 18, τὰ πολιτικά = the citizen levies, as a similar plural.

5 τοῖς κυρίοις] Comp. c. 6 § 1 n. (523), c. 7 § 2 n. (537): also n. (466). SUSEM. (592)

8 περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον] So § 4, ἐν μιᾷ πόλει.

On the following sentence, 9 εἰ δὴ... 13 ἐξ αὐτῶν, see *Introd.* p. 43. Thurot *Etudes* p. 49 gives a brief analysis of §§ 6—14. Aristotle proposed to investigate what class ought to have power in a state where all sorts of superiority (riches, nobility, virtue, numbers) are represented: and this is his answer: (1) *If the virtuous are few, we must inquire whether they are numerous enough to govern the state or to make a state by themselves*, § 6. (2) *No superiority gives an exclusive right to the exercise of power*, §§ 7—10. (3) *The best laws are relative to the interest*

of the whole state and to the great body of the citizens. The citizen is not the same under all governments; under the best government he is the good man, §§ 11, 12. (4) *If a single individual, or a handful of men not numerous enough to form a state by themselves, be preeminent for virtue, they cannot be reduced to the level of equality*, §§ 13, 14. On this answer Thurot remarks; “the first proposition (1) has nothing to do with the question Aristotle has just raised: it is clear that before he discusses what is to be done with the virtuous few he should prove the right of the virtuous to command. The second, (2), has a direct bearing on the question, of which it is the negative solution. The germ of a positive solution is found in (3), but this solution is not given directly; for Aristotle is handling a difficulty as to the end of the best legislation. In (4) he discusses a particular case analogous to that which is the subject of (1). This analogy and the impossibility of understanding (1) in its present place lead me to suppose that the words εἰ δὴ...ἐξ αὐτῶν should be transposed to come after κατ' ἀρετὴν and before εἰ δέ τις (1284 a 3). Then there will be a good sequence of ideas.”

§ 6 13 ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία] So 10 § 1 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν.

§§ 7, 8 The refutation of the several claims is not the same as in c. 10, but is a species of *reductio ad absurdum* by the enforcement on the same ground of the right of the one richest, or noblest, or most virtuous man, or of the strongest group.

15 ξειαν γάρ <ἀν> οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀξιῶντες (VII)  
 ἄρχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος· δῆλον γάρ ὡς εἴ  
 τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιώτερος ἀπάντων ἐστί, [δῆλον] ὅτι κατὰ  
 τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτον ἄρχειν τὸν ἕνα ἀπάντων δεήσει,  
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενεῖα διαφέροντα τῶν ἀμφισβητούν-  
 18 των δι' ἐλευθερίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν τούτοις συμβήσεται καὶ 11  
 21 περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· εἰ γάρ τις εἰς ἀμεί-  
 νων ἀνὴρ εἴη τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων  
 ὄντων, τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ ταῦτ' δίκαιον. οὐκοῦν  
 εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι γε δεῖ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ τῶν  
 24 ὀλίγων, κἂν εἰς ἡ πλείους μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν  
 πόλλων κρείττους ᾧσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἂν δίοι κυρίους  
 27 εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πλῆθος.] πάντα δὲ ταῦτ' ἔοικε ποιεῖν φανε-

15 δόξαιε M<sup>1</sup>, δόξαιεν I<sup>1</sup> (corrector), δόξαιε Ald., δόξαιεν I<sup>2-2</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Plutarch Bk. and I<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || γάρ <ἀν> Koraes Bk.<sup>2</sup>, <ἀν> γάρ Gottling || 17 [δῆλον ὅτι] Camerarius Bk.<sup>2</sup>, Vahlen (*Beitrage zu Ar. Poetik* IV. 432) tries to save ὅτι at least. Comp. also Bonitz *Ar. Stud.* I. p. 58 n. (1) || 20 τοῖσι τοῦτο ἴσως I<sup>2-2</sup> Plutarch Ar., τοῦτ' ἴσως Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. || 27 φανερόν ποιεῖν II<sup>2</sup> Plutarch Bk.

16 δῆλον γάρ ὡς κτλ] Comp. VII(VI). 3 § 3 n. (1407 b) ἐὰν εἰς ἐχθρὸν πλείων τῶν ἄλλων ἐπὶ πόλει, κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνος. SUSEM. (592 b)

17 πάλιν=αδ, in this case as in the former.

18 τὸν ἕνα ἀπάντων] This is called *tyrannis* in VII(VI). 3 § 3.

§ 8 21 περὶ τὰς ἀρ. ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς] Cp. O. § 8 § 8 n. (508), G. 7 § 3. 4 with nn. (536, 8). SUSEM. (593)

There provisionally we get a glimpse of the monarch whose rule he subsequently justifies even in the best state, viz. 16, 17; viz. εἰς τὴν ἀρίστην πόλιν τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων. All the governing class are good, but he is pre-eminent in goodness.

24 εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος κτλ] Comp. Pl. *Gorg.* 489 e ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (594)

§§ 9, 10 πάντα δὲ ταῦτα κτλ] Aristotle here returns to what he has already developed above c. 11, so that the inquiry has not made any real advance. L. Stein (*Zeitschrift f. d. g. Staatswissen-schaft* IX. p. 157) and Hildenbrand (p. 431) are right in maintaining that the negative result which rejects as incorrect all these one-sided claims, is one of the most important passages in the whole work, since it proves most clearly how nearly Aristotle grasped the true nature

tion of a state, as elevated above all particular opposing interests, although he could not quite attain to it, "since the autocratic conception of authority had not been able anywhere in Greece to rise above the conflict of parties to the development of its own activity, and even Aristotle was unacquainted with the only means of elevating it above this conflict, namely, true constitutional monarchy," cp. *Introd.* p. 44 ff. Hildenbrand rightly remarks in answer to Stein, that it is just this negative result which leads to the positive construction of an ideal state, built upon this foundation. Hildenbrand however has also failed to see that even at this point something more than the mere negative result has been attained, and that one claim at any rate, viz. that of superior merit, is only provisionally rejected,—whether it be the case that the excellence of remarkable individuals is *superior* or *inferior* to that of the general mass of citizens. Comp. Aristotle's own express statements 17 §§ 5, 6 nn. (680, 681), VII (V). 1 § 6 n. (1495): which contain by implication the positive result, that only two forms of government can be the best, viz. those which rest upon the one or the other of the above opposite conditions, an ideal monarchy and an aristocracy. The immediate context §§ 11, 12 shows that Aristotle desires

- ρὸν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὅρων οὐδεὶς ὀρθὸς ἐστὶ, καθ' ὃν ἀξι- (VI)  
οὔσιν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχεσθαι  
§ 10 πάντας. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀξιούοντας  
31 κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ  
πλοῦτον, ἔχοιεν ἂν λέγειν τὰ πλήθη λόγον τινὰ δίκαιον.  
οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ποτὲ τὸ πλήθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν ὀλίγων  
καὶ πλουσιώτερον, οὐχ ὥς καθ' ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὥς ἀθρόους.  
§ 11 διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἣν ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσιν  
36 τινες, ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν (ἀποροῦσι γὰρ 13  
τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετητέον, βουλομένῳ τίθε-  
σθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόνων συμ-  
39 φέρουν ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων), ὅταν συμβαίῃ τὸ λεχθέν.  
§ 12 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς

28 ὀρθῶς Q<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, altered by the same hand) || 36 (ἀποροῦσι...  
39 πλειόνων) Bernays: earlier editions have a full stop at ἀπαντᾶν and no parenthesis  
|| 37 βουλομένῳ <γε> Schneider || 40 γὰρ Susem., δ' Γ II Plutarch Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>

distinctly to express this here. See *iii.*  
(597, 599). SUSEM. (595)

28 τῶν ὅρων οὐδεὶς κτλ] Cp. 9 § 1 *n.*  
None of the 'standards,' i.e. the defining  
principles upon which they claim to  
govern.

§ 10 31 κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύ-  
ματος] to control the governing body.

33 τὸ πλήθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν  
ὀλίγων] This is the thesis which Grote  
is striving to prove throughout his history,  
taking the Athenian Demos as his great  
example. He dwells upon the sacrifices  
of which it was capable at Salamis and  
Argennusae, upon its financial honesty,  
as attested by an undebased coinage, and  
its wise moderation in the hour of triumph,  
when after the unparalleled provocations  
of the Thirty it consented to a general  
amnesty, B.C. 403. The appeals made  
to the humanity and enthusiasm of the  
multitude had most chance of success, as  
the cases of Paches and Diagoras prove.  
Against all this must be set the panic  
and terror at the time of the mutilation of  
the Hermae and the hasty condemnation  
of the generals at Athens, the troubles of  
Corcyra and Samos, and other occasional  
outbursts of popular fury like the Scytal-  
ism at Argos.

34 οὐχ ὥς καθ' ἕκαστον] See the  
parallel expression in c. 11 § 2 and the  
note on II. 2 § 2.

§ 11 35 ζητοῦσι...τινες] Was this  
also in writing? SUSEM. (596)

προβάλλουσιν] "bring forward as a

problem"; whence πρόβλημα.

36 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν...39  
ὅταν συμβαίῃ κτλ] May be met as  
follows (in § 12) in the case supposed.

37 τίθεσθαι] Properly, to enact.  
But Herod. I. 29, II. 177 of Solon.

39 τὸ λεχθέν] That is, the case  
when the aggregate merit of the great  
majority surpasses that of prominently  
able individual men. SUSEM. (597)

§ 12 40 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως]  
The problem is to find the standard to  
which the most upright laws (τοὺς  
ὀρθοτάτους νόμους) must conform. Here  
the right must be taken to mean the  
equally right, and the equally right  
regards the interest of the whole city  
and the welfare of the citizens. For  
ἴσως=aequaliter Shilleto quotes Plato  
*Laus* VII. 805 A Σανρομάτιδας αἰς τόξων  
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀπλῶν κοινωνία καὶ τοῖς  
ἀνδράσιν ἴση προστεταγμένη ἴσως ἀσκεῖται:  
*Εἰρήν.* 991 A ἴσως δὲ τοῦ ἐλάττονος πλέον  
ἐλαττόν τε τοῦ μείζονος: Dem. *De Pace*  
59, 18 ὑμεῖς οὔτε συμφέρως οὔτ' ἴσως οὔτε  
καλῶς προεῖσθε Φωκέας; Isocr. *Panegy.*  
77 συνθήκαι...αἰτινες ἂν ἴσως καὶ κοινῶς  
ἀμφοτέροις ἔχωσι, and probably Soph.  
*Philoct.* 758. Though restored in *Pol.*  
II. 6 § 20, it is not elsewhere certain in  
Aristotle. It is however a v. l. VI(IV).  
14 § 12, *Nic. Eth.* II. 6 § 6. Also found  
in *Rhet. ad Alex.* 9 § 10, 1430 a 1, ἂν  
ἴσως καὶ κοινῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς προσφερώμεθα  
(? a citation).

πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν. (VII)  
 πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι  
 ἐστί, καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρί-  
 στην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν  
 πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν.

< \* \* εἰ δὲ τὸν

<ἀριθμὸν εἰεν ὀλίγοι πάνπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα  
 <δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον; ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν,  
 <εἰ δυνατόι διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος  
 <ὥστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; >

1284 a 1 πρὸς] κατὰ Schneider, perhaps rightly 3 τὸν after βίῳ omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand)

1283 b 9 \* \* Couring Thurot (by Susem.<sup>1</sup> placed after 13 αὐτῶν), see Comm. n. (599). Spengel assumes either a lacuna before this passage, or that it should be transposed to follow either (1) 1283 a 40 τὰς ἄλλας or (2) 1283 b 8 τρόπον 1 δι Susem.<sup>2</sup>, δὴ Γ II Plutarch Bk. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> in the text 11 διελεῖν τὸν Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Plutarch Bk. 12 [7] Schneider, probably right

42 πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν κτλ] A neat formula summing up the results of cc. 1-9.

1284 a 1 καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος] See c. 1 § 10 n. (440). SUSEM. (598)

1284 a 1 πρὸς δὲ... ἀρετὴν] In the best constitution, the better class (βελύσσων) coincides not merely with the majority but even with the whole mass of citizens: cp. IV(VII). 9 § 3; 13 §§ 9, 10; VI(IV). 7 §§ 2-4. Thurot rightly remarks that after the negative answer §§ 5-10 n. (595) to the question first raised in § 4, this paragraph §§ 11, 12 also contains the germs of a positive answer. Indeed, when § 6 is transposed to follow directly upon it, the answer is continued in the context without interruption of the connexion. Thurot is no less right when he observes that this solution is no direct answer to the former questions, but as regards its form is only an answer to the subordinate question of § 11 itself. There is therefore a considerable hiatus after § 12. But Thurot is scarcely correct and clear when he assumes that it can be supplied from §§ 11, 12 if we draw the conclusion that "in a state where there are virtuous men, rich men, nobles, and a mass of citizens, power belongs to all those who have true civic virtue, this being something different from moral virtue not only under an ideal government but everywhere else." In my opinion, we should rather express the

conclusion that in the best constitution, all citizens ought to have equal rights, and that the true aristocracy is one in which all citizens are provided with sufficient property. But where the excellence (ἀρετῇ) of the few is equal to that of the many, especially if neither exceed a certain amount, in default of other means of satisfying the claims of both parties, either the exercise of full citizenship, or else the merely passive right of being elected to office (11 § 8 n. 369), must depend on a moderate property qualification, and wealth be introduced as a supplementary consideration. Thus, although inferior to aristocracy, this government, i.e. Polity, would still be included among the normal forms, and would in such a case be better than democratic equality. SUSEM. (599)

2 ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος] Comm. I. 1. 1. § 11. 126 b 9. αὐτοὶ γὰρ δὲ προαιρούμενοι ἀδικεῖν τε, καὶ δὲ δυνάμενοι μὴ προαιρούμενοι δὲ διαβῆναι ὁ νόμος.]

§ 6 1283 b 9 εἰ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν 13 πάλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν] "But if the possessors of virtue are altogether few in number, how should we decide (Bernays: set the limits)? Or must their fewness be considered relatively to the task; are they competent to administer the city or, in other words, numerous enough to form a city themselves?" Schneider rightly saw that the last sentence contained a single supposition: able to manage the city, because strong enough to form a city by themselves.

§ 13  
1284 a 4

εἰ δέ τις ἐστὶν εἰς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερ- VII  
5 βολήν, ἢ πλείους μὲν ἐνὸς μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα πα-  
ρέχεσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων  
ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς (p. 8  
τὴν ἐκείνων, εἰ πλείους, εἰ δ' εἷς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θε-  
τέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως· ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων,  
10 ἄνιστοι τοσοῦτον κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν·  
§ 14 ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν  
δηλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους 2  
καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος.  
αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖος ἂν εἴη νομοθετεῖν τις

1284 a 4 εἷς Γ Μ<sup>s</sup> P<sup>4</sup> and apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 5 δυνατὸν Γ Μ<sup>s</sup> || παρα-  
σχέσθαι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

§ 13 1284 a 4 τοσοῦτον διαφέρων...  
6 ὥστε μὴ...] So preeminent...that the  
merit of the rest is not commensurable.

4 κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν] 'in excess  
of merit'=by reason of his exalted  
merit. So *N. Eth.* IX. 4 § 6, 10 § 5 ἢ  
ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας=friendship in the  
extreme, or exalted friendship.

Two cases are distinguished: (1) one  
such prince of men, (2) a number of them  
too small to form the 'complement' of a  
city. Comp. for πλήρωμα VI(IV). 4 § 12  
and Pl. *Rep.* II. 371 E (where the sense  
is slightly different).

5 ἢ πλείους...6 πόλεως] The second  
case hardly belongs, strictly speaking, to  
this place, since it requires that one kind  
of collective virtue be added to another;  
and in this kind of calculation it is  
impossible to decide where to stop  
adding particular men to the virtuous  
minority, while the result of the calcula-  
tion varies according to our decision.  
Therefore Aristotle in what follows  
neglects this case entirely and does not  
construct from it a 'truest' form of  
aristocracy beyond and above the true  
one. Comp. c. 17 § 5, 18 § 1 with *nn.*  
(678, 682). SUSEM. (600)

7 τὴν πολιτικὴν] In other words,  
τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δύναμιν (Congreve).

9 μέρος] The phrase μέρος εἶναι=με-  
τέχειν or κοινωνεῖν τῆς πόλεως: see IV(VII).  
4 § 6; 8 § 1, § 6; 9 § 4. It is opposed  
to the indispensable adjuncts (ὧν ἀνευ  
οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις) which are excluded from  
the franchise. 'The conditions of com-  
mon political life cease to be applicable;  
the great man is not an equal amongst  
equals to be bound by equal rules'

(Bradley). Trans.: "these men must cease  
to be accounted members of the city.  
For they will be wronged if they are  
deemed worthy of mere equality when  
they are so far superior (ἄνιστοι) in merit  
and civil capacity." See II. 7 § 18 *n.*,  
VIII(V). 1 § 3.

11 ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν] Comp. § 25 and  
*n.* (615). Aristotle could hardly express  
more strongly how improbable he himself  
considers this case. His reasons for  
considering it notwithstanding are no  
doubt those mentioned in 8 § 1 for  
the consideration of other no less im-  
probable cases. Cp. *n.* (542) and *Introd.*  
p. 70 f. See also *n.* (678) on III. 17. 5.  
Bradley *Hellenica* p. 239 rightly traces  
this thought to its origin in Plato's  
*Politicus*. SUSEM. (601)

Plato's words are πασῶν γὰρ ἐκείνην γε,  
sc. τὴν ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν, ἐκκριτέον, οἷον  
θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν,  
303 B.

§ 14 13 κατὰ=anent, applicable to,  
binding upon; and not necessarily  
'against'. Even the rule of law does  
not bind such men.

"This sentence κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ  
ἔστι νόμος occurs word for word in St  
Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, c. 5 v. 23,  
suggesting, at all events, a direct adapta-  
tion from Aristotle." (T. L. Heath.)

14 αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμος] Comp. 17  
§ 2 *n.* (675). SUSEM. (601 b)

"Comp. the identical sentiment in St  
Paul *Romans* c. 2 v. 14, where ἐαυτοῖς  
εἰσι νόμος is applied to ἔθνη τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα  
νόμον, further described (v. 15) as men  
who do by nature (φύσει) the same things  
as the law prescribes, i.e. men who have

πειράμενος κατ' αὐτῶν. λέγουσιν γὰρ ἂν ἴσων ἅπτερ Ἀντισθέ- (VIII)  
νης ἔφη τοὺς λέοντας ὁμηγορούντων τῶν βασυπόδων καὶ τῶ  
ἴσον ἀξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν. διὸ καὶ τίθενται τὸν ὄστρακι-

16 ὁμηγορούντων P<sup>4</sup> and M<sup>o</sup> (1st hand), δημιουργούντων Γ || 17 διὸ καὶ...  
1284 b 34 πολλοὺν Krohn regards as a spurious addition: against this view see Comm.  
n. (602 b)

moral virtue" (T. L. Heath). Comp.  
*Nic. Eth.* IV. 8 § 10, 1128 a 32, *ὅλον νόμον*  
*ὦν ἐν αὐτῷ*.

15 Ἀντισθένης] The celebrated  
pupil of Socrates who founded the Cynic  
school. The quotation is probably from  
his work *Πολιτικός*, 'The Statesman':  
cp. A. Müller *De Antisthenis Cynici vita*  
*et scriptis* p. 64 (Marburg 1860); Zeller  
*Socrates and Socratics* p. 323 n. (41) and  
c. 13 generally, p. 284 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM.  
(602)

*Treatment of disproportionate eminence*  
*in the imperfect constitutions:* §§ 15—23.

Motives of self-preservation lead de-  
mocracies to resort to Ostracism: §§ 15,  
16. This has a counterpart in the  
execution by violence of eminent citizens  
which tyrants practise (§§ 17, 18), and in  
the policy pursued by sovereign states  
(Persia, Athens) in humbling their  
subjects, § 19.

Compare Grote's masterly defence of  
Ostracism: c. 31, IV. pp. 200—212.

§ 16 17 διὸ... ὄστρακισμὸν] It is  
improbable that this conception of Ostra-  
cism is the correct one. It was resorted  
to rather when two party leaders had  
each about the same number of followers  
and thus the machinery of the state was  
likely to be brought to a dead lock. In  
such cases, the removal of one converted  
the other into the leading statesman.  
This at any rate was the significance  
of this institution at the best period of  
the Athenian democracy, although ac-  
cording to Philochorus, *Str.* 79 b, it was  
at Athens originally directed against the  
followers of the Peisistratidae (*ἀδελφὸν δὲ*  
*Τυρρῶναι ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν... ἐξ ὄστρακισ-*  
*θῆναι διὰ μοχθηρίας τρώων, οὗ δὲ ὀψέως*  
*εὐνομήσαντο μετὰ τοῦτον δὲ κατελήθη τὸ*  
*ἔθος, ἀρξάμενος συμπεθεράσαντος Κλεισθέ-*  
*νη, ὅτε τοὺς τυράντους ἀνέλεοντες, ὅπως*  
*ἀποσφάλλει καὶ τοὺς φίλους αὐτῶν*. Müller  
*Frag. Hist. Gr.* I. p. 307, 2 ff.); and else-  
where too it may have had a similar  
origin. Thus it is possible that here  
Aristotle really adheres to the original  
intention of Ostracism (so Seeliger in  
*Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXV. 1877 742, n. 8)  
though on the other hand in his remarks

further on, § 23, there can be no doubt  
that he refers to its later development  
(n. 613). This institution prevailed at  
Athens from the time of Cleisthenes  
until the latter half of the Peloponnesian  
War or even later (n. 613), at Argos,  
VIII (v). 3 § 3 n. (1509 b), Megara,  
Syracuse, Miletus, and Ephesus. At  
Athens the question whether there should  
be an Ostracism in any particular year was  
regularly debated and voted on in the popu-  
lar assembly. If the result was affirmative,  
a day was fixed for another meeting of  
the Assembly, at which at least 6000  
citizens had to be present: so Frankel and  
before him Lugebill *On the nature and his-*  
*torical significance of Ostracism at Athens*  
in the *Suppl. to the Jahrb. f. Philol.*  
N. S. IV. p. 141 ff. Here every citizen  
who possessed a vote wrote on a potsherd  
the name of the person whom he wished  
to banish, and the man who was thus  
designated by the majority had to leave  
Athens within 10 days for a term of ten  
years, subsequently diminished to five; he  
might however be recalled before that  
time by a vote of the Assembly. See  
Schomann pp. 182, 338, 395 Eng. tr. with  
Frankel's corrections *op. cit.* p. 92 f. n.  
1: cp. pp. 14 ff. 52, 80 ff. SUSEM. (603)

One part of the Berlin papyrus, on  
which hardly decipherable fragments of  
Aristotle's *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* have been  
discovered, relates to the establishment  
of ostracism. 'Aristotle distinguishes  
two phases in the development of this  
institution. At first the dread of a res-  
toration of the Peisistratidae prevailed,  
and (2) relatives or friends of Hippias  
and Hipparchus were banished. Later on,  
as a settled institution, it fell upon (3) any  
who by preponderant influence threaten-  
ed to become dangerous to democratic  
equality, such as Aristides and Nan-  
chippus. Diels restores *ἐκ μὲν αὖτε Τυρ-*  
*ρῶναι καὶ τῶν τυράντων* φάσκει ὄστρα-  
*κισμὸν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ἀντιπάλων*  
*μένων (?) θέναι* καὶ δι' αὐτῶν μέλλει [δὲ] τῶν αὐτῶν.  
The name of Aristides is recovered from  
a brief excerpt in pseudo-Hesychius  
Müller *Frag. Hist. Gr.* II. p. 202, 7 of the  
very passage which is but half recovered

σμόν αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις, διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· (VI)  
 αὐται γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν τὴν ἰσότητα μάλιστα πάντων,  
 20 ὥστε τοὺς δοκοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυ-  
 § 16 φιλίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχὺν ὥστράκιζον καὶ με-  
 θίστασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὠρισμένους. μυθολογεῖται 3  
 δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τὸν Ἡρακλέα καταλιπεῖν διὰ  
 τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν Ἀργὴν  
 25 μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ τῶν πλωτῆρων.  
 διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου  
 Θρασυβούλῳ συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν  
 § 17 (φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρου εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμ-  
 φθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας, ἀφαιροῦντα δὲ τοὺς  
 30 ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχύων ὁμαλῦναι τὴν ἄρουραν· ὅθεν  
 ἀγνοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γινομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγ-

19 ταύτας γὰρ δεῖ P<sup>1</sup> || δοκοῦσι omitted by II<sup>1</sup> || διώκειν] *persecuntur* William ||  
 20 πολυφυῖαν P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), γρ. πολυφιλίαν corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>

to us: Κλεισθένης τὸν περὶ ὀστρακισμοῦ νόμον εἰσηγήσατο, ὃς ἐτέθη διὰ τοὺς τυραννιδῶντας (a)· καὶ ἄλλοι τε ὥστράκισθησαν καὶ Ξάνθιππος καὶ Ἀριστείδης (b). Diels *Ueber die Berliner Fragmente* p. 30.

18. διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν] For this reason, that laws are only destined for those who are more or less on an equality, while an individual grows disinclined to be bound by law in proportion as he rises above this general equality. If this very simple connexion be borne in mind, there is no reason to suspect an interpolation. SUSEM. (602 b)

21 ὥστράκιζον] Note the imperfect; here certainly because Ostracism was obsolete in Aristotle's time. See *n.* on II. 9 § 19.

§ 16 22 μυθολογεῖται κτλ] "Even in the story there is a naive hint that Herakles was out of place in the Argo. When he went on board the ship, it threatened to sink, and when he took hold of an oar, it broke at once in his grasp." (Preller *Gk. Mythol.* II. p. 324.) Pherekydes of Leros (*Fr.* 67), Antimachos, and Poseidippos also state that Herakles was set on shore because the Argo complained that his weight was too great for her (Schol. on Apoll. Rhod. I 1290), but this was not the only form of the legend. See Apollod. *Bibl.* I. 19. 9, Herod. VII. 193. SUSEM. (604)

24 οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν] "For the Argo refused to carry (ἀγειν) him with the rest

as far outweighing her crew": φθεγξαμένη μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τούτου βάρος. Apollodor. I. 9. 19.

27 οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν] 'must not be thought to blame it with absolute justice.'

§ 17 28 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρου] In the account given by Herodotos v. 92, the parts of Periander and Thrasybulos are reversed (Vettori). Aristotle refers to the story again VIII(v). 10 § 13, *n.* (1669). For the tyrant Thrasybulos of Miletus see E. Curtius II. p. 108 f. Eng. tr., and for the tyrants of Miletus in general VIII(v). 5. 8, *n.* 1557. Periander, ruler of Corinth probably from 626 to 585, one of the most brilliant and at the same time most tragical figures among the earlier Greek tyrants, was no doubt correctly regarded as one of the first to introduce all those measures which appeared, not without reason, to the Greeks who were contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle, as inseparable from the tyrannis. See VIII(v). 11. 4 *n.* (1711); also VIII(v). 12. 3 *nn.* (1751, 1754), VIII(v). 4 § 9, 10 § 16 *nn.* (1525, 1672): E. Curtius I. p. 250 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (605)

Livy (I. 54) borrows the story for Sextus Tarquinius at Gabii.

32 συννοῆσαι] Comp. *σύννον* γενόμενον, II. 7. 17.

§ 18 33 τοῦτο γὰρ κτλ] Oncken (II. 173) says that Aristotle approves of Ostracism. It would be as correct (or

γέλαντος δὲ τὸ συμπεσόν, συννοῆσαι τὸν Θρασύβουλον ὅτι (VIII) δὲ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἀνδρας ἀναιρεῖν). τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν συμφέρει τοῖς τυράννοις, οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλυγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας· ὁ γὰρ ὀστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν τρόπον τινὰ τῷ κολοῦειν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγαδεύειν. (21) τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ποιοῦσιν οἱ κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως, ὅσον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαρμίους καὶ Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ θῆττον ἐγκρατῶς ἔσχον τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐταπεινώσαν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας), ὁ δὲ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς Μήδους καὶ Βαβυλωνίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπέσκοπτε πολλῶν. τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ πύσεως ἐστὶ :

37 τῷ τὸ Γ Μ<sup>4</sup> Ρ<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || κολοῦειν Γ Μ<sup>4</sup> Ρ<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2-3</sup> (1st hand). γρ. κολοῦειν P<sup>2</sup> (corr. in the margin), reviser of P<sup>3</sup> in the margin, afterwards erased || (καὶ φυγαδεύειν) Valckenaer (on Her. v. 6), perhaps rightly || 41 παρὰ περὶ P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. 1284 b 2 ἐπέσκοπτε T<sup>b</sup>, ἐπέσκοπτε P<sup>2</sup>

rather incorrect) to deduce from this exposition his approval of the violent measures of the tyrants. In point of fact, he approves of both,\* but only from the standpoint of Democracy and Tyrannis respectively, two forms of government which he condemns and pronounces to be degenerate types. See however *n.* 614). SUSEM. (606)

35 ὁμοίως ἔχει] i.e. συμφέρει, it is the interest of oligarchies and democracies and accordingly they take such measures.

§ 19 38 περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη] in the case of cities and nations' (und. subject to them). See *n.* (11) and the references there given. SUSEM. (607)

39 Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαρμίους] Aristotle is thinking of the famous Samian revolt, 441—440 B.C., see E. Curtius II. 1. 471 ff. Eng. tr.; Von Wilamowitz *Ant. Kykladen* p. 11 f. SUSEM. (608)

40 Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους] Samos, Chios, and Lesbos were the only independent states amongst the allies of Athens in the year 424; however, the Chians were compelled by the Athenians, who had suspicions of their intentions, to pull down their new walls: Thuc. IV. 51. The revolt of Mitylene (428) and almost all the other cities of Lesbos, and their punishment (427) are noticed VIII(V). 4. 18. (1248) see E. Curtius III. pp. 100 ff. 18 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (609)

ἐπεὶ γὰρ 41 παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας]

'For as soon as they had firmly grasped empire they humbled these states in violation of the compacts made with them.' It is clear from *n.* (609) that this is not true of the Lesbians: even in regard to the Chians and the Samians it scarcely holds good (Schlosser). SUSEM. (610)

For ἐπεὶ θῆττον = as soon as, Shilleto compares Demosth. *Pentacten.* § 41 p. 978, 18, *Cornel.* § 5 p. 1257, 28: Plato *Protag.* 325 C ἐπειδὴν θῆττον συνέχεται τὰ λεγόμενα, *Alc.* 1. 105 A εἰς θῆττον εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον παρέλθον.

1284 b 1 τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους κτλ.] 'Who had become haughty from having once held empire.' The meaning of ἐπὶ, 'to have been in authority' or 'to have reached empire,' is worth noting. It seems a metaphorical parallel to ἐπ' ἄκρον εἶναι, or ἐπ' εὐθείαις κινεῖσθαι. Compare perhaps Dem. *Protoph.* I § 7 p. 42, 4 ἀν' ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἐβλήθητε γενέσθαι γράμματα.

ἐπέσκοπτε πολλῶν] 'used often to reduce.' Cyrus and the Lydians, Herod. I. 156; externally regarded, his conduct was certainly unusually mild. In regard to the Babylonians see Herod. III. 159 (Eaton). Comp. Duncker's *History of Antiquity* (ed. 4) IV. pp. 334 ff., 464 ff., 477 ff. (vol. VI. cc. 6, 7, 14 Eng. tr.). SUSEM. (611)

τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθάς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβεβηκυῖαι (V)  
 5 πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι τοῦτο δρῶσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ  
 περὶ τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοπούσας τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει  
 § 21 τρόπον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ  
 ἐπιστημῶν· οὔτε γὰρ γραφεὺς ἐάσειεν ἂν τὸν ὑπερβάλ-  
 λοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῶον, οὐδ' εἰ δια-  
 10 φέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὔτε πρύμναν ναυπηγὸς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων  
 τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεώς, οὐδὲ δὴ χοροδιδάσκαλος τὸν μεί-  
 ζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χοροῦ φθεγγόμενον ἐάσει συγ-  
 § 22 χορεύειν. ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχας 6

5 ἀλλὰ <καὶ> Koraes || 8 ἐάσει ἂν M<sup>s</sup>, ἐάσει ἂν P<sup>4</sup> || 10 ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 11 τι omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, hence [τι] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 13 ὥστε .....15 δρῶσιν transposed to follow 20 διορθοῦν Thurot (see *Introd.* 83), by Bernays to precede 7 δῆλον. See Comm. n. (612). Or is the sentence an interpolation, and no change required?

The problem (what to do with men of preeminent merit) is urgent even in the normal state, § 20. Principles of symmetry require that, as in the arts, there should be no disproportionate influence or merit, § 21. This is a frequent cause of revolutions (δι' ὑπεροχὴν), as is explained VIII(v). 2 §§ 6—8, § 3 (Eatons).

§ 20 4 καὶ = even the normal forms.

§ 21 8 τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας] 'a foot that violates symmetry in its size' (the gen. as in § 16, πλωτήρων), 'even if it were of surpassing beauty.' κάλλος adverbial acc., cp. λοιπὰ c. 12 § 2. For the order of the words (hyperbaton) see Vahlen's *Arist. Aufsätze* II. pp. 41—44. On symmetry, see *Metaph.* M. 3 § 11, 1078 a 36, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὀρισμένον: this is illustrated in *Pol.* IV(vii). 4 § 7, *Poet.* 7 §§ 4—7.

§ 22 The transposition of these words was proposed by Thurot and Bernays (see *Introd.* p. 83). Bernays renders "Hence this point need not stand in the way of a good understanding between single rulers and the city communities; so far, that is, as their personal rule is useful (also) for the cities and they adopt this procedure." Thus he understands ταῖς πόλεσι to be those which are ruled by μονάρχας. So Postgate (*Notes* p. 7):—"ταῖς πόλεσιν in both sentences are not 'free states' nor 'dependencies,' but the states governed by the μοναρχαὶ (notice not τύραννοι)." See note (612).

15 κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχὰς] Hence in regard to admitted instances of superiority the case for Ostracism possesses a certain political justification, a ground of right.

§ 23 It would be better to frame the constitution so as not to require anything of the sort; failing that, the next best course is to adopt it as a corrective measure. Unfortunately it was used in the cities for factious purposes.

17 βέλτιον μὲν οὖν κτλ] Comp. VIII(v). 3 § 3 n. (1510) where the same recommendation is given, καίτοι βέλτιον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ ἐνέσονται τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοντες, ἢ ἐάσαντας γενέσθαι ἰᾶσθαι ὕστερον, and c. 8 § 12 n. (1619). SUSEM. (611 b)

13 ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο κτλ] It is only with the gravest misgivings that I have followed Thurot in the transposition of § 22, b 13—15, to this place and in his other by no means simple changes. But I see no other means of obtaining any really consistent connexion, corresponding to the one idea prevalent throughout the whole chapter, namely that the measures taken by Monarchs and Republics rest in this respect on the same principle, and that the same problem must be considered by the true forms of Monarchy and Republic, and not merely by the degenerate ones. Thus in these matters a republic has no advantage over a monarchy; on the contrary the corresponding measures of violence are generally calculated with a view to the maintenance of the monarchy,

συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκίας ἀρχῆς ὠφέλιμον (VIII)  
ταῖς πόλεσιν οὔσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν. διὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογου-  
μένας ὑπεροχὰς ἔχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικὸν ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ  
τὸν ὀστρακισμόν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐννοητέην ἐξ ἀρχῆς  
οὕτω συστήσai τὴν πολιτείαν ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης  
ιατρείας· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἂν συμβῇ, πειρᾶσθαι τοιοῦτο  
τινὶ διορθώματι διορθοῦν. <ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλίζει τοῖς  
<μονάρχαις συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκίας ἀρχῆς ὠφέ-  
<λίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὔσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν.> ὕπερ οὐκ ἐγίνετο περὶ  
τὰς πόλεις· οὐ γὰρ ἔβλεπον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς οἰκίας

14 μονάρχους II<sup>2</sup> Bk. | τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἀρχῇ Thurot, τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἀρχῇ <ῶς>? Susem.  
<ἔκεν> ἀρχῆς Schneider, <χάρων> ἀρχῆς Schmidt | ὠφέλιμον [ταῖς πόλεσιν  
οὔσης] Thurot (the best suggestion as yet), ὠφέλιμου.....οὔσης transposed to follow 19  
ιατρείας Schmidt | 15 ταῖς πόλεσιν] ταῖς πολλοῖς Lindau

while it often happens that they are employed in a degenerate republic not for the corresponding purpose, the maintenance of the republic, but without any plan or principle. In this way the connection is best established. On the other hand it is impossible to fit into any part of the dissertation the idea which Bernays, Postgate, and others find there, that it is rather a question of an agreement between absolute monarchs and their subjects; of absolute rule for the benefit of the latter, and of the banishment of powerful party leaders; with a view to the maintenance of absolute rule and also to the advantage (and therefore with the consent) of the governed. The instance of Pittacus, quoted by Postgate, 14 § 10, is not even appropriate, for it was not as *ἀστυνόμος* that Pittacus banished the Oligarchs: on the contrary, it was not till after their banishment that he was elected *ἀστυνόμος* by the people in order that he might command them against the exiles who were trying to effect their return by arms and violence. He at length brought about the peaceful return of the exiles, and reconciled the parties to one another. Even this interpretation cannot however be obtained without a transposition, viz. that, as Bernays proposed, § 11, *ἔπειτα ὁ δὲ*, be inserted between *ἐπεὶ* and *ὅτι* at the end of § 10; these words, if understood in the sense required, cannot retain their present place, as Postgate thinks. For two conclusions, both introduced by particles of inference (*ἐπεὶ*, *ὅτι*) cannot possibly follow each other if, as the sense here

shows, the second does not follow from the first, but is like the first an inference drawn from preceding premises. Moreover Aristotle nowhere else designates a monarch's subjects as *πόλεις*; we should rather expect *τοῖς ἀρχομένοις* or at any rate *τοῖς πολιταῖς* in both places instead of *ταῖς πόλεσιν*: and, if the philosopher wished to employ this last expression, at any rate *ταῖς ἐαυτῶν πόλεσιν*. Besides, in the second place, the insertion of *καὶ* "also" before *ταῖς πόλεσιν* would be indispensable for the sense, as Bernays' own translation shows. Still in face of all these difficulties, the question may arise whether it is not advisable, instead of making all these violent changes, to regard the whole passage (which we can easily dispense with) as an interpolation by another hand. SUSEM. (612)

10 *ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίνετο* If Thurot's transposition be approved, this means: "but the free states did not employ Ostracism as a measure beneficial to their government." Without any such change Bernays and others make it refer to the words *τοιοῦτο τι διορθώματι διορθοῦν*:—it was not used as a corrective.

11 *οὐ γὰρ ὥλεσεν κτλ* It is probable that there was often chicanery in the exercise of Ostracism, especially under an absolute democracy. It is said that when it was enforced for the last time at Athens, Alcibiades and Nicias diverted it, contrary to the original intention, to a third person Hyperbolus, and that this led to its disuse. Even if the story in this form is not to be relied on, still it may have become apparent on that oc-

- § 24 συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ στασιαστικῶς ἐχρῶντο τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς. ἐν (V)  
 μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκυῖαις πολιτείαις ὅτι μὲν ἰδίᾳ συμ-  
 φέρει καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστι, φανερόν, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἀπλῶς  
 25 δίκαιον, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας γ'  
 ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν  
 ὑπεροχὴν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλὰ (P.)  
 § 25 ἂν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετὴν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ  
 γὰρ δὴ φαῖεν ἂν δεῖν ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦ-  
 30 τον· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου (παραπλήσιον  
 γὰρ καὶ εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν), μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς.  
 λείπεται τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ  
 πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους αἰδίου  
 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

24 [οὐχ] Bernays || 25 ἐπεὶ P<sup>2.3</sup> || 31 ἀξιοῖμεν Γ Susem.<sup>1.2</sup>, ἀξιοῖ μὲν M<sup>8</sup>. The parentheses Hampke, but the subject is not strictly the same as in the principal clause: μερίζοντας? Susem. || 32 ὅπερ <καὶ> Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> and possibly Γ (*quod et videtur* William); perhaps rightly || 33 ἀσμένως] ἀναγκαίως P<sup>4.6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || βασι-  
 λείας P<sup>2.3</sup> T<sup>b</sup>

casion how easily a combination of two parties could defeat the true aim of this institution, and turn it against the most zealous of patriots. Indeed there is no evidence that it was ever actually resorted to again at Athens. Cp. Schömann pp. 182, 395 Eng. tr. When the healthy life of parties ceased there, and especially when its surplus strength began to fail the state, and every man of talent was needed at his post, Ostracism proved to be superfluous. When it had been more than once employed in order to remove some person displeasing to the dominant party (Damon Plut. *Per.* 4., *Aristid.* 7., Callias Pseudo-Andoc. IV. 32) it disappeared from the frame-work of the Constitution (See-liger). SUSEM. (613)

Summary of results: *the removal of eminent men is (α) expedient and just in the interests of perverted constitutions, but (β) not absolutely just. The best state can neither expel such a man of preeminent merit, nor treat him as an ordinary subject. It only remains to make him sovereign*, §§ 24, 25.

§ 24 23 ἰδίᾳ] expedient and just in the private interest of the government. Not 'in particular cases.' This is a restatement of §§ 18, 20.

24 οὐχ ἀπλῶς sc. ἐστὶ δίκαιον. The mere fact of its accord with the δίκαιον of a perverted state is decisive, c. 9 § 3.

25 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας] Aristotle does not say what should be done in a Polity or a false Aristocracy, which are also to be reckoned among right forms of government. Is it possible that he regarded Ostracism as still admissible? Further comp. *un.* on II. 9 § 30 (339); III. 6 § 1 (521); III. 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), § 13 (601); 17 §§ 4, 5 (677—8); VI(IV). 2 §§ 1, 2 (1133-6-7), 10 § 3 (1280) and *Introd.* p. 43 ff. SUSEM. (614)

26 οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν] κατὰ governs ὑπεροχὴν. Note that the cases chiefly alleged for Ostracism before, § 15, are now excluded.

§ 25 31 τοῦ Διὸς] Used proverbially, as in Herod. V. 49 ἥδη τῷ Διὶ πλούτου πέρι ἐρίζετε, 'ye vie with Zeus in wealth.' Comp. *Nic. Eth.* VI. 13 § 8, 1145 a 10 ἔτι ὁμοιον καὶ εἰ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φατὴν ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν (Eaton).

μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς] 'Nor to rule such an one, in a distribution of offices': i.e. to treat him as a subject. Better taken with ἄρχειν γε than, as Bernays and others, with ἀξιοῖεν, in which case it must be strained to mean κατὰ μέρος ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος as in c. 17 § 7, οὐτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος.

33 βασιλέας αἰδίου] Kings for life. The form of the phrase, and the words ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν certainly do not favour the reference to Alexander which it was once

ἴσως δὲ καλῶς ἔχει μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους μετα-IX  
βῆναι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ βασιλείας φάμεν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν  
πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην. σκεπτεῖον δὲ πότερον συμφέρει  
τῇ μὲν καλῶς οἰκησέσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρῃ βασι-  
λεύεσθαι, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἄλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλλον, ἢ τισὶ μὲν  
συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρει. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον διελέσθαι  
πότερον ἐν τι γένος ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἢ πλείους ἔχει διαφοράς.

ῥάδιον δὲ τοῦτό γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλείω τε γένη περι-2  
έχει καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν οὐχ εἰς πασῶν. ἢ γὰρ ἐν  
τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτεία δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν  
κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάντων, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ

38 ὁρισμένους Γ Μ<sup>o</sup> | 37 εἶναι <καὶ> Koraes | δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ Π Ar. Bk. |  
40 δὴ Γ Μ<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup>.2.3 | 41 ἐν τι ἐν τῷ Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. | αὐτῶν Π<sup>2</sup> Ar.

1285 a 1 ῥᾶπον Μ<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup> | δὲ Susem.<sup>2</sup> (perhaps rightly) | 4 &] δ' ἢ P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>5</sup> T<sup>6</sup> U<sup>6</sup>  
L<sup>6</sup>, γὰρ Ar.

the fashion to discover in the treatise. From VIII(v). 10 § 8 we learn that the historical origin of the Macedonian monarchy was widely different from this exaltation of one eminent citizen of extraordinary endowments to lifelong sway.

c. 14 Transition to the particular constitutions or forms of the state, the first of which is **Monarchy**. *There are five actual and historical types of single rule: (α) the Spartan king, (β) the oriental sovereign, (γ) the αἰσχροκράτης or dictator, (δ) the king in the heroic age: §§ 2—14. To all of these is opposed a distinct type, (ε) that of the absolute sovereign with full powers, § 15.*

The last type is alone of value for our inquiry, because, as shown 14 § 25, 17 §§ 7, 8, it is a rare, but quite legitimate, form of the best constitution. See *Introd.* pp. 44—47. *Analyst.* p. 112 f., and VI(IV). c. 10.

§ 1 36 φάμεν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν] Bernays, *Transl.* p. 173 n., arguing in favour of his assumption that cc. 12, 13 are an independent sketch, points out that there is no link to connect these works with the foregoing, as the normal constitutions are not mentioned. He therefore prefers to take the clause in direct conjunction with c. 11 § 21, which closes with the words, 'the laws in the normal forms of the state must necessarily be just, but those in the perverted forms not just.' To this it may be replied that there is a mention of the 'normal forms' in c. 13 § 20 (cp. §§ 18, 24, which imply the same antithesis). But it is more im-

portant to insist that a merely verbal allusion of the kind, is, after all, inconclusive, whereas the discussion of monarchy forms a natural sequel to the result enunciated in c. 13 §§ 24, 25: which, be it observed, answers the question of § 13 and § 6. Indeed Bernays' view would have been more tenable if he had shortened the duplicate version to c. 12, c. 13 §§ 1—12, and had allowed the main thread of the discussion to be resumed at c. 12 § 13, instead of at c. 14 § 1. Comp. *Introd.* p. 42 n. (3).

38 οἰκησέσθαι] middle, II. 1 § 3. πόλει καὶ χώρῃ] Comp. IV(VII). 6 § 5 χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν. This admits the case of the ἔθνος or nation, and helps us to see that Aristotle would not have allowed Persia or Macedon to rank as a πόλις, although he would have admitted their claim to possess a πολιτεία, and although he calls the subjects πολῖται, § 7. Cp. n. on 12 § 8.

§ 2 1285 a 1 γένη] Used indifferently with εἶδος (§§ 5, 6, 8, 11) for 'species' or 'variety': so I. 11 § 5 n., VI(IV). 4 § 8.

§ 3 'The kingly office in the Spartan constitution is held to be the truest type of monarchy according to law,' i.e. constitutional or limited monarchies [(tyrannies).

4 ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ κτλ.] 'He is merely commander in war when he has quitted the country.' See Schoemann p. 228 Eng. tr. It is remarkable that Aristotle does not notice the judicial power of the Spartan kings and their

5 τὴν χώραν, ἡγεμῶν ἐστὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον· ἔτι δὲ τὰ (I)  
 § 4 πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ  
 βασιλεία οἶον στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρίτωρ καὶ αἰδῖος ἐστίν· κτεῖ-  
 ναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἐν τινί [βασιλείᾳ], καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν  
 ἀρχαίων, ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νομῶ. δηλοῖ  
 10 δ' Ὀμηρος· Ἀγαμέμνων γὰρ κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων ἡνείχετο ἐν  
 § 5 ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἦν. λέγει γὰρ  
 ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης...

οὐ οἶ...

ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας ἢ δ' οἰωνούς·

πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.

15 ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίου, τούτων 3

6. τοὺς omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [τοὺς] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 7 αὐτοκρατόρων II Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 8 [βασι-  
 λείᾳ] Susem. and Bernays independently, [ἐν τινὶ βασιλείᾳ] Giph. (untranslated by  
 Ar.) Jackson (who would transpose 9 ἐν ταῖς.....ἐξόδοις before καθάπερ). Other  
 suggestions in my critical edition: add ἐνεκα δειλίας Bywater || 9 νομῶ Fäsi (see  
 Passow's lexicon) νόμῳ all MSS. edd. || 10 ὁ γὰρ ἀγαμέμνων II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 11 γὰρ II<sup>1</sup>  
 Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, γοῦν P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. Susem.<sup>3</sup>, οὖν P<sup>4</sup> || 12 μάχης] νοήσω P<sup>1</sup> (1st  
 hand, μάχης is added in the margin by corr.<sup>1</sup>); φεύγοντα νοήσω added by Γ (*videro*  
*fugientem e proelio* William) Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> (comp. Römer *Sitzungsber. der Münchn. Ak.*  
*phil. Cl.* 1884. II. pp. 270—276, Busse *op. c.* p. 34), φεύγοντα κιχείω by Camot, φεύγοντα  
 κυρέω an unknown hand on the margin of the Munich Aldine; ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσ-  
 σοντα νοήσω *Nic. Eth.* III. 8. 4. See Comm. n. (619) || 13 ἐσεῖται M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>3</sup>, ἐσειται P<sup>4</sup>

presidency in the Senate and the Popular Assembly, especially as in treating afterwards of monarchy in the heroic age (§ 12 n. 628) he rightly emphasizes the former. SUSEM. (616)

§ 4 8 εἰ μὴ ἐν τινί] “except in a specified case.” To the other remedies suggested for this passage Jackson adds the omission of the words 8 ἐν τινὶ βασιλείᾳ and the transposition of 9 ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις to take their place.

καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων] In general we can observe in the office of the Spartan kings many traces of its descent from the old Greek monarchy of the heroic age. See Schömann p. 227 Eng. tr., Trieber p. 114. SUSEM. (617) So as representing the state in relation to the gods, Her. VI. 57, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 13 § 2, 8, 15 § 1. The Spartan state was the early Greek state of the heroic age, barbarically, not scientifically, martial, and from its simple martial organization free. Elsewhere such a state did historically pass into an oligarchy, as the nobles profited by the decline in the power both of the king and of the assembly of warriors. But the peculiar circumstances of Sparta crystallized

(or shall we say fossilized?) this early form, with just so much of modification (Ephors, Helots &c) as sufficed to secure its maintenance.

9 ἐν χειρὸς νομῶ] in hand to hand encounters.

10 Ἀγαμέμνων γὰρ κτλ] ‘For Agamemnon was content to listen to chiding in their debates’: e.g. *Iliad* I. 225. SUSEM. (618)

The Homeric ‘ecclesia,’ or ἀγορά, is not the βουλὴ of chiefs (as Congreve supposed) but a counterpart of the assembly of citizens in time of peace. See Gladstone *Homeric Studies* II. p. 114 ff., Freeman *Comp. Politics*, pp. 201—207. Grote has unduly depreciated it.

§ 5 11 λέγει γὰρ] *Iliad* II. 391 ff. But in our texts the wording is slightly different, and the last words πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος are wanting. The same lines are also quoted, with a slightly different reading ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσ-  
 σοντα νοήσω | οὐ οἶ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυ-  
 γέειν κύνας, in *Nic. Eth.* III. 8. 4 from *Il.* XV. 349 ff., where the variation from our present reading is still greater. SUSEM. (619)

6 δ' αἰ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσὶν αἱ δ' αἰρεταί· παρά ταύτην δ' (IX)  
 ἄλλο μοναρχίας εἶδος, οἷαι παρ' ἐνίοις εἰσὶ βασιλείαι τῶν  
 βαρβάρων. ἔχουσι δ' αὐταὶ τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν  
 τυραννίσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαί· διὰ γὰρ  
 τὸ δουλικώτεροι τὰ ἤθη εἶναι φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν  
 Ἑλλήνων οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην,  
 ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες.  
 τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰσὶν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ  
 τὸ πάτριον καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βασι-  
 λικὴ καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. οἱ γὰρ πολί-  
 ται φυλάττουσιν ὅπλοις τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους  
 ξενικόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἐκόντων οἱ δ' ἀκόν-  
 των ἄρχουσιν. ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ δ' ἐπὶ  
 τοὺς πολίτας ἔχουσι τὴν φυλακὴν. δύο μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα  
 μοναρχίας, ἕτερον δ' ὅπερ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἑλλησιν,

18 παραπλησίαν P<sup>12</sup> (1st hand, emended by the same hand), παραπλησίαι P<sup>12</sup> C<sup>1</sup>  
 Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>) 19 τυραννίσιν,  
 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ Susem., τυραννίσιν καὶ κατὰ Γ M<sup>a</sup>, τυραννίσιν κατὰ P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>2</sup>),  
 τυραννὶ κατὰ P<sup>2</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), τυραννικαὶ κατὰ C<sup>1</sup>, τυραννικαὶ κατὰ Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup>  
 S<sup>b</sup>, τυραννικὴν εἰσὶ δ' ὁμοῦ κατὰ P<sup>1-2</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup>, τυραννίδι εἰσὶ δ' ὁμοῦ κατὰ At.,  
 τυραννικῇ εἰσὶ δ' ὁμοῦ κατὰ W<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. 20 πατρικαὶ Γ M<sup>a</sup>, πατρικαὶ R<sup>b</sup>, πάτριον?  
 Susem. 21 δουλικώτεροι P<sup>1</sup> Q U<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. δουλικώτερας M<sup>b</sup> 22 εἶναι τὰ ἤθη Bk.,  
 εἶναι τὰ ἔθη H<sup>2</sup> Ar. 23 πάτριαι H<sup>2</sup> Bk., πατριαι Schneider 24 αἰτίαν] ταύτην?  
 P (Susem. William) Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, perhaps right 27 <τὸ> ξενικόν? Sylburg (wrongly)

16 αἱ δ' αἰρεταί] Possibly the τὰ αἰρεταί of Thucyd., called βασιλεῖς Her. v. 63. Thus, i. 111: compared with the Roman dictator by Dion. Hal. Greece retained few traces of that older institution common to many Aryan races, an elective monarchy or chieftainship but with presumption greatly in favour of a few noble families (βασιλεῖς=duke, while ἀναξ= noble). See Gladstone *Hom. Stud.* III. 51, *German Comp. Politics*, Lect. IV pp. 114—150.

§ 6 The oriental monarchy is a rule over unfree subjects (ἀσποτική) with their consent and in virtue of traditional forms.

18 παραπλησίαν τυραννίσιν] In Eur. *Alkestis*, 423, οὐ γὰρ τυραννὶδ' ὥστε βαρβάρων ἔχω, the rule of non-Greek kings is called a tyranny (Eaton). SUSEM. (670) 19 διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι κτλ] Comp. i. 3 § 7, 4 n. (11), IV (VII), 3 § 15, 14 § 21; 1002 = At. (54, 750, 751). SUSEM. (621)

20 τὰ ἤθη] This accus. 'of respect' depends on δουλικώτεροι. Comp. 9 § 10 αἰρεταί εἰς μῦθοι, 12 § 2, 13 § 6.

§ 7 23 ἀσφαλεῖς] firmly established, not to be overthrown (like tyranny).

"Yet in 16 § 9, 1187 b 3, as in 11 § 3, 1281 b 26, and in II. 8 § 16 'safe,' 'trustworthy' is the meaning." (T. L. Heath.)

24 ἡ φυλακὴ] From meaning 'self-defence'—see VIII (1), 11 § 37—the word came to be used in the concrete sense of a protecting force, or body-guard. So also ὅπως μὴτε φυλακὴ τρέφῃται, VIII (V), 11 § 8.

26 ξενικόν] Foreigners, a force of foreign mercenaries. Comp. i. 15 § 10 a, (656), § 14 (666), and especially VIII (V), 10 § 10, φυλακὴ τυραννικὴ διὰ ξένων, α. (1665), *Attic*, I. 2 § 19, 1357 b 30 B., Herod. I. 59 (Eaton). SUSEM. (622)

§ 8 State officers called ἀντιπρόσωποι were appointed anciently in tribal times, some for life, others with a commission to accomplish a definite political task (πρόξενος). Hence their analogy to the Roman dictators.

30 ἕτερον δ' αἰρετὴ τυραννίς] Comp. 15 § 14 n. 667, VI (IV), 10 § 2 a. (1177—78). In the *Polity of Cyrus* (*Str.* 481, 1357 a

οὓς καλοῦσιν αἰσυμνήτας. ἔστι δὲ τοῦθ' ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν (IX)  
 αἵρετή τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ  
 § 9 νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἦρχον δ' οἱ μὲν  
 διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὀρισμένων  
 35 χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οἷον εἴλοντό ποτε Μιτυληναῖοι Πιπτα-  
 κὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ  
 § 10 Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοῖ δ' Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἴλοντο  
 τὸν Πιπτακὸν ἔν τινι τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν· ἐπιτιμᾷ γὰρ ὅτι

τὸν κακοπάτριδα

40  
 1285 b

Πιπτακὸν πόλιος τὰς διχόλω καὶ βαρυδαίμονος  
 ἐστάσαντο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπαινέοντες ἀολλέες.

35 οἶαν M<sup>s</sup>, οἶαν P<sup>1</sup>, οἶαν P<sup>4</sup> || φιπτακὸν Π<sup>1</sup> and so subsequently || 38 σκολιῶν  
 Götting || 40 πόλιος Schneidewin, πόλεως all MSS. edd. || διχόλω Schmidt  
 Bergk, ἐχόλω or ἀχόλω M<sup>s</sup>, ἀχόλω ΓΠ<sup>2</sup>P<sup>1</sup> Ar. Bk. Susem. <sup>1.2.3</sup>, ἀσχόλω Camerarius

1285 b 1 μέγ' | μέν Γ M<sup>s</sup> and apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || παλινεντες? H.  
 L. Ahrens

5 ff. = 476 Rose *Ar. pseud.* = 192 Müller)  
 Aristotle stated that in olden times the  
 tyrants were called αἰσυμνήται (ὁ δὲ Ἀρισ-  
 τοτέλης ἐν Κυμαίων πολιτείᾳ τοὺς τυράν-  
 νους φησὶ τὸ πρότερον αἰσυμνήτας προσ-  
 αγορεύεσθαι. εὐφημότερον γὰρ ἐκείνο τοῦ-  
 νομα). SUSEM. (623)

32 οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον] For he  
 was constitutionally appointed, although  
 to powers beyond the constitution.

§ 9 35 οἷον εἴλοντο κτλ] The  
 similar fragment of Theophrastos in  
 Dionys. *R. A.* v. 73, already mentioned  
 in the *Introduction* p. 18, n. 7, runs as  
 follows: οἱ γὰρ αἰσυμνήται καλούμενοι  
 παρ' Ἑλλήσι τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ  
 βασιλείας ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος, αἵρετοί τινες  
 ἦσαν τύραννοι· ἡρῶντο δ' αὐτοὺς αἱ πόλεις  
 οὔτ' εἰς ἀόριστον χρόνον, οὔτε συνεχῶς,  
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς, ὅποτε δόξειε συμ-  
 φέρειν, καὶ εἰς πόσον χρόνον: 'Those whom  
 the Greeks in older times called αἰσυμνή-  
 ται were, as Theophrastos states in his  
 books on Monarchy, elected tyrants.  
 But the states did not elect them for an  
 indefinite period, nor yet regularly, but  
 only during the pressure of misfortunes,  
 as often and for as long a period of time  
 as seemed expedient, as e.g. the Mityle-  
 nians once elected Pittacus to ward off  
 the attack of the exiles, who followed the  
 poet Alcaeus.' The single expression  
 "during the pressure of misfortunes"  
 (πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς) is, as Krohn shows,  
 thoroughly in the manner of Theophrastos  
 and "so too is the further treatment which  
 undertakes to assign to αἰσυμνητεία its

historical position in political develop-  
 ment. Originally, he says, there pre-  
 vailed everywhere in Greece a law-  
 abiding monarchy based on law; but  
 gradually this degenerated into arbitrary  
 rule, and the next step was to a republic.  
 But neither did this prove strong enough  
 to uphold law and right, and thus,  
 through the pressure of circumstances,  
 (καιροὶ πολλὰ νεοχμοῦντες) they reverted  
 in reality, though not in name, to the  
 establishment of monarchical powers.  
 Compare the words, v. c. 74, ἡναγκάζοντο  
 παράγειν πάλιν τὰς βασιλικὰς καὶ τυραννι-  
 κὰς ἐξουσίας εἰς μέσον, ὀνόμασι περικαλύπ-  
 τοντες αὐτὰς εὐπρεπεστέρας, Θετταλοὶ μὲν  
 ἀρχοὺς, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἄρμοστὰς καλοῦν-  
 τες, φοβούμενοι τυράννους ἢ βασιλεῖς αὐτοὺς  
 καλεῖν, with the fragment from Theophras-  
 tos Πολιτικά πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς B. 1 (in  
 Harpocr. s. v. ἐπίσκοπος) πολλῷ γὰρ κάλ-  
 lion κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσιν, ὡς οἱ  
 Λάκωνες ἄρμοστὰς φάσκοντες εἰς τὰς πόλεις  
 πέμπειν, οὐκ ἐπισκόπους οὐδὲ φύλακας, ὡς  
 Ἀθηναῖοι, as a proof that the account  
 moves in the sphere of ideas peculiar to  
 Theophrastos." (Henkel *Zur Arist.*  
*Pol.* p. 3, n. 1.) SUSEM. (624)

§ 10 38 σκολιῶν μελῶν] A skolon  
 was a particular kind of drinking song,  
 sung by the guests at a party singly in a  
 certain order. Fragments of them may  
 be found in Bergk *Poet. lyr.* III<sup>4</sup>. p. 643  
 ff. SUSEM. (625)

39 κακοπάτριδα] Does this mean  
 base-born) (εὐπατρίδαι? 'They set up the  
 base-born Pittacus to be tyrant of the

αὐται μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικά (1X)  
εἶναι τυραννικά, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἰρεταὶ καὶ ἐκόντων βασιλικά·  
τέταρτον δ' εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἥρωι-  
κοὺς χρόνους ἐκούσιοί τε καὶ πατέριοι γινόμεναι κατὰ νόμον.  
διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῖς πρώτοις γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους ἐπ' ἐργάτας  
κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι  
χώραν, ἐγίνοντο βασιλεῖς ἐκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσιν  
πατέριοι κύριοι δ' ἦσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας  
καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικά, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς  
δίκας ἔκρινον. τοῦτο δ' ἐποιοῦν οἱ μὲν οὐκ ὁμνύοντες  
οἱ δ' ὁμνύοντες· ὁ δ' ὄρκος ἦν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάστασις. (p. 32)

2 δεσποτικά.....3 τυραννικά Sepulveda, 2 τυραννικά.....3 δεσποτικά F H Ar.  
Bk. || 5 ἐκούσιοι M<sup>1</sup>, ἐκούσια.....πατέριοι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 8 βασιλεῖαι Casaubon, βασιλικά  
right || 10 οὐσιῶν Π<sup>1</sup>, γρ. οὐσιῶν P<sup>3</sup> in the margin || 12 ἐπανάστασις M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1-4</sup>  
and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, emended by the same hand), ἀνάστασις Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, γρ. ἀνάστασις corr.<sup>1</sup>  
in the margin of P<sup>2</sup> and under the text of P<sup>3</sup>

wrathful ill-fated town with loud cries  
assenting in full assembly' (Wyse). Or  
is it 'bane to his country'?

40 Πιττακὸν] See Exc. II. on this  
book, p. 431 ff. SUSEM. (626)

§ 11 1285 b 2 διὰ τὸ δεσποτικά εἶναι  
τυραννικά κτλ] These two species of  
monarchy—viz. oriental despotism and a  
native dictatorship, §§ 6—10—exclude  
the citizens from the government as com-  
pletely as if they were slaves: hence they  
come under coercive or arbitrary rule  
(δεσποτικά, c. 6 § 6 f. with notes). Xerxes  
is οὐκ ἐπεύθυνος πόλει, Aesch. *Perseus* 213:  
Pittacus is ἀπερὸς τύραννος. So far they  
are akin to the rule of an usurper who  
must rest upon force *because he has no  
legal title to his position*. On the other  
hand they are definitely separated from  
such rule by having a very good and legiti-  
mate title. As Aristotle says they are  
'elective and over willing subjects'; as we  
should put it, they rest upon the con-  
sent of the governed. See n. (634).

41 αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἥρωϊκοὺς χρόνους]  
The monarchies of the heroic age are de-  
scribed by Grote, Part I c. 20; Gladstone  
*Studies on Homer* II. pp. 1—69. See also  
Froeman *Comp. Politics* Lect. IV. and  
Lect. II. p. 64 ff.

§ 12 ὁ διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῖς πρώτοις...ἐπ' ἐργά-  
τας] Comp. c. 15 § 11 (ἀπ' ἐπ' ἐργασίας)  
n. (630) and VIII(v). 10 § 3 ἀπ' ἐπ' ἐργασίας  
ἀρσενίῃ ἢ πρὸς τῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, n.  
(642). SUSEM. (627)

7 κατὰ τέχνας] In the arts (of peace).

He is probably thinking of the mythical  
inventors.

8 τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσιν πατέριοι] 'he-  
reditary kings for their successors.' Yet  
we can hardly be wrong in conjecturing  
that the Hellenic chieftains had once been,  
like the Teutonic, elected. Comp. Kuhn-  
way *The Land Tenure in Homer* in the  
*Journal of Hellenic Studies* VI. 1885, p.  
337: the τέμενος of Odysseus is by no  
means secure to Telemachos, *Odys.* XI.  
184 f.

10 καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν κτλ] "Such as did  
not require a priest acquainted with special  
rites," e.g. like the Eumolpids (Jebb).  
So Saul, the Israelitish king, is de-  
scribed as offering sacrifice.

11 τοῦτο—the judicial functions. It is  
not the 'coronation oath' that is in ques-  
tion, as Mr Lang assumed. *Elmsley* p.  
23.

12 τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάστασις] 'The  
form of oath consisted in the act of uplif-  
ting the sceptre.' Comp. *Iliad* I. 233 f.  
ἐπὶ μέγαν ὄρκον ἀμοιβῆσαι καὶ μὴ τὸδε σέπτε-  
ρον, VII. 412 τὸ σέπτερον ἀνέσχεθε πῶς  
θεοῖσιν, X. 321 τὸ σέπτερον ἀνέσχεο καὶ  
μοι δάσσαν; also n. (616) generally. SUSEM.  
(628)

The sceptre as an instrument of the  
oath is always a symbol of office, whether  
kingly or judicial. Note that while Homer  
calls the thing sworn by (σέπτερον, *Iliad*  
VII. 411 &c.) ὄρκος, Aristotle gives the  
name to the solemn accompanying act.

- § 13 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων [καὶ] τὰ κατὰ πόλιν 8  
καὶ τὰ ἐνδῆμα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια συνεχῶς ἦρχον· ὕστερον  
15 δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλέων, τὰ δὲ τῶν  
ὄχλων παραιρουμένων, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν αἱ πάτριαι  
θυσίαι κατελείφθησαν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι μόνον, ὅπου δ' ἄξιον  
εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπερορίοις τῶν πολεμικῶν  
τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον εἶχον.
- § 14 βασιλείας μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα, τέτταρα τὸν ἀριθμόν, X  
21 μία μὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους (αὕτη δ' ἦν ἐκόντων  
μὲν, ἐπὶ τισὶ δ' ὠρισμένοις· στρατηγός τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικα-  
στής ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος), δευτέρα  
δ' ἡ βαρβαρική (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ γένους ἀρχὴ δεσποτική  
25 κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δὲ ἦν αἰσυμνητεία προσαγορεύουσιν  
(αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν αἵρετὴ τυραννίς), τετάρτη δὲ ἡ Λακωνικὴ  
τούτων (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν στρατηγία κατὰ  
§ 15 γένος αἰδίου)· αὗται μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαφέρουσιν  
ἀλλήλων, πέμπτον δ' εἶδος βασιλείας, ὅταν ἡ πάντων 2  
30 κύριος εἷς ὢν ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη τῶν

13 [καὶ] St Hilaire || 16 αἱ πάτριαι M<sup>s</sup>, omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || οὐσίαι II<sup>1</sup> ||  
|| 18 εἶναι] καὶ Koraes || 22 ὠρισμένων M<sup>s</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Ar. (?) || τε omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Bk.  
|| 27 εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 30 εἷς omitted by I M<sup>s</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || ὦν περ Bücheler,  
probably right, [ὥσπερ.....ἐκάστη] Conring

§ 13 14 τὰ ἐνδῆμα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια] domestic and foreign affairs.

15 τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κτλ.] 'As the kings themselves resigned some of their functions, while others were taken from them by the populace.' παραιρουμένων = shredding or paring off, as in c. 5 § 8.

16 ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις κτλ.] Thus at Athens the second of the nine Archons specially superintended religious worship and bore the title of King Archon, as the successor in this respect of the ancient kings. Comp. further Herod. III. 142, IV. 161 (kings at Cyrene), VII. 149 (kings at Argos), 153; also VII(VI). 8 § 10 n. (1482) below and n. (1653) on VIII(V). 10 § 6. SUSEM. (629) For the functions of the King Archon (whose wife was βασίλισσα, as the wife of the Roman 'rex sacrorum' was called 'regina') see also Lysias c. *Andocidem*, Or. 6 §§ 4, 5: on the Argive kings Pausanias II. 19 § 1 and Plutarch *De fort. Alex.* II § 8, p. 340 D: and in general on these shadowy survivals of a former real kingship, including the interrex and rex sacrorum or sacrificulus, Dion. Hal. IV. 74, Plutarch *Quaest. Rom.* 63, p. 279 C, and Freeman

op. c. pp. 147 ff., 430—441, whence these references are taken.

17 ὅπου δ' ἄξιον sc. ἦν; where it deserved to be called a kingdom.

19 τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον] This is decidedly too strong an assertion, see n. (616). In § 14 where the Spartan kings are mentioned, it is more correctly limited by the qualifying phrase ὡς εἰπεῖν, for the most part. SUSEM. (630) The Argive kings belonged to this class of commanders in war: Herod. VII. 149.

§ 14 22 ἐπὶ τισὶ δ' ὠρισμένοις] On certain fixed conditions: ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι, Thuc. I. 13.

24 ἐκ γένους = κατὰ γένους, hereditary.

27 ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν] See n. (630) and II. 9 § 33, ἐπὶ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν οὐσι στρατηγοῖς αἰδίοις, n. (343). SUSEM. (631)

§ 15 The fifth species is opposed to all the foregoing, so far as they are limited or varieties of constitutional rule. It is a monarchy answering to the art of household management, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν: cp. I. 1 § 2.

30 ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη] Like each separate barbarian

κοινῶν, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν. ὥσπερ γάρ ἡ (X) οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ <παμ>βασιλεία πόλεως [καὶ ἔθνους ἐνὸς ἢ πλείονων] οἰκονομία.

5 σχεδὸν δὲ δύο ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν εἶδη βασιλείας περὶ ὧν σκεπτόμεν, αὕτη τε καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ μεταξὺ τούτων εἰσὶν. ἐλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασι-

31 τεταγμένων Montecatino: Bächeler rightly thinks no change needed; if any, he prefers τεταγμένη. 31 παμβασιλεία Susem., βασιλεία Γ. Ar. Bk. See VII(IV). 10 § 3, 1295 a 19. 33 [καὶ.....πλείονων] Susem.<sup>2</sup>, see Comm. n. (633). 34 καὶ § M<sup>2</sup>. 35 πλείονος M<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> and Π<sup>2,3</sup> (1st hand, altered by corr.<sup>1</sup>). Postgate explains this as the gen. of πλείον used as a subst. 36 οἰκονομίας Π<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> and Π<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, altered by corr.<sup>1</sup> or corr.<sup>2</sup>). 36 βασιλείας Π<sup>1</sup>

tribe or Hellenic city. Comp. *nn.* (11. 633). *MUSEUM* (632).

33 πόλεως...οἰκονομία] It is difficult to see what could have induced Aristotle to describe absolute monarchy not only as dominion over a state, but also to add "and over a nation," where we should at any rate have expected "or" (as M<sup>2</sup> gives); and not content with this, even to add "or several nations." Throughout his work he is dealing with the forms of government of a state, not of a nation: (see 1. 2. 4 n. 11) and there is nothing in the nature of absolute monarchy, which would justify such an exceptional extension. On the contrary, it appears further on in the work (17 § 1, § 5 n. 677), as has been stated several times already, that the only admissible and possible non-despotic absolute monarchy is that which can be conceived in the ideal state in the exceptional case described in c. 13. The interpolator has been misled by the preceding words ἐκαστου ἔθνεος καὶ πόλεως, and has made the mistake into which since his time many modern critics have fallen (see *Introd.* p. 26 and c. 13 § 13 n. 601, § 25 n. 615, 17 § 5 n. 678), of supposing that this Aristotelian absolute monarchy referred to the Macedonian Empire. Cf. also VI(IV). 10 § 3 and n. (1280). *SUSEM.* (632).

Doubtless there are some slight indications in the work itself that Monarchy was actually exercised over a wider area than the territory of a single city. But in such cases it seems to be assumed that the rule must be δεσποτικὴ, and the population not yet fully organized for civil society.

c. 15 From this survey it appears that Monarchy is either (1) a special state office, as at Sparta, or (2) Absolute Monarchy, or something intermediate to these two.

Whether it is expedient to have an hereditary or elective commander-in-chief for life, is a question in the theory of legislation: the expediency of Absolute Monarchy is a constitutional question: §§ 1—3. Montesquieu has criticized Aristotle's classification, *Esprit des Lois* B. XI c. 8, 9.

§ 1 35 αἱ πολλαὶ] The oriental monarchy may be as absolute as the παμβασιλεία; but it is separated from it by the aim and mode of its administration, as δεσποτικὴ ἀρχὴ from οἰκονομικὴ in c. 6 §§ 6, 7. Hence the arbitrary rule of an eastern king is no mere perversion of true monarchy: but because the subjects allow themselves to be enslaved (ἀνδραποδεύου τὰ ἑθνη) they submit to a rule which is primarily for the ruler's advantage (see 6 § 6), and in material results does not greatly differ from tyranny, even as to the four points emphasized c. 14 § 11: (1) the consent of the governed, (2) hereditary, (3) legal forms, and (4) the body-guard.

36 ἐλαττόνων μὲν παμβασιλείας] Of the 'despotic' kings of non-Greek peoples, this is scarcely true. In dealing with Monarchy Aristotle is guilty of the confusion of ideas with which Schwarzet rightly charges him, in *Die Staatsformenlehre des Arist.* p. 32 f. (Aristotle's Theory of the forms of government, Leipzig 1884): he does not properly distinguish between government in accordance with the laws and the legal (i.e. hereditary) origin of the government. [To the former is opposed any arbitrary or personal government whatsoever, whether it be a tyrant, or the great king, or the citizen of transcendent virtue and merit, who rules all things at his own good pleasure ἀρχον ἕκαστος κατὰ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ φρονησάντα]: to the latter is opposed only the unswayed rule of the νόμος.]

To what extent may this also be asserted.

§ 2 λείας, πλειόνων δ' εἰσὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. ὥστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν (X)  
 περὶ δυοῖν ἐστίν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρεται ταῖς πόλεσι στρα-  
 τηγὸν αἰδίου εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ αἵρεσιν,  
 1286 a ἢ οὐ συμφέρεται, ἐν δὲ πότερόν ποτε ἓνα συμφέρεται κύριον εἶναι  
 πάντων, ἢ οὐ συμφέρεται. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρα-  
 τηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας  
 (ἐν ἀπάσαις γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτείαις), (p.)  
 § 3 ὥστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασι-  
 6 λείας πολιτείας εἶδος ἐστίν, ὥστε περὶ τούτου δεῖ θεωρῆσαι  
 καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας.

ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αὕτη, πότερον συμφέρεται μᾶλλον

39 αἵρεσιν P<sup>4.6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ar., μέρος Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2.3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk., ἀρετὴν Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin

1286 a 1 ποτε omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk., perhaps rightly || 3 ἔχει] ἔχεται omitting  
 εἶδος ? Bernays

ed of the αἰσυνητεία? Aristotle does not seem to give a sufficient answer to this question. Both, it is true, are founded on law; but though the elevation of the ideal king in a genuine aristocracy is a suspension of the laws, the αἰσυνητής too, as long as he rules, causes a suspension of the old constitution, and has power to remodel both constitution and laws according to his pleasure. Still the αἰσυνητής himself governs according to his own laws, while the ideal king may, in each single case, disregard them if he pleases. SUSEM. (634)

§ 2 1286 a 3 νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος=presents a branch of legislation rather than of constitution. ἔχειν as in ἔχειν λόγον I. 6 § 9, or ἀπορίαν, III. 10 § 1, II § 1, § 10, 12 § 1: and so ἔχει δ' ἑκάτερα χάριν, *De Part. anim.* I. 5 § 2, 644 b 31. The genitive with εἶδος is again explanatory or defining, much as in ἐν ὀργάνῳ εἶδει, I. 4 § 2. A better example is *Rhet.* II. 22 § 1, 1395 b 21, ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκάτερον (Bekker ἑκατέρου) τούτων ἐστίν. Trans. 'a generalship of this nature is a question for the laws rather than the constitution to examine.' The meaning is better explained in the parallel passage c. 16 § 1.

4 ἐν ἀπάσαις] Comp. 16 § 1 n. (669). SUSEM. (635)

5 ἀφείσθω] 'We may dismiss it for the present.' One of the two passages from which it is inferred that Aristotle intended a treatment of legislation to form part of his *Politics*. See *Introd.* p. 32 n. 1. SUSEM. (636)

τὴν πρώτην=at the first, as in *Meta.* Z (VII). 12 § 12, 1038 a 35, τοσαῦτα

εἰρήσθω τὴν πρώτην. In Herod. I. 153 τὴν πρώτην εἶναι: cf. III. 134. In *Probl.* II. 32 § 2, 869 b 24, ἐκ πρώτης=ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

§ 3 5 ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς κτλ.] "But the remaining mode of royalty forms one species of constitution; hence it must be examined, and the difficulties which it presents must be briefly reviewed." Without doubt then, the difficulties of cc. 15, 16 concern the λοιπὸς τρόπος, i.e. παμβασιλεία. See *iii.* on c. 17 § 1. For ἐπιδραμεῖν 'run over,' like ἐπελθεῖν, comp. *Rhet.* I. 15 § 1, 1375 a 23. The difficulties are collected and partly answered in cc. 15, 16; a decision of some sort is pronounced in c. 17. This is the most confused part of the treatise. The arrangement adopted in the text may be learnt from *Introd.* pp. 83—86, or in greater detail from *Philologus* xxv. 1867. pp. 386—392. Its *rationale* is that the first editor (or publisher) found the discussion imperfect: a lacuna at 16 § 2, 1287 a 10, which he could not fill; three or four supplementary fragments, 16 §§ 4—10, for which he failed to find suitable places in the main discussion; and part of an independent sketch, 16 § 10 (εἰσι δὲ)...§ 13. Hence the changes; c. 16 §§ 4—13 being cut up into four sections and distributed over c. 15, in sequence or juxtaposition to the treatment of related topics there. See *Anal.* p. 112 f.

First ἀπορία: is it expedient to be ruled by the best ruler or the best laws? The passage c. 16 §§ 4—9, on any view of its collocation, manifestly belongs to this question and not to the fifth ἀπορία stated in 16 §§ 2—4.

4 ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων. δο-  
 0 καὶ δὴ τοῖς νομίζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μῆνεν ὁ  
 νόμος λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν. ὥστε  
 ἐν ὁποιοῦν τέχνῃ τὸ κατὰ γράμματ' ἄρχειν ἡλίθιον· καὶ πῶς  
 ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τριήμερον κινεῖν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἰατροῖς,  
 εἰ μὴ πρῶτον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κινδύνῳ. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι  
 5 οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη πολιτεία  
 6 διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκεῖνον δεῖ ὑπάρχειν  
 τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου τοῖς ἄρχουσιν· κρεῖττον δὲ ὅτι μὴ  
 πρόσσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ ὅτι συμφυές. τῷ μὲν οὖν  
 νόμῳ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτ'  
 0 ἔχειν πᾶσαν.

9 δοκοῦσι Bas.<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 10 ο νόμος Götting, ol νόμοι Γ Π Ar. Bk. || 12 <ὥστε>  
 καὶ Conring, <καθὰ> καὶ Koraes || πῶς M<sup>1</sup>, omitted by P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>1</sup> T<sup>1</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and  
 P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), <ὥστε> πῶς <κα>? Susem. || 13 τριήμερον Γ M<sup>1</sup> Ar., τετρίμερον  
 P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 14 αὐτοῦ P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk., αὐτῷ M<sup>1</sup>, αὐτῶν perhaps Ar., αὐτῶν an unknown  
 scholar in the margin of Stahr's copy of Morel's edition, also Schneider following  
 Vettori's translation || 17 δέ] γάρ Koraes, wrongly || 19 τοῦτ' Ald., τοῦτω P<sup>2</sup>  
 and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand)

§ 4 Argument in favour of monarchy.

9 δοκαὶ δὴ κτλ] Now those who maintain kingly rule to be expedient hold that the law lays down general statements (only) and gives no instructions for treating the (various) cases which arise.

"This side is defended in Plato's *Politics* 294—303. Cp. c. 11 § 19 n. (579), c. 16 § 11 nn. (652—3), 11. 8 §§ 18—22 n. (275), VI (IV). 4 § 31 (1210)." SUSEM. (637)

12 ἐν ὁποιοῦν τέχνῃ... ἡλίθιον] Plato brings out the absurdity in navigation and medicine, *Polit.* 298—9.

καὶ πῶς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ] Undoubtedly this is not found in Plato, yet he employs the analogy of the physician, 295 c. See 11. 8 § 18 n. (270), 111. 16 § 6 (726), IV (VII). 2 § 13 (870). SUSEM. (636)

13 μετὰ τὴν τριήμερον... κινδύνῳ] "After the treatment has lasted three days the physician may change it; but if sooner, he does it at his own risk." Herodotus (II. 84) does not mention this, but Diodorus I. 82 § 3 states, without any such limitation, that in Egypt the physicians were paid by the state, and were obliged in their treatment of patients to adhere to a written code, compiled by many of the most celebrated physicians of ancient times. If they acted contrary to prescription, they might be accused of a capital crime (Camerarius). It is not

easy to determine which of the readings, *τριήμερον* or *τετρίμερον*, is correct. That *μελέτην* must be understood with *τὴν τριήμερον* or *τὴν τετρίμερον*, is proved by Postgate from Pseudo-Hippocrates 817 P *τεσσαρακονθήμερον τὴν μελέτην καὶ τὴν ἐπίδεσιν χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι*. Herodotus II. 77 relates that the Egyptians who lived in the corn country purged the body for three successive days in each month by means of emetics and clysters. Diodorus § 1 says that the Egyptians sometimes made daily use of these precautionary means of fasting, vomiting and clysters, but sometimes omitted them for three or four days. Neither does this then supply a safe analogy, if indeed there is an analogy at all. SUSEM. (639)

14 φανερὸν τοίνυν κτλ] An easy victory for one side of the discussion.

§ 5 Reply to this argument.

16 ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκεῖνον κτλ] "But again rulers are obliged to have the general principle, too, before-mentioned; yet that which has no emotional nature" viz. the law "is in general superior to that in which it is innate."

18 τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ κτλ] A similar statement in c. 10 § 5 n. (562 b); *Alc. I. 24*. v. 6 § 5. 1134 a 35; X. 9 § 12. 1182 a 21 (Eaton). SUSEM. (640)

19 τοῦτ' ἔχειν] sc. τὸ παθητικόν, or (10 § 5) τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθῃ καὶ τῇ φύσει.

c. 16 § 5  
1287 a 28

<ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον > (X)

29 <κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μό-  
30 <νους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίον· ἥ τε γὰρ  
<ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους

20 ἀλλ'..... 1287 b 34 ὁμοίως. That the right order has been disturbed was seen by Giphanius, Zwinger, Schneider, Spengel. See *Introd.* 83—86 on the arrangement here followed; also for Cook Wilson's resolution of cc. 15, 16 into two parallel versions 15 §§ 2—10=16 §§ 1—9, §§ 11—13, and for Spengel's proposals.

1287 a 28—b 8. a 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν..... 32 ἐστίν cited by Julian ad Themistium p. 261 B || νόμον] Π Ar. and the Codex Vossianus of Julian, νοῦν Γ Julian and Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 29 δοκεῖ..... ἄρχειν omitted by the Cod. Voss. of Julian || θεὸν] γρ. νοῦν corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup> and corr.<sup>3</sup> of P<sup>2</sup> (both in the margin), ἀλλως νοῦν corr. of P<sup>4</sup> in the margin || τὸν νοῦν μόνους Cod. Voss. of Julian, τοὺς νόμους Γ Π (including fr.) Ar. Julian and Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 30 θηρία Cod. Voss. of Julian perhaps rightly || ἥ τε] ὁ τε M<sup>s</sup>, ὅτε Γ || 31 τοῦτον Cod. Voss. of Julian || ἄρχοντας omitted by Julian, ἄρχον τέλος Γ? (*et furor principatum habuerit, tandem et optimos viros interimet* William), ἄρχων τέλος or ἄρχων <κατὰ> στάς τέλος? Schmidt

Four objections to the human ruler.

c. 16 §§ 5—9; 1287 a 28—b 8. (1) *Law is passionless and therefore its rule is the better*; § 5.

28 ὁ μὲν οὖν] Whether οὖν marks an inference, or is merely a transitional particle, in either case there is a want of logical connexion in its present place. The section might follow 1287 a 23, but there too οὖν would have no force.

νόμον...νοῦν μόνους] The two versions in which this celebrated passage has come down to us can be traced back to an early date. For Julian had before him (as is clear from his words ad Themist. 261 C D ὁρᾷς, ὁ φιλόσοφος...τέλος ἐπιθεῖς τὸν κολοφῶνα τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λόγοις νόμον μὲν εἶναι φησι τὸν νοῦν χωρὶς ὁρέξεως) not the version in the text, but another recension, viz. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἀρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρία· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας. διόπερ ἄνευ ὁρέξεως ὁ νοῦς νόμος ἐστίν. Yet Codex Vossianus of Julian restores to us the valuable reading τὸν νοῦν μόνους, the corruption of which into τοὺς νόμους is the key to the whole confusion. In the existing manuscripts the two recensions are variously blended and confused. See *Julian and Aristotle* in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXVII. 1878 p. 389 f. SUSEM.

Trans. 'he therefore who appoints the Law to rule makes none but God and Reason rulers, it would seem; he who

appoints a human ruler adds thereto a brute; for appetite is akin to the brutes, and anger corrupts even the best of human rulers. Wherefore Law may be called reason unfettered by passion.'

30 προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίον] Best explained by the Platonic simile in *Rep.* IX. 588 B C: the tripartite figure, man, lion, and many-headed appetite (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν).

ἥ τε ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς] While Plato makes θυμός and ἐπιθυμία two different parts of the soul (v. Zeller *Plato* p. 413 ff.), in Aristotle they are only two subdivisions of the sensitive and appetitive part of the soul (I. 5 § 6 n. 40). They are not however the only ones in the region of desire and aversion, as Häcker seems to assume in his treatise *On the division and classification of the moral virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics* (Berlin 1863. 4) p. 6 ff., but there is a third subdivision, the Will, βούλησις. At any rate Häcker's careful investigation of the difference between them has not attained the right result. He maintains that, according to Aristotle, both are based on the instinct of self-preservation, but that ἐπιθυμία springs from the unpleasant sensation accompanying a want i.e. a stopping of vital activity, θυμός on the other hand from the feeling of unpleasantness, aroused by an external limitation of our vital energy; θυμός then consists in the reaction that we oppose to this influence, or in our striving to regain the sensation of pleasure in the unim-

<ἀνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρίξεως τοῦτο ἂ νόμος ἐστίν. τὸ  
 <δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παρὰδειγμα ψεύδους, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ  
 <γράμματα ἰατρύνεσθαι φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ [καί] αἰρετώτερον χρή-  
 <σθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν  
 <παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄρνηνται τὸν μισθὸν τοῖς  
 <κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς  
 <πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασιν πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ  
 <τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς δια-  
 <φθεῖρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν

32 ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδρας II<sup>2</sup> fr. Julian Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (in the margin), φθείρει P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, marked by dots for erasure), *interim* William 1. & τοῦτο νόμος M<sup>2</sup> fr. Julian and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand): no doubt P<sup>1</sup> also. The full text of this older recension was ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελύων.....τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὁ δ' .....διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους.....διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρίξεως ὁ νοῦς νόμος ἐστίν, which gives a sense, though less appropriate than the other | νόμος] μῖνος Cosl. Voss. of Julian | 34 γράμμα M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> fr. | καὶ omitted by fr. [καί] Susem.<sup>2-4</sup>, ἀλλὰ untranslatoed by Ar., [ἀλλὰ] Schneider | 35 φιλίαν <ἢ ἐχθραν> Spengel (hardly needless) | 36 ἀρνούται M<sup>2</sup> Ar. and apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) | 39 πιστευθέντας] πιστευθέντας Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup>, probably right

pled activity of our natural individuality. But Aristotle does not limit *θυμός* to external reaction, nor indeed to mere reaction at all. For, in the first place, even if the passage in *Nic. Eth.* VII. 6. 1 ff. 1149 a 24 ff. was not written by Aristotle himself, but only by some one who (whether directly or indirectly) was his pupil, we may still infer the master's opinion from the pupil's, and assume that in *θυμός* the idea of displeasure at oneself was not foreign to him. For Anger, Displeasure, Indignation, and on the other hand Courage and Love of Freedom, IV(VII). 7. 2 n. (781), are the principal manifestations of *θυμός*, indeed *θυμός* is sometimes actually used for "Anger," sometimes for "Courage." As regards Hacker's second statement, the conception of *θυμός* in Aristotle is by no means always confined within the limits of mere warding off and rejecting; on the contrary Aristotle thinks IV(VII). 7. 5, n. (786), that the part of the soul whence hatred proceeds may also produce love. Thus it embraces, at any rate in part, what we call "the affections." On this analogy however, Fear should belong to it as well as Courage (726. 19. 3-4 1261 a 6 f.) but scarcely, as Eaton supposes, all the passions in contrast to Desire. Plato also ascribes to it ambition and love of honour. And it is by no means as certain, as Hacker and Brandis (*Gen.*

*Röm. Phil.* III i p. 140) suppose, that Aristotle was of an entirely different opinion. In a pamphlet entitled *ὁ θυμὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους Πλάτωνος* P. Meyer has not been more fortunate than Hacker in his account of the Aristotelian distinction between *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* and Aristotle's conception of both; and the matter is no clearer than before. Compare Susemihl in *Burmann's Jahrbuch*, 1876, v. p. 264 ff.; also III. 10. 5 with n. (562 b) and notes 182, 790, 839, 935, 1704, 1741. SUSEM. (641)

(2) *The analogy of the 'arts' is misleading; for there (e.g. in medicine) personal motives do not come in:* §§ 6, 7. In *Nic. Eth.* II. 4 §§ 2, 3 he points out that the [Socratic] analogy of the arts and moral conduct is seriously defective.

§ 7 35 οἱ μὲν κτλ.] 'the physicians do not act unreasonably out of personal liking; on the contrary they earn their fee by healing patients,' so that their interest lies in effecting cures and this coincides with their 'art.'

38 πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν] "to spite (men) and to win favour; since when people once suspect their doctors are pledged to their enemies for gain" i.e. have been bribed "to make away with them, they will in that case more urgently require to be treated according to written rules."

c. 16 § 8 <ζητήσαιεν ἂν μάλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονται γ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς 6

1287 b <οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἰατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυ-  
<μναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές  
<διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περί τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ὥστε δῆλον  
4 <ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος τὸ  
<μέσον.

c. 16 § 9  
5 <ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα  
<νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη εἰσίν, ὥστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμματα  
<ἄνθρωπος ἀρχῶν ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ  
8 <τὸ ἔθος.>

1286 a 20 ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βου-

1286 a 21 λεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα κάλλιον.

1287 b 2 τὸ ἀληθές..... 3 κρίνειν omitted by P<sup>4-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 4 δὲ Thurot, γὰρ Γ  
Π (including fr.) Ar. Bk. || 6 ὥστ' (ὥστε M<sup>s</sup>) εἰ Π<sup>1</sup> Ar., ὥστε Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk., ὥστ' εἰ  
<καὶ> Schneider

§ 8 A fresh objection (3) to the human ruler. "But again physicians, when they are ill, call in other physicians to treat them, and trainers in their practice (call in) other trainers, which implies that they cannot here judge aright, because they are judges in their own case and under the influence of feeling."

1287 b 3 διὰ τὸ κρίνειν κτλ] Comp. c. 9 § 2 n. (544). SUSEM. (642)

ὥστε δῆλον κτλ] "Hence it is clear that whoso seeks what is just and right seeks an impartial middleman: now the law is such a middleman."

4 μέσον] The arbitrator or 'middleman' stands between the two contending sides and is therefore of neither side, i. e. is impartial. Comp. VI(IV). 12 § 5; πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητής δ' ὁ μέσος, n. (1314), and Nic. Eth. v. 4 § 7, 1132 a 22, καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἐνιοὶ μεσιδίου. SUSEM. (643) Add Thuc. IV. 63, ἐτοῖμος ὢν Βρασιδα μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν.

§ 9 (4) In any case the authority of unwritten and social law is supreme.

5 κυριώτεροι] more authoritative. Comp. n. (48), on I. 6 § 1, and VII(VI). 5 § 2 n. (1430). Broughton adds Soph. Antig. 580 ff. SUSEM. (644)

See Cope *Introd. to the Rhetoric* pp. 239—244. He shows that τὸ ἐπιεικές, Equity, is a special application of κοινὸς νόμος, which as universal law, or the law of nature, is opposed to positive, conventional and written laws; that both κοινὸς νόμος and τὸ ἐπιεικές are designated unwritten law, ἀγραφα νόμιμα, Rhet. I. 13 § 2, § 12, 15 §§ 3—6, and correspond

to the ἔθνη and ἐπιτηδεύματα of Plato *Laws* 793 D. Comp. *Politic.* 295 A, *Laws* 680 A; Demosth. *De Cor.* p. 317, 20 ff.: Thuc. II. 37 s. fin.

6 εἰ... 7 ἀλλὰ] Even granting a human ruler is more trustworthy than written statute-law, still he is not so safe as the law of social custom.

c. 15 § 5 1286 a 20 ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις... κάλλιον] "But perhaps some one will say that to compensate for this [a human ruler] will be better able to advise on particular cases." This sentence evidently belongs to the first ἀπορία, advocating like c. 15 § 4 the claims of the human ruler, though in a modified manner. But the words following in the mss, c. 15 § 6, are in no definite logical connexion; so that translators are at a loss to make any intelligible sequence, Jowett for instance inserting [to whom we in turn make reply:] after this sentence, though he does not propose to insert ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιθετέον before the ὅτι or to omit the τοίνυν after it: while Bernays translates "to this objection one might perhaps reply &c.," and separates off the next sentence by a break.

c. 16 §§ 4, 5 1287 a 23—28 This is at any rate a valid objection to the modified view just proposed, and is clearly still concerned with the first ἀπορία. "But yet in any cases where the law seems unable to decide, a man would equally be unable. Whereas the law gives a suitable training and then sets the magistrates to decide and manage all other matters 'to the best of their judgment.'"

<ἀλλὰ μὴν (X1)

<ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίξειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἀνθρώπων  
<ἀν δύναται γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος  
<ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν  
<τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι διδωσιν, ὅ τι ἂν. δόξῃ  
<πειρωμένοις ἀμεινὸν εἶναι τῶν κειμένων.>

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν (X)

ἀνάγκῃ νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κείσθαι νόμους,  
ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων  
εἶναι δεῖ κυρίους· ὅσα δὲ μὴ δυνατόν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ  
ὅλως ἢ εὖ, πότερον ἓνα τὸν ἄριστον δεῖ ἄρχειν ἢ πάντας;  
καὶ γὰρ νῦν συνιόντες δικόζουσι καὶ βουλευόμενοι καὶ κρί-  
νουσιν, αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κρίσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκα-  
στον. καθ' ἓνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος ὅστις οὖν ἴσως χείρων·

1287 a 23-28 24 οὐδ' ὁ δ' Ar. (accepted by Vettori and Schneider) 25 <τὸ  
καθόλου> ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> wrongly (and similarly Schneider and Koraes).  
omitted by William (from a gloss in Γ' on ἐπίτηδες): παιδεύσας omitted by II<sup>1</sup> 27  
ἐτι δὲ <πάντα> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> wrongly, following William's version (*ad hoc autem omnia  
dirigere debet*)

1286 a 21-25 25 δεῖ ἄρχειν] δεῖ διατερεῖν or διατερεῖν? Koraes 26 πάντας] πάντες  
12-2-6 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald., γρ. πάντ p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, πολλοῦ Ar.

1286 a 26-b 3=1287 b 15-35. See *Introd.* p. 84 f., the parallel columns.

1286 a 27 αἱ κρίσεις εἰσι II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

1287 a 26 τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρί-  
νειν] The standing expression apparently  
used of the judge: the heliastae took  
this oath, says Demosthenes, XXIII. c.  
*Arctot.* § 96 p. 652 s. fin. γνώμῃ τῇ δι-  
καιοτάτῃ δικάζειν δημοκόρασιν, cp. *adv.*  
*Zet.* § 180, p. 493, 1 καὶ περὶ ὧν ἂν νόμοι  
μὴ εἴσι γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ κρινεῖν [*διω-  
ποκόρασι* ἐκείνῃ]. Pollux VIII. 10 § 112, 1 ὅ  
ἀσται ἐκ τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι  
εἴσι, ἀφαιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ  
ὧν μὴ εἴσι, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ. (Eaton).  
SUSEM. (646)

Aristotle remarks in *Rhet.* I. 15 § 5.  
1375 a 29 f. that the oath may be ex-  
plained to mean τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι  
τοῖς γεραιμένοις.

27 ἐπανορθοῦσθαι] "and allows them  
to adopt any correction which appears  
upon trial to be an improvement upon the  
established laws." The play upon words  
ἐπανορθοῦσθαι. ἐκτρέφουσιν is accidental.

On behalf of the place here assigned  
to c. 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23-28 it may be  
argued (1) that the plurals (τοὺς ἄρχοντας,  
πειρωμένοι) are not appropriate to the  
transition from the first to the second  
ἀπορία, and (2) that only in this way do

the words ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβα-  
ίνουσι become intelligible.

c. 15 § 6 Transition to the second  
ἀπορία. *If it be allowed that there is  
a province (viz. that of particular cases)  
in which the decision of the laws is in-  
sufficient, should it be supplemented by  
the one best citizen as ruler, or by the  
entire community?*

1286 a 21 αὐτὸν] that he (viz. the  
ruler). Otherwise Eaton, "that there be  
some one to make laws."

23 ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν] "but should  
not be unalterably binding where they are  
wrong." This refers to the gradual cor-  
rection of the established laws just men-  
tioned, c. 16 § 5.

§ 7 With §§ 7-9 compare the parallel  
version c. 16 §§ 10-13, printed in parallel  
columns, p. 84 f.

26 συνιόντες] The subject is πάντες  
sc. οἱ πολῖται, the entire body of citizens.

27 περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον] Cp. *Rhet.*  
I. 1 § 8 περὶ τοῦ γεγραμένου ἢ μὴ γεγραμένου,  
ἢ ἀρᾶσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀρᾶσθαι, ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι,  
§ 7 περὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀπαρχομένων.

28 καθ' ἓνα] Taken individually  
χείρων inferior [to the one best citizen].

ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἐστίαςις συμφορητὸς (30  
καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον  
§ 8 ὅχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἰς ὅστισιν. ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ  
πολύ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν  
ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον· τοῦ γὰρ ἐνὸς ὑπ' ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος  
ἢ τινος ἐτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρί-  
35 σιν, ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν.  
§ 9 ἔστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον  
πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν.  
εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ τοῦτο ῥάδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἶεν  
ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἰς ἀδιαφθορώ-  
40 τερὸς ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ

29 [ὥσπερ.....30 ἀπλῆς] Oncken || 30 κρίνειν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>3</sup> || 32 καθάπερ <γὰρ> Bk.<sup>2</sup>, rashly. Other changes have been proposed, but the construction is Aristotelian. Cp. Vahlen *Zeitschr. f. d. öst. Gymn.* XVIII. p. 721 ff. || 33 γὰρ Susem., δ' Γ II Ar. Bk. || 37 ὃν P<sup>2-3,4</sup>, ὃν Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 38 τοῦτο μὴ II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

29 ἐστίαςις συμφορητὸς] "a feast to which many contribute." Cp. II § 2, n. (564). SUSEM. (646)

§ 8 31 ἔτι μᾶλλον...33 ἀδιαφθορώ-  
τερον] Vahlen has illustrated this construction, viz. a simile breaking the principal sentence (often worked out into elaborate detail) and a resumption of the main thought with οὕτω asyndeton, from VI(IV). 3 § 6, 1290 a 11—15; *Nic. Eth.* VII. 6 § 1, 1149 a 25—31, ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκοῦναι μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακοῦναι δέ, καθάπερ...ὕδατος οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς κτλ; *De Soph. El.* 16 § 5, 175 a 26—30, συμβαίνει δέ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύσαντες ἐνίοτε συνθεῖναι πάλιν ἀδυνατούμεν· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις εἰδότες παρ' ὁ λόγος συμβαίνει συνεῖραι διαλύσαι τὸν λόγον ἀπορούμεν; *Poet.* 15 § 11, 454 b 8—13, ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία βελτιόνων, ἡμᾶς δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἰκονογράφους· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα...γράφουσιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν κτλ; *De Anima* II. 8 § 10, 420 b 17 ff., 9 § 7, 421 b 26 ff. (οὕτως οὖν the text, οὕτω καὶ the other recension or paraphrase of E), III. 7 § 7, 431 b 12 ff. *Comp.* I. 3 § 9, 406 b 15—20 (ὁμοίως δὲ καλ...), *Rhet.* III. 9 § 6, 1409 b 22—25, τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποιεῖ ὥσπερ...ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ περίοδοι κτλ, where the resumption is not asyndeton. "Add *Pol.* I. 4 § 3, 1253 b 33—39, II. 6 § 14, 1265 b 20 f., III. 7 § 6, 1277 a 5 ff., V(VIII). 7 § 7, 1342 a 22 ff." SUSEM.

ἀδιάφθορον] "incorruptible," not merely by bribes, but by any passion.

32 τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθ.] Yet when, *Rhet.* I. 1 § 7, he is comparing the functions of the dicast and of the laws he expresses an opinion which it is difficult to reconcile with this, ὅτι ἓνα λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους ῥᾶον ἢ πολλοὺς ἐν φρονούντας καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν.

35 ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον] "But in the other case it is improbable" lit. difficult, see II. 7 § 3 n., "that all should err at once."

ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον...ἀμαρτεῖν] This is hardly correct. A large assembly is more likely to be led into over-hasty conclusions than a single capable man and ruler. Still it is true that in the case of a large assembly, the passion does not generally last so long; and they more easily regain composure; while a single ruler, if once misled by inclination or hatred, may easily confound obstinacy and stubbornness with energy, so that there is greater danger that he will misuse his unlimited power. SUSEM. (647)

§ 9 36 μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον κτλ.] "not acting against the law except," i. e. only acting against the law in cases where it [i. e. the law] must necessarily be defective.

38 ἐν πολλοῖς = ἐν τῷ πλήθει line 36. ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους] "at least suppose a majority to be good men and good citizens." A majority, though not the whole body of citizens.

40 οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν] Numerous enough, indeed, in the best state, to

οὐδὲ πάντες; ἡ δὴλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάζουσιν (X)  
ὁ δὲ εἰς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθετὸν ἴσως ὅτι  
σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥσπερ καὶ κείνος ὁ εἰς.

<ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει (XII)  
<ἄρα πλείους εἶναι τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτῷ καθιστομένους ἄρχοντας,  
<ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὴν ἕνα  
<καταστήσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, εἴπερ, ὁ καὶ πρότερον  
<εἰρημένον ἐστίν, ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν  
<δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ  
σὺν τε δὴ ἐρχομένῳ

καὶ ἡ εὐχή τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος

<τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες.>

1286 b 1 δὲ πάντες] δ' ἄνδρες Γ Μ<sup>a</sup> στασιάζουσιν Ar. Morel Bk.

1287 b 8-15 8 πολλά omitted by P<sup>16</sup> Q<sup>16</sup> T<sup>16</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>2-4</sup> (1st hand, added in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>, and by a later hand in P<sup>2</sup>, but afterwards erased) | 9 ἑφ' αὐτῷ fr. 11 δ.....12 ἐστίν before εἰ περ Γ II Ar. Bk., transposed by Susem.<sup>2</sup> See Comm. n. (649) | 13 δὴ Camerarius, γὰρ Böcker; but see Bonitz *Ind. Arist.* 167 a 19 ff. | 14 ἐρχομένων Γ Μ<sup>a</sup> fr. | 15 δέκα] δὲ Μ<sup>a</sup>, untranslated by William | ὡς οὐχ ἕνα λοιπὸν (*i.e.* William) ἄρχειν δίκαιος added by Γ Μ<sup>a</sup> after συμφράδμονες; a gloss which has found its way into the text, given by P<sup>2</sup>, and in red ink on the margin of P<sup>3</sup>, in the more correct and fuller form ἀπὸ κοινοῦ τὸ ὡς οὐχ ἕνα λοιπὸν ἄρχειν δίκαιος

form the popular assembly and to appoint the council, the magistrates and the courts of justice from themselves alone—or, more precisely, from the older members amongst them, provided they are not too old: see IV (VII). 14 § 5, n. (817). SUSEM. (648)

§ 10 1286 b 1 ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κτλ] Objection. "A larger body will split up into parties; with the one ruler this is impossible. To which we must, I take it, reply that they are (*ex hypothesi*) as virtuous in soul as that one ruler."

c. 16 §§ 9, 10 1287 b 8-15. The place of this fragment is vindicated by the congruence between its subject-matter and the foregoing. The contrast is still between εἷς and πλείους.

The one ruler cannot envelop all things himself: he must appoint a number of officials, so that the state of things is virtually the same as if there were a number (*i.e.* a large body of the citizens) ruling.

1287 b 10 ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν] "Whether this was the original state of things" as it would be if the great body of citizens were rulers.

§ 10 11 8 καὶ πρότερον κτλ] In c.

13 § 8, §§ 13-25. See also c. 15 § 3 *s. fin.* If we followed the manuscript order we should have to translate: "Last-ly, as was remarked before, if the virtuous man deserves to rule because he is superior": but then it would follow that the apodosis (τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς βελτίων) also occurred in the preceding chapters. But in the two passages which alone are conceivable and to which Bernays refers us c. 11 §§ 1-3 and 12 § 9, 13 § 1 we do not find this, but something really quite different and only comparatively similar. Or could it have occurred in the lacuna which we assume after 13 § 5? This is hardly likely. We must therefore transpose thus: "if, as was previously remarked, the virtuous man &c." SUSEM. (649)

13 τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς] For δὲ in apodosis after εἰ cp. *Iliad*. IV. 8 § 11, 215 b 15, εἰ γὰρ τὰ τέκνα τῶν τριῶν ὑπερέχει ἐνέ, πλείους δὲ τῶν δυῶν. τῶ δὲ μάλιστα αὐ- κείνῃ εἶχει λόγον ᾧ ὑπερέχει. With ἀλλὰ this is frequent: see e.g. c. 5 § 3 of this book.

14 σὺν τε δὴ ἐρχομένῳ] Homer *Iliad* X. 224. SUSEM. (650)

ἡ εὐχή] Agamemnon says this of Nestor, *Iliad* II. 370 f. SUSEM. (651)

1286 b 3

εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν 7 (X)

- 4 τῶν πλειόνων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρα-  
 5 τίαν θετέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς βασιλείαν, αἰρετώτερον ἂν εἴη ταῖς  
 πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ  
 χωρὶς δυνάμεως οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἂν ἦ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους.  
 § 11 καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὐρεῖν  
 ἄνδρας πολὺ διαφέροντας κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε  
 10 μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις, ἐπειδὴ ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν  
 τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ  
 δὲ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐκέτι  
 ὑπέμενον ἀλλ' ἐζήτουν κοινόν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν.  
 § 12 ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρους γενόμενοι ἐχρηματίζοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, 8

1286 b 3—1287 a 23 1286 b 7 ὁμοίως Γ Π<sup>3</sup> Ar. || 9 πολὺ] *plures* Ar., πολλοὺς  
 ? Sylburg || 10 ἐπειδὴ Susem., ἐπεὶ Jackson, ἔτι δ' Susem.<sup>1.2.3</sup> with all earlier autho-  
 rities || ἔτι δ'..... 11 ἀνδρῶν Krohn rejects as spurious, but the change to ἐπειδὴ  
 disposes of his doubts. See Comm. n. (659) || 13 καὶ <ἀριστοκρατίαν καὶ> πολι-  
 τείαν? Susem. || 14 γιγνόμενοι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>, γινόμενοι Bk.<sup>2</sup>

c. 15 § 10 1286 b 3 εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν...  
 5 θετέον] Compare n. (536) on 7 § 3.  
 SUSEM. (655)

6 καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνά-  
 μews] “whether the king has an armed  
 force granted to him or not.” Cp.  
 § 14—c. 16 § 2 n. (666), as well as 14 § 7  
 n. (622). SUSEM. (656)

7 ἂν ἦ λαβεῖν κτλ] “provided al-  
 ways a majority can be found of uniform  
 excellence.” In fact an ‘assembly of  
 kings’ as Kineas said of the Roman  
 senate. ὁμοίους as in 4 § 5, and as in 15  
 § 11 ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

In §§ 11—13 (δημοκρατίαν), we have  
 a sort of historical appendix to the first  
 two ἀπορίαι.

§ 11 8 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κτλ] The im-  
 mediate reason is rather to be sought—as  
 Aristotle himself explains I. 2 § 6, n.  
 (19 b)—in the development of the state  
 from the family through the intermediate  
 link of the village-community. It would  
 have been better therefore to repeat that  
 fact and then to add that on account  
 of the further reason which is here ad-  
 duced kingly rule was maintained for  
 some time longer. Cp. n. (659). SUSEM.  
 (657)

9 τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις] “con-  
 sidering too the small size of the cities in  
 which they lived then.” Comp. § 13  
 n. (663), and the passages there collected.  
 SUSEM. (658)

10 ἐπειδὴ ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας κτλ] It

would have been highly desirable to  
 adjust this second reason to the first.  
 For if monarchy is traced back on the  
 one hand to the government of a com-  
 munity by its elders, and on the other to  
 personal merit, the two causes cannot  
 simply be at once combined, though a  
 partial combination is not only conceiv-  
 able, but even right. Aristotle however  
 has neglected to make it, and has thus  
 left a difficulty unsolved. For when  
 Henkel writes *Stud.* p. 95, ‘but even in  
 places where the original connexion be-  
 tween the state and the organization of  
 the family no longer exercised a deter-  
 mining influence, it was only monarchy  
 that grew up in the beginnings of civi-  
 lization,’ adducing the second reason to  
 explain this, he is quite right, but un-  
 fortunately there is nothing of the kind  
 in Aristotle. See also VIII(v). 10. 3 n.  
 (1649). SUSEM. (659)

12 συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς κτλ]  
 Comp. VIII(v). 10 § 37 n. (1708). “They  
 would no longer submit to the rule of a  
 king, but strove after a commonwealth  
 (κοινόν τι) and tried to set up a free  
 government” (πολιτείαν): i.e. a republican  
 constitution, or more accurately, first an  
 aristocracy or a ‘polity’ of horse soldiers,  
 next a ‘polity’ properly so called, of  
 heavy-armed foot: VI(IV). 13 § 10, cp.  
 n. (1273). SUSEM. (660)

§ 12 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρους... 15 ὀλι-  
 γαρχίας] And yet Aristotle (?) VIII(v).

ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν εὖλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας· ἔτιμον (X) γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραννίδας μετέβαλλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν· αἰεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δι' αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἰσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστ' ἐπιθίσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δημοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πόλεις, ἴσως οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἔτι γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἐτίραν παρὰ δημοκρατίαν.

εἰ δὲ δὴ τις ἄριστον θεῖη τὸ βασιλεύειν αὐταῖς πόλεσιν, πῶς ἔξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γινόμενων ὁποῖοί τινες

17 μετέβαλλον M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. | 18 ἄγοντες «τοῖς ὀλίγοις» or ἄγοντες «ταῖς πλουσίαις» or something similar Henkel (*Studia*, p. 96 n. 24): see Comm. n. (662)

22 α.....27 φῶσιν cited by Julian ad Themist. p. 260 D f. | 23 παρὰ the mss. of Julian except the Cod. Voss. | 24 ὁποῖοι (ὁποῖα M<sup>1</sup>) P<sup>1</sup> fr. Julian and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.), ὁποῖον P<sup>2</sup> W<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), ὁποῖον P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> C<sup>a</sup>

14 § 14 has a hostile criticism of Plato, who accounts for the transition from Timocracy to Oligarchy in precisely the same way (Nóthosmos). See *nn.* (1767, 1777). SUSEM. (661)

18 εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες] Here τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας or τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν must be supplied as object from what precedes. Henkel however will insert τοῖς ὀλίγοις or τοῖς πλουσίαις in the text and translate: "while the powerful" (viz. the tyrants) "from disgraceful avarice continued more and more to thin the ranks of the rich." But then there would be no justification for the development of Tyranny out of Oligarchy, and it would appear as though the people had only risen against the tyrants, and not against the oligarchs. It is true that if we keep to the received text, the passage is somewhat obscure through its brevity, but other passages quoted by Henkel himself supply the necessary explanation. The oligarchies were constantly tending to develop into the rule of single families (II. 10 § 13 n. 371) by the exclusion of more and more families from power, and those who were excluded went to strengthen the commons, which took its leaders from among them; for the masses in spite of its hatred for the rich, living as it did "dispersed over its farms and isolated," VIII(v). 5 § 8 n. (1558), stood in need of leaders. But for this very reason there was first a transitional state of things, viz. the tyranny of these same leaders; and

afterwards when the people grew stronger the tyrants were banished, and a democracy arose. SUSEM. (662)

§ 13 α· ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους ἐκ] Comp. § VI. VI(IV). 6 § 8 n. (1311), 12 § 10 (1373), § 14; VII(VI). 5 § 3 (1425), 4 § 3 (1448—9), also VI(IV). 12. 3 n. (1310). Beside this increase in the population Aristotle quotes as additional factors the development of cities, VIII(V). 5 § 8, 9, comp. *nn.* (1558—9), and VII(IV). 10 § 3 n. (1650): the military organization of the people, which if trained to serve as light infantry would easily hold its own against cavalry and heavy infantry, VII(VI). 7. 2, and the development of the navy, *ib.* *nn.* (1453—5) (Henkel). SUSEM. (663)

21 ἴσως οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἐκ] "Nowadays hardly any form of government, except democracy, can easily arise." Kingly rule in particular is not to be expected; if a monarchical constitution arises at all, it is in the form of tyranny, VII(VI). 10 § 37; cp. VII(IV). 2 III 6—8 (Hecleus) with n. (1708). SUSEM. (664)

22 α δὲ δὴ τις . . . 23 πῶς ἔξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων.] This is the third instance of a standing difficulty of all monarchy. In order to meet it heredity has been modified at different periods (1) by election from a royal line, as amongst the early Teutonic tribes, cp. n. on 1283 a 16, (2) by adoption, as in the best times of the Roman empire.

24 ἀλλὰ γινόμενων ὁποῖοί τινες ἔρχον] "But that will be whichever of

§ 14 ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν. ἀλλ' οὐ παραδώσει κύριος ὦν τοῖς (X)  
26 τέκνοις. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔτι ῥάδιον τοῦτο πιστεῦσαι· χαλεπὸν γάρ,  
καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν.

ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἔχειν δεῖ<sup>10</sup>  
τὸν μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἰσχύν τινα περὶ αὐτόν, ἢ δυνήσεται (Y).  
30 βιάζεσθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν, ἢ πῶς ἐνδέχεται

§ 15 τὴν ἀρχὴν διοικεῖν; εἰ γὰρ [καὶ] κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύριος, μη-  
δὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως  
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἢ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους.

§ 16 τάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν  
35 διορίσαι (δεῖ γὰρ αὐτόν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχύν, εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτην  
τὴν ἰσχύν ὥστε ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω  
τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἦττω, καθάπερ οἱ τ' ἀρχαῖοι τὰς φυλακὰς  
ἐδίδουσαν, ὅτε καθισταίεν τινα τῆς πόλεως ὃν ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνή-  
την ἢ τύραννον, καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ' ἦται τοὺς φύλακας, συν-  
40 εβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας).

<sup>1287 a</sup> 16 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα (X).

25 ἀλλ'.....26 τέκνοις omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, given in P<sup>4.6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> C<sup>c</sup> in the form ἀλλ' οὐ καταλείψει τοὺς υἱεῖς διαδόχους ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπ' ἐξουσίας ἔχων τοῦτο ποιῆσαι || τοῖς] τοιούτοις Ar. Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> (perhaps rightly), omitted by Julian || 26 οὐκ ἔτι ῥάδιον τοῦτο πιστεῦσαι Julian, οὐ ῥάδιον ἔτι τοῦτο Γ (?), οὐκέτι (οὐκ ἔτι M<sup>s</sup>, οὐκ ἔστι P<sup>1</sup>) τοῦτο ῥάδιον Π (including fr.) Bk., perhaps rightly || 29 αὐτόν Bas.<sup>3</sup>, αὐτόν Γ Π || ἢ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2.3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. || δυνήσεσθαι M<sup>s</sup>, *possit* William || 31 καὶ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> fr., untranslated by Ar. || 32 αὐτοῦ Γ, αὐτοῦ Π || 33 φυλάξει P<sup>4</sup> Ald., φυλάξει P<sup>2.3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr., φυλάζεται M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 36 ἐκάστων Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> (*singulorum* William) || 39 [ἢ τύραννον] ? Susem., <αἰρετόν> ἢ τύραννον? Schmidt || 40 συρακοσίοις fr.

the children are liable to turn out good or bad at random" or "just as it happens," a euphemism for "if they are very inferior." So Pl. *Gorg.* 514 E πρὶν πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι: Eur. *Hērō.* 929 τὴν μὲν δικαίαν τὴν δ' ὅπως ἐτύγχανε.

"This is certainly a very serious difficulty in an absolute monarchy, but in limited or constitutional monarchies the question is not so important" (Congreve). SUSEM. (665)

28 ἀπορίαν] The fourth difficulty started is that relating to the forces to be placed at the monarch's disposal.

τῆς δυνάμεως] This means not only a body-guard, but a standing army generally, or even a standing police-force. Cp. further § 10 n. (656), 14 § 7 n. (622). SUSEM. (666)

§ 15 31 εἰ γὰρ κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύ-

ριος] "For even if he be lawfully sovereign...still he must have a force to guard the laws."

§ 16 38 αἰσυμνήτην] Cp. c. 14 § 8 n. (623). SUSEM. (667)

39 ὅτ' ἦται τοὺς φύλακας] This is what Dionysios the Elder did, after he had obtained his nomination as general with unlimited power (στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ Diod. XIII. 95 f.) in the manner described by Diodoros XIII. 85—94 (cp. *nn.* 1562, 1576) B.C. 406 or 405. Cp. [Grote c. 81] Holm *Geschichte Siciliens* II. pp. 94—96, p. 128. Cp. VIII(v). 5 § 10, n. (1562), 6 § 8 (1576), 7 § 10 (1604), 10 § 6 (1660), 11 § 10 (1723): also I. 11. 12 n. (106), *Rhet.* I. 2. 19, 1357 b 30, Plato *Rep.* VIII 566 B, Polyaen. V. 2. 2. SUSEM. (668)

c. 16 § 1 1287 a 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως κτλ.] This clause with δὲ answers

πράττοντος ὃ τε λόγος ἐφίστηκε ἰὺν καὶ ποιητέον τὴν σκέ- (XI)  
ψιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἔστιν  
εἶδος, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρ-  
χειν ἐνδέχεται στρατηγίαν αἰδίων, οἷον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ  
ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιούσιν ἓνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως  
τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τις ἔστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, καὶ περὶ  
Ὀποῦντα δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος ἔλαττον)· περὶ δὲ τῆς παρβα-  
σιλειᾶς καλουμένης, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει πάντων κατὰ  
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς, \* \*.

δοκεῖ δέ τισιν οἰδὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἓνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅπου  
συνέστηκεν ἐξ ὁμοίων ἢ πόλιν· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις φύσει τὸ  
αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν

1287 a 4 πολιτείας Camerarius and Vettori (also by an unknown hand in the  
margin of the Munich Aldine), βασιλειᾶς I II (including fr.) Ar. Sussem.<sup>1</sup> in the text  
8 ἐλάττων Schneider and an unknown scholar in the margin of Stahl's copy of Morel  
(probably right) 8 περὶ 18 ἀναγκαῖον quoted by Julian ad Themist. p. 431 A C  
9 δὲ ἐστὶ Codex Vossianus of Julian 9 ἀρχαί 10 βούλησιν perhaps transposed by  
Γ to follow 10 βασιλεὺς 11 πάντων Julian, πάντα II (including fr.), τῶν Codex Vos-  
sianus 10 αὐτοῦ Cod. Voss. (accent by a second hand), αὐτοῦ Hertlein 1 λεγόμενος  
inserted after βασιλεὺς by Γ; a gloss which has crept into the text, given in a fuller  
form by P<sup>1</sup>: κατὰ κοινὸν τὸ λεγόμενον. There is then a manifest lacuna: hence δέ, which  
is omitted in Julian, should not be altered, with Syllburg and Scaliger, to δὲ. 1 τὸ  
κατὰ Julian 11 εἶναι πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ἓνα I M<sup>1</sup> Sussem.<sup>1-2</sup> 1 ἔπειτα..... 1 τῶν  
and 13 καὶ..... φύσιν omitted by Julian

to the preceding one beginning τάχα μὲν  
ἐν 13 § 16; and it is an objection to Mr  
J. Cook Wilson's analysis of cc. 15, 16  
that it ignores this correspondence.

2 ἐφίστηκε] the question is now at  
hand, impossible.

4 καθάπερ εἶπομεν] c. 15 § 2, n. (635).  
SUSEM. (669)

5 ἀίδιον = held for life.

6 τῆς διοικήσεως] 'of the adminis-  
tration.' Not in the technical sense in  
which δ ἐν τῇ διοίκησει meant the Mi-  
nister of Finance at Athens.

7 περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον] Comp. VIII(V). 1  
§ 11, n. (1501), 4 § 7 n. (1550); also II.  
2 § 23 n. (149). SUSEM. (670)

8 At Opus the holder of this office  
bore the title of Cosmopolis Polyb. XII.  
16. Comp. Schomann p. 142 Eng. tr.

9 2 There is a manifest lacuna after  
line 10 ὁ βασιλεὺς; the omission of δέ in  
the citation by Julian is one attempt to  
conceal it, as the change to δὲ is another.

For instead of extending to τῶν πολιτῶν  
the fourth ἀπορία (which in 15 §§ 15, 16,  
1286 b 34—40, received an easy solution  
in respect of limited monarchy) the text  
goes on to raise an entirely new problem,  
ἀπορία (5); viz. *Is not the rule of one an  
unnatural anomaly when all are free  
(δύοισι)? Is it not natural that power  
should pass from hand to hand (ἀνὰ μέναι)  
and be vested in officials, whose functions  
are arranged by law?* Thus by the men-  
tion of law the fifth difficulty brings us  
round again to the first, — a circumstance  
in itself quite unexceptionable, though it  
is no doubt responsible for the collection  
here of the various fragments §§ 4—12  
which bear more or less closely upon the  
first and second ἀπορία.

10 δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν] Comp. II. 2 § 4 n.  
(131), § 6 (131 b); IV(VII). 3 § 6 n. (1740);  
further I. 7 § 1 n. (158 b); IV(VII). 8 § 4  
(707), VII(V). 11 § 5 (1192). SUSEM.  
(672)

εἶναι, ὥστ' εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ἴσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφήν ἢ (XI  
 15 ἐσθῆτα βλαβερόν τοῖς σώμασιν, <καὶ> οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ  
 § 3 τὰς τιμάς, ὁμοίως [τοῖνυν] καὶ τὸ ἀνίσουν τοὺς ἴσους· διόπερ οὐδένα 3  
 μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τοί-  
 νυν ὡσαύτως. τοῦτο δ' ἤδη νόμος· ἢ γὰρ τάξις νόμος. τὸν (p. 9  
 19 ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἓνα  
 § 4 τινά, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦτον, καὶ εἴ τινας ἄρχειν  
 βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατέον νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς  
 νόμοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναί τινας ἀρχάς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓνα τοῦ-  
 23 τον εἶναί φασι δίκαιον ὁμοίων γε ὄντων πάντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν 4  
 ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος  
 § 5 ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος  
 26 ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν  
 τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ  
 28 πειρωμένοις ἄμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον

14 εἴπερ] ὥσπερ an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine || ὥστ'  
 εἴπερ καὶ] ὥσπερ γὰρ ? Schneider || 15 <καὶ> Göttling || ἔχει] ἔχειν Schneider  
 || τὸ P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Bk. || 16 τοῖνυν omitted by II<sup>1</sup> || οὐδένα Bernays, οὐδὲν Γ II (in-  
 cluding fr.) Ar. Bk. || 23 ὁμοίως II<sup>2</sup>

1287 a 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα..... 28 κειμένων transposed to follow 1286 a  
 21 κάλλιον: see p. 433

1287 a 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν..... b 8 τὸ ἔθος transposed to follow 1286 a  
 20 πᾶσαν: see pp. 430—432

14 τὸ ἴσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους] Comp. Nic. Eth. II. 6 § 7, 1106 a 36 ff. (Brough-  
 ton). SUSEM. (673)

§ 3 16 ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ ἀνίσουν κτλ] “So too it is quite as harmful if unequal shares are assigned to those who are equal. Hence it is right that in ruling and being ruled all should be alike, and consequently should interchange with one another in both. But here we come to law, for the system” on which they interchange “is a law.”

17 τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος rotation in ruling and being ruled.

18 ὡσαύτως sc. δίκαιόν ἐστι.

§ 4 21 νομοφύλακας=guardians of the laws: the expression used by Plato *Laws* IV 715 c (Eaton). SUSEM. (673 b)

23 ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ] “In order to bring this passage 1287 a 23—28, as it stands, into logical connexion with the preceding fifth ἀπορία, it will be necessary to regard it not as an objection to the view therein expressed, but as introducing a new objection to a ruler who goes beyond the letter of the law: ἀλλὰ μὴν=but again, as in 1262

b 24, 1287 b 8. Yet the next sentence, a 25—27, allows that within certain limits the one ruler is really in a position to make such decisions, and speaks of rulers in the plural. Hence there can be no question here of attacking or defending monarchy, and besides all the ἀπορίαι are alike in treating *absolute* monarchy unfavourably. It would still be open to us to read ὁ δ' with Aretinus instead of οὐδ', a 24; but if that were done ἀλλὰ in the next line would not be in place: Ar. omits it and we should rather expect διὸ or ὥστε or something of that sort.” SUSEM.

28 ὁ μὲν οὖν] “It is not to be denied that, if the preceding passage 1287 a 23—28 be transposed, this passage 1287 a 28—b 8 might quite well follow the fifth ἀπορία, so far as the connexion of thought goes. But the form renders this impossible. The fact that law is passionless is not an inference that can be drawn from the natural injustice of a permanent ruling body: so that οὖν will not stand as ‘therefore.’ Nor will it suit as a transitional particle, without something else, καὶ or ἔτι δε.” SUSEM.

κελεύων ἄρχιν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχιν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν (XI)  
μόνον, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θεῶν· ἣ τε γὰρ  
ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους  
ἄνδρας διαφθεῖραι. διόπερ αὐτοῦ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. τὰ  
δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεύδους ὅτι τὰ κατὰ  
γράμματα λατρεύσθαι φαῖλον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἰρετώτερον χρη-  
σθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὖθις διὰ φιλίας  
παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀρνούνται τὸν μισθὸν τοῖς  
κάμνοντας ὑγάσαντες· οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς  
πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασι πράττειν, ἐπὶ καὶ  
τοὺς λατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστευθίντας τοῖς ἔχθοις δια-  
φθεῖρουν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν  
ζητήσαιν ἂν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονται γ' ἑᾶς αὐτοῖς·  
οἱ λατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους λατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυ-  
μναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὥς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνουν τὸ ἀληθές διὰ  
τὸ κρίνουν περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει δεῖται. ὥστε ἔηλθεν ὅτι τὰ  
δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος τὸ μέσον.  
ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα  
νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη εἰσίν, ὥστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμ-  
ματα ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλίστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ (p. 21)  
ἔθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἰφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἵνα· δεῖται  
ἄρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας,  
ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἵνα  
καταστήσῃ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, εἰπερ, ὁ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον  
ἐστίν, ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχιν δέ-  
καιος. τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ  
σύν τε δὴ ἰρχομένω

καὶ ἡ εὐχή τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος

τοιούτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες.

εἰς δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνίων αἱ  
ἀρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνουν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος  
ἀδυνατεῖ διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὧν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβη-

1287 b 8 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέ..... 15 συμφράδμονες transposed to follow  
1286 b 3 ὁ εἰς: see p. 435

1287 b 15 εἰς δὲ καὶ..... 35 δεῖν ὁμοίως is another recension of 1286 a 25  
—b 3. See *Introd.* p. 84 f. δὲ γάρ? Suam. 17 γε omitted by H<sup>2</sup> BL.

c. 16 §§ 10—13 1287 b 15—35. In  
*Introd.* pp. 84—5, the reader will find this  
passage printed in parallel columns side by  
side with c. 15 §§ 7—10, 1286 a 26—b 3.

an arrangement which cannot be adopted  
here, simply because it is then no longer  
possible to preserve the lines of Bekker's  
quarto edition, as is done elsewhere.

τεῖ περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄριστα ὁ νόμος ἄρξειε καὶ κρίνειεν. (X)  
 § 11 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ 8  
 20 δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον  
 τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄρι-  
 στον. περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλευόνται νομοτεθῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων  
 ἐστίν. οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γ' ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἄν-  
 24 θρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρινόμενον περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι  
 § 12 οὐχ ἓνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλούς. κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαι-  
 δευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἄτοπόν τ' ἴσως ἂν εἶναι δό- 9  
 ξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἔχοι τις δυοῖν ὕμμασι καὶ δυσὶν ἀκοαῖς  
 κρίνων, καὶ πρᾶττων δυσὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσίν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολ-  
 30 αῖσι, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μονάρχαι ποιοῦσιν  
 αὐτῶν καὶ ὦτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας. τοῖς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ  
 § 13 καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες  
 οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι  
 καὶ κείνου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος, ὥστ' εἰ  
 τούτους οἶεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἶεται  
 35 δεῖν ὁμοίως. ||

17 ἃ μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν λέγου-

18 ὡς.....κρίνειεν transposed to precede 17 ἐπεὶ by Π<sup>2</sup>, untranslated by Ar. || 19  
 καὶ omitted by Γ and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by P<sup>1</sup>) || ἐπειδὴ Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 22 νενομο-  
 θετῆσθαι Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> *lege statuta esse* William || 25 κρινεῖ Spengel, κρίνει Γ Π Ar. Bk.  
 || 26 ἄτοπον...31 συνάρχους cited in Scholia on Aristoph. *Birds* 92 || τ' Π<sup>1</sup> fr.,  
 δ' Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Schol. on Aristoph. || 27 ἔχοι Susem., ἴδοι Γ Π (including fr.) Ar. Schol.  
 on Aristoph. Bk. || δυοῖν δυοὶ Sylburg || 28 πρᾶττοι Conring wrongly, but recog-  
 nizing that the text was unsound || 29 μόναρχοι Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Schol. on Aristoph. Bk. || 30  
 αὐτῶν Morel, αὐτῶν Π Schol. Aristoph., αὐτοῖς Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> (*sibi* William), possibly right  
 || τῆς ἀρχῆς Casaubon || 31 αὐτοῦ Susem.<sup>3</sup>, αὐτοῦ Γ Π Susem.<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>, αὐτοῖς Schol.  
 Aristoph. Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps right, αὐτοῖς Bk.<sup>2</sup>, but see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 125 a 18 f. || 32  
 δὲ omitted by fr. || 33 ὅ τε Γ, ὅτε P<sup>4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald., οὔτε Q<sup>b</sup>, ὁ δὲ Ar. || φίλους ἴσως Γ M<sup>s</sup>

c. 16 § 11 19 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν κτλ] It is on this account that 'equity' is necessary to supplement law, right, and justice, because the law only determines the general rule, but there are some things for which no general rules can be established; therefore besides laws there must be popular decrees. See *Nic. Eth.* v. 8. Cf. also *Rhet.* i. 13 § 12 ff. 1374 a 25 ff. [with Cope's comments and his *Introd.* pp. 190—193], Plato *Polit.* 294 B ff. (Eaton). Also see notes 275, 579, 637 and VI(IV). 4. 31 n. (1212). SUSEM. (652)

22 περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλευόνται] This department of human action is defined in the detailed investigation of *Nic. Eth.* III. c. 3. SUSEM. (653)

τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν] Here, it may be remarked, Mr J. Cook Wilson finds a place for the fragment 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23—28, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα...τῶν κειμένων.

§ 12 29 ὀφθαλμοὺς] An allusion to the title of the king's eye, given by the Medes and Persians to a counsellor of the king: Herod. i. 114 (cp. c. 100), Aesch. *Persae* 973, Aristoph. *Ach.* 94 with scholiast, Xenoph. *Cyropaed.* VIII. 2 §§ 10—12. Comp. also Pseudo-Arist. *De Mundo* c. 6, 398 a 21 ff., Poll. II. 4 (Eaton) and n. (1715) upon VIII(V). 11 § 7. SUSEM. (654)

c. 17 A partial decision of the above difficulties. A reference to c. 15 §§ 2, 3

σι, σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτ' ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δὲ τινῶν οὐχ οὕτως. ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποτικὸν καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον· τυραννικὸν δ' οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ὕσαι παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶν τοῦτα· γὰρ γίνεται [τὰ] παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φανερόν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε συμφέρον ἔστιν οὔτε δίκαιον ἓνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ ὄντων νόμων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀριστην ἀμείνων ἢ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον εἰρηται δέ πως ἤδη καὶ πρότερον. [πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ

38 δεσποτικὸν] δεσποτὸν P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ald., probably also P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), δεσποτικὸν Syllburg Bk., ἀριστοκρατικὸν in place of either δεσποτικὸν or βασιλικὸν Schömann. See Comm. | καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν omitted by II<sup>1</sup> (in P<sup>1</sup> added in the margin) βασιλευσὶν P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ald. Bk., probably also P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), βασιλευσὶν P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) c. 41 τὰ rightly omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk., retained by fr.

1288 a 2 νόμων ὄντων M<sup>2</sup> II<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. | 3 ἀλλ'.....νόμον omitted by II<sup>2</sup> | 5 εἰ omitted by fr. | 6 ἤδη omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, [ἤδη] Sussem.<sup>1</sup> | [αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον] Sussem. See *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 398 f.

will suffice to show that the solution here proposed relates to nothing else than the *ἀποδὲ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως, of absolute monarchy*. Comp. Sussemihl *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 396 ff. If so, they must relate to *that commonwealth of virtuous men in which alone absolute monarchy will arise*. Comp. c. 15 § 9.

§ 1 36 [ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν] i.e. in certain circumstances: *not*, as Bernays and others translate, "in the case of certain men (populations, civic bodies)." See n. (677) and *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 397 ff. SUSSEM. (674)

38 δεσποτικὸν...βασιλικὸν] "Bekker writes δεσποτικὸν after Syllburg and βασιλευσὶν as in II<sup>2</sup>. But we find τυραννικὸν standing side by side with these; and as this can hardly be used, like δεσποτικὸν and πολιτικὸν, in a passive sense it proves that we should rather read δεσποτικὸν with Götting, as in II<sup>1</sup>, and adopt βασιλικὸν from the corr. of P<sup>1</sup>. Further, how else are we to construe καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον and τὰ ἄλλα...καταλλήλῃ, in which Lamián raised an objection? But with the text before us *τὰ φύσει* is the predicate of the first clause, *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* the predicate of the second clause; all the rest is subject." SUSSEM.

40 ταῦτα γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν] Com-

pare the apparently inconsistent passage VII(IV). 12 § 3 n. (1310). SUSSEM. (674 b)

§ 2 1288 a 3 ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον] Cp. 13 § 14 n. 601 b. SUSSEM. (675)

This is the thorough-going Absolutism of the scientific expert in government, as advanced by Plato.

§ 3 6 καὶ πρότερον] viz. c. 13 §§ 13—15. SUSSEM. (676)

6 πρῶτον δὲ...ἀρχάς] Kröner is right in objecting to the meaningless tautology in the definition of the peoples suited to monarchy or aristocracy. It is even worse that aristocracy is here described in a manner which, although it does not directly contradict Aristotle's conception, still by no means exhausts it, and therefore does not render it fatalistic. It is indeed essential that a true aristocracy should possess citizens who are capable enough always to elect the most capable persons to office. But it is as essential to this ideal aristocracy, that these persons should only hold their offices for a certain time, and then be replaced by persons not inferior in capacity, so that there is a perpetual interchange of rulers and ruled. And it is yet worse to find the people suited for a monarchy represented as different from that suited for

Βασιλευτὸν καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν. (X)  
 § 4 βασιλευτὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν  
 γένος ὑπερέχον κατ' ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικὴν, ἀρι-  
 10 στοκρατικὸν δὲ πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν [[πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι  
 δυνάμενον]] τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν  
 ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος ἐν  
 ᾧ πέφυκε ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικὸν δυνάμενον ἄρ-  
 χεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα  
 § 5 τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς.] ὅταν οὖν ἡ γένος ὅλον ἡ καὶ τῶν 12

10 [πλῆθος...φέρειν] Vettori Bk. || [πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον] Susem. following Ar. and Schneider. Perhaps another recension of the preceding || 11 ἀρχὴν omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 12 πλῆθος ἐν ᾧ.....13 ἐγγίνεσθαι Spengel Bk.<sup>2</sup>, [ἐν ᾧ.....13 πολεμικόν] Hercher (*Hermes* VII. 467) || 13 πέφυκε καὶ ἐν Π<sup>2</sup> (only P<sup>4</sup> has ἐν for ἐν, written over an erasure), [καὶ ἐν] Bk.<sup>1</sup>, omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> fr. Ar. || ἡθος Hayduck (probably right) || πολιτικὸν fr. Π<sup>1</sup> (emended by corr. of P<sup>1</sup>) || καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι M<sup>s</sup>, ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 15 ἀπόροις P<sup>3</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> fr. Ar. γρ. ἀπόροις P<sup>1</sup> in the margin. P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand) also had ἀπόροις : εὐπόροις was written over by corr.<sup>3</sup> and γρ. καὶ ἀπόροις inserted in the margin ; <εὐπόροις καὶ> ἀπόροις? Stahr (not bad). See Comm. II. (677) : πολῖταις Koraes || ἡ P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Bernays Susem.<sup>1</sup> || [τῶν ἄλλων] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, *aliorum id est aliorum* Albert ; if ἡ is right either τῶν ἄλλων is a dittographia from 17, or must be transposed to follow 16 *ἐνα τινά*, or, as Schmidt proposes, to follow 19 *βασιλέα*

aristocracy, although according to the genuine teaching of Aristotle, the true monarchy and the true aristocracy are only possible with the same people, viz. that of the ideal state (13 § 24 n. 614, see *Introd.* p. 44). For this very reason, we would not translate above at 17 § 1 “for some people monarchical government is naturally suitable, for others the true Republican government”—but rather: “under some circumstances the one, and under others the other.” But the interpolator, like many modern critics, misunderstanding the passage adopted the former meaning, and so it seemed to him necessary to interpolate here an exact account of each kind of people. When the passage is rightly interpreted, the incorrectness of this interpolation at once becomes manifest. While c. 17 § 5 is closely connected with καὶ πρότερον... (§ 3) the intermediate §§ 3, 4 disturb this connexion entirely. In its present form the definition of the people suited to a Polity is quite un-Aristotelian, whether we adopt the reading εὐπόροις or ἀπόροις ; the former gives a mixture of aristocracy and oligarchy, the latter a monstrous combination of aristocracy and democracy, while the Aristotelian Polity is a compromise between oligarchy and demo-

cracy. Yet this mistake seems too bad even for this interpolator, and we ought perhaps to adopt Stahr's conjecture τοῖς εὐπόροις <καὶ τοῖς ἀπόροις> which would remove the difficulty. SUSEM. (677)

§ 4 12 πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος κτλ.] If we adopt the very probable change of the second πλῆθος into ἡθος, the sense is : “And the population suited for a Polity is that in which there is naturally a warlike character (ἡθος), qualified to be rulers as well as subjects in accordance with a law which assigns the offices of state in accordance with their merits to the rich (? and the poor).” If this change be not made, the sentence will be differently rendered according as the second πλῆθος is regarded (1) as mere redundancy (*Postgate Notes* p. 25), or (2) as used in a different sense from the first : i. e. as meaning ‘body,’ ‘class’ within the entire civic population. Bernays, while adopting this latter view, makes δυνάμενον...ἀρχάς refer to the first πολιτικὸν πλῆθος : which seems inconsistent. If ‘the population suited to Polity’ were ‘one in which a warlike class naturally arises,’ it should merely be *this class* and not the population generally ‘in which an interchange of ruling and being ruled can be carried into effect.’ SUSEM.

6 ἄλλων ἓνα τινὰ συμβῇ διαφέρειντα γένεσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν (XI)  
 τοσοῦτον ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων.  
 τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικόν καὶ κύριον πάν-  
 6 των καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἓνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρό-  
 7 τερον, οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ προφέρειν εἰσ-  
 θασιν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες οἳ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς  
 καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς  
 (πάντη γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν  
 7 αὐτήν), ἀλλὰ <καὶ> κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ  
 φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' ὀστρακίζειν δὴ πον τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν.  
 οὔτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος  
 ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι  
 8 τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθισθαι τῷ  
 τοιούτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος [τοῦτον] ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς.  
 9 περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας, τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, καὶ πότερον XII

16 τινὰ omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, [τινὰ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> | 20 [οὐ μόνον] Bojsen | 21 ἀριστο-  
 κρατίας and 22 ὀλιγαρχίας I<sup>1</sup> M<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> | 22 δημοκρατίας I<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> and M<sup>1</sup> (1st  
 hand) | 23 παντὶ fr. πάντες II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), perhaps right; yet altered to  
 πάντῃ by the corr. of P<sup>4</sup> | ἀξιοῦσιν... ὑπεροχὴν omitted by T<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>2</sup> (1st hand,  
 ἀξιοῦσιν added in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>, and ἀξιοῦσιν ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν by a later hand in the  
 margin of Q<sup>2</sup>) | 24 <καὶ> Schneider, which supersedes Bojsen's violent change  
 (line 20) and Spengel's suspicion of 20 οὐ μόνον οὕτως | 27 τὴν omitted by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup>  
 Q<sup>2</sup> T<sup>2</sup> Bk. | 29 τοῦτον omitted by II<sup>1</sup> | κατὰ μέρος εἶναι τοῦτον ἀλλὰ απλῶς fr.

§ 5 18 τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος κτλ] Ari-  
 stotle speaks with far more correctness  
 here than in 13 § 13 when he is dealing  
 with a whole stock of individuals or even  
 a single man. But this gives a fresh proof  
 (cf. *Introd.* p. 46) that in describing his  
 ideal monarchy, he was not thinking of  
 Macedonia; for not even Oncken would  
 attribute to him the absurdity of regarding  
 the whole royal family of Macedon as  
 gods dwelling among men (13 § 13 n.  
 601, § 25 n. 615). SUSEM. (678)

§ 6 19 (εἴρηται πρότερον) viz. c. 13  
 §§ 23—25 and §§ 1—12. SUSEM. (679)

21 τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς] Instead of  
 αὐτοκρατίας, we should at first sight  
 rather expect polity: for aristocracy is  
 founded on the right of fitness or merit,  
 the only ultimate right (7 § 3 n. 536).  
 But Aristotle is here pointing to the ex-  
 planations in 13 §§ 1—12, in which it is  
 aristocracy and not polity that is dis-  
 cussed; and even this is hypothetically  
 designated as faulty, in cases, that is,  
 where the excellence of the community is  
 not weighed against that of individuals

to see which excels the other. SUSEM.  
 (680)

24 κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν] viz.  
 δίκαιον 'but also according to the right  
 previously expounded': viz. the right  
 of merit, when the estimate just men-  
 tioned (in n. 680) has been correctly  
 made. Accordingly we are referred back  
 to c. 9 as well as to c. 13. Further comp.  
 n. (595) and VIIIV. 1 § 6 n. (1491).  
 SUSEM. (681)

§ 7 26 οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε... 28 συμβέβη-  
 κεν] 'For it is not natural that the part  
 should outweigh the whole, and the pos-  
 session of such extraordinary eminence has  
 happened to be in this case' viz. that all  
 the others together stand to him as part to  
 whole. The ordinary interpretation is,  
 'For it is not the course of nature that  
 the part should surpass the whole, whereas  
 this happens when a man is very superior  
 to the rest.' But see c. 13 § 12. SUSEM.  
 (681 b)

§ 8 29 μὴ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς]  
 'not merely in relation' with others,  
 'but absolutely sovereign.'

31 οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρει, καὶ τίσι, καὶ πῶς, (2)  
 18 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φαμεν εἶναι τὰς  
 ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, τούτων δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἀρίστην εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ  
 τῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομουμένην, τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐν ᾗ συμβέβη-  
 35 κεν ἢ ἓνα τινὰ συμπάντων ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ πλῆθος ὑπερέχον  
 εἶναι κατ' ἀρετὴν, τῶν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δ'  
 ἄρχειν πρὸς τὴν αἰρετωτάτην ζωὴν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδεί-  
 χθη λόγοις ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ  
 πολίτου τῆς ἀρίστης πόλεως· φανερόν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον  
 40 καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συ-  
 στήσειεν ἂν τις ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευομένην, ὥστε ἔσται 2  
 1288 b καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθνη ταῦτά σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον  
 § 2 ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν [καὶ βασιλικόν]. διωρισμέ-  
 νων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἥδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς  
 4 ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς.

36 ἄρχεσθαι <καὶ ἄρχειν> Spengel Bk.<sup>2</sup> || 39 τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης II<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.  
 || 41 <ἄριστ' ἢ> ἀριστοκρατουμένην Bücheler, probably right. Schmidt  
 thinks ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευομένην a gloss which has taken the place of the  
 true reading ἄριστα πολιτευομένην or εὖ τεταγμένην; [ἢ βασιλευομένην] Spengel who  
 first saw the text to be unsound

1288 b 2 πολιτικόν] πολίτην ἀγαθόν (or σπουδαῖον)? Spengel || [καὶ βασιλικόν]  
 Spengel, καὶ βασιλικόν <καὶ ἀριστοκρατικόν> Conring wrongly: καὶ βασιλευτὸν  
 Nickes, accepted by Bernays, whose translation shows that it will not give a good  
 sense || 4 καθιστᾶσθαι πῶς M<sup>s</sup>, καθίστασθαι πῶς P<sup>3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand,  
 the second acute has been erased).

c. 18 *Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the narrower sense, i.e., excluding monarchy, to pure Aristocracy.*

This chapter is of first-rate importance for the question of the order of Books IV (VII), V(VIII), because it enables us to decide whether the best (i.e. the ideal) state in its normal form is or is not identical with the ὀρθὴ πολιτεία Aristocracy: a point which Forchhammer (*Philol.* xv. p. 56 ff.) and Bendixen (*Philol.* xiv. p. 293 ff. *Der alte Staat des Aris.* p. 66 ff.), defending the traditional order of the books, denied. Their objections are examined by Spengel *Arist. Studien* II. p. 60 (652) f.

§ 1 34 οἰκονομουμένην] administered, managed. No stress can be laid upon this word: see VIII(v). 8 § 15 τῇ ἄλλῃ οἰκονομίᾳ.

35 ἢ ἓνα τινὰ... ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ πλῆθος] The first two cases give the ideal kingdom; see c. 17 § 5 n. (678): the third

gives the ideal aristocracy. See also n. (600). SUSEM. (682)

37 πρὸς τὴν...[ζωὴν] Comp. II. 1 § 1 n. (128): also n. (21) on I. 2 § 8, n. (284) on II. 9 § 5 and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (683)

ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις] c. 5 § 10; see n. (471). SUSEM. (684)

At the end of this chapter in the manuscripts and in the editions (down to and including Bekker's quarto) is appended the unfinished sentence ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν. It was Spengel's great merit, *Ueb. Arist. Pol.* p. 17 ff., *Arist. Stud.* II. p. 60 (652) ff., to recognize in this imperfect sentence a transition to the discussion of the ideal state, dating back from the time when that discussion immediately followed the present chapter, and consequently evidence of an older order of the books than that adopted by the compilers of our present text (? Andronicus). See *Introd.* p. 17, p. 47 f.

## EXCURSUS I.

### ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS, POLITIES, OR FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. III. 7. 1.

On the development of the theory of the different forms of government before Aristotle see especially Henkel *Studien* p. 38 ff., Oncken II. p. 139 ff. From Herodotos III. 80—82 we learn that the Athenians of the Periclean age used to distinguish three forms only, but with tolerable definiteness and clearness of view; the rule of the people, for which Herodotos nowhere as yet uses the term democracy; Oligarchy i.e. the rule of a picked association of the best men; and Monarchy. Thus Oligarchy means here what was in later times called Aristocracy, after that 'during the Peloponnesian war,' as Henkel says, 'men endeavoured to win credit for party efforts by well sounding names (Thuc. III. 82): afterwards the Socratics used the term with great predilection as a word of good omen, τὴν εὐαγγελὸν ἀριστοκρατίαν, Plato *Politic.* 302 D.' Lastly the terms Monarchy, Kingship, Tyrannis, are found in Herodotos as yet undistinguished side by side. Considerable progress is shown in the masterly descriptions of the Athenian and Spartan governments and their points of contrast by Thucydides, in Pericles' Funeral Oration and elsewhere; there indeed the Athenian constitution is already called a democracy. But it was Socrates who first prepared the way for the more subtle distinctions to be found in Plato and Aristotle. He divided the monarchical constitutions into kingships and tyrannies, and the oligarchies into aristocracies and plutocracies (governments of wealth). He took as the criterion for kingship the government of the prince in accordance with the laws and the willing obedience of the people; for tyranny, the arbitrary rule of the prince and the coercion of the people: for aristocracy, the appointment to the magisterial offices of men from among the number of those who are most law-abiding<sup>1</sup> as at Sparta (Xen. *Mem.* III. 5. 14—16: IV. 4. 15, cp. *De Rep. Lac.* 10. 7, Plato *Crito* 92 E); for plutocracy, their appointment by a property qualification, Xen. *Mem.* IV. 6. 12, cp. I. 2. 41—45. Here already is the germ of the distinction found in Plato and Aristotle between normal constitutions and the perverted forms corresponding to them. Yet the principle of law-abiding rule and willing obedience (and their opposites respectively), which Socrates followed, is carried out clearly in the case of

<sup>1</sup> And not, as Oncken II. 152 misinforms us only 'after performance of definite statutory injunctions.'

the monarchical constitutions only. Plutocracy, thus defined, does not present any such sharp antithesis to Aristocracy, although the mere wealth of the rulers in the one case, and their excellence and obedience to the laws in the other offer a strong contrast of a similar kind<sup>1</sup>. In democracy he made no such distinction at all: he merely defined it by the fact that the appointment to the offices of state is open to all; and certain statements by him lead to the inference that in general he regarded it as a perverted form (*Xen. Mem.* III. 7. 5 f., I. 2. 9, cp. I. 2. 58 f., III. 9. 10).

Plato follows in his master's footsteps most closely in his *Politicus*, strange to say, for from the most recent investigations it follows that this is in all probability not his earliest exposition. But the principle which Socrates had already laid down, that the excellence of a man and of a ruler is only conferred by conceptual knowledge, is there put into serious application by the exaltation of reason above the law. He declares the most perfect constitution to be the rule of the wise man unfettered by legal restraint, so far as it can actually be realized. Next, after dismissing this ideal state, he carries out completely the Socratic opposition between states governed by laws and those which are subject to arbitrary rule, at the same time showing a correct appreciation of the numerical standard<sup>2</sup> which, though in itself something external, nevertheless involves essential intrinsic differences. Thus he distinguishes not only between Kingship and Tyrannis, Aristocracy and Oligarchy (which latter name he employs instead of Socrates' Plutocracy), but also between Democracy governed by law, or moderate Democracy, and arbitrary or unrestrained Democracy. But it is quite a novelty when he undertakes to determine precisely the order of merit of these constitutions, reversing this order in the two classes of constitutions, (1) those where the laws are respected and (2) those where they are not; so that the former are less bad, the latter less good according as the number of the rulers increases.

With this the older account given in the *Republic* so far agrees that here also Tyranny is depicted as the worst of all constitutions and Democracy and Oligarchy as coming next to it. But while in the *Politicus* arbitrary Democracy is, as we have said, represented as more tolerable than Oligarchy, in the *Republic* on the contrary Democracy ranks below Oligarchy, and nothing is said about recognizing a good Democracy or Oligarchy along with the bad forms. Instead of this, Aristocracy, the name given in the *Politicus* to Oligarchy where the laws are respected, is here reserved for the ideal state itself and this Aristocracy is in its real and essential nature placed on a par with true Monarchy: cp. Zeller *Plato* p. 469 Eng. tr. But to make up for this, between the only good constitution of the *Republic* and the three wholly bad ones an intermediate form is inserted, a constitution after

<sup>1</sup> Hence Oncken's criticism is quite unfair when he asserts that this point of view is abandoned in the non-monarchical constitutions, purely external differences respecting the conditions for admission to office being alone taken into account,

and that Socrates reverts to the superficial view which bases a distinction simply on the number of rulers.

<sup>2</sup> That is, the distinction between government by one man, a few, or a multitude: Plato *Polit.* 219 D f., 302 C.

the fashion of Sparta and Crete, in which Plato invents the new name Timocracy (rule of honour) because he regards its intrinsic principle as being ambition and the love of honour. We may conjecture that this is partly due to the views of those theorists who originated the doctrine of the mixed constitution and discovered such a combination in Sparta and Crete (II. 6. 17 with *n.* 219, cp. also *Introd.* p. 20): for Plato in the *Republic* does not simply describe Timocracy as a constitution intermediate between Aristocracy and Oligarchy, he expressly says it is a combination of elements of both, of good and bad: IX 544 f., 547 D ff.

Lastly, it was pointed out in the notes on II. 6 §§ 17, 18 that he shews himself very distinctly influenced by these theories in the last of his works, the *Laws*, where he himself sketches a wholly new and improved form of such a mixed constitution (cp. also *n.* 191 on II. 6. 4). Thus forms of government are now divided by him into mixed or moderate and pure or unlimited; the latter he represents as merely governments of faction or party in the one-sided interest of the ruling power. This division in the main coincides with that followed in the *Politicus*, except that it is not stated in the *Laws* whether Oligarchy or absolute Democracy is regarded as the less bad: nor whether unlimited Monarchy, otherwise called Despotism or Tyrannis, is still regarded as the most intolerable constitution of all. But in any case he no longer assigns to limited or constitutional Monarchy the same high place as in the *Politicus*, where it ranks not only above moderate Democracy but even above Aristocracy: nor does he make Kingship and Aristocracy identical, as in the *Republic*. It would appear as if he placed limited Democracy before limited Monarchy rather than in the reverse order: at least he apparently sets both on an equality in merit, but certainly ranks mixed Aristocracy before them both: for if we adopt his own terminology we may thus describe the pattern state of the second rank sketched in the *Laws*, since he uses the term Aristocracy III 701 A in the sense of a 'government by the best,' although in III 681 D it means a government by nobles, while in the decisive passage IV 712 C D it is employed in such a way that one does not rightly see whether that is still its meaning or what it is that Plato understands by "Aristocracy." We may however conjecture that it is at any rate a government by certain families in which special excellence is really hereditary. It may be seen from Aristotle (III. 7. 3, VI(IV). 7. 1, *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10. 1—cp. *n.* 1230) that the champions of a mixed constitution before Plato's time gave it the common name Πολιτεία, Constitution or Commonwealth in general: evidently (a) because, as a combination of several or indeed of all constitutions with one another, it is so to speak the all-comprehensive constitution or the constitution *par excellence*; or else (b) because as in their opinion the *best* constitution it seemed alone deserving of the name, or it may be (c) for both reasons. This name is retained by Aristotle, yet with the remark in the *Ethics* I. c. that the more correct term would be Timocracy, which however he applies to it in a sense different altogether from that in which Plato coined the expression, to mean the rule of the census or property-qualifica-

tion, i.e. the rule of a moderate property-qualification. Comp. III. 7. 4 *n.* (537), VI(IV). 9. 3 *n.* (1254), VI(IV). 13. 7 *n.* (1269).

Aristotle for his part follows very closely, as he himself remarks VI(IV). 2. 3 (cp. *nn.* 1139, 1140), the view presented by Plato in the *Politicus*, except that he replaces law-abiding Democracy by Polity and adheres firmly to the distinction between law-abiding or moderate Oligarchy and Democracy and their opposites, a distinction which with special reference to the Athenian state was certainly the common property of educated Athenians, even before Plato, in the form of the antithesis between the 'old fashioned' and the 'modern' Democracy—II. 12 §§ 2, 4, cp. VI(IV). 6 § 5, 14 § 7, §§ 11, 12: VII(VI). 4 §§ 1, 2; 5 §§ 3, 4. VIII(V). §§ 10 and *n.* (406)—which Isocrates, in particular, is fond of using<sup>1</sup>. Hence follows the essentially original addition made by Aristotle to the Greek classification of forms of government, which he expressly claims as original VI(IV). 1 §§ 8—11 (cp. *n.* 1126, also VI[IV]. 2 § 4 *n.* 1140 b, VII[VI]. 1 § 7 *n.* 1383 b, VIII[V]. 12 § 18 *n.* 1787), namely the accurate analysis of the principal forms of constitution, Oligarchy and Democracy in particular, into their sub-species, and the estimate of the comparative merit of the latter, which leads him to assume not simply two but more exactly four forms of Democracy and Oligarchy from the most moderate and law-observing species, which resemble Polity, down to the most unbridled and corrupt, which resemble Tyrannis, VI(IV). c. 4 f, VII(VI). cc. 4—7. Thus in contrast to Plato's procedure in the *Politicus* and the *Laws* he certainly regards even the first and most law-observing of these forms as already a degeneration, though it stands still very near to Polity. But even amongst the mixed forms he employs a more exact mode of distinction, particularly to delimitate spurious or mixed Aristocracies from Politics, the name of Aristocracy in its proper distinctive sense being reserved for what is really and truly such, Aristocracy pure and unmixed, the best constitution in the absolute sense: VI(IV). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 § 9, cp. 2 § 1 *n.* (1133), § 4 (1141); II. 6. 17 (218), IV(VII). II. 5 (849), also *n.* (536) on III. 7. 3: for which an ideal Monarchy as the best form of all is at least conceivable: III. c. 13 *nn.* (595, 597, 601), c. 17 *nn.* (677, 678); VI(IV). 2 § 1 f *nn.* (1133, 1136—7), 10 § 4 *n.* comparing *nn.* (521) on III. 6. 1, (614) on III. 14. 24, (633) on III. 14. 2. But this, the only Monarchy which has any justification in the developed state, is not tied down to laws but is absolutely unqualified. Comp. *Introd.* p. 44 ff. The same sketch of the various constitutions had already been given by Aristotle, without specifying the sub-species, in the *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10. 1—3:<sup>2</sup> indeed he had probably expounded it still earlier in one of his dialogues. For it is assuredly probable, if not certain, that when Isocrates, who is trying to maintain the old threefold division into Monarchy, Oligarchy and Democracy, as found in Herodotos<sup>3</sup>, makes a hit at those who, caring little for essential points, regard Democracy blended with Aristocracy, and Timocracy

<sup>1</sup> Comp. e.g. Isocr. VII. 15 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The divergences which Oncken, p. 158 ff. believes he has discovered rest upon misapprehensions.

<sup>3</sup> But in such a way as to give Oligarchy the meaning it has in Plato and Aristotle.

in the sense of government by property qualification, as separate forms (*Panath.* §§ 131—133), he is attacking Aristotle. But Isocrates is not referring, as Henkel p. 46 n. 25 thinks, to the *Ethics*, which at that time unquestionably was not yet published<sup>1</sup>; nor is there anything said in the *Ethics* about a combination of Aristocracy and Democracy at all, much less as a special constitution.

Van der Rest p. 415 f, criticizing the principle of classifying constitutions as normal and perverted which had been inherited by Aristotle from Socrates and Plato, says not without some reason: la science ne peut admettre une classification des gouvernements qui s'appuie, non pas sur le principe même ou l'organisation des divers gouvernements, non pas sur leurs différences intrinsèques, mais sur la manière dont usent du pouvoir ceux qui en sont revêtus, sur les qualités morales dont ils font ou non preuve dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, c'est à dire sur quelque chose de tout à fait en dehors des constitutions mêmes. However there is always this difference; that certain constitutions by their essential organization may be adapted either to prevent such misuse, or on the other hand to call it into existence, sometimes indeed to render it inevitable. How else could the distinction between a despotism and a really free government be maintained? And is there not a difference in the 'principle of the constitution itself' between a constitution which really favours the rule of the masses and one which distributes power wisely? The conception of Plato and Aristotle may be untenable in this form, but there is something true underlying it. SUSEM. (633)

## EXCURSUS II.

## PITTACUS: III. 14. 10.

In regard to the life of Pittacus, all that we either know with certainty, or may with some probability conjecture, amounts to very little, as Topffer more particularly has recently shown in his *Questiones Pisistratae* pp. 81—107

<sup>1</sup> Heitz in his continuation of K. O. Müller's History of Greek Literature, *Geschichte der griech. Litt.* II ii p. 281 f. (cp. p. 245) is certainly of opinion that the *Academical Ethics* owes its origin, in part at least, to pupils' notes of lectures delivered by Aristotle during Plato's lifetime in the Academy: but see, as against this, Sussemühl in *Philologischer Anzeiger* XLII. 1886, p. 4 f. Another possibility, which occurred to Oncken II p. 160 f., is however by no means excluded:—it, that is, on other grounds we really must assume with Teschmüller and Hergk that the polemic of Isocrates in the *Panathenaeus* §§ 16—34 is directed against

Aristotle and his friends, and that consequently after Plato's death Aristotle paid a second visit to Athens from 344 to 342 B.C. and lectured there in the Lyceum on rhetoric and poetry (see Sussemühl *Zeitschr. f. d. Phil.* XXX. 1883 p. 4 ff.). For this would make it at least possible that his lectures extended to ethics, and that Isocrates was informed of the subject-matter of those ethical lectures, and thus came to attack the part of them treating of politics in §§ 131—133 of the same pamphlet (the *Panathenaeus*). But we do not require such an altogether uncertain hypothesis, and therefore it would be better, I take it, to abstain from it.

(Dorpat, 1886). He is said to have been allied to the Lesbian nobility through his wife, who was descended from the once princely house of the Pentilidae, VIII(V). 10. 19 *n.* (1681); but on the father's side he was not of Lesbian, but of Thracian descent (Duris *Frag.* 53 in Diog. Laert. I. 74, Suidas). Yet whilst still in his vigorous manhood he attained great reputation. Mitylene was at that time torn with factions and Pittacus' first political act seems to have been to bring about the fall of the tyrant Melanchros with the aid of the nobles, or at least that party of them which was headed by Antimenides and Kikis the brothers of Alcaeus the poet. Perhaps this also contributed to his election by the Mitylenaeans (presumably not long afterwards) to be their general in the war with the Athenian immigrants into the Troad, who under the leadership of Phrynon had conquered the Mitylenaeon colony Sigeion. In this campaign, which proved disastrous to the Mitylenaeans, Alcaeus also took part. No mention is made of him on occasion of the expulsion of Melanchros, although according to Aristotle's statement here he was afterwards chosen as the leader of the exiled nobles along with Antimenides. He himself describes his flight after a battle with the Athenians, in a poem addressed to his friend Melanippos (*Fr.* 32 in Herod. v. 95, Strabo XIII. p. 600). The statement that Pittacus slew Phrynon in single combat (Strab. XIII. 600, Plut. *De Herod. malign.* c. 15, Diog. Laert. *l.c.*, Suidas) is very suspicious, as Töpffer has shown: probably it did not originate long before Strabo's time. At last peace was concluded in accordance with the decision of Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, and the Athenians retained Sigeion (Herod. and Strabo *ll. cc.*, Apollodoros *Fr.* 78 in Diog. Laert. *l.c.*, Töpffer p. 86 ff.). But there was no cessation of the intestine feuds, in which Alcaeus largely increased his renown as a poet by the composition of his "Faction songs," *στασιωτικά*, as they are called (Strab. XIV. p. 617). The tyranny of Myrsilos, whose death Alcaeus celebrated in one of his poems, *Frag.* 20, probably falls within this period, although Strabo mentions him before Melanchros. At length the nobles themselves were banished, and when the exiles threatened to commence an attack, Pittacus was chosen Aesymnetes. He victoriously repulsed the invaders, taking Alcaeus prisoner; but he pardoned him (Heraclitus in Diog. Laert. I. 76, Diod. IX. 20) and permitted Antimenides also to return. He issued a general amnesty, and though he authorized a new division of the land he introduced no changes at all into the constitution, but only into the laws and courts of justice (see II. 12 § 13 *n.* 429). So completely was peace restored that several years before his death he was able to lay down his office.

The fixed dates in his biography which are given, from the same original source, most fully in Diog. Laert. I. 75, 79 and in Suidas, are based upon very arbitrary calculations. Nothing more was known about Pittacus and Alcaeus than what tradition and the poems of the latter had to tell about them, and that of course furnished very uncertain starting points for chronology. The only trustworthy date established by written evidence was due to the fact of Phrynon having previously won a victory at the Olympic games (*viz.* according to Julius Africanus, in 636), so that his name stood on record

in the corresponding list of victors. If I am right in my conjecture, he was reckoned as being 25 years old at that time and 30 when he conquered Sigeion, and Pittacus as being about ten years younger: hence the *floruit* (*ἰδέσθαι*) of the latter, *i.e.* his fortieth year, perhaps also the beginning of the Sigeian war, was placed in the 42nd Olympiad; more precisely Ol. 42, 2=611 B.C., which would make his birth fall in Ol. 32, 2=651. To the same 42nd Olympiad, but somewhat earlier probably, was next assigned the fall of Melanchros. Those who wanted to bring in the single combat with Phrynon placed it half a decade later than the outbreak of the war, *i.e.* as Eusebius in the Armenian translation attests, Ol. 43, 3=606<sup>1</sup>. Now counting two decades from 611 we arrive at 591; and as it was important that two events which followed at no long interval, *viz.* the expulsion of the nobles and Pittacus' appointment to be Aesymnetes, should be fixed here, a year earlier, 592, was chosen for the one (the Parian Marble, *Ep.* 36 as restored by A. Schöne 'Researches into the life of Sappho' in *Symb. phil. Bonn.* p. 755 ff.), and a year later, 590, for the other. Just as arbitrary was the assignment of ten years to Pittacus' tenure of office and ten years more to the remainder of his life (Diog. Laert. i. 75), whereby the year of his death became exactly Ol. 52, 3=570, and he was made to live just over 80 years, or between 80 and 81 (Laert. Diog. i. 79, where *ἑβδομήκοντα* must obviously be altered to *ογδοήκοντα*). Now this whole calculation in round numbers, decades and half-decades, may still be approximately correct; but it is quite possible that mistakes of more than ten years have crept in. Hence we must be contented, *e.g.* to place the Sigeian war in the latter part of the seventh century, some time after 636. Nor can we decide whether Alcaeus was younger than Pittacus, nor, if he was so, by how many years. About Antimenides we learn further, from a poem of Alcaeus addressed to him, of which the beginning has been preserved (*Fr.* 33), that he served in the Babylonian army. This must certainly have happened after his banishment which, though quite possibly previous to 592, can hardly have been earlier than 605; hence we are obliged to reject the conjecture of Otfried Muller that he took part in the battle of Carchemish, B.C. 605; see his essay, 'A brother of the poet Alcaeus fighting under Nebuchadnezzar,' in *Rhein. Mus.* for 1827, pp. 287—296. Muller's only reason on the other side, *viz.* that at the later date he would have been too old, is not valid; for there is nothing to contradict the supposition that he was a man of about fifty, or a little over, in 590. Possibly Pittacus himself was no older in that year; for we must be content to place his birth somewhere about 650—640, and that of Alcaeus still more vaguely, somewhere about 650—630. Hence Duncker is nearer the truth when he remarks *op. cit.* vi. p. 281: "Antimenides may have taken part in Nebuchadnezzar's Syrian campaigns, or in his conflicts with Pharaoh

<sup>1</sup> The text of Suidas (*ζ. v.* Πιττακός) καὶ τῇ μὲν ὀλίμῳ Μελανχρῶν τὸν τοῦτον Μιτυλήνης ἀντίλε. καὶ Φρύγωνα στρατηγὸν Ἀθηναίων πολέμοισιν ἐπὶ τοῦ Σελίου ποταμοῦ ἀπέκτεινε διατρεπεύοντες αὐτὸν should be thus punctuated,

with a full stop, in place of a comma, after ἀντίλε. If this be done, Suidas does not contradict Eusebius. This too has been correctly remarked by Toyler p. 55 f.

Hophra, or in the taking of Jerusalem." Moreover, as Alcaeus himself tells us that he reached Egypt (*Fr.* 106 in Strabo I. p. 37), which was no doubt during his exile, it would appear that he at any rate was exiled for several years. SUSEM. (626) Cp. now *Rhein. Mus.* XLII. 1887, p. 140 ff

\*  
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

Ol. 32, 2	Pittacus born	B.C. 651
Ol. 36	Phrynon aetat. 25 victor	636
Ol. 42	Downfall of the tyrant Melanchros	
Ol. 42, 2	Pittacus floruit, aetat. 40	611
	Phrynon aetat. 50 conquers Sigeion }	
Ol. 43, 3	Phrynon slain in single combat by Pittacus	606
Ol. 47	Expulsion of the Lesbian nobles	592
Ol. 47, 2	Pittacus aetat. 60	591
Ol. 47, 3	Pittacus made Aesymnetes	590
Ol. 50	Pittacus resigns his office	580
Ol. 52, 3	Pittacus dies, aetat. 81	570

## EXCURSUS III.

## FRAGMENTA VATICANA RESCRIPTA.

The printing of B. III was almost completed when a very praiseworthy piece of work was published: in the *Rheinisches Museum* for 1887, vol. XLII p. 102 ff. G. Heylbut communicated to the world his collation of twelve leaves of a palimpsest in the Vatican library (gr. 1298) containing the following passages of the *Politics*: 1275 a 13—b 33, 1276 b 17—1277 b 1, 1278 a 24—1281 a 37, 1286 b 16—1288 b 37, 1290 a 36—1292 b 20. Notwithstanding their great age<sup>1</sup> the fragments, which we denote by fr., abound in more or less serious blunders of every kind, which need not be fully recorded in the critical notes<sup>2</sup>. The gain accruing to the text is next to nothing: at 1278 a 34 they confirm Perizonius' conjecture ἀστῶν, at 1287 a 34 my rejection of καὶ, and that is all. No one need be surprised at this when he reflects on the extraordinary accuracy which marks P<sup>2</sup>, the principal codex of the family Π<sup>2</sup>, although it is, comparatively speaking, so recent<sup>3</sup>. For the definite separation between the two recensions Π<sup>1</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> Heylbut pronounces the writing to be of the tenth century. Accents are very rare, but not altogether absent; iota adscriptum is written or omitted at random; etacism is very frequent; there are no pauses between the words except at the end of a paragraph.

<sup>2</sup> It will be found that of some 400 readings cited by Heylbut 59 record the

partial illegibility of the palimpsest; 79 consist in the retention of ν ἐφελκυστικόν; 81 are blunders of spelling (including etacism); there are 9 cases of ditto-graphy, 11 of omission through homoeoteleuton and 14 of words or letters omitted through other causes.

<sup>3</sup> Namely, of XIV century, four centuries later than fr.

$\Pi^2$  was brought about, as I have shown<sup>1</sup>, in the sixth or seventh century while the manuscript of which these fragments have been preserved, was copied from an original of an earlier date than that separation. So far it may be compared with the manuscript which Julian used; but with this difference, that of the two subsequent recensions Julian's  $M^2$  apparently more nearly resembled  $\Pi^1$  than  $\Pi^2$ , while the case is just the opposite with the newly recovered fragments. That is to say, apart from the two readings above mentioned it shares in general both the merits and the faults of  $\Pi^1$  and of  $\Pi^2$ . Consequently, as I am bound to state in reply to Heylbut, it is not of the slightest importance for deciding the question, whether on the average the text is better preserved in  $\Pi^1$  or  $\Pi^2$ . On the contrary, the reasons which have led me to infer that  $\Pi^1$  has retained the true reading (or traces of the true reading) somewhat oftener and in more important cases<sup>2</sup> than  $\Pi^2$ , and must therefore in all more or less indifferent cases retain the advantage over it, remain, now that the palimpsest has been made known, exactly the same as they were before. More than this I have never asserted.

But besides, Heylbut has made no complete enumeration of the readings in which the fragments agree with  $\Pi^1$ , or with  $\Pi^2$ : sometimes too, where he records such agreement, his statement is not quite precise enough to make clear the actual state of the case. Thus he tells us, "1276 b 30 *ἀν*" with  $\Pi^2$ , 1281 a 35 *ἔχοντα...ψυχὴν* placed after *φαιδρον* with  $\Pi^2$ , 1287 a 11 "ἐν παντὶ εἶναι" with  $\Pi^2$ , a 32 *οὐ τοὺς νόμους* as Julian reads, 1288 a 2 *οὐτως* "οὕτως" as  $\Pi^2$ : whereas in the fourth of these passages  $\Pi^1$  also agrees with Julian, and in the other four it is not  $\Pi^1$ , but only  $\Gamma^1 M^1$  (or in the last passage  $\Gamma^1 P^1$ ), from which fr. diverge. If Heylbut chose to adopt this procedure (viz. to make divergence from  $\Gamma^1 M^1$  equivalent to divergence from  $\Pi^1$ ), he should in all fairness have set down to the credit of  $\Pi^1$  the readings in which the fragments agree with  $\Gamma^1 M^1$  only; namely, 1278 b 22 *πολλοὺς*, 1280 b 5 *διεκομίσαι*, 1287 b 13 *ερχομένων*. The second of these three erroneous readings is of some interest: for while a codex so late as  $P^1$  has not got beyond the first stage of corruption, *διεκομίσαι* for *διεκομίσαν*, the fragment as well as  $\Gamma^1 M^1$  had already converted this into *διεκομίσαν*<sup>3</sup>. Still more interesting is 1292 a 3, where  $M^1$  has the true reading with  $\Pi^2$ , while the frightfully corrupt reading which, as we now see, already stood in the palimpsest was also found in  $\Gamma$ , and originally also in  $P^1$ . At 1287 a 33  $\Gamma^1 \Pi^1$  rightly have *γράμματα*, fr. has *γράμμα* with  $M^1 P^1$ . The statement "1286 b 17 *μερεθῶλλον* with  $\Pi^2$ " is quite misleading: for here it is only  $P^1$  that has *μερεθῶλον* at all, at least we cannot determine the reading of  $\Gamma$ . At 1278 a 36 the order of the words in fr. is the same as in  $P^1$  and corr.  $P^1$ , i.e. a branch of  $\Pi^1$ .

<sup>1</sup> In my critical edition p. 815. Cp. above, p. 2, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> A reference to a single passage may suffice, II. 2.4.6, 1461 a 30 ff. where  $\Pi^1$  affords an especially deterrent example: cp. *Quaest. crit. col.* p. 360 f. I can with the greatest ease supply a

series of similar passages.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 76 n. 111. We know that  $P^1$  was copied quite at the end of the fifteenth century; but on the last page but one the scribe, Demetrios Chalkondylas, records the births of his children from the year 1484 to the year 1501.

Remarkable, too, is the reading at 1291 a 39, if Heylbut's statement is accurate: for in that case fr. have βουλευόμενον with Π<sup>2</sup> and κρινούν with Π<sup>1</sup>. Heylbut's omission to annotate a number of readings in which fr. agree with Π<sup>1</sup> or Π<sup>2</sup>, as the case may be, is evidently intentional: but on his own principles he should have added "with Π<sup>2</sup>" in the following cases; 1276 b 33<sup>1</sup>, 1277 a 20, 1278 b 19, 1281 a 3, 1288 a 29, 1292 b 9 (εἴπαμεν); and "with Π<sup>1</sup>" in the following; 1276 b 36, 1279 a 25 (το πολιτευμα), 1280 b 4 (εξεῖ), 1287 b 41, 1288 a 23.

Leaving out of account the circumstance that fr. usually write οὐθεὶς and γίγνεσθαι with Π<sup>2</sup>, on the basis of an exact calculation made by me the case stands as follows: fr. agree with Π<sup>2</sup> against Π<sup>1</sup> 62 times; 15 times rightly, 16 times wrongly, while 31 cases are doubtful or impossible to decide: whereas fr. agree with Π<sup>1</sup> 27 times, 20 times rightly and only 4 times wrongly with 3 cases doubtful or not to be decided<sup>2</sup>. The correctness of the calculation that Π<sup>1</sup> has retained the true text oftener than Π<sup>2</sup> cannot be better brought before us. Moreover the right reading in fr. at 1275 a 27 *αν φαιη* is undoubtedly derived from Π<sup>1</sup>. And if we now take into account the cases mentioned above where fr. have the right or the wrong reading in agreement with a part only of the family Π<sup>1</sup>, even this makes but very little change in favour of Π<sup>2</sup>.

Assuredly we ought not to reckon amongst the doubtful cases 1278 b 20 f. φύσει μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν πολιτικόν: on the contrary there can be no doubt that Π<sup>2</sup> fr. are wrong in omitting the article. That by Aristotelian usage it might in itself be dispensed with, would never have been doubted even apart from the parallel passages which Heylbut adduces; but unfortunately Heylbut has left out the three closest parallels, which are alone sufficient to decide the case: 1253 a 7 διότι πολιτικὸν ζῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, *Eth. Nic.* 1097 b 11 φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος<sup>3</sup>, 1169 b 18 πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. [Moreover ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ may be for ἄνθρωπος, as Stöhr suggests.<sup>4</sup>]

On the other hand in the above calculation καὶ εἰ or καὶν εἰ, and in most cases the order of the words, have been regarded as doubtful. Yet as a matter of fact we may hold it more probable that Aristotle everywhere wrote καὶν εἰ. Again no one of course will dispute the fact that he frequently places the attributive after the substantive and repeats the article as in τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης: but precisely because this occurs often enough, we must

<sup>1</sup> It is a mere accident that M<sup>s</sup> here agrees with Π<sup>2</sup>. With the copyist of M<sup>s</sup> no other fault is so frequent as the omission of words in consequence of an homoeoteleuton: here too it is he, no doubt, who is to blame, and not his original.

<sup>2</sup> Besides the 51 passages noted below in which Π<sup>2</sup> fr. agree against Π<sup>1</sup> there are 11 others where the text with which Heylbut collated fr., viz. Susem.<sup>3</sup>, agrees with Π<sup>2</sup> against Π<sup>1</sup>, viz. 1275 a 28 f., 1277 a 12, a 20, a 24, 1279 a 2 f., 1280 b 5, 1288 a 16 (in which cases Π<sup>1</sup> omits words), also 1277 a 23, 1280 a 24, 1291 b 27, 1292

b 5. Similarly with the eight passages 1275 b 32, 1280 b 34, 1286 b 24, 1288 b 27, 1290 b 19, 1291 a 39, b 6, 1292 b 14 in which fr. may be assumed (from Heylbut's silence) to agree with Susem.<sup>3</sup>, i. e. with Π<sup>1</sup> as against Π<sup>2</sup>: adding these 8 to the 19 noted below we get 27 readings in which Π<sup>1</sup> fr. are agreed as against Π<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> See Rassow *Forschungen über die Nikom. Ethik.* (Weimar, 1874) p. 54.

<sup>4</sup> See *Commentationes Philologicae* (Monachii, 1891) p. 98.

feel some scruples about accusing the author of the recension  $\Pi^1$  (which, as the figures above show, is on the average the better and more careful) with such confidence as to exclude all doubt, of having three times intentionally altered it 1260 b 23 f., 1288 a 39, 1331 a 5. Just as little do I hold the case to be decided, or even possible to decide, by Heylbut's examples at 1260 a 15 f.,<sup>1</sup> and 1288 a 13 f.<sup>2</sup> Those which he adduces in favour of  $\mu\acute{\iota}\nu \delta\eta\rho\eta$  1277 a 1 have certainly somewhat more weight.<sup>3</sup> However I have made it a rule as regards the order of the words, so far as it is of any importance, quietly to follow everywhere the class of manuscripts which is, on the average, the better, in order to limit as much as possible the editor's own subjective leanings: but I have no objection if in the future another editor, bolder than I am, prefers to attempt a decision of each case upon its merits, so long as he only refrains from the wish to deduce theories as to the order of words in Aristotle from a text like this preserved to us by a bifurcate tradition. Otherwise the matter is without significance and not worth contesting. And lastly I fail to see what right Heylbut has to prohibit Aristotle from using two alternative forms  $\mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\alpha\rho\chi\omicron\varsigma$  and  $\mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\alpha\rho\chi\eta\varsigma$ : one should have learnt by now to guard against the endeavour after uniformity of this sort.

In my third edition I did not, at 1278 b 22, bracket the words  $\omicron\iota\kappa \epsilon\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega\varsigma$ , my reason being the observed fact that words are more often omitted by  $\Pi^1$  than added by  $\Pi^2$  without justification. But now it appears that fr. agree with  $\Pi^1$  in rejecting these two words; and not only so, but Heylbut has proved that they are untenable<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, at 1278 b 31 the  $\gamma\epsilon$  inserted after  $\delta\mu\epsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$  by  $P^{2-3}$  fr. deserves perhaps to be accepted, and at 1292 b 15 I shall without hesitation replace  $\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$  in the text with  $P^{2-3}$  fr.  $\text{Ald. Ik.}$ , as here the sense favours the article.  $\text{SUSEM.}$

Heylbut's collation with the text of Susem.<sup>5</sup> is as follows (words and letters in brackets being such as are illegible):

1275 a 15  $\epsilon\gamma\gamma\epsilon\gamma\rho\alpha\mu\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\varsigma$  | 19  $\gamma\alpha\rho$  |  $\alpha\sigma\lambda\omega\varsigma$ :  $\lambda$  is added above the line | 21  $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$  | 22  $\mu\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu$  | 24  $\epsilon\iota\pi\omega$  | 26  $\alpha\upsilon\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ :  $\omicron$  added above the line | 33  $\{ \omicron \mu \mu \epsilon \}$  | 34  $\{ \lambda \epsilon \}$   $\gamma\omicron\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\varsigma$  | 39  $\{ \mu \alpha \varsigma \dots \alpha \nu \tau \iota \varsigma \}$ ; there is only room for about 10 letters; probably the copyist omitted  $\tau\alpha\varsigma \delta\epsilon \pi\rho\omicron\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\varsigma$

1275 b 4  $\{ \kappa \alpha \iota \dots \epsilon \kappa \alpha \tau \eta \mu \}$   $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\epsilon\iota\{ \alpha \nu \delta \iota \omega \}$   $\pi\epsilon\rho\{ \alpha \lambda \epsilon \chi \theta \epsilon \iota \alpha \}$  | 5  $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$  | 7  $\epsilon\kappa$  omitted | 8  $\delta\iota\alpha\kappa\alpha\zeta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\mu\epsilon$  | 10  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$   $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\upsilon$  | 11  $\tau\eta\varsigma \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\alpha\iota$  | 12  $\kappa\rho\iota\tau\iota\kappa\alpha\iota$  | 13  $\tau\omicron\upsilon$  | 15  $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$  |  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$  | 16  $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  with  $\Pi^2$  | 19  $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\eta\varsigma$   $\eta$   $\kappa\rho\iota\tau\iota\kappa\eta\varsigma$  | 20  $\{ \pi\rho\omicron\upsilon \}$ ... 21  $\{ \eta \mu \}$

<sup>1</sup> In favour of  $\phi\alpha\epsilon\lambda\alpha\iota$   $\kappa\rho\iota\tau\alpha\iota$ , the order of  $\Pi^2$  fr., Heylbut quotes 1282 a 16,  $\tau\omicron\lambda\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ , VII, 11 § 3, 161 a 37  $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\lambda \delta\epsilon \phi\alpha\epsilon\lambda\alpha\iota$   $\epsilon\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\iota \delta' \epsilon\mu\pi\omicron\delta\iota\zeta\omega\mu\epsilon\kappa\tau\lambda$ ,  $\text{N}\epsilon\upsilon$ .  $\text{E}\acute{\epsilon}\tau\eta$ . I. 3 § 2, 1094 b 28  $\delta\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$   $\kappa\rho\iota\tau\eta\varsigma$ .

For the less usual order of  $\Pi^2$  fr.,  $\delta\rho\chi\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$   $\kappa\alpha\iota$   $\delta\rho\chi\iota\omega$ , Heylbut cites 1259 b 37, 1277 b 27, 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2. Comp. 1255 b 8 with  $\text{C}\acute{\rho}\iota\tau$ .  $\text{note}$ .

<sup>2</sup> They are 1276 b 32, 1277 a 10, b 18, 1312 a 8, a 26.

<sup>3</sup> Heylbut points out that  $\epsilon\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega\varsigma$  denotes a less sum, or something less in number, time or space: e.g.  $\alpha\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\omega$ —

$\epsilon\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega\varsigma$  VII(VI). 3 § 3, 1318 a 26:  $\epsilon\zeta \epsilon\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega\upsilon\sigma\alpha\iota \epsilon\iota\varsigma \epsilon\zeta\alpha\kappa\alpha\sigma\iota\mu\epsilon\iota \delta\alpha\lambda\epsilon\alpha$ , VIII(VI). 6 § 3, 1303 b 12:  $\alpha\iota \gamma\alpha\rho \gamma\iota\alpha\varsigma \epsilon\zeta\alpha\kappa\alpha\sigma\iota\mu\epsilon\iota$ ,  $\epsilon\iota \delta\epsilon \delta\epsilon \epsilon\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega\upsilon\sigma\alpha\iota$  (sc.  $\chi\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\iota$ )  $\tau\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$   $\epsilon\iota\varsigma \delta\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$  VII(VI). 15 § 1, 1299 a 6:  $\alpha\iota \gamma\alpha\rho \epsilon\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega\varsigma \delta\iota\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\iota$  IV(VIII). 3 § 2, 1323 a 28. Whereas the sense required in the passage in question is that invariably expressed by  $\omicron\iota\chi \epsilon\tau\tau\omega\varsigma$ ,  $\alpha\iota\lambda\iota\epsilon \epsilon\tau\tau\omega\varsigma$ , the opposite of which is  $\tau\alpha\lambda\iota \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\sigma\iota\mu\epsilon\iota$  less easily, e.g. VII(VI). 11 § 11, 1296 a 5. At VIII(VI). 8 § 7, 1308 a 18,  $\epsilon\tau\tau\omega\varsigma$  is parallel to  $\alpha\iota \gamma\alpha\rho \iota\sigma\alpha\lambda\iota\omega\varsigma \delta\alpha\lambda\epsilon\alpha$ .

ζονται) δη | 23 επι...οιον twice over | 24 παμππους | 25 απορουσιν | 27 ειρωνευ-  
ομονος | 29 υπο των twice over | λαρισσοποιους, but just before λαρισταιους | 30  
εστιν | 31 διορισμος | 32 και γαρ ουδε

1276 b 18 ημη corrected from ημιν | 21 τωδε | 23 τινεχωντην τοιαυτην |  
24 δη(λον) | 25 (αρετη)s | 26 (εργον εστ)ιν | 27 (των) | 29 εστιν, then κοινωνία  
δ' εστιν is omitted | 30 διο with P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> | πολι(του προς) | 31 εστιν | 32 α(ρετην) |  
33 τὸν δ'...τελείαν is omitted with M<sup>s</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> | 34 ευδεχετ(αι) | πολι(την) | 35 (καθην) |  
36 ἀλλὰ is omitted with Π<sup>1</sup> | εστιν | 39 αυτον | π(οιει)ν | 40 επειδε as Π<sup>2</sup> |  
(παν)τας

1277 a 1 ει(η)μ(ια)αρετη as Π<sup>2</sup> | (κα)ι | 2 (σπουδαιου πο)λιτ(ουδ)ει | 3 (αναγ-  
καιον ειναι τ)η(ν) | πόλιν τήν] πολιτην | αγαθ(ου αδυνατον ει μη) | 5 (τησπου)δαια |  
6 (πολις ωσπερ ζων) | ψυχ(η εκ) | 8 κτησεις | 9 ανοποιων | 15 αγαθονειναι  
as Π<sup>2</sup> | 16 φρουημον | 17 λεγουσιν | 18 ευρηπιδης φησιν | 19 κομφ as Π<sup>2</sup> | 20 ειδε-  
αυτη as Π<sup>2</sup> | 21 εστιν | 22 απλως αν ειη as Π<sup>2</sup> | 24 πινην | 29 αμφω επαιουν  
ποτε | 32 τουντευθεν as Π<sup>2</sup> | 33 εστιν | 39 τουνομαντους as Π<sup>2</sup>

1278 a 29 τουνοθους | οis in πολλοis over an erasure | 30 αλλα | 31 ολιγ(αν..) |  
θρωπιαν, between γ and θ room for four letters | 32 δοχλ(ου κα)τα | 34 αστων |  
36 ωσπερ...38 μετεχων comes after 40 συνοικουντων εστιν as in P<sup>1</sup> corr. P<sup>4</sup>

1278 b 1 εστιν | εκ των ειρημενων with Π<sup>2</sup> | 3 κακεινος ου with Π<sup>2</sup> | 8 κανει with  
Π<sup>2</sup> | after τινες an erasure of half a line | 9 εστιν | 10 κυριος | 11 δεστιν |  
12 διοιον | 14 δεκαι | 16 συνεστηκεν | 19 δη with Π<sup>2</sup> | 21 ο is omitted with  
Π<sup>2</sup> | 22 περι αλληλων πολιτειας ορεγονται\* | 24 εστιν τερος | 25 πασιν | 26 και...  
κοινωνιαν between αυτου and ισως as Π<sup>1</sup> | 28 υπερβαλη | 29 κακοπαθιαν | 31 γε  
after αρχης | 40 ἡ <ει> omitted | 41 ωσπερ with Π<sup>2</sup>

1279 a 2 παιδοτρειβην | 13 το κεινου | 15 αρχ(ουσινοςακ)αιροις | 16 αρχας :  
χ above the line | 19 σφετερον] σ above the line | 22 εστιν | επι(σκεψασθαι) |  
23 εισιν | 25 διωρισθεισων | το πολιτευμα with Π<sup>1</sup> | 26 σημαινει...πολιτευμα is  
omitted | (δ)εστιν | 28 (ο)ταν | (π)ολλοι | 31 (η)του | 32 (δει) | 33 (την) | 34 (απο-  
βλεπουσαν...την) δε των οντων μεν | 35 δ(ε ενος αρισ)τοκρατιαν | 37 οτανδετο |  
38 (κ)αλει(ται το) | (πασων...δευλο)γως | 39 μεν is omitted

1279 b 2 πληθ(ει) γιγνεται | 6 εστιν | 8 (το) των | 14 εστιν | (μη δε τι) |  
15 καταληπειν | 16 εστιν | 20 ειε(νοι) | 23 συμβαινι | 26 καντις | 28 προσ-  
αγορευει | 34 the line ends with πο, the next begins τεια: either λι is omitted,  
or it was written above. There is no trace of it. | 38 δια is omitted | 39 γιγ-  
νεσθαι | 40 δημοκρατεια

1280 a 1 αρχωσιν | 10 πân τὸ: παντα | 14 αφερουσιν | 15 φαυλοι κριται with  
Π<sup>2</sup> | 19 ομολογουσιν | 20 διαλεχθεν omitting το | κρινουσιν | 22 νομιζουσιν]  
ομιζουσι over an erasure | 24 ελευθεριοι: the first ι above the line | 26 μετε-  
χουσιν | 29 εκατον μνων | εισενεγκαντα with Π<sup>2</sup> | 31 μονον ενεκεν with Π<sup>2</sup> |  
33 εστιν | 36 τυρηννοι | 37 εστιν

1280 b 1 του is omitted with Π<sup>1</sup> | αδικος: κ above the line | 4 εξει with  
Π<sup>1</sup> | αδικησωσιν | 5 δαρετης | διακονουσιν with ΓM<sup>s</sup> | 8 γιγνεται | 9 απωθε |  
10 συμμαχων | 11 λυκοφρον | 17 πολειςιν | δουδει | 23 που | 26 οικειαι | σφι(σι)ν |  
28 δοξειεν | 30 η πολις ουκ εστιν with Π<sup>2</sup> | 34 γενεσιν | 35 και] η | 40 δεη

1281 a 1 χάριν is omitted | 3 χαριν with Π<sup>2</sup> | 5 μετεστιν | τ(οι)s | 6 μειζοσιν |

\* περι with M<sup>s</sup> Π<sup>2</sup>, πολιτειας with ΓM<sup>s</sup>, οὐκ ἔλαττον omitted with Π<sup>1</sup>.

7 (πολιτικην)την | υπερεχουσιν | 10 λεγουσιν | 16 *he* is omitted with P<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup> | 17 χρη with Π<sup>2</sup> | παλι | λειψθεντων | 21 τούτων | 23 κριτ(τω)ν | 24 διακυβερχειν with Π<sup>2</sup>; *v* in αρχειν above the line | 26 εστιν | 27 πανταφαιδα with Π<sup>2</sup> | 28 δικαιο with Π<sup>2</sup> | 35 εχοντα... 36 ψυχην after φανλον with P<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup>

1286 b 17 μεταβαλλον with M<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup> | 18 αισχροκερδιαν | 21 γιγνεσθαι | 24 γιγνομειων | 26 τουτο ρυθιον | 31 και is omitted with Π<sup>1</sup> | 33 φυλαξει | 34 βασιλει των τοιούτων is omitted with Π<sup>1</sup> | 40 συρακοις

1287 a 2 εφιστηκεν | 4 βασιλειας | 5 οτον | 7 εστιν | 9 εστιν | 10 παντα | 11 ενι ποταμων ειναι with P<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup> | 16 ομοιως τοιουν και as Π<sup>2</sup> | ουθεν | 25 παιδευσας with Π<sup>1</sup> | 26 εφιστησιν | 29 τον κοιν μόνους | τους νομους | 31 αρχοντας διαστρεφει as Π<sup>2</sup> | 32 διαφθείρει is omitted as in Π<sup>2</sup> | ο νους νομος with Π<sup>1</sup> Julian | 33 γραμμα with M<sup>1</sup>P<sup>1</sup> | 34 και is omitted | 37 καρποτας is corrected from σεαρποτας | 38 εφηριαν | 40 θεραιαν

1287 b 4 ο γαρ νομος | 5 τω κατα | 6 (κατα) | τω κατα | 8 υφαιστον | 10 καταστησαι | 11 ποτερον | (αν)ηρ | 13 εστιν | ερχομενων with P<sup>1</sup> M<sup>1</sup> | 16 εστιν | 17 αρχειν | 19 επειδη with Π<sup>2</sup> | σημειωθησιν | 24 α(λλο)τε | 26 τισιν with Π<sup>1</sup> | 27 (η) λυσωσιν τις (δυοιν) ομμασ(ι και δυσι)ν | 28 ποσιν | 29 μοναρχαι with Π<sup>2</sup> | 32 ποιησανσιν | δε is omitted | 37 εστιν | δεσποτον with Π<sup>2</sup> | βασιλευσιν with Π<sup>2</sup> | 41 γιγνεται τα παρα φυσιν with Π<sup>1</sup>

1288 a 2 νομων οστων with M<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup> | 5 *ei* is omitted | 6 ποτερον | 8 εστιν πεφυκεν | 13 πεφυκεν ενγιγνεσθαι as Π<sup>1</sup>, omitting και εν | πολιτικον with Π<sup>1</sup> | 14 αρχεσθαι και αρχειν with Π<sup>2</sup> | after καταξιν dittography; διανεμεσθαι καταξιν, then διανεμοντα | 15 αποροις with Π<sup>2</sup> | 17 (τουτου)τον ω(ς)θ | 18 βασιλειων | 21 ειτε for οιτε | 23 παντη with Π<sup>1</sup> | 24 και is omitted | 26 πεφυκεν | 29 κατα μερος ειναι τοντον αλλα απλως with Π<sup>2</sup> | 30 προτερον | 31 after η συμφορει dittography; ταις πολεισιν η συμφερει | ταις | 33 διαγωγικον | 34 apparently οικοδομητης | 35 τισυμπαντων | 39 την πολειω της αριστης with Π<sup>2</sup> | 41 ωστεται

1288 b 1 παιδια | 3 δηπουτων | πο(λι)ταις | τε(ν)α πεφυ(κε) γιγ(νε)σθαι(ν) ροπον | 5 δη | γ ημαιοτελεια πολισικω | γ - in the margin by the same hand | Δ. [fol. 302<sup>v</sup> begins with this heading] | 11 γιγνομενος: the second γ scratched

out | 14 καθιστα | κεχορημεναι | 16 εργον with Π<sup>1</sup> | δεαν | 18 μηθεν | 19 εστιν with Π<sup>2</sup> | 23 εστιν | 24 αρμοστουσα with Π<sup>2</sup> | 26 τε απλως και την is omitted | 31 συμβεβηκεν | 35 ως | 36 λεγουσιν

1290 a 36 ομοιως: the second *i* above the line | ουδεις

1290 b 2 δοταν | πολλους with Π<sup>2</sup> | 5 φησιν | 8 *eti* instead of *επει* | πλειονισμοισι with Π<sup>2</sup> | 11 δημοσι | 12 τούτοι | τημαι | 15 δημοι | οισιν as Π<sup>2</sup> | 17 εστιν | 19 δοταν | 21 πολιτειαι or πολιτειαι | πλειονι... οισιν is omitted | 24 ποσιν εχειν with Π<sup>2</sup> | 25 *μεν* is omitted as Π<sup>2</sup> | 29 δη | εδωκεσιν | 33 πλει, no trace of ω | ταυτων | 35 ληφθωσιν | 37 δε | 39 συγκατε | μερην with Π<sup>2</sup> | 40 εστιν | καλλυμεναι

1291 a 4 διαγοριον | 5 και τας ωσιν is omitted | 6 απηλιν | 7 ουδεις | εστιν αναγκαιοι as Π<sup>2</sup> | 11 φησιν | 13 τουτου τοις | 18 μολον | 20 αποδωσιν | 21 απομεσων as Π<sup>2</sup> | 22 τετραριαν | 27 διαστικει corrected from δεστικει | 29 ουθεν | γαρ before διαφερει with Π<sup>1</sup> | 33 αναγκαιοι μερην της πολειως

with  $\Pi^2$  | 34 ο with  $\Pi^2$ , not ὅπερ | ογδον | 39 βουλευομενον with  $\Pi^{2*}$  | 41 πο-  
λεσιν | γινεσθαι | δικαιος

1291 b 3 αυτους: s above the line | 4 και τεχνιτας twice | 12 καθιστασιν | και  
δοκουσιν twice | 14 εισιν | 15 εστιν | διμοκρατειας | 17 λεγωμενων | 21 χρημα-  
τιστικον | 22 αλιευτικον: the first ι above the line | εκαστα: τα above the line |  
27 αμφοτερον | ετερον | 30 δημοκρατεια | εστιν | 32 υπαρχειν | 34 μαλιστεστιν

1292 a 3 τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι] ταλλαμεν ειναι with  $\Gamma P^1$  | 17 τοιουτος | δημοσ as  
 $\Pi^2$  | 22 παρ' is omitted | 23 δειμαγωγοι | 24 εισιν | 29 προσκλησιν with  $\Pi^1$  |  
30 αρχε | 32 εστιν | 33 εκαστα or εκαστον | 34 εστιν | 36 ουθεν

1292 b 1 μακρων with  $\Pi^1$  | 3 ποιωσιν | 5 οταν παις | 9 τελευτεας | ειπαμεν  
with  $\Pi^2$  | δημοκραταις εν ταις is omitted | 10 καλουσιν | 13 between κατα and  
τους room for 3 letters | δε after δια is omitted | 14 πολιτευεσθαι δε δημοτικως | †  
15 κατα τους νομους | 17 τουτο δε | 19 αλλα αγαπωσιν ‡

\* Apparently κρινοῦν with  $\Pi^1$ ; this at least is the inference to be drawn from  
Heylbut's silence.

† Apparently ἔθος with  $\Pi^1$ ; Heylbut is silent.

‡ [It should be observed that considerable alterations have been made in Heylbut's  
annotation of the readings (see p. 456): also that 1280 a 29 εισενεγκαντα is given as  
the reading at any rate of  $\Pi^2$  and presumably of fr. (εισεναγκαντα Heylbut).]

#### NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.

In Mr Newman's edition I. p. VIII. f. II. p. LIV. there recurs, although in a  
much milder form, Heylbut's assertion already refuted by me in *Jahrb. f.*  
*Philol.* CXXV. p. 801 ff., and in Excursus III. above, that I seek to base  
the text of Aristotle's *Politics* primarily on  $\Pi^1$ , and especially on  $\Gamma$ . Mr  
Newman writes:

"Susemihl bases his text in the main on the first family, and especially  
on  $\Gamma$ , but he frequently adopts readings from the second."

Now even in my first edition, in which as in the second I certainly too  
often followed  $\Pi^1$ , I have nevertheless already said at p. XXXII. :

"quanquam ex eo, quod dixi, satis apparet ita nobis traditum esse hoc  
Aristotelis opus similiter atque complura alia, ut non nisi mixtam ex utraque  
codicum familia recensionem perficere hodie queamus, tamen in hac mixtura  
artis criticae regulas diligentius, quam adhuc factum sit, esse adhibendas  
periti omnes concedent. Quod ut fiat, ipsius vetustae translationis verba...  
cum libris affinis Graecis (sunt) conferenda, *deinde quaerendum, ubi*  
*huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent: ubicumque autem aequae*  
*bonam sententiam utraque praebent, vulgata semper recensio alteri est*  
*posthabenda."*

Here it is stated, that in my judgment any one who wished *a priori*  
to make the recension  $\Pi^1$  the basis of the text would proceed just as  
perversely as any one who does, or as if any one were to do, the like with  
 $\Pi^2$ ; that on the contrary in the main each case must be decided on its  
merits: *quaerendum, ubi huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent*; and

only afterwards in all these cases in which on material grounds (I might have added "and on linguistic grounds") a decision is impossible, that family must be followed which in the greater number of determinable cases and at the same time in essential matters has more frequently preserved the true text or the traces of the true text, i.e. according to my opinion and my figures the family II<sup>1</sup>. The accuracy of this computation I have already endeavoured to establish statistically against Heylbut for those passages which are contained in the Vatican palimpsest: but I will not spare myself the pains of a similar demonstration as against Newman in respect to Books I. and II. which he has edited. I must however prefix one or two observations, although entering as little as possible upon a special controversy.

I gladly acknowledge, that Newman has adopted as against Bekker many readings from II<sup>1</sup>. In spite of this, he cannot be wholly acquitted of a certain prejudice in favour of II<sup>2</sup>, as some examples will hereafter show. In addition to this there is a particular circumstance which disturbs his impartiality. He believes that the text of the *Politics* has been transmitted in an excellent condition, and has therefore a strong dislike to conjectural emendations, so that in order to avoid one he prefers to adopt explanations implicitly containing an absurdity which but for this prepossession could not possibly have escaped a man of his discernment. A truly deterrent example of this sort is to be found for instance at 1272 b 38. Hence wherever a reading in II<sup>1</sup>, however convincing on other grounds, cannot be retained without the help of a conjecture, though it may be the slightest change in the world, this is sufficient for him to condemn it. But the truth of Spengel's dictum, that the *Politics* has come down to us in a state legible on the whole but very corrupt in particular passages, can be shown *a priori* by the consideration that shoals of mistakes in II<sup>1</sup> are corrected by means of II<sup>2</sup> and those in II<sup>2</sup> by means of II<sup>1</sup>; whence it follows that in each of the two families the original is preserved with but very moderate fidelity. Who can rationally assume that the original is well preserved where the two families agree, and not rather that a quantity of errors lurk in both? Further Mr Newman has allowed himself to be misled by an assertion of Dittenberger's, to me incomprehensible, into the belief that all the good readings found only in the "Vetusta translatio," or in a single codex, are mere conjectures: whereas this opinion, partially true perhaps of P<sup>1</sup> and Ar., for the rest is certainly true only of the "deteriores" of the family II<sup>2</sup> (= II<sup>3</sup>). I ask any one just to consider the not unimportant class of readings to be derived solely from P<sup>1</sup> or from P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr.), and soberly to put the question: Do these really look like Byzantine emendations made (say) since the 11th century? And if he is not convinced by this, let him further ask himself: If the Byzantines had thus handled the text, then along with this after all but moderate number of good emendations should we not find a far greater number of attempts at emendation, i.e. of sheer corruptions, common to all our sources of the text? But yet apart from such general considerations how else is the excellence of an old manuscript to be demon-

strated, unless it be one so preeminently excellent as e.g. A<sup>c</sup> of the *Rhetoric* and *Poetic*, or Σ in Demosthenes, or Γ in Isocrates? Otherwise it might even be maintained, that the 70 odd passages, where K<sup>b</sup> alone presents right readings in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, are after all only good conjectures. If this cannot rationally be imagined, and if it is just as certain that the pair of right readings lately found in the Vatican fragments are traces of a good tradition, the same view is, in most cases, just as decidedly to be taken where not all, but only single representatives of the recension Π<sup>1</sup>, or of the better class of Π<sup>2</sup>, present us with the true text. And then it tells decisively in favour of Π<sup>1</sup>, that while these cases are not quite rare in Π<sup>1</sup>, in Π<sup>2</sup> they are almost zero. I am here obliged to repeat what I have put together in my third edition p. XII. ff. [cp. above p. 74 f. notes] on this matter:

“solī Γ libro debemus praeter 1260 a 4 ἀρχόντων καὶ has rectas lectiones: 1258 b 40 Χαρητίδῃ, 1260 b 41 εἰς ὁ τῆς, 1266 b 2 δ' ἥδῃ, 1271 a 20 κἂν (μὴν Π; partem veri vidit Busseus), 1276 a 33 ἔθνος ἐν, 1282 a 27 μέγιστα, 1285 a 7 αὐτοκράτωρ, 1331 a 42 ἔνια δέ, 1336 a 34 σπονδασομένων (aut σπονδασθησομένων, quod praebet P<sup>5</sup>), 35 κατὰ, 1296 a 8 συστάσεις (ut videtur), b 38 πλήθει, 1320 b 9 τὴν Ταραντίνων ἀρχήν, 15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, 1321 a 12 ὀπλιτικὴν, 1303 a 24 ἐγγὺς ὄν (an ἐγγίζον?), 1311 a 6 χρημάτων (ut videtur),

solis Γ P<sup>5</sup> has: 1328 a 5 παρὰ, 1336 a 6 εἰσάγειν, 1340 a 16 δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ, 1321 b 29 τὰ om., 1322 b 36 προσευθύνas (?), 1306 b 39 καὶ om.:

solis Γ et pr. P<sup>2</sup> 1259 b 28 δέ:

solis Γ P<sup>1</sup> 1265 a 16 παρὰ, 1272 b 39 καθ' αὐτό:

solis Γ et corr. P<sup>1</sup> 1278 b 22 παρ':

solis Γ Ar. 1289 b 38 πολέμους:

solis Γ P<sup>5</sup> Ar. 1336 a 5 δέ:

solis Γ R<sup>b</sup> 1303 b 31 τὰ:

solis Γ Ald. corr.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> 1332 a 33 τῷ:

solis Γ Ar. corr.<sup>3</sup> P<sup>2</sup> 1335 a 26 σώματος:

solis Γ P<sup>2</sup> 1254 a 10 ἀπλῶς (ἀπλῶς ὅλως M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ὅλως cet.).

Neque fas esse censeo in tali rerum condicione 1260 b 20 et 1280 a 29 codicum servatorum lectionibus οἱ κοινωνοὶ et μνῶν multo illas exquisitiores et pleniores coloris Aristotelei postponere, quas suppeditat translatio, οἰκονόμοι et ταλάντων...

E solo P<sup>1</sup> has...depromere licet rectas scripturas: 1257 a 40 ἐπιβαλόντων (nisi idem habuit Γ), 1259 a 13 ἐλαιουργείων, 1278 a 36 sqq. rectum ordinem (corr.<sup>1</sup>), b 4 κακείνης corr.<sup>1</sup> (nisi potius retinendum est κακείνος), 1286 b 17 μετέβαλον (nisi idem habuit etiam Γ), 1287 b 38 βασιλικόν, 1328 a 5 ἀπάγχει, 1335 b 20 γενομένων, 1338 b 4 πρότερον corr.<sup>1</sup>, 1340 b 30 παιδίω, 1299 b 24 ἐτέρων pr., 1314 a 35 τὸ ποιεῖν (?):

e solis P<sup>1</sup> et Ar. has: 1263 b 4 τὸ, 1280 b 19 εἴησαν:

e solis Ar. et corr. P<sup>1</sup> has: 1255 a 37 ἔκγονον, 1299 a 14 πολιτείας:

e solis P<sup>1</sup> mg. P<sup>2</sup> rc. P<sup>3</sup> 1284 a 37 κολούειν, quarum nonnullae...ita sunt comparatae, ut currente calamo a Demetrio Chalcondyla demum et Leonardo Aretino e suis ingeniis facile potuerint restitui, velut ἐλαιουργείων, πρότερον, παιδίω, τὸ ποιεῖν, εἴησαν, ἔκγονον...Solo autem M<sup>s</sup> codice paene nusquam

nitur textus, item nusquam paene solo P<sup>1</sup>, solo P<sup>2</sup> 1253 a 25 (καὶ ποὺ φέρεται om.), 1270 b 38 (αἶποι), 1325 a 29 (αὐτὸ τὸ corr.<sup>1</sup>), 1339 a 14 (αἶψαι), quibus locis fortasse addendum est 1338 b 33 ἀπαιδαγωγήτους.\*

This is exclusive of the cases, in which ΓM' alone or M'P<sup>1</sup> alone or P<sup>1</sup> alone have preserved the true text: and to these may be added (Zc. p. xi.)

1253 b 33 ὁ om. M', erased by P<sup>1</sup> (whether they are to be followed, is certainly a matter for dispute):

1279 b 22 συμβαίνει P<sup>14</sup>:

1336 a 17 ψυχρὸν P<sup>1</sup>P<sup>1</sup> (corr.):

1342 b 33 ἡ added by P<sup>1</sup> and corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>2</sup> (here conjecture is really out of the question):

1290 a 1 δὴ P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>24</sup> (corr.):

1290 a 2 διαιλόμεν P<sup>1</sup> (corr.), διαιλόμεθα P<sup>1</sup>, διαιλόμην ceteri:

1291 b 32 ἐπερίχων P<sup>14</sup> Ar.:

1295 a 39 δ' erased by corr. of P<sup>1</sup>, γρ. καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ δὲ corr.<sup>2</sup> in the margin of P<sup>2</sup> (this may be a conjecture):

1319 b 24 καὶ τὰ P<sup>12</sup> and γρ. in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>:

1309 a 40 αἴρεσιν P<sup>1</sup> (corrector):

1316 a 38 ἀναξιλάου P<sup>14</sup>.

From this also is seen, in what a very restricted sense I assert, or am entitled to assert, that the Vetusta translatio is "instar optimi codicis." That the text is to be based upon it as far as it can be based upon anything, I never once even dreamed of thinking (as the above remark in my first edition shows) even at an earlier time, when I still overrated the worth of this source of the text.

In the first book indeed Mr Newman has adopted the readings of Π<sup>1</sup> only at

1252 b 28 (ἡδὴ ΓP<sup>1</sup>),

1253 a 7, 1254 a 15, 1255 b 27, 1256 b 13, 32, 1257 b 3,

1258 b 40 (Χρητῖδῃ Γ),

1259 a 37 (mirabile dictu, even here not without some doubt),

1259 b 28 (δὲ Γ 1st hand of P<sup>1</sup>),

1260 a 37 (ἄρα):

and at 1253 b 37 he remarks with justice: ἐποδίσθαι ΓM' possibly rightly.

But though it is true, as he mentions, that 1253 a 2 ὁ is only added before ἀνθρώπος in M'P<sup>1</sup>, yet it stands in all the manuscripts just below, at line 7. The two similar passages in the *Ethics* (as I have remarked on p. 456) also defend the article, which should therefore be adopted 1278 b 21 from M'P<sup>1</sup>; and all this makes for the article at 1253 a 32 also. Similarly in B. II. 1270 b 19 f. Mr Newman pronounces in favour of διὰ τῶν against M'P<sup>1</sup>; but at 1323 b 29, as Mr Hicks reminded me, all manuscripts have διὰ τῶν τῶν. Further on the strength of the well-known Aristotelian idiom Mr Newman erases, 1255 a 35, the καὶ between εὐγενὲς and εὐκλέστερον with Π<sup>1</sup>; and at 1260 a 26 ἡ before τὸ with P<sup>14</sup>SVT<sup>1</sup>. In the latter case he is right, in the former wrong: for this usage is restricted to enumerations (after οἶον, ὥσπερ especially, but also in other cases), and at 1316 b 15

unless καὶ be inserted (which might easily have dropped out before κατατοκίζόμενοι) the explanation must be quite different, viz. ἀσσωτευόμενοι κατατοκίζόμενοι must mean "accumulating debts in consequence of their profligacy." At 1252 a 9 Mr Newman himself wavers between admitting εἶναι or leaving it out : as however the latter is the more unusual, to me at least it seems the safer supposition that it is interpolated in Π<sup>2</sup>. And while Mr Newman holds it to be almost indispensable 1257 b 7, I believe that on the contrary I have shown (*Qu. crit. coll.* p. 353 f.) it is quite out of place in that passage. Although Π<sup>1</sup> is more often wrong in omitting words which are found in Π<sup>2</sup>, yet I hold that anyone with an appreciation of Aristotle's mosaic style must unhesitatingly admit that 1252 b 19 f he wrote ἐκ βασιλευμένων γὰρ without συνῆλθον. To be sure nothing of this kind can be demonstrated. At 1252 b 14 I also have accepted ὁμοκάπους, but it still remains doubtful whether ὁμοκάπνους be not right after all (see Addenda *ad loc.*). At 1253 b 27 τῶν οἰκονομικῶν (Π<sup>2</sup>) is defended by Newman by means of a subtle interpretation. But he should say where the apodosis begins. It is certainly upon mere conjecture that b 25 δὲ is omitted by P<sup>46</sup>O<sup>1</sup>U<sup>b</sup>L<sup>a</sup> Ald., but one which is justified by the facts ; for here the apodosis really begins (only it would be better to write δὴ) : that being so, a rational sense can only be obtained by Rassow's emendation, which I have accepted, and this admits only the reading of Π<sup>1</sup> τῶ οἰκονομικῶ. At 1254 a 10, whether it is more natural that ὅλως was explained by ἀπλῶς or conversely, every one may decide for himself. I hold the latter to be much more probable : still the Byzantine gloss-writers were unaccountable people. Why I hold, at 1254 b 23, λόγῳ (Π<sup>1</sup>) to correspond better to the sense and grammar than λόγου (Π<sup>2</sup>), I have laid down *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 343, and Mr Newman says nothing about this. That at 1255 b 26 ὀψοποιητικὴ and 1256 a 6 κερκιδοποιητικὴ are the genuine Aristotelian forms is unmistakably clear from the very materials collected by Mr Newman, and how anyone can prefer, 1256 b 8, the present διδομένη to the perfect δεδομένη and conversely 1260 a 4 the perfect ὑφήγηται to the present ὑφηγεῖται, I cannot comprehend. As to 1260 a 4 <ἀρχόντων καὶ> ἀρχομένων, see Addenda *ad loc.*

Leaving out of account the order of the words at 1253 a 7, 11, b 3, 7, 1256 b 26, 1259 b 30, 1260 b 24, there remain, besides 1252 b 15 (ὁμοκάπους or ὁμοκάπνους), the following quite uncertain cases : 1252 b 2, 5, 14, 1253 a 1, 1254 b 18, 1255 b 24, 26, 1258 b 7, 1259 a 28, 1260 a 21, 31. Also 1256 b 1 κομίζονται and 1258 b 1 μεταβολικῆς (Π<sup>1</sup>) may be corruptions of πορίζονται and μεταβλητικῆς ; yet it is much more natural to suppose that on the contrary the former unusual expressions were arbitrarily transformed into the latter which are continually used elsewhere. Π<sup>1</sup> is certainly wrong 15 times : 1252 a 5, 1253 a 25, b 25, 1255 a 5, 24, 32, 39, b 12, 1256 b 18, 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1259 b 2, 1260 a 26, 39, b 17 ; besides it is probably wrong 1254 b 14 (as I must now concede), 1255 b 24 (ταῖς), 1257 b 24. Π<sup>1</sup> is right 24 times : 1252 a 9, b 20, 28 (ἤδη Γ<sup>P1</sup>), 1253 a 7, b 27, 1254 a 15, b 23, 28, 1255 a 35, b 26, 27, 1256 a 6, b 8, 13, 32, 1257 b 3, 7, 1258 b 40 (Χαρητίδη Γ), 1259 a 37, b 28 (δὲ Γ 1st hand P<sup>2</sup>), 1260 a 4 twice (ἀρχόντων καὶ Γ and

*ἀφ' ὧν*), 1260 a 37 (*ἀπα*), of which it is true 1252 b 28, 1258 b 40 and 1260 a 37 have no decisive importance here: but in return 1253 a 32, 1254 a 10, 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, and also perhaps 1253 b 37 (p. 463), should probably be added, to say nothing of 1260 b 26 (p. 462). On the other hand possibly the mistake at 1256 a 10 extends to M' as well as ΓP<sup>1</sup>. The glosses which have crept in (1256 b 26) are of course not to be reckoned to the disadvantage of the original recension Π<sup>1</sup>, either here or elsewhere.

The comparison tells far more strikingly in favour of Π<sup>1</sup> in the second book, not merely numerically, but by a series of quite unique variants, whereas the mistakes for the most part concern trifles and simple *errata*, as e.g. *φιλία*, three times (for which moreover the archetype of this family is perhaps not responsible, see Susem.<sup>1</sup> p. XIV.), and the repeated *φωλλία*. Each of these is properly reckoned once only in what follows, and the same with the right reading *ἀνδρεία* (*ἀντρεία*). Apart from the order of the words 1263 a 37, b 15, 17, 32, 1267 a 38, 1268 a 11 f., 1271 a 19 f., 1273 b 36, 1274 a 17, b 6, an even approximate decision is impossible 1260 b 36, 1261 a 22, 1262 b 21, 1263 a 23, b 32, 1264 a 16, 21, b 26, 31, 1265 a 4, 12, b 19, 1266 a 23, b 3, 1268 a 6, 6 f., 17, b 5, 9, 17, 32, 1269 a 11, b 21, 28, 1272 b 15 f., 28, 1273 a 16, b 27, 32, 1274 b 8, 14: one feels inclined to decide in favour of Π<sup>2</sup> at 1261 a 22, b 21, 1269 b 21, but on the other hand in favour of Π<sup>1</sup> at 1263 a 23 (*καί* omitted), 1272 b 28, and 1269 a 11 Mr Newman himself describes with "possibly rightly" the reading of Π<sup>1</sup>. In the remaining 109 cases Π<sup>1</sup> has preserved the right reading, or the traces of it, 69 times: 1260 b 27 (see Addenda to 1260 b 20), 28, 41 (*εἰς ὃ τῆς Γ*), 1261 a 15 twice, 27 (*ἐλκίσαι ΓP<sup>1</sup>*), 1261 b 2 f. five times, b 4 (see *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 360 f.), b 5, 1262 a 3 twice, b 13 (at the least highly probable, see Newman's *crit. n.*), 33, 1263 a 12, 23 (*ἔθελ*), b 7 (see *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 360 f.), 9, 11, 1265 a 31 f. four times, b 11 (*ἐλλαν ΓM'*), 30, 1266 b 2 (Γ), 24, 31, 1267 a 35, 40, b 16, 23, 26, 35, 1268 a 3, 11, 25, b 3, 12, 1269 a 21, b 6, 1270 a 13 (*αὐτῆς ΓP<sup>1</sup>*), 22, 1270 b 19 (p. 463), 32 (*αὐτῆς* affects only accent and breathing), 1271 a 15, 17, 20 (*καὶ Γ*), 37, 40, b 37, 1272 a 3, 29, b 8 f. twice, 36, 39, 1273 a 7, 9, b 1, 41, 1274 a 5, 19, 21 (at least probable), 25, 39, b 13. Π<sup>1</sup> has changed the right reading at the most only 40 times: 1261 a 18 (*ἦ* omitted by M'P<sup>1</sup>, probably wrongly, whether by P also, cannot be known), 35 (at least M'P<sup>1</sup>), b 7 (*οὐ*, it may however be right), 19, 1262 a 30, 1263 b 1, 6, 1264 a 1, b 3, 1265 a 30, 35, b 4, 21, 39 (at least M'P<sup>1</sup>), 1266 a 20, 23, 37, 39 (*φωλλία*), b 6, 1267 b 40, 1268 a 26 (probably at least), b 16, 1269 a 6, b 26, 1270 a 20, 21 (at least M'P<sup>1</sup>), 25, 27 (at least M'P<sup>1</sup>), 34, 1270 b 12, 1271 a 27 (*φιλία*, cp. 1272 a 3, b 34), b 26, 28, 1273 a 1 (at least M'P<sup>1</sup>), 35, 1273 a 9, 10, b 2, 3, 1274 a 4 (unless *θάρσος* is here nearer to the true reading than *θάρσος*, *θάρσος* being the original). To the latter cases Newman certainly adds 1260 b 27, 1261 a 27, b 4, 1263 a 12, 23, b 7, 9, 11, 1264 a 39, 1265 a 33 f., b 11, 30, 1267 a 40, b 26, 1268 a 3, 25, b 3, 12, 1269 b 6 (but *Περικλής* is the right orthography), 1270 b 19, 32, 1271 a 20 (but *μήν* gives a wrong sense), b 37, 1272 b 9, 1273 b 41 (but was it not more obvious to change *τὸ δεικνύμεν* into the more natural and simple *τὸ δεικνύμα*?), 1274 a 21: yet not without himself giving expression to his

doubts in regard to 1261 a 27, 1265 b 11, 30, 1268 a 3, b 5, 1271 b 37, 1272 b 9, 39 occasionally with some warmth.

I must here content myself with a brief mention of most of these last mentioned passages and one or two besides.

1261 b 2 f. Although Mr Newman is bound to admit that here Π<sup>2</sup> presents attempts at emendation as arbitrary as they are worthless, and although it is clear that in this way ἐν τούτοις has arisen from τοῦτο, yet he seeks to save the former reading, because then τὸ before ἐν μέρει need not be changed into τῷ; but there is no need of this with the reading τοῦτο: see Susem.<sup>4</sup> *crit. n.* and *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 361.

1262 b 32. The omission of τοὺς φύλακας in M<sup>s</sup>P<sup>1</sup> is doubtless an indication that the place of these words varied, and if the old translator renders them at the only possible place, I do not see why under these circumstances it should be improbable that he actually found them in his codex Γ at that place.

1263 a 23. For ἔθελαι Mr Newman himself cites the parallel passage 1263 b 39. I should think this would be sufficient for any unprejudiced person. As to 1263 a 28 ff. see the Addenda *ad loc.* If ἐκάστω προσεδρεύοντες (ΓM<sup>s</sup>) is, as it seems, the true reading, this would make the 70th case in favour of Π<sup>1</sup>.

1265 a 33 f. That frugality usually attends as a consequence upon a toilsome life, and liberality upon a life of luxury, is what only an unreflecting person, not Aristotle, would maintain: those who live luxuriously will soon find the means for liberality fail them. But the converse is perfectly true. Π<sup>1</sup> has therefore transmitted the right reading, and we must make up our minds to accept the excellent emendation of the sensible Koraes, without which this reading transmitted to us cannot be maintained.

1265 b 11. How improbable it is that in any of the existing states such regulations as those here proposed can have existed, a man so well informed as Mr Newman cannot fail to see. Nevertheless he admits πλείσταις, not ἄλλαις into the text.

1265 b 30. In case the reading πολιτείαν were right, τὴν could scarcely be omitted before this word or before κοινοτάτην.

1267 b 25 f. With the reading κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ arises the absurdity, that ἐσθῆτος εὐτελοῦς would depend not simply on πλήθει, but on κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ. Of this Mr Newman says nothing.

1268 a 3. Is καταδικάζειν τὴν δίκην in the sense of "to decide the case against the accused" Greek at all, except in the formula ἐρήμην καταδικάζειν?

1268 b 21. Mr Newman's statement in the critical note, that ἤδη is left out by Π<sup>1</sup> here, is erroneous: it was omitted only by Γ and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand). So too of his assertion, that 1271 a 15 I have taken τούτῳ (Π<sup>1</sup>) not as neuter, but as masculine.

1272 b 8 f. In spite of all attempts to make sense of it, τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν is simple nonsense: and a man of Mr Newman's intelligence cannot in reality disguise this from himself. Hence he would willingly transpose

τῶν δημοτῶν, with Π<sup>1</sup>, to follow δοῦναι (line 9): but unfortunately this is not possible without the conjecture—an extraordinarily slight conjecture, it is true—of Korais, αἱ αὖ (line 8) for ὅταν. Now conjectures are once for all forbidden. There is nothing for it but to justify the order of the words in Π<sup>2</sup>, as well, or rather as ill, as possible. Again, one might have imagined that δημοστῶν (Π<sup>1</sup>) instead of δημοτῶν (Π<sup>2</sup>) was sufficiently defended by the fact that the Cretan constitution is declared to be δημοκρατία μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτεία. Not so. Once for all, Π<sup>2</sup> is made out to be the better recension!

1271 b 39. Here in the first place Mr Newman is mistaken in saying that καθ' αὐτό is not found in any manuscript: it is in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>, quite apart from the fact that beyond all doubt it was in P. He is exceedingly disposed to concede that it is most appropriate to the sense and the language. One might have imagined that given this most appropriate reading καθ' αὐτό, a second καθ' αὐτό (P<sup>1</sup> and somewhat corrupted M<sup>2</sup>), and a third κατὰ τὸ αὐτό (Π<sup>2</sup>), the progress of the corruption from the first through the second to the third was at the same time given clearly enough. But it is all in vain. Again, once for all, Π<sup>2</sup> is made out to be the better recension!

1273 b 6. Here on the contrary Mr Newman has rightly restored to the text εὐπορίαν from Π<sup>2</sup> and O<sup>1</sup>, in opposition to Bekker, myself, and the other editors.

I believe then that I exactly described the state of the case in relation to the recensions Π<sup>1</sup> and Π<sup>2</sup> when in my third edition p. v. I wrote: "haud raro laus, saepius illam meliorem." Now to return with a few words to the Vatican palimpsest. According to Heylbut's account, which I have not correctly reported in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXX. p. 304 l., it is of the tenth century. Accordingly it furnishes a proof that even at that time, in which undoubtedly the sharp separation of these two recensions had already taken place, copies were nevertheless still made of older codices, which had arisen before this sharp separation, and thus still bore a mixed character, approximating in this case more to Π<sup>2</sup>, but in the case of the codex used by Julian more to Π<sup>1</sup>. If the two facts are viewed impartially side by side, no conclusion follows from them in favour of Π<sup>2</sup> any more than in favour of Π<sup>1</sup>: on the contrary, the procedure which I have adopted is only justified anew. This and the confirmation of two conjectures, δῶταρ 1278 a 34 and 1287 a 34 καὶ omitted, form the total net result of this new discovery. If the codex had been preserved entire, it is probable that other isolated conjectural emendations would have been confirmed: as it is, these two cases are enough to restrain us from an exaggerated mistrust of this means for the restoration of the text.

Mr Newman thinks it possible that William of Moerbeke employed several Greek manuscripts. I see no ground for doing so much honour to the rare bestowed by the worthy monk; indeed what makes this assumption very improbable is simply that all these codices must have belonged to the class Π<sup>1</sup>. However if this was the case, it can remain tolerably indifferent to us, for the fact remains still the same: the *Vergesta* translation is the oldest representative of this family and (excepting the Vatican frag-

ments and the citations of Greek writers) the oldest source of the text anywhere.

I should have much besides to adduce on my side against Mr Newman, but I have no intention of entering on a controversy with him and would far sooner take this opportunity to recognize with gratitude, in spite of all our differences, the very great merits of his work, which contains much both good and new. In regard to I. c. 11 I agree with him: I would not guarantee that this chapter was written by Aristotle himself, but I very much doubt whether a valid proof can be adduced to show that this is not the case, or even that Aristotle inserted it in his work at a later date. In any case it is well known to be older than the so-called second book of the *Oeconomics*, which had its origin somewhere between 260 and 200 B.C. SUSEM.

## H.

ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προση-  
κουσαν σκέψιν [περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσα- I

1288 b 5 ἀνάγκη...6 σκέψιν joined by all previous authorities to B. III, omitted by Bk.<sup>2</sup> See Comm. δὲ Spengel, δὲ II<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>5</sup> T<sup>5</sup> fr. Ald. Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, γὰρ (with the omission of the following τὸν μέλλοντα) P<sup>2-5</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ar.

1323 a 14 [περὶ...15 ἀνάγκη] Spengel δὲ added after περὶ by P<sup>2</sup> and corrector of P<sup>3</sup>; perhaps rightly, yet see *Introd.* p. 14 n. 3 τῇ; inserted before ἀρίστη in P<sup>2</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>; cp. p. 456 f.

B. IV(VII), i.e. the fourth book of the new order, but in the traditional order of the manuscripts the seventh, commences a sketch of the best polity which is continued through the next book, B. V(VIII), there being no break between them, and finally left unfinished at its close. Preliminary questions are discussed in cc. 1-3, the external conditions (the land, the people, the agricultural class, the public buildings) in cc. 4-13; c. 13 treats of the end of the constitution and the masses at the legislator's command for realising it, the most important of which, viz. a system of state education (in the widest sense), receives a detailed exposition, beginning with c. 14 of this book and not completed at the abrupt close of the next. The two books are written in a finished style, carefully elaborated, with minute attention to the rule of the hiatus, which is seldom violated in B. IV(VII) and not at all in B. V(VIII).

1288 b 5, ἀνάγκη δὲ...6 σκέψιν] That this conclusion of B. III, breaking off in the middle of a sentence, is only a parallel version of the beginning of the (old) seventh book, is acknowledged by all who recognise that the proper place for the (old) seventh book is immediately after the third. Beyond all doubt, of the two parallel versions, that at the end of B. III is the original one, as Spengel rightly decides, and it ought not to have been omitted from the text of Bekker's

octavo edition\*. When the rest of this book had been torn away from its connexion and transformed into the seventh book, some transition was needed; hence the clause περὶ πολιτείας ἡγήσασθαι ἀνάγκη was added by the redactor. SUSSEM.

The grounds for making the transposition of the books have been already noticed: *Introd.* p. 16 n. (4), p. 17, p. 47 f. The main point to decide is, *where* in the treatise ought the description of the best polity (in the form of pure aristocracy) to come, whether before the description of the existing faulty polities or after them. The indications of B. III are unmistakable, especially cc. 13 and 18; and upon them Spengel has rightly insisted (*Ueber die Politik* p. 16 f., *Arist. Studien* II, pp. 46 ff., 60 ff., 71). Not less convincing is the assertion in VI(IV), c. 2 that aristocracy, as well as monarchy, has been already discussed. But when the question has been decided upon these grounds, the unfinished sentence at the end of B. III certainly affords striking corroborative evidence.

c. 1 (with c. 2 §§ 1, 2). *The conclusion of the best constitution with the highest life.*

Few chapters in the work have been subjected to more minute examination than this. See Bernays *Ueber die Arist.* pp. 69-84 and Valden *Arist.*

\* Not that of Oxford (1837), but *Introd. octavo* (J. Bekker, Berlin 1831; now corrected 1856).

1323 a 15

σθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη] διορίσασθαι πρότερον τίς αἰρετώτατος βίος. ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἀδήλον εἶναι πολιτείαν· ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἄριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων  
 § 2 αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ τι γίνηται παράλογον. διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον  
 20 ὁμολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἰρετώτατος βίος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πρότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος.

νομίσαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξω-  
 20 τερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.  
 § 3 ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητή-

15 πρότερον] πρῶτον P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., perhaps rightly || 19 παρὰ λόγον Γ Ar. ||  
 20 ὁμολογήσθαι Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, *confessum esse* William || 22 [καὶ] Schneider, [καὶ τῶν] Oncken wrongly

*lische Aufsätze* II 'On a chapter of the Politics' (Vienna 1872; 52 pp.).

§ 1 1323 a 16 αἰρετώτατος βίος] See n. (683) with the passages there quoted. SUSEM. (685)

τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν] i.e. the absolutely best constitution: see VI(IV). I § 3 πολλοῖς γὰρ τῆς ἀρίστης τυχεῖν ἴσως ἀδύνατον, ὥστε τὴν κρατίστην τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ λεληθέναι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν, and n. (1116). SUSEM. (686)

18 προσήκει] 'We should expect the citizens who live under the best constitution possible to them (ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς to be taken closely with ἄριστα) to fare best,' i.e. to lead the most desirable life.

§ 2 21 κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι, χωρὶς ἐκάστω.  
 22 τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις] See Excursus I. to this book. SUSEM. (687)

23 καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς] "It is clear from passages such as *De Caelo* II. 13 § 18, 295 a 2 f. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων διώριστα πρότερον ὅσα κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν δύναμιν εἴχομεν, χρηστέον ὡς ὑπάρχουσιν and *Meteor.* III. 2 § 12, 372 b 10 f. ἔστω δὲ περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν τε θεωρημένον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεικνυμένοις· διὸ τὰ μὲν λέγωμεν, τοῖς δ' ὡς ὑπάρχουσι χρησόμεθα αὐτῶν, that this expression does not imply that an exposition given elsewhere is to be borrowed or reproduced, but that the results of some other discussion will be employed and utilized. Those who remember the tolerably frequent use of the verb χρῆσθαι by Herodotos e.g. in II. 120 εἰ χρὴ τι τοῖσι ἐποποιούσι χρεώμενον λέγειν, corresponding to Thucydides I. 10 § 3 τῇ Ὀμήρου αὐ ποιήσει εἴ τι χρῆ

κἀνατᾷθα πιστεύειν, will hardly raise any objection to our taking the word, used here and in *Nic. Eth.* I. 13 § 9, 1102 a 27 in connexion with the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, but not as confined to them, in the sense of the phrase in *Nic. Eth.* VI. 4 § 2, 1140 a 2, πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. It is plain that this expression does not in any way show whether the discussion referred to is Aristotle's own or belongs to some one else, nor to what degree or extent it is utilized" (Vahlen). SUSEM. (688)

§ 3 24 πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀν] The appeal to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι in this passage and in § 5 (see n. 694) thus amounts (in effect at any rate) to an appeal to public opinion, to what was at the time conceded by all, or at least by all cultivated and intelligent men. We should also notice how, as III. 12 § 1, the strictly scientific (philosophical) distinctions and discussions are opposed (1) to opinion universally current, and on the other hand, (2) if not by Aristotle himself at least by his pupil Eudemos (see n. 584), to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι; and it is hardly possible to regard the latter as anything else but the expression of that universal opinion. Bernays sees in these words an ironical excuse on Aristotle's part in reply to the charge which was no doubt often levelled at him, of useless logical hair-splitting, when he thus expresses the hope that he may be allowed to make *one* division at least without opposition. But Vahlen rightly urges against this view that, in spite of the announcement of at least this *one* division, the emphasis is not

21 σιαν ἄν ὥς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτός καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ  
 τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ἵπάρχειν  
 24 τοῖς μακαρίοις χρή. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μηδὲν  
 μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρίας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης  
 30 μῆδ' αὖ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπιτομένας  
 30 μυίας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηδενός, ἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ τοῦ  
 πίνειν, τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἕνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθείροντα τοῖς  
 φιλτάτους φίλους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν

25 [οὐ] Oncken wrongly. 26 τῷ omitted by P<sup>2</sup> S<sup>2</sup> V<sup>2</sup> Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand). 27 χρή omitted by P<sup>2</sup> H<sup>2</sup> (added in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>): δὲ Vettori Bk. 29 [καὶ φρονήσεως] Susem.<sup>1</sup>; see on a 32. 30 του Koraez, [τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ τοῦ πίνειν] Bernays, περὶ αὐτοῦ rightly. Yet see Vahlen *Arist. Aufz. II*, p. 11 (9) ff. 31 τῷ before τοῖς omitted by H<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. 31 ποιεῖν P<sup>1</sup> and M<sup>1</sup> (1st hand). 32 [φαγεῖν] Koraez Bk.<sup>2</sup> τὴν διάνοιαν is omitted by M<sup>1</sup> (which has a lacuna of 4 or 5 letters) and apparently by P; *quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant* William, doubtless from a gloss. Hence ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔχει, οἷοι γὰρ μεταξὺ τούτων Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> wrongly.

laid on the division, but on the inference drawn from it; that just because there are three kinds of goods, he who is to be happy cannot entirely dispense with any of the three. But I do not perceive why this thought ought properly to have been elaborated for all three kinds of goods, as Vahlen supposes; at any rate with the form of 'argumentum ad hominem' here chosen, proceeding from premisses universally conceded, where all that was required was to prove the superior claim of intellectual goods, which was alone in dispute. Besides the request that 'he might be allowed just this one division' would appear very strange in connexion with this division of goods. For, except perhaps the comprehensive term "external goods," it is not at all peculiar to Aristotle; and he repeats it elsewhere, e.g. *Nic. Eth.* I. 8 § 2, 1098 b 12 ff., *Act.* I. 5 § 4, 1360 b 25 ff., and often mentions it in passing as something well known and perfectly certain, without a word of justification or approval. SUSEM. (600).

25 [μερίδων] Even though it is plain to everybody that the subject is "goods," yet it is strange that no express mention of the term occurs either here (where it would be very appropriate instead of the word chosen, μερίδων) or in what precedes. SUSEM. (600).

§ 4 28 σωφροσύνης] Comp. *a.* (206 b). SUSEM. (601).

These are the four Platonic virtues,

which Aristotle substantially retained as the basis of his more extended list.

29 δεδιότα... 30 μυίας] This hyperbolic description, according to Bernays, also points to the passage having been transferred from some dialogue. But an extravagant and drastic picture of the kind is by no means rare in Aristotle. See *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 § 16, 1098 a 18 and γὰρ χελιδὼν ἕναρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ καὶ οὐκ οὐδ' αὐτῷ αὐτῷ δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα καὶ ἡμεῖς οὐδ' ὀλίγοι χυδαῖοι: 10 § 14, 1101 a 8 de Πρωτοκρίτου τῶν καὶ περὶ πέντε: VII. 5 § 6, 1149 a 8 εὐδαίμονα πάντες αὐτὸν ἀποφύγετε καὶ X. 8 § 7, 1178 b 10 τραχέος δὲ ποταμοὶ ἀπορροαῖαι χυδαῖοι αἰσῶσι (sc. τοῖς θεοῖς) καὶ X... b 19 οὐ γὰρ δὲ καθόλου αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἐυδαίμονα: 8 § 10, 1179 a 4 εὐδαίμονα δὲ καὶ μὴ ἀφαιρῶντα γὰρ καὶ θαλάσσης τράποντα τὰ κακά: *Polit.* 7 § 4, 1451 a 2 οἱ ἀνθρώποι σταδίῳ εἰς γῆρας, α 7 εὐδαίμονα τραγῶνται ἀγνωστῶνται: *Act.* II. 10 § 8, 1389 a 25 f. τοῖς δὲ τοῖς τοῖς καὶ πολλὰς πάλαι καὶ ἐκ παλαιότητος ἀποχέουσι. τὸ γὰρ πάλαι καὶ παλαιότητα καὶ αἰὶν καὶ αἰὶν, εἰς αἰὶν καὶ αἰὶν (Vahlen). SUSEM. (602).

30 For τῷ with the infinitive after ἐπιθυμῶν see Xenophon *Memor.* I. 7 § 5, III. 6 § 16; *Charm.* 14 § 9. For τοῦ ποιεῖν as a substantive Plato *Rep.* IV. 439 a καὶ ἀφαιρῶνται καὶ θύονται αὐτοῖς θύματα ἐπὶ τοῖς ποταμοῖς, and Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 30 (Vahlen).

32 τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν] Here too, however, the virtue of the practical intellect, stands in contrast to the moral vir-

οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεψευσμένον ὥσπερ τι παιδίον ἢ μαινό- (I)  
 § 5 μενον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥσπερ πάντες ἂν συγ- 3  
 35 χωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.  
 τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ἱκανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὅποσονοῦν,  
 πλούτου δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάν-  
 § 6 των τῶν τοιούτων εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ἡμεῖς  
 δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ῥάδιον μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν  
 40 ἔργων [δια]λαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ  
 φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταύταις,  
 1323 b καὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ

34 ὥσπερ] οὕτω before λεγόμενα P<sup>5</sup>, [ὥσπερ] Scaliger who is followed by Spengel, ἀπλῶς Bernays, <ἀπλῶς> ὥσπερ ? Susem., a conjecture which I hold to be probable even after Vahlen's defence of the text p. 14 (16). Nevertheless I concede to Vahlen that the transposition ὥσπερ λέγομεν ἅπαντες would also make good sense. Other suggestions in my critical edition: ὥσπερ \* \* \* Schneider, ὡς εἰπεῖν Koraes || 36 εἶναι omitted by P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || 37 [καὶ] χρημάτων Bernays, wrongly || 40 λαμβάνειν Lambin, διαλαμβάνειν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup>, διαβαίνειν Π<sup>1</sup>

tues; cp. I. 13 § 8, III. 4 §§ 7, 8, 18, II § 2, § 6 and §§ 10, 11 below with *nn.* (40, 45, 112, 115, 474—476, 498, 565, 703). SUSEM. (693)

§ 5 34 ὥσπερ πάντες] "Almost all would allow, when stated." Comp. *n.* (689). SUSEM. (694) ὥσπερ πάντες: ὡς εἰπεῖν πάντες = ὥσπερ οὐδέν: ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐδέν. Vahlen compares *Rhet.* I. 6 § 24, 1363 a 11, ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἥδη ὁμολογοῦσιν = for this is now as good as an universal admission (Cope): and with the idiomatic use of the participle Plato *Sympos.* 199 B τάληθ' ἡ λεγόμενα ἀκούειν, *Protag.* 311 E, τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; and the Herodotean ταῦθ' ὡς ἀπενειχθέντα ἤκουσαν.

35 διαφέρονται] Men differ as to how much of each kind of goods they should have, and to which of the three the superiority is due. The view of the multitude is that ever so small a measure of goods intellectual suffices, but the possession of goods external should be increased without end.

37 Cp. I. 9, 10, 1257 b 7 πλούτου καὶ (that is) χρημάτων (Vahlen).

38 εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν] Cp. I. 8 § 14 f., 9 § 13 ff. with *nn.* (76 b, 90). SUSEM. (695)

§ 6 ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν] Here again Bernays finds a reminiscence of some dialogue. See on the other hand c. 3 § 1 *n.* (733), VI(IV). 2. 3, 1289 b 9 [add II. 9. 12, 1270 a 10], *De Anima* I. 3

§ 10, 406 b 22 ἡμεῖς δ' ἐρωτήσομεν; *Meta.* III. 5 § 19, 1010 a 15 f. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐροῦμεν (cp. § 6, 1009 a 30), *Post. Anal.* I. 3 § 2 s. f., 72 b 18 ἡμεῖς δὲ φάμεν (Vahlen). SUSEM. (696)

39 διὰ τῶν ἔργων] To convince oneself by means of the facts. Like γινόμενα, φαινόμενα, συμβεβηκότα we find ἔργα and πράγματα used for 'facts' as distinguished from λόγοι, 'theories.' See c. 4 § 7, 1326 a 25, § 12, 1326 b 12; B. II. c. 8 § 19, 1268 b 39, c. 9 § 16; also c. 3 § 8, 1262 a 17 (λαμβάνειν τὰς πίστεις).

40 ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται κτλ.] Cp. II. 9 § 35 with *n.* (346 b) and c. 15 § 6 *n.* (928) below. SUSEM. (697)

1323 b 1 εἴτ' ἐν τῷ... 2 εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν] Bernays argues that to leave several possibilities open in this way is another indication that we have something borrowed from a dialogue. But if we presuppose Aristotle's own view of happiness, there is no further need of this argument, or rather it becomes useless. "Opponents however are most effectively met by a proof of the untenableness of their opinions drawn from their own point of view, or the concession of their own assumptions. The conceptions of happiness here brought together in the form of alternatives, all of which alike make the goods of the mind its more important elements, occur elsewhere, e.g. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 11 § 2, 1152 b 6 ff. [yet it is doubtful if this part of the *Ethics* is Aristotelian]: cp. 13

τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ (1)  
 ἥθος μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολὴν,  
 περὶ δὲ τὴν ἔξω κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάξουσιν, ἢ τοῖς  
 ἐκείνα μὲν κεκτημένοις πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τοῖτοις  
 ἐλλείπουσιν οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπούμενοις  
 τὸν εὐσύννοπον ἐστίν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρασ, ὥσπερ ὄρ-  
 γανόν τι (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν, ὦν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ  
 βλάβειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν τοῖς  
 ἔχουσιν)· τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἕκαστον ἀγαθῶν, ὅσῳ περ ἂν  
 ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον χρήσιμον [εἶναι], εἰ δεῖ καὶ τού-  
 τοις ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον.  
 ὅλως τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρί-

1323 b 6 ἀλλὰ omitted by M<sup>1</sup>, by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), and possibly by P<sup>1</sup> § 8 γὰρ  
 Susem., δὲ P<sup>1</sup> II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text and Bernays, who alters πᾶν into πέρασ,  
 wrongly § χρήσιμον τι τι Vahlen, perhaps rightly; = χρήσιμον τοῦτο ἔχει πέρασ εἰς δὲ  
 χρήσιμόν ἐστιν (or something similar) Susem. Both probable corrections, the one is  
 no easier than the other § ὦν ὥστε Bernays, and so (or perhaps ὥστε αὐτῶν) Ar.,  
 = ὡς William, αὐτῶν perhaps P<sup>1</sup>; ὥστε αὐτῶν Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Vahlen p. 21 (23) §  
 αὐτῶν omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Ar., [αὐτῶν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> with Koraes, αὐτῶν Oncken, quite need-  
 lessly, but not (as Vahlen thinks) less correctly § 11 χρήσιμον μᾶλλον P<sup>1</sup> S<sup>1</sup> § [εἶναι]  
 Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup>, ἐστίν ? Spengel, = χρῆ = χρήσιμον Bernays. I am not convinced by  
 Vahlen's defence p. 23 (25)

§ 2, 1323 b 15 ff., and I. 8 § 6 ff. 1098 b  
 24 ff., and also cp. *Rhet.* I. 5 § 3 ff." (Vahlen). Cp. also below V(VIII). 5 § 10  
 (Eaton) with *u.* (1033). SUSEM. (698)

2 ὅτι μᾶλλον...6 (ἐλλείπουσιν) Cp.  
*Nic. Eth.* IX. 8 § 9 ff., 1179 a 3 ff. οὐ  
 γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐδ' ἢ  
 πράξις...καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναι' ἂν  
 τι πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν (Eaton).  
 SUSEM. (699)

§ 7 τὰ μὲν γὰρ...ὄργανόν τι Cp.  
 I. 8 § 12, 7 § 12 with *uu.* 110 b 2, yet, also  
*De Anima* I. 3 § 15, 407 a 23 ff., τῶν μὲν  
 γὰρ πρακτικῶν τοῦτων ἐστὶ πέρατα, πᾶ-  
 σαι γὰρ ἐν τῷ χάρι, *Metaph.* II (a). 2 § 12,  
 994 b 13 ff. [yet this is a spurious book].  
*Nic. Eth.* VII. 13 § 4, 1153 b 24 ff. πρὸς  
 μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς  
 εὐτυχίας] (Vahlen). SUSEM. (700)

8 πᾶν γὰρ κτλ] The sense required  
 is 'whatever is useful is useful up to a  
 certain point [or, has a limit to its utility].  
 to exceed which must necessarily either  
 do harm or confer no benefit upon its  
 possessor.' Vahlen supposes a participial  
 clause to have been replaced by the words  
 ὦν = ὑπερβολήν. The simplest draft of  
 the sentence would be τὰ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρασ

...ἢ ὑπερβάλλουσα (i.e. ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ) ἢ  
 βλάβειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηδὲν ὄφελος τοῖς  
 ἔχουσιν. Then by a familiar idiom the  
 second alternative is replaced by ἢ μηδὲν  
 ὄφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν ἐκτῶν). The  
 sentence thus becomes somewhat un-  
 symmetrical in form, because τὴν ὑπερ-  
 βολήν, though it goes well enough with  
 βλάβειν, is less suitable as the subject  
 of μηδὲν ὄφελος.

11 καὶ τούτοις ἐπιλέγειν] 'to predi-  
 cate of these also,' viz. of mental goods.  
 So *Nic. Eth.* II. 6 § 9, 1106 b 10 ὅθεν  
 εὐδαιμονία ἐπιλέγεται τοῖς αἰσθητικῶν  
 ἀπὸ οὐδὲ ὄφελος ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πρακτικῶν.  
 With the use of the prep. cp. the phrase  
 ἐν τῇ πολλότητι.

§ 8 13 ὅλως τε δῆλον...15 διαθέσεις]  
 "Further, as a general rule it is clear  
 that the relative superiority of the best  
 condition of one thing [as compared with  
 that of another] will be said to be  
 measured by the difference existing be-  
 tween the things of which these are said  
 to be in themselves the best conditions."  
*Comp. Rhet.* I. 7 § 4, 1395 b 21 ff.  
 (Congreve), § 18, 1364 a 27 ff. καὶ ὡς  
 ὑπερκεῖ ἀρετατέρη § καλλίων...καὶ ὡς

στην ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, (1)  
 15 ἥνπερ εἶληχε διάστασιν ὧν φαμεν εἶναι αὐτὰς ταύτας δια-  
 θέσεις. ὥστ' εἶπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τιμιώτερον καὶ τῆς κτήσεως  
 καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διά-

15 εἶληφε Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> (emended by corr.<sup>3</sup> of P<sup>2</sup>) || διάστασις Ar. (apparently) and Γ, but before ἥνπερ: [διάστασιν] Bojesen, ἥπερ διέστασιν ὧν Bernays, wrongly, ἥπερ... διαστάσει? Vahlen needlessly: see Comm. || αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. avoiding hiatus || ταύτας] τοιαύτας Bernays, perhaps rightly, but not necessary: see Comm. || 16 τιμιώτερον transposed to come after 17 σώματος in Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., τιμιωτέραν M<sup>s</sup>, *pretiosior* William

τικειμένως δὲ τῶν βελτιόνων αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ βελτίους καὶ καλλιόνων καλλίους. So *l. c.* § 4, καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχη, καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν· καὶ ὅσα [ῥῥαν] αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου: *Tor.* III. 3 § 4, 118 b 4 ff. ἔτι οὐ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς αἰρετώτερα, καὶ αὐτὸ αἰρετώτερον (Vahlen): 2 § 9, 117 b 33 ff. εἰ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τούτου βέλτιον, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον τῶν ἐν τούτῳ βέλτιον τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ βελτίστου (Bernays). Even in this unmistakable and express 'development of the logical formula' Bernays discovers a proof of quotation from a dialogue. See *n.* (702). SUSEM. (701)

14 A parallel to πρὸς ἄλληλα after ἐκάστου is *Pol.* 23 § 2, ὧν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα. Comp. ἀλλήλων after ἐκάτερον Pl. *Phaedo* 97 A, Aeschines I. 137, after μηδένα Ar. *Lysistr.* 49. Take κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν with what immediately precedes: the best condition of two things 'compared in point of superiority,' i.e. as judged by the superiority of the one relatively to the other. All this forms the subject of ἀκολουθεῖν. What is the object? Either τῇ διαστάσει, or κατὰ τὴν διάστασιν (for which cp. c. 14 § 1, 1332 b 15), ἥνπερ κτλ. Normally one would expect this to be changed by attraction of the relative into ἥπερ εἶληχε διαστάσει (or καθ' ἥνπερ εἶλ. διάστασιν). Instead of this, the antecedent is absorbed into the relative sentence and assimilated to its construction ἥνπερ εἶληχε διάστασιν. Such absorption and assimilation may be seen in VI(IV). 4. 8, 1290 b 28, 5. 2, 1292 b 8, 12. 2, 1296 b 20, possibly (see *n.* ad loc.) I. 8. 13, 1256 b 29. A good example is Pl. *Rep.* 400 D εὐθελὲς ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἥν ἄνοιαν οὖσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς... διάνοιαν: where the construction of the relative sentence invades the resumed principal sentence. See 1323 b 34, 1324 b 13. The periphrasis of ἔχειν c. accus. for a verb is

sometimes varied. Here εἶληχέναι διάστασιν = διεστάναι as Pl. *Tim.* 38 D, *Pol.* 288 E δύναμιν εἶληχέναι = δύνασθαι, *Phil.* 49 C γελοίων εἶληχε τάξιν = γελοῖα ἐστὶ. In its simplest form the proposition states that the ὑπεροχὴ of the best condition of two things compared corresponds to the διάστασις between the things. The best state of A : the best state of B :: A : B. Allow the soul's superiority, and you must allow the superiority of ἀρετῇ and φρόνησις its best states. (Vahlen.)

15 διάστασιν] The order of the words in Γ (*distantia quam quidem sortita est quarum dicimus esse ipsas* has Will.) may suggest that διάστασιν was originally a variant of ὑπεροχὴν, and to be bracketed (Bojesen, followed by Spengel and Madvig who also proposed <καὶ> διάστασιν). But Vahlen pp. 28—34 (30—36) has shown that διάστασιν is all but indispensable for the sense, and himself admits that it is not necessary to alter to ἥπερ... διαστάσει. Schneider, who first felt a difficulty, proposed violent changes ἐκ. πράγματος κατὰ τὴν διάστασιν ἥνπερ εἶληχε πρὸς ἄλληλα τῇ ὑπεροχῇ ὧν φαμεν κτλ. SUSEM.

αὐτὰς ταύτας] Vahlen shows that this is an instance of the idiomatic attraction of a pronominal subject (here a demonstrative, often a relative) into the number and gender of the predicate. In Plato *Phil.* 57 E ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστ' εἶναι = this is what we especially mean by the exact sciences. So here: 'the things whereof we say that just this and that are the attributes' becomes, not ὧν αὐτὰ ταῦτα, but ὧν αὐτὰς ταύτας φαμέν εἶναι διαθέσεις.

17 καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν] Both absolutely and relatively to us. See *N. Eth.* I. 4. 5, 1059 b 2: Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 77 a 21 ff. where τινί, ἐκάστῳ, πρὸς τινα, πρὸς τι are cited as similarly contrasted with ἀπλῶς. So III. 9. 3, 1280 a 21, μέχρι τινός.

9 θεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν αἰρετὰ πέφυκε ταῦτα καὶ διὰ πάντας αἰρεῖσθαι τοὺς εὐφρονούντας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ἕνεκεν τὴν ψυχὴν.  
10 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσούτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμέ-

18 καὶ omitted by P<sup>12</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. | 19 ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἰρετὰ P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. | 20 καὶ added before τοὺς εὐφρονούντας by Γ M'

18 Take τούτων after ἐκάστου. For the use of ἀνάλογον ἔχειν absolutely cp. II. 10 § 4, 1271 b 41, II § 3, 1272 b 37.

§ 9 18 ἔτι δὲ... 20 τὴν ψυχὴν] Cp. *Tóp.* III. 1 § 4, 116a 29 f. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν τοῦ δι' ἑαυτὸν αἰρετὸν αἰρετώτερον. "What is desirable on its own account is more desirable than that which is desirable for the sake of something else" (Bernays). Although this point of view (τόπος) is closely related to the one adopted here, yet it is not identical with it. A more important point is that as the precise argument of the *Tópics* is employed e.g. in the *Ethics* also, I. 7 § 4, 1097a 30, we have no right to follow Bernays in ascribing to this chapter of the *Política* a scientific character materially distinct from the method of the *Ethics* and only suited for popular writings (Vahlen). Moreover there is no development of the 'logical formula' for this proof, as in the former case (see n. 701); while in the passage of the *Ethics* this is done. SUMM. (702)

The last remark because Bernays argues (p. 80) that in the dialogues the treatment must necessarily have been somewhat abstract and dialectical; and this side of the dialogue he thinks is reflected in the present chapter. The author wrote, he says, for the public at large, who, if impatient of technical terms, are nevertheless especially qualified to appreciate the tact which adapts to each branch of science its appropriate logic.

§ 10 21 ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως] Cp. III. 4 § 7, 111 § 2, with *nu.* (474, 265). SUMM. (703)

καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας] Why Aristotle was obliged to add 'activity in accordance with the virtues' we learn from *N. Eth.* I. 8 § 9, 1098b 31 ff. ἀαφ' ὧν δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας ἢ χρῆται τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ πολεμεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἢ ἐκτελεῖν τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐκδέχεται μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀπολαύειν ἀρχόμενος, ἀπορῶν κατεβέβηκεν... τῆς δὲ ἐκτέλεσιν καὶ ἐκτελεῖν κατὰ τὴν γὰρ αἰτίαν ἀγαθόν, καὶ εὖ πράξει. We must agree

with Bernays that it is owing to the manifestly popular character of the style of description here followed that Aristotle now avoids the technical term *ἐκτέλεσις* used in that passage. Cf. also § 12 with *n.* (710), and *n.* (736). SUMM. (704)

23 μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις] Bernays wrongly endeavours to discover a solemn religious tone in this expression. It denotes no more than 'taking the happiness of God as evidence' or 'appealing to the happiness of God,' cp. *Thuc.* I. 75, 2, just as in a similar phrase the Cynicals and Epicureans are reproached with appealing to the lower animals, *Plat. Phaed.* 67 B τοῖς θηρίοις ἡμεῖς ἀποκατακρίνομεν εἶναι μάρτυρας, Cic. *De Fin.* II. 33 § 109 bestis... quibus non de summo bono testibus uti solent. It is nothing unusual for Aristotle in his strictly scientific writings to introduce God into the inquiry. Not only is there really not the slightest difference in this respect between *c.* 3 § 10 (cp. *n.* 746) and the passage before us, but further the very same thought is worked out rather more fully in *N. Eth.* I. 8 § 7, 1178 b 7 ff., and similar references to the deity occur e.g. *N. Eth.* VIII. 7 § 4, 1138 b 35, cp. VII. 14 § 8, 1154 b 26 ff. Lastly, the comparison here between human and divine happiness is not in the slightest degree carried beyond the proper point. According to Aristotle the activity of God is only speculative thought, and indeed even this thought is nothing but his absolutely perfect thinking upon his own nature, and it is in this that his perfect happiness consists, see Zeller *op. cit.* II. II. p. 305 ff. Aristotle's aim is to prove, as against the opposite view generally current, the greater necessity for goods of the mind, in order to happiness. A reference to the happiness of God was not unattainable for his purpose, the inference from this is that happiness in general does not depend upon external goods, but is founded on mental qualities.

νοῖς, ὃς εὐδαίμων μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν (I)  
 25 ἑξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις  
 εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ  
 ταύτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν  
 τῆς ψυχῆς αἴτιον ταυτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δὲ οὐδεὶς  
 § 11 οὐδὲ σῶφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστίν). || ἐχόμενον  
 30 δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα

25 αὐτὸν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>3</sup> || τῷ τὸ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (perhaps rightly) || 27 [ἀγαθῶν] Bernays, [τῆς ψυχῆς] Spengel Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Vahlen p. 40 (42) ff. || 29 ἐχόμενον...36 σῶφρων a duplicate of 1324 a 4 πότερον...13 σπουδαιοτέραν first recognized by Susemihl, Spengel (following Schlosser) having previously remarked that the two passages do not go well together. See p. 86 f. where they are printed in parallel columns

and consequently that man, too, cannot find his principal happiness in external goods. On the other hand the notion that man also may be able to dispense entirely with external goods and yet attain happiness is completely excluded by the whole previous course of the argument, which began with admitting each and all of the three kinds of goods to be necessary for human happiness (see *n.* 689) and endeavoured to determine the relative importance of external and internal goods (Vahlen). SUSEM. (705)

For this *N. E.* x. 8. 9, 1179 a 2, may be quoted, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι: cp. I. 10. 16, 1101 a 19.

26 καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἑτέραν εἶναι] Many see no difference between the two: *Nic. Eth.* I. 8 § 17, 1099 b 7 f. ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. Cp. Socrates apud Xen. *Memor.* III. 9 § 14 (Eaton). SUSEM. (706)

Add *Phys.* II. 6 § 1, 197 b 3 σημείον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἥτοι ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἢ εὐτυχίᾳ ἢ ἐγγύς, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τις εὐπραξία γάρ.

29 ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην] Cp. *Phys.* II. 6 § 4, 197 b 18 ff. ἐν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἕνεκά του γινομένοις, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἕνεκα γένηται οὐ ἕξω τὸ αἴτιον, τότε ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου λέγομεν ἀπὸ τύχης δὲ τούτων ὅσα ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου γίνεται τῶν προαιρετῶν τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν: "Hence it is clear that of events, which in themselves answer a purpose, we call anything not done by design a spontaneous occurrence; whilst all such spontaneous occurrences which happen in the region of purpose and to beings possessed of

purpose are said to be by chance" (Eaton). SUSEM. (707)

Comp. the lucid comments of D. D. Heath *Misconceptions of Aristotle in Journal of Philology* VII. p. 111 ff.

§ 11 ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ κτλ.] Next there follows, without need for fresh arguments, the inference to the happiness and welfare of the best state. For welfare is impossible apart from well-doing. A literal version would be: closely connected and dependent upon the same arguments is the proof that the best state, too, is happy and fares well [like the best man]. It need hardly be insisted that 30 εὐδαίμονα and 31 πράττουσαν καλῶς are predicates of which τὴν ἀρίστην πόλιν is the subject.

30 τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] Although this makes the essential identity of happiness in the individual and the state rest on no other grounds than those already adduced, we nevertheless get a new proof that human happiness consists mainly in virtue, and we are told (§ 12) that this applies to the state precisely in the same way as to the individual. This supplementary proof is certainly very incomplete. All human thought is largely conditioned and fettered by the language of a nation. Thus among the Greeks the verb πράττειν has (1) the transitive meaning 'to do=to perform certain acts,' line 32 τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν, (2) the intransitive meaning 'to do=to be (in a certain state),' as e.g. in this present connexion καλῶς πράττειν =to be doing (or faring) well, to be in a prosperous state. Hence it became easy to make the mistake of directly inferring the second meaning from the first, where we of course see only a dialectical play upon words. We do not however draw Bernays' conclusion that Aristotle would

τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον γὰρ καλῶς (I)  
 πράττειν τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν· οἷζιν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον  
 οὐτ' ἀνδρὸς οὔτε πόλεως χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως· ἀνδρία  
 δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύ-  
 ναμιν καὶ μορφὴν, ὧν μετασχὼν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων  
 λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων.  
 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔστω πεφρόνισμένα τῷ  
 λόγῳ (οὔτε γὰρ μὴ θιγγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνατόν, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς  
 οἰκείους ἐπεξελεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους, ἑτέρας γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔργον σχο-

31 γὰρ Bernays, δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup> in the text (defended by Vahlen p. 45 [47] f.) § 32 τὴν Spengel, τοῖς Γ II Ar. Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup> in the text (defended by Vahlen loc. cit.) § 33 [καὶ φρονήσεως] Schneider § 34 Κο-  
 ραῖς and Bk.<sup>2</sup> insert καὶ σωφροσύνη after φρόνησις, and l. 36 ἀνδρία καὶ before δίκαιος;  
 but see Vahlen p. 48 (50) ff.

not have allowed himself this licence except in a dialogue. Had he looked upon it as a mere play upon words, he certainly would not have admitted it into a dialogue either; most certainly he would not have transcribed it from a dialogue into the present work. As a matter of fact not only has Plato committed the same mistake in all scientific seriousness, *Gorg.* 507 c [*Rep.* 353 E], but it is also to be found in c. 3, §§ 1, 8 (cp. *iii.* 732, 744) and *iii.* 9 § 14 (cp. *ii.* 360 b), and similarly in *Nom.* *Book* 1, § 4, 1093 b 20 ff., though Bernays vainly attempts to disprove the last case (Vahlen). But Spengel is right in thinking it strange that the question disposed of in § 11 is in c. 2 §§ 1, 2 spoken of as still requiring to be settled and is accordingly there settled. This difficulty disappears so soon as we set the two paragraphs side by side as distinct versions of the same subject, and with it another difficulty raised by Hildenbrand p. 368 ff., on which Spengel *Arist. Stud.* II. p. 73 (368) ff. has laid far more stress than it deserves. Hildenbrand's view is that in *iii.* 18 the question, whether the virtue or the happiness of the individual and of the state is identical or not, is brought forward as having already been settled by *iii.* cc. 5, 6 (cp. *iii.* 471, 684), whereas in *iv*(VII). 1 § 11, 2 § 1, the question is first submitted to investigation, and that therefore *iii.* c. 18 is a draft from Aristotle's pen which he afterwards discarded. The error in this conclusion lurks (as Becker observes) in the words

'virtue or happiness'; for the latter term as used by Aristotle is not coincident with the former, but requires in addition a certain measure of external goods. The proof that the *virtue* of the state is identical with that of the individual does not therefore by itself in any way demonstrate the identity of their happiness [or wellbeing]. In any case, if we take the one version, that contained in c. 1. § 11, there is no escape from the difficulty that the previous inquiry as to the identity of the *virtue* of both is also ignored. But if we replace it by the second version, c. 2 §§ 1, 2, there would be nothing to prevent Aristotle expressing himself as he does, even with the distinct presupposition of the earlier inquiry (cc. *iii.* 5, 6) and the reference to it in *iii.* c. 18 § 2. As to the identity of the 'virtue or excellence' manifested by the state and by the individual cp. also c. 13 §§ 9, 10 and *viii*(V). 9 § 12 with *ii.* (1641). Sussem. (708)

§ 12 31. Observe that this is the postulate of Plato in the *Republic*, made implicitly *ii.* 368 E and restated expressly *iv* 435 E, 442 D E. On *ἀρετή* καὶ *μακάριον*, terms cognate to εὖ, ἀγαθόν, φέρειν, cp. Bonitz *Instit. Ar.* 265 b 11, and *ii.* on l. 4, 6, 1254 a 14. Apparently the antecedent of εὖ, if expressed, would be τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ καὶ τῷ φρονήτερι. see on 1313 b 15.

§ 13 39 ἐτέρας σχολῆς] For this forms the task of another study, a lecture of another kind. Here only in this sense,

40 λῆς ταῦτα· νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἄριστος, καὶ (I)  
χωρὶς ἐκάστου καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς κεχο- (p. 9  
1324 a ρηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν πρά-  
§ 14 ξεων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἔασαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν  
μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ὕστερον, εἴ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τυγχά-  
2 νει μὴ πειθόμενος)· || πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν II  
5 αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων  
καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, λοιπὸν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν. φα-  
νερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο. πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν εἶ-  
§ 2 ναι τὴν αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὖ τίθεν-  
ται ἐφ' ἐνός, οὗτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, εἰ μὴ πλουσία,  
10 μακαρίζουσιν· ὅσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τι-  
μῶσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρχουσιν εὐδαιμονεστά-  
την εἶναι φαῖεν ἂν· εἴ τέ τις τὸν ἕνα δι' ἀρετὴν ἀποδέχεται,  
§ 3 καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. || [ἀλλὰ 2

40 καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστου omitted by P<sup>4</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald. and the first hand of P<sup>8</sup> S<sup>b</sup> (added in the margin of S<sup>b</sup> by the same hand, in the margin of P<sup>3</sup> by a later hand and again expunged) || 41 ἐκάστῳ P<sup>2</sup> Ar. (?) Bk. and apparently a later hand in the margin of P<sup>3</sup> || κεχορηγημένος P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald.

1324 a 4 πότερον...13 σπουδαιοτέραν a duplicate of 1323 b 29—36. See p. 86  
10 μακαρίζουσιν or μακαριοῦσιν Ar. Spengel || 12 ἂν before εἶναι II<sup>2</sup> Bk. and P<sup>5</sup> (in the margin, omitted by the 1st hand) || 13 [ἀλλὰ...1325 b 34 πρότερον] Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>

Lat. disciplina, course of study or instruction: in all other passages of Aristotle σχολή=leisure. What is meant is of course ethical science or instruction, which is itself, according to Aristotle, only a portion of politics in the wider sense, ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα, *Nic. Eth.* I. 2 § 9, 1094 b 11; see *Introd.* pp. 67, 70 f. As there was a work of Theophrastus called *ἠθικαὶ σχολαί* (Diog. Laert. v. 47) Krohn *op. c.* p. 37 ff. finds in this an indication that we have here a passage from his lectures, and not from Aristotle's. But his view requires some stronger proofs. SUSEM. (709) "That σχολή was the recognized term for lecture in the time of Plato is shown by the sarcasm of Diogenes the Cynic τὴν μὲν Εὐκλείδου σχολὴν ἔλεγε χολήν, τὴν δὲ Πλάτωνος διατριβήν, κατατριβήν, Diog. Laert. VI. 42: cf. also Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* I. §§ 7, 8, ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere auderemus..., itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli" (Ridgeway). But the witticisms attributed to Diogenes need very careful sifting be-

fore they can pass as historical (Susemihl).

41 ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς...1324 a 1 πράξεων] Here also, as well as in § 10, what is said in n. (704) is applicable. Cp. also n. (736). SUSEM. (710)

1324 a 3 διασκεπτέον ὕστερον] Spengel rightly observes, *Ueber die Pol.* p. 46, that this is not the way in which Aristotle usually speaks. But the mode of expression is very like that of a lecturer who invites his hearers to mention, and discuss with him afterwards, any difficulties they may still have. Cp. Excursus I. SUSEM. (711)

c. 2 § 2 9 ἐφ' ἐνός] Cp. Plato *Theaet.* 157 A ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοήσαι.

c. 2 § 3—c. 4 § 1 (τεθεώρηται πρότερον).

A subsidiary question: is the virtuous life, which is most desirable, a life of active participation in civic duties, or a life of study and philosophic retirement? A life of war and external conquest, or of peaceable rule over freemen and of internal activity?

§ 3 13 ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη δύο] The close

ταύτ' ἤδη δύο ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖται σκέψεως, ἐν μὲν πότερος αἶρε- (II)  
 1 πότερος βίος, ὃ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πό-  
 λεως ἢ μᾶλλον ὃ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπο-  
 λευμένος, ἔτι δὲ τίνα πολιτείαν θετέον καὶ ποίαν ἐιάθισιν  
 2 πόλεως ἀρίστην, εἴτε πᾶσιν ὄντος αἰρετοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως  
 3 εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς  
 4 διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον  
 5 αἰρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην νῦν προσηρήμεθα τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκείνο  
 μὲν [[γάρ]] πάρεργον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο δ' ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.  
 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην

See Comm. *nn.* 712—717, 725, 729, 736, 738, 741, 743, 745, 747—9 | 14 πότερος

Γ<sup>Μ</sup> (?) Π<sup>2</sup> Σ<sup>5</sup> Α<sup>1</sup>. (Μ<sup>1</sup> has πὸ) | 18 αἰρετοῦ < τοῦ > Κοιναὶ | 19 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπεὶ καὶ  
 Μ<sup>2</sup>, τὸ δὲ περισσόν is a gloss of π<sup>2</sup> in the margin; γάρ Spengel, quite wrongly |  
 21 νῦν after προσηρήμεθα Π<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> Β<sup>k</sup>. | 22 γάρ omitted by Γ<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>4-5</sup> Λ<sup>1</sup> Β<sup>k</sup>., rightly

sequence of cc. 2, 3 upon c. 1 leaves us only two alternatives: either cc. 2, 3 have exactly the same origin as c. 1, although in no way distinguished by the same excellences of style, or else the editor who inserted c. 1 has further added to it from his own materials cc. 2, 3, except of course c. 2 §§ 1, 2 (see *n.* 708). Even setting aside the difference of style, the second alternative is forced upon us by the numerous difficulties, some slight, others very considerable, which present themselves in this section, see *nn.* (713—717, 725, 729, 736, 738, 741, 743, 745, 747—749), with which the few points in c. 1 and c. 2 §§ 1, 2 that might raise doubts as to the genuineness of that portion (see *nn.* 690, 709, 711) should be more closely compared. Read Ed. Muller's exhaustive examination in his *History of the theory of art among the ancients* II. pp. 366—373. Breslau, 1837, a work universally neglected, which ought to have led subsequent inquirers to a renewed consideration of these chapters. What a deal of pains he takes to remove the difficulties in them, and all in vain. Although my view differs considerably from his, in many respects it is most intimately connected with his exposition. This is not the place to enter into a more detailed examination of his argument, but see *n.* (743). Only one difficulty is common to the two portions c. 1 (with c. 2 §§ 1, 2) and c. 2 § 3—c. 4 § 1: viz. that later on in c. 3 §§ 3, 4 the inquiry of c. 1, and so too a little further on in c. 13 § 8 ff. the inquiry pursued in cc. 2,

3, though in a slightly altered form, is commenced over again, in each case without the slightest sign that they have been already adequately discussed, whereas the interpolator does not fail to refer by anticipation to this later section, c. 3 § 1 (cp. *n.* 731). SUSAN. (712)

14 ἔν μὲν—22 μεθόδον ταύτης] The transition to the best constitution took place as far back as III. c. 18, and in IV (VII). 1 it was stated that we must first examine the best life; now after having concluded this examination and after having stated that the result holds good for the state as well as for the individual, it seems very awkward to say that there are two questions requiring to be investigated, (1) whether the best life for the individual is one of scientific leisure or of political activity, and (2) which is the best constitution. The first question is violently thrust in, and, as it stands, cannot properly be allowed to take even a secondary rank as a question of politics, which the author at once declares is all that he himself claims for it; it has nothing whatever to do with the science of politics, as Scholium long since observed. It would be a different thing if it were preceded by, and then taken up and treated as co-ordinate to, the inquiry whether the end of the state is peaceful activity or war, which in § 5 is treated as a co-ordinate question. SUSAN. (713)

§ 5 23 ὅτι μὲν οὖν φανερόν ἐστιν] It is plain then that the [absolute] best polity is that system under which now one of the citizens whatever would law

καθ' ἣν τάξιν καὶ ὅστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῶη μα- (II  
 25 καρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν· ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν  
 ὁμολογούντων τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον αἰρετώτατον, πότε-  
 ρον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἰρετὸς ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ  
 πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικὸς τις, ὃν  
 § 6 μόνον τινὲς φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτους τοὺς  
 30 δύο βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμώτατοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν φαί-  
 νονται προαιρούμενοι, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν· λέγω  
 δὲ δύο τὸν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ<sup>4</sup>  
 μικρὸν ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθές· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν γε εὖ<sup>5</sup> (P.  
 34 φρονούντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίω σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν  
 § 7 ἀνθρώπων ἐκάστω καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ. νομίζουσι δ' οἱ  
 μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γινόμενον μετ'  
 ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον

24 ἡς Ar. apparently, [τάξιν] Spengel. The former probably right: yet see Vahlen p. 35 (37) || ζῆ M<sup>s</sup>, ζῆ P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 28 τις <ῶν> ? Koraes, [τις] would be a more obvious change, yet doubtless none is needed || 29 φιλόσοφοι [sc. αἰρετόν] Jackson || 30 τούτους after τοὺς δύο M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || φιλοτιμώτατοι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>4.5</sup> Ald. || 31 πρότερον Koraes (needlessly) and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) || 33 γε Spengel, τε M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, omitted by P<sup>5</sup>, perhaps rightly, [τε] Congreve || 35 ἑκαστον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. Spengel, γρ. ἑκαστον P<sup>1</sup> (corr. in the margin), perhaps rightly || τῇ πολι<sup>τ</sup> M<sup>s</sup>, τὴν πολιτείαν (πολιτείαν 1st hand of P<sup>3</sup>) Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. (γρ. τὴν πολιτείαν corr. in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>), perhaps rightly; τὴν πόλιν Spengel, needlessly || 37 τινὸς omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>

best and live in the enjoyment of happiness' Cp. c. i § 1 and n. (685). SUSEM. (714)

29 τινές] 'Some' only? We should expect 'all.' But this may be explained as due to Aristotle's minimizing style of expression. Cp. n. (401). SUSEM. (715)

§ 6 σχεδὸν γὰρ ... 32 φιλόσοφον] The two sections §§ 5, 6 are unusually diffuse. SUSEM. (716)

No account is here taken of the view that honour is the aim of the political life, *N.E.* i. v. 4, 1095 b 23. Whereas in *N.E.* x. 7. 7, 1177 b 19 ff. αἱ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ἀρεταὶ are sharply distinguished from ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια (θεωρητικὴ), here the object seems to be to represent the political and contemplative life as akin, though the latter is in both discussions regarded as αὐτοτελής (Newman).

34 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκάστω καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ] But granting that the speculative (i.e. studious) life is the better end for the individual, the state is in no

way concerned in this, beyond rendering such a life possible to the few fitted for it, provided that the rest consent to take active part in the administration: for otherwise the state would itself come to an end. The author is in error (cp. n. 736\*) in supposing that the question, whether scientific or political activity ranks highest for the individual, corresponds exactly to the question which arises with regard to the state, whether it should pursue a policy of peace or of war. Cp. *iii.* (743, 745). SUSEM. (717)

§ 7 35 οὐ μὲν] The advocates of a peace policy think that while despotic rule over others is never without a certain injustice of the deepest dye, even rule as exercised under a free government, though devoid of injustice, yet tends to disturb our own easy prosperity. The conjunction of τὸ ἄρχειν and γινόμενον = ἡ ἀρχὴ γινόμενη is harsh, but can be paralleled. On δεσποτικῶς (properly as slaves) see 1277 a 33 n.

οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὴν εἰημερίᾳ τοίτων (11)  
 δ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἕτεροι τυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες. μόνον  
 γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν· ἐφ'  
 ἐκάστης γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις  
 ἢ τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι καὶ πολιτευομένοις. \* \* οἱ μὲν οὖν  
 οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν  
 τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐδαίμονα φασίν. παρ'  
 ἐνίοις δ' οὗτος καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος, ὅπως δε-  
 σπόζωσι τῶν πέλας. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χίδην  
 ὥς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως εἴ ποῦ τι πρὸς  
 ἐν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχάζονται πάντες, ὥσπερ  
 ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοῖς πολέμοις συντέτακται  
 σχεδὸν ἢ τε παιδείᾳ καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλήθος· ἔτι δ' ἐν  
 τοῖς ἔθνεσι πᾶσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ τοιαύτη τε-  
 τίμηται δύναμις, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θραξί  
 καὶ Κελτοῖς. ἐν ἐνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τινὲς εἰσι παροξύνον-  
 τες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ  
 τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον λαμβάνειν ὅσας ἂν στρατεύσων-  
 ται στρατείας· ἣν δέ ποτε καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίαν νόμος τὸν

38 αὐτὸν Γ, perhaps rightly, αὐτῶν Vettori<sup>2</sup>, αὐτοῖς Schneider.

1324 b 1 \* \* of Susem. and Böcker, «ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἀμφεβητεῖται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ \* \* » οἱ or something similar? Susem. | 4 δ'...ἄροι] δ' οὗτοι καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος τῶν νόμων P<sup>1</sup>, δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτος τῶν νόμων P<sup>46</sup>, δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτος ὅρος (καὶ added by Congreve) τῶν νόμων all other codices and editors except Susem. || 8 πολέμοις P<sup>1</sup> | 14 τῶν] τοσούτων? Koraes, but see Vahlen p. 34 (36) on 1323 b 15

41 οὐ μᾶλλον] not so much.

[8 Secuta est uberior expositio sententiae summi rei publicae optima esse constitutendae civitatibus quae κατ' αἰρὰς ἰδρυμένηται, cf. 1315 b 23—17. SUSEM.]

1324 b 1 πολιτευομένοις \* \* | To complete the connexion we require words to the following effect:—“and there is the same difference of opinion with regard to states. For some think that those states lead the best and happiest existence which devote themselves purely to domestic politics and have nothing to do with any policy of war. For, they say, etc.” “This then is one view, but others (of M) etc.” SUSEM. (718)

[9 ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι—ἐλθόν] Cp. II. 9 § 24, IV(VII). 14 § 15 ff., V(VII). 4 §§ 1—6, with *nu.* (344, 910, 1005). SUSEM. (719)

[10 ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι] cp. I. 2 § 6, and II. (19 b). SUSEM. (720)

[11 καὶ Πέρσαις] cp. IIb. VII. 2, 10, 102 (Eaton). SUSEM. (721)

[12 καὶ Κελτοῖς] cp. II. 9 § 7, and II. (287) p. 234 f. and below v. 17. F 2 and II. (983). SUSEM. (722)

[14 τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον] Does this throw any light on the real significance of Hannibal's sending by Mago the rings of the Roman equites, as told by Livy XXIII. 12? (Rideaway)

[11 12 καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίας] Here we see the Macedonians expressly mentioned among barbarian peoples. And even if this is pronounced the interpolation of a pupil, yet the more closely the earlier Peripatetics were attached to the Macedonian cause, the more probable it becomes that the pupil is here reproducing

μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότα πολέμιον ἄνδρα περιεζῶσθαι τὴν φορ-  
βείαν. ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἐξῆν πίνειν ἐν ἑορτῇ τινι σκύφον  
 περιφερόμενον τῷ μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότι πολέμιον· ἐν δὲ τοῖς  
 Ἰβηρσιν, ἔθνει πολεμικῶ, τοσοῦτους τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀβελίσκους  
 20 καταπηγνύουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρῃ τῶν  
 § 12 πολεμίων· καὶ ἕτερα δὴ παρ' ἐτέροις ἔστι τοιαῦτα πολλά,  
 τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατελιγμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθεσιν.  
 καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἄγαν ἄτοπον ἴσως εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένοις  
 ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι  
 25 θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἄρχῃ καὶ δεσπόζῃ τῶν πλησίων καὶ βουλομένων καὶ  
 § 13 μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴῃ τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἢ νομοθετικόν,  
 ὃ γε μὴδὲ νόμιμον ἐστίν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδίκως ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δ' ἔστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως.

16 ἀπεκτονότα P<sup>1-5</sup>, ἀπεκτανκοτα P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, corrected in the margin by a later hand, but the correction was afterwards expunged), ἀπεκτακότα P<sup>4-6</sup> Ald., ἐπταικότα M<sup>s</sup> || 17 σκύφου περιφερομένου? Schneider || 18 ἀπεκτακότι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1-4-6</sup>, ἀπεκτανκότι P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, corrected by a later hand), ἀπεκτονότι P<sup>5</sup> || 19 ἀριθμοῦντες or ἀριθμοῦντας, apparently, Γ (*numerantes* William) || οὐ βελίσκους M<sup>s</sup> || 21 δὲ? Koraes wrongly || 24 δύνασθαι transposed by Lindau to follow 28 ἄρχειν, wrongly || 27 μόνον after δικαίως P<sup>5</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> and apparently Γ

unaltered his master's view. SUSEM. (723). Cp. *Introd.* p. 46 n. (3)

17 ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις] Comp. Herod. iv. 66. SUSEM. (724)

18 ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηρσιν] The only mention of the Iberians, or Spaniards, in the genuine works of Aristotle. They are mentioned in the spurious *De Mirabilibus* 46, 85, 87, 88, 833 b 15, 837 a 8, 24 ff. SUSEM. (725)

19 ὀβελίσκους] What this word means, is not so easy to decide. The usual translation 'obelisks' or 'stone pillars' is quite reconcileable with the practice of savage tribes. Thus "in New Caledonia rows of stones are found commemorating the number of enemies killed and eaten in former wars." Mr Ridgeway writing to the *Academy* of Aug. 29, 1885, suggests that this Iberian practice accounts for the stone pillars actually placed around tombs in Western Europe. On the other hand Dr Jackson communicates the following note.

"ὀβελίσκους means, not 'obelisks' as the commentators suppose, but literally 'spits.' Originally the spits carried the heads of the slain: when the custom of affixing the heads fell into disuse, the

spits, which should have borne the actual trophies, continued to be planted ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολεμίων; i.e. the trophy was converted into a badge. On trophy-taking, and its connexion with 'militancy', of which Aristotle is quite aware, see Spencer's *Ceremonial Institutions* ch. ii, p. 48 with p. 186."

§ 12 22 κατελιγμένα] established, confirmed, secured: Cope *Rhet.* II. 2 § 20 compares Thuc. V. 21 σπονδὰς εὖρον κατελιγμένας; Plato *Latius* VII. 823 A τὰ ταῖς ζημίαις ὑπὸ νόμων κατελιγμένα; *Nic. Eth.* x. 9 § 5 τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἡθεσι κατελιγμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι: also the active use in Thuc. VIII. 63 § 3 τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἔτι βεβαιότερον κατέλαβον.

25 τῶν πλησίων] but § 8, a 5 τῶν πέλας.

§ 13 Hampke compares with this the discussion upon slavery I. 6 §§ 1—5: one phrase of which, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν, is certainly echoed by the protest 27 f. οὐ νόμιμον δὲ κτλ "to rule at all hazards, whether justly or unjustly, is not lawful, and a victory may be won even by unjust means."

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμας τοῦτο ἠρώμεν· οὔτε  
 30 γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ [[ῆ]] πείσσει ἢ  
 τὸ βυίσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτῆ-  
 14 ρας. ἀλλ' εἰκόσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἶεσθαι  
 εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς ἕκαστοι οὐ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οἰδὲ  
 συμφέρον. τοῦτ' οἶκ' αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τινὲς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντας·  
 35 αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ δικάως ἀρχειν ζητοῦσι, πρὸς  
 15 δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἄτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ  
 φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποστὸν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσποστὸν, ὥστε εἴπερ  
 ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὐ δεῖ πάντων πειρᾶσθαι δεσποῦν.  
 ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποστῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεῖν ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυ-  
 40 σίαν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτὸν· ἐστὶ δὲ θηρευ-  
 16 τὸν ὃ ἂν ἄγριον ἢ ἐδεστὸν ζῶον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴη γ' ἂν καὶ  
 καθ' ἑαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐδαίμων, ἣ πολιτεύεται δηλονότι  
 καλῶς, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται πόλιν οἰκεῖσθαι πον καθ' ἑαυτὴν νό-

29 ἀλλὰ... ἠρώμεν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>) § 30 ῆ before πείσσει inserted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. § 31 τὸ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. § ἰάσασθαι Π<sup>1</sup> (but βιάσασθαι a correction in P<sup>1</sup>) § 33 ὅπερ <παρ'> or ὃ παρ' ? Spengel, perhaps rightly § 36 μὴ φύσει κτλ can hardly be right: [μὴ] Thurot, perhaps rightly. Schneider suspected a lacuna: if so, it may conceivably be filled up thus: μὴ - φύσει πειρᾶσθαι, καὶ > φύσει § 37 δεσποστὸν—δεσποστὸν Stahr, δεσποστὸν—δεσποστὸν Giffelman, δεσπόζον—δεσπόζον Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text § 39 δεσποστῶν a later hand in P<sup>3</sup> and Lambin, δεσποτῶν Γ Μ<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1-2-3</sup> S<sup>3</sup> V<sup>3</sup> Ald. and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand), δεσποτῶν P<sup>1-6</sup> L<sup>2</sup> § 40 ἐστὶ δὲ <πρὸς τοῦτο> θηρευτὸν Oncken rightly, though perhaps this need only be understood

19 The appeal to the other 'arts and sciences' is strictly on Socratic and Platonic lines, and Dr Jackson points out that the mention of persuasion is by no means superfluous. See Xen. *Mem.* III. 9 § 11, Pl. *Rep.* 488 D δι' αὐτὴν ξυλλαμβάνειν δεῖναι ἢ, ὅπως ἀρξέουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιάσασθαι τὸν ναύκληρον, *Politics* 296 B ἂν τις ἄρα μὴ πείθων τὸν λατρευόμενον, ἔχων δὲ ἀρῶντες τὴν τέχνην, παρὰ τὰ γινόμενα ἔλθουσιν ἀναγκάσει δρᾶν τινα, τί τοῦτοια τῆς βίης ἐνταῖ ταύτης; Yet the repeated collision of vowels, 30 ἱατροῦ οὔτε, κυβερνήτου ἔργον, πείσσει ἢ, 32 οἶεσθαι εἶναι, 33 ἕκαστοι οἶ, is in striking contrast to the book as a whole, and in two cases is not removable by transposition.

οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ οὔτε κτλ] Comp. Plat. *Gorg.* 456 B (Eaton): also c. 13 § 4 n. (870), and above III. 6 § 7 n. (531). 19 § 4 n. (638), 16 §§ 6—8: II. 8 § 18 n. (170). SUSEM. (726)

§ 14 35 αἰετὸς παρ' αἰετῆς] 11 horses, in their own political affairs.

§ 15 37 φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποστὸν] See II. I. c. 4 § 6, cc. 5, 6. SUSEM. (727)

39 θηρεῖν ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυσίαν] Ptolemy *Alexand.* 72 ὥστε ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνηγίον ἀνθρώπων ἐξέλθαι, καὶ τὸ Κασσιανὸν ἔθνος καταστρέφειν, πάντας ἱπποὺς ἀποσφάττειν. τοῦτο δὲ Πτολεμαῖος ἀναγινώσκοντες ἐκάλειτο. This was B.C. 314—3 quite at the close of Alexander's career.

40 τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτὸν] Implying that wild animals which are not fit for food may be hunted for other purposes, and to supply other necessities of life. It is not quite clear whether the writer thinks that for such other purposes it is also under certain circumstances permissible to hunt men, and whether therefore he would allow of war for the capture of slaves, which Aristotle disallows (I. 8 § 14 cc. 65, 75) as a branch of *thymotachē*. See also (728)

μοις χρωμένην σπονδαίοις, ἥς τῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ (I)  
πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολεμίων.  
5 μηδὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιούτων.

§ 17 δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς 10  
μὲν θετέον, οὐχ ὥς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνου  
χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι  
9 πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς ἀγα-  
§ 18 θῆς πῶς μεθέξουσιν καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίας. δι-  
οίσει μέντοι τῶν ταπτομένων ἕνια νομίμων· καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομο-  
θετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ἐάν τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειτνιῶντες, ποῖα πρὸς (P)  
ποίους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρηστέον.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν κἂν ὕστερον τύχοι τῆς προσηκούσης  
15 σκέψεως, πρὸς τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντείνειν·  
3 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον I  
αἰρετώτατον, διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λε-  
κτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμά-  
ζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τὸν τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου

1325 a 6 ἄρα after ὅτι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1-2-3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 8 τοῦ before σπουδαίου omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>  
|| 18 οὐ...23 ταύτων] This whole parenthesis is transposed in P<sup>2-3</sup> to follow 24 ὁρθῶς,  
by means of the letters αβγ written above the line || 19 [τε] Spengel

§ 16 1325 a 3 ἥς τῆς πολιτείας] We may well believe that such conceptions, though foreign to Pericles, and new even to Isocrates, had become familiar enough in the Athens of Phocion, especially amongst those who lived to compare the brilliant peace administration of Demetrios of Phaleron with the disastrous results of the active policy which had led to Chaeronea and Crannon. Comp. Bernays *Phokion* pp. 31 ff., 55 ff. and Newman I. p. 311.

5 μηδὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιούτων] But this is only true with the proviso that such a state is not attacked by offensive wars, for which it must by its constitution be prepared, as indeed the writer himself explains, § 18. SUSEM. (729)

§ 17 6 δῆλον ἄρα...10 εὐδαιμονίας] Precisely the same statement as in these two sentences is made by Plato *Laus* I. 628 D: ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώτου διανοοῦμενος οὕτω τις οὐτ' ἂν ποτε πολιτικὸς γένοιτο ὁρθός, πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων μόνον καὶ πρῶτον, οὐτ' ἂν νομοθέτης ἀκριβής, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἕνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης (Eaton). SUSEM. (730)

§ 18 12 ἐάν τινες...γειτνιῶντες] So already II. 6 §§ 7, 8. The state must have a foreign policy, if it be only a policy of non-intervention and self-defence.

14 κἂν ὕστερον] c. 14 §§ 7—11. See *nn.* (712)—this reference may of course be interpolated—and (906). SUSEM. (731)

c. 3 *The best life for the individual is practical activity in the service of a free city. Yet intellectual activity is also practical and is a higher life still.*

§ 1 17 περὶ τῆς χρήσεως] How it is to be enjoyed.

λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους] Comp. *n.* (696) on c. 1 § 6. SUSEM. (733)

19 'τε interduo ei vocabulo additur, quod utrique membro commune est: φύσει τε <γὰρ> ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ νῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐγγόνων (i.e. φύσει γὰρ ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ τε νῶν καὶ...) *N. E.* VIII. 13 [c. xi. § 2], 1161 a 18' Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 749 b 44 ff. τοῦ ἐλευθέρου] τοῦ ἀπολελυμένου, untrammelled by office and by civic obligations. Aristotle and Xenocrates were metoecs, as Anaxagoras had been before them.

βίον ἕτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἰρετώτατον. (III)  
οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μῆδιν πράττοντα  
πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι  
ταυτόν), ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφοτέροι λέγουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ δὲ οὐκ  
ὀρθῶς, οἱ μὲν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείνων.  
τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές· οὐδὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλω, ἢ δοῦλος, χρῆσθαι  
σεμνόν· ἢ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀνδένος με-  
τέχει τῶν καλῶν. τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δε-  
σποτείαν οὐκ ὀρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον διέστηκεν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων  
ἀρχῇ τῆς τῶν δούλων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει ἐλεύθερον τοῦ φύσει δοῦ-  
λου. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις.  
τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τοῦ πράττειν οὐκ ἀλη-  
θές· ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ κα-

22 εἶναι before καὶ M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup> 25 τό] τῷ M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1-2-4</sup>, τῷ Ald. 27 δεσποτείαν P<sup>2</sup>  
(1st hand, corrected by a later hand), δεσποτικὴν P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps Γ, so that this may  
be right || 29 αὐτὸ τὸ P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), αὐτὸ τὸ Γ P<sup>1-4-5</sup>, αὐτὸ M<sup>o</sup> Ald., αὐτῷ P<sup>2</sup> S<sup>2</sup> V<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>2</sup>  
(1st hand)

21 ἀδύνατον γὰρ... 23 ταυτόν] Comp.  
u. (708). SUSEM. (732)

§ 2 25 οὐδὲν γὰρ... σιμνόν] Comp.  
I. 7 § 3. (64) and below c. 14 § 19 u.  
(913). SUSEM. (734)

26 ἐπίταξις] See note (124) on ἐπι-  
τάξει χρῆσθαι I. 13 § 14.

27 νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν δεσποτείαν]  
See u. (58). Yet Plato was free from  
this error when he classified the forms of  
rule, *Λόγος* III. 690 a ff. On the other  
hand he makes πολιτικὴ = βασιλική. *Εὐ-  
δαίμων* 292 c, a passage which should be  
added to *Polit.* 258 E, as quoted on I.  
1 § 2.

29 ἢ αὐτὸ... δούλου] How great that  
difference may be, we learn from I. 5  
§ 8 u. (47).

30 ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις] B. 1. cc.  
4-7. SUSEM. (735)

§ 3 31 οὐκ ἀληθές] is not right, hand  
verum est.

32 ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις] This is  
certainly a genuine Aristotelian doctrine.  
See c. 1 §§ 10-13, uu. (704, 710); *Nic.  
Eth.* I. cc. 7-9; VI. 2 § 5, 1139 a 3, VI.  
2 § 4, 1140 b 7, S. 6 § 2, 1176 a 33;  
*Phys.* II. 6 § 1, 197 b 5; *Met.* 6 § 12,  
1450 a 17; *Met.* I. 5 § 3, 1360 b 14;  
compare Zeller II. II. 615. But still it is not  
provided only that under πρᾶξις is includ-  
ed not merely practical, but also theoretical  
or mental activity, and that consequently  
the term is understood in the wider sense;  
for otherwise this doctrine would not be

true of the highest felicity of pure thought,  
as it pertains to God alone (u. 705), to  
which however the author himself appeals  
§ 10, u. (746). And of human well-being,  
too, scientific perfection in active opera-  
tion is the higher element, moral perfec-  
tion only the lower element, according to  
the genuine Aristotelian doctrine. "It  
must be granted, that then it would be hard  
to say how the happiness of the individ-  
ual and of the whole state can be one and  
the same" (Schlosser). Here Schlosser en-  
deavours to explain the mistake pointed  
out in uu. (717, 745) by assuming that  
"Aristotle subordinated the idea of in-  
ternal activity to that of contemplation."  
This thought is quite just; but does this  
unhappy attempt to mend matters by such  
a confusion look more like the master or  
a pupil? Granted that this subordina-  
tion is intended here (and from § 8 this  
cannot be doubtful—see u. 745), still of  
those who prefer the *εὐδαίμων* life to the  
practical life it cannot possibly be main-  
tained with truth that they prefer in-  
activity to activity, nor can Aristotle him-  
self have written anything so inconsistent.  
SUSEM. (736)

ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν κτλ] "The actions  
done by the just and temperate constitute  
a realization of many noble ends." This  
is certainly in the spirit of Aristotle him-  
self. Further comp. for *εὐδαίμων* u.  
(206 b), II. 6 § 9. SUSEM. (737)

λῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. (1)  
 καίτοι τάχ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων 3  
 35 ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἄριστον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πλεί-  
 § 4 στων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἴη πράξεων. ὥστε οὐ δεῖν τὸν  
 δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παρίεναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον  
 ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων μήτε παῖδας πα-  
 τρὸς μήθ' ὅλως φίλον φίλου μηδένα ὑπολογίζειν μηδὲ πρὸς  
 40 τοῦτο φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἰρετώτατον, τὸ δ' εὖ πράτ-  
 τειν ἄριστον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἴσως λέγουσιν, εἴπερ ὑπάρ- 4  
 1325 b ξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἰρετώ-  
 § 5 τατον· ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ὑποτίθενται (1)  
 τοῦτο ψεῦδος. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι  
 τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατὴρ  
 5 τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων· ὥστε ὁ παραβαλὼν οὐδὲν ἂν τη-  
 λικοῦτον κατορθώσειεν ὕστερον ὅσον ἤδη παρεκβέβηκε τῆς  
 ἀρετῆς. τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ  
 § 6 <ἐν> μέρει, τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις

36 δεῖν Susem., δεῖ Π Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 39 ὑπολογίζειν Bas.<sup>3</sup>, ὑπολογεῖν S<sup>b</sup> Bk., ὑπολογεῖν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>·2·3·4·5 V<sup>b</sup> Ald. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, ὑπόλογ<ον ἐχ>ειν or ὑπόλογον ποιεῖσθαι Madvig || Koraes proposed either (1) to bracket μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φροντίζειν, or to alter to (2) μηθὲν, or (3) μηδὲν πρὸ τούτου φροντίζειν ||

1325 b 3 ψεῦδος untranslated by William, [ψεῦδος] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, ψευδῶς ? Casaubon || 8 <ἐν> Thurot

34 ταχ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις] 'Some one might imagine that, if these conclusions are laid down, universal sovereignty is the highest good.' This further inference is not at all easy to justify: it is fairly dragged in by force. SUSEM. (738)

§ 4 Development of this extreme view, that, as the practical life implies the possession of power, the more power the better.

37 παρίεναι = to surrender, sc. τὸ ἄρχειν, III. 14 § 13. ἀφαιρεῖσθαι = to deprive another (state or ruler) of empire, Dem. VIII. *De Chers.* § 42, p. 100, 7, ἔχοντ' ἀφελέσθαι.

38 πατέρα παίδων κτλ] Plutarch, *Demetrius* c. 3, p. 890 B, complains that the Diadochi sacrificed every natural tie to their lust for empire.

39 ὑπολογίζειν] This verb, if indeed it be right, is ἀπαξ εἰρημένον in Aristotle, though found in Plato and Demosthenes.

41 ἴσως] 'perhaps,' conforming to Aristotle's own dictum *Rhet.* II. 13 § 2, 1389 b 18 ἀμφισβητοῦντες προστιθέασιν αἰεὶ τὸ ἴσως καὶ τάχα. But in b 2 it con-

ceals a very positive opinion under a cautious formula.

§ 5 1325 b 3 τὰς πράξεις] The actions of one who has obtained power by violence (ἀποστερῶν καὶ βιαζόμενος).

4 ὅσον ἀνὴρ... 5 δούλων] These three species of domestic relations, and of household rule based upon them, are taken as the prototypes of all rule, except where it is government of equals by equals and so alternates with obedience. See I. 12 § 1 f. and *Nic. Eth.* VIII. c. 11 (Eaton). SUSEM. (739)

5 ὁ παραβαλὼν] An Archelaos or a Napoleon.

6 κατορθώσειν] would perform a right action: rectum faciat. This use of the verb, as opposed to παρεκβαίνειν, may be easily understood from *Nic. Eth.* II. 5 § 12, 1106 b 26, ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται, and in its turn led up to the Stoic use of κατορθωμα as a technical term.

§ 6 8 τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον... παρὰ φύσιν] Cp. III. 16 §§ 2—4 n. (672), II. 2 § 6 n. (134 b). SUSEM. (740)

καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν, οἶδεν ἔτι τῶν (III)  
 10 παρὰ φύσιν καλόν. διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις ἢ κρείττων κατ'  
 ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, τούτῳ  
 7 καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δ' οὐ μόνον  
 ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ' ἣν ἔσται πρα-  
 κτικός. ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν  
 15 εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ'  
 8 ἕκαστον ἀριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ  
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονται τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς  
 διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαι-  
 νόντων χάριν γινομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μάλ-  
 20 λον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἔνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ δια-

18 εἶναι after μόνας P<sup>1</sup>, after ταύτας Γ | 20 αὐτῶν Vettiosi, αὐτῶν Γ II | Εἰσαγ-  
 σεύ... 21 μάλιστα] Should this be διανοήσκει ἢ...πράξει τίτι. μάλιστα?

10 διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις] To the genuine Aristotle this proposition holds provided only that the one great citizen is superior in virtue to all combined, not (as is here expressed) to each individual: see III. 13 §§ 13—25, c. 17. SUSEM. (741)

§ 7 12 δεῖ δ' οὐ μόνον κτλ] "He must have not only the virtue but the force to develop his activity fully" (without transgressing virtue). This is only possible in the best state: see III. 13 §§ 24, 25; also *n.* (677) and *Introd.* p. 44. SUSEM. (742)

14 ταῦτα] That while the life of freedom is preferable to that of rule over unwilling subjects, βίος δεσποτικός, § 1, yet the life of action is preferable to that of inaction § 3 (which however does not imply that conquest or grasping at sovereignty is unconditionally desirable §§ 4—6).

16 ὁ πρακτικός] So far as the individual is concerned, comp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 8 § 8, 1178 b 32, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις, 7 § 9, 1178 a 7, οὗτος ἄρα (sc. ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος) καὶ εὐδαιμονότατος· δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν. But the qualifications introduced in § 8 seriously impair the comparison.

§ 8 "But the practical life need not mean a life in relation to others, as some suppose, nor those intellectual acts alone be practical which are done for the sake of certain external results of the action; on the contrary the self-contained speculations and processes of the intellect are far more truly practical." By τινες we should naturally understand Plato; but the cap better fits Aristotle himself, *Nic.*

*Eth.* X. 7 § 4, 1177 a 30. ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δαίτῃ πρὸς οὓς δαειοπραγεῖ καὶ μεθ' ὧν, § 7, αἰτᾷ, sc. αἱ πολιτικαὶ πράξεις, ἀσχολᾷ καὶ τέλει τινα ἐφίενται καὶ οὗ δὲ αἰετὰ αἰρεταί εἰσιν. Eaton compares *Diff.* IV 443 D where justice is expounded to be harmonious activity of all the parts of man, and therefore internal, περὶ τῆς ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἐαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ [πράξει].

20 τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς...διανοήσεις] This can only mean theoretical or purely scientific thinking; Ed. Muller's uncertainty on this point is the chief defect in his whole exposition, which hinders him from arriving at any really tenable result and is the cause of many errors. Cp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 7 § 5, 1177 b 1 οὐδὲν ἄρ' αὐτῇ, sc. τῇ θεωρητικῇ, γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἡ τέλος ἢ εὐδαιμονία περὶ αὐτὴν αὐτὴ κατὰ τὴν πράξιν. Upon Aristotle's view two things must be distinguished in every activity, the end and the means; theoretical activity differs from practical and creative activity (see *n.* 34) in this respect, that in the former internal activity is a self-contained end, while in practical activity the end lies in the act produced by it, which affects some external person, and in the creative activity of art the end is the work or result produced. \* See *De Caelo* II. 12 § 9, 292 b 6, ἡ πράξις ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, ἐπεὶ καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα §, καὶ τὸ τοῦτον ἐνεκά, *Nic. Eth.* VI. cc. 2—5, *De Anima* III. c. 9 (1415b); Zeller *op. c.* II. ii. p. 177 f. If αὐτοτελεῖς θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις are the most truly practical, the supporters of the view that the intellectual life is to be

νοήσεις. ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πράξις τις· μά- (I)  
 λιστα δὲ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν  
 § 9 πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοαῖς ἀρχιτέκτονας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ'  
 ἀπρακτεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθ' αὐτὰς πόλεις ἰδρυμένας καὶ  
 25 ζῆν οὕτω προηρημέναι· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο  
 συμβαίνειν· πολλὰ γὰρ κοινωναὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς μέρεσι  
 § 10 τῆς πόλεως εἰσὶν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' ἐνὸς  
 ὅτουοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς  
 καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ  
 30 τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν.

21 μάλιστα...23 ἀρχιτέκτονας cited by Julian ep. ad Themist. p. 263 D || 22 καὶ  
 inserted after δὲ by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || τῶν] τὸ Julian || 23 τῆς διανοίας Julian

preferred to that of the statesman are unconditionally right, nor can we see how far the writer thinks he is mediating between them and their opponents. He would have done so in orthodox Aristotelian fashion only by adding that man must exercise not only his intellectual, but also his moral, powers: that he is an integral part of the whole formed by the state, and not a god, I. 2 §§ 11, 12. That consequently, although it is life in the state which alone renders possible an assured scientific activity itself, yet it may well be permitted to individual men to be active for science primarily, and for the state only secondarily and in the fulfilment of the most general duties of a citizen. That at the same time there must be others who find their real satisfaction in the activity of the statesman and consequently adopt the opposite procedure: while a symmetrical combination of excellence in both will be the highest, and for that reason certainly the least common. See c. 14 §§ 7—11, n. (906), also *nn.* (717, 1024) and *Introd.* p. 48, p. 50 ff. SUSEM. (743)

21 ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος] Comp. c. I. § 11 n. (708). SUSEM. (744)

§ 9 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν...28 ὅτουοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων] 'However even for states placed by themselves and determined upon an isolated life there is no necessity for inaction: activity is still possible to them in sections, for the various sections of the city have many ways of associating. And in the same way this is true of each individual man.' What was recalled to mind in n. (717) is true here also. The comparison is not suitable; for neither is the internal administration of the state a theoretical activity, but rather it is practical or partly

practical, partly creative (see *nn.* 34, 743); while in the case of the individual man every activity (except the theoretical) is always finally directed to others. Even on the doctrine of Plato (Zeller *Plato* p. 451 ff. Eng. tr.), no less than of Aristotle, the individual's moral virtue is primarily a mutual relation of the parts of his soul, the rational soul and that which has to be subjected to the guidance of reason (see *nn.* 41, 112). Yet its active exercise is for the most part possible only in intercourse with others. SUSEM. (745)

28 ὁ θεός] See n. (705) on c. I § 10, n. (736). SUSEM. (746)

29 πᾶς ὁ κόσμος] An activity and happiness of the universe cannot, strictly speaking, be in question on the orthodox doctrine of Aristotle, as he combats the Platonic assumption of a World-soul. The world as a whole is only passively affected, i.e. God causes it to revolve round the earth, which is at rest, in 24 hours: or precisely stated, this passive affection belongs to the rest of the universe, the earth alone being exempt. All other motions and activities, affections and changes, belong to the several beings inside the universe. See Zeller II. ii. pp. 374 ff. 450, 462 ff. And though comprehending all this in its harmonious arrangement we may call it, in a metaphorical sense, the activity of the universe, or even say that the world has its wellbeing in this harmoniously ordered activity, yet considered as an analogy to the internal administration of the state this is more halting than the last (n. 745). For it is intended to prove that the highest happiness of the individual man lies in purely internal or theoretical

ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν ἀριστον (III)  
 1 ἐκάστω τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώ-  
 4 ποῖς, φανερόν ἐστίν· ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφρονημίσται τὰ νῦν εἰρημίστα περὶ IV  
 αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεώρηται πρό-

32 [καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] Koras followed by Spengel Bk.<sup>2</sup> Sussem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Comm.  
 n. (739) § 33 [περὶ αὐτῶν] Schneider, περὶ τούτων? Nicksa, perhaps rightly  
 34 [καὶ...πρότερον] Spengel Bk.<sup>2</sup> Sussem.<sup>1</sup> See on 1324 a 13

activity; hence the whole analogy has its meaning unless the wellbeing of the universe (εἶναι καλῶς) is exactly identical with its happiness (εὐδαιμονεῖν). Yet happiness can only be predicated of a single thinking self-conscious subject, so that if the collective personality of the state may be said to be happy, a world without a world-soul scarcely can. At least, this can hardly be without extraordinary misuse of the term, which I cannot bring myself to attribute to Aristotle. SUSSEM. (747)

32 καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] This somewhat objectionable phrase I once believed, as others have done, to be a later addition. Now however I simply set it down to the interpolator of the entire section, see. 2, 3, as one more proof of interpolation. SUSSEM. (748)

ε. 4 § 1 34 καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολι-  
 τείας] By "other forms of government" were formerly understood all others except the perfect one, and the context which here gives the exact transition to the discussion of the latter, would scarcely permit of any other interpretation. Indeed if we assume that Aristotle himself wrote this as well as all the rest of the chapter, from ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν onwards, the "other forms of government" can scarcely be understood except as in direct antithesis to the "state to be constituted according to an ideal," τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνιστάμεν πόλεως (cp. Diebitsch's excellent remarks, p. 8 f., in opposition to Teichmüller). But then these words would prove that the traditional order of the books is the correct one. Yet the whole of §§ 1, 2 is merely a recapitulation of the contents of the first three chapters, and it is only so much that it has any meaning and connection, as Spengel, *Über die Politik* p. 20 f., has incontrovertibly proved. The only sensible explanation is this: "After disposing of the necessary introductory questions regarding the best state, we must discuss this best state itself, and must treat first of its internal and then

of its internal requirements." Thus the intermediate reference to other forms of government (whether the discussion of them has preceded or not) is out of place here and breaks the connexion. Therefore Spengel pronounced the words in question καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας...πρότερον to be an interpolation, and he was followed among others by Sussemild.\* But when Hildenbrand p. 363 f. and Teichmüller (*Philologus* XVI. p. 164 ff.) pronounced "the other forms of government" to refer rather to the other model politics or at least those which are claimed as such, which have been already criticised in the Second Book, as distinguished from the true Aristotelian model state, Spengel gave his adhesion to this view. Yet even if the reference back to these is less injurious to the proposed connexion, still it is an inadmissible interruption, and would have to be set aside as an interpolation by another hand, besides that for the reasons previously stated it is only the former explanation of them, as referring to all other states except the perfect state, which appears possible. But the case is entirely different, if ex. 2, 3 are the work of an interpolator, who must then also be the author of ε. 4 § 1 as far as πρότερον. We must then only add this new piece of awkwardness to the rest of his sins, and we shall have after all to decide in favour of the latter interpolation, that the words do refer to B. II, 4, since the interpolator has lacked his composition on to the first chapter, the first sentence of which is immediately connected with the end of Book III, so that, as we have already stated, *Introd.* p. 48, he either found or made a redaction, which contained the books in the right order. At any rate this is the simplest explanation; we should otherwise have to assume that these words had been afterwards interpolated into his interpolation by a third person, who must already have been acquainted with the order of the

\* In *Zeitsch. f. Politik* vi. 189, p. 120.

- 35 *τερον,*] ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον ποίας τινὰς δεῖ τὰς ὑπο- (I)  
 θέσεις εἶναι περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως.  
 § 2 οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε πολιτείαν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην ἄνευ συμ-  
 μέτρου χορηγίας. διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι καθάπερ  
 39 εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ  
 § 3 οἶον περὶ τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ 2  
 1326 a τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, οἶον ὑφάντη καὶ ναυπηγῶ, δεῖ τὴν  
 ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείαν οὔσαν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν (ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν  
 αὕτη τυγχάνη παρεσκευασμένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γενόμε-  
 νον ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ  
 5 τῷ νομοθέτῃ δεῖ τὴν οἰκείαν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσιν.  
 § 4 ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πλήθος τῶν ἀν-  
 θρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ  
 τὴν χώραν ὡσαύτως, πόσῃν τε εἶναι καὶ ποίαν τινὰ ταύτην.  
 οἶονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλείστοι προσήκειν μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν 3  
 10 εὐδαίμονα πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἀγνοοῦσι ποία μεγάλη καὶ

35 [τῶν λοιπῶν] Spengel. See Comm. *n.* (749). If these words take up the sentence 1323 b 37 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν...1324 a 4 *πειθόμενος*, we should expect ἀρχὴ <δὲ> τῶν λοιπῶν || 36 περὶ omitted by M<sup>s</sup>, [περὶ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 37 *γενήσεσθαι* Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, *fore* William, *γίνεσθαι* ? Susem. || 38 *προϋποτίθεσθαι* Sylburg Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, *praesupponi* William, probably right, unless we should write 39 *εὐχομένοις*, as Sylburg suggested

1326 a 3 αὕτη II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 4 κάλλιον] βέλτιον M<sup>s</sup> || 7 [κατὰ] Spengel, <τὰ> κατὰ ? Schmidt correctly, if any change is needed || 8 πόσῃν Sylburg, ὅσῃν II Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text

books, in which they have come down to us. If we omit c. 2—c. 4 § 1, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν κτλ naturally follows upon c. 1. But if it be objected that even c. 1 in its present form could hardly have made part of this work in Aristotle's own intention (see *nn.* 687, 712), we must observe that it is easy to give to what follows, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν κτλ, a place immediately after the end of Book III. without the slightest disturbance or deficiency of meaning, if only we give the last unfinished sentence of B. III. to B. IV(VII). —as has been done—and then get rid of it with the rest of c. 1. of B. IV(VII). and at the same time treat the words τῶν λοιπῶν in § 1 as the interpolator's addition. We should then translate here: "Our beginning is a statement of the necessary external conditions &c." SUSEM. (749) Cp. II. 1 § 2, 1260 b 36, ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον, ἥ περ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως.

c. 4 §§ 2—14, cc. 5—7: περὶ τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. With this compare generally Plato *Laus* IV.

§ 2 38 χορηγίας] See *n.* on I. 6 § 3, 1255 a 14.

διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ κτλ] Cp. II. 6 § 7 *n.* (202): also II. 1 § 1, *n.* (128) and the references there collected. SUSEM. (750)

§ 3 40 ὥσπερ γὰρ κτλ] The analogy was used I. 10 §§ 1, 2.

§ 4 Under the external means required for a city comes first the mass of the population: how many ought they to be? and of what natural character? So likewise in regard to the territory: how large and of what nature ought this to be?

The proper number of the inhabitants is discussed in §§ 4—14: their race and mental characteristics in c. 7.

*The size of the ideal city:* c. 4 §§ 4—14. 1326 a 10 ποία μεγάλη] With §§ 4—6 compare Pl. *Rep.* IV. 423 B: ἕως ἂν ἡ πόλις σοι οἰκῇ σωφρόνως ὥς ἄρτι ἐτάχθη,

5 ποία μικρὰ πόλιν, κατ' ἀριθμὸν γὰρ πλήθος τῶν ἐνοικοούντων κρέ- (xv)  
 νουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλήθος εἰς δὲ δύνα-  
 μιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὥστε τὴν δύνα-  
 μένην τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην.  
 10 οἷον Ἴπποκράτην οὐκ ἀνθρώπον ἀλλ' ἰατρὸν εἶναι μίջω φησαι-  
 6 εν ἄν τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οἷ  
 μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ δεῖ κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλήθος ἀποβλέπονται.  
 οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλήθος τοῦτο οἰητέον (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἴσως  
 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν  
 10 καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων), ἀλλ' ὅσοι μέρος εἰσὶ πόλεως καὶ  
 ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται πόλις οἰκείων μερῶν· ἡ γὰρ τούτων ὑπε-  
 ροχὴ τοῦ πλήθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημεῖον, ἐξ ἧς δὲ βάσαν-  
 15 σοι μὲν ἐξέρχονται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀπλῖται δὲ ὀλίγοι, (p. 101)  
 ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν γε ἐκ τῶν  
 7 πόλιν καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτό γε ἐκ τῶν  
 16 ἔργων φανερόν ὅτι χαλεπὸν, ἴσως δ' ἀδύνατον εὐνομεῖσθαι

11 ποία added by I<sup>1</sup> M<sup>1</sup> Ar., omitted by all other authorities and Bk. 12 εἰ δὲ] ἀλλ' εἰ preferred by Thurot, but such variations should be noted without correction. The passage supports R. Scholl's conjecture at 1253 a 22, «οὐκ» ἔστι 14 οἰητέον omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [οἰητέον] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly 18 ποιητέον Camerarius Bk<sup>2</sup>, ὀριστέον? Schmidt 19 ἴσως after 19 πόλεσιν Π<sup>2</sup> I<sup>2</sup> Bk. 20 εἰς μέρος πόλεως apparently I<sup>1</sup>, πόλεως εἰς μέρος Π<sup>2</sup> I<sup>2</sup> Bk. 21 μερίων Π<sup>2</sup> I<sup>2</sup> Bk. 25 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ Π<sup>1</sup>, ἀλλὰ μὴν Π<sup>2</sup> I<sup>2</sup> Bk. 26 ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε καὶ? Koraes

μεγάλη ἔσται, οὐ τῷ εὐδοκίμῳ λέγω, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη, καὶ ἐὰν μόνον ἡ χεῖρ τῶν π.πολεμοούντων (Eaton). Plato also criticizes the widespread belief that a state to be happy must be large and wealthy *Λαὸν γὰρ οὐ π. ἐν. γὰρ* 125 E. 11—13 Comp. Isocr. VII. 13. SUSEM. (751). Add VI. 81, xv. 171 L. (Newman).

10 11 μὴ εἰς τὸ πλήθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν] We should regard not so much their numbers as their efficiency: explained, in the next line, as power to execute the proper task, or function, of a city. (In § 10, a 38 it is rather "essence," cp. c. 1 § 11, 1213 b 35.) For the use of δὲ instead of the more usual ἀλλά, as in a 15 πᾶσι ἀνθρώποις ἀλλ' ἰατρὸν, cp. Thuc. iv. 86. 1 οὐκ ἐστὶ καὶ τῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ.

12 Ἴπποκράτην] We have no certain information concerning the life of this most renowned of Greek physicians, who flourished in the latter half of the fifth century. Of the numerous works bearing his name that have been handed down to us, the only genuine ones are the excellent descriptions of diseases, which

constitute the first and third books of the 'Epidemics,' the no less excellent little work 'On the influence of air, water and locality,' and perhaps 'On the origin and cure of diseases,' and the fragment 'On winds in the head.' Still these are enough to prove the ability of the man, who is rightly called the Father of Medicine. SUSEM. (752)

26 18 εἰς τὸ τυχὸν πλήθος] "We must not estimate it by the mass of any and every sort of people." Comp. c. 4 § 8 n. (804) and VII(VI). 3 § 11 ὥστε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλήθους πᾶσι γινέσθαι αἰσθῆναι αἰσθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος χροῖον. (1121 b) SUSEM. (753)

20 ὅσοι μέρος . . . μερίων] "Not only must those who form an integral part of a city or the parts of which it properly consists," cp. c. 4 § 8 n. (804).

21 τούτων depends on οἰκείων.

23 ὀπλῖται] Of course the soldiers are here mentioned only to exemplify the organic members of the city generally. SUSEM. (755)

§ 7 26 χαλεπὸν, ἴσως δ' ἀδύνατον]

τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτεύεσθαι (I)  
καλῶς οὐδεμίαν ὀρώμεν οὕσαν ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλήθος.  
§ 8 τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. ὁ τε γὰρ  
30 νόμος τάξις τίς ἐστι, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαῖον εὐταξίαν  
εἶναι, ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν  
τάξεως· θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τότε  
συνέχει τὸ πᾶν. ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει  
§ 9 εἶωθε γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλιν ἥς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς  
35 ὅρος ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον, <ἐπεὶ τό γε  
<καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἶωθε γίνεσθαι.> ἀλλ' ἐστὶ 6  
36 τι καὶ πόλεως μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάν-  
§ 10 των, ζώων φυτῶν ὀργάνων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν  
μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἔξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύνα-  
μιν, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὅλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως ὅτε

29 τε omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, very likely by Γ, perhaps rightly, [τε] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 33 ἐπεὶ  
...34 γίνεσθαι transposed by Böcker to follow 35 ἀναγκαῖον. See p. 87. Schneider,  
who first saw the difficulty, proposed to transpose the whole clause or to bracket ἐν  
πλήθει καὶ || τό γε] δὲ τὸ and 34 [διὸ] Koraes || 34 πόλιν] πόλις P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>5</sup> (1st  
hand) || ἡ Koraes, most likely right || 36 πόλεσι II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., *civitatī* Ar. || 38  
αὐτοῦ Γ P<sup>1-5</sup>, αὐτοῦ M<sup>s</sup> II<sup>2</sup>

Sparta and the small Cretan cities were the typical instances of *εὐνομία*: Syracuse, and to a less degree Athens, of the opposite. Yet Carthage is praised for its comparatively good government II. 11 §§ 1, 2. The most populous cities of the Hellenic world in the fourth century were the two already named. Syracuse may have had in its territory 800,000, the numbers given for Acragas Diog. Laert. VIII. 63, Holm *Gesch. des Siciliens* II. 402 (Diod. XIII. 84 makes the free population, exclusive of slaves, 200,000 at Acragas). Corinth, Rhodes, Byzantium, and Tarentum came next. The glory of Miletus, Samos, Sybaris, Croton, and Acragas had departed.

§ 8 30 νόμος τάξις τις] And πολιτεία=τάξις τις ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, so that this vague notion of system or arrangement does not tell us much. Editors compare Pl. *Gorg.* 503 E ff. esp. 504 D ταῖς δὲ δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσι (νόμοι) νόμιμον τε καὶ νόμος.

32. θείας γὰρ...33 τὸ πᾶν] “for this is a task for divine power, such as holds this whole world together.” And this although Aristotle makes the whole activity of the deity consist in pure thought, *νοήσεως νόησις*, thought thinking upon itself. For God is not only the highest and ultimate

formal and final cause, but also the highest and ultimate moving cause: see esp. *Meta.* XII. (A) 7 § 6, 1072 b 13 ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα φύσεως ἡρτῆται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις; 8 § 19, 1074 b 3 παραδέδοται παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων· ὅτι...περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν. SUSEM. (756)

§ 9 34 ἥς μετὰ μεγέθους κτλ.] ‘which has the definition here given,’ i.e. *εὐταξία*, ‘combined with a certain size,’ ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν κτλ ‘since beauty is usually found to depend on number and magnitude.’

Comp. *Poet.* 7 §§ 8, 9, 1450 b 34 ἐτι δ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὁ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν, διὸ οὔτε πᾶμικρον ἂν τι γένοιτο καλὸν ζῶον...οὔτε παμμέγεθες: *Meta.* XIII. (M) 3 § 11, 1078 a 36 τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὠρισμένον: *Probl.* XIX. 38; XVII. 1; *Nic. Eth.* IV. 3 § 5, 1123 b 6 τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δὲ ἀστέιοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ’ οὐ: Ed. Müller *op. c.* II. pp. 84—107: Zeller II. ii. p. 765 f. SUSEM. (757)

Plato *Phileb.* 64 D, μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ἑυμετρία κάλλος δήποτε.

§ 10 39 ἐστερημένον κτλ.] ‘robbed of its true nature,’ i.e. depraved, like the

οὐδὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἷον πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον μὲν οὐκ ἔσται (V)  
 πλοῖον ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίοις, εἰς δὲ τὶ μέγεθος λαβὼν ὅτι  
 μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην ποιήσῃ τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὅτι δὲ  
 εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις ἢ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων  
 λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἢ δὲ πόλις αὐτάρκης), ἢ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν  
 ἄγαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλ'  
 οὐ πόλις· πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον ὑπάρχειν· τίς γὰρ στρατη-  
 γὸς ἔσται τοῦ λίαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλήθους, ἢ τίς κῆρυξ μὴ  
 Στειντόρειος; διὸ πρώτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ  
 τοσούτου πλήθους ὃ πρῶτον πλήθος αὐτάρκες πρὸς τὸ ζῆν  
 εὖ ἔστι κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν· ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν  
 ταύτης ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλήθος εἶναι [μείζω] πόλιν,  
 ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἀόριστον. τίς δ' ἔστιν ὁ  
 τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος, ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἰδεῖν ῥάδιον. εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ  
 πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων.  
 ἀρχοντος δ' ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργον· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν  
 περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανίμειν κατ'

1326 b 3 ἢ δὲ πόλις αὐτάρκης omitted by P<sup>1-3</sup> H<sup>3</sup> A<sup>1</sup>. 4 μὲν after τοῖς P<sup>1-3</sup> S<sup>3</sup> V<sup>3</sup> Bk. 5 αὐτάρκης, <αὐτάρκης δὲ> ὥσπερ ἔθνος or αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ - ἔθ - ἔθνος Jack-son, perhaps rightly 5 πολιτείαν] πολι P<sup>1-3</sup>, πολιτικὴν S<sup>3</sup> V<sup>3</sup> 8 (ζῆν after 9 of H<sup>3</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. 10 [μείζω] Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup> Schmidt would transpose thus: αὐτάρκης καὶ τῆς = καὶ =. Presumably μείζω is a variant or gloss upon ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλήθος

ἀεθροαυμένα of 1. 5 § 5 (cp. 1. 2 § 13 n. 28), 'or stunted,' in poor condition.

40 πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον] A boat a span long.

41 οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίοις] not yet a local two furlongs long: comp. *Plat.* 7 § 9, 1431 a 2, *ὡς εἰ μιλίων σταδίων εἰς ζώνη*.

§ 11 1326 b 2 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* ix. 10 § 3, 1170 b 31: ὁ ἔστιν τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικὸν πλήθος, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένεται ἂν πόλις, οὐτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἢ πόλις ἔστιν (Eaton). SUSEM. (768)

3 αὐτάρκης] See 1. 2 § 12 n. (21), also n. (136), III. 1 § 12 (447), 9 § 14 (500), IV(VII). 5 § 1 (764), 8 § 8 (804). SUSEM. (769)

4 αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις] See n. (11) and II. 2 § 3 n. (132). SUSEM. (760)

5 οὐ ῥάδιον] The larger the city or canton-state becomes, the more difficult is the working of the constitution. Bathydon, like all Peloponnesus (II. 6 § 6, III.

3 § 5), has passed the limits within which civic unity is possible. Such an overgrown city or canton-state must be treated as an *ἔθνος*; or possibly that is what he contemplates in III. 14 § 1 (πλεονεχία χώρα). The problem which to Aristotle seemed almost insoluble was solved by events, as the federal system became developed; the Achaean league, an *ἔθνος*, included for a while all Peloponnesians in political unity, Polyb. II. 37. 11.

7 πρώτην] primitive, earliest as to its growth. The term is applied to *πόλις*, *κώμη* I. 2 § 5. So in the definition *De Anima* II. 1 § 6, 412 b 3, *πρῶτον ἀποτέλεσμα σώματος φυσικῶν ὁργανῶν*.

§ 12 14 ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις] Cp. VI(IV). 13 § 1, *ἐνδοξον δ' ἀρχὴν λαοῦ καὶ τούτου ἔστιν ἀποτέλεσμα φυσικῶν ὁργανῶν καὶ τούτου ἔστιν ἀποτέλεσμα νομοθετικῶν ὁργανῶν*, n. (1349 b). SUSEM. (764) Similarly *Pl. Πολιτικὴ* 290 a, *ἐκαστοῦ τοῦ γινώσκοντος τὸ μὲν ἀποκρίσασθαι ἀφ' οὗ* ὃ ἐκρίνεται

ἀξίαν ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους, ποιοί τινές εἰσι, τοὺς (IV)  
πολίτας, ὡς ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι, φαύλως  
ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις.

19 περὶ ἀμφοτέρα γὰρ οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, ὅπερ ἐν  
§ 14 τῇ πολυανθρωπίᾳ τῇ λίαν ὑπάρχει φανερώς. ἔτι δὲ ξένοις 8  
καὶ μετοίκους ῥάδιον μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς πολιτείας· οὐ γὰρ  
χαλεπὸν τὸ λανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλήθους. δῆ-  
λον τοίνυν ὡς οὗτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος ἄριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ  
πλήθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύννοπος.

5 περὶ μὲν οὖν μεγέθους πόλεως διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦ-  
26 του· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἔχει. περὶ V  
μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τινὰ, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην πᾶς  
τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν (τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν παν-  
τοφόρον· τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς  
30 αὐταρκες)· πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τοσαύτην ὥστε δύνασθαι  
τοὺς οἰκοῦντας ζῆν σχολάζοντας ἐλευθερίως ἅμα καὶ σω-

20 πολυανθρωπία τῇ] πολυανθρώπῳ Susem.<sup>1</sup>, quae valde multorum hominum William  
|| 23 [πόλεως] Spengel, ὅρος <τῆς μεγίστης> Schneider, both unnecessarily || 24 ἤτοι  
εὐβοήητος P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>) and P<sup>3</sup> (a later hand), a gloss from 1327 a 3 || 26 τὰ omitted  
by P<sup>4.5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 27 τινὰ <δεῖ> Spengel, τινὰ <δεῖ εἶναι τὴν χώραν> Scaliger, but  
πᾶς τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν should be understood from what follows || πᾶς] πᾶν Bk.<sup>2</sup> by  
a misprint

§ 13 17 ὡς ὅπου...18 κρίσεις] τοῦτο =  
τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους. A genuine Athenian  
sentiment; not only does Plato's judg-  
ment agree with this (*Laus* v. 738 E, ὅπως  
ἂν φιλοφρονῶνται ἀλλήλους μετὰ θυσιῶν καὶ  
γνωρίζωσιν, οὐ μείζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθόν, ἡ  
γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ  
φῶς ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς τρόποις  
ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὗτ' ἂν τιμῆς τῆς ἀξίας οὗτ'  
ἀρχῶν οὔτε δίκης ποτέ τις ἂν τῆς προσηκούσης  
ὀρθῶς τυγχάνοι), but Thucydides also re-  
marks, VIII. 66 § 3, that during the reign  
of terror under the Four Hundred people  
were afraid to communicate their sus-  
picions to one another διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς  
πόλεως καὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀγνωσίαν (Eaton).  
SUSEM. (762)

19 οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν] "it is  
not fair to pronounce off-hand." Know-  
ing the ground of his objection to over-  
populous cities, we can argue (as in a  
similar case previously, see on III. 5 § 5)  
that his own principles require him to  
withdraw it where increased facilities of  
communication have enabled men to sur-  
mount this difficulty.

§ 14 23 ἡ μεγίστη...24 εὐσύννοπος]

'the largest excess of population which  
will promote independence of life and  
yet can be taken in at one view.' This  
closely corresponds with the decision pro-  
nounced by Aristotle as to the proper  
length of a poem, and the size of a work  
of art generally, *Poet.* c. 7 § 10, 1451 a  
3 ff. 23 § 5. 1459 a 30 ff. 24 § 5, 1459 b  
18. *Comp. Rhet.* III. 9 § 6, 1409 b  
17 ff. (Eaton). Also c. 5 § 3 below with  
n. (768). SUSEM. (763)

c. 5 deals with the territory. *It should  
be sufficient for the support of the inhabit-  
ants without external supplies*, §§ 1, 2;  
*compact and easily defensible*, § 3; and  
*with direct access to the sea*, § 4.

§ 1 30 αὐταρκες] 'Independence'  
implies that the soil produces all the  
necessaries of life. See I. 2 § 12 n. (21),  
and the references in n. (759). SUSEM.  
(764)

πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει] 'in extent and  
magnitude'; muchness and greatness are  
here nearly synonymous.

31 ζῆν σχολάζοντας] Cp. χώρας δεήσει  
τοῖς τοσοῦτοις ἐξ ἧς ἀργοὶ θρέψονται, II.  
6 § 6 n. (201): δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ

2 φρόνως. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ὅρον εἰ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς λέγο- [V]  
 μιν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον ἀκριβέστερον, ἵταρ δλας τερεῖ κτε-  
 σεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰπορίας συμβαίνει ποιῆσθαι  
 31 μνείαν, πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν  
 αὐτήν· πολλαὶ γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσὶν ἀμφι-  
 σβητήσεις διὰ τοὺς ἔλκοιτας ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν ὑπερ-  
 βολήν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλισχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τρυφήν.

2 τὸ δ' εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν (δεῖ δ' εἶνα  
 30 πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐμπεύροις), ὅτι χρῆ  
 μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον αἰτοῖς δ' εὐέξοδον  
 31 ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔφαμεν εὐσύντο-  
 πτον εἶναι δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ δ' εὐσύνοπτον  
 τὸ εὐβοήητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν.

τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρῆ ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχὴν, πρὸς τε  
 3 τὴν θαλάτταν προσήκει κεῖσθαι καλῶς πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν 13-14  
 4 εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοηθείας κοι-  
 νὴν εἶναι τῶν τόπων ἀπάντων)· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν

32 τοῦτο L<sup>2</sup> Ar. Ald. | τὸν ὅρον omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Ar. (supplied by corr.<sup>3</sup> in P<sup>2</sup>) |  
 38 τὴν before γλισχρότητα omitted by P<sup>1</sup>,<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> | 41 μὲν τοῖς] τοῖς μὲν? Susem. (scr.  
 v. l. 1326 b 4)

1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν after εὐσύνοπτον II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. | 6 μὲν <οὗν> Schneider

σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολά-  
 ζωμεν, *N. E. Eth.* x. 7. 6.

Διευθίως ἄμα καὶ σωφρόνως] "at  
 once with liberality and temperance":  
 cr. II. 6 § 4 n. (106), § 9 n. (106 b, 107);  
 also II. 7 § 7 n. (137 b), and VI(IV). 11  
 §§ 3, 4 n. (1290 b). SUSEM. (765)

§ 2 33 ὕστερον] An unfulfilled pro-  
 mise; there is no such treatment of  
 political economy. See *Introd.* p. 49  
 n. 14), 53 n. (6). SUSEM. (766)

§ 6 ἀμφισβητήσεις] "For there are  
 many controversies on this subject; be-  
 cause of those who urge us to one or the  
 other extreme in life, to parsimony on the  
 one hand and to luxury on the other."  
 Presumably written works are intended.

37 ὑπερβολήν] excess, extreme, as in  
 c. 1 § 5, 1323 a 38, VI(IV). 11 § 10 τὰ  
 ἐκείνης ὑπερβολῆς. Cr. c. 1 § 7, 1323 b  
 11, II. 9 § 24 (ἡ διαίτα ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ  
 σκληρὸν) and *N. E.* IV. 1 § 39, 1121 b 27  
 (ἀνίσταται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ  
 ἀφ' οὗ δὲ λίσσεται).

§ 3 41 τοῖς πολεμίοις . . . εὐέξοδον] "a  
 difficult country for the enemy to invade,  
 but easy for the citizens to quit." Comp.  
 a. 11 § 3 n. (848). SUSEM. (767)

1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι]  
 See c. 4 § 14 n. (763). SUSEM. (768)

"We say of the territory, as we said of  
 the population, that it should be such as  
 can be taken in at one view; meaning  
 thereby that reinforcements can easily be  
 marched for the defense of every part  
 of it."

4 κατ' εὐχὴν] "If we are to fix upon  
 an ideal site": comp. n. (118): "a position  
 favourable for access to the sea and for  
 communications by land is imperative."  
 SUSEM. (769)

§ 4 6 εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος] "One  
 defining principle," see n. on III. 9 § 1  
 "is that just mentioned": τὸ εἰρησπερεῖν  
 εἶναι; "the city must be equally in com-  
 munication with all parts of the country  
 for defensive purposes." This is ex-  
 panding c. 6 § 3, 221—23. *facilem aditum habere ad omnes locos*  
*Bonitz Int. Ar. i. 2.*

7 ὁ δὲ λοιπός] "And the other is that  
 it should be easy of access (τὸ εὐεχόμε-  
 νον εἶναι τὴν χώραν) for the convey-  
 ance of the produce of the soil as well as  
 of material like timber, or any other  
 similar material in which the country may

γινομένων καρπῶν παραπομπάς, ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα (ἔλξης, καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἢ χώρα τυγχάνοι  
 6 κεκτημένη τοιαύτην εὐπαρακόμιστον. περὶ δὲ τῆς  
 11 πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, πότερον ὠφέλιμος ταῖς  
 εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ βλαβερά, πολλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν  
 ἀμφισβητοῦντες· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιξενοῦσθαί τινας ἐν ἄλ-  
 λοις τεθραμμένους νόμοις ἀσύμφορόν φασιν εἶναι πρὸς  
 15 τὴν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν· γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ  
 ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τῇ θαλάσσῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους  
 ἐμπόρων πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δ' εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι  
 § 2 καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ  
 πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετέχειν  
 20 τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς<sup>ν</sup> χώρας <καὶ> τῆς θαλάττης, οὐκ ἄδηλον.  
 § 3 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ῥᾶον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους εὐβοηθήτους  
 εἶναι δεῖ κατ' ἀμφοτέρα τοὺς σωθησομένους, καὶ κατὰ γῆν

8 The punctuation (a comma after παραπομπάς instead of a period, and no comma after 10 τοιαύτην) Jackson followed by Welldon || 9 τυγχάνη P<sup>1</sup>, τυγχάνει P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> || 10 τοιαύτην before κεκτημένη M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, before ἡ χώρα Γ || [περὶ... 1327 b 18 τοῦτον] Broughton: see Comm. || 12 πολλοὶ Camerarius and possibly M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand): for

M<sup>s</sup> has πο<sup>λλ</sup>, i.e. πολλὰ or πολλοὶ, and P<sup>1</sup> has πο<sup>λλ</sup> (with α written very small and apparently an erasure after it), πολλὰ Γ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (corr.) and perhaps M<sup>s</sup> || 14 εἶναι φασι Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 17 ὑπ' ἐναντίαν M<sup>s</sup>, ὑπεναντίον P<sup>2</sup> C<sup>c</sup> || 20 τὴν πόλιν omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup> || τῆς χώρας <καὶ> Bojesen (see c. 5 § 3, c. 11 § 1), τὴν χώραν Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 21 πολέμους Sylburg, πολεμίους Γ Π Ar. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text

trade" (Welldon). κεκτηῖσθαι ἐργασίαν τι-  
 νος=to have acquired a trade in any  
 staple commodity.

c. 6 The advantage and disadvantage  
 of proximity to the sea.

Comp. A. Lang *Introductory Essays*  
 p. 71. Broughton maintains that c. 6 is  
 not by Aristotle, but is wholly the work  
 of some Peripatetic, which Apellikon or  
 Andronikos first inserted in this place.  
 Comp. n. (790), and on the other side  
 m. (881, 932). SUSEM.

§ 1 12 πολλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισ-  
 βητοῦντες] See Plato *Laus* IV. 705 A,  
 706 ff.; cp. XII. 950. But in Aristotle's  
 account of the opinions held by represen-  
 tatives of this view there are some things  
 not to be found in Plato: accordingly it  
 would seem that he has other writers also  
 in view. At a later time Cicero 'is  
 wholly in agreement' with such opinions,  
*De Repub.* II. c. 3 f. 'Aristotle looks at  
 the question more impartially' (Oncken)

and really goes as far as it was possible  
 for him to go with his narrow theories  
 upon Political Economy. But of course  
 even he was greatly hampered by them.  
 See *nn.* (772, 774). SUSEM. (770)

13—18. Objections: (1) the con-  
 tinued residence of aliens brought up  
 under alien laws, and (2) the populousness  
 of seaport-towns, are prejudicial to good  
 government. See *Laus* IV. 704 D.

15 καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν sc. ἀσύμ-  
 φορόν εἶναι. γίνεσθαι] sc. τὴν πολυαν-  
 θρωπίαν. A large population is the result  
 of their traffic by sea. The participles  
 are accus. as subjects of χρῆσθαι.

§ 2 18 εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει] apart  
 from these results.

20 "that the city should communi-  
 cate both with the land and the sea."  
 This sense seems certain from 25 ἀμφο-  
 τέρων μετέχουσιν.

§ 3 21 φέρειν] To resist, bear the  
 brunt of an attack.

καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν· καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμένους, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἄμφω δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὑπάρξει μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρων μετέχουσιν. ὅσα τ' ἂν μὴ τυγχάνῃ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄντα, δέξασθαι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα τῶν γινομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. αὕτη γὰρ ἐμπορικὴν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν· οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν προσίδου χάριν ταῦτα πράττουσιν· ἣν δὲ μὴ δεῖ πόλιν τοιαύτης μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδ' ἐμπόριον δεῖ κεκτηῖσθαι τοιοῦτον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρώμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχον<τα> καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυνῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ μήτε πόρρω λίαν, ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις ἄλλοις ἱρύμασι, φανερόν ὥς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δέ

24 ἀλλ' εἰ Π<sup>2</sup>, ἀλλὰ γε Schneider 30 ἦν P<sup>2</sup>-24 V<sup>b</sup> Ald. and apparently Ar. 32 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐπειδὴ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar., ἐπεὶ δὲ Götting 33 ὑπάρχοντα καὶ Wellhon. ὑπάρχοντα Congreve Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>, ὑπάρχον καὶ Γ II Bk.<sup>1</sup>, ὑπάρχειν καὶ Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup> 34 ἐπίνεια αὐτὰ τὸ Γ Ar. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, αὐτὰ τὸ after a lacuna P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), τὸ αὐτὸ (αὐτῶν Γ<sup>2</sup>) Susem. other authorities and P<sup>2</sup> (later hand). Either may be correct. Cp. Busem. p. 38.

23 καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι] Cp. c. 11 n. (855). SUSEM. (771) Also II. 6 § 8.

24 κατὰ θάτερον] 'in one of the two ways, if both are at their command' (κατέχουσιν dative plur. of the participle.)

24 27 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν] Partitive genitive: 'is one amongst necessary conditions'; so II. 11 § 10. 1273 a 33. This periphrasis enables Aristotle to avoid the hiatus of ἐκπέμψασθαι ἀναγκαῖον.

αὕτη γὰρ ἐμπορικὴν κτλ] 'For it ought to carry on trade in its own interests exclusively and not for the advantage of others.' This dictum strikes at the root of free trade legislation (Eaton). SUSEM. (772)

Thirty years ago our other English commentator Congreve uncompromisingly denounced this dictum: "Any theory like this of Aristotle's—such as the mercantile and protective system of later times, which aims at exclusiveness, is to be condemned as a direct attack on the real interests of mankind." Even now how large a part of civilized mankind is in Aristotle's position and fails to discern its real interests in this matter.

29 πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν] 'a universal mart.' This exactly describes the situation of Athens as the sole mart e.g. of corn from the Black Sea. Cp. Xen. *De Vect.* 3.

31 οὐδ' ἐμπόριον] The ideal city is not itself to be such a place of trade, nor is it to have a commercial seaport of this kind.

§ 5 32 ἐπεὶ δὲ... 33 ἐπίνεια] "This was the situation of Peiræus, Cenchreæ, Lechaion, Notion [cp. VII. 1. 13 § 13 n. 1541], Nisæa, Pegæ, Patræ, Argæ" (Eaton). SUSEM. (773)

35 τείχεσι] As the long walls connecting Peiræus with Athens, Lechaion with Corinth, and Nisæa with Megara.

37 εἰ δὲ τι βλαβερὸν] "while any harm they may cause it is easy to guard against by prescribing and defining in the laws who are, and who are not, to enjoy mutual intercourse." Here then even Aristotle adopts the principles of Plato's policy in regard to the treatment of foreigners, *Λόγος* XII 950 ff., esp. 952 b-953 a (Eaton). SUSEM. (774) Plato would exercise a strict surveillance on all who enter or leave the country: compare m. (1373) on the Spartan *ἐνοχλῆσι*.

τι βλαβερόν, φυλάξασθαι ῥάδιον τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας (V  
 39 καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δεῖ καὶ τίνας ἐπιμίσγεσθαι δεῖ πρὸς  
 § 6 ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι μὲν  
 βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τινὸς πλήθους, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ  
 1327 b μόνον αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίον τισὶ δεῖ καὶ φοβεροὺς  
 εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, ὥσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ  
 § 7 θάλατταν). περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἤδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως  
 ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέον τῆς πόλεως. εἰ μὲν γὰρ  
 5 ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζήσεται βίον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύ-  
 την τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον.  
 τὴν δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γινομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν  
 ὄχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ  
 § 8 αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατι-  
 10 κὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζευόντων ἐστίν, ὃ κύριόν ἐστι καὶ  
 κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτιλίας. πλήθους δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιοίκων  
 καὶ τῶν τὴν χώραν γεωργούντων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι  
 καὶ ναυτῶν. ὁρῶμεν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισίν,  
 οἷον τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν. πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι  
 15 τριήρεις κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἑτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν.

1327 b 1 αὐτοῖς M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2.3.4</sup> Ald. || πλησίον P<sup>2.4</sup> || καὶ φοβεροὺς εἶναι transposed to follow 2 βοηθεῖν by Camerarius and Lambin, perhaps rightly || 5 πολεμικὸν Schneider (in the translation) Bk.<sup>2</sup>, <μὴ μόνον> πολιτικὸν ? Schneider, which may also be right. His proposal to bracket καὶ πολιτικὸν is not commendable || 8 ἄρχειν ? Schlosser (wrongly) || οὐθὲν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., οὐδὲ Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 9 μέρος omitted by L<sup>s</sup> C<sup>c</sup> Ald. W<sup>b</sup> || 13 καὶ added after δὲ by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 14 ἡρακλειωτῶν P<sup>4.5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 15 ἐνδεεστέραν Sepulveda, and Γ apparently had κεκτισμένης πόλεως τῷ μεγέθει ἑτέρων ἐνδεεστέρας (*aedificata civitate magnitudine aliis contractiore*)

§ 6 A naval force is essential within due limits. Epaminondas shared this opinion apparently; see Grote c. 79.

§ 7 1327 b 4 εἰ μὲν γὰρ...βίον] "For if the city is to have a career of supremacy." One would have thought that in his ideal of a state Aristotle would have attended to the domestic activity of the citizens and not to external power and rule: 14 § 21. Nor is this really inconsistent with the present remark, which is very general in its tenor. Proximity to the sea, he says, and a naval force is an advantage to every state: a warlike, conquering state (which on Aristotle's principles therefore is not the best) needs of course a stronger naval force: the best state can do with a smaller fleet. See however n. (917) and *Introd.* p. 55. SUSEM. (775)

5 πολιτικὸν] Schneider well remarks:

quasi reliquae civitates πολιτικὸν βίον non colant. Conservative critics defend the word as meaning "a true political life" by reference to II. 6 § 7, IV(VII). 2 § 3.

§ 8 9 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικὸν κτλ.] "For only the marines are free men and form part of the land army; and it is they who are supreme (on board ship) and control the crew."

10 καὶ τῶν πεζευόντων] At Athens too the soldiers for the fleet were sometimes taken from the actual citizen army, the heavy-armed infantry (cf. n. 1519), Thuc. III. 98 § 4, VIII. 24 § 2; but generally (n. 1453) from the Thetes or fourth class in the census, Thuc. VI. 43 (Eaton). Cp. Boeckh *Staatsh.* I<sup>3</sup>. 583 f., I<sup>2</sup> 649 f. p. 500 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (776)

14 τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν] Xenophon also speaks of the large naval force of the

περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ πόλεως καὶ λιμένων καὶ (V)  
θαλάττης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμειος ἔστω διωρισμένα  
τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους, τίνα μὲν VI  
ὄρον ὑπάρχειν χρή, πρότερον εἶπομεν, ποίους δὲ τινὰς τὴν  
φύσιν εἶναι δεῖ, νῦν λέγωμεν. σχεδὸν δὴ κατανοήσμεν ἄν  
τις τοῦτό γε, βλέψας ἐπὶ τε τὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδοκιμούσας  
τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὡς διέλη-

16 καὶ πόλεως καὶ λιμένων Sussem., καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεως P<sup>1</sup> H. A. Bk.  
Sussem.<sup>1,2</sup> in the text, καὶ πόλεως λιμένων Wellshon wrongly, καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεως  
Conington. In place of πόλεως Kotzab conjectured ἐκαστῶν, Schmidt ἐκαστῶν.  
Broughton περιπολιῶν, Jowett πλοίων. Conring followed by Bk.<sup>2</sup> bracketed καὶ πόλεως  
17 διωρισμένον L<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2,6</sup> Ald. Bk.<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr.), διωρισμένον P<sup>3</sup>, διωρισμένον S<sup>1</sup> V<sup>1</sup>.  
21 τὰς πόλεις omitted by P<sup>1,6</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ald. W<sup>1</sup>

Heracleiots, *Anab.* v. 6 § 10 (Ciphanius). He also calls Heracleia in Pontus a colony from Megara, settled in the land of the Mariandynians (*Anab.* v. 10 § 1). We know from other sources that there were also Boeotians (from Tanagra) along with the Megarian colonists, and that the colony was founded about 430. Strabo XII. 549 is wrong in designating it a Milesian settlement. The colonists had converted the Mariandynians whom they had conquered into subjects or vassals, in virtue of a compact similar to that made by the Thesalians with the Persidae (cp. n. 480) and by the Spartans with the Helots, containing a special proviso that they should not be sold out of the country. Indeed the Heracleiots did not call them their property or their slaves, but their spear-bearers (δορυφόροι). See Posidonius *Frags.* 16 in Ath. vi. 263 c, Strabo XII. 542, Plato *Lysis* vi 776 D (J. G. Schneider). Comp. also Pseudo-Arist. *Occen.* II. 9 § 1, 1347 b 3 ff. (Eaton). Sussem. (777)

15 τῷ μεγέθει ... ἡμελίστῳ] "A city of but moderate size, as compared with others." We find nowhere else an accurate statement as to the probable size of Heracleia; but extracts from the work of its native historian Mennon in Photius give us information as to its power and history (J. G. Schneider). See Müller's edition, *Thaer.* 404. Gr. III. p. 212 ff. There are notices of the early internal history of Heracleia VII(V). 5 § 3 n. (1555); 6 § 3 (1569), § 7 (1578), § 15 (1582). Sussem. (778)

Comp. also Grote, c. 98, vol. XII. p. 612 ff.

18 περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους

19 πρότερον] "As to the strength of the citizen body, and what limit should be set to it, we spoke above (n. 4 §§ 4—14)."

c. 7 *The natural characteristics of the citizens: they should be of Greek race, uniting intelligence with a spirited temper.* §§ 1—4. *Criticism of Plato:* §§ 5—8.

§ 1 22 διέληπται τοῖς (ἔθνεσιν) divided amongst different races. So *ἀναβ. cū dō πάντας VII(V). II § 12*, 1296 a 11; *εἰς διαφοράς De Pers. Anab.* I. 3 § 3, 642 b 30; *διαμεμεσθῆναι καὶ διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη ἄλλῃς* I. 4 § 4, 1319 b 3.

§§ 2, 3 Compare the remark made by Plato *Rep.* IV. 435 E, that among the Thracians, Scythians and other northern nations courage predominates; among the Phoenicians and Egyptians love of gain; among the Greeks reason. Hippocrates in his work *de aere, aquis, locis* alluded to above in n. (732), p. 247 B. Kuhn, compares in detail the natural differences between Europeans and Asiatics, and describes the happy mean of the Greeks. Herod. IX. 122 makes Cyrus say that fertile countries make effeminate people, since the same soil is not capable of producing rare fruits and warlike men; and in III. 106, he says that Hellas enjoys by far the best climate. Plato *Tim.* 44 c commends in particular the happy blending of the seasons in Attica, and the combination of warlike excellence and love of knowledge resulting from this influence. In the Aristotelian *Problems* XIV. 8, 9, there is a discussion of the question why the inhabitants of warm countries are as a rule cowardly, and those of cold countries brave (Eaton). Cp. also n. 2641. Sussem. (781)

§ 2 πται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη (V)  
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ πλήρη, διανοίας  
25 δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ  
μᾶλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἄρχειν οὐ δυνά-  
μενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ  
τὴν ψυχὴν, ἄθυμα δέ, διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα (P)  
§ 3 διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὥσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ  
30 τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει. ἡ καὶ γὰρ ἐνθυμον καὶ  
διανοητικὸν ἐστίν· διόπερ ἐλευθερόν τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλ-  
τιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μῖα  
§ 4 τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δ' ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ 2

24 [καὶ] τὰ Spengel Susem.<sup>2</sup> Or better καὶ [τὰ] with explicative sense? Cp. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 357 b 13 ff., Vahlen *Beit. zu Poet.* II. p. 88. || 28 μὲν inserted after ἀρχόμενα by Π<sup>1</sup> || 31 μάλιστα Γ (apparently) Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

§ 2 23 τὰ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] "The nations which live in cold countries, and those which live in Europe." J. G. Schneider tried to explain the text as though Europe were here used in its oldest sense of the country between Peloponnesus and Thrace (Hom. *Hymn to Apollo* 251). Not only is this interpretation in itself improbable, but the contrast shows that it is not Greek but only non-Greek natives that are here alluded to; and as immediately afterwards Asia is opposed to Europe, the latter must refer to the whole continent just as much as the former. Similarly c. 10 § 3 n. (823). It is necessary therefore to bracket either καὶ or τὰ. In the latter case καὶ will be epexegetic: "those who live in the cold countries, i.e. in Europe." SUSEM. (779)

26 ἀπολίτευτα] Without organized government; and, in consequence, incapable of common action for aggression. Probably on the analogy of the individual φύσει ἄρχων Aristotle considers that the race, like the city, ought to be capable of ruling over the φύσει ἀρχόμενος.

28 διόπερ ἀρχόμενα ... 29 διατελεῖ] Comp. III. 14 § 6 n. (621) and n. (54). SUSEM. (780)

§ 3 30 ἐνθυμον] spirited, courageous.

31 διόπερ ἐλευθερόν ... 33 πολιτείας] "For which reason the Greek race is and always has been" [lit. continues to be] "free and best governed and capable of ruling all mankind, if it happened to be under a single government." Herod. IX. 2 makes the Thebans say to Mardonios that so long as the Greeks keep united (as formerly had been the case) the

whole world could scarcely subdue them: κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἰσχυρόν Ἕλληνας ὁμοφρονέοντας, οἵπερ καὶ πάρος ταῦτα ἐγίνωσκον, χαλεπὰ εἶναι περιγίνεσθαι καὶ ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις (Eaton). See further *Intro.* p. 46. SUSEM. (782)

This is the passage on which Oncken I. 18 ff. II. p. 273 relies for his interpretation of Aristotle's attitude to Alexander and to Greek politics. He compares Isocrates' repeated appeals to the Greek nation to cherish ὁμόνοια (*Panegyric*, *De Pace*, *Philippus*, cp. *Ep.* 3). According to Oncken the μία πολιτεία was already realized *de facto* in the protectorate over Greece exercised by Philip, and after him by Alexander: the terms of which he infers from the contemporary speech (falsely attributed to Demosthenes) περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν. But that the arrangement of -336 B.C. was an alliance of ostensibly free and independent powers, in short a confederation (συμμαχία βοηθείας χάριν) and not a πολιτεία (II. 2 § 3) is proved most conclusively by the wording of the first article; by the orator's argument that Macedon having broken the treaty, Athens has the right to appeal to arms; and by the terms συνθῆκαι and κοινὴ εἰρήνη themselves (cp. *Rhet.* II. 23 § 18, 1399 b 12 ὅτι τὸ δίδοναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν [ἐστίν], καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον). Some however are not content to find in the words of the text, as in those of Herodotos, a sudden thought or passing hint. It remains then to inquire: what precisely was the constitution which Aristotle had in mind,

τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη [καὶ] πρὸς ἄλληλα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει  
τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὖ [τε] κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφω-  
τέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι διὰ νομο-  
θετικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοῖς μέλλουσιν  
εὐαγώγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν. ὅπερ γὰρ  
φασί τινες δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικούς μὲν  
εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνωστας ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμὸς  
ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν. αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς

34 *kal* inserted by M<sup>o</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk.      35 *re* omitted by II<sup>1</sup> Bk.<sup>2</sup> Spengel approves the omission unless *kal* be inserted after *re*.      38 *re* *repper* *re* P<sup>3</sup>, *re* *repper* *re* I<sup>1</sup> apparently

under which he thought united Hellas could rule the world? The answer expected is either (1) an absolute monarchy, or (2) a federal state (*Bundesstaat*). Yet neither satisfies the conditions of a possible answer as given rather in the whole character and tendency of the work than in any single passage. That by 'constitution' Aristotle means the constitution of a city-state and not a race or nation or tribe, is a fundamental postulate, although nowhere expressly laid down. Nations other than the Greek are occasionally mentioned as monarchically and 'despotically' governed, and so far as oriental despotism is one variety of *φασαδία* they may be said to have a constitution. But the very words in which this variety is described (see *n.* on III. 12 § 8) exclude its application to the Greeks: it is *because* Asians are of more servile temper than Europeans, and barbarians generally than Greeks, that they quietly endure the yoke. III. 14 §§ 6, 7. The difficulty lies in the absence of any detailed treatment of the interpolitical relations of the Greek cities. From the silence of our author it would be rash to affirm that theoretically the absolute king who may arise in a single city (III. 13 §§ 13, 14, 24, 25; 14 § 1, § 15; 17 §§ 5—8) has a counterpart in an absolute king over the whole Greek race. The slight evidence there is points to Aristotle's discerning in the hegemony of Macedonia (which was nominally all that Philip or Alexander asked and the Congress of Corinth granted) a fact analogous to the old hegemonies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes: see VI(IV). 11 § 18 L, and *frag.* 30. 1489 b 26. Plutarch *De Alexandri virtute* c. 6 in 'Aristoteli (Aristotele) opera 2' (1902) has this title: 'Ελληνικήν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ βασιλείαν δημοτικῶς κειμένην. To us, however, as Channing, or Channing, may mark the

end of Greek history. Such was not the feeling of contemporary Greeks, — whether they sided with Demosthenes or with Phocion.

§ 4. 34 The Dorian, Ionian, Thes-  
salian, Arcadian, Achaean, Aetolian  
*etc.*, occur as examples of Greek tribal  
populations.

35 μονόκωλον] one-sided. The Aetolians approximated to the hardy *γεωργία* of the north: the Asiatic looked to the softer Asiatics.

§ 5. 38 ὅπερ γὰρ φασὶ τινες] *Plato*  
in *Acad.* II. 375 CH. *Comp. x.* (1000)  
ON V (VIII). 4 § 2. *SUMM.* (783)

39 τοῖς φύλαξι] See n. 1140) on H. J.  
 5. SUSAN. (784)

φαινητικός] The word *φαῖναι* is not used by Plato, but in substance his meaning is not essentially different (*φαῖναι* *νῦν* *ροῦς* *ἀλλοίαν* *ἐπιδείκναι* *ἀλλοίαν* *ἀντι*), so that it is difficult to see why Schleiermacher should believe that Aristotle does him injustice. See however *ib.* (1789). SCHLEIER-  
(785)

40 ὁ θυμός ἐστιν φιλοῦμεν] 'It is passion or temper which makes us friendly; for that is the faculty of soul with which we love.' The logic reads badly in the translation because we can generally render by the same word *φίλος*, 'friendly,' *φιλον* = affection, although we too speak of the heart as the seat of both. See n. (641) on III. 16 § 3. Comp. II. vi. 7 § 6, 113 A 35 ff., οὐκ αὖτε καὶ ποτὲ φιλότητος ἔργα δέχοιτο, εἴη δὲ τὸ πόθος αἰετὶ θυμῷ κίχεται· ἐοικὸς γὰρ αὖτις αἰσῆς, and I. ii. 13 § 5, 126 A 8 ff.: ὅπου γὰρ παύσιμος τῆς Λυγισσαῖς ὁ δὲ φίλος αἰετὶ θυμῷ κίχεται, καὶ ὁ μὲν Λυγίος αἰετὶ ἀποθυμῶν· ὃ δὲ ἀργεὶ δὲ τῷ θυμῳ κίχεται, whose love and anger are hypothetically assigned to the first, but have (plainly) to the second, calm or impulsive principle of the soul (J. G.).

1328 a δύναμις ἧ φιλοῦμεν. σημείον δέ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις 3  
καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας,  
§ 6 ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος προσηκόντως τοῖς  
φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν·

5 σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχειαι.

καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης  
§ 7 ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήττητον ὁ θυμός. οὐ  
καλῶς δ' ἔχει λέγειν χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας·  
πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ εἶναι χρή τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι

1328 a 5 σὺ Bergk, following Schneider, οὐ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || δεῖ  
M<sup>s</sup>, untranslated by William || παρὰ Γ P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bergk, περὶ with all other authorities  
Bk. || ἀπάγχειαι P<sup>1</sup>, ἀπέγχειαι M<sup>s</sup> and apparently Γ (*a lanceis perforationes* William),  
ἀπάγχεο P<sup>2-3,6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. Bk. Bergk, ἀπάγχετο P<sup>4</sup>, ἀπήγχεο P<sup>5</sup>, ἀπέγχεο S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and  
perhaps Ar. (*lanceis transfixus es*)

Schneider). Just because this is only hypothetically expressed, there is no contradiction between it and the present passage. "Theognis, too, 109 ff., ascribes love and hatred to 'spirit' or θυμός" (Camerarius). Further comp. *u.* (790, 182, 839, 935). SUSEM. (786)

41 αὐτῇ] Not τοῦτο, see c. 1 § 8 *u.*

1328 a 1 πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις] Eaton compares *Rhet.* II. 2 § 15, 1379 b 2, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις [ὀργίζονται] μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις· οἶονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὐ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἢ μῆ. SUSEM. (787)

2 αἴρεται] rises viz. in indignation.

§ 6 3 Ἀρχίλοχος] *Frag.* 67. Archilochus of Paros, who flourished about 680 or somewhat earlier, was the true father of Greek lyrical poetry. Before his time the νόμος belonging to religious poetry had received its artistic development only from Terpander and Klonas (see *u.* 17 to my edition of the *Poetics*). The invention of elegiac poetry was disputed between him and Kallinos. But his claim to be the inventor of iambic verse is undisputed, and also to be the first who made a regular arrangement of secular poetry. He seems also to have composed in regular fashion sacred songs for choruses; there is however a doubt as to the genuineness of the ἰὼ Βάκχε attributed to him (*Frag.* 120), but none as to the hymn to Herakles (*Frag.* 119). Whether he also wrote dithyrambs and paeans cannot be certainly inferred from *Frag.* 76, 77. He was the first to introduce the iambic and trochaic metre into poetry and into vocal music con-

structed according to the rules of art, and he supplied it with a series of strophes composed of short dactylic iambic and trochaic verses, and of verses in which dactyls or anapaests and trochees or iambics were combined. See Westphal *Greek Metric* II. p. 350 ff., 443, 450, 457, 479 f., 498, 563 ff. The fragment of verse here quoted is a trochaic tetrameter without the opening dipody, and it belonged to a poem composed throughout of such tetrameters, as we see from another longer fragment (*Frag.* 66). On Archilochus, see Bernhardt *History of Greek literature* II. p. 486. SUSEM. (788)

§ 7 7 οὐ καλῶς κτλ] Here clearly Aristotle is taking Plato's statements much too literally, and in a much cruder and stricter sense than they are meant. SUSEM. (789)

9 οὐδὲ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι κτλ] Plato also *Rep.* IV. 440 c designates indignation at injuries received as a main element of θυμός, and indeed, as already noticed in *u.* (641), he refers ambition to θυμός. But Aristotle also mentions *Post. Anal.* II. 12 § 22, 97 b 15 ff. as one of the chief characteristics of the μεγαλόψυχοι, that they will not brook insult. On the other hand *Nic. Eth.* IV. 3 § 30, 1125 a 31 ff. that they are not revengeful, but know how to forgive and forget (Eaton). It is not easy however to reconcile what is here stated with the description given there § 24, 1124 b 9 ff., according to which the high-minded man is ready to confer benefits, but is ashamed of receiving them, and always requites services done

10 τὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικούντας. τοῦτο δὲ μάλ- (11)  
 λον ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχουσιν, ὅπῃ εἴρηται πρότερον.  
 12 ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον παρ'  
 οἷς γὰρ, ὀφείλεσθαι [δεῖν τῇ] εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς  
 τῷ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν. ὅθεν εἴρηται  
 15 καὶ  
 χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν

16 οἱ τοὶ πέραν στέρξαιτες, οἱ δὲ καὶ πέραν  
 μισοῦσιν.

19 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν  
 18 δεῖ καὶ ποίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσῃ  
 τέ τινα καὶ ποίαν τινά, διώρισται σχεδόν (οὐ γὰρ τὴν  
 20 αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διὰ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γινω-  
 8 μένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως). ἐπεὶ δὲ ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν VII

13 δεῖν] δεῖ M<sup>o</sup>, δὲ apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, corrected by p<sup>1</sup>), δὲ ? Korte, William  
 leaves it untranslated, [δεῖν] Schneider Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly. — τινά ? Korte  
 [ὑπολαμβάνουσι] νομίζουσι M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and very likely Γ<sup>o</sup>. — 14 τῇ βλάβῃ P<sup>4</sup>, τὴ βλάβῃ I<sup>o</sup>,  
 τῇ βλάβῃ I<sup>o</sup>. — 15 πόλεμοι (πολέμοι Γ<sup>o</sup>) γὰρ II<sup>1</sup> Plutarch *de frat. am.* p. 480 D, γὰρ  
 πόλεμοι II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>o</sup> Bk. — 16 πέραν—πέρα II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>o</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> — 18 ἀπὸ τῶν M<sup>o</sup> Γ<sup>o</sup>  
 21 τῶν ἄλλων omitted by I<sup>o</sup> L<sup>o</sup> Ald. W<sup>o</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand, supplied in the margin)

him by greater services in return, so that  
 he may not be under obligation to others,  
 but rather others to him (Broughton).  
 Cp. also *u.* (878). SUSEM. (790)

§ 8. "And this is a result to be ex-  
 pected; for they imagine themselves to  
 be robbed as well as slighted by those  
 from whom they believe a kindness ought  
 to be due to them." ἀποστερεῖσθαι (ἐπ'  
 ἐκείνων) παρ' οἷς—by those *in whose case*  
 there ought to be an obligation to a service  
 to themselves.

"Cp. *Rhet.* II. 2 § 15, 1379 b 2 ff.  
 (Eaton, Congreve)." SUSEM. (791)

14 ὅθεν εἴρηται] This is a line of  
 Euripides, from what play is not known,  
*Frag.* 963 (Nauck). SUSEM. (792)

16 οἱ τοὶ πέραν κτλ] We know  
 neither the author nor the play from which  
 this is quoted (*Frag. adesp.* 53 Nauck).  
 SUSEM. (793)

§ 9 19 οὐ γὰρ... 21 αἰσθήσεως] Comp.  
 c. 13 § 9 *u.* (868). SUSEM. (794)

Also *Nic. EtA.* I. 7 §§ 18, 19, 1098 a 26 ff.  
 and *De Anima* I. 1 ad init. 422 a 2, with  
 Wallace's note on ἀκρίβεια. Also I. 5 § 1,  
 424 a 20, IV(VII). 1 § 6, 1323 a 39 with  
*u.*

vc. 8—12 contain the social conditions  
 of the best city, which differ but slightly  
 from those laid down by Plato (more

especially in the *Lysis* B. v., vi.) and would  
 command the assent of most reflecting  
 Greeks as at least theoretically desirable.

c. 8. *Distinction of the virtuous people,*  
*who are an essential part of the city, from*  
*the rest of the population, which is but an*  
*indispensable adjunct.*

This idea is already familiar to the  
 reader of B. III. c. 5, c. 13 § 13; see *u.*  
 on 1284 a 9.

§ 1 21 ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων] This  
 for instance the things without which  
 happiness cannot exist are not all parts  
 of happiness, *Enclim. EtA.* I. 2 §§ 2—3,  
 1214 b 11—27 (Eaton). Some of them  
 (ὡς ἀπὸ αἰῶς) are only secondary causes,  
 as Plato already called them (*Lat. Lat.*  
*Phil.* 5, v, εὐνοῦνται), or necessary con-  
 ditions (Camerarius). Cp. *Metaph.* I. 1, 1  
 § 1, 1013 a 20: "necessary (or indispens-  
 able) is that without which as secondary  
 cause life is impossible" (Eaton). See  
 Zeller II. II. p. 331 n. (1). Cp. *u.* 1007  
 and *u.* (504) on III. 5 § 2. SUSEM.  
 (795)

τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνιστάτων] Na-  
 tural wholes made up of organic parts, as  
 in I. 5, 3, 1234 a 29, with which τῶν  
 was ranked III. I. 2, 1274 b 29 n. (1224).  
 They are frequently mentioned in the  
 zoological treatises.

κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι μύρια τῆς ὅλης συ- (VI)  
στάσεως ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πό-  
24 λεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν  
— <οἶον εἶτε τροφή τοῦτό ἐστιν εἶτε χώρας πληθός  
<εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν> — οὐδ'  
§ 2 ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐξ ἧς ἔν τι τὸ γένος. ἐν γάρ

22 ταυτὰ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ταῦτά Bk.<sup>1</sup>, ταῦτ' P<sup>4</sup>, πάντα ? Wyse || 25 ἐξῆς P<sup>2</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and perhaps P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), since in that ms. ἐξ ἧς is over an erasure, [ἐξ] ἧς and τέλος for γένος ? Postgate || [τὸ] γένος ? Koraes

22 μύρια] Also μέρη (μάλιστα ὄντα 1329 a 4 f., cp. 1291 b 8): the technical terms for 'full members,' constituent parts and not mere adjuncts of the organic whole. See the good instances c. 4 § 6, 1326 a 20 f.; VI(IV). 4. 14, 1291 a 24. In contrast to them the adjuncts are (1) necessary appendages, ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, (2) *sine quibus non*, ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐ συνίσταται, (3) requirements, ὧν δεῖ, or even (4) τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα e.g. τροφή, χώρα. Note that both μέρος and μῦριον are also used as non-technical terms, for the adjuncts. So μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως sometimes (as here) of full membership, 1329 a 35: sometimes again of the entire population, 1279 a 32. The relation between constituent parts and necessary conditions is explained III. 12. 8 f., 1283 a 15—22 and IV(VII). 6. 7, 1327 b 9: the ναυτικὸς ὄχλος is no part of Aristotle's city. There can be no city of brutes or of slaves.

συστάσεως] A term with various meanings: (1) the putting together = construction, (2) the thing so constructed ὃ συνίσταται, thus duplicating τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστ., cp. 1329 a 35. It is largely used in the biological works for 'structure' or 'organism': so also VI(IV). 11. 8, 1295 b 28. On the latent analogy between organism and state, implied in this term and in ἔργα = functions, but drawn out at length VI(IV). c. 4 §§ 8, 9, see A. C. Bradley *op. c.* p. 203 ff.

The view of *De Partibus Animal.* 1. 5 §§ 12—16, 645 b 14—20, is that every part (μῦριον) of the body, like an instrument (ὄργανον), is for an end: this end is a function (πράξις τις). The parts are nose, eyes, face, etc.; the functions, more or less specific, γένεσις, αὔξεισις, ὕπνος, πορεία, κτλ.

The transposition of the clause 27 οἶον εἶτε τροφή... 28 ἐστίν appears inevitable, because 'food' and a 'quantum of territory' would otherwise be adduced as

instances of ἐν τι κοινὸν τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, for which purpose they are clearly inappropriate. The common object of the society, which gives the city its unity, is its ethical end, the conviction of the members that they must endeavour to realize a noble life, § 4, a 36—38 (cp. III. c. 9). On the other hand a supply of food and so much territory are indispensable requisites, and would seem to be included under κτήσις a 33.

24 οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας.. ἐξ ἧς ἔν τι τὸ γένος] "Nor is this true of any other association which is to form a unity of kind" (and not merely of mass, γένος is adverbial accus.): i.e. which is to have a true organic unity, not merely the collective unity of an aggregate or heap. After 25 ἐν τι there is no need to insert ἔσται, for γενήσεται (or ἔσται) can easily be understood. SUSEM. (796)

§ 2 For the real members of the society must have some one identical common interest, though they need not all share in it equally. Haec mihi videtur esse sententia: unum aliquid idemque sociis commune necesse est (Sussemihl).

25 A generic unity, or natural composite whole, I. 5. 3, 1254 a 29 n., but not a κράσις, μίξις, or σύμφυσις in which the mingled elements vanish and give birth to a new product: for the citizens continue to exist as parts of the whole I. 2. 14, 1253 a 26. The difference between the mere heap and the organic whole is explained *Meta. Z.* 17. 8, 1041 b 18 ff. (examples: a syllable, flesh; each something apart from its constituents). See also *Meta. H.* 6. 1, 1045 a 8, ὅσα πλείω μέρη ἔχει καὶ μὴ ἐστὶν οἶον σωρὸς τὸ πᾶν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον παρὰ τὰ μύρια. For a parallel to the language see *Phys.* v. 3. 7, 227 a 14, ἐν τοῦτοις ἐστὶ τὸ συνεχές, ἐξ ὧν ἐν τι πέφυκε γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν σύναψιν.

The notion of Unity is analysed *Meta. Δ.* 6, I. 1: τὰ πρῶτως λεγόμενα ἐν ἀν ἢ οὐσία μία ἢ συνεχέα (sometimes τὸ ὅλον is

τι [καί] κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ταὐτὸ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς. ἂν τε ἴσον (11)  
 ἂν τε ἄνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν (οἷον εἴτε τροφή τοῦτό ἐστιν  
 3 εἴτε χώρας πληθὺς εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν). ὅταν  
 δ' ἢ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἕνεκεν τὸ δὲ οὐ ἕνεκεν, οὐδὲν ἔν γε τοιούτοις  
 κοινὸν ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν· λέγω δ' οἷον ὁρ-  
 γάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γινόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς·  
 οἰκία γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐδὲν ἐστίν ὃ γίνεται κοινόν, ἀλλ'  
 4 ἐστὶ τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἢ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως  
 μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστίν ἢ κτήσεως μέρος τῆς  
 πόλεως. πολλὰ δ' ἔμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεως ἐστίν. ἢ δὲ

26 τι] τοι M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> 2, [τι] Kortaes [καί] Susem. | δεῖ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Ar., δὴ P<sup>2</sup> 2 S<sup>1</sup> V<sup>1</sup>  
 Ald. | ταὐτὸ τοῦτο Π<sup>1</sup> | 27 οἷον...28 ἐστίν transposed by Eusebius to follow 24  
 ὑπάρχειν, cp. *Introd.* p. 87 | 27 ἐστίν erased by a later hand in P<sup>1</sup>, perhaps  
 rightly | 28 ὅταν...35 ἐστίν transposed to follow 1328 b 1 παλαίαι Susem. See  
 Comm. and cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 401 f. | 29 δ' ἢ] δὴ Π<sup>2</sup>, δὲ Ar. | αἰδὲν] αἰδὲ  
 Γ M<sup>1</sup> | ἔν M<sup>1</sup> and apparently P<sup>1</sup> | 30 λαβεῖν] παθεῖν Postgate, perhaps rightly  
 | 32 [ὃ γίνεται] Schneider | 33 δεῖ μὲν κτήσεως Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, δεῖ κτήσεως (without  
 μὲν) Γ M<sup>1</sup> | 34 οὐδὲν δ' ἢ κτήσεως μέρος τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶ (ἐστὶ Π<sup>1</sup>) M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ἢ δὲ κτήσεως  
 μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς πόλεως Γ apparently | 35 κτήσεως P<sup>1</sup> V<sup>1</sup>

added to τὸ συνεχές) ἢ εἰδὲ ἢ λόγῳ, 1016  
 b 8. The last two together = ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος  
 εἴη ἢ, 1052 a 29.

§ 3 There is no such 'common inter-  
 est' in the case of the means to an end and  
 the end itself, the tools and the craftsman,  
 architecture (the builder's art) and the house.  
 § 4 Hence property may be necessary to cities,  
 but nevertheless does not form part of a city.

28 ὅταν δ' ἢ.....35 ἐστίν] This pas-  
 sage is closely connected with § 6 b 2  
 ἰσχυροτέρῳ δὲ κτλ. No one would suspect  
 any loss if the intervening passage §§ 4,  
 27, 1328 a 35—b 2 were removed. In fact  
 this intervening passage must be regarded  
 as a parenthesis, suggested by a *πῶς* in the  
 text *ἂν τε ἴσον μεταλαμβάνωσιν*, appar-  
 ently inserted in the wrong place: *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 401. In confirmation of this  
 view may be cited Dr Postgate's remark  
 (*Nides* p. 91) "the same sense can be got  
 out of the text by making *δε γάρ τι μετα-*  
*λαμβάνωσι*, § 4, parenthetical, and *ἢ δὲ*  
*παλαι κτλ.*, § 4, a resumption of it: thus  
*οἷον...ἐστίν* will refer to *ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν*  
*ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν*." That is, though his  
 own remedies are different (see *Crit. n. 1*),  
 he agrees as to the end in view; viz. the  
 reference of 27 οἷον κτλ. to 24 ὅσα ταῖς  
 πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, and the re-  
 sumption of 15 *δε γάρ τι...27 μεταλαμβάν-*

*ωσιν* at 35 *ἢ δὲ παλαι κτλ.*

28 ὅταν δ' ] 'When one thing is the  
 means and another the end, in this case  
 at least there is nothing in common, ex-  
 cept that the latter receives the activity  
 of the former.' A very doubtful use of  
 λαβεῖν instead of λαβεῖν τι, and of the  
 thing acted upon: by no means estab-  
 lished, as Prof. Ridgway thinks, by Pl.  
*Apul.* 254, where τὰς παρρησίας παθεῖν  
 τὰς ξυνοίας is followed by καὶ ἐν λα-  
 βῇ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. Dr Postgate's *παθεῖν*  
 brings out the exact shade of meaning:  
 "the one acts and the other is acted  
 upon; the builder makes and the house  
 is made."

30 οἷον ὁργάνῳ] *Nides*, *Crit.* VIII. 14.  
 6, 1161 a 32 ff. The same commensurability  
 exists between the tyrant and his  
 subjects as between soul and body, work-  
 man and tool, master and slave. *Crit.*  
*E. A.* VIII. 9. 2, 1141 b 17—19. (Would  
 λαβεῖν = be the recipient of service, παθεῖν  
 = to render them?)

§ 4 33 That property is not part  
 of the state, but merely an indispensable  
 condition, must weigh with us in deciding  
 whether *κτῆσις* is a branch of *πολιτικὴ* 1.  
 4. 1. n. (37), from the constant parallel  
 of household and state 1. 8 § 13. 1 13.  
 1156 b 30, 37 f.; 11 1 13, 1139 a 23 ff.

33 πολλὰ δ' ἔμψυχα κτλ.] *Ueber*

- πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἔνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδὲ  
 § 5 χομένης ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δ'  
 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτω  
 ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχασθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἢ μηδέ  
 40 δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἴτιον τῷ γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ  
 πολιτείας πλείους· ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτ'  
 1328 b θηρεύοντες τοὺς τε βίους ἐτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας.  
 § 6 ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτί ἐστὶν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐ  
 ἂν εἴη· καὶ γὰρ ἃ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως, ἐν τούτοις  
 4 ἂν εἴη. διὸ \* \* ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. ληπτέον τοίνυν τῶν  
 § 7 ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμόν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσται δῆλον. πρῶτον

39 αὐτῆς <πάντως> ? Spengel, needlessly || 40 τῷ τοῦ II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

1328 b 2 ταῦτ' Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup>, ταῦτα Bas.<sup>3</sup> || 4 διὸ omitted by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. and Vettori, who detected the lacuna. But Bk. ignored it, and Welldon is content to punctuate 3 εἴη (καὶ γὰρ...4 εἴη)· διὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν

the head of 'animate property' are included slaves as well as domestic animals: see I c. 4, c. 5 § 8 ff., c. 8 § 6 ff., c. 11 §§ 1, 2, c. 13 §§ 1, 2. Comp. also n. (37). SUSEM. (801)

ἢ δὲ πόλις κτλ] "Now the city is a society of like members": comp. I. 7 § 1, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων, VI(IV). 11 § 8 ἴσων καὶ ὁμοίων, with notes (58 b, 1293). See also n. (133) and the passages there cited. On the other hand ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, III. I § 5, see n. (471). SUSEM. (797)

36 ἔνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς κτλ] It is therefore this 'best life realizable' which is the 'one identical common interest' in question, ἐν τι κοινόν (Congreve). Compare further n. (21) and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (798)

§ 5 37 αὕτη δὲ κτλ] No reference is made to a previous discussion or to the *Ethics*. Comp. the Excursus I. SUSEM. (799)

38 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τις τέλειος] A fair paraphrase of the definition of *Nic. Eth.*, as may be seen from *E. E.* II. 1, 1219 a 16, τῶν δ' ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, 1219 b 2, ὧν ἕκαστον χρῆσις ἐστὶ καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις.

39 ὥστε] Apparently redundant, as in II. 2 § 5 n.

40 τῷ γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους] This supplements the statement of III. I §§ 8, 9. An imperfect constitution exists because it is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Either the subordinate ends, which fall short of man's true develop-

ment, are raised into ultimate ends: or the true end is sought, but not for all (A. C. Bradley). Cp. c. 9 § 2, 1328 b 3

41 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον κτλ] Cp. 1328 b 1 Cp. I. 8. 4 ff.

§ 6 2 The recognition of the 'parts or Members proper will be facilitated by an enumeration of social functions (ἔργα, i.e. 'occupations' (b 20 ἐργασίας) requisite to the independent existence of the community, which serves roughly to classify the inhabitants working at these occupations: food implies farmers, hand-crafts workmen, etc. New terms are introduced in the parallel lists VII(VI). 7 1, 1321 a 4 ff. (βανανσικόν, ἀγοραῖον) and VI(IV). 4. 9, 1290 b 40 ff. (βάνανσον, ἀγοραῖον, δικαστικόν, δημιουργικόν, βουλευσικόν, μενον): but here τεχνῖται must include βάνανσοι, while τὸ εὐπορον or 'capital' probably furnishes the wealthier merchants (ἀγοραῖον), so far as these are citizens, and the comprehensive κριτικῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων correspond in the main to three classes (judicial, official, deliberative) of VI(IV). c. 4. "Both lists reflect the imperfect industrial and professional development of Greek society" (Newman).

3 All the real members, or parts (μέρη), of a city will be indispensable though not all things indispensable will be members.

4 διὸ \* \*] There are so many conceivable possibilities for filling up the lacuna that any definite attempt of the kind becomes idle. SUSEM. (802)

μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας (πολλὰν γὰρ ὀργάνων δεῖται τὸ ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὄπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον [καὶ] ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὄπλα πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξωθεν ἀνιόντας ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχῃσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὐτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς <τάς> πολεμικάς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν καλοῦσιν ἱερατείαν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαϊότατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δίκαιων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὥς εἰπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλῆθος ἐστὶν οὐ τὸ τυχόν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζῶν αὐτάρκες, ὥς φαμέν, ἐὰν δέ τι τούτων τυγχάνῃ ἐκλείπων, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωσίαν εἶναι ταύτην· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν· δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν τ' εἶναι πλῆθος, οἱ παρασκευάζουσι τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὐπορον, καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν δίκαιων καὶ συμφερόντων).  
9 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον πᾶσι καὶ VIII

9 [καὶ] Koraes, for which [τε] Welldon, wrongly. 1. αὐτοῖς P<sup>1</sup> (?), αὐτῶν Γ and the rest of our authorities. 2. 11 <τάς> Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup> 3. 12 [καὶ πρῶτον] Sprengel 4. 16 ὧν δ M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> 5. 18 τούτων after τυγχάνῃ (τυγχάνει P<sup>2</sup>) H<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk., thus avoiding hiatus. 6. 20 συνεστάναι M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> 7. 21 παρασκευάζουσι P<sup>2</sup> Bk. 8. 22 διωκῶν Lambin, ἀναγκαῖων Γ Π Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text.

§ 7. An enumeration of functions necessary in a city, to some extent parallel, is attempted in Plato *Rep.* II. 381, cp. *Politeia*, 248 D, E.

§ 7. 8. πρὸς τε τὴν ἀρχήν κτλ.] To these two legitimate ends of warfare is added a third c. 14 § 21, 1334 a 2 n. (918).

17. πρῶτον] First in importance.

14. κρίσιν] Under κρίσις the word *justice* is here included everything besides the administration of justice which belongs to the government of a state. Thus it includes the making of laws and the common action of the consultative and executive councils as well as of the officers of state. SUSEM. (803)

§ 8. 18. ὡς φαμέν] III. 1 § 12, cp. n. (447); IV(III) 5 § 11 n. (739); also n. (21) with the passages there quoted. The present phrase is equivalent to a reference to what has preceded, not only here but c. 10 § 9, n. (311), c. 12 § 4 n. (371), 14 § 2 n. (381). Any multitude of men taken at

random does not constitute a state; a mark which was made c. 4 § 6 n. (77) and repeated VII(7). 3. 11 n. (153) cf. SUSEM. (804).

§ 9. 20. κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας] must be organized in accordance with these occupations.

21. Cp. II. 8. 10, 1368 a 32 f.

23. κριτὰς] See above, § 7, p. 14, cp. n. c. 9. Exclusion from the number of the producing classes—artisans, traders, husbandmen. These who must not have different functions, according to age, military, governmental, and judicial status. This view holds of course not only the land: when incorporated, it becomes private.

This exclusion of the 'necessary occupations' from full civic rights was foreshadowed in the constitution of Plato's Republic, II. c. 3 §§ 48—49, and of Hippocratus, c. 8 §§ 8—10; it was laid down distinctly III. c. 3; see n. (104).

25 νωνητέον πάντων τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαν-  
 τας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους  
 καὶ δικάζοντας), ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους  
 ὑποθετέον, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
 § 2 ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταὐτὸ πολιτεία. καθάπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν,  
 30 ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων καὶ μὴ πάντας  
 πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολι-  
 τείας ἐτέρας· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι  
 § 3 πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τούναντίον. ἐπεὶ δὲ 2  
 τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη  
 35 δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστ' εὐδαιμόνων, τὴν δ'  
 εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται  
 πρότερον, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτεο-  
 μένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἄνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ  
 μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάνανσον βίον οὔτ' ἀγοραῖον  
 40 δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννῆς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς  
 § 4 τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος), οὐδὲ δεῖ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλ-

29 ταὐτὸ Susem., τοῦτο Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 32 μὲν omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || 37 κάλλιστα P<sup>4</sup>, καλλίστη II<sup>1</sup> || 40 ζῆν] ζη-  
 τεῖν Γ P<sup>5</sup> || 41 τὴν omitted by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. || δεῖ] δὴ II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk.

§ 1 25 τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαντας] This would be the case in democracies.

§ 2 29 καθάπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν] Just before, § 1, b 25 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κτλ. SUSEM. (805)

33 πάντων sc. ἔργων.

§ 3 34 αὕτη... 35 εὐδαιμόνων] Comp. c. I § 3 n. (686), c. 13 § 4 n. (872): also II. 9. 5 n. (284) and n. (21). For the wide range of πολιτεία, see n. (466). SUSEM. (806)

36 εἴρηται πρότερον] It was observed in Excursus I., n. (687), that this can be referred to c. 8 § 5, 1328 a 37, and does not therefore compel us to infer that cc. 1—3 originally formed an integral part of this treatise. Nay more: had the reference been to c. 1, the more appropriate term would have been ἀποδέδεικται, 'proved,' rather than εἴρηται 'stated.' Comp. further n. (872). SUSEM. (807)

38 ἀπλῶς] In contrast to the partial justice of oligarchy and democracy: III. 9.

39 πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν] Relatively to the constitution of the time being: under its conditions, taking its principle or special idea (ὅρος) for the standard. See III. 4. 3, 1276 b 30, VI(IV). 7. 2, 1293 b 3 ff.

τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, with n. (1233). Comp. also II. 9. 1 n. SUSEM. (808). Add VI(IV). c. 11 s. fin. 1296 b 9 ἂν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνη τις, but c. 16 § 1, 1300 b 14, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν, and *Meta*. XIII. (M) c. 7 § 30 1082 b 32 πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς. Bonitz *Ind.* Ar. 796 b 48 remarks that ὑπόθεσις does not differ much from τέλος or ὅρος. Apparently the meaning is the same here as a 22 ὑποθέσεως or II. 2. 1, 1261 a 16, λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν.

40 ἀγεννῆς] See III. c. 5, esp. *notes* (506, 509, 511). Cp. also n. (103) SUSEM. (809)

On the construction ὑπεναντίος πρὸς cp. II. 9. 1, 1269 a 32, § 18, 1270 a 40. For the thought Spengel has the parallel Demosth. *Olynth.* III § 32, p. 37, 10: ἔστι δ' οὐδέποτ', οἶμαι, μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα πράττοντας· ὁποῖ' ἅττα γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ᾗ, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ φρόνημ' ἔχειν. Cp. Burke: Great empires and little minds go ill together.

§ 4 1329 a 1 δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς] 'Lei-

λοντας ἔσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς). ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρίνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα, πότερον ἕτερα <ἐτέροις> καὶ ταῦτα θετίον ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω; φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, διότι τρόπον μὲν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόπον δὲ τινα καὶ ἐτέροις. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρας ἀκμῆς ἐκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐαῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἐτέροις. ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κωλύειν, τούτους ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους αἰεὶ, ταύτῃ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς. οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν.λείπεται τοίνυν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν

1329 a 1 πολιτας added after ἔσεσθαι by P<sup>1</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ar. Ald. W<sup>1</sup>, [πολίται] Susem.<sup>1</sup> <ἐτέροις> Koraes Bk.<sup>2</sup>; previously Schneider wrote ἐτέροις for ἕτερα c. 6 24] 24 II 11 δὲ untranslated by William, δεῖ? Götting <τοῖς αὐτοῖς> Camerarius Bk.<sup>2</sup> perhaps even Ar., τοῖς αὐτοῖς Γ II Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text 11 24] 24 I Ald. W<sup>1</sup> 13 ἀμφοτέρα? Susem. followed by Welldon, who nevertheless retains 14 ταύτην

sure is needed if virtue is to be forthcoming, as well as for the conduct of state affairs.' Contempt for labour goes side by side with exaltation of leisure: *n.* (93). The artizan, the farmer even, is too busy to cultivate virtue. Cp. Aelian *V. H.* κ. 16, ἡ ἀργία ἀδεύει τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐστὶ. From the Greeks this estimate passed to the Jews: see Ecclesiasticus c. 38, 24—34 (Newman).

3 βουλευόμενον...καὶ κρίνον] From ἀμφω a 6, it is clear that a single class is meant: a body which deliberates on questions of policy and decides questions of justice. Cp. § 9, a 31, τὸ τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν.

4 ἐνυπάρχει] 'are contained in the city as members in the fullest sense' and merely indispensable adjuncts.

6 ἀμφω—the functions (1) of the military class, (2) of the deliberative and judicial class.

§ 8 7 διότι—that (after φανερόν): as 1323 a 7 and often.

8 ἐτέρας ἀκμῆς] sc. ἐστὶ: belongs to a different time of life.

9 φρονήσεως] Cp. III. 4. 17 *n.* (497): αἰώων. (45, 112, 115, 474—476). SUSEM. (810)

ἢ δὲ κτλ] This is said to be σπάνιον αἴτιον, II. 5. 25, 1264 b 8. With the partitive genitive τῶν ἀδυνάτων cp. c. 6 § 4, 1327 a 27: in full ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων c. 14

§ 4, 1332 b 32.

11 ταύτῃ δὲ] Resumptive of the δὲ in a 9: 'in as far as it is impossible—in so far they must be the same.' When δὲ has preceded with the relative, it may for emphasis be repeated with the demonstrative. The idiom is found in Herod. ix 2, 11. 50, Thuc. III. 46, Xenophon, Hierocrates (*Paucor.* § 98, § 176), Plato (*Leg.* 194 b ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔσονται πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀπὲρ σοφοί, ἀ δὲ ἀμφοῖν, ταῦτα δὲ καὶ οἱ αἰεὶ) and Demosthenes (*i.* *Mid.* § 100, see Buttmann's *Exc.* 811.). Bionti, *Ind. Ar.* 166 b 28—167 a 12, and Susem. II. III. pp. 124—129, has disowned of the view formerly held (by Zell, Götting, etc.) that Aristotle in some cases used δὲ where other Greek prose writers introduced the aposlosis without any particle. The only valid instances are (1) after a conditional particle (1287 b 12 *n.*), (2) as ἀλλὰ occasionally far on in the sentence.

οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κτλ] Hence one of the favourite measures of tyrants was to forbid the use of arms VIII 1, 10 § 11, and II § 22 *nn.* (1667, 1734 *nn.*). See moreover Xen. *Cyr.* VII. 4. 79, Thuc. III. 27, the Demos in Mytilene obtained arms: ἐπεὶ δὲ λαβὼν ὅπλα οὐκ ἐκώλυον τοὺς ἀρχόντας (Katon). SUSEM. (811)

§ 6 13 τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην] 'hanc partem rei publicae administrandam' Bionti *Ind. Ar.* c. 4. 'It only remains to

πολιτείαν ταύτην, μὴ ἅμα δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ μὲν (V)  
 15 δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις  
 ἐστίν· οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νευεμῆσθαι συμφέρεи καὶ δίκαιον  
 § 7 [εἶναι]· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ 5  
 μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ <εἶναι> περὶ τούτους. ἀναγκαῖον  
 γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολῖται δὲ οὗτοι. τὸ  
 20 γὰρ βάνουσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν μέρος  
 ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργὸν ἐστίν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς  
 ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ  
 τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαν-  
 § 8 τας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φα-  
 25 νερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἶπερ ἀναγ-  
 καῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους [ἢ] περιοίκους.  
 λοιπὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος. 6  
 § 9 φανερά δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε  
 βάνουσον ἱερέα καταστατέον (ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει

14 [ταύτην] Thurot (unless the word be transposed to follow 16 ἀμφοῖν), τὴν αὐτὴν Ueberweg, ταῦτα Susem. Cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 402 f. || μὲν <γὰρ> Vettori in his translation || 16 ἐστίν] εἶναι (from l. 17) Lambin || 17 εἶναι was transposed to follow 18 τούτους by Camerarius, to follow 18 δεῖ by Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>; εἶναι δοκεῖ Γ P<sup>5</sup> Ar., εἶναι [δοκεῖ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, ἐστίν Lambin followed by Welldon || 18 <εἶναι> added by P<sup>5</sup> Bk., and so William Ar. translate || 20 μέρος] γένος Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. which is just as good || 25 ὅτι—εἶπερ] εἶπερ—ὅτι Hayduck || 26 [ἢ] Susem., cp. 1330 a 29 and *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 403 || 27 ἱερέων Γ P<sup>5</sup> L<sup>8</sup> Ar. Ald., ἱερώων the other authorities || 29 ἱερέα omitted by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), πολίτην supplied by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin

entrust this whole side of political life to both who are the same persons" (a lame conclusion): as if agriculture, trade, etc. were the other side, contrary to the teaching of cc. 8, 9. If however we adopt ἀμφοτέρα and ταῦτα (see *Crit. notes*), then τὴν πολιτείαν becomes the subject, not the object, of the verb ἀποδιδόναι. SUSEM.

17 ἔχει...ἀξίαν] "This division recognizes desert." See c. 14 § 4, 1332 b 35, which is a reference back to the present passage; n. (896). SUSEM. (812)

§ 7 18 <εἶναι> περὶ τούτους] Cp. § 8, a 25, εἶναι τούτων, § 9, a 33, τὴν ἀνάπασιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς. 'περὶ c. acc. rem significat ad quam aliqua actio referatur' Bonitz *Ind. Ar.*, who cites *Topics* II. 7. 5, 113 a 31, cp. 579 b 43 διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθήσεως = the sensation of sight. "The landed property must be in their hands."

19 Civic rights are not for the artisans, nor for any other class which is not employed upon the 'manufacture' of virtue.

21 ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως] We need not refer this to c. 1, it can be regarded as a reference to c. 8 § 5, 1328 a 37 ff., as was explained in n. (807). SUSEM. (813)

23 εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν] 'When we call a city happy, we have in view all the citizens and not merely a particular class.' Cp. II. 5. 27 n. (184). SUSEM. (814)

§ 8 φανερόν δὲ κτλ] It is certainly not a direct inference, that the soil should be cultivated by slaves or barbarians. But it follows indirectly if we mentally supply two propositions: (1) Aristotle's decision that the Greeks in general are not slaves by nature, so that they cannot be treated as serfs or half-free, n. (54); (2) his remarks, II. 9. 2 ff., 1269 a 36 ff., on the evil consequences attending the employment of serfs of Greek descent, Penestae, Helots, etc. *iii.* (280, 284). Further comp. c. 10 § 13 n. (839) and Exc. 'On the Cretan περίουκοι' p. 336 SUSEM. (815)

§ 9 33 περὶ αὐτοὺς must be περὶ τοὺς

τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς). ἐπεὶ δὲ διήρρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο (VIII) μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει (p. 101) δὲ τὴν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνίστασιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τοῖς τοῖς ἂν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον.

ὧν μὲν τοίνυν ἄνευ πόλεις οὐ συνίσταται καὶ ὅσα μέρη πόλεως, εἴρηται (γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν, καὶ κεχώρισται δι) τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος) [ἔοικε δὲ οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ 15

33 αὐτοὺς? Susem. | τοῦτοις Γ P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, for οὐ is written over an erasure) and Bk. | 34 τὰς ἱερωσύνας Ar. and Bas.<sup>2</sup>, ταῖς ἱερωσύναις Γ H Bk. | 35 γεωργόν τεχνίτας? Scaliger | 37 [ὑπάρχειν] Sprengel: the text can hardly be sound | 39 δὲ Schneider, δὴ Γ H Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text | 40 [ἔοικε δὲ οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ 15] Susem., [b 3 τὰ γε... 25 Σισώστριος] Chandler, [b 5 ἀρχαία... 25 Σισώστριος] Blegen: see Comm. and *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 404 ff.

θεοῖς; in their service (Welldon). But see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 404.

τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας] Those who are superannuated: upon the principle stated II. 9. 25, see *n.* (530). This is the solution of an apparent inconsistency; that in this, the only genuine aristocracy, *n.* (530), all citizens have equal rights, see *n.* (930), and yet aristocracy is the rule of a minority: III. 7 §§ 1—3, 15 §§ 9—10 *n.* (648), cf. III. 18. 1. For if the citizens of the ideal state must complete military service before admission, at the age of 35, into the popular assembly (c. 16 § 9 1335 a 30 ff., Exc. II.), and are not eligible to the Council or the offices of state (military commands excepted) till they are about fifty, while later on they are again released from all civic duties and lose all civic rights by becoming priests, it follows that it is only from his fiftieth to about his seventieth year that each citizen can have a share in the entire government and administration, as indeed was remarked *Introd.* p. 51, p. 54. For those twenty years only is he actually a full citizen, in the active exercise of his rights. This being so, the ruling body of full citizens will always remain, beyond all doubt, a minority of the civic body in the wider sense, including the soldiers and superannuated old men, even if the boys and youths are excluded. Comp. c. 13 § 9, 1337 a 34 ff. 18911, c. 14 §§ 4, 5. On the position

which the priests hold in relation to the magistrates proper see VII(IV). 15. 2 *n.* (1344), VII(VI). 8. 21 *n.* (1478). Susem. (816, 817)

35 ff. 'Thus we have given (1) the indispensable adjuncts and (2) the integral parts of a city: i.e. cultivators, artisans, and the whole class of labourers are adjuncts indispensable to cities, while the integral parts are the defensive force and the deliberative body. These elements are severally distinct, the distinction between integral parts and adjuncts being permanent, that between the army and the deliberative body only temporary.' A valuable summary of results.

c. 10 [*Historical digression* §§ 1—9.] *Particulars respecting the division and cultivation of the land* §§ 9—14.

The historical digression is apparently an interpolation by a well-informed Peripatetic. At all events the impression under which it labours (see *Exc.* notes) has not been dispelled by Sprengel's fond admiration of this "beautiful passage" (*Lehr- und Stud.* III. p. 3 *n.*), or by Newman's dispassionate survey, Vol. I. p. 373 f.

§ 1 40 οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ νεωστὶ] Possibly this is directed against Plato, and intended to prove that he was by no means the inventor of the picturesque fictionism wherein Aristotle here follows him. E. Curtius *History of Greece* 1<sup>st</sup> p. 181 (1. p. 181 Eng. tr.) even goes so far as to suppose that all the three "fictions" of the

πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διηρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη (1329 b τὴν πόλιν καὶ τό τε μάχιμον ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν. ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τε γὰρ ἔχει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔτι καὶ νῦν, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Αἴγυπτον 4 Σεσώστριος, ὡς φασίν, οὕτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ

1329 b 2 τε omitted by P<sup>2-5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup>, perhaps by Γ || τοῦτον after τὸν τρόπον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. and γρ. P<sup>1</sup> (corr. in the margin) || δὲ added after ἔτι by Π<sup>1</sup> (but corr. in the margin of P<sup>1</sup> marks it for omission γρ.) || 4 μένω Γ M<sup>s</sup>

Platonic state had actually existed in Crete:—an opinion which few people will accept. See II. 5. 16 n. (167). SUSEM. (818) Hippodamos (see II. 8. 2) also adopted this division between the military and agricultural population, which was always one of the main features of the Spartan state, II. 5. 17, 1264 a 10 note. A later historian finds a parallel to Plato's republic in the Indian state: Holm *Griech. Gesch.* III. p. 185.

41 γένη] Classes, castes. Seven in Egypt are enumerated by Herod. II. 164: *ιερείς* (*ib.* c. 37, 143), *μάχιμοι* (c. 165), *βουκόλοι* (c. 65), *συβῶται* (c. 47), *κάπηλοι*, *κυβερνήται*, *ἐρμηνέες* c. 154). See however E. Meyer *Gesch. des Alterthums* I. § 53, p. 61, § 471, p. 565.

1329 b 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν] An instance of the idiomatic use of the particle οὖν not illative, at the beginning of a sentence, but explanatory and distributive, introducing a subordinate clause: “μὲν οὖν saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronuntiata amplius explicatur” Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v. The stock instance is *Poet.* c. 22 § 4, 1458 a 23: ἀλλὰ ἂν τις ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσῃ, ἣ αἰνιγμα ἔσται ἣ βαρβαρισμός, ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αἰνιγμα, ἂν δ' ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός. Vahlen *Beiträge* III. 317 f. points out that this sentence should not be divided by a colon or period after the first βαρβαρισμός. So closely is the whole connected that the clause ἂν μὲν οὖν serves simply to distribute the preceding clause into its parts, explaining τοιαῦτα by ἐκ μεταφορῶν and ἐκ γλωττῶν. Consequently οὖν is not illative: a simple μὲν and δὲ would have sufficed (as in the present passage they do suffice below § 2, b 6 f. τὰ μὲν...τὰ δὲ...). Vahlen classifies the present passage and *Soph. El.* 6. 15, 169 a 19, as precisely similar. He admits *Categ.* 2 § 1, 1 a 17, *Top.* 105 b 21, 108 b 9, b 38 to be not very different: while *Pol.* I. 2. 8, 1252 b 29 (see *Crit. note*), IV(VII). 17. 8, 1336 b 4, b 6 (ὅλως μὲν οὖν...μάλιστα μὲν οὖν), and VIII(V). 12. 8, 1316 a 8 are

somewhat dissimilar. Perhaps *De Rep. Athen.* c. 43 § 3, p. 111, 6 K.<sup>1</sup>, but Harpocration omits οὖν.

4 Σεσώστριος] The Greeks were accustomed to refer all manner of Egyptian institutions to this celebrated king, in whom they seem to have combined (see Duncker *History of Antiquity*, I.<sup>5</sup> 134—158, Eng. tr. 1877, pp. 142—159) two real kings, Sethos I. (1439—1388 B.C.) and Ramses II. (1388—circa 1350), just as all Spartan institutions were attributed to Lycurgus, and all Cretan institutions to Minos. In reality the caste-system, or rather the organization of the Egyptian population (Duncker I.<sup>5</sup> 191 f., Eng. tr. pp. 197—200) existed long before these two kings, and in germ at any rate goes back to the earliest records of Egyptian history. SUSEM. (819)

“The monuments prove that there was no such thing as caste, in the strict sense of the term, in Egypt. The son might, and usually did, follow the father's calling: professions and offices of state were often inherited. But there is no evidence of compulsion, or of obligation to marry only in a given caste”: A. Wiedemann on Herod. II. 164, *Herodots zweites Buch* p. 573, who quotes Plato *Tim.* 23, 24, Isocr. *Busiris* 6—8, Diod. I. 73 f., I. 28, Strabo XVII. p. 787. Cp. *Les castes en Egypte* in *Le Muséon*, 1886. Also E. Meyer *Gesch. des alten Aegyptens* (Berlin 1887) II. p. 169. Meyer (*ib.* p. 292) doubts whether Ramses II. really corresponds to Sesostris, any more than User-tesen II. (as supposed by Manetho), or indeed any one military conqueror more than another among the kings. Wiedemann however (*Aegyptische Geschichte* p. 429 f.) follows Lepsius in regarding Ramses II. as the nucleus, around whom, as around Alexander the Great, legends collected. Cp. Ranke *Weltgesch.* I. p. 26, Maspero *Genre ép.* p. 83: ‘Setsû, var. Setsû-râ, le nom populaire de Rhamsès II.’

Of Aristotle Wiedemann says (*Gesch.* p. 117): “the three notices dealing with

2 *περὶ Κρήτην. ἀρχαία δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ*  
*τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην, γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βα-*  
*σιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῶ παλαιότερα τοῖς*  
3 *των. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγιοι τῶν ἐκεῖ κατοικοῦντων Ἰταλόν*  
*τινα γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οἰνωτρίας, ἀφ' οὗ τό τε ὄνομα*  
10 *μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλοὺς ἀντ' Οἰνωτρῶν κληθῆναι καὶ τὴν*  
*ἀκτὴν ταύτην τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἰταλίαν τοῦνομα λαβεῖν, ὅση*  
*τετύχηκεν ἐντὸς οὖσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλαητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ*  
*Λαμητικοῦ· ἀπέχει δὲ ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὁδὸν ἡμι-*  
4 *σείας ἡμέρας. τοῦτον δὲ λέγουσι τὸν Ἰταλὸν νομάδας τοὺς*  
5 *Οἰνωτροὺς ὄντας ποιῆσαι γεωργούς, καὶ νόμους τε αὐτοῖς ἄλ-*  
*λους θέσθαι καὶ τὰ συσσίτια καταστήσαι πρῶτον· διὸ*  
*καὶ νῦν ἔτι τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινὲς χρῶνται τοῖς συσσιτίοις*  
*καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις. ὥκουν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρη-*

8 Λόγιοι Γ<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup>, λογικοὶ P<sup>1</sup> § 13 Ναπετίνον ? Sylburg (from Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1. 35) § δὲ] γάρ II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. § 15 τε αὐτοῖς ἄλλοις M<sup>2</sup>, τ' ἄλλοις αὐτοῖς P<sup>6</sup>, ἄλλοις τε αὐτοῖς P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. § 18 τυρρηίαν M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup>. 1-4 S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and perhaps Γ

the country leave a good impression: yet the statement that the division into castes originated with Sesostris does not diverge from the current erroneous tradition. It would seem that Aristotle can hardly have made independent researches on Egypt in detail."

**Μίνω δὲ τὰ περὶ Κρήτην]** The division of the Cretan population is mentioned II. 5. 19, 1264 a 21, *u.* (171), c. 10 §§ 1-8 with Exc. III. p. 336 ff. SUSEM. (820)

§ 2 5 *τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις]* The system of public meals, as *ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας*, II. 11. 2, 1272 b 30: cp. also II. 5. 5, 1263 a 23.

6 *περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν]* Compare again II. 10 § 3, § 5, § 7, § 9. SUSEM. (821)

§ 3 8 *οἱ λόγιοι]* II. 8. 1, 1267 b 28. Comp. Antiochus *Frag.* 3. 4. 6, Muller *F. H. G.* 1. p. 181 f. SUSEM. (822)

*Ἰταλόν τινα... 15 γεωργούς]* Antiochus (*Frag.* 6 apud Strab. vi. 254 f.) however calls the Lametic gulf the Napetine: the name common in later times is ὁ Ἰταπιασιακός. This gulf is in the south-west of Italy, in Bruttium, and is now Golfo di S. Eufemia: just opposite to it, on the east coast, is the Scylletic Gulf or Golfo di Squillaci. Strabo describes them as 160 stadia [i.e. 18 miles 660 yds.] apart, rather more than half a day's journey. The name Italy was then

originally confined to the south-west promontory of the peninsula, between the strait of Messina on the one side and these two gulfs on the other. Oenotria means Wine-land, Italia the Ox, or calf: Italy, the land of Oxen. The ox used for ploughing must be meant, a symbol of the transition of the Graeco-Italians from a pastoral to an agricultural life; and this, one of the oldest legends of the Italian race, shrewdly connects the original Italian legislation with the transition. Another version of the same belief makes the ox the leader of the primitive Samnite colonies; while the oldest national names in Latin distinguish the people as *sepiers* (Siculi perhaps also Saeani) or *field-labourers* (Osci). See Mommsen, *History of Rome* 1. p. 21 f. *Eng.* II. Thucydides vi. 2-4 calls this king Italus not an Oenotrian but a Saeid. For the name Europe, see c. 7 § 2, *u.* 1270. SUSEM. (823)

§ 4 16 *καὶ τὰ συσσίτια]* There is no other authority for this statement of common meals in Italy. SUSEM. (824)

*διὸ καὶ νῦν 17 χρῶνται]* The language is undoubtedly the echo of II. 10. 3, 1271 b 30 *διὸ καὶ νῦν αἱ πόλεις τὰς αὐτὰς ἐπιτάς χρῶνται ἀεὶ καὶ*. But we hesitate to draw the inference that here, as there, an extract from Ephorus follows (Newman 1. p. 374 n. 2).

§ 5 18 *ῥέουν δὲ καὶ]* Have the in-

19 νίαν Ὀπικοὶ καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καλούμενοι τὴν ἑπώνυ- (I)  
 20 μίαν Αὔσωνες, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν Ἴόνιον  
 Χῶνες, τὴν καλουμένην Σιρίτιν· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χῶνες  
 § 6 Οἰνωτροὶ τὸ γένος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐντεῦθεν  
 γέγονε πρῶτον, ὁ δὲ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ (P)  
 24 πλήθους ἐξ Αἰγύπτου· πολλὸν γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν

20 αὔσωνες M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>4.5</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 21 χάωνες (χάωνες S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup>) Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. || Σιρίτιν Götting Bk.<sup>2</sup>, *Syrtem* William, *σύρτην* P<sup>5</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand), *σύρτιν* the other authorities Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text and P<sup>3</sup> (later hand), *Σίριν* Heyne (*Orusc.* II. 211, 235) from Arist. *Frag.* 542, 1568 b 11 ff. (*Σίριν* is the correct accentuation.) || χάωνες Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar.

terpolator has taken the opportunity to air his historic knowledge, for this whole passage has nothing whatever to do with the point he wants to prove. The nearest neighbours of the Oenotrians or Itali on the north-west and north-east only, are mentioned here. At any rate this must be supposed to have been the writer's intention, if indeed the mention of these places has any meaning at all. The name of the one, Opici, is the same as the Opisci or Oscans, explained in *n.* (823). Why the Greeks called them Ausonians we cannot tell. Iapygia denotes what was afterwards called Apulia and Calabria. The Siris is a river in the south-east of Lucania. His inclusion of the Chonians among the Oenotrians is another proof of the author's agreement with Antiochus (*Frag.* 6, *n.* 823). But the Oscans were not near neighbours of that oldest Italy; even according to the account given by the interpolator they lived south of Tyrrhenia (Etruria) in Latium, and more especially in Campania, north of the Gulf of Paestum. Cp. Arist. *Frag.* 567 [558 Arist. *pseudep.* = 609 ed. Teubn.] in Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I. 72 where Latium is described as a region in Ὀπικε, τὸν τόπον τοῦτον τῆς Ὀπικῆς, ὃς καλεῖται Λάτιον (Eaton). But Antiochus goes on to say that the name Italy, and probably also the earlier name Oenotria, had first been extended further north as far to the north-west as the river Laos which flows through the south-west of Lucania and to the north-east as far as the plain of the Siris and Metapontum, situated to the north of this plain in the north-east part of Lucania; so that Tarentum, which is not far east of Metapontum, was still included in Iapygia; for he tells us, the country round the plain of the Siris had been inhabited by a great

Oenotrian tribe, the Chonians, who gave it the name Chonē. Thus the whole of the west coast of this region newly added to the old designation Italy is washed by the Terinaic Gulf, of which the Hipponiatic in the extreme south is only a particular bay. Thucydides' use of the word Italy quite accords with this, for he includes Metapontum in Italy, but makes it the boundary towards Iapygia (VII. 33 § 3), while he appears to include Tarentum in Iapygia (VI. 44 § 2) and places Campanian Cuma in Opicia (VI. 4 § 5). Herodotos (I. 167) even extends the designation Oenotria beyond the Laos and the Terinaic Gulf, so that Elea also is included in it. The country of the Opici would then touch this enlarged Italy on the north-west, but unfortunately in our present passage there is no mention of this extension of the name; and, besides, the Chonian territory is not said to border on this enlarged Italy or Oenotria, but is itself included in it. The whole passage is therefore doubtless a wretched interpolation, and as such would have to be removed from the rest, if that really belonged to Aristotle. But it will be shown in *notes* (829, 830) that the whole passage §§ 1—9 has been added by another hand, and that its author, one of the oldest Peripatetics, though he has drawn from good historical sources, may yet have written this sentence, in which he has certainly made very bad use of them. SUSEM. (825)

§ 6 24. πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει κτλ.] As shown in *n.* (819). SUSEM. (826)

τοῖς χρόνοις] The plural as in VI(IV). 6 § 5, 1293 a 1, and in the suspected chapter II. 12 § 7, 1274 a 30: more usually as in VI(IV). 3 § 3, VIII(V). 4 § 1. Another instance is *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 12 § 2, 1161 b 25, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις.



- § 7 Μίνω βασιλείαν ἢ Σεσώστριος. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ (I  
 26 ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὐρήσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ,  
 μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρεῖαν  
 εἰκὸς διδάσκειν αὐτήν, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιου-  
 30 σιν· ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἶεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν  
 § 8 ἔχειν τρόπον. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ 5  
 Αἴγυπτον ἐστίν· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρχαιοτάτοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,  
 νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασιν <ἀεὶ> καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς  
 μὲν εἰρημένοις ἱκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα  
 35 πειρᾶσθαι ζητεῖν.  
 § 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὅπλα κεκτη-  
 μένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἴρηται πρότε-  
 ρον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργοῦντας αὐτῶν ἐτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ  
 πόσῃν τινὰ χρῆ καὶ ποίαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν·] περὶ δὲ τῆς 6  
 40 διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργούντων, τίνας καὶ ποίους εἶναι χρῆ,  
 λεκτέον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε κοινὴν φάμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὴν

28 εἰκὸς after διδάσκειν II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 30 τὰ omitted by Γ and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 31 δὲ] γὰρ ? Susem. || 33 <ἀεὶ> Bernays and Susem. independently, <πρῶτοι> ? Schneider || 34 εὐρημένοις Lambin Bk.<sup>2</sup>, apparently right || 36 τῶν <τὰ> Spengel || 41 δεῖν after εἶναι II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

27 μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις] Cp. the well known passage *Meteorol.* I. 3 § 8, 339 a 29, οὐ γὰρ δὴ φήσομεν ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δις οὐδ' ὀλιγάκις τὰς αὐτὰς δόξας ἀνακυκλεῖν γινομένας ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἀπειράκις.

§ 7 27 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα] Comp. n. (795) on c. 8 § 1. SUSEM. (827)

28 τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην κτλ] All these ideas are certainly genuinely Aristotelian: see II. 5 § 16, 1264 a 3 with n. (167) and *Meta.* I. I. § 15, 981 b 17 ff.: esp. b 20 ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐρέθησαν. But see n. (829). SUSEM. (828)

§ 8 34 τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα πειρᾶσθαι ζητεῖν] How can that be done, if everything has been already discovered? It is hardly possible to attribute this paradox to Aristotle. The intermediate link is wanting, which explains that what has been already discovered may be lost in oblivion and therefore require to be rediscovered. SUSEM. (829) Cp. Plato *Latws* 630 E of legislators: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἕκαστος ἐν χρεῖᾳ γίγνηται, τοῦτο ζητεῖ νῦν παραθέμενος. But Waitz compares the end of the *Torics*, 184 b 6—8.

§ 9 36 ὅτι μὲν οὖν...39 χώραν] If we compare this new recapitulation with the one given above in c. 9 § 10, it is clear that it passes over everything intermediate, as not containing anything peculiar or important for the course of the inquiry, but as seeking historic confirmation partly for what is affirmed in c. 9 and partly, with an eye to what is coming, for the syssitia, which do not come up for discussion until 10 § 10; like the former recapitulation, it summarizes everything discussed before c. 10. But while the former is rightly confined to the contents of the two preceding chapters, with which alone what follows (6—9) is connected, the latter wrongly passes over the passage c. 5 § 4—c. 6 § 7, as though none of it were there at all, and goes back to the subject-matter of c. 5 §§ 1—3, although this has no immediate connexion with what follows. We can clearly detect the interpolator, who has framed this second recapitulation, so entirely out of place here, with the sole object of fastening his own composition (i.e. c. 10 §§ 1—8) on Aristotle's treatise. SUSEM. (830)

41 φάμεν] II. 5 §§ 4—9 *nn.* (156, 156 b,

κτῆσιν, ὥσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς (IX)  
 γινόμενῃ κοινῇ, οὐτ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφῆς.  
 10 περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὖ  
 κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν συν-  
 5 δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. δεῖ δὲ τούτων κοινωνεῖν  
 πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐ ράδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν  
 ἰδίων τε εἰσφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἀλ-  
 λην οἰκίαν. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοινὰ  
 11 πάσης τῆς πόλεως ἐστίν. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν εἰς δύο μέρη  
 διηρῆσθαι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κοινὴν τὴν δὲ τῶν  
 ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἑκατέραν διηρῆσθαι διῆχα πάλιν, τῆς  
 μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μέρος εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς  
 λειτουργίας τὸ δὲ ἕτερον εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην,  
 τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχα-  
 5 τιαῖς, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κλήρων ἐκάστη  
 γεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν. τό-  
 τε γὰρ ἴσον οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς

1330 a 2 γινόμενῃ Congreve, γινόμενῃ < γίνεσθαι > Susem.<sup>2</sup>, γινόμενῃ F H Ar. Bk.  
 Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text | 4 δοκεῖ? Susem. | 14 τὸ μὲν ἕτερον Stob. p. 331 and Paeli.  
 2042 | τὸ after μέρος omitted by Stob. | ταῖς ἐσχατιαῖς Stob., προφύταις παλαι-  
 ῶτες William Ar. Suid. and Phot. notice this passage s. v. ἐσχατιαί | 15 ἕτερον  
 δὲ τὸ] τὸ δὲ ἕτερον Stob. | τῇ πόλει Stob. | ἐκάστη F<sup>4</sup>, ἐκάστη L' All. W<sup>8</sup>

138), 9 III 2—4 n. (179), 11 § 10 n. (193).  
 Compare also II. 6 § 10—14 n. (211);  
 IV(VII). 9 II 3, 7, 8. The same use of  
 the present, *φαίμεν*, as in c. 8 § 8 n. (844),  
 and below c. 13 § 4 n. (1711), c. 14 § 8 n.  
 (900). SUSEM. (831)

1330 a 1 τινὲς] Plato alone is meant by  
 this. SUSEM. (832) See n. on 1261 a 6.

οὐτ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα] A condition  
 upon which special stress is laid in the  
 criticism of Carthage cited n. (831): *εἰ  
 ἔστιν γὰρ τοῦθ' ὅπῃ ἐστι τῶν ἀναγκαιο-  
 τῶν, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνανται σχολάζειν  
 καὶ ἀσπῆς ἀρχαῖαν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀρχαῖαν  
 ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ ἰδιωτισμοῦ, 1313 a 31 ff.*

§ 10 γ συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι] As e.g. Plato  
*Legis* 784 a, *ἵνα μὲν ἑκάστη ἐκ πα-  
 τριᾶς τὸ νόμισμα*, Xen. *De Rep. Lat.* c. 5.

ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν] An unfulfilled pro-  
 mise: *Infat.* p. 49 n. (4) and p. 53.  
 SUSEM. (833)

δεῖ δὲ τούτων ἅ αἰσταν] "Now all  
 the citizens must take part in these  
 exactions), but it is not easy to arrange  
 that poor men should contribute their  
 quota from their own means and at the

same time pay all that is needed for  
 their own housekeeping as well." See II.  
 9 § 31 n. (113), 10 § 8 n. (1252). Compare  
 also n. (113) on II. 3. c. 844. (894)  
 For τὸ κοινόμενον cp. II. 10 § 2. 1171  
 a 15.

8 κοινὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεως] "The  
*Polis* takes for granted the main-  
 tenance, even in the best state, of the  
 popular faith and the traditional wor-  
 ship" (Newman). Comp. n. (830).

§ 11 13 εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δα-  
 πάνην] This is precisely the solution  
 which the criticism in Book II indicated;  
 see n. on 8 § 3 (1251), 9 § 31 (1251), 10  
 § 8 (1252).

14 τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν 16 μετέχο-  
 σιν] See II. 6 § 13 n. (1252). SUSEM.  
 (835) The lands nearest to the city would  
 possess many advantages over those more  
 remote.

16 τό τε γὰρ ἴσον 16 καὶ δίκαιον] Comp.  
 Thus. I. 110 § 2 (the various members of  
 the Peloponnesian confederacy), c. 61  
 § 3 (the Achaean); the Book of Num-  
 bers c. 31 (the tribes beyond Jordan), as

- § 12 ἀστυγείτονας πολέμους ὁμονοητικώτερον. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ τοῦτον (II)  
 ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους  
 20 ἔχθρας, οἱ δὲ λίαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλόν. διὸ  
 παρ' ἐνίοις νόμος ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τοῖς ὁμόροις μὴ συμ-  
 μετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὥς διὰ τὸ ἴδιον  
 οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους βουλευσασθαι καλῶς.
- § 13 τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν ἀνάγκη διηρῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον  
 25 διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας· τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας μάλιστα μέν, 9  
 εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχὴν, δούλους εἶναι, μήτε ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε  
 θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἶεν χρήσιμοι  
 καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν ἀσφαλεῖς), δεύτερον δὲ  
 29 βαρβάρους περιοίκους παραπλησίους τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν φύ-  
 § 14 σιν, τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν [ιδίους] ἐν τοῖς ἰδίους εἶναι ἰδίους  
 τῶν κεκτημένων τὰς οὐσίας, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινούς.  
 τίνα δὲ δεῖ τρόπον χρῆσθαι δούλοις, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι τοῖς  
 δούλοις ἄθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.
- 11 τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεῖ κοινὴν εἶναι τῆς ἡπείρου τε X  
 35 καὶ τῆς θαλάττης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἀπάσης ὁμοίως ἐκ τῶν  
 ἐνδεχομένων, εἴρηται πρότερον· αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι

19 τῆς] τὴν Π<sup>3</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || 20 ἔχθραν Π<sup>3</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || διὸ παρ'] διόπερ Π<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly ||  
 22 βουλῆς] τιμῆς Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 26 εἰ δεῖ] εἴδει Sylburg, δεῖ Schneider, εἰ <εἶναι> δεῖ  
 Spengel, possibly rightly || ὁμοφύλους πάντας—27 θυμοειδεῖς Schneider, hardly  
 right || 29 <ῆ> περιοίκους Schneider, cp. 1329 a 26 || 30 ἰδίου before ἐν  
 omitted by P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ar., the second ἰδίου omitted by Γ P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 34 τὲ Ald., τὰς P<sup>3</sup>  
 T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 35 θαλάττης M<sup>s</sup>, θαλάσσης the other authorities Bk. Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 36 αὐτὴν]  
 αὐτὴν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || εἶναι... 37 δῆ] εἰ κατ' εὐχὴν δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν,  
 τὴν θέσιν πρὸς τέτταρα \* \* δῆ (δεῖ Schneider Susem.<sup>2</sup>) Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, wrongly, *si ad votum*

cited by editors. Moreover for §§ 11, 12 generally see II. 6 § 14 n. (211). SUSEM. (836)

§ 13 26 εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχὴν] Compare the passages collected in n. (128) on II. 1 § 1. SUSEM. (837)

μήτε ὁμοφύλων] So Plato *Latius* VI. 777 D cp. μήτε πατριώτας ἀλλήλων εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ῥῆον δουλεύσειν ἀσυμφώνους τε εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα. Comp. Ps.-Ar. *Oecon.* I. 5 §§ 5, 6, 1344 b 11 ff., esp. b 18 καὶ μὴ κτᾶσθαι ὁμοεθνεῖς πολλούς (Schneider). SUSEM. (838)

μήτε θυμοειδῶν] The same expression II. 5. § 25, 1264 b 9, see n. (182); there "men of spirit," here "passionate." Compare what is said of θυμός in notes on III. 16 § 1 (64), IV(VII). 7 § 5 (786), § 7 (790). SUSEM. (839)

28 δεύτερον δὲ] Comp. c. 9 § 8 n.

(815), also notes on II. 9. 4 (282) and Exc. III. on the Cretan περίοικοι p. 338. SUSEM. (840)

32 διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι... ἐλευθερίαν] A new contradiction in Aristotle's theory of slavery. For slaves by nature, as in the best state actual slaves or serfs can only be, must logically remain slaves for ever. However comp. Ps.-Ar. *Oecon.* I. 5 § 5 f., 1344 b 14 ff. χρῆ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὡρίσθαι πᾶσιν· δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κείσθαι ἄθλον. SUSEM. (841)

33 ὕστερον] an unfulfilled promise: *Introd.* pp. 49, 53. SUSEM. (842)

cc. 11, 12. *The city: regulations in detail for the site, the water-supply, the plan of the streets, the fortifications, and the two Agorai.* Cp. *Analysis* p. 115.

§ 1 36 εἴρηται πρότερον] In c. 5 §§ 3, 4. SUSEM. (843)

27 τὴν θέσιν εὔχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέ- (30)  
 2 ποντας. πρῶτον μὲν, ὥς ἀναγκαῖον, πρὸς ὑγίαιαν (αἱ τε  
 γὰρ πρὸς ἔω τὴν ἐγκλισιν ἔχουσιν καὶ πρὸς τὰ πικρὰ καὶ  
 40 τὰ πνέοντα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς ὑγιεινότεραι, δεύτερον δὲ  
 κατὰ βορέαν· εὐχίμεροι γὰρ αὐταὶ μᾶλλον)· τῶν δὲ λοι- 2

*oportet adipisci positionem, quattuor utique cardinales* William, who doubtless translates a gloss. εἶναι omitted by P<sup>2</sup>. [εἶναι] Bk.<sup>2</sup> (perhaps rightly). cf. *dei* Welldon, who transposes 37 εὔχεσθαι δεῖ to follow κατατυγχάνειν (wrongly). Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v. suspects that κατατυγχάνειν is corrupt. 37 εὔχεσθαι] ἀρχεσθαι M<sup>1</sup>. εἰς omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied by P<sup>1</sup>). δὴ omitted by H Bk., *dei*? Schneider, \* \* *dei* Sussem.<sup>1</sup> 38 αἱ τε] *are* P<sup>2</sup> S<sup>b</sup>, αἱ Π<sup>1</sup>, αἱ [τε] Sussem.<sup>1</sup>, αἱ μὲν Koraes (needlessly). 40 δὲ = αἱ Koraes, certainly necessary; perhaps δ' αἱ is better. 41 κατὰ βορέαν Lindau; but Schneider shows that κατὰ βορέαν has the same sense. εὐχίμεροι] *κατά* Sussem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, *recentiores* William, *εὐδίοροι* Muretus, *εὐδίοροι* Becker, approved by Sussem.<sup>1</sup>, —all resting upon misapprehension of κατὰ βορέαν.

αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι...κατατυ-  
 χάνειν...37 βλέποντας] The construction of the infinitives εἶναι, κατατυγχάνειν is disputed, and Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v. suspects the latter word. Busse (*op. c.* p. 17) compares (as Gottling had done) phrases like ἐκὼν εἶναι and the like: he thinks an object of the verb κατατυγχάνειν can be supplied without trouble from what follows. On the contrary, if κατατυγχάνειν is sound, it is on this verb that the accus. with infinitive τὴν θέσιν εἶναι must depend: this construction already given in Passow's lexicon has lately been proposed anew by Dr Jowett (= τοῦ θέσιν εἶναι). To this Sussemihl objects: "at non hoc ostendendum est ut τὴν θέσιν accipiat urbs, sed τὴν ἐπιτηδεύαν θέσιν vel τὴν θέσιν ὡς δὲ, quod ut subaudiri posset e verbis πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέπονται, scribendum potius erat fere sic: αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν θέσιν κατατυγχάνειν. Aut igitur lacuna deformatum esse videtur locus aut, quae est Bonitzii suspicio, κατατυγχάνειν corruptum. Omnia bene se haberent, si < τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύαν > vel < τοῦ ὅαν δεῖ > εἶναι legatur, sed in re tam incerta praestat a coniecturis abstinere." Mr Welldon's proposal is met by the inquiry, Can κατατυγχάνειν govern an accusative? and if it can, would it not be easier to omit εἶναι with P<sup>2</sup>? (See *Quintil. crit. vol.* p. 407, of which the foregoing is an abstraction.) 41 KORAES.

37 εὔχεσθαι] Another of the passages omitted in H. (128) on II. I. 1. SUSSEM.<sup>1</sup> (1844).

§ 2 38 αἱ τε γὰρ...40 ὑγιεινότεραι] Similarly Hippocrates *De acut.* I. p. 325 H.

Kuhn. In Greece, east winds bring rain, thus moderating the heat and purifying the air: cp. *Metam.* II. 6. 70, 364 b 19 l., *Problema.* XXVI. 56. *Quint.* I. 6. 9, 1345 a 31 H., *Thuc.* III. 24. 2. Aristophanes *Wasps* 265 speaks of the north wind as rainy, and so also Thucydides *De ventis* § 4: like the trade winds, he adds, which are described sometimes as north-east and sometimes as north-west winds. Socrates in Xen. *Memor.* III. 9. 9 and Xenophon himself (*Quint.* c. 9 § 4 in passage almost literally copied Pseudo-Arist. *Quint.* I. c. as Schiesser remarked) prefer a house with a south aspect (*Enchirid.* SUSSEM. 1845).

Add Plutarch *De superstitione* c. 1. 318 c: ὡς περ τῆς εὐνῆς τετραπλὴ πρὸς γῆρας ἀναστὰς κατακλίνει καὶ τὴν εὐνὴν ἐκκλίνει δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περσέως ἀνακλίνει, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς ἐκκλίνει καὶ τὴν εὐνὴν καὶ τοῦ Χαιρέως. The east wind is spoken of as warm (*Probl.* XXVI. 31, 943 b 24 (Nesemann)).

41 κατὰ βορέαν] Under the north wind, and so protected from it, i.e. with south aspect. Cp. *Quint.* I. 6. 8, 1345 a 32: κατὰ βορέαν εἶναι, Plato *Cratylus* 118 a, 81: πρὸς τῆς εὐνῆς τετραπλὴ πρὸς τὴν ἀνατολὴν κατακλίνει (J. G. Schneider). Hippocrates however preferred a north aspect as next best to an east aspect. SUSSEM. (1846).

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν] What are the four points to be observed, a 36? Health first, a 38; two more are suggested by the words πρὸς τὰς τετραπλὴς τετραπλὴ καὶ τετραπλὴ καὶ τὴν εὐνὴν: the one which still remains is, in all probability, *sanitas*.

1330 b πῶν \* \* \* πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς (X)  
 § 3 ἔχειν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον  
 εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον,  
 ὑδάτων δὲ καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλήθος (P).  
 5 οἰκείον, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῦτό γε εὔρηται διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζειν  
 ὑποδοχὰς ὀμβρίοις ὕδασιν ἀφθόνοους καὶ μεγάλας, ὥστε  
 μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ πόλεμον.  
 § 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ περὶ ὑγείας φροντίζειν τῶν ἐνοικούντων, τοῦτο 3  
 δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κείσθαι τὸν τόπον ἔν τε τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς  
 10 τοιούτον καλῶς, δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι, καὶ  
 τούτου τὴν ἐμπιμέλειαν ἔχειν μὴ παρέργως. οἷς γὰρ πλείστοις  
 χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλείστον  
 συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ὑγίαν. ἡ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ  
 § 5 πνεύματος δύναμις ταύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν. διόπερ ἐν  
 15 ταῖς εὖ φρονούσαις δεῖ διωρίσθαι πόλεσιν, εἰ μὴ πάνθ'

1330 b 1 <πρὸς μὲν τὸν κόσμον \* \*, τὸ δὲ μέγιστόν ἐστι τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως> πρὸς,  
 or something similar, ? Susem. || 2 μὲν after αὐτοῖς is omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> and not trans-  
 lated by Ar.; hence [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 4 δὲ Γ P<sup>5</sup> Ar., τε M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 5 εὔρηται  
 εὐρήσθαι Lambin Bk.<sup>2</sup>, but Schneider thought another verb required: τηρῆσαι for γε  
 εὔρηται ? Susem.<sup>2</sup>, needlessly; cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 408 || 6 ὀμβρίους ὕδασιν M<sup>8</sup>  
 P<sup>1-3-4</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald., ὀμβρίους ὕδατος P<sup>2</sup>, *aquarum imbrium* William, ὀμβρίου ὕδατος or  
 ὀμβρίων ὑδάτων ? Susem.<sup>2</sup> || 7 ἐπιλείπειν Koraes Bk.<sup>2</sup>, needlessly || εἰργομένους  
 Madvig || 8 ἐπεὶ εἴπερ Böcker, transposing εἴπερ...17 χρείαν to precede τῶν δὲ  
 λοιπῶν 1330 a 41 || 9 δεῖ <καὶ> ? Susem. || 10 καὶ τούτου <δεῖ> Schneider,  
 <δεῖ> καὶ τούτου Welldon, 11 ἔχειν <δεῖ> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>. But if a verb is required  
 (instead of understanding δεῖ in the apodosis from b 9 the protasis) χρῆσθαι, <χρή>  
 καὶ is more obvious || 11 τούτου] τούτων Welldon, wrongly || πλείστους P<sup>3-4</sup> ||  
 14 τοιαύτην Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk.

of situation. See ἡδίω 1330 b 22, κόσμον  
 b 31, εὐχαρις 1331 a 36, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν  
 κόσμον a 38. If the mention of this has  
 been lost after λοιπῶν we may perhaps  
 supply it, as suggested in the *Critical*  
*notes*, and render the whole: "of the  
 remaining points, <regard for the beauty  
 of the town is indeed important, but far  
 more important> that it should be well  
 situated for the needs of civil administra-  
 tion and for military purposes." See  
*Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 408. SUSEM. (847)  
 § 3 1330 b 2 πρὸς μὲν οὖν κτλ.]  
 Again from the same point of view as  
 c. 5 § 3, 1326 b 41: see n. (767).  
 SUSEM. (848)

4 ὑδάτων] The water supply of Greek  
 towns was often scanty enough (Mahaffy):  
 that of Antioch was wonderfully good:  
 Liban. I. 354 R. Strabo, too (p. 235),

commends the Romans for their attention  
 to this requirement (Newman). Cp. Pl.  
*Laus* 779 c.

5 τοῦτό γε εὔρηται] See *Oecon.* II.  
 2. 22, 1350 a 17, εὐρεῖν=assequi; though  
 τοῦτο is a little strange, the sense must  
 be "thus what is required has been at-  
 tained." Cp. c. 13 § 2, 1331 b 29.  
 SUSEM.

7 'Recte Ridgewayus ὕδατα subiec-  
 tum esse monet et εἰργομένους obiectum  
 verbi ὑπολείπειν' *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 408  
 SUSEM. That this is Aristotle's regular  
 use of the verb is plain from *Rhet.* I. 13.  
 20, 1374 a 33, ὑπολείπει γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰὼν  
 διαριθμοῦντα, and III. 17. 21, 1418 a 35,  
 οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος (Ridgeway).

§§ 4, 5. These suggestions are emi-  
 nently sound and practical.

ὅμοια μὴτ' ἀφθονία τοιούτων ἢ ναμάτων, χωρὶς τὰ τε εἰς (X) τροφήν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν. περὶ δὲ τόπων [τῶν] ἐρυμνῶν οὐ πάσαις ὁμοίως ἔχει τὸ συμφέρον ταῖς πολιτείαις· οἷον ἀκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικὴ καὶ μοναρχικόν, δημοκρατικὸν δ' ὁμαλότητι, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκισέων διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, ἂν εὐτομος ἢ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἰπποδάμειον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς ἀσφαλείας τοῦναντίον ὥς εἶχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον· δυσίξοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερευνήτος ταῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων μετέχειν (ἐνδέχεται γάρ, ἂν τις οὕτως κατασκευάζῃ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις ἃς καλοῦσιν τινες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας) καὶ τὴν μὲν ὅλην πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν εὐτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους·

16 μὴτ' ] μηδὲ Korae, rightly | τοιούτων Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>8</sup> (corr.), ταύτων the other authorities Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> | 18 τῶν omitted by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, «τῶν» τόπων τῶν P<sup>3</sup> V<sup>6</sup>, τόπων τῶν Bk. with the other authorities | 21 ἰδίων οἰκισέων M<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>8</sup> (1st hand, corrected in the margin) | 22 μὲν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, untranslated by Ar., hence [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> | 23 καὶ inserted before κατὰ by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. | 24 [καὶ] Schneider Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, possibly right | ἰπποδάμειον Π<sup>2</sup> (in P<sup>3</sup> ἰ written faintly) P<sup>4</sup> | 25 χρόνον] τρόπον P<sup>1</sup> M<sup>1</sup> | 26 δυσίξοδος—δυσεξερευνήτος δυσεξερευνήτοι—δυσεξερευνήτοι Jachou | 27 ἀμφοτέρων after τούτων Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., thus avoiding hiatus | 28 γεωργίοις Scaliger, γεωργοῖς P<sup>1</sup> H Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, γεωργοῖς Camerottius | 30 ὅλην] ἄλλην Ar. and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) | τὰς after καὶ πρὸς Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk., omitted by P<sup>1</sup>

§ 5 20 ἀριστοκρατικόν] This holds good of the best constitution also, since this is at once the true and the best form of aristocracy: VI(IV). 7. 2 n. (1332), cp. c. 2 § 1 (1133), § 4 (1141): II. 6. 17 n. (1318): III. 7. 3 n. (1336) and Exc. I. on B. III. For it is only in an aristocracy that fortified places are used solely as a protection against external foes, and the latter will plainly find the conquest of the city more difficult if they have to capture many such. Under a monarchy or an oligarchy the Acropolis, or single citadel, was also used for defence against popular insurrections: for this reason it is against the interests of democracy, because liable to become the rallying place of movements in favour of the tyrant or the oligarchs; in short usurpers may establish themselves there. These remarks are not disproved by the fact that democratic states like Athens itself retained their old Acropolis. SUSEM. (849)

§ 6 23 κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον τρόπον] See Exc. II. to Plac. II. 2. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. (850)

24 πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς τοῦναντίον] Euseb. remarks that the capture of Plataea (Thuc. II. 2. 41) in ancient, and the second siege of Saragossa in modern, times, will illustrate the author's meaning. But "Aristotle probably has in view the experience of Perinthus, when besieged by Philip of Macedon. Philip after a hard struggle made himself master of the city-wall only to find himself in face of a close array of houses rising tier over tier up the slope of the hill, and parted by narrow lanes across which the besieged carried walls; Diod. XVI. 76." (Nicomach. SUSEM. 851)

§ 7 29 τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας] i. e. unquestionably, vines planted in the fashion of a quincunx. SUSEM. 852

30 εὐτομον] Cut up, i. e. laid out, in straight streets: as Strabo says of Alex-

οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔξει καλῶς. (X)  
 § 8 περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρε-  
 τῆς ἀντιποιοιμένας πόλεις λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν,  
 34 καὶ ταῦθ' ὀρώντες ἐλεγχόμενας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλω-  
 § 9 πισαμένας. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ β  
 πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειρᾶσθαι σφῆζεσθαι διὰ (p.  
 τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρυμνότητος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ  
 ἐνδέχεται πλείω τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιδόντων [καὶ]  
 τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς, εἰ δεῖ σφ-  
 40 ζεσθαι καὶ μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν  
 ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα τῶν τειχῶν οἰητέον εἶναι πολε-  
 1331 a μικωτάτην, ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὖρημένων τῶν περὶ τὰ  
 βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας.  
 § 10 ὅμοιον γὰρ τὸ τείχη μὴ περιβάλλειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀξιοῦν 7

31 πρὸς before κόσμον omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 37 καὶ before  
 συμβαίνει omitted by M<sup>a</sup>, [καὶ] Koraes; καὶ συμβαίνει transposed to follow 38 ἐνδέχε-  
 ται Stahr || 38 καὶ untranslated by William, [καὶ] Spengel || 39 [καὶ] Spengel,  
 wrongly || [καὶ τῆς] ἀρετῆς ἀνθρωπίνης <τε> καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις Schmidt  
 1331 a 3 τὸ τῷ S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and perhaps P<sup>5</sup> (1st hand)

andria (p. 793) ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ὁδοῖς κατα-  
 τέμνεται.

§ 8 32 οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν κτλ.]  
 Plato *Laus* VI. 778 D ff.: περὶ δὲ τειχῶν  
 ἔγωγ' ἂν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ξυμφεροίμην τὸ καθεύ-  
 δειν ἔαν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη καὶ  
 μὴ ἐπανιστάναί. SUSEM. (853)

34 ἐλεγχόμενας ἔργῳ] Here no doubt  
 he is thinking more especially of Sparta:  
 see n. (554) on III. 9. 10. SUSEM. (854)

Grote asked how, if Sparta had had  
 walls like those of Babylon, they could  
 have procured for her any greater protec-  
 tion than her strong position afforded in  
 the first Theban invasion, 370—369. But  
 in his last invasion, 362, Epaminondas,  
 though he did not succeed in surprising  
 it unawares, actually penetrated into the  
 city, Xen. *Hellen.* VII. 5. 11, Polyb. IX.  
 8. 5. Very obstinate resistance had been  
 offered to Philip by Byzantium and Perin-  
 thus (340), although Thebes, in spite of  
 its walls, was carried by assault (335).

§ 9 36 οὐ καλὸν] To skulk behind  
 fortifications has been in all ages con-  
 trasted with courage in the open field.  
 So of the remark of Archidamus, which  
 Camerarius quotes from Plutarch, that at  
 the sight of a catapult he exclaimed:  
 ἀπώλετο ἀνδρὸς ἀρετά.

37 καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται] An

inversion which Mr Newman compares  
 with II. 5. 27, 1264 b 18, μὴ τῶν πλείσ-  
 των ἢ μὴ πάντων. Translate: "but as it  
 not only may but does happen that the  
 superiority of the enemy is too much for  
 the brave but not superhuman resistance  
 of the smaller number, in such cases, if  
 the defenders are to preserve themselves  
 and be free from indignity and injury, we  
 must hold that walls of impregnable  
 strength are a soldierly precaution, es-  
 pecially when we consider the precision  
 that has been attained in the manufacture  
 of missiles and siege-engines."

1331 a 1 τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ τὰς  
 μηχανὰς] Possibly this indicates the two  
 main divisions of Greek artillery ὀξυβελεῖς  
 sc. καταπάλται for discharging arrows  
 chiefly, with a range of 400 yards, and the  
 heavier engines πετροβόλοι; see A. Bauer  
*Griech. Kriegsalterthümer* in Iwan Mül-  
 ler's *Handbuch d. Kl. Alt.* IV. 1, p.  
 310 ff. H. Droysen *Kriegsalterthümer*  
 p. 190—204.

§ 10 3 ὅμοιον γὰρ τὸ...ἀξιοῦν καὶ]  
 "To insist on not building walls round  
 cities is the same thing as to seek for a  
 country easily invaded:" for καὶ 'as' after  
 ὅμοιον see II. 8. 21, 1269 a 6. With  
 ἀξιοῦν cp. II. 8. 13, 1268 b 5, τὸ κρίνειν  
 ἀξιοῦν.

καὶ τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν καὶ περιαιρεῖν τοῖς (X)  
 5 ὄρεινους τόπους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις οἰκῆσει μὴ  
 περιβάλλειν τοίχους ὡς ἀνδρῶν ἱσχυμένων τῶν κατοικοῦ-  
 11 των. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτό γε δεῖ λανθάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν  
 περιβεβλημένοις τείχη περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξιστιν ἀμφοτέρως  
 χρήσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ ὡς ἐχούσαις τείχη καὶ ὥς μὴ  
 10 ἐχούσαις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις οὐκ ἔξιστιν. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον  
 ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον, ἀλλὰ  
 καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχῃ τῇ  
 πόλει πρεπόντως καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρεῖας, τὰς τε  
 12 ἄλλας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπι-  
 15 τιθεμένοις ἐπιμελὲς ἐστὶ δι' ὧν τρόπων πλεονεκτήσουσιν.  
 οὕτω τὰ μὲν εὔρηται τὰ δὲ ζητεῖν δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ  
 12 τοὺς φυλαττομένους ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐπιτίθε-  
 σθαι τοῖς εὖ παρεσκευασμένοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πλη-  
 θος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν συσσιτίοις κατανεμεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ  
 20 τείχη διειληφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις κατὰ τόπους  
 ἐπικαίρους, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται παρασκευ-

5 ὄρεινους H<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> | ταῖς οἰκῆσει ταῖς ἰδίαις H<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. | 10 τοῖς—κεκτημένοις Ac.,  
 ταῖς—κεκτημένοις Γ II Bk.<sup>1</sup> | 11 [μόνον] ? Koraes, wrongly (cp. Pl. Symp. 179 a  
 with Hug's note) | 12 τούτων] τῶν ὄρων ? Koraes | 13 χρήσαις «ἀνδρῶν»  
 ? Schneider, not badly | 16 δεῖ before ζητεῖν H<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk., omitted by P<sup>3</sup> (not hand,  
 supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup>) | καὶ after φιλοσοφεῖν untranslated by William and Ac. (perhaps  
 rightly) | 17 ἐπιχειρήσουσιν ? Schmidt | 21 δῆλον...22 φυλακτῆρας omitted by H<sup>2</sup>  
 (supplied in the margin by p<sup>1</sup>) | αὐτὰ Bonitz (*Ind. Ac.* 135 a 35 f.), certainly right

8 The construction must be ὁμοίως δὲ  
 «ὁμοίως δὲ» = ...μὴ περιβάλλειν, this in-  
 finitive being parallel to ζητεῖν.

§ 11 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ] We had a  
 similar mode of argument in c. 6 § 2 =  
 (771) with respect to a maritime site for  
 the city. SUSEM. (856)

11 οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον] μόνον is  
 pleonastic.

14 τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας] Dionysius  
 the Elder invented machines of this kind;  
 Diod. XIV. 42. 1, 50. 4 (Camerarius).  
 Cp. Rustow and Kochly *Gesch. der griech. u.*  
*Antiquitäten* p. 207 f. Afterwards the  
 strategos of Philip and Alexander of  
 Maastricht led to many fresh improve-  
 ments in the siege-engines and heavy  
 artillery; see Rustow and Kochly p. 264.  
 207 ff. "It is possible" (see n. 1589 on  
 VII(V). 6. 13) "that Aristotle was ac-  
 quainted with the work of Aemias Tacti-  
 cus. (SUSEM. 856)" (Eaton.) SUSEM. (856)

See also H. Droysen *Antiquitäten*

c. 9 p. 187 ff. The first casual mention  
 of καταπύλαι at Athens occurs CH. 104 or  
 106, 356—348: they were of course built  
 by Philip in the sieges of Byzantium and  
 Perinthos, 340, 349; and by Alexander  
 against Halicarnassos 354.

§ 12 17 ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν]  
 This is equivalent to the Latin maxim:  
 in bellum vitare vis, bellum parat p. 207  
 207 ff. SUSEM. (857)

c. 12 § 1 19 τὰ δὲ τείχη 21 ἐπικαί-  
 ρους] So Xenoph. *Cyrop.* VII. 3 § 14,  
 towers for guard-posts καὶ τῶν τοιαύτων  
 πύργων, ὅταν τις πόλιν φυλακτῆρας εἴη  
 and Polyb. VIII. 17. 3 of Carian watch-  
 towers at Sardis ἐπὶ τῶν τοιαύτων τοῖς Κάρ-  
 κιστοῖς ποταμοῖς καὶ τῶν φυλακτῶν τῶν κατὰ  
 τὰς πόλεις τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν [J. G.  
 Schneider]. SUSEM. (856)

20 διειληφθαι] c. 7 § 1, 1347 b 24,  
 διεληφθαι, not there.

21 αὐτὰ] Valian on *Ind. c.* 43 § 12,  
 134 b 17 out of several conditions has

ἄξειν ἓνια τῶν συσσιτίων ἐν τούτοις τοῖς φυλακτηρί- (X)  
 § 2 οἷς. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἂν τις διακοσμήσειε  
 τὸν τρόπον· τὰς δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδοδόμενας οἰκήσεις XI  
 25 καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια ἀρμόττει τό-  
 πον ἐπιτήδειόν τε ἔχειν καὶ τὸν αὐτόν, ὅσα μὴ τῶν  
 ἱερῶν ὁ νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρὶς ἢ τι μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθό- (p.)  
 § 3 χρηστον. εἴη δ' ἂν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὅστις ἐπιφάνειάν τε ἔχει  
 πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιῶντα  
 30 μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρμυνοτέρως. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον 2  
 τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης ἀγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οἴαν καὶ περὶ  
 § 4 Θετταλίαν νομίζουσιν, ἣν ἔλευθέραν καλοῦσιν, αὕτη δ'  
 ἐστὶν ἣν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὀνίων πάντων, καὶ μήτε  
 βάνανσον μήτε γεωργὸν μήτ' ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν τοιούτων παρα-

24 θεοῖς P<sup>4</sup> Ar., θείοις the other authorities and Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 25 τὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων  
 ? Susem., τὰ κυριώτατα <τὰ> τῶν Ridgeway (but see § 7, 133 i b 6 ff.) || ἀρχείων  
 P<sup>5</sup>, ἀρχῶν P<sup>4+6</sup> L<sup>8</sup> Ar. Ald., ἀρχαίων the other authorities || [συσσίτια] Spengel ||  
 28 ἐπιφάνειάν—θέσιν] θέσιν—ἐπιφάνειαν Thomas Aquinas, approved by Chandler and  
 Spengel, perhaps rightly. If so, τε must be bracketed or transposed to follow ἔχει  
 πρὸς || 29 ἀρετῆς] ἱερατείας ? Jackson || ἀρετῆς θέσιν] θέσεως ἀρετῆν Lambin ||  
 θέσιν] ἔξιν Göttling, ἔφεισιν Eaton, θεὰν Schneider. If this latter be accepted, either  
 with Susem.<sup>1</sup> read [ἐπιφάνειάν τε] as a gloss, or with Bücheler transpose ἐπιφάνειάν  
 τε to follow θεὰν || 32 νομίζουσιν Lambin, ὀνομάζουσιν Γ Π Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in  
 the text || 34 τῶν τοιούτων] τοιοῦτον M<sup>8</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., also P<sup>1</sup> (corr.) and apparently  
 Ar. (perhaps rightly)

one similar: *De anima* II. 4 § 12, 416 a  
 10 αὐτὸ φαίνεται μόνον τρεφόμενον. Add  
*Pol.* III. 5. 4, 1278 a 14.

Prof. Ridgeway says quite rightly:  
 "Aristotle's idea is that the messes of the  
 several divisions of the citizens shall be  
 held at the immediate sphere of their  
 employment: those of the φύλακες in the  
 φυλακτήρια and πύργοι where they are on  
 duty. Similarly the common meal of the  
 ἄρχοντες is in the town hall." Hence he  
 proposes to read τὰ κυριώτατα τὰ τῶν  
 ἀρχείων, which is open to the objection:  
 non omnium magistratuum sed superiorum  
 tantum praetoria circa forum superius  
 iacent. SUSEM.

§ 2 27 μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθόχρηστον]  
 Thus Aristotle places all the regulations  
 for religion and 'cultus' in his ideal state  
 under the Delphic oracle precisely as  
 Plato does *Rep.* IV. 427 B (Congreve).  
 SUSEM. (859).

§ 3 28 ἐπιφάνειάν τε κτλ.] Cp. Vitruv.  
 I. 7: aedibus vero sacris, quorum deorum  
 maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse, in  
 excelsissimo loco, unde moenium maxima

pars conspiciatur, areae distribuuntur  
 (J. G. Schneider). Quite similarly Plato  
*Laus* VI. 778 C, the temples to be built  
 all round the Agora and the city around  
 them πρὸς τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς τῶν τόπων εὐερκίας  
 τε καὶ καθαρότητος χάριν: VIII. 848 D  
 (similarly in the twelve κῶμαι). SUSEM.  
 (860)

Add Pausan. IX. 22 εὖ δέ μοι Τανα-  
 γραῖοι νομίσαι τὰ ἐς τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα  
 δοκοῦσιν Ἑλλήνων, χωρὶς μὲν γὰρ αἱ οἰκίαι  
 σφίσι, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ ἱερὰ ὑπὲρ αὐτὰς ἐν  
 καθαρῷ τε ἐστί καὶ ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώπων. Xeno-  
 phon gives as Socrates' opinion: ναοὶς γε  
 μὴν καὶ βωμοῖς χάραν ἔφη εἶναι πρεπω-  
 δεστάτην ἣτις ἐμφανεστάτη οὐσα ἀστι-  
 βεστάτη εἴη, *Mem.* III. 8. 10.

31 περὶ Θετταλίαν] Also, according  
 to Xenophon's romance, amongst the  
 Persians also: *Cyr.* I. 2. 3, ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς  
 ἐλευθέρα ἀγορὰ καλουμένη, ἐνθα τὰ τε  
 βασίλεια καὶ τὰλλα ἀρχεῖα πεποιήται.  
 SUSEM. (861)

See Blümner *Privatalf.*<sup>3</sup> § 18 p. 134 n.  
 (2). ἀγορά was also used as a term for  
 'harbour' in Thessaly (Hesychius).

3: βάλλειν μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων (εἴη δ' ἄν (XI)  
 εὐχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων  
 5 ἔχοι τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα· πρέπει γὰρ διηρησθαι κατὰ τὰς  
 ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖν νεωτέ-  
 30 ροις ἄρχοντάς τινας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ  
 5 τοῖς ἄρχουσιν· ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρον-  
 σία μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευ-  
 5 θέρων φόβον)· τὴν δὲ τῶν ὠνίων ἀγορὰν ἑτέραν τε δεῖ ταύ-  
 της εἶναι καὶ χωρὶς, ἔχουσιν τόπον εὐσυνάγωγον τοῖς τε  
 ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης περμπομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας  
 πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως διαιρεῖται εἰς ἱερεῖς  
 3 εἰς ἄρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια περὶ τὴν  
 7 τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δ' ἀρχόντων

39 τὰς—πρεσβυτέρας Γ, τὰ—πρεσβύτερα apparently M<sup>1</sup>

1331 b 4 τῆς πόλεως after διαιρεῖται Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk., thus avoiding hiatus, "there must be some mistake" Congreve, ? πολιτεύματος Susem. § 5 <cal> = ἐκ Λαμβία Bk.<sup>2</sup> [εἰς] <καὶ> ? Susem. But if 4 τῆς πόλεως is right, ὁπλίτας or στρατιώτας must have been dropped and εἰ may be a trace of this, [+εἰ] <καὶ> ἀρχοντας <καὶ> ἐπὶ τῶν. Welldon, combining these suggestions § τῆς omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied in P<sup>2</sup> by corr.), untranslated by Ar. Perhaps rightly, if there is really a lacuna after οἰκοδομημάτων [τὴν—ὁ οἰκοδομημάτων] τὰ—οἰκοδομήματα Ridgeway § 6 χῶραν inserted after οἰκοδομημάτων by Bas.<sup>2</sup> It should be ἀγορὰν which may just as well be understood; οἰκοδομημάτων <χῶραν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς τῆς πόλεως> Sprengel

§ 4 34 παραβάλλειν] Intrude upon, approach: *N.E.* VII. 13 § 6, 1153 b 34 παραβάλλειν εἰς ἡδονὰς καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν: *Hist. anim.* VIII. 12 § 11, 597 b 15: *Isus* ἐκείθεν παραβάλλωσιν αὐ. ὄντες. *De ren. anim.* III. 11 § 31, 763 a 31, περὶ Ῥόδον παραβαλόντος ναυτικοῦ στρατοῦ.

§ 5 39 ἄρχοντάς τινας] Either special magistrates: cp. VII(VI). 8 § 22 γυμνασιάρχια, πρὸς δὲ τοῖς περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμέλεια γυμνασικῆς καὶ Διονυσιακῆς with *n.* (1484)—or the παιδοκόμοι, for whom see c. 16 § 12 *n.* (943), c. 17 § 5 (958), § 7 (960), § 19 (963), § 18 (969): VI(IV). 19 § 3 (1345), § 9 (1355), § 13: VII(VI). 8 § 22 *n.* (1483) and *Introd.* p. 52. SUSEM. (862)

τοῖς δὲ πρεσβυτέροις] In order that they may be kept in check by the presence of the magistrates: *Introd.* p. 52. Comp. c. 17 § 9, 1336 b 11 f. *n.* (962). SUSEM. (863)

§ 6 1331 b 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ] See c. 9 above. SUSEM. (864)

§ The repetition of εἰς before ἄρχοντας is not without parallel. But as the

soldiers form an important element of τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως, it is probable either that they were mentioned here (possibly the double εἰς conceals some corruption), or that πόλεως is itself a corruption of πολιτεύματος, the governing body. See *Classical text. coll.* p. 409—411. It is apparent from a comparison of II. 6. 2, 1064 b 32, εἰς τοὺς μέγας, εἰς αὐτὸν εἰς γουρῶνα, εἰς δὲ εἰς τὸ πρυτανεῖον μέγας, and *infra* c. 14 § 12, 1313 a 30 ff. διηρηται... τῶν πρυτανῶν τὰ πρὸς εἰς τὸ ἀγορεύειν καὶ χεῖρσιν τὰ δὲ εἰς τὸ εὐλόγῃ, how much harder the text is than would be the following e.g. εἰς αὐτὸν εἰς ἀγορὰν εἰς δὲ εἰς ἀρχοντας.

With the εἰς before οἰκοδομημάτων understood, from b 1, ἀγῶνας as in b 11. See *Classical text. coll.* p. 410. This removes one of Prof. Ridgeway's objections (*Translations II.* p. 147), but it is still strange that εἰς should be an adjective here when it is a substantive § 2, § 8.

§ ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν οἰκοδομημάτων, as § 2, 1331 a 37. So ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν οἰκοδομημάτων.

ὅσα περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περί τε γρα- (XI)  
φὰς δικῶν καὶ τὰς κλήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην  
διοίκησιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀγορανομίαν καὶ τὴν καλουμένην  
10 ἀστυνομίαν, πρὸς ἀγορᾷ μὲν δεῖ καὶ συνόδῳ τινὶ κοινῇ κα-  
τεσκευάσθαι, τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀγορὰν ἐστὶ  
τόπος· ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ  
πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις.

§ 8 νενεμῆσθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν 4  
15 χώραν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ὑλωροὺς  
οἱ δὲ ἀγρονόμους, καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συσσίτια πρὸς φυλακὴν  
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ ἱερὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νενεμη-  
μένα, τὰ μὲν θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἥρωσιν.

§ 9 ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβολογουμένους καὶ λέγον- (p. 1  
20 τας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀργὸν ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ἐστὶ  
τὰ τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχης. διὸ περὶ

8 τὴν after ἄλλην omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly, [τὴν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 10 καὶ]  
κάν ? Susem. || κατεσκευάσθαι P<sup>1</sup>, κατασκευάσθαι S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup>, κατασκευάσασθαι M<sup>s</sup> ||  
14 μεμιμῆσθαι P<sup>3.5.6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk.<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>2.4</sup> (1st hand, νενε in P<sup>2</sup> is written over  
an erasure), νενεμιμῆσθαι P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) || 16 ἀγορανόμους P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, cor-  
rected by a later hand)

1333 b 35; ἔχ. τὴν φύσιν = πεφυκέναι,  
1330 b 14; ἐπιμέλειαν = ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,  
1330 b 11; αἰσθησιν = αἰσθάνεσθαι, 1340 a  
3 (cp. 1253 a 17); not to mention various  
phrases ἔχειν δυσχέριαν, μοχθῆριαν, δυσμέ-  
νειαν, διαφορὰν, δυσκολίαν, which are equi-  
valent to εἶναι δυσχερές, μοχθηρόν, δυσ-  
μενές, διάφορον, δύσκολον. Comp. Vahlen  
*Arist. Aufs.* II. p. 30 f.

§ 7 9 ἀγορανομίαν... 10 ἀστυνομίαν]  
Comp. II. 5. 21 n. (176 b), VI(IV). 15. 9  
n. (1354), § 22 n. (1373); VII(VI). 8 §§ 3—5  
nn. (1461, 1463, 1468). SUSEM. (865)

10 συνόδῳ] As in II. 9. 31, 1271 a 28  
n. meeting, gathering. Cp. 1319 a 32.

11 περὶ has almost the meaning of a  
possessive gen., cp. c. 9 § 7, 1329 a 18.

§ 8 14 τάξιν is the so-called cognate  
accus. after νενεμῆσθαι.

15 οὓς καλοῦσιν, κτλ] Comp. VII(VI).  
8. 6 n. (1465) for these wood-rangers or  
foresters. Plato has the term ἀγρονόμοι  
*Laws* VI. 760 ff. SUSEM. (866)

16 φυλακτήρια κτλ] Comp. Plato  
*Laws* VIII. 848 D: for the twelve κῶμαι,  
exactly as VI. 778 c for the Agora (Eaton).  
See the citation n. (860). SUSEM. (867)

§ 9 19 ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν κτλ] Cp. I.

II. 5, 1258 b 34 f. τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος  
ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ  
ἐνδιατρίβειν.

20 οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν] Comp. c. 7 § 9,  
1328 a 19 ff., n. (794). SUSEM. (868).

22 εὐχῆς ἔργον] Another of the pas-  
sages cited in n. (128) on II. I. 1. SUSEM.  
(869)

This next chapter, c. 13, is preliminary  
to that detailed account of Education in  
the best state which forms the subject of  
the treatise from c. 14 to the (incomplete)  
termination of B. V(VIII). We have here  
a string of remarks on the end of the  
state, and the best means to secure it by  
a given character in the citizens: remarks  
not very dissimilar to parts of cc. 1—3,  
or again to c. 14. For this reason the  
chapter has been bracketed by Congreve  
and Broughton, either wholly or in part.  
See *Anal.* p. 115 f., *Introd.* p. 88 f.  
Prof. J. Cook Wilson's view, as there  
stated, is that c. 13 seems like a shorter  
duplicate of cc. 14, 15. "The chief  
difference is that c. 13, 1332 a 7—9,  
takes the definition of the Good in the  
general form given in *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 7  
(or *Eud. Eth.* II. 1), while cc. 14—15,

μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τό γε ἐπὶ πλείον ἀφείσθω γὰρ εἶναι.  
 13 περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τίνων καὶ ποίων δεῖ  
 25 συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ  
 26 πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς, λεκτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὗτοισι εἶναι οὐκ ἔστι  
 γινεσθαι τὸ εὖ πᾶσι, τούτοις δ' ἐστὶν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν σκο-  
 πὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὁρθῶς, ἐν δὲ τὰς  
 30 πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις εὐρίσκειν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ  
 ταῦτα καὶ διαφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμφωνεῖν ἐνίστη γὰρ  
 ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἔκκειται καλῶς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυ-  
 χεῖν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν, ὅτε δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος  
 πάντων ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλος ἔθειτο φαῦλον,  
 35 ὅτι δὲ ἐκατέρου διαμαρτάνουσιν, οἷον περὶ ἰατρικὴν οὔτε [γὰρ]  
 ποῖόν τι δεῖ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον εἶναι σῶμα κρίνουσιν ἐνίστη καλῶς,  
 οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὄρον τυγχάνουσι τῶν ποιη-  
 τικῶν· δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμασι ταῦτα ἀμ-  
 φότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις.  
 40 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὖ ζῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίενται·  
 πάντες, φανερόν, ἀλλὰ τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσία τυγχάνειν,  
 τοῖς δὲ οὐ, διὰ τινὰ φύσιν ἢ τύχην (δοῦναι γὰρ καὶ χ-

23 ἐπιπλεῖον P<sup>2-3,4</sup> Ald., ἐπὶ πλεῖν P<sup>1</sup> (perhaps rightly) | 24 ἐκ τίνων καὶ ποίων by H<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup>, [ἐκ] Bk.<sup>2</sup> | 25 συνεστάναι M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> | 26 πολιτεύεσθαι K<sup>1</sup> Bk.<sup>2</sup>, πολιτεῖσθαι H Bk.<sup>1</sup> | [ἐπεὶ δὲ οὗτοισι... 1332 a 27 τέχνη] Congruous, who calls it an unnecessary interruption of the reasoning, [ἐπεὶ... 1332 b 11 ἀφείσθω] Broughton and Wilson, the latter considering c. 13 a shorter duplicate of c. 14, 15; see *Introduct.* p. 88 f. and *Comm. int.* (876, 879, 881, 948, 949) | 28 εὖ ζῆν = εὖ ζῆναι P<sup>1-3,6</sup> S<sup>5</sup> V<sup>5</sup> L<sup>2</sup> | 31 καλῶς P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> | 32 ὅτε P<sup>4</sup>, ἐνίστη P<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> | 33 γὰρ omitted by H<sup>1</sup>, inserted by H<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> | 41 τύχην ἢ φύσιν H<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> and perhaps M<sup>1</sup>

like *Nic. Eth.* x., distinguish between the life of moral virtue and the higher life of philosophical contemplation. In c. 13 there is no consciousness of what is implied in c. 15, that moral virtue does not belong so completely to the καλὸς as θεωρία. In the version of c. 13 the language which follows the words *φαμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικαῖς*, 1332 a 7, has more affinity for the Eudemian than the Nicomachean Ethics" (*Journal of Phil.* x. 94 ff.).

11 15—38 Eudemian reproduces this *A. A.* II. 11. 3, 1327 b 19—22. The whole period b 26—1332 a 3 is excellently discussed by Bonitz *Ar. Stud.* II. III. p. 94 sq. SUSEM.

2 29 εὐρίσκειν = assequi. See 1330 b 3 n. So λαβεῖν = ascertain. Yet below b 38 κρατεῖσθαι = to be won, secured.

30 ταῦτα are (1) τὰ τέλη καὶ (2) αἱ πρὸς τὸ τέλος πράξεις πράξεις. See b 38.

34 οἷον περὶ ἰατρικὴν] Eudemian in *Medicine* have omitted. II. B. 18 n. (170), III. c. 6 § 7 n. (321), c. 11 § 10, 11, c. 13 § 4 n. (638), c. 16 § 6 ff. Also *introd.* c. 2 § 13 n. (726). SUSEM. 870.

35 τὸ ἐγιαῖνον εἶναι σῶμα] Nicomachean εἶναι is transposed. The order is *ποῖόν τι τὸ ἐγιαῖνον σῶμα δεῖ εἶναι*, in what condition the patient should be left, in order to be well.

41 χορηγίας τυχεῖς] Certain resources, means, provisions, acquisitions. For this meaning cp. *A. Eth.* I. 8. 12, 1099 a 31—32, καὶ τὸν δότον ἀγαθὸν προσδεσμένον· ἀλλοτρίων γὰρ ὁ οὐ μέλει τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀποχορηγῆναι δότον, I. 10. 13, 1101 a 14 f. τὸν δότον δότον ἀγαθὸν δότον ἀποχορηγῆναι. x. 8. 4. 1177 a 22 ff. 2 n.

- 1332 a ρηγίας τινὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, τούτου δὲ ἐλάττονος μὲν τοῖς (XII)  
 § 4 ἄμεινον διακειμένοις, πλείονος δὲ τοῖς χεῖρον), οἷ δ' εὐθὺς  
 οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης. ἐπεὶ  
 δὲ τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δ'  
 5 ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἀριστ' ἂν πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἀριστα δ' ἂν πολι-  
 τεύοιτο καθ' ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν.  
 δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστι, μὴ λανθάνειν.  
 § 5 φαμέν δὲ καὶ διωρίσμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων 3

1332 a. 1 τούτου] ταύτης Schneider needlessly || 2 εὐθὺς] αὐθις Madvig, wrongly (αὐθις is not found in Arist.) || 4 ἐστὶν ἀρίστην M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> omitting τὴν, hence [τὴν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 6 ἐνδέχοιτο M<sup>s</sup> and perhaps Γ || 8 διωρίσμεθα omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. || τι] τε M<sup>s</sup>, τι γε P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>): the word is untranslated by William

1178 b 33 (Eaton). These are the auxiliary causes or indispensable conditions (see *n.* 795) of Wellbeing. SUSEM. (871)

§ 4 1332 a 2 οἷ δ' εὐθὺς] The δὲ answers μὲν of 1331 b 40: 'whereas others, with the means at their command, from the outset miss the right way to attain happiness.' For this sense of εὐθὺς comp. I. 5. 2, 1254 a 23 εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς. Bonitz *Ind.* s. v. distinguishes (1) a temporal use, as in III. 16. 9, 1287 b 10, I. 8, 9, 1256 b 9, κατὰ τὴν πρώτῃν γενεσιν εὐθὺς; so VI(IV). II. 6, 1295 b 16, εὐθὺς οἰκοθεν, and VIII(V). c. 4 § 9, 1304 a 30, § 12, 1304 b 9, c. 5 § 3, 1304 b 32, c. 11 § 23, 1314 b 29: (2) a quasi-causal sense, suapte natura, = φύσει εὐθὺς (ὑπάρχει), as in V(VIII). 5. 23, 1340 a 40: (3) introducing, in a series of reasons, one which is at once perfectly obvious, as I. 13. 6, 1260 a 4, III. 4. 6, 1277 a b, IV(VII). 14, 2, 1332 b 18, V(VIII). 2. 2, 1337 b 2.

3 ἐπεὶ... 7 λανθάνειν] It is pointed out in Exc. I. (p. 559) that the same expression has already been employed twice before, (i) in c. 1 § 1 ff. and (ii) in cc. 8 and 9 (c. 8 § 4 f. 1328 a 35—39, with which must go c. 9 § 3, 1328 b 34—39, § 7, 1329 a 22). The first time this resulted in an independent investigation of the nature of Happiness, εὐδαιμονία, while on the second occasion Happiness was merely defined (as ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τέλειος 1328 a 38), without further explanation and without reference either to the previous discussion of c. 1, or to the *Ethics*. Hence—assuming the genuineness of c. 13 and especially observing that in this present passage, too, the discussion of c. 1 is ignored—we inferred that the first chapter of our present book was

not intended, in Aristotle's final plan, to find a place in this work. Another difficulty, certainly, though a less serious one, arises from the fact that here the passage in cc. 8 and 9 is equally ignored. Had Aristotle put the finishing touches to his work, he would doubtless have inserted a reference to the *Ethics* there (i. e. in c. 8 § 4), and a short allusion to the previous passage (c. 8 § 4 f., c. 9 § 3, § 7) here. The difficulty is however much diminished by the reading adopted in c. 13 § 1, φαμέν δὲ καὶ διωρίσμεθα, where the present φαμέν should perhaps be again taken—as at 1328 b 18 *n.* (804), 1329 b 41 *n.* (831), 1331 a 19 *n.* (902)—in the sense of ἔφαμεν, and thus as referring back to cc. 8 and 9. Cp. also *n.* (807) and I. 2. 8 *n.* (21). SUSEM. (872)

§ 5 8 ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς] *Nic. Eth.* I. 7. 9 ff., esp. § 15, 1098 a 15 ff., 1101 a 14 ff. Comp. cc. 6—8. SUSEM. (873)  
 εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὀφέλος] It is impossible to decide whether this parenthetical remark is due solely to Aristotle's love of qualifying and limiting expressions (see *n.* 401), or is to be explained, as Bernays supposes [*Dialogue*, p. 72], from his relations with practical statesmen as a half-sarcastic reference to the scornful way in which men like Phocion and Antipater would look down upon his philosophical treatment of such questions. SUSEM. (874)

With far less probability Grote in an essay on the *Ethics* (in *Fragments* p. 133 f.) connects this passage with *Nic. Eth.* I. 3. 2 f., 1094 b 14 ff. and II. 2. 3—5, 1104 a 1—11 (πειρατέον βοηθεῖν) as an indication of Aristotle's despair of reaching certainty, or securing any common agreement upon matters of ethics and politics (cp. 1337 b 2): "that Aristotle regarded

9 ἐκείνων ὄφελος, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ (XII)  
 6 ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. λίγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (u. 11)  
 τἀναγκαῖα, τὸ δ' ἀπλῶς τὸ καλῶς· οἶον τὰ περὶ τὰς δι-  
 12 καίας πράξεις αἱ διὰ τὰς τιμορίας καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' ἀρε-  
 τῆς μὲν εἰσιν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως  
 ἔχουσιν (αἰρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων  
 13 μῆτε τὸν ἄνδρα μῆτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ  
 7 τὰς εὐπορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσι κάλλισται πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
 ἕτερον κακοῦ τινος ἀναίρεσις ἐστίν, αἱ τοιαῦται δὲ πράξεις  
 τοῖναντίον· κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ γενήσεις.

10 ταύτης? Stahr, not badly. 11 αἱ <γὰρ> Reiz. 12 διὰ τὰς τιμορίας Jackson, δίκαιαι (δίκαιαι αἱ Γ Μ' and apparently Ar.) τιμορίαι Γ Π Ar. Bk. Sussem.<sup>1-2</sup> 13 καὶ (before κολάσεις) omitted by Γ Ar. 14 καὶ before ἀναγκαῖαι omitted by Γ<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. (perhaps rightly) 14 [μὲν] Koraes, perhaps rightly 15 δ' ἐπ' Ar.] διὰ περὶ? Schneider 16 εὐδοξίας? Spengel, προεδρίας? Jackson 17 κάλλισται καλὰ? Spengel 17 ἀναίρεσις Schneider, αἵρεσις Γ Π Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Sussem.<sup>1</sup> in the text. Cp. 1332 b 36.

the successful prosecution of ethical inquiries as all but desperate."

9. The grammatical subject of εἶναι is εὐδαιμονία. The definition in full is ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελεία, οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. Comp. Mr Newman's remarks l. p. 578 f., II. 393—401.

τελείαν] We may paraphrase: "matured and relatively permanent." See Rasso *Forschungen* p. 116 ff. Happiness of too short duration is not true happiness, as Aristotle shows in the passage to which he refers. At the same time in expressing himself thus he is doubtless thinking of a certain immaturity in age; for a child has not yet attained to Well-being, because its virtue is not yet developed: *Nic. Eth.* I. 9. 10, 1100 a 1 ff., cp. *Pol.* I. 13. 14, n. (120). The corresponding negative term, too, ἀτελής, is used for the undeveloped and immature virtue and reasoning power, as well as for that of a commonplace man who has never attained full intellectual or social development: I. 13. 7 f. (cp. § 11), III. 11. 9 n. (572), V(VIII). 5. 10 n. (1033). SUSSEM. (876)

10—11] Respexit haec Eudemus VII. p. 43 (56), 1338 b 5 seqq. SUSSEM.

10 ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως] This is not to be found in *Nic. Eth.*, but Aristotle adds it here to avoid any possible misunderstanding, if indeed, as I believe, n. (881), he is the author of this chapter. SUSSEM. (876)

There are no good English equivalents for these technical terms: 'conditional' (or contingent) and 'absolute' are attributes not very suitable to moral or virtuous activity, or goods in general.

§ 6 11 τἀναγκαῖα] On this passage see Dr Jackson's article, *Journal of Phil.* N. 311, to which should be added that he justifies "the rather abrupt use of the word τἀναγκαῖα for morality enforced by law and custom by a reference to Plato *Rep.* VI. 493 C: ἄλλὰ τἀναγκαῖα θεοὺς καλοὶ καὶ καλὰ, τῆς δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκασμοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσα διαφέρει τῆς δικῆς, οὐκ ἐμφανὲς εἶναι κτλ." Cp. c. 14 § 12, 1332 a 31: πραεὶ—(1) ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρηστοί, (2) καλὰ; and *Nic. Eth.* III. 8. 5, 1115 b 2 f. διὰ δ' οὐδ' ἀναγκῆς ἀποφύγειν εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ καλῆς.

τὸ καλῶς] sc. πραεῖος. But below, n 13, τὸ καλῶς, sc. ἔχειν = nobleness or beauty as a quality of actions.

13 καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν] 'They are of the character of a necessary evil' (Congreve). SUSSEM. (877)

14 τὰς τοιαύτας, sc. τοιαύτας καὶ ἐκκαίους.

15 ἐπὶ—to secure; the final sense of ἐπὶ c. acc. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 268 b 13 ff., Eucken II. p. 58.

§ 7 17 ἀναίρεσις] Postgate detects the vulgar ἀναίρεσις choice, in the sense that of two evils we choose the less. For me this is too subtle. SUSSEM. (877 b)

αἱ τοιαῦται] sc. αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας.

χρήσαιοτο δ' ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενία καὶ νόσος καὶ  
 20 ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακά-  
 ριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ  
 τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, ᾧ διὰ τὴν  
 § 8 ἀρετὴν [τὰ] ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ  
 τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας  
 25 ἀπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἷτια  
 τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμ-  
 πρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῶτο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

22 δι' ἀρετὴν, omitting τὴν, M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>: hence [τὴν] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || 23 [τὰ]  
 before ἀγαθὰ Reiz Bk.<sup>2</sup> || δὲ Sepulveda, δ', Γ II<sup>1</sup> Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || δὲ  
 καὶ ὅτι apparently Γ (palam autem et quod William) || 27 αἰτιῶτό <τις> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.<sup>2</sup> ||  
 ἡ λύρα Γ, perhaps rightly

19 **χρήσαιοτο δ' ἂν** Comp. *Nic. Eth.*  
 I. 10. 11 f., 1100 b 18 ff., where this  
 is presented as a special feature of Mag-  
 nanimity (cp. c. 7 § 7, n. 790). Again in  
*Post. Analytics* II. 13. 18, 97 b 15 ff., this,  
 τὸ ἀδιάφορο εἶναι εὐτυχούντες καὶ ἀτυχοῦν-  
 τες, is mentioned as a second mark of the  
 high-souled character (μεγαλόψυχος) along  
 with that adduced in n. (790), τὸ μὴ ἀνέ-  
 χεσθαι ὑβριζόμενοι (Eaton). SUSEM. (878)  
 Cp. χρήσις in *N. E.* I. 10. 12, 1100 b 27,  
 χρήσθαι § 13, 1101 a 4.

20 **τὸ μακάριον**] The decision in *N. E.*  
 I. 10. 14, 1101 a 6, is ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε  
 γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε,  
 ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. Cp. *ib.* I.  
 10. 3, 1100 a 16 f., and the absurd deriva-  
 tion from χαίρειν, VII. 11. 2, 1152 b 7.

21 **κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους**] *Nic.*  
*Eth.* III. c. 4 [c. 6, Bk.], esp. § 4, 1113  
 a 25, τῷ μὲν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν  
 (sc. βουλευτὸν) εἶναι sc. φατέον βουλευτὸν, a 32  
 διαφέρει πλεῖστον ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ ἀληθὲς ἐν  
 ἐκάστοις ὁρᾶν. It is quite true the statement  
 is not made there in so many words: this  
 is much more nearly the case in the two  
 spurious treatises, *Eud. Eth.* VII. 15. 5,  
 1248 b 26 ff., *Magna Moralia* II. 9. 14,  
 1207 b 31 ff. SUSEM. (879) Comp.  
 also *Rhet.* I. 6. 2, 1362 a 24 ff.

§ 8 24 **τὰς χρήσεις**] The plural as  
 ἐνέργειαι. In fact χρήσις and ἐνέργεια are  
 both opposed to ἐξίς. The use which  
 from time to time he makes of these  
 goods (not of their opposites) attests  
 his absolute virtuousness and goodness.  
 Hence to consider external goods the  
 cause of Wellbeing is the same thing as  
 to attribute to the instrument what is  
 really the result of the player's skill.

25 **διὸ....26 ἀγαθῶν**] Because external

goods are just those which while abso-  
 lutely good (ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ) are not good  
 for every one, but only good at all times  
 to the good man: *Nic. Eth.* V. 1. 9, 1129  
 b 1 ff., ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ  
 τὰγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα  
 εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰ  
 ἀγαθὰ, τινὲ δ' οὐκ αἰ, *Meta. Z* (VII). 4. 2,  
 1029 b 5, καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν  
 ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστω ἀγα-  
 θῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστω ἀγαθὰ. SUSEM.  
 (880) The distinction is drawn *N. E.*  
 VII. 12. 1, 1152 b 26 f. τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς  
 τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί. See *N. E.* I. 3.  
 3, 1094 b 17 ff.: wealth and strength are  
 instances, since they have proved in some  
 cases fatal (τινὶ δ' οὐκ αἰ ἀγαθὰ).

c. 13 §§ 1—8. Congreve (see *Crit.*  
*note* on 1331 b 26) enclosed in brackets  
 the whole passage, §§ 2—8, from 1331 b 26  
 ἐπεὶ δὲ...to 1332 a 27 τῆς τέχνης, as an  
 unnecessary interruption of the reasoning.  
 "What was said" (a 28, τῶν εἰρημένων)  
 would then mean what was said cc. 4—  
 12; and that would undoubtedly serve  
 to explain what according to §§ 9, 10  
 requires explanation ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. But  
 then the following passage a 31 τὸ δὲ  
 σπουδαῖον κτλ lacks all proper connexion  
 unless it has been directly preceded by  
 the statement that Wellbeing consists in  
 the practice of virtue assisted by the re-  
 quisite external conditions. This alone  
 makes all follow in regular order: these  
 conditions, we are now told, § 9, depend  
 on Fortune, but if the external condi-  
 tions are present it is the governing intel-  
 ligence that produces virtue. Hence the  
 fundamental idea of §§ 1—8 is indispen-  
 sable for the context, and the athetesis of  
 that passage is not the right way to re-

ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὸν νομοθέτην. διὸ κατατιγχῶν εἰς ὁμοθεσίαν τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν ὣν ἡ τύχη κυρία (κυρίαν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν). τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν οὐκέτι τῆς τύχης ἔργον ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλὰ μὴν σπουδαῖα γε πόλεις ἐστὶ τῷ τοῦς πολίτας τοῖς μετέχουσιν τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαῖους. ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολῖται μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τοῦτ' ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀπὸ γί-

29 *καταρχῇ* Koraes, *κατ' εὐχῇ* P II Ar. Bk. Suess.<sup>1</sup> in the text, and *ρχῇ* Madvig, *κατ'ερχῇ* Schmidt, and *τὸ εὖ ἔχειν* ? Jackson    31 *εὐχῇ* inserted after *τῶν* by P<sup>1</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ar. Ald W<sup>10</sup> Bk., perhaps also by S<sup>10</sup>    32 *τῶν* omitted by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>10</sup> Bk.    33 *γῆ* omitted by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>10</sup> Bk.    *τῶ* I Ald. W<sup>10</sup> and P<sup>10</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), *τὸ* M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>10</sup> + <sup>104</sup> S<sup>10</sup> V<sup>10</sup> Ar. and P<sup>10</sup> (1st hand)

move the objection noticed in *nn.* (687, 871), although we do not deny, and *n.* (872) have clearly stated, that the present detailed discussion would doubtless have received a different character had the final touches been given to the work. With Congreve, square brackets do not necessarily imply an un-Aristotelian origin. Still it is all but inconceivable, if the connexion intended was that assumed by Congreve, that Aristotle himself should have spoilt it by the inserted passage. Apart from the connexion, the whole passage does not look un-Aristotelian. For, though we cannot stop to prove this here, of all Broughton's objections to the genuineness of c. 13 the only valid one is that mentioned in *nn.* (876, 879), which taken by itself is far from decisive; while the genuineness of the passage is supported by the reference back to it embedded in the context of c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 6 f.; *ep. n.* (911). SUSEM. (881)

38. [κ] It follows from what has been said: cp. *n.* on 1254 a 31.

τά μὲν ἐκ τύχης καὶ πόλεως δεῖ συνεστάναι  
τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσσεσθαι πόλιν μακάριον  
χορῆσι δροσῆ ἀπλῶς καὶ γάργα ἀπλῶς.  
In this is opposed the work of the legis-  
lator as in 1. 10. 1, 1258 a 21 ff., 11. 5. 2,  
1263 a 39, 11 § 15, 1273 b 21. The drift  
of §§ 9, 10, seems to be this. Of the two  
requisites, the one, *χορηγία*, is due to For-  
tune; the other, *δροσῆ*, is the legislator's  
task (*σχεπεύειν*). Cp. 1333 a 14 *πρωθυμ-  
τεύειν*, viz. by education. 'Wisdom  
cannot create materials; they are the  
gifts of nature or of chance.'

§ 9 30 εὐχόμεθα] Another of the passages cited *ib.* (128). SUSSEM. (1883)

10 τὴν τῆς πόλεως εὐσυναν] The

structure of the state—the state we are constructing, or are to construct. We pray it may be fortunate enough to secure the goods at Fortune's disposal. The relative clause is the object of *we pray*.

κρίαν γὰρ] For here we acknowledge that Fortune is supreme. Comp. c. 13 to. 1433b 27 f., *ibid.* (707, 793, 871); Zeller<sup>2</sup> *op. cit.* II. II. p. 313. *SUSMAN*, 1982.

32 (ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ πράξεις) 'The presence of virtue in the state is not then a matter of fortune, but of knowledge and purpose (will), the two conditions of all right action, the *epistēmē* and *prohairesis* of *N. Eth.* II. 4. 3, 1103 a 30 f. (Gongreve). On them depend virtue or vice, goodness or badness of character. See further *Nic. Eth.* III. vi. 4-5, dealing with the intellect and moral action; also *ib.* (121) on I. 12. 12. SCHEM. (304)

34 ἡμῶν δὲ πᾶσι] How still more clearly than at c. 9 § 7. 1316 a 19. It is laid down that all the citizens of the best state have perfectly equal rights. Cp. *ibid.* (816, 817); III. c. 1 § 9. 10. c. 13 § 12. *ibid.* (440, 460). STEAM. (503)

§ 10. 35. *τὸν δὲ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπον*. By this term Aristotle denotes only the man of developed and matured virtue and excellence. See III. 2, 2, 1292a, and II. (112) on 1. 13, 6; further *ibid.* III. 2, 1, 1129 a 13, 2 & 6, 1129 b 12 f. Comp. Walter op. cit. p. 28; II. In what sense the words of *ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώποι*, etc., *ἐκείνῳ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώποι* *διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν* are to be taken is clear from III. c. 12 13 a—4, 1281 a 42 ff., esp. b 4 f. *ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώποι* *διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν* *πολλοὶ* *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* and *ἐκείνῳ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώποι* *διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν*, II. (134) 10, c. 12 131 a, 1283 a 37 ff. See further III. 131 a.

36 νεται σπουδαῖος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους (X)  
εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἰρετώτερον·  
ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας.

§ 11 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ 6  
40 τρία δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶ-  
τον οἶον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῶων, εἴτα καὶ (P)  
ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. ἔνια δὲ οὐδὲν ὄφελος  
1332 b φῦναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθνη μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ. ἔνια γὰρ ἐστὶ διὰ  
τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

§ 12 καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῶων μάλιστα μὲν 7  
τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ  
5 καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον· ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφω-

41 εἴτα P<sup>5</sup> (later hand) and Lambin, οὕτω Π<sup>1.2</sup> Ar. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text and P<sup>5</sup> (1st hand) || 42 δὲ Γ, τε Π Ar. Bk.

1332 b 1 μεταβαλεῖν P<sup>2</sup> Bk. || ἔνια...3 βέλτιον observed to be defective by Conring || γάρ] δέ ? Schneider || ἐστὶ διὰ] ἐστὶν ἴδια Koraes || [διὰ] Göttling, βία Lindau, against the sense || 2 φύσεως <καὶ> in the margin || <ᾧ διάγεται> διὰ ? Susem., <ᾧ> διὰ and <ρέπει> ἐπὶ Schmidt, ἐθῶν <δὲ μεταβαλλόμενα> ? Conring, ἐθῶν \* \* or else [διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν] Thurot || δὲ is added after διὰ by Alb. and Thomas || 3 βέλτιον <ἀγονται> Schneider (who also brackets b 1 ἐστὶ), βέλτιον <ἀγόμενα> Welldon who also reads 2 διὰ <δὲ> τῶν ἐθῶν || 5 ὥστε...6 ἀλλήλοις transposed by Böcker to precede 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν: see *Introd.* p. 89. Susem. had observed that in its traditional place this clause is plainly inconsistent with 6 πολλὰ γὰρ...7 βέλτιον || 5 μόνος Spengel (*solus* Ar.), perhaps right

§§ 11, 12 n. (708), VIII(V). 9. 12, 1310 a 18 f. n. (1642). SUSEM. (886) As here the virtue of the whole state is unequally diffused through the citizens (as was doubtless the case in the existing democracies), so (II. 5. 27) we find unequal distribution of happiness discussed. For the antithesis πάντες )( ὡς ἕκαστος, see II. 3. 2, 1261 b 26 n. Add to the instances VIII(V). 8. 3, 1307 b 35 ff.

39 ἀλλά μὴν...40 λόγος] This is repeated c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 6 f., n. (931). Comp. *N. Eth.* x. 9. 6, 1179 b 20 f., γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἳ μὲν φύσει οἳ δ' ἔθει οἳ δὲ διδασκῇ. As in that passage λόγος, reason, is replaced by διδασκή, instruction, so in B. II. 5. 16, 1263 b 39, it is replaced by φιλοσοφία, culture. Comp. also II. 8. 24, 1269 a 20: the coercive force of law is due to custom and involves time. SUSEM. (887)

41 εἴτα καὶ...42 ψυχὴν] For slaves by birth are still men, though incapable of real human excellence I. 5. 8, 1254 b 16 ff., I. 13. 2 f., 1259 b 22—28. In *Nic. Eth.* vi. 13, 1144 b 1 ff., Aristotle treats

of these good or bad natural dispositions, or qualities (αἱ φυσικαὶ ἕξεις), as the necessary conditions for the future growth of the real moral and intellectual qualities or aptitudes (ἕξεις), which correspond to them. Comp. n. (1043), i.e. Exc. III. on B. V(VIII). SUSEM. (888)

42 ἔνια is subject to φῦναι, but in the next line it must be the object governed by μεταβάλλειν.

§ 11 1332 b 1 ἔνια γὰρ...3 βέλτιον] That there is some flaw in this sentence will hardly be disputed. Aretinus translates well enough to show the meaning, 'nam aliqua per naturam ad utrumque apta per mores ad peius vel melius convertuntur'; but in this he can scarcely have followed any manuscript. SUSEM.

§ 12 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα κτλ] In form this sentence recalls *Meta.* I. I. 3, 980 b 25—28, *N. E.* VIII. 12. 7, 1162 a 19—22.

4 μικρὰ is accus., ἔνια nominative. The gender of μόνον is a parallel to τελεωθέν and χωρισθέν, I. 2. 15, 1253 a 32 f.

5 δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν] Habit should cooperate with natural endowment. This

4 *καὶ ἄλλοις. «τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει» (XIII)  
 «ζῆ, μικρὰ δ' ἓνα καὶ τοῖς ἔθουσιν, ἄνθρωπον δὲ καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον»  
 «γὰρ ἔχει λόγον»· πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἔθισμους καὶ τὴν φύσιν  
 7 πρίττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅταν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον.  
 13 τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἷους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλον-  
 τας εὐχειρώτους ἔσεσθαι τῇ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον  
 10 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἤδη παιδείας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιζόμενοι  
 μαθαίνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες.*

4 ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνίστηται ἐξ ἀρχόν- XIII  
των καὶ ἀρχομένων, τοῦτο ἤδη σκεπτόμεν, εἰ ἑτέροις εἶναι  
δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ  
15 βίου· δηλὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεήσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν

8 *τοὺς* omitted and *δὲ* inserted after *φύσει* by M<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin): presumably *τοὺς* and *δὲ* (*ἐφ' ἧς φύσει*) were variants. In Bk.<sup>2</sup> *φύσει* is omitted by mistake | 10 *ἐπιζόμενα* II<sup>2</sup> | 13 *ἔσται* P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), *ἔσ* II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.), possibly right | *ἐρρέουσιν*—14 *τοὺς αὐτοὺς* P II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, *τοὺς αὐτοὺς*—14 *ἐρρέουσιν* Susem.<sup>2,3</sup> Madvig first suspected corruption, but proposed *ἀρχομένους*, [ἦ] | 15 *τοὺς* omitted by P<sup>2</sup> S<sup>2</sup> V<sup>2</sup>.

is a satisfactory sense; see however p. 89 for Prof. Wilson's view (*sensu*—*reason*, *habit*, *natural endowment*: all three).

§ 13 9 πρότερον] In c. 7. SUSEM. (890)  
 10 τὰ μὲν γὰρ] By habituation (ἐθι-  
 ζόμενα) arises moral virtue, by instruction  
 (διδασκόμενα) intellectual virtue, *Nic. Eth.* II.  
 I. 1, 1103a 14 ff. These are the two sides  
 of Education: *N. E.* II. I. 8, 1103 b 22 ff.,  
 X. 9. 8, 1179 b 29 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM.  
 (890)

11 ἀκούοντες) Cp. *N. E.* x. 9, 7, 1179  
b 17 οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου. Apparently  
θεόμενοι...ἀκούοντες corresponds to τῶ  
λόγῳ...τοῖς θεοῖν c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 18.

c. 14. *The distinction between rulers and ruled; whether absolute and life-long, or relative and temporary: §§ 1—5.*

[12-16] Comp. III, 4, 8 n. (477)  
for the distinction in education. SUSEM.  
(891)

§ 6. Against the proposed transposition (see *Crit. n.*) Dr Jackson argues in the following note: 'Aristotle here contrasts (*a*) the permanent assignment of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that the man who rules never is ruled, the man who is ruled never rules, with (*b*) the alternation of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that at one time X rules, Y is ruled, at another Y rules, X is ruled. Now a priori the phrase *res alicuius esse* might be used to describe either of the contrasted systems: i.e. it might

he said that, when the functions are permanently assigned, "the same person always rules, the same person always is ruled"; or again it might be said that, when the functions alternate, "the same persons rule and are ruled." But although the phrase might be used in either sense, plainly it should not be used simultaneously in both senses. Sumnerd however, though he has altered the text in 1332 b 13, 14, so that the phrase *ruet aérois d'ois* bears the latter of the two meanings, above distinguished, nevertheless employs it in the *former* of these meanings in 1332 b 22. Thus the alteration creates an inconsistency. On the other hand, if the phrase is taken in *both* places in the *former* of the two meanings, the unaltered text is consistent and intelligible.

What Jackson calls an inconsistency Summihl assumes to have been the cause of the alteration: "vilius inde ortus esse videtur, quod demum pro rula dixerat aut. rula dixerunt etiam alii. Ad hoc potius dicitur ad rem aliam rula inde dixerunt si dixerint, subterfugit. Itaq. ut pro rula aliam dicitur, non est videtur dicitur, tuncque ad rem aliam dixerunt dixerunt. Itaq. ut rula aliam dixerunt. Itaq. ut rula aliam dixerunt." (p. 411). Where the elements are each made as equally balanced, the traditional order in the text indicates, not more than now found.

§ 2 κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εἴησαν τοσοῦτον (X) διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχοντας ὑπερβολήν, εἶτα κατὰ  
 20 τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥστε ἀναμφισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον αἰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι  
 § 3 καθάπαξ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐ ῥάδιον λαβεῖν οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν 2  
 Ἰνδοῖς φησι Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσοῦτον διαφέ-  
 25 ροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερόν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. τό τε γὰρ ἴσον \* \* ταῦτόν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, καὶ χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυῖαν παρὰ τὸ  
 § 4 δίκαιον. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπάρχουσιν νεωτερίζειν  
 30 βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν· τοσοῦτους τε εἶναι

23 ὥσπερ] ὅπερ Reiz || 26 κατὰ μέρος transposed to follow 27 ἄρχεσθαι ? Schneider, [κατὰ μέρος] or 27 [καὶ ἄρχεσθαι], or else ἄρχεσθαι καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν Spengel (the last the best suggestion) || 27 ἴσον <τῷ δικαίῳ> Thurot, ἴσον <καὶ τὸ δίκαιον> Susem. from Dübner's translation || 29 νεωτερίζειν βουλόμενοι transposed to follow 30 χώραν by Lambin and Thurot || 30 βουλομένων Vettori (in his translation), Reiz, rightly || τε] δὲ ? Spengel

16 κατὰ=in virtue of. Cp. κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι *Meta.* I. 6. 3, 987 b 9, Bonitz *ad loc.* Eucken p. 43. This construction with ἀκολουθεῖν is less frequent than the dative. But cp. *N. E.* II. I. 8, 1103 b 23, κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἔξεις, VII. 9. 6, 1151 b 34, καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἡκολούθηκεν, *Hist. Animal.* VIII. 2. 13, 590 a 16, ἀκολουθοῦσιν οἱ βίοι κατὰ ταύτας τὰς διαιρέσεις, a 18, III. 9. 2, 517 a 13 (*Ind. Ar.* 26 a 36 has, what is rare, a double misprint, Γ 2. 517 a 3).

§ 2 εἰ μὲν τοίνυν κτλ] *Comp.* I. 5. 10, 1284 b 34—36 with n. (47). SUSEM. (892) Strikingly similar to Pl. *Politicus* 301 D, E: νῦν δέ γε ὁπότε οὐκ ἔστι γιγνόμενος, ὡς δὴ φαμεν, ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι βασιλεὺς οἷος ἐν σμήνεσιν ἐμφύεται, τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρων εἰς, δεῖ δὲ συνελθόντας συγγράμματα γράφειν.

22 βέλτιον αἰ κτλ] This has been affirmed II. 2. 6, 1261 a 38. It is the basis of the argument for Absolute Monarchy III. 13. 13. See *nn.* (601, 678).

§ 3 Scylax of Caryanda in Caria was sent by Darius Hystaspis to explore the mouth of the Indus, Herod. IV. 44. We may conclude with certainty from this passage that he published an account of his

expedition in a book of travels. But the geographical work, which has come down to us bearing the name of Scylax, Περὶ πλοῦς τῶν ἐντὸς τῶν Ἡρακλέους στηλῶν, is of much later date. SUSEM. (893)

*Comp.* Niebuhr in *Phil. Museum* I. 245.

24 τοὺς βασιλέας κτλ] Cp. VI(IV). 4. 4, n. (1165). In Ethiopia the kings were chosen for their stature. SUSEM. (894)

27 τό τε γὰρ ἴσον <καὶ τὸ δίκαιον> ταῦτόν] Where all the citizens are peers, equality is the same thing as justice. See III. 9 §§ 1, 2. SUSEM. (895)

Equality=τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, cp. 1261 a 30. From VIII(V). I. 11—13, 1301 b 26 ff., it is τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον which is ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, while it is τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἴσον which is ταῦτό.

28 χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν..... 32 ἔστιν] This passage condenses the results of the inquiry into the stability and instability of governments in B. VIII(V) and VI(IV), especially recognising the criterion of VIII(V). 9. 6, 1309 b 16 ff., and VI(IV). 12. 1, 1296 b 14 ff. ὅπως κρεῖττον ἔσται τὸ βουλούμενον τὴν πολιτείαν. See n. (1307).

τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' εἶναι κρείττους τοῖς  
 των πάντων, ἔν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὲν ὅτι  
 γε δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀναμφισβή-  
 τητον. πῶς οὖν ταύτ' ἐσται καὶ πῶς μεθίξουσιν, δεῖ σκέψασ-  
 θαι τὸν νομοθέτην. εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἡ γὰρ  
 φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν, ποιήσασα [αὐτῷ] τῷ γένει  
 ταυτό τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὧν τοῖς μὲν ἄρ-  
 χεσθαι πρέπει τοῖς δ' ἄρχειν· ἀνανακτὶ δὲ οἰδαῖς καθ'  
 ἡλικίαν ἀρχόμενος, οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρείττων, ἀλλῶς τε  
 καὶ μέλλον ἀντιλαμβάνειν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἔρανον, ὅταν τύχῃ  
 τῆς ἱκνουμένης ἡλικίας. ἐστὶ μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοῖν αἰτοῖν ἄρχειν  
 καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατίον, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς ἐτέρους. ἅστε καὶ τὴν  
 παιδείαν ἐστὶν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς ἐτέραν  
 εἶναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναί φασιν  
 δεῖν πρῶτον. ἐστὶ δὲ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις εἴρη-  
 ται λόγοις, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἀρχοντος χάριν ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀρχομένου.  
 τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναί φασιν, τὴν δὲ τῶν

31 τούτων after 32 πάντων P<sup>1,2</sup> H<sup>2</sup> Bk. | 36 διαίρεσιν Ar., αἰρεσιν FH Bk., cp.  
 1333 a 33 | αὐτῷ inserted by Ald. W<sup>2</sup> Bk., αὐτῷ M<sup>2</sup> and Γ after τῷ, αὐτῷ P<sup>1,2,3,4,5</sup>  
 S<sup>2</sup> V<sup>2</sup> L<sup>2</sup>, τῶν αὐτῶν Bas.<sup>2</sup>, τὸ Spengel, omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Ar. | τῷ Ald. W<sup>2</sup> |  
 37 ταύτων Bk., ταύτῳ M<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>), ταύτῳ Ar., un-  
 translated by William, omitted by Bas.<sup>2</sup> | τὸ—τὸ] τὰ—τὰ M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> | 39 οὐδὲ  
 εἰ νομίζει Sepulveda, οἰδ' εἰ νομίζει Koraes, not badly | 40 τὴν ταύτων] ταύτῳ  
 τῶν H<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk., perhaps right, *eundem* Ar.

1333 a 1 [ἐστὶν] ἐστὶ μὲν Bk.<sup>2</sup>

§ 5 35 [εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον] c. 9 §§  
 4—6: see n. (812). SUSSEM. (896)

41 ἱκνουμένη = προσηκουμένη Bon. *Ind.*  
 Ar. s. v. Found with ὥρα *Procl.* 88, 14,  
 924 b 14; with ἔξω, ἐπαιτήμη *Ind.* VI (IV).  
 I. 2, 1288 b 16.

*Education to be in our sense the same  
 for all; in another sense a different edu-  
 cation for rulers and ruled:* §§ 6—8.

§ 6 1333 a 1 [ἐστὶν ὡς κτλ.] The  
 education is the same and yet different  
 in so far as it has two different sides; it  
 trains the governed to obey well, but only  
 in so far as this would seem to teach  
 them how to govern well in the future:  
 thus so far it really teaches the future  
 governors. Comp. Bonitz in *Zeit.* 4. 7,  
 6. *Zeit.* Gymn. XVIII, 1867, p. 686 f.  
 SUSSEM. (897)

2 τὸν τε γάρ] With this whole pas-  
 sage comp. III. 4. 10—14, 1377 a 25 n.

(490). This is one of the few instances  
 in which *τε γάρ* stands, as is allowed  
 by Bonitz, who discusses the Aristotelian  
 usage of *τε γάρ* generally in the paper  
 just cited p. 672 ff., esp. p. 686. SUSSEM.  
 (898)

English readers may consult Stallan's  
 critical note to Dem. *De Fidei Leg.* § 136.  
 He cites Herod. IV. 167, Aeschyl. *Eum.*  
 402, Ar. *Eccl.* III. 7, II. 1408 b 17, and  
 III. II. 7, 1412 b 9, and further illustrates  
 the similar usage of *ἀλλὰ γάρ*.

3 ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις [εἴρηται λόγοις] i.e.  
 III. 6 §§ 6—10, 1378 b 20 ff. It is un-  
 worthy that reference is only made to this  
 passage, and not to the much more  
 similar one quoted in n. (897). However,  
 some such reference may have been lost,  
 where the following context is defective.  
 See n. (897), also n. (891). SUSSEM.  
 (899)

ἐλευθέρων. \* \* διαφέρει δ' ἔνια τῶν ἐπιταττομένων οὐ τοῖς ἔρ- 5  
 γοις ἀλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκα. διὸ πολλὰ τῶν εἶναι δοκούντων δια-  
 κονικῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καλὸν διακο-  
 νεῖν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν οὐχ οὕτως δια-  
 10 φέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις καθ' αὐτὰς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ  
 § 8 τίνος ἕνεκεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτικῶν καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν  
 ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δ' αὐτὸν  
 ἀρχόμενον τε δεῖν γίνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ὕστερον,  
 τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγα-  
 15 θοὶ γίνωνται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ  
 τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς.  
 § 9 διήρηται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' ὃ  
 αὐτό, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὐτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνά-

6 \* \* διαφέρει Conring, cp. B. III. c. 4 1277 a 29—b 30, and see Comm. n. (900) ||  
 11 πολιτικῶν Rassow, πολιτεία M<sup>s</sup>, πολιτου Γ P<sup>1.5</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text,  
 πολίτου <ἀρίστου> Spengel || αὐτὴν omitted by P<sup>4.6</sup> C<sup>c</sup> (?) || 13 δεῖν over an  
 erasure P<sup>4</sup>, δεῖ P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 14 πῶς Schneider, πῶς <ἄν> ? Koraes || 15 γίνωνται  
 P<sup>3.4.5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk.<sup>1</sup>, γίγνεται P<sup>2</sup>, γίγνουντο ? Koraes

§ 7 6 ἐλευθέρων\*] The passage which is wanting here, must have stated that in the government of the best state only the latter kind of rule can be in question, and that the power of ruling over slaves is not such as can only be learnt by previous corresponding service; on the contrary, the service of a slave is unworthy of a free man, and ought not to be learnt at all by the young sons of our citizens. Compare the discussion III. 4 §§ 11—14, which is analogous in other respects too, and where § 13, like § 7 here, contains a limiting clause:—"except sometimes of necessity and for their own use," 1277 b 5 ff. SUSEM. (900)

6 διαφέρει δ' ..... 11 τίνος ἕνεκεν] See v(VIII). 2. 6, 1337 b 17 ff. with n. (983). SUSEM. (901) The end redeems and ennoble apparently menial offices, as for a soldier to groom his own horse.

§ 8 If the good officer, who has learnt to command by obeying, is also the good man, how are we to train up good men? By this section we are brought back to 1332 a 36. But the last clause τί τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς carries us back further, to 1332 a 7 or the beginning of c. 13, 1331 b 24 ff. How tortuous the course of the discussion is, may be seen from the fact that after the Unity of Education we take its two main branches, moral and intellectual Educa-

tion; next criticise Sparta; then after much repetition arrive at a similar halting place to the present, 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.

12 φαμεν] The present may well stand here also (see m. 804, 831, 872) in the sense of a past tense: if so there is certainly a reference to III. 4 § 5. Comp. n. (471). SUSEM. (902)

14 τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη..... 16 ζωῆς] The virtues which must be learnt by obedience are however only the moral virtues, not the intellectual ones, as in the case of φρόνησις has been clearly proved in III. 4. 17. The question now to be considered is which of the two rank the higher; in other words—is development of character or of intellect the highest aim in education? Aristotle decides in favour of the latter. Cf. also v(VIII), 2. 1 n. (977), also n. (1024) and Exc. I. to B. v(VIII). Also *Introd.* p. 48, p. 50 ff. SUSEM. (903)

*Principle regulating the subordination of the semi-rational soul, the seat of moral virtue, to the properly rational soul, the seat of intellectual excellence: §§ 9—14. Application of this to the criticism of states (like Sparta) which make success in war the goal of education: §§ 15—22.*

§ 9 17 διήρηται δὲ κτλ.] See n. (40) on I. 5. 6. SUSEM. (904)

μενον. ὧν φαμεν τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καθ' ἃς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς λέγεται (XIII)  
 10 ται πῶς. τούτων δ' ἐν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ τέλος, ταῖς μὲν αὐταῖς  
 10 διαιροῦσιν ὥς ἡμεῖς φαμεν οὐκ ἀδήλων πῶς λακτέον. αἱ γὰρ τὸ  
 χεῖρον τοῦ βελτιονός ἐστιν ἕνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φαιερὸν ὁμοίως ἐν τῷ  
 τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν· βέλτιον δὲ τὸ λόγον  
 ἔχον. [διήρηται τε διχῶ, καθ' ὅνπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον εἶναι  
 15 ρεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικὸς ἐστὶ λόγον ὃ δὲ θεωρητικόν.  
 11 ὡσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος διηρησθαι δηλον-  
 ὅτι.] καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν εἶναι, καὶ δεῖ τὰν  
 τοῦ φύσει βελτιονός αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένους τυγ-  
 20 χάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐκάστη τοῦθ' αἰρε-  
 12 τώτατον οὐ τυχεῖν ἐστὶν ἀκροτάτου. διήρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ  
 31 βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ εἰς σχολήν καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρή-  
 νην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρή-  
 13 σιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλὰ. περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν  
 αἵρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξε-

20 ποτέρα M<sup>s</sup>, quia William. 24 [διήρηται... 27 δηλωτέ] Sussem. 25 τε] δὲ Γ<sup>s</sup>. διχῶ <ὁ λόγος> Reiz, following Lambin's translation. 26 αὐτῶν δ' P<sup>s</sup>. 27 καὶ ταῖς τὸ μέρος after διηρησθαι P<sup>1-2</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. 28 δηλον ὅτι Bk., omitted by Ald. W<sup>s</sup>, while Ar. translates it after πράξεις: δηλον <δ' > ὅτι Sylburg. <καὶ> δηλον ὅτι Spengel. Both Sylburg and Spengel omit 27 δὲ, which neither William nor Ar. translates. 29 ἢ πασῶν ἢ <τῶν> τοῖν δυοῖν Ed. Müller (*Genk. der Kunsttheorie* II. p. 370). ἢ πασῶν ἢ τῶν δυοῖν Lindau. [ἢ] πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν Ridgeway. [ἢ] πασῶν [ἢ τῶν δυοῖν] or εἰς [ἢ πασῶν ἢ] <τῶν> τοῖν δυοῖν Sussem.: Schmidt however conjectures that *we do* βούλωνται has been dropped after δυοῖν. 31 [καὶ] πόλεμον Reiz. 32 [εἰς τὰ] and 33 [εἰς τὰ] Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 42 b 26 ff., 632 a 29 f.; see however Vahlen *Index. f. d. Astr. Gym.* 1872 p. 540. 33 [περὶ] and 34 αἵρεσιν Schneider, wrongly

§ 10 24 διήρηται] See τὸ λόγον εἶναι. The passage in brackets as far as 26 δηλον ὅτι is in itself thoroughly Aristotelian, see n. (40); and it would be quite appropriate to raise here the further questions: In regard to Reason itself, is it the theoretical or the practical side that occupies the higher place? Is it the intellectual development of the former, or rather the cultivation of practical and political insight, which is the chief and final aim of education? Yet these questions are not raised anywhere in the context and so the passage serves no useful purpose. What is worse, it interrupts the connexion in the most confusing manner: it must therefore be pronounced an interpolation by an alien hand. SUSSEM. (905)

§ 11 27 καὶ τὰς πράξεις] Cp. *na.* (712, 717, 731, 736, 743) on c. 2 § 1, § 6, c. 3 § 1, § 3, § 8. SUSSEM. (906)

29 τοῖς δυοῖν] The relation is expressed 1331 b 29, τὰς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ποιεῖται πράξεις.

30 οὐ τυχεῖν ἐστὶν ἀκροτάτου] The highest within his reach, how determined is not explained. Cp. L. i. 1.

§ 12 32 διήρηται] Ar. c. 2. 1. 10, 1254 b 31. There is an echo of this division in Plot. *En. lib. abstract.* c. 14. 96 c τὰς δ' αἱρετὰς εἰς θεωρεῖν καὶ εὐαγεῖν διήρηται (Newman).

32 τῶν πρακτῶν] Cp. 1331 a 10. With χρῆσιν comp. the utilitarian conception of a civic virtue as in Plot's *Phaedr., Protag.*, Erythraei and Mr Archer Hind's *Phaedr.* Appendix 1.

§ 13 34 αἵρεσιν] The evaluation of pleasures at 18, so at 41, the two practical pleasures with the choice of one action, in preference to another. The estimate of value is the ground of preference. Ar.

35 σιν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχο- (XI)  
 λῆς, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἔνεκεν.  
 πρὸς πάντα μὲν τοίνυν τῷ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετητέον,<sup>9</sup>  
 καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις  
 § 14 αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν  
 40 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμά-  
 των αἰρέσεις· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πο-  
 1333 b λεμεῖν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην ἄγειν καὶ σχολάζειν, καὶ τὰ-  
 ναγκαῖα καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα [δὲ] πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεῖ  
 μᾶλλον. ὥστε πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ παῖδας ἔτι  
 4 ὄντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, ὅσαι δέονται παι-  
 § 15 δείας. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄριστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν Ἑλ- 10  
 6 λήνων, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς  
 πολιτείας, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαν-  
 τες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὔτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς  
 τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν  
 10 πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ πλεονεκτικωτέρας.  
 § 16 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ὕστερόν τινες γραψάντων

40 πρακτῶν? Susem. cp. a 32. Yet πραγμάτων gives a suitable sense || 41 αἰ-  
 ρέσεις Koraes (cp. a 34), διαιρέσεις (δι' αἰρέσεις P<sup>4</sup>) Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text ||  
 μὲν omitted by Γ P<sup>5</sup>, hence [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1</sup>

1333 b 2 δὲ before πράττειν added by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., before καὶ P<sup>5</sup>, δεῖ? Stahr || 7 βέλ-  
 τιον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., possibly right, βέλτιον <καὶ τὸ>? Schneider || 8 πάσας omitted  
 by Π<sup>1</sup>

a later time αἰρεῖσθαι, φεύγειν are tech-  
 nical Stoic terms, e.g. D. L. VII. 105.

35 πόλεμον] sc. αἰρετὸν εἶναι or αἰ-  
 ρεῖσθαι δεῖ.

ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς] Comp. *N. E.*  
 x. 7. 6, 1177 a 4 ff., Plato *Laus* I. 628 D  
 (Eaton), and with the former passage *n.*  
 (921) below. SUSEM. (907)

37 βλέποντι] Goes with πρὸς πάντα:  
 an instance of hyperbaton.

39 τέλη] Plural as in § 14 b 3 σκοποῦς.

§ 14 1333 b 1 μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην  
 ἄγειν] Cp. again Plato *Laus* I. 628 D,  
 ὡσαύτως τις οὐτ' ἂν ποτε πολιτικὸς γένοιτ'  
 ὀρθῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων  
 μόνον ἢ πρῶτον, οὐτ' ἂν νομοθέτης ἀκριβῆς,  
 εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ  
 μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἕνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰ-  
 ρήνης (Eaton). SUSEM. (908)

4 τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας] What these  
 are, is plain from 1260 b 15 f., 1277 a 16  
 —20. See further *n.* (1024) on V(VIII).

5. 4, 1339 a 29 f.

§ 15 5 οἱ δὲ νῦν] Cp. II. I. 1, *n.*

(128 b). SUSEM. (909) The plural  
 notwithstanding, it would seem as if  
 Sparta and Lycurgus alone were meant.

7 οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον] A familiar  
 criticism. Cp. II. 9. 34 *n.* (344 ff.), IV  
 (VII). 2. 9 *n.* (719), V(VIII). 4 §§ 1—7, *n.*  
 (1005). SUSEM. (910) Add Isocr.  
 IV. (*Panegyric*) 187, 188, 228 (Newman).  
 With συντάξαντες comp. 1324 b 8, and  
 1271 b 2 (σύνταξις).

9 φορτικῶς] In a purely utilitarian,  
 almost mercenary spirit.

§ 16 11 καὶ τῶν ὕστερόν τινες γρ.]  
 Comp. VI(IV). 1 § 3 with *n.* (1123) and  
*Introd.* p. 20 *n.* 1. Here we again clearly  
 perceive how slight is our knowledge of  
 such political literature before Aristotle.  
 It is highly probable that among the  
 writers here alluded to were those too  
 who were the first to set up the theory of  
 a mixed constitution, see II. 6. 17, *III.*  
 (219—221) and B. III. Exc. I. p. 449,  
 since it was in the Spartan and Cretan  
 constitutions that they found the realiza-

ἀπεφώνησαν τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν· ἐπαινοῦντες γάρ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἄγανται τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν σκοπόν, ὅτι πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν. αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὰς λόγων ἐστὶν ἐνέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήλεγκται νῦν. (ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζήλουσι τὸ πολλῶν δεσπόζειν, ὅτι πολλὴ χορηγία γίνεται

14 ἐνομοθέτησαν Γ M<sup>o</sup> | 16 νῦν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [νῦν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> | γὰρ Camot Bk.<sup>2</sup>, certainly right | 17 τὸ τῶν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. | πολλὴ Γ M<sup>o</sup> | γίνεται Γ M<sup>o</sup>, γίνεται Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>

tion of their ideal, 1265 b 33 with *n.* (219). Thimbron, or Thilbron, according to another reading, is quite unknown to us. There can scarcely be a doubt that Aristotle was also thinking of the work on the Lacedaemonian constitution which bears the name of Xenophon. At any rate its author, if, i. e., makes the happiness which the Lacedaemonians attain by obeying the Laws of Lycurgus consist chiefly in the fact that, in spite of their small number, they had proved themselves the most powerful and celebrated state in Greece; and Aristotle's next remarks sound exactly like a polemic against the opening words of this little work: ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐνοήσας ποτὶ ὡς ἡ Σπάρτη τῶν ὀλιγανθρωποτάτων πόλεως ὥστα δυνατώτατη καὶ ἐξ ὀλιγοτάτων ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐράνη, εὐθάρσασα ὅπως ποτὶ τριπλῶ τοῦτ' ἐγένετο· ἐπεὶ μέντοι κατενόησα τὰ εὐταγήματα τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐδέ τι θαύμαζον. The suggestion would therefore be natural enough that Thimbron, and not Xenophon, was the real author; but the true authorship of Xenophon has been lately demonstrated with such certainty by Naumann *De Xenophonis librorum* (Berlin 1876) that it is scarcely possible to adduce any tenable argument against it. Oncken's suggestion, too, *op. c.* II. p. 179, that Xenophon wrote it under the assumed name of Thimbron, is just as unsatisfactory as that of v. Leutsch (*Philologus* XXXIII. p. 97) that he wrote the first part of the *Hellenica* under the name of Cratippus. Both these hypotheses themselves depend on an hypothesis, the falsity of which has been demonstrated by Nische (after Morus) in a dissertation *Ueber die Abfassung von X. Hellenica* (Berlin 1871) p. 42 ff. This is the hypothesis, unquestionably dating from ancient times, that, according to his own statement, *Hell.* (I. 1, 3), Xenophon pseudonymously his *Anabasis* under the name of Themistoc-

genes of Syracuse. But the right interpretation of the passage in question is that Themistocenes also wrote an *Anabasis*, to which Xenophon refers because his own was not written at the time. Moreover there is no ground for the supposition that Xenophon ever published any of his works under an assumed name. Thimbron or Thilbron is a well-known Lacedaemonian name, and the one alluded to here by Aristotle was doubtless a Lacedaemonian by birth, and this may have been the reason why Aristotle cites him by name, without mentioning Xenophon. SUSEM. (911)

v. Wilamowitz identifies the author Thimbron with the Spartan who commanded in Asia Minor 399 B.C. (*Xen. Anab.* VII. 6. 1, 8. 14, *Hell.* III. 1. 4, IV. 8. 17). His words are: "Next there appeared on the scene a champion of Oligarchy, Thilbron, an ambitious character and incompetent official, but one of the ruling caste; he wrote in glorification of Lycurgus. Well might Agislaus request his literary agent, Xenophon, to draw up a new version of the story of Sparta, 'just as he had entrusted him with the task of justifying before public opinion the period from 404 to 388. . . . The foundation for the common traditional view of Sparta was laid in the half century 403—350: its author was probably Diemochides of Megara" (*Neue Beiträge* p. 273 f.). He conjectures in a note that possibly Plato's strange authority for Sparta in the *Law* [II. iii. esp. 683—692] was Thilbron.

14 τὸ κρατεῖν] Compare, 'to win victory,' as § 19. b 30, 1271 b 3. We find ourselves in the midst of a discussion similar to that of c. 2 § 8 C.

15 καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήλεγκται νῦν] Compare II. 9 § 16 a. (1261 § 14 a. [1257] and a. (919). SUSEM. (912)

§ 17 17 πολλὴ χορηγία] As in c. 2 § 12, γένεσθαι τῆς πόλεως τὸν πολεμικὸν ἔργον.

τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίμβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται (X)  
 τὸν τῶν Λακώνων νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος τῶν  
 20 γραφόντων περὶ <τῆς> πολιτείας αὐτῶν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι  
 § 18 πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους πολλῶν ἦρχον·) καίτοι δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ 12  
 νῦν γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Λάκωσι τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐκ εὐδαί-  
 μονες, οὐδ' ὁ νομοθέτης ἀγαθός. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ  
 μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος  
 25 πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν κα-  
 § 19 λῶς. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἦν  
 δεῖ τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην· τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς  
 ἄρχειν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ'  
 ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαίμονα νομί- 13  
 30 ζεῖν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ  
 τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν. ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἔχει βλάβην.  
 § 20 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τοῦτο πει-  
 ρατέον διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἄρχειν·  
 ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Λάκωνες Πausanias τῷ βασιλεῖ, καί-  
 35 περ ἔχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμὴν. οὕτε δὲ πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιού-  
 των νόμων καὶ λόγων οὐδεὶς οὕτε ὠφέλιμος οὕτε ἀληθὴς ἐστίν.

18 θίβρων Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. || 20 <τῆς> Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup> || γεγυμνασθαι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> ||  
 21 ἐπειδὴ γε νῦν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 23 ἔστι δὲ Congreve, ἔστι γὰρ Susem. || 26 δὲ M<sup>s</sup>,  
 omitted by P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> || 30 [κρατεῖν] Reiz, καρτερεῖν ? Congreve, perhaps rightly  
 || ἔσχυσεν Γ P<sup>2</sup>, ἤσχυσεν M<sup>s</sup> || 31 τὸ Scaliger Bk.<sup>2</sup> || 36 λόγων (omitted by  
 P<sup>4</sup>) καὶ νόμων Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. (?) and Bk.

18 Θίμβρων] See n. (911).

19 τῶν ἄλλων] To Thimbron and Xenophon we saw cause to add Ephoros n. (219): and perhaps Critias.

20 γεγυμνάσθαι] By the Agoge, the public training which constituted a Spartan citizen: see Schömann *op. c.* E. tr. p. 255 ff.

§ 18 21 δῆλον] That is, on their own premisses such eulogies are refuted. Aristotle fastens on the logical inconsistency of *post hoc propter hoc*.

23—25] As Mr Newman observes, there were evidently two views current in Greece as to the cause of the decline in the Lacedaemonian state. (1) Many ascribed it to a departure from the laws of Lycurgus, e.g. Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* c. 14, [Plut.] *Inst. Lac.* c. 42. (2) But Aristotle ascribes it to faults in them: cp. 1270 a 19. Possibly Plutarch's authority for the 'Life of Agis' adopted the first view, and was anxious to save the

credit of Lycurgus from Aristotle's criticism in B. II. and in the *Politics*. Thus Plutarch replies in effect that (α) Lycurgus was not in fault, but Epitadeus and degenerate Spartans: (β) Lycurgus had nothing to do with the Crypteia, or the treatment of the Helots: and (γ) it was not true that he had failed to subject the women to his training.

§ 19 27 τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς κτλ.] Comp. I. 5 § 2, n. (38 b); IV(VII). c. 3 § 2 n. (734). SUSEM. (913)

§ 20 32 δῆλον γάρ] 'For on these same principles every single citizen, if he can, must aim at making himself supreme in his own state.' Certainly a very appropriate remark. SUSEM. (914)

34 On Pausanias see VIII(V). § 10, 7 § 2 n. (1498, 1596). SUSEM. (915)

35 πολιτικός] Statesmanlike. The adjective of a 'noun' πολιτικός, exactly as in 1324 b 26 νομοθετικός stands to νομοθέτης.

1 ταῦτά γὰρ ἄριστα καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινῇ, τὸν <τε> νομοθέτην (XIII)  
 2 ἔμποιεῖν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὴν τε τῶν  
 3 πολεμικῶν ἀσκήσιν οὐ τούτου χάριν δεῖ μελετᾶν, ἵνα κατα-  
 4 δουλώσωνται τοὺς ἀναξίους, ἀλλ' ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αἰτοὶ μὴ  
 5 δουλεύσωσιν ἑτέροις, ἔπειτα ὅπως ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς  
 6 ὠφελείας ἔνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσπο-  
 7 τείας, τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δουλεύειν. ὅτι δὲ  
 8 δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ  
 9 τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν  
 10 ἔνεκεν τάξῃ καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γινόμενα τοῖς  
 11 λόγοις. αἱ γὰρ πλείσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι  
 12 μὲν σφύζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπολλύνται.  
 13 τὴν γὰρ βαρβάρων ἀνιάσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγου-  
 14 ρες. αἴτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχο-

15 λάζειν.  
 16 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῇ καὶ  
 17 ἰδίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι  
 18 τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερόν ἐστι  
 19 δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς ὑπερέχειν· τέλος γάρ,

37 ταῦτά P<sup>2.3.4</sup> L<sup>1</sup> V<sup>6</sup> Ar., ταῦτα the other authorities, τὰ Spengel || 38a P<sup>2</sup>  
 Ald. || τὸν <τε> Thurot Sussem.<sup>2.3</sup>, <καὶ> τὸν Congreve || 38 ταῦτα omitted  
 by P<sup>4.6</sup> L<sup>1</sup>, [ταῦτα] Bk.<sup>2</sup> || ἀνθρώπων τὴν τε τῶν twice over in P<sup>1</sup> || 39 κατα-  
 Γ M<sup>2</sup> || 41 δουλεύωσιν P<sup>4.5</sup> S<sup>2</sup> V<sup>6</sup> || ζητῶσι Γ

1334 a 1 πάντως ? Oncken || 2 πρῶτον τοῦτο Joh. Brandis (*Classica. Misc.* xi.  
 p. 596), not rightly || τῷ Vettori, τοῦ Koras || 3 ὅπως 4 σχολάζειν omitted  
 by Γ M<sup>2</sup> || 5 τάξει P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) and probably Γ (*aristoc.* William), τάξει M<sup>1</sup> || 8  
 ἀφίαν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk., perhaps rightly || 11 δὲ ? Sussem., yet δὲ is also trouble || 14  
 ὑπερέχειν Sussem., ἐπάρχειν Γ II Ar. Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup>

§ 21 37 τὸν <τε> νομοθέτην] Cp.  
 n. (196) on II. 9. 12. SUSSEM. (916)

46 ἵνα followed by ὅπως. See P.  
 Weber *Adelphotoma* p. 20, who quotes  
 1167 a 2, 1301 b 6, 1310 b 11.

41 ἔπειτα ὅπως ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγ.] This  
 is a curious admission, which proves that  
 Aristotle did not necessarily imagine his  
 ideal state without external dominion, but  
 rather as at the head of a group of allies,  
 whom it has conquered in war, and pro-  
 tects, but also to some extent rules; like  
 Athens, Sparta or Thebes. Only this  
 dominion might be generously exercised,  
 so that it may be of even greater service  
 to the governed than to the governing  
 states. Cp. also *Introd.* p. 55. SUSSEM.  
 (917)

1334 a 2 τρίτον δὲ κατ] Comp. I. 5.

12, 1356 b 23, with *noton*; also *not.* (14.  
 75, 728) and I. 7. 5, 1255 b 37, *n.* (63).  
 SUSSEM. (918)

§ 22 5 τὰ γινόμενα] So I. 5. 1,  
 1254 a 21 *ἐκ τῶν γινόμενων κατασκευάζειν*.  
 A fuller phrase 1318 a 20, *not n.*

6 Ephorus apud Strabonem IX. p.  
 614: *καθ' ὅσον Ἑλληνιστῶν θέλει τε-  
 λεωθῆναι τὴν γὰρ ἐκείνου τῆς ἡγεμονίας  
 ἀποβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως, γινόμε-  
 νον αὐτῷ μέγεθος αἰτίας δι' ἣν καὶ τὰ Ἕλλη-  
 νες καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀναγορεύουσι, καὶ τὴν ἑ-  
 θέλει τῇ ἐκείνου πύλῃσι ἀποδοῦναι, P. II. 1,  
 l. 254 (Newman).*

9 αἴτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης] Cp. again  
 II. 9. 34, with *n.* (143). SUSSEM. (919)

c. 15 *Prolegomena of the history of  
 man, though all nations are alike unde-  
 rstandable* || 1—6.

15 ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμου σχολή δ' (X)  
 § 2 ἀσχολίας. χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσι πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν 17  
 καὶ διαγωγὴν, ὧν τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὧν ἐν τῇ  
 ἀσχολίᾳ. — δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως  
 ἐξῇ σχολάζειν· διὸ [σώφρονα] τὴν πόλιν εἶναι προσήκει  
 20 καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικὴν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ  
 σχολὴ δούλοις, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείως  
 § 3 δούλοι τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσίν. ἀνδρίας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας 18  
 δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν,  
 σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς χρό-  
 25 νοις, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήνην ἄγουσι καὶ σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν

19 ἐξῆς Γ M<sup>s</sup>, perhaps Γ had σχολάζης || [σώφρονα] Susem.

§ 1 15 εἴρηται πολλάκις] c. 14 §§ 12, 13, 22. SUSEM. (920)

§ 2 16 πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν] Besides its general meaning 'mode, or condition, of life' and the more special sense, extending beyond the necessities of existence, 'refinement of life' (*Meta.* I. 1. 15. 981 b 18, I. 2. 11, 982 b 23), the word *διαγωγή* in Aristotle, with or without the attribute *ἐλευθέριος* (cp. v[VIII] 5. 8 with *n.* 1027) or some similar expression, or ἐν τῇ σχολῇ "in a condition of leisure" (v[VIII] 3 § 3, § 8, cp. *n.* 993), means the occupation of leisure worthy of a really free man, such as he attains when his political duties have been performed, or such as he always possesses, provided he is pecuniarily independent, and leads a life of true study or contemplation. The occupation of such leisure, i.e. in other words (see *Nic. Eth.* x. 7. 6, 1177 a 4, cp. *nn.* 907, 548, and 922) the highest degree of human happiness and satisfaction, is however activity: according to Aristotle, the highest activity there is. It consists in the study of all branches of knowledge and the contemplation of all works of art: it confers the highest intellectual enjoyment and most nearly approaches to the divine blessedness, *Metaph.* XII (Λ). 7 § 7, 1072 b 14 f. and above *nn.* (702, 728). From this meaning of 'the highest intellectual enjoyment,' the word sometimes descends to the more commonplace one of mere occupation and especially 'social occupation or intercourse': *N. E.* IX. 11. 5, 1171 b 13, *Fragm.* 90, 1492 a 28; cp. also e.g. *Pol.* v(VIII). 2 § 9 with *n.* (995). Then it is used in the plural for societies whose object is such intercourse, especi-

ally refined intellectual culture (III. 9. 13, 1280 b 37, where it might be translated "social clubs," cp. *n.* 558 and v[VIII]. 5. 11 with *n.* 1035) and even for regular feasts, gambling and drinking parties: *Nic. Eth.* x. 6 § 3, § 8, 1176 b 12 ff., 1177 a 9. In such cases the word becomes identified with the amusement, sport, or pastime, undertaken for recreation (cp. *Nic. Eth.* IV. 8 § 1, 1127 b 33 f.); though in the former and stricter interpretation, the two are sharply distinguished: v(VIII). c. 3 §§ 3—8, c. 5 § 1 ff. § 9 ff., c. 7 § 3 ff., comp. *nn.* (993, 995, 1023, 1024, 1027, 1032, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1041) and especially Exc. v. on B. v(VIII). See also Schwegler ad *Arist. Meta.* Vol. III. p. 19 f., Bonitz, *Arist. Meta.* II. p. 45, *Ind. Ar.* 178 a 26 ff., and especially Zeller<sup>3</sup> II. ii. p. 734 f. *n.* (5). SUSEM. (921) In short, a term which may stand for any employment of leisure, even on vulgar amusements, receives a special application to (1) elevated *intellectual* enjoyments (1339 a 25); in particular (2) those of philosophy and art, including music.

20 οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις] Comp. *n.* (548) on III. 9. 6. Slaves do certainly need recreation, but leisure in Aristotle's sense of the word, as explained *n.* (921), is something quite different from recreation. SUSEM. (922)

§ 3 23 φιλοσοφίας] Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. refers this to the meaning 'investigatio,' as in III. 12. 2, 1282 b 23, or *Phys.* I. 2. 5, 185 a 20; and hence explains it as 'virtus intellectualis.'

25 ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτλ.] Comp. *Thuc.* III. 82. 2: ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ

γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἡ δὲ (XIII)  
 τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπολαυσίς καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ' εἰρήνης  
 4 ὕβριστας ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δι' ἐκαιοσύνης καὶ  
 πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πρίττειν καὶ  
 20 πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας, οἷον εἰ τινὲς  
 εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιεταί φασιν, ἐν μακίρων νήσοι· μάλιστα  
 γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἐκ-  
 25 καιοσύνης, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιοῦ-  
 31 καὶ σπουδαίων ἔσεσθαι πόλιν τούτων δι' τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέ-  
 χειν, φανερόν. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι  
 τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἐτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν χρῆ-  
 36 σθαι, ἀλλ' ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι ἀγαθοῖς,  
 εἰρήνην δ' ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδῶδεις. διὸ δι' αὐ-

28 δι' δέονται (δὲ over an enasure), 29 δοκοῦντας, and 30 ἀπολαύοντας P<sup>1</sup>, *videtur*—*qui videntur*—*frui* William 1. 29 σωφροσύνης—μετέχειν—Kortae, note satis-  
 factory, if any change is needed. 31 τῶν ἀρετῶν omitted by P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, supplied  
 by a later hand), τοῖς...χρῆσθαι omitted by M<sup>1</sup>, ἐτι...χρῆσθαι omitted by P<sup>2</sup> A<sup>1</sup>. 1  
 τῷ P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), omitted by P<sup>2</sup> Bk.,—αἰσχρόν—τὸ Kortae, perhaps rightly.

πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν πολλῶν  
 ἀνοσφ (Eaton). SUSSEM. (924)

16 ἡ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας] Comp. Thuc.  
 III. 29. 4, VIII. 24. 4. Plato *Laos* VII  
 814 E (Eaton). SUSSEM. (924)

24 29 δοκοῦντας] Porson discusses  
 this idiom, accus. not dat., in a note on  
*Orestes* 639. It is not confined to Euri-  
 pides amongst Attic writers (Valerianus  
 on *Herod.* 23): see Aesch. *P. T.* 86, and  
 the same fragment apud Herodianum  
 Pictor, p. 450, *ἀσχετοῖς τε διό*, as cited  
 by Porson.

31 οἱ ποιεταί] First in the *Odyssey*  
 IV. 161 ff., next the author of the epilogue  
 on the ages of the world in Hesiod's  
*Works and Days* 167 ff., then Pindar  
*Olymp.* II. 60 ff., and others. The Isles  
 of the Blest, or Elysium, are placed at  
 the remotest ends of the earth: it is the  
 land of privileged heroes who do not die  
 but are taken alive from the earth: here,  
 'where falls not hail or rain or any snow,'  
 where gentle breezes are ever blowing,  
 they spend a most blessed life in undis-  
 turbed enjoyment of all good under the  
 sway of Kronos or Rhadamanthus. See  
 Preller *Griech. Mythol.* I. p. 635 ff.; cp.  
 194. 31. 69. SUSSEM. (925)

μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι κτλ] This is the  
 moral of Plato's fine myth requesting the

children of Kronos, *Platonos* 170 A—B.  
 Though it is not there stated that the  
 advantages of the golden age failed to  
 confer greater happiness, there can be  
 little doubt that this is Plato's meaning.  
 Several expressions of the *Platonos*, *κα-  
 οῖσιν ἀφ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ σχολή*, *κατε-  
 χρώοντο τοῖς τε ἔργοις τε φιλοσοφίαν*,  
*ἐκαστὸν ἑκάστῳ* seem to find an echo here.

32 φιλοσοφίας] Culture, cp. II. 3. 15,  
 1164 = 40. Intellectual pursuits, a habit  
 of intellectual inquiry, to give occupation  
 in leisure and save the citizens from rest-  
 ing. Liberal and refined pursuits such  
 as music, literature, philosophy in the  
 restricted sense, must in leisure hours  
 replace the active business of life, *ἐκαστὸν  
 καὶ κατὰ χρῆμα*.

33 σχολάζουσιν] This conception of  
 a life of cultivated leisure, distinct from  
 work and recreation, as the ideal life rep-  
 resented by the golden age, which only 'philosophy' can  
 train us rightly to enjoy (cp. 1367 a 11),  
 is of primary importance for the discus-  
 sion in Hesiod VI (111). See esp. VI (111)  
 c. 3 ff. 4—8 with notes.

35 39 ἀνδραποδῶδεις] This term  
 'slavish' means to Aristotle 'such like  
 beasts in low sensual enjoyment.' Plato  
 traces out exactly the same line of thought,

40 μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. ἐκεῖ-  
 νοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν  
 1334 b ταῦτὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γενέσθαι  
 ταῦτα μᾶλλον διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς· ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ  
 ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν \* \*.  
 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν \* \* τὴν ἀρετὴν,> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτὴν, φανε-  
 5 ρὸν ἐκ τούτων· πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.  
 § 7 τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους 21  
 καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τούτων δὲ ποίους μὲν τινὰς εἶναι χρὴ τὴν

1334 b 1 γίνεσθαι Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup>, γένεσθαι P<sup>4</sup>, γενέσθαι the other authorities Bk.<sup>1</sup>  
 Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 2 ἐπεὶ] ἔτι Welldon, who punctuates with a full stop at 3 ἀρε-  
 τῶν, ignoring the lacuna || τε] τὰ P<sup>1.5</sup> || 3 ἢ (omitted by M<sup>s</sup>) || τὰ τοῦ (τοῦ  
 omitted by M<sup>s</sup>) πολέμου added by Γ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>5</sup> before ταῦτα contrary to the sense, τὰ πολε-  
 μικά, a similar addition, is presented as a gloss by p<sup>2</sup> || τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ ὅτι] Camera-  
 rius first saw that the text was defective. Thurot placed the lacuna after, and Spen-  
 gel before, the words τῶν ἀρετῶν, supplying it conjecturally as follows: τῶν ἀρετῶν  
 <ὕπολαμβάνουσιν, ἐσφύζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες. ὅτι μὲν  
 οὖν δεῖ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀσκεῖν> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτὴν κτλ Thurot (cp. II. 9 § 34,  
 1271 b 3 ff.): τῶν <πολεμικῶν μείζω εἶναι ἀνάγκη. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην  
 χρὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν εἰς τὴν σχολὴν> ἀρετῶν καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτῶν, κτλ Spengel; mistak-  
 ing the sense. Thurot's supplement requires a slight alteration to account for the  
 loss: hence 4 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ μάλιστα δεῖ σχολάζοντας ἀσκεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν,> καὶ ὅτι  
 κτλ Susem. Welldon supplies <ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἀρετὴν δεῖ ἀσκεῖν> ||  
 αὐτὴν] αὐτὴν? Congreve || 6 [τυγχάνομεν...12 ἦχθαι] Broughton, thinking it to be  
 an interpolation by the author of the present redaction || δῇ] δὲ? Susem.

though in a different manner, in the first two books of the *Laus*. See n. (43) on I. 5. 8. SUSEM. (926)

§ 6 1334 b 1 ταῦτὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέ-  
 γιστα] Namely the external goods. Com-  
 pare for the Spartan convictions II. 9. § 24,  
 1270 b 34, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ  
 λάθρα....ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν,  
 n. (328), and § 35, 1271 b 7 ff., νομίζουσι  
 μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχῃ δι'  
 ἀρετῆς κτλ with nn. (346, 346 b, 347).  
 SUSEM. (927)

2 διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς] That is, by means  
 of valour or courage, which is a particular  
 virtue: see II. 9 §§ 34, 35 nn. (344, 347),  
 esp. 1271 b 2 f. πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ  
 πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, τὴν πολε-  
 μικήν· αὕτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν.  
 Comp. also IV(VII). I § 6, κτώνται καὶ  
 φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ'  
 ἐκείνα ταύταις, n. (697). SUSEM. (928)

Mr Newman well observes that this  
 correction of the one-sidedness of Lace-  
 daemonian training tells just as much

against all systems which, like Stoicism  
 and Puritanism, tend to develop some-  
 thing less than the whole man.

ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω...3 ἀρετῶν] The passage  
 is defective: we may supplement it from  
 II. 9 § 34, 1271 b 4, thus: 'But as they  
 esteemed these goods higher than the  
 virtues, and the enjoyment of them higher  
 than that of the virtues, <they maintained  
 their state only while at war, and fell  
 after they had acquired empire.> (Thu-  
 rot.) SUSEM. (929)

4 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν κτλ] Thurot further  
 suggests as the sense of this opening para-  
 graph: <That virtue must be practised  
 in leisure also,> and for its own sake, is  
 clear from this. SUSEM. (930)

§ 7 6 διηρημένοι πρότερον] The re-  
 sult of our previous analysis: 13 § 10,  
 1332 a 39 f., see n. (887) and n. (881) on  
 c. 13 § 8. SUSEM. (931)

7 τούτων] The citizens of the best  
 state (Susemihl): cp. b 8 παιδευτέοι, § 5,  
 a 34, § 4, a 29, § 1, a 13.

φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πρότερον παύ. (XIII)  
 δευτέροι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἐθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δαί  
 πρὸς ἀλλήλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχε-  
 ται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑπο-  
 θέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὁμοίως ἤχθαι φανερόν· ὅγ τοῦτό τι  
 γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ'  
 ἀρχῆς, ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους, ὁ  
 δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὥστε πρὸς  
 ταύτους τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν δεῖ παρασκευάζειν  
 μελέτην· ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δὴ ἐστίν, οὕτως καὶ  
 καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρῶμεν δύο μέρη, τὸ τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ  
 λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς ἐξείς τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμὸν.  
 τῶν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὄρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα

8 παιδευταῖοι M<sup>1</sup>, παιδευτῶν P<sup>2</sup> || 9 πρότερον omitted by P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> || 10 ἀρίστη.  
 = ἡ τοῖς ἐθεσιν; > ? Jackson || 11 καὶ omitted by P<sup>2</sup>, [καὶ] Kocaris Bk. 2; Kocaris also  
 suggested its transposition to follow τὸν λόγον || 12 ἐθνῶν omitted by P<sup>2</sup> (supplied  
 in the margin of P<sup>2</sup> with γρ. prefixed) || 13 ὁμοίως P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> V<sup>1</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>2</sup>  
 with γρ. prefixed, ὁμοίους Ar., ὁμοίων P<sup>2</sup> || 14 διὰ... ἤχθαι] τὴν διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἡμεῶν  
 ἀγωγήν? Schneider || 14 ἀρχῆς <ἀρχῇ> François Thurot, perhaps rightly, but (as  
 Foussier observes) even this slight change is hardly needed || [τέλος] and ἄλλ' αὖ  
 C. Thurnis, ἄλλο τελούσ<ης> Spengel

8 διώρισται πρότερον] In c. 7. SUMM. (932)

9 τῷ λόγῳ κτλ] Parallel to c. 13  
 II 13, 15, and to the more general dis-  
 cussion of *Nic. Eth.* X. 9 §§ 1—12 (c. 10  
 II 1, 1179 a 33 ff.).

11 διημαρτηκέναι τῆς βελτίστης ὑπο-  
 θέσεως] To miss the truest (highest) con-  
 ception or ideal: as is explained in c. 13  
 § 1. See c. 4 § 1, 1325 b 35. Men may be  
 led astray by habit as well as by reason.  
 With ἤχθαι = drawn off. *N. E.* I. 4.  
 6, 1095 b 4. The sense of ὁμοίως is vir-  
 tually, 'amiss.' Gottling is quite wrong  
 in rendering "evidens mensuras  
 quo perduxisset ἡ βελτίστη ἐκθέσται."

§ 8 12—15] Mr Newman thinks much  
 light is thrown on this difficult passage by  
*De Part. Animal.* II. 1. 6, 646 a 30 ff.  
 τὰς γὰρ τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ τινος καὶ ἐκ τι  
 ποιεῖται τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐκ  
 ἀρχῆν, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἀκείνης καὶ ἐχού-  
 σης ὅτε τινὰ φύσιν ἐκί τινὰ μορφήν ἢ τινὸς  
 ἄλλου τέλους.

12 ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς] The sense  
 of ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is clear from c. 16 § 1, see n.  
 (921) ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομασθέντα ὁρᾶν δὲ  
 δεῖν δελ. "Obviously birth is the first  
 or earliest thing which demands our care,"

for we begin with birth. The text would  
 mean 'the nearest or proximate end from  
 any starting-point'—understanding ἀπὸ  
 with the gen. ἄλλαν τέλει, 'belongs to'  
 [is referred to] another, or new, end'.  
 The proximate end is but a means, sub-  
 ordinate to a higher end: *Nic. Eth.* I.  
 1. 4, 1094 a 14 ff. In our human nature  
 this higher end is intellect and reason.  
 SUMM. (933)

16 τὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν μελέτην] Summ. has  
 ἀποδοτὴ τῆς ἐκείνης, the which *Nic.*  
*N. E.* X. 9 §§ 9, 13—15, 17 162, 1380  
 b 23 δὲ ἐκπολεῖται βελτίονος ποιεῖται.

§ 8 12 ὅτι μέρη καὶ] See c. 14  
 § 9, 1333 a 17, n. (904), and esp. n. (120)  
 on I. 5. 6. SUMM. (934)

13 τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὁρεξις καὶ τὸ αὖτε] In  
 English, as in German, it is not easy to  
 find two terms, mutually related as ὁρεξις  
 and ἐπιθυμία. Striving, or effort in gen-  
 eral, is the meaning of ὁρεξις [Hamilton's  
 conation]; ἐπιθυμία denotes desire, love,  
 or appetite, in particular. This explains  
 why ὁρεξις alone denotes 'the motive force  
 of the irrational soul' (as I should trans-  
 late *ἔξρις*; characteristic possession, or atti-  
 tude, is not strong enough), while  
 within the soul *ἔξρις*, passion—see n.

- πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ  
 § 10 λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βού-  
 λησις, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς  
 παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϋοῦσιν πέφυκεν ἐγ-  
 25 γίνεσθαι. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν  
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέρα ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔπειτα τὴν  
 τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἔνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ  
 τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.  
 16 εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅπως  
 30 τὰ σώματα βέλτιστα γίνηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν

23 καὶ after δὲ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 24 πέφυκεν after ἐγγίνεσθαι (ἐγγίγε-  
 σθαι P<sup>2.3.4</sup>) P<sup>1.5</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 26 τὴν after ἢ omitted by P<sup>4.5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> || 27 τὴν δὲ τοῦ] τοῦ  
 δὲ Π<sup>1</sup> || 28 τοῦ σώματος] τοῦ τρίτου M<sup>s</sup> (*huius autem eorum quae animae* William) ||  
 30 τὰ σώματα after βέλτιστα Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || γίνηται Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

(641, 786)—ἐπιθυμία, desire, and βούλησις, will, are distinguished: and further, why in I. 5. 6 the term ὄρεξις is first used, 1254 b 5, and afterwards 1254 b 8, τὸ παθη-  
 τικὸν μέρος 'the emotional part,' see note (40). The same trichotomy of the irrational soul is also found in *De Anima* II. 3. 1, 414 b 1, III. 10. 3, 433a 23 ff. (That these passages are not in conflict with *De Anima* III. 9. 3, 432 b 4 ff. and *Torica* IV. 5. 6, 126 a 12 f., if the statement ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἢ βούλησις be rightly interpreted, is shown by Susemihl *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXIX. 1879, p. 743 n. 17.) The spurious treatise *De Motu Animal.* c. 6 § 4, 700 b 22, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὄρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, and *Eud. Eth.* II. 7. 2, 1223 a 26 f. βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὄρεξις... ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητὸν, need not be taken into account. The Will appears, as the passage from *Eud. Eth.* more particularly proves, as ὄρεξις = impulse, whether rightly or wrongly guided by reason, directed to real or apparent good, see *N. Eth.* II. 4 (II. c. 6 Bk.), while Desire (ἐπιθυμία) aims at what is pleasant, and Anger (θυμὸς) at revenge. See Walter *Die praktische Vernunft* pp. 194—212. Yet all this does not suffice to explain the present passage, which rightly denies to the child (at all events to the infant just after birth) the possession of any rational impulses. The difference between our passage and the two cited from *De Anima* is that here θυμὸς and βούλησις are again drawn closer together and opposed to ἐπιθυμία. Should

θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις be taken to mean 'aversion and liking'? In any case at b 22 βούλησις is used in what Zeller calls (*op. c.* II. ii. p. 587, n. 3) a wider sense, or more precisely a weakened sense, denoting something more analogous to θυμὸς than to ἐπιθυμία. SUSEM. (935)

§ 10 We must then train the body first; next the impulses, the motive forces of the irrational soul; and lastly the reason.

25 πρῶτον μὲν... 27 ὀρέξεως] Here again Aristotle follows closely in the track of Plato, *Laws* II. 652 E—653 C. SUSEM. (936)

Add *Republic* 410 B, 563 A, 591 C ff.

c. 16 Precautions necessary on the part of the parents to secure healthy progeny.

§ 1 29 εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κτλ.] The expression is chosen with reference to the words at the beginning of c. 13 § 8, 1334 b 13, and as regards the facts also Aristotle takes up the same thread. Cp. n. (933). But in the further and decisive step, of making education begin not merely before birth but even before conception, Aristotle quite follows Plato's procedure *Laws* IV 721, VI 774—776, 783 D ff., 788 ff. (comp. *Rep.* V 458 E, *Politicus* 310). It is in imitation of the Spartan model: see Xen. *De Rep. Lacadaem.* 1. 3 ff., Plut. *Lyc.* 14 (Eaton). SUSEM. (937) Add Critias, *Fr.* 1, *F. H. G.* II. 68 (Newman).

δεῖ ὅπως] The remedy for a rather violent hiatus may be easily discovered by comparing 1320 a 33, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸν ἀληθινῶς δημοτικὸν ὁρᾶν ὅπως κτλ.

ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποίους τιναί δύναι (XIV)  
 χρη ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν

2 δεῖ γὰρ ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς  
 αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς  
 3 ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνά-  
 μεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεννῆν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης,  
 ἥ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρὸς μὴ (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στα-  
 4 σεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφοράς)· ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν  
 5 τῶν τέκνων διαδοχὴν, δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι τὰ  
 6 τέκνα ταῖς ἡλικίαις τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν  
 πρεσβυτέροις ἢ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἢ δὲ παρὰ τῶν  
 7 πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις) οὔτε λίαν πάρεργος εἶναι  
 (πολλὴν γὰρ ἔχει δυσχέρειαν· ἢ τε γὰρ αἰδῶς ὅτιτις ὑπάρ-  
 8 χει τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ὥσπερ ἡλικιωταῖς, καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν  
 9 ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεργος)· ἔτι δ', ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεῦρο  
 10 μετέβημεν, ὅπως τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχη  
 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα  
 11 συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐπὶ γὰρ ὤριστα τέλος  
 τῆς γυνήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον εἶπεν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ  
 12 τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτων ἀριθμὸς ἰσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ  
 13 γυναιξίν, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζεύξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν

32 πρὸς ἀλλήλους omitted by Γ Μ', hence [πρὸς ἀλλήλους] Sussem.<sup>1</sup> || 33 γὰρ  
 Sussem., δ' Γ Η Ar. Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup> || «*τοῖς*» *ταύτης* Vettori, perhaps rightly. || 34  
 συζῆν Γ<sup>4</sup> (corr.) || 37 γὰρ omitted by S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ar. || 39 τῶν omitted by Γ<sup>4</sup> ||  
 Μ' omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || τὰ τέκνα after 40 τοῖς ἡλικίαις Π<sup>2</sup> Γ<sup>4</sup> Bk.

1335 a 2 γὰρ after τε omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 5 ὑπάρχει Μ' Γ<sup>4</sup> || 6 σχεδόν... 11 ταύ-  
 τας transposed to follow a 27 ἐτι «*ἡ μέρων*» Sussem.<sup>2,3</sup>. See *Introd.* p. 59

31 γαμικὴν] 'Nuptial,' not 'con-  
 jugal'; cp. l. 3. 1, 1253 b 9 n. Or, as  
 Prof. Gildersleeve puts it, γάμος = wed-  
 ding, not wedlock.

§ 2 33 κοινωνίαν] Comp. Eur. *Phaenias*  
 1277 ἐγείρετο | Πένθεος ἐμυ τε καὶ πατὴρ  
 κοινωνίῳ.

34 συγκαταβαίνωσι] For the vb. *συ-  
 βαίνειν*, § 5, 1335 a 11, see Schw. *Lex.*  
*Herod.* It is used, like *καταβαίνειν* (cp. 1334  
 b 41), for 'to suit': properly 'to meet in.'  
 The compound with *συν* = to come im-  
 mediately to an end, so producing a com-  
 position or correspondence.

Γ 3 Judicium *Κατωτάτ.* c. 19 affords  
 a parallel. "From these early marriages  
 proceeds likewise the rivalry of parents  
 and children: the son is eager to enjoy  
 the world before the father is willing to

for sake it, and there is hardly room at  
 once for two generations. . . . Those who  
 marry at an advanced age will probably  
 escape the encroachments of their chil-  
 dren; but, in diminution of this advan-  
 tage, they will be likely to leave them,  
 ignorant and helpless, to a guardian's  
 mercy. From their children if they have  
 less to fear they have less also to hope."

41 ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων] The  
 gratitude due from their children. Cp.  
 Plato *Laos* IV. 717 E, c.

1335 a 1 βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις] From  
*Laos* 717 c *ὅτι ἀσπονδοὶ εἰσὶν* with  
 Stallbaum's note: *ἀσπονδοὶ* *ἐν λόγῳ* *Platon.*  
 125 c, *Id.* I. 116 a, *τοὺς* *πλοῦτας*.

4 ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεργος] New-  
 ness, i.e. equality in age, produces back-  
 stings, *ἐκμισθολογία* 91. 5-10

§ 6 εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους. ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συν-  
 12 δυασμὸς φαῦλος πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζώοις  
 ἀτελῇ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα καὶ θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον καὶ  
 μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν  
 15 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δέ· ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ τῶν  
 πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζει τὸ νέους συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτε-  
 § 7 λείψ καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματα εἰσίν. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις  
 αἱ νέαι πονοῦσί τε μᾶλλον καὶ διαφθείρονται πλείους· διὸ  
 καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν γενέσθαι τινὲς φασὶ διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν  
 20 τοῖς Τροϊζηνίοις, ὡς πολλῶν διαφθειρομένων διὰ τὸ γαμί-  
 σκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κο-  
 § 8 μιδήν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδό-  
 σεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις· ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ δοκοῦσι  
 νέαι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συνουσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων  
 25 δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν, ἐὰν ἔτι τοῦ

11 ἔστι] ἔτι Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the notes, wrongly || 12 τὴν omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. ||  
 13 ἔκγονα Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || θηλυτόκα Camerarius (wrongly), θηλυτέρα Koraes || 14 αὐτὸ  
 τοῦτο Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk., *hoc ipsiū* William || 16 ἐπιχωριάζει M<sup>s</sup> and (after a lacuna)  
 P<sup>1</sup>, ἐπιχωριάζεται Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. p<sup>1</sup> (in the margin) and apparently Γ || τὸ τοὺς M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>5</sup> ||  
 18 αἱ νέαι] *ἐναι* Π<sup>1</sup>, ἄλλως αἱ νέαι p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || πονοῦσι after τε M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 23  
 εἶναι inserted after γὰρ by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>2</sup> || 25 δὲ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, untranslated  
 by Ar., [δὲ] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, wrongly

§ 6 13 θηλυτόκα] This point is not mentioned *Hist. Animal.* v. 12. 1 (v. 14 Bk.), 544 b 16, where the offspring are merely said to be weak and puny. SUSEM. (938)

We find it however, with the presumed physical cause, *De Gen. Animal.* iv. 2. 1, 766 b 29 ff., τὰ τε γὰρ νέα θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον τῶν ἀκμαζόντων, καὶ γηράσκοντα μᾶλλον τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐπω τέλειον τὸ θερμόν, τοῖς δ' ἀπολείπει. Falstaff, *Henry IV.* Part II, Act 4 sc. 3, humourously calls this one of the ill effects of water-drinking.

15 τεκμήριον δέ....γὰρ] If the *Index Ar.* s. v. may be trusted, this is the only instance of this usage in its normal form, the pronoun being omitted. We had σημείον δέ....γὰρ c. 7 § 6, 1328 a 1, and Bonitz *ib.* 677 b 9 ff. cites ten other instances, including 1312 b 21, 1318 b 17.

16 ἐπιχωριάζει] Comp. v(VIII). 6. 12, 1341 a 34. The verb appears in another sense in Pl. *Phaedo* 57 A. The supposed passive of the Lexx. (see *Crit. n.*) receives its *coup de grâce* from Kaibel, the last editor of Athenaeus, who at XIV. 619 f. reads κατὰ τινα ἐπιχωριαζομένην παρ' αὐτοῖς....ἄδοντες, with the critical note

"παρ' αὐτοῖς < ἑορτὴν > Wilamowitz, recte defendens ἐπιχωριάζεσθαι verbum medium."

συζευγνύναι] To pair, join in marriage: § 9, a 29.

§ 7 18 πονοῦσί τε μᾶλλον] This statement reappears in the spurious B. VII. of *Hist. An.* c. 1 § 16, 582 a 20.

19 τὸν χρησμὸν] A gloss cites the oracle in the form μὴ τέμνε νέαν ἄλοκα, 'till not the fresh furrow.' Götting proposed to alter νέαν to νέας, thinking there was a play upon νεᾶς which he took to be gen. of a supposed νεά=novale, fallow land [for which νεῖός, Attic νεός, is the received form]. SUSEM. (939) Comp. Eur. *Phoen.* 18 σπείρειν τέκνων ἄλοκα, Soph. *Oed. T.* 1210 (Ridgeway); also *Antig.* 569 ἀρώσιμοι γὰρ χάτερων εἰσὶν γυῖα.

20 διαφθειρομένων] Comp. *Frag.* Λόγου γαμικοῦ of Clemens Alexandrinus p. 1022 P., III. 501 Dind. παρθένων φθορὰ λέγεται οὐ μόνον πορνεία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ πρὸ καιροῦ ἔκδοσις, ὅταν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἄωρος ἐκδοθῇ τῷ ἀνδρὶ.

§ 8 24 Comp. Aristoxenus Tarent. *Fr.* 20, *F. H. G.* II. 278.

σώματος αὐξανόμενον ποιοῦνται τὴν συνουσίαν καὶ γὰρ τοῦτον (XIV)  
 1 τις χρόνος ὁρισμένος, ὃν οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει πληθύνει ἐτι <ἢ μι-  
 κρόν.> § 4 a 6 <σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα γ' συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν  
 <ἐπιμέλειαν. § 5 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁρισται τέλος § τῆς γενήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ  
 <πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ γ' τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς  
 <ἔσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ 10 γυναιξίν, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζεί-  
 <ξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν 11 εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τοῖτον.>  
 9 διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν  
 ἡλικίαν συζευγνύναι, τοὺς δ' ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα[. ἢ μικρόν].  
 10 ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσί τε τοῖς σώμασι σίζειν ξίς ἐσται.  
 καὶ πρὸς τὴν παῦλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται  
 11 τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως· ἐτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς  
 12 μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἐσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίνηται κατὰ λό-

26 σώματος Γ Ar. and I<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>2</sup>), ἄλλως σώματος I<sup>1</sup> (in the margin), στέματος  
 the other authorities || 27 χρόνος after ὁρισμένος I<sup>1-2</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || πληθύνει Bk.<sup>2</sup>, πλε-  
 M<sup>1</sup>, multum William Ar.

6 δὲ Susem., δὴ Γ II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> || ταῦτα before πάντα M<sup>1</sup>, untranslated by  
 William

29 συζευγνύναι I<sup>1</sup>, συζευχθῆναι M<sup>1</sup> || ἐξ Ar., ἐπὶ all other authorities: πέντε ?  
 Susem. from an earlier suggestion of Spengel's, see Comm. n. (940) || [ἢ μικρόν] Susem-  
 vola, transposed by Gottling Susem.<sup>2-3</sup> to follow 27 ἐτι || 30 τοσούτῳ ταύτῃ II<sup>1-2</sup>  
 Ar. and I<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || ἀκμάζουσι M<sup>1</sup>, ἀκμαῖουσι I<sup>2-3</sup> S<sup>1</sup> V<sup>1</sup> || 31  
 = συγ-καταβήσονται Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> wrongly following William (conveniant) || 32 ταῖς  
 αὐτῶν ἀρχαῖς Ridgway wrongly: see Bk. II, p. 167 || 33 ἀκμῆς Γ erroneously  
 (mischante akmes William) Bk. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> and I<sup>2</sup> (corr.), perhaps rightly || γίνηται  
 II<sup>2</sup> I<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>, γένηται I<sup>1</sup>

26 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτον κτλ) 5c. γὰρ αὐ-  
 πανται: bodily growth has fixed limits of  
 time which it does not exceed (or only to  
 a small extent). Comp. note on v (VIII).  
 l. 1, 1337 a 13.

§ 9 26 δὴ τὰς μὲν κτλ) In Leg. v.  
 460 e Plato fixes the period for procrea-  
 tion amongst his guardians from twenty  
 to forty in the woman, and from twenty-  
 five (apparently) to fifty-five in any case  
 in the man. His regulations in the *Law*  
 are not consistent. The marriage of the  
 sons is at one time enjoined when they  
 are between thirty and fifty-five (iv. 721 a,  
 71. 792 b), at another time when they are  
 between twenty-five and thirty-five at  
 latest (vi. 773 b). Similarly the daughters  
 are to marry before the age of twenty,  
 but while the earlier limit is once fixed  
 at sixteen (vi. 785 b), it is elsewhere  
 raised to eighteen (VIII. 833 b).

In the questions II. vii. of Aristotle's  
*Historia Animal.* cc. 5, 6 there are state-  
 ments about the limits of age for getting  
 offspring in tolerable agreement with the  
 present passage. The limit is said to be,  
 as a rule, forty in the man, forty in the  
 woman, with occasional prolongation to  
 seventy and fifty respectively. Aristotle  
 (*Chon.* 7 § 4, esp. 3 § 12) fixes the earlier  
 limit in the wife's case at fifteen. See also  
 (940)

§§ 9, 10 are treated by Prof. Ridgway,  
*Translation* pp. 145 f., Dr Jackson ib. pp.  
 116—118.

\* Vide quite dissonant in Herm. 312.  
 p. 592 sup.: add etiam exponit, ut pro-  
 pter hoc olim Spengelius v. 29 πέντε πρὸς  
 ἐπὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν ἀκμῆν· Quasi-  
 crit. coll. p. 414. The substance of the  
 paper in *Hermes* is given in Fac. II, p.  
 566. SUSEM.

γον εὐθὺς ἢ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλι- (X)  
 35 κίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν. περὶ μὲν 7  
 οὖν τοῦ πότε δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύζευξιν, εἴρηται· τοῖς δὲ  
 περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οἷς οἱ πολλοὶ χρώνται καλῶς  
 καὶ νῦν, ὀρίσαντες χειμῶνος ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συναυλίαν ταύτην.  
 § 11 δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἤδη θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν τὰ τε  
 40 παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν·  
 οἷ τε γὰρ ἱατροὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν σωμάτων λέγουσιν ἱκανῶς,  
 1335 b καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοί, τὰ βόρεια τῶν νο-  
 § 12 τίων ἐπαινοῦντες μᾶλλον. ποίων δέ τινων τῶν σωμάτων 8  
 ὑπαρχόντων μάλιστ' <ἂν> ὄφελος εἴη τοῖς γεννωμένοις, ἐπιστή-  
 σασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας,  
 5 τύπῳ δὲ ἱκανὸν <δεῖ> εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν  
 χρήσιμος ἕξις πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν

34 γέννησις Reiz Susem.<sup>2</sup> || [τῆς ἡλικίας] Spengel || 37 δεῖ χρῆσθαι omitted  
 by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. thus avoiding hiatus || χρᾶσθαι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || οἷς] ὡς Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. ||  
 ὡς—καὶ νῦν καλῶς Schmidt || [δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὡς] Madvig || 38 ποιεῖσθαι after τὴν  
 συναυλίαν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || συνουσίαν Zwinger Bk.<sup>2</sup> || 39 δὲ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar., δι' P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand),  
 δὴ other authorities Bk. and P<sup>3</sup> (later hand) || 41 λέγουσι after ἱκανῶς Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

1335 b 3 μάλιστ' <ἂν> Koraes Bk.<sup>2</sup>, μάλιστα ἂν M<sup>s</sup> (?), μάλιστα the other autho-  
 rities and Bk. || 4 μᾶλλον...τοῖς omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, sup-  
 plied by p<sup>1</sup>) || παιδείας Π<sup>1</sup> (corrected by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || 5 <δεῖ> Susem.,  
 possibly however it can be understood from 4 λεκτέον || οὔτε γὰρ ἡ omitted and a  
 lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) || 6 ἕξις omitted and a lacuna left by  
 P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) || οὔτε πρὸς εὐεξίαν inserted after εὐεξίαν by Γ M<sup>s</sup> ||  
 οὐδὲ Koraes, οὔτε Π || πρὸς omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied

§ 10 34 καταλελυμένης] On the ana-  
 logy of καταλύειν πόλεμον, εἰρήνην, βίον, ἀνάλυσις συμποσίου, στρατιάς, τριήρους (a  
 crew), δήμου, πολιτείας, where 'breaking  
 up,' 'dissolution' are the main ideas, we  
 must render 'in the decline of their  
 powers, or vigour.' So *fracta aetate* Vict.,  
*aetate iam decrepita* Lambin.

38 χειμῶνος] more exactly, in the  
 month Gamelion (January and February),  
 which derived its name of wedding-month  
 from the custom: Theophr. *Hist. Plant.*  
 VII. 1 § 2. Pseudo-Hippoc. *περὶ ἀφώρων*  
 (III. p. 12 Kühn), quoted by Eaton, main-  
 tains "that the spring is the most suitable  
 time." SUSEM. (941)

§ 11 41 καιροὺς] Favourable condi-  
 tions.

1335 b 1 τὰ βόρεια] That the north  
 wind is particularly favourable to male  
 offspring is more precisely stated by  
 Aristotle in different passages of his  
*Historia Animalium* and *De generatione*

*Animalium*: e. g. *H. A.* VI. 19 § 4, 574  
 a 1 καὶ βορείοις μὲν ὀχευόμενα ἀρρενοτοκεῖ  
 μᾶλλον, νοτίοις δὲ θηλυτοκεῖ. SUSEM. (942)

3 ἐπιστήσασιν] Intransitive, as if τὴν  
 γνώμην had to be supplied: attentively.  
 Cp. 1336 b 25, also Soph. *Ant.* 227.

§ 12 4 ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας]  
 Another reference to a discussion to fol-  
 low, which is not to be found in the  
 extant work: see c. 17 § 5 n. (958), § 7  
 n. (960), § 10 n. (963), § 12 n. (969), 12  
 § 5 n. (862); VI(IV). c. 15 § 19 n. (1355),  
 § 13, VII(VI). 8 § 22 n. (1483). Also *In-  
 trod.* p. 49 n. (4), p. 52. SUSEM. (943)

5 Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 168 a 54 ff. is in  
 doubt whether δεῖ might be mentally  
 supplied from λεκτέον, or must be added.  
 The sense is: id iam nunc dicendum est,  
 quod est τύπῳ ἱκανόν. SUSEM.

5 οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν κτλ] Comp.  
 Plato *Rep.* III. 404 A (Eaton) and below  
 V(VIII). 4 § 1 n. (1004), §§ 7—9 n. (1015).  
 SUSEM. (944)

καὶ τεκνοποιίαν, οὐτε ἡ θεραπευτικὴ καὶ κακοποιητικὴ λίσαν. (XIV)  
 13 ἀλλ' ἡ μέση τούτων. πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχιν δεῖ τὴν ὁρμήν  
 εἶναι, πεπονημένην δὲ πόνοις μὴ βιαίσις, μηδὲ πρὸς ἑα  
 6 μόνον, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἔξις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν  
 ἀλευθέρων πράξεις. ὁμοίως δὲ δεῖ ταῦτ' ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀν-  
 14 ἄρσι καὶ γυναιξίν. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι  
 τῶν σωμάτων, μὴ ῥαθυμούσας μηδ' ἀραιὰ τροφῇ χρωρί-  
 νας. τοῦτο δὲ ῥάδιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ ποιῆσαι προστάξαντι καὶ  
 1 ἡμέραν τινὰ ποιεῖσθαι πορείαν πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπείαν  
 τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμὴν. τὴν μὲντοι δι-  
 νοίαν τούναντίον τῶν σωμάτων ῥαθυμοτέρως ἀρμόττει δι-  
 γειν· ἀπολαύοντα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς ἐχούσης  
 15 ὥσπερ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ  
 20 τροφῆς τῶν γενομένων ἔστω νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρωμένον  
 τρέφειν, διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων ἢ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν  
 κωλύει μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γενομένων· ὠρίσθαι γὰρ

by p<sup>1</sup>) || ὑγίαν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1-5</sup> || 7 θεραπευτικὴ M<sup>1</sup> and apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, cor-  
 rected by p<sup>1</sup>), *curis indigens* William || κακοποιητικὴ M<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, cor-  
 rected by p<sup>1</sup>), *male habens* William || 8 ἔχιν omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup>  
 (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) || 9 ἑα • • Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, *ἐν* as a gloss by corr.<sup>1</sup> in the  
 margin of P<sup>2</sup> and Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup>; but *πῶς* should be understood || 11 ἀ-  
 λευθέρων Γ P<sup>1</sup>, ἀλευθέρων the other authorities Bk. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || ταῦτα Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk.  
 || καὶ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 12 ἐγκύους P<sup>1</sup> Ald. || 16 ταῦτα ἐλθούσας Γ Ar.  
 Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 18 ἀπολάβοντα M<sup>1</sup>, ἀπολαβόντα Γ and perhaps Ar. ||  
 γενόμενα Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 19 καὶ added before τὰ by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 20 γενομένων P<sup>1</sup>, γενο-  
 μένων P<sup>2</sup>, γενομένων M<sup>1</sup> Bk.<sup>2</sup>, γενομένων Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 21 ἑὰν added after τρέφειν by  
 Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (margin), ἑὰν μὴ ? Scaliger. Schömann *Gr. Ald.* ii. p. 112  
 n. (1) restores the passage thus: τέκνων (ἑὰν ἢ ταῖς τῶν ἐθῶν καλῇ καὶ ἀποθέσει  
 τῶν γενομένων) ὠρίσθαι γε δεῖ || ἐθῶν Γ P<sup>1-4</sup> S<sup>1</sup> L<sup>1</sup> C<sup>1</sup> Ar. || 22 καλῇ P<sup>1-4</sup> S<sup>1</sup> V<sup>1</sup>  
 Ar. Ald. Bk. and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), καλῶς apparently P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), perhaps rightly, καλῶς  
 Susem., καλῇ § (with preceding ἑὰν) Schömann || γενομένων Korte (who does not  
 reject γενομένων), γενομένων Scaliger, γενομένων M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Bk.<sup>2</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text,  
 γενομένων Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || ὠρίσθαι Γ Ar. P<sup>1</sup> (margin) and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), ὠρίσθαι M<sup>1</sup>,  
 ὠρίσθαι P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), ὠρίσθαι P<sup>2-5</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. P<sup>1</sup> (corr. in the margin) and P<sup>2</sup> (1st  
 hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>), ὠρίσθαι Spengel || γὰρ] γὰρ Korte, γε Schömann

§ 13 10 "If any word is needed,  
 read πόρον, but ἑὰν refers to πόρος  
 with quite sufficient clearness. Similarly  
 viii), 4. 2, 1335 b 15" (Ridgway).  
 Comp. however *Quaest. viii. coll.* p. 415.

§ 14 14 προστάξαντι καὶ ἡμέραν  
 τινὰ...16 τιμὴν] Plato, too, *Leges* vii  
 784 b, prescribes in spite of ridicule, *ἀν-  
 ἄρσι προῖσθαι*, that when exercise the  
 wife should take walks continually (Ea-  
 too). SUSEM. (1945)

15 ἀποθεραπείαν] The form of the  
 prefix is similar in ἀποθεραπεία, to dis-  
 charge one's conscience. Here, 'to dis-  
 charge her services.'

(8 ἀπολάβοντα) Paul. Ridgway takes  
 this to mean that the father is a law to  
 the woman's strength, just as plants draw  
 the good out of the ground; *ἐπὶ αὐτῇ  
 γαστρὶ ἔχουσιν*.

§ 13 21 ὠρίσθαι... 22 καλῇ] How  
 this is to be thought about was stated in

δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλήθος, ἐὰν δέ τισι γίνηται παρὰ  
 ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζῶην,  
 25 ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ  
 § 16 διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν 11  
 ἀρχὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ διώρισταί, πότε ἀρχε-  
 σθαι δεῖ τῆς συζεύξεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἀρ-  
 μόττει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν ὀρίσθω. τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων  
 30 ἔκγονα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελῇ γίνεται καὶ τοῖς  
 σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοαῖς, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἀσθενῇ.

23 δεῖ Π<sup>1</sup> Ar. and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand), δὴ P<sup>2.5</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (corr. in the margin) P<sup>3</sup> (a later hand): so Spengel || 24 συνδυασθέντων Spengel Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> from a misuse of William's translation *aliquibus...combinatis*, <τῶν> συνδυασθέντων ? Koraes || 25 μὴ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || 28 δεῖ] χρὴ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || ζεύξεως M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 30 καὶ inserted after καθάπερ by Γ, if *sicut et iuniorum* (William) is an accurate translation || τὰ omitted by M<sup>s</sup>, possibly by Γ || τῶν omitted by P<sup>1</sup> || 31 γηρασκόντων M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, corrected in the margin with γρ. prefixed)

6 § 12: see *nn.* (209, 211), also II. 7 § 5 *n.* (236). Plato, too, *Rep.* v 460 D, 461 C, orders exposure in the case of weakly or deformed infants of the guardian class (as was remarked *n.* 140), and in the case of conception occurring where the law or the magistrates' orders have been infringed, abortion, or (presumably if this has been delayed) exposure. Indeed he goes further than this by condemning the offspring of inferior guardians: τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐὰν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν, 460 C. But even in the *Timaeus* 19 A his words convey the impression that he had not given any instructions for exposing the children of less qualified parents, but meant simply a secret transference of them to the third class of the population. Under the guise, that is, of a mere repetition, he modifies his former regulation in this sense (see Zeller *Griech. Phil.* ed. 4 II. i. 909 *n.* 2, ed. 3 pp. 771 *n.* 3, Eng. tr. p. 478 *n.* 55, Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. p. 171). In the *Laus* (see *nn.* 192, 208) he drops the preventive means of abortion altogether, nor does he say anything about exposing illegitimate and deformed infants. Thus in the course of his own lifetime Plato gradually attained to a more humane view. In this respect Aristotle's ideal state goes far beyond that of the *Laus* in the stringency and callousness, or rather, to give it its true name, the

abominable cruelty of its regulations. As to exposure, the example of Sparta has again had a determining influence on both thinkers. In all other Greek states it was left to the father's decision whether he would expose his child or not: but at Sparta a committee of the eldest members of the Phyle decided, and in accordance with their decision the deformed or weakly infant had to be despatched to the place of exposure (Ἀποθέται) on Taygetos. See Schömann p. 270 f. (Eng. tr. 256). Comp. also *Introđ.* p. 52 f. SUSEM. (946)

Note that ὀρίσθαι...πλήθος is a virtual repetition of II. 6. 12, 1265 b 6 ff., just as c. 4 § 2, 1325 b 38 f. reproduces 1265 a 17, in both cases without the conventional ὡς εἴρηται πρότερον (Newman).

23—25] Here the indignation of some honest reader found vent in the remarkable gloss on the margin of P<sup>3</sup>, τί λέγει ὁ δαιμόνιος τοῦτοις; Doubtless the same hand which scribbled φλυαρεῖ, φλυαρία, against 1269 b 26, 1272 a 23. Whether from this "thin end of the wedge" came the gradual depopulation of Greece, which Polybius (xxxvii. 9) deplores, is another matter. Cp. Thirlwall *Hist.* VIII. 463 ff.

§ 16 28 Meisterhans ed.<sup>2</sup> p. 28 ff. shows that λητουργεῖν is the true Attic form. The usurping λειτουργεῖν does not appear before the third century B.C. When this εἰ was pronounced as ι, λι-

διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμήν. αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς (XIV)  
πλείστοις ἢνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινες εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες  
ταῖς ἰβδομάσιν τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πε-  
τήκοντα ἐτῶν. ὥστε τέτταρσιν ἢ πέντε ἔτισιν ὑπερβάλλοντα ::  
τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεν-  
νήσεως· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑγείας χάριν ἢ τινος ἄλλης ταιαί-  
της αἰτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὁμιλίαν. περὶ δὲ  
τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἔστω μὲν ἅπλως μὴ καλὸν  
ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ἡ καὶ προσ-  
αγορευθῇ πόσις· περὶ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας  
εἰάν τις φαίνεται τοιοῦτον τι δρῶν, ἀτιμῇ ζημιυνάσθω προ-  
πούση πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.

γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οἶεσθαι <δεῖ> μεγάλην εἶναι δια- XV  
φορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωματῶν δύναμιν τὴν τροφήν, ὅποια  
τις ἂν ἦ. φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τε τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐπισκο-  
ποῦσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν οἷς ἐπιμελές ἐστιν εἰσάγειν τὴν

35 ὡς Π<sup>1</sup>, but ὥστε Π<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>) | 36 τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην omitted and a lacuna  
left by Π<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) | 37 ὑγείας M<sup>1</sup> Γ<sup>2</sup>, ὑγείας χάριν omitted and a  
lacuna left by Π<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) | 38 τὴν omitted and a lacuna left  
by Π<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) | 39 καὶ ἡ Π<sup>1</sup> Γ<sup>2</sup> Bk., perhaps rightly

1336 a 3 <δεῖ> Sussem. Should it come before διαφοράν? | 5 δὲ Γ<sup>2</sup> Bk., τε  
M<sup>1</sup>, τε Π<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> | 6 εἰσάγειν Γ<sup>2</sup>, ἀγειν M<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>1</sup>, δει Γ<sup>2</sup> Bk., ἀειν Sussem, ἐάγειν  
? Sussem.

τροφή was written in inscriptions of the  
Roman period.

§ 17 33 τῶν ποιητῶν τινες] Solon  
*Frags.* 27. Aristotle virtually adopts this  
theory of successive stages in human life  
at c. 17 § 15 (cp. n. 971), and similarly  
in *Hist. Animal.* v. 12 § 2 (v. 14 § 3, 544  
b 28 ff.), 17 § 16 (v. 20 § 3, 553 a 2 ff.),  
vi. 16 § 1 (17 § 2, 570 a 30 f.); comp.  
xii. 1 § 1, 581 a 12 ff., vii. 13 (vii. 12  
§ 1, 588 a 8 ff. quoted in the *Scholien* to  
Aristoph. *Birds* 494). Compare Hippocr.  
quoted in Philo *περὶ εὐστροφίας* p. 71  
Pflaf. and Celsus in *De die natati* 14 (J. Li.  
Schneider). Congreve remarks that in  
*Adm.* ii. 14 § 4, 1398 b 11 f. the forty-  
ninth year is more precisely given, not  
the fiftieth as here. SUSSEM. (947)

36 τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως]  
This means that if any license is taken,  
there must be recourse to abortion, so  
that no child is born. The key is fur-  
nished by *Eccl.* v. 461 c. μὴ εἰς φῶς  
ἐκφέρειν σῶμα μηδὲν, 'to prevent any  
embryo which may come into being from

seeing the light' (J. G. Schneider).  
Comp. n. (946) and *Internat.* p. 65. SUSSEM.  
(948)

§ 18 40 προσαγορευθῇ πόσις] "In  
the sense of καὶ προσαγορευόμενα sometimes  
employed προσγγόμενα and προσγορευ-  
θην, though in the sense of ἀπεργασί-  
θην, though in the sense of ἀπεργασί-  
θην" (Rutherford). See *New Papyro-  
logy* p. 333 ff. with citation of [Dion.]  
*Adm. Persepolis de die* xi. § 1, *ἵνα τοῖς*  
*ἀδελφοῖς προσαγορευθῇ*. Comp. i. 11. 5,  
1359 b 13 (προσγορευόμεναι), and for the use  
of πόσις, Soph. *Trach.* 550 f. καὶ πόσις  
μὲν Πρακτὴς εὖτε καλεῖται τὴν εὐστροφίαν  
ἀεὶ (paramisi).

c. 17 *Treatment and food of children*  
*during infancy.*

§ 1 1335 a 3 οὐδὲν . . . εἰ δὲ ἡ] "One  
next care must be for the proper quality  
of the nourishment, since much depends  
upon this, as we are bound to believe, for  
the thriving of the body." Comp. Philo  
*Eccl.* iii. 401 a ff., *Nonophan De Reg.*  
*Lat.* 2 § 5 (Katon). SUSSEM. (949)

πολεμικὴν ἔξιν, ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος πλήθουσα τροφή μάλιστα' (2)  
 § 2 οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν, αἰνουτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. ἔτι 2  
 δὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὅσας ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τηλικούτων συμ-  
 10 φέρει. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δι' ἀπαλό-  
 τητα χρῶνται καὶ νῦν ἓνια τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀργάνοις τισὶ μη-  
 χανικοῖς, ἃ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραβές. συμ-  
 φέρει δ' εὐθύς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψύχῃ συνεθίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν  
 14 παίδων· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς  
 § 3 πράξεις εὐχρηστότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρ-  
 βάρων ἔθος τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γενό-  
 μενα [ψυχρόν], τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα ψυχρὸν ἀμπίσχειν, οἷον  
 Κελτοῖς. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐθίζειν, εὐθύς ἀρχο- 3  
 μένων βέλτιον μὲν ἐθίζειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δ' ἐθίζειν·  
 20 εὐφυῆς δὲ ἡ τῶν παίδων ἔξις διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν

7 πληθύνουσα Vettori Bk., probably right || 8 νοσήματα] σώματα P<sup>4.6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> ||  
 9 τηλικούτους Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, tantillos William, τηλικούτον ? Susem., τηλικούτω P<sup>4.6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> ||  
 10 διαφέρεσθαι M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), διαφέρθαι P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), defluere William, δια-  
 στρέφεσθαι other authorities and P<sup>1</sup> (in the margin, with γρ. prefixed) || ἀπαλό-  
 τητα M<sup>s</sup>, ἀπλότητα Π<sup>3</sup> || 14 πρὸς before πολεμικὰς omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 16 τοῖς]  
 τῶν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || γενόμενα Susem., γεννώμενα Scaliger, γινόμενα M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Bk.<sup>2</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup>  
 in the text, γιγνόμενα Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 17 [ψυχρόν] Susem. || ψυχρὸν after σκέπασμα  
 P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), μικρὸν the other authorities and Ar. Bk. || ἀμπισχεῖν Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>  
 and P<sup>2.3</sup> (?), ἀπίσχειν P<sup>5</sup> (1st hand), ἀμπύχειν P<sup>6</sup> || 18 εὐθύς...19 ἐθίζειν omitted by  
 P<sup>4.6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> || ἀρχομένω P<sup>2.3</sup> Ald. Bk., ἀρχομένους ? Sylburg, ἀρχόμενον ? Spengel ||  
 19 ἐκ...ἐθίζειν omitted by Ar. || 20 διὰ <τὴν> Jackson

8 αἰνουτέρα] Plato *Laws* II. 666 A forbids indulgence in wine before the eighteenth year (Göttling). Comp. *Hist. Anim.* VII. 12 § 2, 588 a 5 ff. (Eaton); *De Somno* c. 3 § 9, 457 a 4 ff., § 14, 14 ff. SUSEM. (950) Comp. L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* p. 25 (Ridgeway).

§ 2 9 κινήσεις...τηλικούτων] "All the exercise possible at that early age." So also Plato *Laws* VII. 789 e ff. SUSEM. (951)

10 πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι] This passage, says St Hilaire, is the first germ of orthopedy. Camerarius understood it of cradles and swaddling clothes (cp. Plato *l. c.*): Vettori of irons to straighten the crooked knees of children, *serperastra* as Varro calls them *L. L.* IX. 5. II. SUSEM. (952)

§ 3 15 διὸ.... 18 Κελτοῖς] The same thing is said in an epigram first published by Brunck *Anal. vet. poet.* III. p. 150 XXXII, θαρσαλέοι Κελτοὶ ποταμῷ ξηλήμονι ῥήνῳ | τέκνα ταλαντεύουσι, καὶ οὐ πάρος εἰσι

τοκήες | πρὶν παῖν ἀθρήσωσι λελουμένον ὕδατι σεμνῷ..., | οὐπω γὰρ γενέταο φέρον νόον, πρὶν γ' ἐαθρήσῃ | κεκρυμένον λουτροῖσιν ἐλεγεῖ γάμου ποταμοῖο: and by Nonnos *Dionys.* XXIII. 95, XXXVI. 5 (Göttling). Further compare Strabo III. 165, Galen *περὶ ὑγιεινῶν* I. T. VI. p. 51. Kühn, and Kapp *Aristot. Staatspädagog.* p. 123 (Eaton). Galen however calls the people, of whom this is told, not Kelts but Germans. See on this point II. 9 § 7 with *Note*, p. 334 and IV(VII). 2 § 10 n. Comp. further Verg. *Aen.* IX. 603 f. There is a similar habit amongst the Beloochees (Ridgeway). SUSEM. (953)

§ 5 20 διὰ θερμότητα] Aristotle thus assumes that the vital heat, which by its gradual but serious decline causes old age, and by its extinction death, gradually becomes weaker and weaker from the moment of birth, so that it is most largely found in the embryo and the new-born infant, and in animals generally so long as they are growing, because growth is

ψυχρῶν ἄσκησιν. § 6 a 34 <τὰς δὲ διατάσεις 31 τῶν παίδων κατὰ τοὺς [XV]  
 <κλαυθμούς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν 36 οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς  
 νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν. 31 γίνεται γὰρ τρεῖς  
 <τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ 38 τοῦ πνεύματος κἀνάξις  
 <ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, ὃ 39 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παι-  
 <δαίοις διατεινομένοις.> § 4 περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρώτην συμφέρει ποιῆ-  
 θαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ τὴν ταύτη παραπλη-  
 σίαν τὴν δ' ἐχομένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πάντε ἐτών,  
 ἣν οὔτε πω πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσάγειν οἰκίαν  
 οὔτε πρὸς ἀναγκαίους πόρους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὐξήσιν ἐμποδί-  
 ζουσιν, δεῖ [δὲ] τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ὥστε διαφεύγειν  
 τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων, ἣν χρή παρασκευάζειν καὶ δι'  
 ἄλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδείας. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς  
 παιδικὰς εἶναι μῆτε ἀνελευθέρους μῆτε ἐπιπόνους μῆτε ἀναι-  
 μένας. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινας ἀκούειν  
 δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτους, ἐπιμέλῃς ἔστω τοῖς ἀρχαῖσι καὶ καλοῖσι  
 παιδονόμοις. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προσδοποιεῖν πρὸς  
 τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδικὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολ-  
 λὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ὕστερον σπουδασομένων. τὰς 84 διατά-

1336 a 34—39 34 τὰς δὲ διατάσεις...39 διατεινομένους transposed by Sussem. to follow 31 ἄσκησιν, see *Introd.* p. 89 | 35 κατὰ I, καὶ II Ar. Bk. | τὰς omitted by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. | 38 ποιοῦσιν] πνεύμοσι Ridgeway

21 πρώτην <ἡλικίαν> ? Spengel, Schmidt would transpose 23 ἡλικίαν to this place; but it can just as well be understood | 22 τῆς ταύτης] τῶν ταύτης V<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.), ταύτης P<sup>2</sup> L<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) | 23 ἐχομένην I<sup>2</sup> S<sup>2</sup> V<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) | 24 ἐν] in qua William | 26 δὲ omitted by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk., but it should perhaps be retained | 29 ἄγαν inserted before ἀνελευθέρους by P<sup>1</sup> | 31 τὰς omitted by P<sup>2</sup> V<sup>2</sup> and perhaps by S<sup>2</sup> | 33 διὸ <καὶ> ? Sussem. | 34 σπουδασομένων Kriem,

conditioned by vital heat. Comp. *Protr.* III. 7, 81. 14, *De Juventute etc.* cc. 3, 4 (Eaton). SUSSEM. (954)

§ 6 36 οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις] Plato *Lysis* VII. 791 E ff. (Camerarius). SUSSEM. (955)

38 Dr Jackson defends τὰς παραδεί-  
 by an appeal to Darwin *On the Expression*  
*of the Emotions* pp. 146, 156, 184.

§ 4 23 μέχρι πάντε ἐτών] Plato him-  
 ever in the *Lysis* VII. 793 E ff. makes this  
 second stage of education extend from  
 the third to the sixth year (Eaton). Still  
 this deviation is not material, since Aris-  
 totle makes education proper begin with  
 the seventh year. § 7—25. SUSSEM. (956)

28 καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδείας] Plato *L.* 7.  
 proposes for this age a kind of Kinder-

garten under the inspection of the nurses  
 [αἱ τροφεῖς] who for the most part leave  
 the children to invent their own games  
 (παιδικὰ ἀσπασίματα), but prevent them from  
 growing too angry over them, the nurses  
 themselves being under the control of a  
 female Board of Inspection. SUSSEM. (957)  
 § 5 30 καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων]  
 Comp. n. (970), and § 7—12 is referred  
 to the τριτάτους: above c. 16 § 11 n.  
 (943), c. 12 § 5 n. (860) with some 1900,  
 903, 909, and *Introd.* p. 32 L, also VI. 17.  
 15 § 9 n. (1355), § 11, VII(VI) 2 § 23 n.  
 (1485). SUSSEM. (958)

33 διὸ τὰς παιδικὰς... 34 σπουδασο-  
 μένων] Comp. Plato *Lysis* I. 643 E ff.  
 SUSSEM. (959)

35 σεις τῶν παίδων κατὰ τοὺς κλαυθμούς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὕξιν· γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, δ  
 § 7 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις. ἐπισκεπτόεν δὴ  
 40 τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τὴν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἡλι-  
 1336 b κίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφήν ἔχειν. εὖλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων  
 § 8 καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογία ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ τι ἄλλο, δεῖ  
 5 τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτι οὖν τῶν αἰσchrῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς), μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούωσι μη-  
 § 9 δὲν τοιοῦτον. εἰ δέ τις φαίνεται τι λέγων ἢ πράττων ἀπηγορευμένον, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως

σπουδασομένων οἱ σπουδασθησομένων Γ apparently (*studendorum* William) and perhaps Ar. (*quae postea serio sunt facienda*), σπουδασθησομένων P<sup>5</sup>, σπουδαζομένων M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk., σπουδασμάτων Ridgeway

39 δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ Π Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text

1336 b <τὴν> μέχρι? Susem., but see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 109 b 44 ff. || 2 ἀπολαβεῖν Γ (*absumere* William) Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, ἀπελαύνειν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 3 ἀνελευθερίαν] τῶν ἀνελευθέρων P<sup>6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk.<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), τῶν ἀνελευθερίαν P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) || 4 ὥσπερ] εἴπερ Lambin Bk.<sup>2</sup>, wrongly || τι after ἄλλο (so avoiding hiatus) Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 7 μὲν οὖν] δὲ Susem., approved by Schmidt || 8 δέ] δὴ Susem., μὲν οὖν Schmidt (with colon after 12 χάριν) 9 ἀπηγορευμένον] τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. || ἐλεύθερον <μὲν> Koraes

§ 7 41 ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται] Comp. § 9 n. (962). Here then Aristotle refuses to adopt the idea of common games for children, in which the children of aliens and slaves of this age also take part, as was proposed by Plato, here again the more humane of the two, and briefly mentioned in n. (957). His refusal is on the ground that by means of these infant schools Plato begins the public education as soon as the third year has been reached, while he follows the Spartans in postponing it to the seventh year: see Schömann p. 271 (Eng. tr. p. 206). Further see § 5, n. (958). SUSEM. (960)

1336 b 2 εὖλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν κτλ.] This and the two following sentences with the double use of μὲν οὖν gave occasion to many critical doubts, for which see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 540 b 55 ff., Vahlen *Poetics*<sup>2</sup> p.

190 f., Busse *op. c.* p. 28, Susemihl *Quaest. crit.* coll. p. 416. Unquestionably ἀπολαύειν, which William of Moerbeke mis took, not only here but in 1335 b 18 and 1303 b 31, for ἀπολαβεῖν (in pronunciation ν=f, β=v), is correct and means to derive influence of any kind, good or bad: Busse cites δέδοικα μὴ ἀπολαύσω τι φλαῦρον Isocr. 8. 81.

§ 8 4 ὥσπερ τι ἄλλο] With the utmost vigilance. A variation upon the more usual εἴπερ τι ἄλλο which recurs VIII(V). 8. 2, 1307 b 31 in the same order, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι, which Π<sup>2</sup> gives here.

7 ἀκούωσι] Plut. *De recta ratione audiendi* c. 2, 38 B, διὰ καὶ Ξενοκράτης τοῖς παισὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἀθληταῖς ἐκέλευε περιάπτειν ἀμφωτίδας ὥς ἐκείνων μὲν τὰ ὤτα ταῖς πληγαῖς, τούτων δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τὰ ἦθη διαστρεφόμενων.

ἡξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις [ἀτιμίαις] κολλάζειν καὶ πλη- [XV]  
γαῖς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης ἀτιμίαις  
ἀνελκυθίοις ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λεγόν τι  
τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἢ  
γραφᾶς ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς  
ἄρχουσι μηδὲν μῆτε ἄγαλμα μῆτε γραφήν εἶναι τοιούτων  
πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ  
τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος. [πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἀφίη-  
ται]

10 [ἀτιμίαις] Bücheler Sussem.<sup>2,3</sup>, rightly if ἀτιμίαις is not corrupt: ἐπιτιμίαις  
or ἐπιτιμήσει; ? Sussem. formerly, αἰτίαις ? Schmidt who further argues [καὶ  
πληγαῖς] Schneider § 14 ἔστω P<sup>1,2</sup> Ar., ἐστὶ ΓΜ<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> § 17 τῶν ἐκείνων ποιη-  
ται in P<sup>1,2</sup> S<sup>1</sup> V<sup>1</sup> § τούτους Reiz Bk.<sup>2</sup> | παρήγειν Γ<sup>2</sup> over an αἰσάναι, ἐφάρται  
Korzen

§ 9 11 ἀτιμίαις ἀνελκυθίοις] Meier, *De bonis damni*, p. 103, understands by this their exclusion from sacrificial festivals in which slaves could not take part, that is, from the state sacrifices (ἐπεὶ θεοσπονδῆς) proper: for which cp. Böckh *Scholeth.* I<sup>2</sup>, p. 269 (ed. 2, p. 298). SUSSEM. (1901)

12 ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν] "To punish him for his degrading conduct." Comp. c. 15 § 5 n. (926) and especially n. (43) on l. 5 § 8: and in regard to this whole section c. 12 § 5 n. (863), and more particularly *Introd.* p. 52 n. (3). SUSSEM. (1902)

§ 10 14 ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν... 16 μίμησιν] See V(VIII). 15 § 21 n. (1053), V(VIII). 1 § 3 n. (1084). The magistrates here mentioned are of course the Παιδονόμοι, as before; see n. (958). SUSSEM. (1903)

16 πράξεων=scenes, n. (1084).

ἂ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς. 17 ὁ νόμος] As, for instance, Dionysos, Aphroditē, Erispos, Eileithyia (Karpē), Aristotle himself. It is well known, traces the origin of Comedy to the worship of Dionysos, namely, to the improvised speeches added to the choral ode by the chief singer or leader of the chorus in the phallic songs; such phallic songs, he says, were still customary in many places (γενναίη ἀπὸ τοῦ τὰ φαλλοῖς ἡσυχάζοντο), *ibid.* 4 § 14, 1449 a 11 ff. These improvised speeches certainly contained improprieties of the sort here mentioned. But that even in the phallic songs properly so called there was often much that was positively imbecile might hardly be doubted, even apart from the specimen we have in Aristotle. *ibid.* 103 ff., where

Dikaiopolis sings a burlesque of one, as he himself says (261). Other facts relative to this matter are mentioned by Athenaeus xiv. 621 d-b; d. on the authority of Sosikles and Semon. Both writers mentioned certain rhapsodes, called ἀνταρῆσται, who delivered monologues or even dialogues (ῥήματα) from the stage crowned with ivy according to Semon, and were at a later date called ἱεσμοί, like their poems. It is beyond all doubt that Archilochos, n. (788), found similar iambic lampoons in current use at the merry festivals of harvest and vintage, and therefore in the worship of Demeter and Thesmōter, which was especially cultivated in his home of Paros and her colony Thasos, where Archilochos settled. Comp. Homer *Hymn to Demeter* 496, Paus. x. 16. 1, Steph. Byzant. s. v. Πάρος, Hesych. s. v. Κόλπος; Wackeier *Ar.*, Schol. s. v. p. 87 ff. It was out of this natural popular poetry that he fashioned his own satiric iambic poetry. Aristotle himself mentions directly afterwards (11) the recital of such artistic compositions (ῥήματα), which certainly took place at such religious festivals at Athens and elsewhere at the proper season, probably in contests between rhapsodes. For it would appear from the pseudo-Platonist *Ion* 531 a that a contemporary rhapsode might include Archilochos in his repertoire; in any case his iambic poetry, on the analogy of the present passage; whether also his dialogues, is doubtful. About that time also the burlesque epic and its imitations by rhapsodes were brought into vogue by Hagnon of Thasos, in contests at festivals of this kind. SUSSEM. (1904)

- σιν ὁ νόμος τοὺς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας ἔτι τὴν ἰκνουμένην καὶ  
 19 ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς.  
 § 11 τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὐτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμωδίας θεατὰς θετέον,  
 πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ᾗ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρ-  
 ξει κοινωνεῖν ἤδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων  
 γινομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἢ παιδεία ποιήσῃ πάντας.  
 § 12 νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τούτων πεποιημέθα τὸν λόγον.  
 25 ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ  
 πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ κατὰ δὲ τὸν  
 § 13 παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ  
 κακῶς ἔλεγε τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς τραγωδίας ὑπο-

18 τοὺς...ἰκνουμένην M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν πλέον προήκουσαν Γ P<sup>5</sup> Bk. (πλέον P<sup>5</sup> over an erasure), *iam homines factos* Ar., τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin; omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bas.<sup>1,2</sup> and the text of Bas.<sup>3</sup> || ἔτι ἥδη ? Susem., *iam* Ar., [ἔτι] Welldon || 19 αὐτῶν P<sup>1,5</sup>, αὐτῶν Γ M<sup>s</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> || καὶ γυναικῶν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>), hence [καὶ γυναικῶν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || τιμαλφῶν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || [τοὺς θεοὺς] ? Susem. || 20 θετέον] *θετητέον* M<sup>s</sup>, *νομοθετητέον* Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., <εἶναι> *εἰτέον* Jackson, probably right || 23 ἀπαθῆς M<sup>s</sup> and apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || πάντας suspected by Jackson, πάντως ? Susem. || 24 νῦν μὲν οὖν...27 ἀναγκαῖον transposed by Susem. to follow 35 δυσμένειαν || 27 [ἴσως ...37 αὐτοὺς] Böcker || 28 κακῶς] *καλῶς* Γ M<sup>3</sup> || ἔλεγε suspected by Camerarius, *ἔψεγε* or *ἡλεγχε* ? Schmidt

18 ἔτι] The word cannot have arisen from ἥδη, nor is it likely to have crept into the text. However dissimilar, this must apparently be added to the passages in which ἔτι means *iam*. SUSEM.

§ 11 20 οὐτ' ἰάμβων] See *n.* (964) and *n.* (788) IV(VII). 7 § 6. SUSEM. (965)

21 κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κτλ] The term *μέθη* which recurs V(VIII). 5 § 2, *n.* (1019) denotes the advanced stage of the banquet, at which men's spirits were more elevated and they began to drink wine undiluted (*ἄκρατον*): cp. Plato *Lysis* II. 271 E, Ath. II. 40 a (J. G. Schneider). Comp. also V(VIII). 5 § 8, *n.* (1028), 7 § 13 f. *n.* (1067), also *n.* (113). But, as was remarked in *Introd.* p. 55, *κατάκλισις*, or admission into *syssitia*, in all probability commenced with initiation into military service from the seventeenth year onwards: see V(VIII). 4 § 9 Exc. I. to B. V(VIII): but when recruits have a compulsory diet prescribed for them (Exc. to B. V(VIII)) they certainly have *syssitia* of their own, and only when their education has been completed, from their twenty-first year onwards, are they admitted to the *syssitia* proper, at first those of the soldiers, and allowed the

other liberties here mentioned. SUSEM. (966)

22 καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων κτλ] Plato on the contrary even in the *Lysis* VII. 816 D, E, XI. 935 E wholly banishes comedy and Iambos, and only permits comic dances by foreigners or slaves. SUSEM. (967)

§ 12 25 ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας] Another point the discussion of which is missing: see *Introd.* p. 49 *n.* (4), p. 53 *n.* (1). SUSEM. (969)

§ 13 28 Θεόδωρος] It is beyond all doubt that Theodoros is here treated as one deceased: but I fail to see that he is spoken of *Rhet.* III. 2 § 4, 1404 b 22 ff. as if he were still living and on the stage, as Zeller II. ii. p. 131 *n.* (1) maintains. From the latter passage it is very clear that he was the greatest tragic actor of recent times. Aelian, *V. H.* XIV. 40, relates a story of the powerful impression which his acting made on the tyrant Alexander of Pherae. Plutarch mentions him along with Polos as a famous protagonist actor in leading parts in *De regim.* 21, 816 F, and with Nikostratos, Kallipides, Mymniskos, Polos in *De Gloria*

κριτής· οὐδενὶ γὰρ πώποτε παρήκεν ἑαυτοῦ προεισάγειν, οἶδε (XV)  
 τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκριτῶν, ὥς οἰκειουμένων τῶν θεάτρων ταῖς  
 πρώταις ἀκοαῖς· συμβαίνει δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων  
 πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον. διὸ καὶ τοῖς  
 νέοις πάντα ποιεῖν ξένα τὰ φαῦλα, μάλιστα δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν  
 ἔχει ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμένειαν.

§ 12 b 24 <νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον  
 <15 ὑστέρον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ  
 <26 πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν  
 <31 παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον.> ἡ διεκθόνηται δὲ τῶν  
 πέντε ἐτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἐπτὰ δεῖ θεωροῦς ἤδη γίνεσθαι  
 τῶν μαθήσεων ἃς δεήσει μαθάνειν αὐτοὺς.

δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διηρῆσθαι τὴν παι-  
 δεῖαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπτὰ μέχρις ἡβῆς καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν

29 προσάγειν P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ald. W<sup>b</sup> and probably P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand) § <αἰθερ>, add  
 Bothe (on Terent. p. 619) § 30 θεατρῶν II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. and (with γὰρ prefixed) over.<sup>1</sup>  
 of P<sup>1</sup> in the margin § 34 ὅσα after αὐτῶν P<sup>1-2</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. § 35 διεκθόνηται II Bk.  
 Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> in the text, *inhacationem* William, *improbitatem* Ar., *disgratiam* Schmidt,  
 Susem.<sup>2</sup>, *δυσχέρειαν* Koraes.

1336 b 24—27 24 τοῦτον P<sup>1</sup> and (transposing it before ἐν παραδρομῇ P<sup>4</sup> Ald.,  
 τούτων Γ M<sup>a</sup> Ar. and (transposing it before ἐν παραδρομῇ) all other authorities Bk. §  
 25 διαρίσαι P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ald. W<sup>b</sup> § 26 πρῶτον] πρῶτερον? Koraes, nondescript

36 ἤδη omitted by P<sup>1</sup> wrongly, [ἤδη] Susem.<sup>1</sup> Cp. 1268 b 21, 1280 a 6 § 38 τῶν  
 omitted by M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup> in P<sup>1</sup>). [τῶν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> § 39 καὶ  
 II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>

Athen. vi. 835 F (cp. also *De Audiendis Poetis* 18 C). Demosthenes *De Falsa Leg.*  
 I 246 f. p. 418, 41 mentions him along with  
 another great protagonist of the time, Ari-  
 stodemus, with the remark that both shone  
 in the rôle of Sophocles' Antigone, but  
 did not appear in the *Phaenix* of Euripides;  
 that Aeschines acted under them as  
 antagonist and had represented Creon in the  
*Antigone*. In his private life  
 Timotheus appears to have been very  
 wild, to judge by the nickname given him  
 no doubt by the comic poets (see Hesych.  
 s. v. πελοβίβηξ or πελοβιδίψ). An idea  
 of his habits may also be gathered from  
 Hesych. s. v. Θεόδωρου ἔλεγον αὐ καμμελ  
 τοῖς πρῶτοις, ἀπὸ Θεόδωρου τινὲς οἱ αὖ  
 τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλοι χρησαμένους. See also  
 Hesych. s. v. Ἀριστόδημος αὐ καμμελ τοῖς  
 πρῶτοις, καὶ Θεόδωρος καὶ Τιμοκρίστου  
 ἔλεγον. Diog. Laert. ii. 104 calls him a  
 tragic poet; but this must rest either on a

false reading of an error—more probably  
 the latter, as Aelian also calls him a tragic  
 poet—than on the text. Comp. also Athen.  
 xi. 483 D and Meineke *Antigon. Com. Gr.*  
 i. p. 323 f. SUSEM. (1868)

§ 18 39 μετὰ τὴν ἀφ' ἡβῆς 40 ἐτῶν]  
 The first period is to be wholly taken up  
 with gymnastic, three years of the second  
 with the remaining subjects of youthful  
 training, the following years again with  
 severer bodily exercises, see VIVANTI 3112.  
 n. (1003), 4 § 9 n. (1015) Fock. Here  
 Aristotle only partially follows Plato (see  
 n. (1015, 1016). In the *Republic* the  
 latter divides the educational course into  
 three parts. The first begins with gym-  
 nastic, preceded by the narration of  
 myths, legends and tales, such as Aes-  
 chylus also prescribes (see § 10, n. 928);  
 gymnastic is followed by music and  
 poetry together with reading, writing  
 and arithmetic, and certain elements of

40 ἀφ' ἧβης μέχρι τῶν ἐνὸς καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐβδομάσι (   
 διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς,   
 1337 a δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη   
 καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλείπον τῆς φύσεως βούλεται ἀναπληροῦν.

40 ἐν P<sup>4.5.6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> || 41 κακῶς Muret, καλῶς Γ Π Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text   
 1337 a 2 τῆς φύσεως after βούλεται Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

mathematics generally: this lasts until the seventeenth or eighteenth year. The next two or three years, until the twentieth, are to be spent in military exercises. The second course of ten years for the more highly qualified students is in the higher mathematics, pure and applied; the third or philosophical course, which is only for the most richly endowed natures, lasts five years longer, as we had occasion to mention in *n.* (182) on II. 5 § 25. See *Rep.* II. 376 E f., III. 403 C, VII. 534 C—535 A, 536—537 D, 539 D ff. In the *Laws* (see VII. 794 C—795 D, 809 E—813 C, 817 C—822 D, cp. 813 C ff.). Plato prescribes the elements of gymnastic from the sixth to the tenth year (cp. *n.* 956); reading and writing from ten to thirteen; music, singing, and at the same time the really severer instruction in dancing and gymnastic from 13 to 17; lastly, the elements of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy—no doubt from seventeen to eighteen. It has been explained in *n.* (193) on II. 6. 5 that even in the *Laws* the better endowed natures were afforded opportunity, after the age of thirty, for the same higher education as that furnished in the *Republic* by the second and third courses, or at least for something similar to it. SUSEM. (970)

40 οἱ γὰρ... 41 οὐ κακῶς] Cp. c. 16 § 8 *n.* (947). SUSEM. (971)

1337 a 1 πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη... 2 ἀνα-

πληροῦν] Eaton compares *Phys.* II. 8 § 8, 199 a 15 f. ὅλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται: "and in general it is art which either brings to completion what nature is unable to effect or else imitates nature": on which passage see Döring *op. c.* p. 81 ff. Further comp. *Nic. Eth.* I. 6. 15 (i.e. I. c. 4 Bk., 1097 a 5) where we are told of all arts and sciences that each seeks to meet a definite want, τὸ ἐνδὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι. SUSEM. (972)

"The context here, in its reference to education, limits the scope of τέχνη to useful art. Useful art supplements nature and at the same time follows her guidance. He who would be a master in any art must first discern the true end by a study of nature's principles, and then employ the method which she suggests for the attainment of that end" (S. H. Butcher, *Some Aspects*, p. 241). He adds: "in the passage from the *Physics* also it is probable that the distinction is not, as would at first sight seem, between useful and fine art, but between two aspects of useful art. The sentence is not quite logical in form, but the meaning is that useful art on the one hand satisfies those needs of man for which nature has not fully provided, on the other hand its processes are those of nature."

## EXCURSUS I.

### Οἱ ἑξωτερικοὶ λόγοι.

NOTE ON IV(VII). I. 2, 1323 a 22 (687).

It would take us too far out of our way to give a detailed or perfectly complete account, supposing it were even possible, of the meaning of this expression which recurs in III. 6. 5, 1278 b 32, and in six other passages<sup>1</sup>. Inquiry has not by any means as yet disposed of the subject. The one point which has been conclusively established is that in general 'outside discussions' (or discourses) are opposed to strictly scientific discussions (*οἱ ἐντὶ θεωρητικῶν λόγους*, III. 12. 1, 1282 b 19, see *n.* 584). But whether they are (1) *discussions by others*, or by Aristotle himself: whether, in the latter case, the reference is to (2) Aristotle's *dialogues and popular works*, or to (3) *dialectical discussions*, in Aristotle's sense of the term dialectic as the tentative solution of problems<sup>2</sup>, in *his scientific writings*, and whether they should be sought in another work or, as in *Physics* IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31, in the same work<sup>3</sup>: whether in fact writings of any sort, or merely (4) *oral controversies and expressions of opinion* are intended, must on each occasion be decided from the context, if at all<sup>4</sup>.

Now here, as at III. 6. 5, *n.* (527 b), it appears to me that the only meaning which really suits the context is 'discussions in daily life' or 'in ordinary intercourse.' Aristotle appeals (see *n.* 684) to what has already become the common property of the ordinary cultivated consciousness and

<sup>1</sup> *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 9, 1102 a 26, VI. 1. 5, 1140 a 31; *Metaphysics* XIII(M). 1. 1, 1076 a 38; *Physics* IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31; *Ind. Eth.* I. 8. 4, 1217 b 22, II. 1. 1, 118 b 34.

<sup>2</sup> See Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen* II p. 242 ff., Thurot, *Études* p. 115 ff., Jaeger, *De vi et de notione dialecticæ Aristotelis* (Treibow 1877).

<sup>3</sup> See Boeckh *Ind. Ar.* 105 b 16 ff.

<sup>4</sup> This is a point quite rightly emphasized by Vahlen. But here is it consistent to say e.g. that 'the division of

'goods which follows has furthermore been laid down and explained in the 'outside discussions and does not require to be repeated in detail here' (cp. Vahlen p. 9), when Vahlen at the same time in this passage accepts as possible the interpretation of the phrase, 'outside discussions' accepted by me? And how can the suggestion of a possible explanation be got out of the world? They contain nothing but an appeal to what is universally admitted. Cp. *n.* 686.

has developed into a permanent conviction of universal validity; what is treated as a settled and generally accepted fact in the conversations and discussions on such subjects in educated circles<sup>1</sup>. In other words he calls in good sound common sense. Bernays on the other hand, *Dialoge des Arist.* p. 69 ff., 158 ff., finds here a quotation from an Aristotelian dialogue and thinks that the very lively fluent style of this chapter, which presents a marked contrast to the remainder of the book, should be explained by assuming that Aristotle in the main borrowed and transferred it from that dialogue, reproducing even the very words. Vahlen<sup>2</sup>, *Aristotelische Aufsätze* II. (*Phil.-hist. Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad.* LXXII. p. 5 ff.) has conclusively shown how weak is the foundation for this hypothesis (cp. also the review by Susemihl *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1873, p. 673 ff.). He has not made another attempt on his own part to clear up this fact, but only remarked that this chapter forms a complete whole by itself, which must be retained or condemned as a whole—a statement which no one would be likely to controvert. Still for a right decision of the matter considerable importance attaches to his pertinent observation, that Bernays appears not to have fully met the difficulty of the surprise we naturally feel<sup>3</sup> that for a question discussed in the *Ethics* Aristotle should quote his popular writings in preference to that treatise.

This difficulty remains the same, even though we substitute an appeal to the popular judgment for the appeal to popular writings. In the *Ethics* the whole investigation turns on the inquiry, "What is the best life, or human happiness?" and that this factor also should be utilized was perfectly in point. In the *Politics* Aristotle might have done in starting this inquiry what he has done on several other occasions (II. I. 5, III. 5 § 9, 7 § 1, VI(IV). 9 § 2 cp. IV(VII). 12 §§ 3, 4: see *nn.* 133, 545, 584, 873, 879, 1289); he might simply have referred to the results of the *Ethics*. But if he had intended to begin in this place a fresh discussion of the question over again in detail, and in such a manner that his investigation should not merely satisfy the requirements of science, but so far as possible compel the assent of ordinary opinion with its own peculiar assumptions and prepossessions, then at any rate, when the same subject comes up for discussion later on, it would have been impossible so utterly to ignore this exposition, to treat it as so altogether non-existent, as is actually the case.

<sup>1</sup> For Bernays' proof of the impossibility of this interpretation, though advanced with full confidence in its success, can be easily refuted. And Zeller *op. cit.* II ii p. 119 *n.* (2) reads into this passage something very different from what is there. It does not state that ordinary opinion agrees with the outside discussions merely in holding that mental goods are required for the best kind of life, but it says:—"as we believe many of the statements current in ordinary conversation respecting the constituents of the best life

to be perfectly correct, we should in the present instance make use of them. For one thing at any rate is universally conceded, that there are three kinds of goods and that all three are necessary to the best life, or in other words, to happiness. But of course our agreement with ordinary opinion (*ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*) goes no farther for the ordinary view regards mental goods i.e. the virtues, as subsidiary, whilst we make them the principal thing."

<sup>2</sup> And more recently Diels: see below

<sup>3</sup> See Krohn *op. cit.* p. 37.

Now already at c. 8 § 4, cp. n. (799), and at c. 9 § 3, § 7 Aristotle has returned to the position, that the state has for its aim the best possible life, and that the best constitution is the one by which the state attains the greatest happiness (cp. n. 806). In the first of these passages it is merely stated what constitutes the best life or happiness without any such addition as "according to our previous inquiry," and equally without any reference to the investigation of this question in the *Ethica*. In the second passage there is a reference, but apparently it is to the former passage, c. 8, and not to c. 1 at all; see nn. (807, 813). There is thus further and more serious difficulty, that c. 13 (cp. n. 872) begins, just like c. 1, with the statement that, as the best constitution is that which enables the state in the highest degree to attain happiness, the precise nature of happiness must not be left obscure. For the general character of this transition is not in the least altered by the fact that c. 13 treats, not of the best life, but of happiness, and the happiness of the state in particular. But in this the non-existence of c. 1 is expressly implied; the other course—of a reference to the results of the *Ethica*—is quite gratuitously adopted, and thus the matter is settled. However if the genuineness of c. 13 is not quite above suspicion (see nn. 876, 879, 881<sup>1</sup>), there only remain the other and minor objections to c. 1 in its present place upon which dependence can be placed.

But taking everything into consideration, are we to decide offhand that c. 1 is spurious? There is nothing in the following chapters which is materially inconsistent with it<sup>2</sup>, and there is nothing to disturb the suggestion made in the *Introd.* pp. 12, 15, 48, that in his oral lectures on Politics Aristotle was accustomed to effect the transition to the description of the ideal state in the very words before us, however different may have been his procedure when committing his thoughts to paper. If this be so, we have before us in this chapter a portion of some careful hearer's notes which the editor has inserted, although it stands in no organic connexion with the rest of the work. Cp. also n. (711). SUSEM. (687)

The oldest view of this much disputed phrase, which implied a twofold form of the Aristotelian teaching, had long been felt to be unsatisfactory when Bernays, in 1863, in the work already cited, put forward the brilliant and attractive theory that the Aristotelian dialogues are meant. Subsequent writers were much influenced by this theory, but very unequally. Thus Grote, who discussed the expression *Aristotle* 1. pp. 63–75, not content to understand by it 'discourses outside the subject,' thinks a negative character, dialectic not didactic, is intended, appealing especially to *Pol.* iv. c. 10 to where all the difficulties which beset the notion of time are noticed and traced out. For this view, which is substantially that of Thurot, *Études* p. 212, he can cite Alexander *in Topica* ἀνδιδακτικῶς δὲ πρὸς διδῆναι, ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πραγματείῃ (the *Topica*) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑξωτερικοῖς, *ibid.* s. 24 ed. Brandis. So too Simplicius, τὰ ἑξωτερικὰ—τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δι' ἐνδιδῆναι πραγματικῶς.

<sup>1</sup> On the other hand this is the very utmost that can be conceded; see n. (881).

<sup>2</sup> For the inconsistencies which Krohn

thinks he has discovered are too deep for me to detect.

Grote then understands the term "extraneous to philosophy" (because dialectical) to include not merely oral debate but writings, whether Aristotle's own or the Platonic and other dialogues.

Zeller also in the third edition (1879) of his great work has advanced beyond his earlier standpoint, by recognising in *ἐξωτερικός* more than one primary meaning. First, simply 'extraneous,' as when applied to *σκέψις Pol.* I. 5. 4, 1254 a 33; equivalent to the phrase *οἱ ἔξωθεν λόγοι*, II. 6. 3, 1264 b 39, and so unquestionably used by Eudemus who paraphrases Aristotle's own *ἀπορίαν... ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον Phys.* I. 2. 9, 185 b 11, by *ἀπορίαν ἐξωτερικὴν Simpl. in Physica* 85, 26 Diels. But the word may also mean 'relating to what is outside,' and this again may bear more than one sense. Thus to suit *Phys.* c. IV. 10, Zeller adds the meaning (2) discussions 'that do not go deep into the subject,' and from *Eud. Eth.* II. 1. 1, 1218 b 33 compared with *Nic. Eth.* I. 8, 1098 b 10 *καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς*, (3) oral, not written, discussions. Lastly, he admits (4) that some lost Aristotelian writing of a more popular character is referred to in the six remaining passages, including those in the *Politics*, 1323 a 22, 1278 b 32.

In the view taken of these six passages we trace the influence exerted by the theory of Bernays, that the 'exoteric discourses' are Aristotle's own dialogues: a theory adopted, in the main, by Heitz and by Bonitz (*Ind. Ar.* 104 b 44 ff.). More recently this theory has been vigorously attacked by Diels in a paper entitled *Ueber die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles* reported in *Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad.* 1883 pp. 477—494, in its turn followed by a note from Hirzel, defending Bernays, *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIX. p. 178 f. n. 1, and an article by Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXIX. 1884, pp. 265—277. Diels insists that the term is a technical term in the Peripatetic school, and holds it to be indispensable that its meaning should be constant wherever it occurs. The explanation he gives is 'discussions carried on outside the Peripatetic school,' *τὰ ἔξωθεν λεγόμενα*, including such as were customary in the Academy or had been held of old by philosophers or laymen. He rejects the view of Grote (and Thurot) that the imperfect form or the dialectical character, is intended by 'exoteric,' arguing that if evidence from without confirms Aristotle, in what form it is stated or how obtained is not the essential point: though doubtless a Peripatetic will attach to it no more credit *a priori* than to *ἐνδοξα* generally. Moreover, if the difference of method is emphasized in the formula of citation, why is not the appeal to *λόγοι διαλεκτικοί*? (cp. *λόγοι ἐπιχειρηματικοί*, 451 a 19). Diels allows that when contrasted with *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι* all outside discussions present a character of their own. Not that they are all to be rejected: on the contrary the Peripatetics are unwearied in their use of the wisdom of the ancients, philosophers and famous men, verses of the poets, sophistic declamations: but in such *ἐνδοξα* we have only the raw material of knowledge; only true scientific method, viz. that in use inside the Peripatetic school, can properly test the alloy and extract the ore from it.

This view is based in the first instance on a detailed examination of our present passage and comparison with *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 8, where a similar in-

attention is announced, 1098 b 9 *σκεπτόμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συνηρηματιοῦ καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λεγόμενου περὶ αὐτῆς τῶν μὲν τῶν ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνᾶδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῶν δὲ ψευδῶν ταχὺ διαφρασεῖ τὰ λυγρὰ.* The evidence got from the use of terms, from popular or philosophic views, is to be set side by side with the syllogistic conclusion and philosophic definition. Then follows the threefold division of goods, as in our *Politics* passage. Diels pronounces it a current Academic division, familiar to Plato (*Lehrs.* III. 167 A, B), adopted by Xenocrates and his successors, and points triumphantly to the words 1098 b 16 ff. *ὥστε κοινῶς ἂν λεγούτο κατὰ γὰρ τούτων τὴν διζῶν πολυαῖν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων.* "Thus he has found support for his definition in this old opinion. Observe the γάρ: 'at least this διαφρασεῖς is wholly recognized': the particle recurs in *Pol.* IV. VII. 1. 3. 1323 a 24, while the confidence in general recognition is repeated § 5. 1323 a 34. ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥσπερ πάντες ἂν συγχωρήσειαν. That he had the *Εἰκάζει* in mind is shown by the words of 1323 b 39 *ἑτέροις σχολῇ,* and by the citation c. 13. Returning to 1323 a 22, we see that the emphasis is on *ἑκείνη*—believing that a sufficient account of the best life can be drawn from much of what is found in *Outside Discourses*, we must now also make use of it: καὶ εἴη, here in the *Politics* as before in the *Ethics*!."

Working on these lines, the temptation becomes irresistible to find a parallel in the older literature for all the passages where the phrase (or *οἱ ἐξώτεροι λόγοι* and the like) occurs. E.g. Alcmaeon (? Epicharmus) is suggested as the authority for the dichotomy of the soul in *N. E.* I. 13, 1102 a 26; Plato *Charmides* 163 A for *N. E.* VI. 4, 1140 a 3; Hesiod, Homer, or the Sophists for 1278 b 32 ff. Thus Diels succeeds in satisfying his own postulate of a technical term with constant meaning, and for consistency he is bound to infer that the *ἀπορία* concerning Time in *Phy.* IV. c. 10 have come down to Aristotle from his predecessors.

It may however be gravely questioned whether the interpretation in all passages should be so strict. "With the same fundamental meaning the phrase may have had different shades of meaning in different connexions: not only is it *external* and *referring to what is external*, but in contradistinction to *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι*, it would naturally be used for *non-philosophical discussions*." What all men say may be a part of the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* though it is not necessarily the whole. Certainly in *End. Eth.* II. 1 it is just—'what all the world says.' And this meaning makes both *Politics* passages, 1278 b 32 as well as 1323 a 22, more logical. But on the other hand with regard to *Meta.* 1076 a 22—28, *End. Eth.* 1217 b 22, and *Physics* IV. 10 it can plausibly be maintained that the reference is not so much to *λεγόμενα* as to something lying 'outside of philosophy' by reason not of its origin, but of its method<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *Monatsh. der Berl. Akad.* 1883, p. 480 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Sommühl Jahrb. f. Philol.* 1884, p. 267.

[<sup>3</sup> Tarsituk's rendering of another dis-

puted phrase *οἱ ἐκ τῶν γὰρ λέγοντες ἄνθρωποι* *De Anima* I. 4. 1. 402 b 29, is not distinguished from *οἱ ἐκ τῶν λέγοντων ἀνθρώπων* *De Anima* I. 4. 1. 402 b 29. Thus at least does justice to the present participle.]

## NOTE ON IV(VII). II. 6, 1330 b 26.

*δυσέξοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις.*

Aristotle here recommends the older sort of street architecture on the ground that it makes it difficult for strangers who are within to get out, and for enemies who are without to attack, thus echoing the latter part of the precept *πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον* 1330 b 2, but at the same time amplifying it, in so far as account is taken of the case in which strangers are endeavouring to make their escape, as for example Thucyd. II. 4. It seems strange however that, whereas the case in which the stranger or enemy wants to get out (1) cannot occur until he has first got in, and (2) is exceptional and comparatively unimportant, Aristotle should give it both precedence and prominence. Should we not expect *δυσείσοδος*? and if so, would it not seem that *δυσεξερεύνητος* should correlate with *ξενικοῖς*, *δυσείσοδος* with *ἐπιτιθεμένοις*, rather than *δυσείσοδος* with *ξενικοῖς*, *δυσεξερεύνητος* with *ἐπιτιθεμένοις*? I conjecture therefore *δυσεξερεύνητος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσείσοδος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις.* H. JACKSON.

## EXCURSUS II.

## THE AGE OF SUPERANNUATION.

*ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίνηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἢ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτων ἀριθμόν.* IV(VII). 16. 10, 1335 a 32—35.

The sense is: Furthermore supposing the birth of children to follow upon the marriage as early as may reasonably be expected, the eldest (or only) sons will succeed their fathers at a time when the former (i.e. the children) begin to enter on their prime, while the latter are already in their decline towards their seventieth year.

Aristotle has in view simply the normal case: the eldest son, born nine months after the marriage, grows up to manhood. If the number given in the text, 1335 a 29, for the man's age at marriage (37) were correct, the eldest son would be only about 32 at the time when the father is about 70. But it is in the highest degree improbable that he should succeed to his father's civic rights (so I take *διαδοχὴ*) before he is himself permitted and obliged to marry. Besides, Aristotle approves (§ 17, *n.* 947) the division of human life into periods of seven years. Now suppose that, with Spengel, we replace 37 by 35: in that case, by the time the eldest son reaches 35 the

father's age will be, on the foregoing assumptions, 70½ years. The father may then be relieved from active citizenship and give up the two family properties: his son steps into his place, while he as priest is superannuated, c. 9 § 9, 1329 a 30—34. It might certainly be supposed to be in favour of the number 37, that Aristotle demands the simultaneous cessation of the reproductive faculty for husband and wife and fixes the limit in the one case at seventy, in the other at fifty years: if a man of 37 marries a wife at 18, this calculation is fairly exact, since when the husband is 69, the wife will be 50: whereas if the man marries at 35 he reaches the limit three years before his wife. To this we may reply, that beyond all doubt a mere approximation is quite sufficient, especially as the husband is forbidden to have children after his 55th year (§§ 16, 17, 1335 b 26—38). In the whole question, the younger sons, if any are born, are left out of account: there is no place for them on Aristotle's scheme, except to fill the vacancies caused by death or to be adopted into childless families, where the head of the house finds himself after his fifty-fifth year without male offspring (§ 15, 1335 b 21—26, II. 6. 10—13, 1265 a 38—b 16, cp. II. 7. 5, 1266 b 9 ff.). Further, the remark in *Introd.* p. 54, that the citizens do not serve on the jury-courts or become members of the popular assembly until they are fifty, requires now to be modified: even as early as at thirty-five, it appears, they become qualified for these functions and must take them. But it may be doubted whether their obligation to military service ceases then, and unquestionably Aristotle intended to fix a higher age, presumably 50, as the qualification for serving on the Council and filling the magistracies (with the exception of military commands). What arrangements were to be made in case the heir did not attain the age of 35 until from one to twenty years after the superannuation of his father, or adopted father, is a matter which receives no elucidation either in our incomplete sketch of Aristotle's ideal of a state or elsewhere in his writings. The only conceivable solution is that the exercise of political rights in this family is dropped in the interval, and the family properties are managed by guardians, though not necessarily for the full term until the heir becomes thirty-five. If we remember that full civic rights are exercised only from the age of fifty to the age of seventy, it still remains true that these possessors are only a minority of the whole civic population, *α. (317)*.

The above explanation premised, a word or two of criticism on the views of Ridgeway and Jackson. The former (*Transactions of Cambridge Philological Society* II. p. 146) would read τοῖς μὲν ἀρχαίοις, thus opposing the wife's physical prime to the husband's intellectual prime (about 40). That this is unsatisfactory is pointed out by Jackson (*ib.* p. 113), who in his turn retains ἀρχαίους (P and corr. P<sup>2</sup>), but, while rightly referring ἀρχαίους τῶν ἀμῶν as well as καταλειμμένους τῆς ἡλικίας to the father, takes τοῖς μὲν to be the older, τοῖς δὲ the younger children by the same marriage, and explains ὁ χρόνος τῶν τέκνων as the children's attainment of the age of puberty. Had this been the sense we should have expected τοῖς μὲν...τοῖς δὲ instead of the datives, and perhaps the addition of τῶν πατέρων after τῶν ἀμῶν and of ἡλικίας after ἡλικίας would then have conduced to clearness. This however is a small

matter. The chief difficulty is the strange sense given to ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων; as if it meant that the children succeed (*not their father but*) one another, i.e. they successively attain puberty between the thirty-eighth and fifty-sixth years of the father's age. This presupposes several children, comparatively speaking a large family: whereas the passage quoted above from B. II. as well as the whole of the present chapter make it abundantly clear that Aristotle is committed to the system of small families—in the normal case, one son and one daughter,—in order to keep the population stationary. SUSEM.

# Θ.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτόμεν εἰ ποιητόν τάξιν τινα  
περὶ τοὺς παῖδας, ἔπειτα πότερον συμφέρει κοινῇ παι-  
δεύεσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἢ κατ' ἴδιον τρόπον (ὃ γίνεται  
καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείστοις τῶν πόλεων), τρίτον δὲ ποίαν  
τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην.  
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον  
περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσῃεν, καὶ  
γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γινόμενον τοῦτο βλάπτει τὰς πο-  
λιτείας (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἦθος

1337 a 3 πρῶτον...7 ταύτην first separated from B. IV(VII) and rightly rejoined to B. V(VIII) by Spengel § 7 δέεται M', δέει δέαι Summ.<sup>1-2</sup> following William's translation (*oportet esse*) § 14 παιδεύεσθαι A1., πολιτεύεσθαι PHEK., τελευτῶσαν τὰς πόλεις Jackson, yet at c. 6 § 5, 1341 a 1 Γ M' have τελευτούμενας τὰς πόλεις (cp. 1360 b 15, 1310 a 14)

B. V(VIII). The same subject continued: the true system of state education.

This book joins on so closely with the preceding that it is not easy to make a parting at all. Undoubtedly Spengel's proposal to begin at *πρῶτον* *scilicet* is in full accordance with the usage of Aristotle. The same thing frequently happens at the commencement of a chapter. Aristotle recapitulates before starting a fresh subject. The worthy people who divided his books into chapters ignore this: see e.g. cc. 3, 5, and 7 of this book, which more properly should begin at 1337 b 32, 1338 b 29, and at 1341 b 9 respectively. The alternative commencement has actually been marked in this edition at B. C. IV, p. 314, III. C. I, p. 359.

C. I. *Quid primum sit dicendum*. (1) *Should there be a systematic education?* (2) *Should it be a public system?* (3) *What subjects should it include?* While (1) and (2) are soon settled in the affirmative, B. V(VIII)

leaves off before we are far advanced with (3). Cp. *Anal.* p. 118.

§ 1 12 καὶ γὰρ] So much of significance, pro altero cui a 18 post longam parenthesis adhiectum est tria sū, and facilities fortasse and γὰρ εἰσὶν αὐτῶν αἰτίαι, certe altera eorum inducta est tria, αἰτίαι tria δὲ particulae, et post a 22 a 12 comparatur *Et comparationes prae legunt a 11*. See also.

13 οὐ γινόμενον τοῦτο] The neglect of this: in Latin, *non notatum*. Cp. 1324 a 35 n., VIII(V), S. 2, 1307 b 23 f.

§ 2 14 δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην πολιτεύεσθαι] What this means is explained VIII(V), § III 11, 12, 1310 a 17 ff. Cp. n. 1364 f. *Καὶ τὰς πόλεις, 1365 a 14 f.* (Erdson). *ἔπειτα δὲ τὰς πόλεις τὰς πολιτείας διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκάστην πόλιν πολιτεύμενον πρὸς ἐκάστην δεῖαι*. See also, p. 118.

τὸ ἦθος τῆς πολιτείας] A1. *ἦθος* in *Anal.* VIII, 344 ff. *ἦθος* is, of course, *character* (e.g. a disposition) is that is the principle of a system (e.g. *disposition*) imposed amongst the citizens: *de leg. a. 4* *scilicet*

15 τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης τὸ οἰκείον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν (1  
 πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρα-  
 τικὸν δημοκρατίαν τὸ δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· αἰεὶ δὲ  
 τὸ βέλτιον ἦθος βελτίονος αἵτιον πολιτείας), ἔτι δὲ πρὸς 2  
 πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ προπαιδεύεσθαι  
 20 καὶ προεθίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, ὥστε δῆλον  
 § 3 ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τὸ τέλος  
 τῇ πόλει πάσῃ, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ  
 τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέ-  
 λειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὃν τρόπον ἑκα-  
 25 στος νῦν ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ μάθησιν  
 ἰδίαν, ἣν ἂν δόξῃ, διδάσκων. δεῖ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν  
 § 4 ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν. ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν  
 αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς  
 πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως· ἢ δ' ἐπιμέλεια

18 βέλτιον M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar., βέλτιστον the other authorities (viz. Γ P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup>) and Bk.<sup>1</sup> ||  
 24 [κατ'] Spengel, needlessly || ἕκαστος after 25 νῦν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 26 γὰρ Susem.,  
 καὶ M<sup>s</sup>, δὲ the other authorities Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 28 αὐτῶν Γ, αὐ<sup>τ</sup> M<sup>s</sup>  
 || αὐτοῦ P<sup>5</sup>, αὐτοῦ or αὐτοῦ P<sup>2</sup>, αὐτοῦ P<sup>3</sup> Π<sup>3</sup>, αὐτῶ Γ P<sup>1</sup>, αὐτῶ M<sup>s</sup> || 29 μόριον...πόλεως  
 omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>

δρῦός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ρέψαντα, τὰλλα ἐφελκύσθαι; Comp. also *Rep.* 541 A, *Laws* IV. 711 B. It is not the 'spirit of the constitution,' but the temper or character which originates and keeps up the constitution. Comp. the application of the term ἦθος to ἀρμονίαι and ρυθμοί c. 5 §§ 22, 23, 1340 a 40, b 7.

18 τὸ βέλτιον ἦθος] The nobler temper. In other words, where the constitution is such as to permit the excellence of the individual considered as a citizen to coincide with his excellence considered as a man: cp. III. cc. 4—6 § 2, c. 14 §§ 7, 8: IV(VII). 6 § 1, c. 8 §§ 2, 5, c. 13 §§ 9, 10: VI(IV). 7 § 2 with notes (468, 471, 684, 808, 1233). Also Plato *Laws* I. 641 B, εἰ δ' ὅλως ἐρωτᾷς παιδείαν τῶν παιδευθέντων, τί μέγα τὴν πόλιν ὀνίνησιν, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι παιδευθέντες μὲν εὖ γίγνοντ' ἂν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί. SUSEM. (974)

As to the argument, it is much the same as in I. 5. 2 f. 1254 a 25. It is perplexing to determine whether it merely guarantees consistency in the use of the term βέλτιον, or is intended for a material inference.

ἔτι δὲ] answers a 12 καὶ γὰρ, alleging another reason.

19 δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας] An Aristotelian periphrasis for the special sciences which has already occurred II. 8. 18, 1268 b 36. Comp. III. 12 § 1, 1282 b 16, where ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις is one, the highest of ἐπιστήμαι καὶ τέχναι, b 14, which phrase is replaced in § 3, 1282 b 31, by ἐπιστήμαι καὶ δυνάμεις; also VI(IV). I §§ 1, 2, with notes.

21 καὶ πρὸς τ. τ. ἀ. π.] Therefore there should be τάξις τις περὶ τοὺς παῖδας: the first of the three questions is settled.

§ 3 21 ἐπεὶ δὲ] This corresponds to ὅτι μὲν οὖν of a 11.

25 τε καὶ] join ἰδίᾳ to διδάσκων.

26 δεῖ γὰρ] This sentence gives one reason why the education is to be public. The second point is quickly dismissed, but the third takes up the whole of this book.

§ 4 27 ἅμα δὲ κτλ] The sacrifice of the individual to the state was carried out most completely at Sparta, but Periclean Athens did not fall far short in this respect. Aristotle accepts the principle along with the other fundamental postulates of the Greek state, and expresses it as clearly in I. 13. 15 as here. Comp. I. 1 § 12 ff., 4 § 5, and Eucken *Methode* p. 80 f. Also the conception of rearing a family as λειτουργία, IV(VII). 16. 16.

πέφυκεν ἐκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν. (1) ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἂν τις κατὰ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην. (2) ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην κοινῇ ποιητέον, φανερόν· τίς δ' ἐστὶν παιδεία καὶ πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται διὰ τῶν ἔργων. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι δεῖν μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον, οὔδ' ἐφανερόν ποτερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν· πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος· ἐκ τε τῆς ἐμποδίων παιδείας παραχώδης ἢ σκέψιν, καὶ δῆλον οὐδεὶ ποτερον ἀσκεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τεύοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κρι-

31 κατὰ Syllburg, καὶ P<sup>1</sup> H Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 32 ἐποῇ or ἐποῶν P<sup>1</sup> A<sup>1</sup>. (conjunction), κοινῶς M<sup>1</sup>, κοινῇ H<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Bk., perhaps rightly || 36 ἄδ' τε P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Bk. and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 40 οὐδεὶ H<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, οὐδ' the other authorities and Bk. (this may of course be right) || 42 εἴληφε Reiz, needlessly

30 The order πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βλέπειν ἐπιμέλειαν would avoid the hiatus and conform to I. 13. 15, 1260 b 14, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετὴν. Cp. Plato *Lysis* 903 n, c.

31 ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἂν τις] Comp. *N. Eth.* 8. 9. 13, 1180 a 24 ff. (Eaton). SUSSEM. (975)

32 καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην] On the ἀγωγὴ or public training of Spartan citizens see Schömann Eng. tr. I p. 255 ff.

It was the same for all VI(IV). 9. 7. 1294 b 21 ff. (except the kings' eldest sons or next heirs, P<sup>1</sup> H<sup>1</sup> *Alc.* I. 122 n, Plot. *E. Argutai* c. 1), and without it mere birth from Spartan parents did not constitute any one a citizen: cp. the well-known story of the hostages; 'Ἐρεοκλήϊ ἐφαρμόων εἶναι· οὐκ αὖτις μὲν οὐ δώσαν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπαίδευται γένεσθαι, τῇ πατρίδι ἀγωγῇ ἀρετῆς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ πολίται γὰρ ἀνέειραν.' Plutarch *Agamem.* Lac. 34, 235 n. Cp. *Inst. Lac.* 21.

c. 2. Conflict of views as to what should be taught; divergent theories of the end of education: § 1, 2.

The knowledge needed for affairs of life must be imparted, but only within certain limits. Even in scientific studies there is much which a gentleman would not pursue, or only as means to a given end, § 3—6.

37 οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν—ἀρετῆς] But Aristotle would not recognise any such dilemma as 'virtue or happiness,' unless

we here limit virtue to mean moral virtue only. This limited meaning occurs in § 2, a 42, see n. (978). SUSSEM. (976)

38 οὐδὲ φανερόν—ἡθοῖ] Cp. IV(VIII). 14 § 8 ff with n. (903) and *Inst.* p. 43 ff., 47 ff. As here τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος, 'character of the soul' is a fuller form of expression for ἡθοῖ, so also in c. 3 § 15 we have τῆς ψυχῆς ἡθοῖ cp. n. (1043). SUSSEM. (977)

§ 2 39 τῆς ἐμποδίων παιδείας] From the standpoint of the ordinary, current education.

40 παραχώδης = perplexing: τὰς ἐποῇ for ἀπορία in II. 8. 12, 1260 b 4. The three theories of the end of education are that it should be (1) directly utilitarian i.e. subservient to a livelihood, or should cultivate (2) the moral, or (3) the intellectual faculties. They still find supporters in the modern controversies on the subject.

41 πρὸς ἀρετὴν] Here and in the following clause (b 1) ἀρετὴ is evidently restricted to 'moral virtue,' contrasted with *ἐπιστήμη*, practical wisdom. SUSSEM. (978)

ἢ τὰ περιττά] The argument which has come down to us does not include a discussion of the question whether and to what extent these higher sciences should also be taken into account in the education of the young, cp. c. 1 § 11 m, 11, with n. (992) and n. (1013), *Inst.* I, also *Inst.* 32 ff. SUSSEM. (979)

εἴληφε ταῦτα ἀρετῆς τινος] Have failed

1337 b τὰς τινας)· περί τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὁμολογούμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶσιν, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσκησιν αὐτῆς).

§ 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, ἢ οὐκ ἄδηλον· ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερόν ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ βάνανσον. βάνανσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων [ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι παρασκευάζουσι τὸ σῶμα χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλούμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνι-

1337 b 4 δεῖ omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 5 ἐλευθερίων ? Schneider (perhaps the reading of Γ Ar.) and 6 ἀνελευθερίων P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps Ar.; both possibly right || 11 [ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] Susem. || 12 τε omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps Γ, hence [τε] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || παρασκευάζουσι after τὸ σῶμα Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

partizans, supporters; literally 'umpires to decide for them.' The metaphor is clearly taken from the dramatic contests: cp. *Metaph.* I. 8. 5, 989 a 6 ff.

1337 b 2 οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες] See 1332 a 2' n. and for the thought cp. *N. E.* I. 3. 2, 1094 b 14 ff.

3 πρὸς] not περί, after διαφέρονται, as after ἀμφισβητεῖν in III. 13. 1, 1283 a 23, 24: 'with regard to' (cp. 1283 b 15).

What is ἀσκησις ἀρετῆς? Learning by practice, practical training in virtue: cp. 1341 a 8, πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ ἀσκ., 1333 b 30, 38, τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκησιν... μελετᾶν.

§ 3 The first theory is only partially accepted. Some 'utilitarian' studies are indispensable, but we must exclude all which bear the taint of βανανσία.

4 By the really indispensable parts of useful knowledge he may be supposed to mean much what we mean by the three Rs. Here in fact we return to the starting-point, IV(VII). 14. 14, 1333 b 1—4. There is no need to limit the expression to τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἔργων as in I. 7. 3, II. 6. 5, III. 4. 11.

5 ὅτι δὲ] There is nothing strange in the repetition of ὅτι after φανερόν. Comp. III. 13. 7, 1283 b 16 f., where ὥς is picked up by ὅτι, as also in *Phys.* I. 7. 9, 190 b 17, 19: other instances from *Phys.* VI. 2. 9, 233 a 13 f., VIII. 7. 1, 260 a 23, 25 (Bonitz). We may render: "as to all not being required, in view of the distinc-

tion made between liberal and illiberal occupations, it is clear that such useful subjects only should be studied as will not degrade the student." τῶν τοιούτων limiting as in 1260 a 40.

§ 4 8 The article omitted with ἔργων, because τοῦτο is predicate.

11 ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] If διάνοια is a part of the soul, we should expect ἦθος for ψυχὴν [cp. 1340 a b πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν]. But if it is the soul as opposed to the body (cp. Plat. *Theaet.* 173 E, τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κείται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἢ δὲ διάνοια... πανταχῇ φέρεται), then ψυχὴν must be regarded as a gloss upon διάνοιαν, ultimately incorporated in the text. See p. 622 ff. SUSEM.

§ 5 13 βαναύσους] What is meant by παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι comes out in I. 11. 6, 1258 b 37 τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται. See n. (103). SUSEM. (980) This is the best description of "sordid occupations": see Newman I. p. 111 f.

τὰς μισθαρνικάς ἐργασίας] "Trades plied for hire" including all kinds of paid labour, mental as well as manual. See notes (102, 103). But in I. 11. 4, 1258 b 25, μισθαρνία is used in a different sense, = 'working for wage,' to denote merely the manual labour of artisans and unskilled labourers as distinct from ἐμπορία and τοκισμός, i.e. all kinds of trade and commercial occupations (including usury). Comp. n. (101). SUSEM. (981)

καὶ ἐργασίας. ἄσυχον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τα- (II)  
πεινήν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μὲν  
τινὸς ἐνίων μετέχειν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον, τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν ἕως  
πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἔνοχον ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλάβαις. ἔχει δὲ  
πολλὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνοος ἕνεκεν πράττει τις ἢ με-  
θάγειν τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων ἢ δι' ἀρετὴν οὐκ  
ἀνελεύθερον, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων πολλάκις δι' ἄλλους  
θητικὸν καὶ δουλικὸν ἂν δόξειε πράττειν.

15 «μὴ» ἐλευθερίων or ἀνελευθερίων? Götting (wrongly), ἀνελευθερίων Rldgeway;  
but see Comm. n. (982) || 16 ἀνελευθερίων perhaps Γ Ar. || 16 τὸ το ἀνελευθερίων  
omitted by Π² (supplied in the margin of P⁴) || τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν omitted and a  
lacuna left by P⁵ (1st hand), προσεδρεύειν δὲ (supplied by a later hand in P⁴) Bk. ||  
17 ἀκρίβειαν] τὸ τέλειον P⁵, perfectionem William, extremum Ar., τὸ ἐντελὲς Vatican  
Bk. || εἰρημέναις] ῥηθείσαι P⁵ || δὲ] γάρ? Sussem. (a very doubtful suggestion) ||  
18 ἔνεκεν] χάριν P⁵ Bk. || 19 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ P⁵ Bk. with hiatus  
in pausa || αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ P⁴ in the margin, αὐ M⁴ || τὸ inserted before φίλων by  
P⁵ || 20 ἀνελευθερίων perhaps Γ Ar. || πράττειν Π² P⁵ cp. 1371 b 34, 11, 17,  
1327 a 16 || πολλάκις (πολλάκις P⁴) after δι' ἄλλους Π² P⁵ Bk. || 21 δὲ (in P⁵ a cor-  
rection by a later hand) after δόξειεν Π² P⁵ Bk.

15 ἔστι δὲ... 17 βλάβαις] The sense, which Götting and Ridgeway have mis-  
taken, is: "And even as to studies not in  
themselves illiberal, while (μὲν) there are  
some which it is liberal to pursue [ὡς  
ἐντελέτερα ἔργα 1255 b 28] within certain  
limits, too close application to them with  
the aim of scientific mastery is subject to  
the drawbacks above mentioned." Ari-  
stotle is thinking more particularly of  
Gymnastics and Music, but also of Draw-  
ing and Painting. See c. 4 § 1, n. (1004),  
c. 5 § 8, n. (1029), c. 6 §§ 3—8, §§ 15, 16,  
nn. (1065, 1080). But on the other hand  
consult Exc. 1. p. 619. SUSSEM. (982) Of  
the two clauses introduced by μὲν and δὲ  
Hunitz' dictum holds: "prius sc. mem-  
brum, grammaticae constructionis, ut res  
subiectum est alteri membro."

16 προσεδρεύειν] to work closely at:  
II. 5. 6, 1263 a 29; *infra* c. 4 § 4, 1338 b  
18. Comp. ἀρβυλολογεῖσθαι I. II. 5,  
1258 b 34.

16 17 ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν =  
καλὴ διαφέρει, it makes a great difference;  
cp. II. 8. 25. Otherwise c. 6 § 1 below.

19 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν κτλ]  
Cf. III. 4. 13, n. (488), IV. III. 4. 2 nn.  
(900, 901). SUSSEM. (983)

20 ὁ δὲ δὲ... πράττειν] Comp. n. (103)  
and *Metaph.* XII (A). 10. 3, 1075 a 19 n.  
(Eaton). SUSSEM. (984)

πολλάκις] This word goes with δι'  
δόξει while δι' ἄλλους (or in connection to  
others) goes with πράττειν as contrasted  
with αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων, and accordingly  
Π² have transposed it. But the hypo-  
theton is not stranger than in many other  
passages. Cp. 1215 b 3.

21 θητικὸν] Cp. 1343 b 14. The  
strait conjunction between *πραγματι* and  
*δουλ* is laid down I. 12. 13, n. (1021).  
The day labourer, *θηρ*, was mentioned III.  
5. 4, 1275 a 13, 18, 21; see nn. (1007,  
486). The word is used in *the Art.* III.  
of the lowest property class, as consti-  
tuted by Solon: τὰς δ' ἄλλας θητικές,  
οὐδενὸς μετέχοντος ἀρχῆς. *And not one*  
*ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔργα τὰ μέλαινα ἀναμειβέ-*  
*ται ἀρχῆς, πῶς εἶναι εἶναι, καὶ διὰ*  
*ἀπὸς θητικές:* c. 7, 1, 151 a very close  
parallel to II. 12. 6, 1274 a 21.

c. 3. Of the sciences, *subjects of in-*  
*struction* Grammar (Letters), Gymnastics,  
Drawing have a practical value: § 1. *A*  
*combination of Music leads us to dis-*  
*cuss the higher end of all Education,*  
*which is the right development of human*  
§§ 1—7, as *Human subjects*: §§ 8, 9. *De-*  
*velopment*: §§ 10, 11.

The higher treatment of subjects of  
practical utility: §§ 12, 13. *Practical*  
*should precede*: § 13. Cp. *ibid.* p. 108.

3 αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημένοι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ εἴρη-  
ται πρότερον, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν· ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἃ παι-  
δεύειν εἰώθασι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ  
25 τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικὴν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν  
ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὔσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ  
γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσιν πρὸς ἀνδρίαν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν  
§ 2 ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ  
πλείστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παι-  
30 δεῖα διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρη-  
ται, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύ-  
νασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν  
§ 3 εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ δ' ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ  
αἰρετόν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον (1

22 εἴρηται] ἐλέχθη Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 25 τὴν μὲν...γραφικὴν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || 27 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν] περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς P<sup>5</sup> and perhaps Γ (*de musica autem dubitabit utique aliquis* William) || 28 ἤδη omitted by P<sup>5</sup>, untranslated by William and Ar., [ἤδη] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, εἰ δεῖ Koraes, needlessly || 33 δ' Susem., γὰρ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 34 τῆς...35 σχολάζειν omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> (supplied in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>), τῆς ἀσχολίας over an erasure P<sup>5</sup>, καὶ...σχολάζειν omitted by Ar. || [τέλος] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly, τελευταῖον P<sup>5</sup>, ὅλως Vettori Bk.

§ 1 22 καταβεβλημένοι] Here and 1338 a 36 used for ordinary, current i.q. τὰ ἐγκύκλια, or ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία. Apparently from καταβάλλεσθαι = 'lay down a foundation' mid. So Pl. *Laus* 803 A. Late writers use the passive in the sense of 'to be published,' committed to writing, so already *N.E.* I. 5. 8, 1096 a 10: cp. Antigonus Caryst. *De Mirabilibus* c. 60 ἐβδομήκοντα περὶ αὐτῶν καταβέβληται βιβλία.

23 πρότερον] In c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 39—b 2. SUSEM. (985)

ἔστι δὲ...25 γραφικὴν] Comp. Plin. *N. H.* xxxv. 10. 77 (Vettori): huius (Pamphili) auctoritate effectum est Sicyone primum, deinde et in tota Graecia, ut pueri ingenui omnia ante graphice, hoc est picturam in buxo, docerentur, recipere-  
returque ars ea in primum gradum liberalium: Plato *Protag.* 325 D, *Crito* 50 D, *Rep.* II. 376 E, *Laus* VII. 795 D, Xen. *De Lac. Rep.* 2. 1, Pseudo-Plat. *Theages* 122 E (Eaton). SUSEM. (986) Under γράμματα came reading, writing, counting (λογιστική), and the elements of arithmetic. Most of the authorities given above recognize the threefold division e.g. Pl. *Prot.* I. c. (1) γραμμάτων τε καὶ (2) κιθαρρίσεως, both in the διδασκάλειον (*ib.* εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες) and (3) physical training

(εἰς παιδοτρίβου πέμπουσιν) at first in the palaestra. So *Theages* I.c. οἶον (1) γράμματα τε καὶ (2) κιθαρρίσειν καὶ (3) παλαίειν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀγωνίαν.

§ 2 30 ζητεῖν] Nature, personified, is said to aim at a right use of leisure, as she is said to define, to make a division, to place at man's disposal: I. 8. 5, 1256 a 26 f., IV(VII). 14. 5, 1332 b 35 f., I. 10. 1, 1258 a 23.

πολλάκις] E.g. II. 9. 34, IV(VII). c. 14 § 9, c. 15 § 6. SUSEM. (987)

32 αὕτη] "This is the principle which determines all." The pronoun is attracted into the gender of the predicate. See IV(VII). I. 8, 1323 b 15, n., Vahlen *Aufs.* II. p. 34. Another instance IV(VII). 7. 5, 1327 b 41.

πάλιν] That is, after 1333 b 1.

§ 3 33 δέ] *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 418. Hoc loco γὰρ (Γ Π Ar. Bk.) plane absurdum est. Immo si Aristoteles omnino voluisset haec cum antecedentibus nexu causae et consecutionis coniungere, certe multo magis illa causa sunt, haec consecutio. Ut in hoc potissimum libro saepius peccatum est γὰρ et δὲ coniunctionibus propter compendiorum similitudinem inter se permutatis, ita hoc loco δὲ restituendum est. SUSEM.

ὅ τι δεῖ ποιῶντας σχολάζειν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας τέλος (H)  
 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βίου τὴν παίδειαν ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο  
 ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταύτῃ ἀσχολίᾳ χρῆσθαι ταῖς  
 παιδιαῖς (ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἢ δὲ παι-  
 διαὶ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστίν· τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει  
 μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο διὰ παιδίας ἀσάφην-  
 σθαι καιροφυλακοῦντα τὴν χρῆσιν, ὡς προσάγοντα φαρ-  
 μακείας χάριν. ἄνεσις γὰρ ἢ τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς.  
 καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνίπτανται· τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν ἔχει  
 αὐτὸ δοκεῖ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ζῆν  
 μακαρίως. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τοῖς ἀσχολοῦσιν ὑπάρχει ἀλλὰ τοῖς  
 σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολῶν ἐντὶ κά τινος ἀσχολεῖ  
 τέλους ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία τέλος ἐστίν, ἐν  
 οὐ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἡδονῆς αἰσνται πάντες εἶναι.

35 ὅ τι Susem., τί I<sup>o</sup> Bas.<sup>2</sup> Bk., ὅτι the other authorities; διὰ ἀπὸ παιδίας  
 I (if William has translated closely *quod facientes oportet causare*) I<sup>o</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in  
 the text | 36 <ἀν> ἀναγκαῖον Schneider, ἀναγκαῖον <ἔν> Spengel; one or other  
 ποῖον needed | 38 ἢ τε? Susem. | 41 καιροφυλακοῦντας II<sup>o</sup>, which may also be  
 right, καιροφυλακτοῦντας I<sup>o</sup> Bk. | προσάγοντας II<sup>o</sup> I<sup>o</sup> Bk., which may also be right  
 1338 a 3 γὰρ Susem., δ' I<sup>o</sup> II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text

34—36) With the punctuation now  
 adopted (common after τέλος): "If both  
 are necessary but leisure more desirable  
 and more truly the end than occupation,  
 we must next inquire what should employ  
 our leisure. Certainly not amusement, or  
 else amusement would be made the end of  
 life." With ἀναγκαῖον there is the less  
 need to express ἀν.

35 οὐ γὰρ δὴ κτλ] Comp. *N. E. Eccl.*  
 vi. 6, 6, 1176 b 27 ff.: οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ  
 εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἀναστὰς τὰ τέλει εἶναι  
 παιδία καὶ πνευματεύσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν  
 τὰς βίαις ἀναστὰς τοῦ παίζειν χάριν (Eaton).  
 Also *in/ra* c. 5 § 10, n. (1033), § 13 n.  
 (1038). SUSEM. (988)

§ 4 41 φαρμακείας χάριν] Cp. *N. E.*  
 vii. 14 § 4, 1154 a 26 ff., διὰ τὰς ὑπερβό-  
 λας τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὐσιμὴ ἰατρία, τὴν ἡ-  
 ψυχὴν ἰατρῶσι; §§ 6, 7, b 9 ff. ἐξελάνθη  
 ἐκ λύπης λύπη...κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδονὴ τὰ  
 διεγείνεται (Eaton). See below c. 5 § 10,  
 n. (1031). SUSEM. (989)

41 ἀνεσις γὰρ...τῆς ψυχῆς] This is  
 best stated plainly in the case of sleep,  
 which is sweet because it affords pleasure  
 of this kind; c. 7 § 3 (cp. n. 1021).  
 Further comp. *N. E. Eccl.* vii. 7, 7, 1156 b  
 17 ff. γὰρ παιδία ἀνεσις ὥστε ἄσπερ ἀν-  
 ἡσυχία: "amusement is recreation, and

consequently of the nature of relaxation."  
 SUSEM. (990)

1338 a 2 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν] Here  
 καὶ is explicative; translate, "and indeed,"  
 "and what is more." For the pleasure  
 here mentioned is not something apart  
 from Happiness (i.e. Well-being), but is  
 contained in it. It is incredible that  
 Döring *op. cit.* p. 151 (cp. p. 109 f.) should  
 have been satisfied with the ambiguity  
 "happiness," or as he says, the life of hap-  
 piness (which is much the same). "consists  
 of happiness accompanied by pleasure."  
 To complete the logical ambiguity he  
 should have added "together with the  
 sense of existence." SUSEM. (991)

§ 5 3 The violent blast—ἐπὶ τὴν  
 ἀνάμ—can be removed by emendation, for  
 we may relegate the whole clause τὴν...  
 ἐξελάττωσιν to the margin.

6 μεθ' ἡδονῆς] Plausible. The  
 use of ἀντὶ and a positive as an equivalent  
 for an adverb or adjective is noticed in the  
 lexicon s.v. Ant. B p. 310 f. *Howe* *Ant.*  
*Eccl.* 425 a 2 ff. Döring's difficulty (see  
 n. 991) partly arises from overlooking the  
 fact that Happiness is a well-being term  
 for εὐδαιμονία. The English reader need  
 not be reminded that Well-being (of which  
 "well-doing" is the primary

ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἀλλὰ (I  
 καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἕκαστος καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὐτῶν, ὁ δ' ἄριστος  
 § 6 τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι  
 10 δεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν μανθάνειν ἅττα  
 καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ ταύ-  
 τας τὰς μαθήσεις (ἐαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν,) τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν  
 § 7 ἀσχολίαν ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ τὴν 6  
 μουσικὴν οἱ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον  
 15 (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον) οὐδ' ὡς χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ τὰ γράμ-  
 ματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν [καὶ πρὸς  
 μάθησιν] καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλὰς, δοκεῖ δὲ  
 καὶ γραφικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τῶν τε-

8 αὐτῶν P<sup>4</sup> Ald. and corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup>, αὐτὴν M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 10 ἐν τῇ σχολῇ  
 διαγωγῇ Koraes, cf. § 8, a 22, [ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ] σχολὴν Spengel, ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ [σχο-  
 λῇ] Jackson: but Postgate has satisfactorily defended the text || 16 [καὶ πρὸς  
 μάθησιν] Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>, but more probably μάθησιν is corrupt, μαθηματικὴν ? Flach, hardly  
 right || 18 χρησίμη P<sup>4</sup> 5-6 S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup>

constituent), or even Real Interest, would often better express man's ultimate good, because these terms do not necessarily imply "a whole of which the elements are pleasurable feelings": Prof. H. Sidgwick *Methods of Ethics* p. 76 n. 1, *History of Ethics*<sup>2</sup> p. 48 n., p. 56 n. 2.

7 ταύτην μέντοι... 9 καλλίστων] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* I. 8. 10 ff., 1099 a 7 ff. (Congreve). I cannot understand how Döring p. 109 f. is able to prove from these words, that the pleasure which belongs as a necessary condition to the life of happiness is not the pleasure which arises from virtuous action and theoretical knowledge, but something which taken by itself is an integral factor of happiness. (To this view Döring's reviewer Walter, *Jen. Littz.* 1877 p. 29, rightly took exception.) From what other source can it arise? Every pleasure, as Aristotle rightly maintains (see Zeller *op. c.* II ii p. 617 ff.), can only be conceived as a consequence of some bodily or mental activity—even the pleasures of taste or the agreeable sensation of falling asleep: for eating and drinking are bodily activities, and the very act of falling asleep (inasmuch as the cessation of a movement is itself a movement) is also an activity. Döring is no less mistaken when he goes on to state that the pleasure which is introduced as an integral factor into the end of life itself contributes to the highest intellectual enjoy-

ment (διαγωγῇ), whereas the latter is really due to the cognitive faculties and the pleasure inseparably associated with their strenuous exercise. The thought of Aristotle is a very simple one: that those activities alone can belong to happiness, which naturally produce the purest possible joy with the smallest admixture of pain. Comp. further c. 5 § 10, n. (1032). SUSEM. (992)

§ 6 10 Dr Jackson writes: "in the face of τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῇ § 8, a 21, I cannot reconcile myself to this phrase. Is it possible that σχολὴν is the interpolation of a scribe, who, finding πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ, did not see that with these words ἡδονὴν should be understood from the preceding sentence?" Dr Postgate *Notes* p. 15 defended both phrases, explaining this as 'our training must include certain studies available for leisure to be spent in rational amusement,' and a 21 as 'rational amusement to be pursued in leisure time.'

§ 7 14 εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν] Ranked under, with: so 1339 b 14 and θετέον εἰς, 1339 b 12. But § 8, 1338 a 23, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσιν.

17 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφικὴ] "While drawing too has its use in making us better judges of works of art," so that we are less liable to be taken in when purchasing such works, c. 3 § 12, 1338 b 1. SUSEM. (994)



§ 11 ται καὶ πῶς; ὕστερον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν  
 35 εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔχομέν  
 τινα μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων· ἡ γὰρ  
 μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι  
 δεῖ τινὰ παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμοι  
 39 οἶον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολ-  
 § 12 λὰς δι' αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεσθαι γίνεσθαι μαθήσεις ἐτέρας, ὁμοίως  
 41 δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἵνα ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὠνίοις μὴ δια-  
 μαρτάνωσιν ἀλλ' ὥσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν  
 1338 b ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἣ μᾶλλον ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ  
 περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρή-  
 σιμον ἥκιστα ἀρμόζει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις.

36 \* \* ἐκ Conring, rightly, if, as Reiz and Schneider thought, the passage needs any alteration: but this is extremely doubtful. <ὅτι τὸ καλὸν οὐκ ἐξείργον> ἐκ ? Susem. || 37 τῶν χρησίμων after ὅτι δεῖ Γ (if William has translated accurately *quod oportet utilium*) P<sup>5</sup> || 40 δι' αὐτῶν after γίνεσθαι (γίνεσθαι Bk.<sup>2</sup>) Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. (in P<sup>1</sup> ἐνδέχεσθαι is omitted) || 42 ἀλλ' ἢ Reiz || [ὥσιν...b 1 ἢ] Koraes

1338 b 1 ἢ transposed by Postgate to follow μᾶλλον || ἢ] ἀλλὰ Ar.(?) Reiz Thurot || πρᾶσιν. ἢ μᾶλλον...2 κάλλους; Jackson formerly || θεωρητικὴν (θεωρητικὴν S<sup>b</sup>) Π<sup>2</sup>, θεωρητικούς P<sup>5</sup> || 3 ἀρμόττει Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || ἐλευθέροις ? Susem.

§ 10 34 ὕστερον] Another of the unfulfilled promises. See *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4). SUSEM. (999)

§ 11 νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον...37 δῆλον] The sequence of thought here is liable to be misunderstood. In §§ 2—9 Aristotle has proved, or tried to prove, that the ancients had regarded poetry and music as being preeminently a means to intellectual training, which in his eyes is more important than moral training, and to the highest intellectual enjoyment associated with it. It is true the evidence he has produced suffices for no more than the inference that the ancients considered music and poetry in the light of higher rational amusements for men of riper age, but not that they adopted music in the education of the young with the view of training them for this rational enjoyment in the future: cp. *nn.* (993, 1024). He does not, in §§ 2—9, touch upon the question, see *n.* (993), whether this art may not be utilized for the development of character: this he discusses later on, c. 5 § 1, where he expressly states that he will resume the inquiry of c. 2 § 3—c. 3 § 11, which had been left incomplete: see *nn.* (1017, 1018). Hence he is here contrasting the intellectual and theoretical aim of education not with its moral aim, the

development of character, but only with the third and lowest aim, a knowledge of what is absolutely necessary and practically useful. All three aspects are more intimately concerned with the mental side of education. The third is disposed of in §§ 11, 12; in § 13 Aristotle reverts to the difference between intellectual and moral training, without however pursuing the inquiry more precisely into particulars, his attention being at present especially directed to the proper development of the body. SUSEM. (1000)

35 εἶναι] Lobeck in his ed. of Phrynichus p. 275 treats this as a case of the absolute inf. See *n.* on 1330 a 37.

§ 12 42 πρὸς] This preposition as in 1261 a 13, 1262 b 3, 1284 a 1, 1336 b 31 1338 b 2.

1338 b 2 περὶ τὰ σώματα] The prepositional phrase an equivalent for the adjective 'corporeal.' So Plat. *Timaeus* 35 A, *Phaedr.* 246 D. See *Ast Lex.* s. v. of whose exx. *Soph.* 251 C πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως = 'poverty in mental endowment' is perhaps the best.

τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν κτλ.] See III. 8. 1, 1279 b 13 f., Eucken *Methode* p. 35.

3 τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις] Editors comp. *N. E.* IV. 3. 33, 1125 a 11 f. SUSEM. (1001)

ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν πρότερον τοῖς ἔθουσιν παιδευτέον ἢ τῷ λόγῳ εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὁῖον ἐκ τούτων ὅτι παραδοτέον τοὺς παῖδας γυμναστικῇ καὶ παιδοτριβικῇ· τούτων γὰρ ἡ μὲν ποιεῖν τινα ποιεῖ τὴν ἕξιν τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τὰ ἔργα.

νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκῶσι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λι-

4 πρότερον P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), πρότερον Ar. with all the other authorities. 5 παραδοτέον after 5 λόγῳ P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., avoiding hiatus. 6 εἶναι omitted by IP. 7 δὲ = τῷ λόγῳ. παραδοτέον? Susem.

§ 13 4 πρότερον] IV(VII). 15 §§ 6—10. SUSEM. (1002)

7 τούτων γάρ κτλ] From what follows, as well as from c. 3 § 1, compared with IV(VII). c. 12 § 9 ff., c. 13 § 6 ff., it is plain that instruction in gymnastics does not conduce merely to physical development, but also to the moral education of the mind in courage. For the difference between παιδοτριβικὴ and γυμναστική see also Galen *De util. tuenda* II. 9. T. VI. p. 143 Kühn, where the relation between trainer (παιδοτριβητή) and teacher (διδάσκαλος) is compared to that between a cook and a physician. See VI(IV). 1. 2 n. (1115), and for this passage generally c. 4 § 7 ff. n. (1015), i.e. Ess. I. p. 619. SUSEM. (1003)

ποιεῖν τινα ποιεῖ] The phrase recurs c. 3 § 3, 1339 a 13 f., § 24, 1340 b 11, c. 4 § 16, 1341 b 18. Like τοιοῦτος (see c. 1. 5. 7, 1336 a 37) the precise import of ποιεῖν τινα is "of a definite character" is determined by the context: in 1339 a 24 = διδασκαλίας καὶ ἀρετῆς (cp. 1339 b 24 f.), in 1341 b 18 = βίαια simply; while in 1340 b 11 it is as vague as ὀργαστικὰ καὶ νοητικὰ 1340 b 3. In our present passage it is substantially *θελεῖν ποιεῖν, πρὸς ἀρετὴν (τὸ ἦθος) συνεχεῖν*; in short, *παιδεύειν*, "develop," "influence." A correlative phrase, ποιεῖ τινα γυμναστικά, occurs c. 4 § 16, 1340 a 7 f., where see note. Comp. *N. E.* I. 9. 8, 1099 b 31, *Rhet.* I. 1. 9, 1354 b 20.

c. 4 Athletic training. Two errors to avoid: we do not desire to make professional athletes, or to realize the Spartan type (§§ 1—7). Bodily exercises to be relaxed in favour of other studies for three years after puberty: §§ 7—9.

The censure of an athletic training was passed IV(VII). c. 16 §§ 12, 13, 1335 b 1—12. The criticism of the exercises of the Spartans widens into a condemnation

of their political system in general on the lines of B. II. c. 9. IV(VII). c. 14 §§ 13—22, c. 15 § 6.

10 αἱ μὲν...[μποιοῦσι] Some endeavour to make their sons professional athletes. Aristotle evidently considers that such a career is *βλάπτον*: cp. § 6, b 21, n. (1010), § 9, n. (1015), i.e. Ess. I., and IV(VII). 16, 12, 1335 b 3 ff., n. (944). SUSEM. (1004)

In his condemnation of the *mimoi* for sports, Aristotle had predecessors in Xenophanes *Frag.* 2, Euripides *Andr.* *Fr.* 4, as well as Plato *Rep.* III. 404 b, 407 n, 410 b—d, VII. 533 b, 534 c. The judgment of poets and philosophers was confirmed by practical soldiers like Epaminondas and Alexander, and later Philostratus (Plat. *Vita Phil.* c. 3, p. 357 c), by medical authorities like Galen (*Hypocr. Αἵματι* c. 9—14, I. p. 20 ff. Bk. I cp. Plat. *De anat. tuenda* c. 15, p. 139 a ff.), and by the Romans. On the degradation of the athletic sports, see P. Gardner *More Characters* pp. 200—202; Mommsen *The Romans* c. p. 464, 477—489 Eng. II. The chief causes for the prominence of the professional element were (1) the increasing popularity of the heavier sports, boxing and the pankration; (2) the change of diet, see c. (1015); (3) the progress made in the science and art of training. "But it was Herodorus of Solvmdia who ruined athletics, by introducing elaborate rules for eating and drinking and exercise. He first discovered that the human body has by scientific training become not healthy and beautiful, but muscular and adapted to that or that special service. He improved the speed of the races and the skill of the wrestlers, but spoiled athletics as a means of education for life and happiness" (Plutarch). The evil increased until in Roman times we pre-

βώμεναι τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ τὴν αὖξησιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ  
 12 δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θη-  
 ριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὥς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν  
 § 2 μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε  
 15 πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα ποιητέον  
 τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν· εἴ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρί-  
 σκουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν  
 ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ  
 § 3 μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἦθεσιν· πολλὰ  
 20 δ' ἔστι τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρω-  
 ποφαγίαν (εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον  
 Ἀχαιοὶ τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι καὶ τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν ἕτερα,  
 τὰ μὲν ὁμοίως τοῦτοις τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἃ ληστρικὰ μὲν ἔστιν,  
 § 4 ἀνδρίας δὲ οὐ μετειλήφασιν. ἔτι δ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας

15 μίαν <ἀρετὴν> Susem. (after Alb. and Ar.), μίαν <ξίω> Ridgeway. It is better to understand ταύτην || 20 δ'] τ' or γὰρ Susem., *que* Ar. || 23 ληστρικὰ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald., ληστικά Bk. with all the other authorities || 24 τοὺς omitted by P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald.

vince of the empire possessed so many professional athletes, and none supplied so few soldiers.

12 The statement that the Spartans were prohibited from boxing and the pancratium is found in Plutarch *V. Lycurg.* 19, *Apophthegm. Lycurg.* 4, 189 E, Seneca *De Benef.* v. 3. 1, Philostr. *De Gymnast.* 9, 58. It is not certain that it applies to classical times. Xenophon says καὶ γὰρ πυκτεύουσι διὰ τὴν ἔριν ὅπου ἂν συμβάλωσι, *Rep. Lac.* 4 § 6. Epaminondas saw the difference between the corpulent athletic habit and that of a spare, wiry soldier: Plut. *Apophth.* *Ep.* 3, 192 C.

13 τοῖς πόνοις] Cp. II. 9. 24, 1270 b 33, ὑπερβάλλει (ἢ δίατα) ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρόν.

§ 2 14 πολλάκις] II. 6. 34 n. (344), IV(VII). 14. 15 ff., n. (910), c. 15 § 5; cp. IV(VII). 2. 9, n. (719). SUSEM. (1005)

15 With μίαν understand ταύτην: 'neither to this alone, nor to this principally' (Ridgeway). An omission of ἀρετὰς to be found I. 13. 9, 1260 a 24.

19 λεοντώδεσιν] The character of the lion is given *Hist. Animal.* IX. 44. 2—6: 629 b 8 ff. ἐν τῇ βρώσει μὲν χαλεπώτατός ἐστι, μὴ πεινῶν δὲ καὶ βεβρωκὼς πραΰτατος, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἦθος οὐχ ὑπόπτῃς οὐδενὸς οὐδ' ὑφορώμενος οὐδέν, πρὸς τε τὰ σύντροφά καὶ συνήθη σφόδρα φιλοπαίγμων καὶ στερκτικός. ἐν δὲ ταῖς θήραις ὁρώμενος μὲν οὐδέποτε φεύγει οὐδὲ πτήσσει, ἀλλ' ἐάν

καὶ διὰ πλῆθος ἀναγκασθῇ τῶν θηρευόντων ὑπαγαγεῖν βάδην ὑποχωρεῖ καὶ κατὰ σκέλος, κατὰ βραχὺ ἐπιστρεφόμενος. Plato, whom Aristotle here follows in the treatment and criticism of γυμναστική (see *Rep.* III. 404—412), gives the dog as an example of the 'spirited' temperament in *Rep.* II. 375 C ff.; comp. also III. 410 E, to which Aristotle alludes in IV(VII). 7. 5, n. (783, ff.). SUSEM. (1006)

§ 3 21 εὐχερῶς ἔχει] "are indifferent to (think little of) bloodshed and cannibalism." These wild races lead the 'natural' ληστικὸς βίος of I. 8. 7 f., 1256 b 1 (Newman).

καθάπερ τῶν... 24 μετειλήφασιν] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 5. 2, 1148 b 21 ff (λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις)... οἷσις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίοις τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὡμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν: Herod. IV. 18, 106, Ἀνδροφάγοι δὲ ἀγριώτατα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσι ἥθεα, οὔτε δίκην νομίζοντες οὔτε νόμῳ οὐδενὶ χρεόμενοι, νομάδες δὲ εἰσι: Scylax *Peripl.* 75 f. p. 60 (Müller). Nevertheless the Greeks took these tribes to be of kindred origin with themselves: Strabo IX. 416 A (colonists of the Orchomenians, who had wandered thither with Ialmenus after the capture of Troy), XI. 495 f. φασὶ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰάσονος στρατίας τοὺς μὲν Φθιώτας Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν ἐνθάδε Ἀχαιῶν οἰκίσαι (Eaton).

With courage, as with every other virtue

ἴσμεν, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὶ προσήδρανον ταῖς φιλοπορίαις, ἵππερ  
 ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνασίοις ἀγῶσι καὶ  
 τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἐτέρων οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοῖς νῦν  
 γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνον πρὸς  
 μὴ ἀσκούντας ἀσκεῖν. 36 <δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων 37 ἔργου  
 <κρίνειν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς 38 παιδείας νῦν  
 ἔχουσιν, πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον.> 39 ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ θηρι-  
 ῶδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θη-  
 ρίων ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐδένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον  
 ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέκτες τοῖς παιδείας

35 αὐτοὶ <μόνοι> Eucken; but why should not αὐτοὶ alone have the sense of  
 'we', as often? | 36 γυμνασίοις H<sup>2</sup> I<sup>2</sup> Bk. | ἀγῶσι after 37 τοῖς νῦν H<sup>2</sup> I<sup>2</sup> Bk.  
 | 37 λειπομένοις M<sup>2</sup> I<sup>2</sup> | οὐ γὰρ] οὐκ ἀρα? Sussem. doubtfully | 38 ἔργου τῷ  
 Bk. | 36 δεῖ δὲ... 38 εἶχον transposed by Sussem. and Böckler to produce 39 ὥστε  
 36 ἐτέρων. See *Introd.* p. 89 f. | 36 δὲ Sussem., δὲ P H Ar. Bk. Sussem.<sup>2</sup> in the  
 text | προτέρων] πρότερον Spengel, needlessly

30 οὐδὲ γὰρ H<sup>1</sup>, οὐ γὰρ H<sup>2</sup> I<sup>2</sup> Bk. | 31 inserted after θηρίων by Vossius Bk.;  
 cannot insert οὐδέτις, Koraes οὐθέν | 31 οὐδένα] οὐθέν Gentling. <οὐθέν> οὐθέν  
 Sussem., but perhaps no change is needed

1008 *Nic. Eth.* iv. 2. 7, 1122 b 6, and  
 1009), the motive must be purely the  
 noble, the beautiful, the good; the virtue  
 must be exercised τῷ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, cf. § 5,  
 n. (1009). See *N. E.* iii. c. 7 § 6, 1115  
 b 19 ff., § 13, 1116 a 10 ff., c. 8 §§ 1—17  
 (Longstreve). SUSSEM. (1007)

§ 4 Cp. Pl. *Protag.* 342 n, c, where  
 Wesscheil says: haec Platonis verba tan-  
 git, minor, Aristoteles Pol. viii. 4.

35 αὐτοὶ] By themselves, alone; αὐτοὶ  
 <μόνοι>. Very near to this is the sense  
 αὐτοὶ (but is it right?) would bear, II. 9.  
 19, 1370 b 8 "iam per se" and I. 1. 2,  
 1331 a 12, I. 6. 4, 1255 a 18. SUSSEM.  
 Add 1335 a 29.

37 λειπομένους ἐτέρων] This criticism  
 repeated from II. 9 § 16, § 34, IV(VII).  
 14 ff 16—18; see n. (308, 345, 912).  
 SUSSEM. (1008) The simple verb here  
 in the sense of ἐπαλείπασθαι, IV(VII). 16.  
 II. 1112 b 39.

38 πρὸς μὴ ἀσκούντας] See Xen. *De  
 Rer. Loo.* 21 § 2, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοι ἀσκού-  
 ντες εἶναι τὰ στρατιωτικὰ, ἀσθε-  
 νέστες δὲ μέντοι τῷ διπλ. τεχνίτι καὶ  
 πολεμικῷ.

35 19 τὸ καλὸν] With this and b 30  
 καλὸν κίνδυνον, cp. n. (1007). SUSSEM.  
 (1009)

30 οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος κτλ] Comp. *Nic.  
 Eth.* iii. 8. 11, 1116 b 30 ff. (Eaton).  
 SUSSEM. (1010)

τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων] With this genitive  
 should be compared I. 13 § 2, 1349 a 22,  
 § 13, 1360 b 2, III. § 7, 1378 a 27, 13  
 § 21, 1384 b 11 (if H<sup>2</sup> gives the true read-  
 ing); 'genetivus partitivus non addit a  
 quo pendens vel ἕνεκα vel pronominis  
 indefinitivi.' SUSSEM.

§ 6 30 οἱ δὲ λίαν κτλ] In *Spartan  
 training and writing* were not included  
 among the subjects taught by the state.  
 But this did not prevent individuals from  
 training them as their own property, if  
 it seemed expedient to do so (Plat. *Lys.*  
 163), and it is therefore a rhetorical exag-  
 geration for Isocrates to make the over-  
 ruling assertion (*Isocrat.* § 209) that in the  
 most ordinary education they were as  
 backward as not even to know their  
 letters (Schömann *Eng.* 11 p. 409). Yet  
 the author of the *History of Greece* (1887)  
 says very few Spartans understood letters  
 (Eaton). Plato *Alc.* viii. 345 b 1 conclu-  
 sively proves that they attached far greater  
 importance to gymnastics than to music.  
 Chamaeleon in *Athen.* iv. 184 b asserts  
 that all the Lacedaemonians loved exer-  
 cising, but this cannot be accepted on  
 the face of Aristotle's statement, I. 1  
 § 7 n. (1026), that they were not taught  
 music. This diagram of Schömann's as-  
 sertion to the contrary. And yet strictly  
 speaking this would include singing as  
 well; but the expression should probably

καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγωγούς ποιήσαντες, βαναύσους (II)  
κατεργάζονται κατὰ γε τὸ ἀληθές, πρὸς ἓν τε μόνον ἔρ-  
35 γον τῇ πολιτικῇ χρησίμους ποιήσαντες, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο χεῖ-  
§ 7 ρον, ὡς φησὶν ὁ λόγος, ἐτέρων. δεῖ δὴ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέ-  
ρων ἔργων κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς  
παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι, πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον, ὁμο- IV  
40 λογούμενον ἐστίν (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβῆς κουφότερα γυμνάσια  
προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφήν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόρους  
§ 8 ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν, σημείον  
1339 a γὰρ οὐ μικρὸν ὅτι δύνανται τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς  
ὀλυμπιονίκαις δύο τις ἂν ἢ τρεῖς εὔροι τοὺς αὐτοὺς νενικηκότας  
ἄνδρας τε καὶ παῖδας, διὰ τὸ νέους ἀσκούντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι (P)  
§ 9 τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων· ὅταν δ' ἀφ' 2  
5 ἡβῆς ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γένωνται, τότε  
ἀρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις κατα-

33 ἀπαιδαγωγήτους P<sup>2</sup> Bk. Sussem.<sup>1.2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 34 ἀπεργάζονται P<sup>1</sup> ||  
40 μὲν omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup>, perhaps rightly, [μὲν] Sussem.<sup>1</sup> || κουφότερα Γ M<sup>s</sup> Ar., κου-  
φοτέρα P<sup>1.2.4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup>, κουφοτέρα Ald. W<sup>b</sup> || γυμνασια P<sup>2</sup>, γυμνασία M<sup>s</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald.  
W<sup>b</sup>, γυμνασί L<sup>s</sup>

1339 a 1 δύνανται Π<sup>1</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. W<sup>b</sup>, δύναται P<sup>2.3.4.5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Bk. || ταῖς Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || 2  
ὀλυμπιονικαῖς P<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (later hand) || ἂν] ἀνὴρ Π<sup>1</sup> (corrected by p<sup>1</sup>) || 3 ἀσκούν-  
τας] ἀκοντας Γ || 5 γίνωνται Π<sup>1</sup> || 6 ἀναγκοφαγίαις] ξηροφαγίαις Γ, from a gloss  
which is retained as such in the margin of P<sup>2</sup> from corr.<sup>3</sup>

not be pressed. Singing, no doubt, formed part of the prescribed course of study. Many too must of their own accord have learned to play the lyre and flute, or else it would be difficult to explain how the choregus of whom Aristotle tells a story, c. 6 § 12, n. (1026), could have attained such mastery of the flute. From Aristotle's language c. 5 § 7, it may be inferred that the Spartans who simply listened to others, as well as those who could themselves play, held music to be a means of moral training, and not simply a source of pleasure and amusement. SUSEM. (1011)

33 The form ἀπαιδαγωγῆτος appears N. E. IV. 1. 36, 1121 b 11.

βαναύσους] Comp. *nn.* (103, 1004). SUSEM. (1012)

35 χεῖρον ἐτέρων] Comp. again the passages quoted in *n.* (1005). SUSEM. (1013)

§ 7 40 μέχρι μὲν ἡβῆς] Comp. Platō *Latws* VIII. 833 C: τριττὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀθλήματα διανοηθῶμεν, ἐν μὲν παιδικόν, ἐν δὲ

ἀγενοίων, ἐν δὲ ἀνδρῶν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν τῶν ἀγενοίων τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν τοῦ μήκους τοῦ δρόμου θήσομεν, τοῖς δὲ παισὶ τὰ τούτων ἡμίσεα (Eaton). SUSEM. (1014)

To the "lighter" course are opposed the "heavy" or "violent" (βία) contests: ἔστι τοίνυν ἀγωνίας ξυμπάσης τὰ μὲν κοῦφα ταῦτα· στάδιον, δόλιχος, ὀπλίται, δίαυλος, ἄλμα· τὰ βαρύτερα δέ, παγκράτιον, πάλη, πυκται. πένταθλος δὲ ἀμφοῖν συνηρμόσθη Philostr. *De Gymnastic*. 3. These terms are also applied to the athletes, 'heavy-weights,' 'light-weights,' Galen VI. 487 K.

§ 8 1339 a 2 δύο τις ἂν ἢ τρεῖς εὔροι] The order is artistic; four short syllables.

§ 9 6 ἀρμόττει] But 1338 b 3 ἀρμόζει Π<sup>1</sup>, ἀρμόττει Π<sup>2</sup>.

ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις] The compulsory diet of the athletes consisted principally of vegetable food: dried figs, porridge, cheese. Only in later times was meat allowed: Dromeus of Stymphalus in Arcadia is credited with the change, Pausan. VI. 7. 10 (according to Pliny

λαμβάνειν τὴν ἔχουμένην ἡλικίαν, ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τε διακρίναι (IV)  
καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, τοῖναιτίον γὰρ ἑκάτε-  
ρος ἀπεργάζεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν πόνων, ἱμποδίζων ὁ μὲν  
τοῦ σώματος πόνος τὴν διάνοιαν ὁ δὲ ταύτης τὸ σῶμα.  
5 περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἕνια μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ  
πρότερον, καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαμβάνοντας αἰτὰ  
προαγαγεῖν, ὡς ὅσπερ ἐνδοσίμον γίνηται τοῖς λόγοις οὗς  
2 ἂν τις εἴπειεν ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα  
5 δύναμιν ἔχει ῥάδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χά-  
ριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον παιδιάς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύ-  
σεως, καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αἰτὰ  
μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἅμα μέριμναν

11 διηπορήσαμεν II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. | 13 ὡς] ὡς M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. | γίνηται? Susem., and so perhaps I<sup>1</sup> Ar. | 14 εἴπειεν P<sup>2</sup>, εἴπειεν the other authorities | 15 δύναμιν after ἔχει II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., allowing a slight hiatus (cp. 1341 b 2) | 16 ἕνεκα I<sup>1</sup>, χάριν P<sup>5</sup> | 18 οὐδὲ or οὔτε -τῶν καλῶν οὔτε- Reiz, rightly | ἀμα...19 αὐτῆς first acc.

N. H. XXIII. 7 (63). 121 and Diog. Laert. VIII. 13 a trainer named Pythagoras, ἀλίστην τοῦ, not the philosopher). Cp. Favorinus in Diog. Laert. VIII. 12, ἰσχάσι ξηραῖς καὶ τυροῖς ὕγροις καὶ πυροῖς σωματικῶτος. Plato *Rep.* III. 404 A says that their mode of life made them sleepy, and that any departure, however slight, from the prescribed regimen made them liable to lung and various illness. Aristotle himself states *De Gen. Animal.* IV. 3. 4<sup>o</sup>, 768 b 29 ff., that a disproportionate and abnormal growth of certain parts of their bodies resulted from the large quantities of food which they consumed (Eaton). In *Problems* XXXVII. 5, 967 a 11 ff., VIII. 4, 887 b 22 ff., they are described as pale and chilly (ἀχροὶ, θέρει-γμα) and *Phys.* I. 28, 862 b 21 ff. it is said that athletes and all very healthy people seldom get ill, but when once they fall ill are very likely to succumb (θνήσκουσι). With this passage generally comp. c. 4 § 1, n. (1004), IV(VIII). c. 16 §§ 12, 13 n. (944) and *Exc.* I. p. 619, SUSEM. (1015)

7 ἅμα γὰρ...10 σῶμα] Plato practically lays down the same principle: *Rep.* VII. 537 D. τοῦ καὶ οὐ τοῦτο τοῦ τε σώματος καὶ μαθημάτων καὶ φρονέειν δεῖ ἐν ἀνταρξίᾳ τοῦ δὲ φρονέειν, καὶ ἀρῶν τοῦ ἐκτρέφειν...ἀεὶ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαῶν γυμνασίων μαθήματα. αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἂν χάριν εἴη τε τοῦ εἶναι τε τοῦ ἐκτρέφειν, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἐν ἀνταρξίᾳ, αὐτοὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων πολέμου. He differs slightly in his mode

of carrying it out; see IV(VIII). 17. 15. n. (970) and *Exc.* I. SUSEM. (1016)

cc. 5—7 discuss the place of music in education. See *Anal.* p. 119.

The corresponding passages in Plato are *Rep.* III. 398 B—403 E, 404 E, 410 B—412 A, IV. 424 E, c. VII. 532 A; *Laert.* II. esp. 653—660 c, 664 B—674 A, VII. esp. 796 B—804 B, 809 B—813 A.

§ 1 11 καὶ πρότερον] In c. 2 II c. 11, SUSEM. (1017)

19 καὶ τὴν ἀναλαμβάνοντας ἀντ] The discussion breaks off, c. 2 § 12, 1232 a 24 ff., with the sentence beginning ἐν ἀνταρξίᾳ γὰρ εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους γίνονται οὗτοι κτλ. See n. (1000), SUSEM. (1015)

13 ὡς] The variant ὡς M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> is valuable for the treatment of εἶναι and εἶναι in the manuscripts.

14 ἀποφαινόμενος] For the absolute use Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. quotes I. 12. 16, 1260 b 23, VI(IV). I. 5, 1288 b 35. With αὐτοὶ 1289 b 5; with the direct object (τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης), IV(VIII). 14. 16, 1232 b 12. In II. 14. 1, 1275 b 27, there is a variant.

§ 2 15 διελεῖν] As in II. 12. 6, 1283 b 11, "decide." Its distinguishing significance also in post-classical discussion, especially, especially; Bonitz s. v. also quotes 1290 a 12, 1300 b 18. Also VII(VII). 7. 2, 1341 b 31; but see note.

16 The first use of ἀναλαμβάνοντας ἀντ] is in the text.

17 μετὰ] See IV(VIII). 17. 11. n. (966), SUSEM. (1017)

§ 3 παύει, ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ (Γ)  
 20 χρῶνται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως, ὕπνω καὶ μέθῃ καὶ μουσικῇ·  
 τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις), ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον  
 2) πρὸς ἀρετὴν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικὴν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ  
 ἢ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν  
 24 μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσιν δύνασθαι χαί-

pected by Vettori, ἅμα παύει μέριμναν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>, avoiding hiatus, ἀναπαύει μέριμναν Götting Bk.<sup>2</sup>, not badly; ἅμα transposed by Schmidt to follow 19 διὸ καὶ: [ἅμα] here, but 19 f. καὶ <ἅμα τούτοις> τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ χρῶνται πᾶσιν [τούτοις] ὁμοίως Flach, not badly || 19 τάττουσιν <εἰς τάξιν ταῦτα τὴν> αὐτὴν Lambin, τάττουσιν αὐτὴν <ἐν παιδιᾷ> Reiz, τάττουσιν <ἐν> αὐτῇ Koraes: cp. Comm. n. (1020 b) || 20 ὕπνω Ar. and a marginal note in a codex of William's translation, οἶνω Γ Π Bk. || 21 οἰητέον (οἰητεον P<sup>1</sup>) after 22 μουσικὴν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, after 22 τείνειν τι Γ || 22 τι after τείνειν Γ, omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 23 παρασκευάζειν Γ M<sup>s</sup>, perhaps rightly || [καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν] Flach, needlessly || 24 δύνασθαι omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup>, hence [δύνασθαι] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

19 The quotation is from the *Bacchae* 381, ἀποπαῦσαι τε μερίμνας. The preceding line is μετὰ τ' αὐτοῦ γελάσαι, and the choral ode continues ὅπῳταν βότρυος ἔλθῃ | γάνος ἐν δαιτὶ θεῶν, | κισσοφόροις δ' ἐν θαλίαις | ἀνδράσι κρατὴρ ὕπνον ἀμφιβάλλῃ. SUSEM. (1020)

§ 3 διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν κτλ] The sense of this corrupt passage is quite plain. Laminus has perhaps made the best attempt at its restoration. Postgate would explain the text as it stands, taking τάττουσιν = prescribe, recommend as in VI(IV). 2. 18: "and so it (music) is also appointed for the purpose of recreation alone, and all these things are employed in like manner." But then the words in italics have to be supplied. With Flach's transposition ἅμα τούτοις τάττουσιν = 'and so they rank music with all these, and employ them all alike.' SUSEM. (1020 b)

21 τὴν ὄρχησιν] Reiz correctly quotes Ath. I. 9 f. ff. in illustration of the passage, but he should not have adduced *Od.* I. 151 f., for in Homer's description of dancing and singing as "ornaments of the feast" (τὰ γὰρ τ' ἀναθήματα δαιτός) Aristotle perceives, c. 3 § 8 notes (995—998), a higher estimate of these arts as a means of refined amusement and the best intellectual enjoyment. In Ps-Plato *Alcib.* I. 108 c the term μουσικὴ is used in the widest sense to embrace the whole of the rhythmic arts, music, poetry, and dancing: but Plato himself only uses the word to include music and poetry. He makes dancing a part of gymnastics, *Laws* II. 673 A, VII. 795 E, 813 A ff.; and distin-

guishes between imitative dancing and non-imitative, called 'gymnastic' dancing in the narrower sense of the term, 795 E τῆς ὀρχήσεως ἄλλη μὲν Μούσης λέξιν μιμουμένων, τό τε μεγαλοπρεπὲς φυλάττουσα ἅμα καὶ ἐλεύθερον, ἄλλη δὲ εὐεξίας ἐλαφρότητός τε ἕνεκα καὶ κάλλους τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν (Eaton). Aristotle *Poet.* I. 5. 6, 1447 a 27 f. finds it necessary to lay special stress on the fact that either this first kind of imitative dancing—or artistic dancing properly so called—or else (as I have assumed) all dancing belongs to the group of imitative arts of the rhythmical or musical class (the defective text of the *Poetics* admits of more than one explanation, and one explanation can be extorted from the words as they stand, see Vahlen *Beiträge zu Arist. Poet.* I p. 3 [267]). As to sleep, see n. (990). SUSEM. (1021)

ἢ μᾶλλον] The second use: for moral training and formation of character, as gymnastic trains the body.

24 ἐθίζουσιν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὁρθῶς] According to Aristotle's theory, which is diametrically opposed to that of Kant, moral virtue is only found where love of the good is present, and where the moral activities are really exercised with pleasure and delight. The main thing in the formation of character, as Plato teaches, *Laws* II. 653 B, C, is to awaken and render habitual this right feeling of pleasure: see *Nic. Eth.* II. 3. 1, 1104 b 3 ff., X. I. 1, 1172 a 19 ff., X. 9. 6 ff., 1179 b 23 ff., and below c. 6 § 17 ff. with n. (1044). Compare *Nic. Eth.* III. 9. 2 ff., 1117 a 32 ff., III. cc. 11 and 12, IV I § 13, 1120 a 26,

αρεῖν ὀρθῶς, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς (IV) φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετικὸν τῶν ἡρημίων).

ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἔνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἢ μάθησις)· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν τι παισὶν ἀρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος). ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν δόξειεν ἢ τῶν παι-

25 ἦ] ἡ P<sup>2</sup> Ald. and P<sup>3</sup> (later hand), ἡ «καὶ» Kotacco *weisung* 3 καὶ πρὸς εὐφροσύνην Spengel, [καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν] Döring *Philosophie* 88VII p. 704 l. So Haidenhain (*De doctrinae artium Aristotelicae principia* p. 49) who considers the words as a gloss upon 22 πρὸς ἀρετήν. See Comm. u. (1023) § 29 τε πασὶν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> (παι over an erasure) Bk.<sup>1</sup> Sussem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, γε πασὶν P<sup>4</sup> Newman *Class. Rev.* VII. 305 n. 1, πασὶν M<sup>1</sup>, *pueris* William, [τε] πασὶν Bk.<sup>2</sup>, πασὶ τε Flach, τὰ πασὶν Reiz, τε «καὶ φρόνησιν» πασὶν ? Gottling, ἀρετῶν Schmidt *Sussem.*<sup>2</sup> § 30 οὐδὲ] οὐδὲν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, οὐδενί Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Ar. Bk. Either may be right

§ 24, b 30. c. 2 § 5, 1112 b 7 l., and many other passages. In the same way the moral judgment is confused and moral perception hindered by the wrong and harmful feeling of pleasure and pain, see *Nw. Eth.* III. 4. 4 l., 1113 a 29 ff., VI. 5. 6, 1140 b 12 ff., and even ordinary pleasures of sense, which are permissible and within due limits necessary, easily delude men into over-estimating their importance: see below § 13 l., 1339 b 31 ff., u. (1039). Cp. Döring *op. c. p.* 106 l., 110 f. SUSSEM. (1022)

§ 4 The third use: to promote rational enjoyment and the culture of the intellect.

26 φρόνησιν] Bonitz *Inl. Ar.* 831 b 4: φρόνησις *Intellectus*, syn. γνῶσις, ἐπιστήμη. The passages cited, among them 1288 b 23, 1290 a 12, are sufficient proof that the term is found in Aristotle with the meaning 'intellectual culture,' which is here appropriate, as well as in the kindred sense of 'knowledge' or 'science.' By this additional term Aristotle emphasizes the fact that rational activity as well as rational enjoyment is one element of our highest satisfaction: while c. 5 § 8 he unequivocally well emphasises the other element by inserting εὐνομέλιαν καὶ before διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέραν; see u. (1017). There is nothing therefore to justify alteration, bracketing, or transposition. Spengel's suggestion εὐφροσύνη, on the analogy of the second passage, is least open to objection: yet amusement, as well as music, is εὐφροσύνη and Aristotle would hardly have designated amusement as εὐνομέλιαν. SUSSEM. (1023)

27 παιδιᾶς ἔνεκα] Comp. *Nw. Eth.* X. 6 §§ 3—8, 1176 b 6 ff.

28 μετὰ λύπης] But Happiness is not μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μετ' ἡδονῆς, c. 2 § 4, 1338 a 6. The inference is obvious. If learning is painful, teaching is difficult: a tacit contradiction of the Sophists' belief that education is no more than cramming: see Pl. *Rep.* 343 B, 348 C, and Aristotle's own comparison of the sale of ready-made commodities, *De Soph. El.* 33 § 17, 184 a 2—8 (Barthelme). On the pleasures of learning see *Eth.* I. 11. 21, 1371 a 31 ff., b 4 ff., also the application to art, *Phet.* c. 4 § 4, 1448 b 12 ff.

29 τε] See IV(VII). 5. 1, 1214 a 19, u. 30 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος] Döring p. 137 is right then in saying that the young are incapable of enjoying an either as an amusement (παιδιὰ) or by deriving from it the highest intellectual gratification: although it is really only in the latter sense that the 'enjoyment' of art can be spoken of. For the rest of the passage cp. c. 6 § 2, u. (1062). In IV(VII). 14 § 9 ff., 12 § 1 l., cp. u. 10211 Amusement, intellectual training is the highest aim of education, and moral training only a means thereto; while IV(VII). 2. 8 he says that even for the highest intellectual gratification we need to be educated and to learn certain things, adding in c. 3 § 2 l. the fact that the ancient musical Muses in this sense a part of education, cp. u. 10233, u. 11000. This inconsistency can only be reconciled by assuming (a) that in the passages from IV(VII). 1—παιδεύειν (1233 b 4, cp. εὐνομέλιαν 1234 b 16, cp. εὐφροσύνην b 15—the dual

δων σπουδὴ παιδιᾶς εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ (IV)  
 τελειωθείσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος ἂν ἔνεκα δέοι  
 35 μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ (P.  
 § 6 τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον  
 ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην  
 τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελουμένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον.  
 εἰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα δεῖ διαπονεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν  
 40 ὄψων πραγματείαν αὐτοὺς ἂν δέοι παρασκευάζειν. ἀλλ'  
 § 7 ἄτοπον. τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἡθη  
 βελτίω ποιεῖν. ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ'  
 1339 b οὐχ ἐτέρων ἀκούοντας ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν,  
 ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὁμῶς δύ-  
 νανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ  
 § 8 χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ εἰ πρὸς εὐημε-

33 δέοι] δεῖ Π<sup>1</sup> (emended by corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup>) || 35 δι' omitted by P<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 36 καὶ  
 <ἀνευ> Susem., [καὶ] Spengel, κοῦ Madvig || 39 τὰ τοιαῦτα after δεῖ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. ||  
 40 ἂν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>

1339 b 1 καὶ transposed to follow δύνασθαι Spengel, perhaps rightly if § 3, a 24  
 δύνασθαι is to stand || 4 εἰ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup>, εἴη P<sup>2-3-5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald.

not use education in the exclusive sense in which it is applied to the education of the young up to their twenty-first year, and (β) that, as appears from c. 5 §§ 5, 6, n. (1025), § 8, n. (1027), § 11, n. (1036), cp. nn. (1101, 1113), in his judgment Music, although as applied to the education of the young it directly influences character (ἦθος) only, at the same time indirectly serves to prepare them for the future enjoyment of music as a recreation and for the formation of correct musical taste. It thus would pave the way for the true artistic enjoyment of music of a high order, and consequently for that highest gratification which is to flow therefrom. See also § 7 n. (1026), Excursus I, and n. (875) on IV(VII). 13. 5. SUSEM. (1024)

§ 5 32 παιδιᾶς χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις] In itself this is really not inconsistent with Aristotle's own opinion: see c. 5 § 11, n. (1036). SUSEM. (1025)

35 βασιλεῖς] So Philip of Macedon: Plut. *Vita Periclis* c. 1, p. 152 s. f. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιτερπῶς ἐν τινὶ πότῳ ψήλαντα καὶ τεχνικῶς εἶπεν· "Οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ καλῶς οὕτω ψάλλον;" ἀρκεῖ γάρ, ἂν βασιλεὺς ἀκροᾶσθαι ψαλλόντων σχολάζῃ, καὶ πολὺ νέμει ταῖς Μούσαις ἐτέρων

ἀγωνιζομένων τὰ τοιαῦτα θεατῆς γιγνόμενος.

§ 6 37 ἀπεργάζεσθαι] The absolute use: give a performance. Note that πεποιημένους is perfect of the middle ποιείσθαι (ἔργον).

39 τὰ τοιαῦτα] All such subjects as afford an amateur enjoyment.

40 ὄψων] We find ὀψοποιητικὴ an example I. 7. 3, 1255 b 26, and condemned as δουλικὴ ἐπιστήμη. Comp. also III. 11. 14, 1282 a 17—23, III. 4 §§ 11—13, 1277 a 23—b 7; on the whole principle V(VIII). 3 §§ 3—6.

§ 7 41 δύναται] The subject is ἡ μουσική, but to find it expressed we must return to § 3, a 22—24, though it is obscurely indicated a 37 by αὐτὸ τοῦτο, i.e. the execution.

1339 b 2 ἐκεῖνοι γάρ κτλ] See notes (1011, 1024): also c. 5 § 17 nn. (1022, 1044, 1045): comp. c. 6 § 1 ff. with nn. (1061, 1066). SUSEM. (1026)

§ 8 4 ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κτλ] Here the concession already made with regard to amusement and recreation (§ 5, n. 1025) is extended to intellectual enjoyment, see n. (1024); namely that musical instruction during youth may possibly

5 ρίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον χρηστίον αὐτῇ· τί δαὶ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαΐναι; σκεπ-  
 10 πεῖν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν· οἱ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς αἰεῖδει καὶ καθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιοῦτους καὶ τὸ πρᾶττον οὐκ  
 15 ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύνοντος ἢ παίζοντος. V

9 ἀλλ' ἴσως περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη ἢ ζήτησις ἐστὶ πότερον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θε-  
 4 δεῖαν ἢ παιδιάν ἢ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται  
 10 καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἡ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστὶ, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ  
 9 ἡδονῆς (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν)· καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν  
 11 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναί φασιν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψι-

6 χρωμένων] χειρουργοῦντων Flach. S. δδο I<sup>o</sup>, ὁδο II<sup>o</sup>. 13 παιδία ὁ παι-  
 14 δεῖαν Vettori<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly. 14 παιδιάν] ἀρετὴν? Jackson

serve as preparation for the elevated enjoyment of music in later years. Cp. also *ibid.* (921, 1023). SUSEM. (1027)

7 ὑπόληψιν] See *Monist* ad *Arist.* D. 1. 2, 981 a 7, b 6, p. 41, p. 47 f.; Waitz ad 66 b 19, *Orig.* 1. p. 523. Such 'unproven' assumptions, like other *telos*ε, contain a germ of truth.

9 ὁ Ζεὺς] Schlosser thinks that here Aristotle has forgotten Apollo. On the contrary the mention of Zeus, the highest divinity, alone, is quite intentional. As to representations of Apollo and other gods with the cithara or lyre (cp. *n.* 1071), see particularly L. van Jan *De Aditiis Graecorum* (Berlin 1859), pp. 17, 20 f., 24 ff. Zeus is not among the number. SUSEM. (1028)

ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ] See *n.* (981). *Exc.* 1. to this book, and c. 6 § 4, c. 7 § 13, 14 with *n.* (1007). SUSEM. (1029)

10 Plato *Lysis* II. 663 D E. πᾶς ποσὶ γιγνέσκει προσβύτει, αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοῖς φίλοις αἰσθάνει, καὶ χαίρει τε ὅτιον πρᾶττον τοῦτο καὶ ἀνάγκη γιγνόμενῃ αἰσθάνει· αὐτὸς δὲ χαίρει.

§ 9 11 ὕστερον] I.e. c. 6 § 1, 1340 b 10 ff. where this point is again taken up. See *n.* (1060). SUSEM. (1030)

13 παιδεῖαν] The end to which Plato confined all poetry and all art: see *Hutchins* *Symposium* p. 317 ff.

"Aristotle allows that for childhood the use of poetry and music is to convey moral instruction"—but "for the grown man the poet's function is not that of a teacher, he is only so by accident" p. 322 f.

§ 10 17 ἰατρὸς τις] This has been set forth c. 3 § 4, *φάρμακον* χάριν: cp. *n.* (689). SUSEM. (1031)

18 μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν κατὰ] The highest intellectual (or aesthetic) enjoyment implies the highest nobleness (τὸ καλόν), because it is the highest activity of soul: it implies the highest pleasure, because from this highest human activity flows the pleasure appropriate to it: see *n.* (992) on c. 3 § 5. SUSEM. (1032)

19 ἡ ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῶν] Cp. *n.* 2 §§ 3, 4 (1007) *ἡδονή*, with *n.* (980, 991, 992); also IV(VII). 1. 6, 1323 b 12. τὸ ἥδονα αὐτῶν ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν χαίρειν ἐστὶ δὲ ἀρετῶν ἐστὶ δὲ ἀρετῶν, *n.* (1095). SUSEM. (1033)

§ 11 20 ψαλὴν] Instrumental music, unaccompanied by the voice: § 17, 1340 a 10 ff. *ἀρμονία*—*χορὸς* τὸν μελῶν καὶ τὸν μελῶν αὐτῶν.

Comp. *Nb.* *Exc.* 1. 9, 1, 1025 b 14, 15. S. 9, 1169 a 20—21; also VII. 11, 2, 1151 b 6, c. 13, 2, 1153 b 14 (Newman).

λὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας (φησὶ γὰρ καὶ Μουσαῖος εἶναι 2  
βροτοῖς ἥδιστον αἰδεῖν·

διὸ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνου-  
24 σιν αὐτὴν ὡς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν), ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ὑπολάβοι (p.  
§ 12 ἄν τις παιδεύεσθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῆ  
τῶν ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς  
τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς  
ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναπαύονται  
καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς παιδιαῖς οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον ἀλλὰ καὶ  
30 διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, χρήσιμον ἂν εἴη διαναπαύειν ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ

21 γὰρ Π<sup>1</sup>, γοῦν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., δὲ P<sup>5</sup> || 24 ὑπολάβοι after 25 ἄν τις Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., avoid-  
ing hiatus || 28 γενέσθαι? Susem. || 29 καὶ διὰ] δι' αὐτὴν Spengel, but the text  
can give the same sense

21 Μουσαῖος] Not an historical char-  
acter, but a mythical personage. Under  
this name went a variety of ancient  
poems, the real authors of which were  
unknown, including (α) hymns—Pau-  
sanias, IV. 1. 4, maintains that a hymn  
to Demeter is by Musaeus, and is the  
only genuine fragment of his which has  
been preserved—(β) oracular responses  
(χρησμοί); collected by Onomacritus  
of Athens under the direction of  
Hipparchus and esteemed of such im-  
portance that Onomacritus was banished  
from Athens for the interpolation of a  
single line, which was discovered by  
Lasus of Hermione: Herod. VII. 6, VIII.  
96, IX. 43; also (γ) a gnostic poem ad-  
dressed to his son Eumolpus, referred to  
by Plato *Repub.* II. 363 C, called 'Eu-  
molpia' by Pausanias, X. 5. 3, but 'Υπο-  
θήκαι, 'Precepts' or 'Advice,' by Suidas.  
SUSEM. (1034)

23 διαγωγὰς] The plural has a con-  
crete meaning 'social gatherings,' 'the  
more playful forms of social intercourse,'  
approximating to παιδιὰς, from which δια-  
γωγή is in general carefully discriminated.  
Comp. *n.* (921), and III. 9. 13, *Nic.*  
*Eth.* X. 6 § 3, § 8 there cited. SUSEM.  
(1035)

24 καὶ ἐντεῦθεν] In order that in  
mature life they may find in music a  
recreation: cp. c. 5 § 5 with *nn.* (1024,  
1025). The difficulty there raised, as to  
why in that case boys should learn to  
sing and play themselves, has been post-  
poned for future discussion: § 9, *n.* (1030).  
SUSEM. (1036)

The order of the words in Π<sup>1</sup> must be  
modified. There is authority for ὑπο-

λάβοι τις ἂν, 1265 b 6: or we might  
comp. 1277 a 32, *κάντεῦθεν ἂν κατῖδοι*  
*τις*. Yet as at § 14, b 39, all MSS. give  
*ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι*, we should probably adopt  
the same order from Π<sup>2</sup> here.

§ 12 25 ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδέων] A Pla-  
tonic conception: *Phil.* 51 A—52 B, 66 C,  
*Rep.* II. 357 B αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς,  
*Laws* II. 667 D, E. The harmless plea-  
sures, especially those of imitative art,  
"conduce both to our great end, Happi-  
ness, and to rest by the way. Few men  
have the fortune to find themselves at the  
goal. All, however, take frequent rest  
and pastime" (Jebb).

27 ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει γίνεσθαι] An un-  
usual phrase, which must mean τοῦ τέλους  
τυχεῖν, to achieve that highest end of life.

Possibly the following is a burlesque  
of some encomium on music: εὐθὺς ἀπο-  
λαύει τῆς τέχνης ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μανθάνειν, καὶ  
ἅμα τε ἀρχεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τέλει ἐστίν, *Luc.*  
*De Parasito* 14.

29 οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον] "Not merely  
for the sake of a good beyond it, but also  
for the sake of the pleasure." Even the  
man who spends his leisure in contem-  
plative activity requires a change: the  
most cultivated would then seek repose  
not in difficult but in easy music, though  
not perhaps such music as is described  
c. 7 § 7, 1342 a 22 ff., cp. *nn.* (1097—  
1099). But Congreve is right in calling  
attention to the fact that in *Nic. Eth.* X.  
6. 3, 1176 b 6 ff., virtuous activities and  
pleasant pastimes (αἱ ἡδέαι τῶν παιδιῶν)  
are declared to be the only two things  
which men pursue purely for their own  
sakes and with no other end in view.  
SUSEM. (1037)

*leisure*, and necessity, has found its recreation according to his soul at the right time and in accordance with what positively useful and not merely harmful." Cp. c. 3 §§ 1-4 with n. 1981. Theing op. c. p. 107 f. points out the apparent inconsistency with the parallel passage *Nic. Eth.* x. 6. 6, 1176 b 27 ff., quoted in that note, but without attempting to clear it up. In the Ethics Aristotle says: Happiness does not consist in amusement. For amusement is clearly connected with recreation, and man needs recreation because he is not capable of supporting unbroken exertion. Consequently recreation is not an end but a means to activity. οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαίως ἔστι τὸ αἰετὶ ποιεῖν, καὶ πάλιν ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ καταλείπειν τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ταχέος χρόνου. ἀναπαυὰ γάρ ἐστι σφόδρα ἐργασίᾳ βέλτερον ἀπ' αὐτῆς πληροῦσι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. τέλος γὰρ αὐτοῦ προαίρετος ἐστὶ καὶ τοσοῦτον ποιεῖν ὥστε ἡλπίσει γενέσθαι καὶ μακάριον. ταχέος δ' ὅταν προαίρεται, καὶ "Ανελεγενομένης τυχούσης. ἀναπαύεται γὰρ τὸ αἰετὶ ποιεῖν ὁ πολὺς ἀποκαταφέρει δὲ συνεχὲς ποιεῖν ἀναπαύσαντά τε. καὶ οὗτοί γε ἀναπαύονται γρηγορά. γὰρ ὅταν τὴν ἀνάγκην. Here the end of recreation is said to consist in the work to be done, not the work already done, and rightly enough; recreation is naturally to lead from the labour of the past to new labours. But although a man may know this very well, nevertheless, in the midst of recreation (if it is to be a real and enjoyable rest) he will forget the fact, and without any thought of future labour give himself up entirely to a feeling of satisfaction at having happily ended the past toil, for which the present holiday is a recompense and restoration. This appears to me to be the idea which Aristotle wishes to express in the *Ethics* by contradiction to the idea in the *Symposium*. Cp. also e (1141). See also (1033).

ἐσομένων ἔνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν γεγονότων, οἷον πόνων καὶ λύ-  
 § 14 πης. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν) ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γίνε-  
 σθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν, ταύτην εἰκότως ἂν τις ὑπο-  
 40 λάβοι τὴν αἰτίαν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ  
 διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς  
 § 15 τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὥς ἔοικεν. [οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μὴ ποτε  
 1340 a τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἢ φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ  
 κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρεῖαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς  
 ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἥς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθησιν (ἔχει  
 γὰρ ἢ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις  
 5 καὶ πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἢ χρήσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλῆς), ἀλλ'  
 ὁρᾶν εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν.  
 § 16 τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἦθη γινόμεθα δι'

37 οἷον omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup> in P<sup>1</sup>), [οἷον] Susem.<sup>1</sup> perhaps rightly  
 || 39 εἰκότως after ἂν τις Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 40 τὴν αἰτίαν transposed by Flach to follow  
 41 μόνην || 41 διὰ...42 ἔοικεν supposed to be defective. [διὰ] Spengel: Sylburg  
 conjectured a lacuna after 42 ἀναπαύσεις, Koraes one after 42 ἔοικεν, Schmidt the loss  
 of <φαῖεν ἂν δεῖν> before 41 διὰ τὸ, Susemihl of <φιλοῦσιν αὐτήν> after 41 μόνην.  
 Yet it may be sufficient to understand ζητοῦσιν (αὐτήν) from the preceding || <πάν-  
 των μάλιστα> χρήσιμον or χρησιμώτατον Flach, perhaps rightly

1340 a 1 ἢ φύσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶν P<sup>1</sup>, ἐστὶν ἢ φύσις αὐτῆς Γ M<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 6 πῃ τι P<sup>1</sup> and  
 P<sup>4</sup> (corrector) || The second πρὸς is omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [πρὸς] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly

§ 14 38 δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν κτλ] See  
 § 3, 1339 a 24 f. n. (1022). SUSEM. (1039)  
 Notice the repetition of αἰτίαν, and the  
 omission of a verb with περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοι-  
 νωνεῖν. It is best with Flach to repeat  
 εἰκότως ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι, understanding  
 ζητεῖσθαι or γίνεσθαι. See *Quaest. crit.*  
*coll.* p. 419.

§ 15 42 μὴ ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέ-  
 βηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ' κτλ] For the use of  
 μὲν=while, see n. (982) on c. 2 § 5, 1337  
 b 15. "Let it be granted that such ser-  
 vice is incidental to Music. Still we must  
 ask,—Does not the nature of Music range  
 above this sphere of service?" (Jebb).  
 The real complement to ζητητέον is the  
 clause introduced by δέ.

1340 a 3 ἔχουσι...αἰσθησιν]=αἰσθά-  
 νονται I. 2. 12, 1253 a 17.

4 διὸ πάσαις...προσφιλῆς] Cp. c. 6  
 § 8, 1341 a 15, τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, n.  
 (1069). SUSEM. (1040) The pleasure is  
 natural, i.e. it is κατὰ φύσιν. In this sense  
 used of self-love II. 5. 8, 1263 b 1; and  
 III. 6. 5, 1278 b 30.

6 εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει]  
 "Whether Music has not somehow a  
 bearing on the character." So c. 6 § 7,

1341 a 10.

καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν] Evidently an  
 emphatic expression, 'the soul's depths,'  
 'the inmost soul.' For as the mere  
 pastime of recreation music also affects  
 the soul: it is the soul and not the body  
 which feels pleasure [cp. *N. E.* x. 6. 3,  
 1173 b 10, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν  
 καὶ ἡδοίτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ]. Cp.  
 n. (1043). But the transition is abrupt.  
 After the preceding comparison between  
 this sensuous pleasure and the highest con-  
 templative enjoyment of elevated mental  
 satisfaction, it is strange to find that  
 nothing is said about the latter as an  
 effect of music, but the question is raised,  
 whether Music is capable of producing a  
 higher ethical delight, as well as διαγωγή;  
 and whether it is thus qualified to pro-  
 mote the moral education of the young:  
 for it is this with which Aristotle in the  
 context is chiefly concerned. SUSEM.  
 (1041)

§ 16 7 ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἦθη] So c. 6  
 § 16, 1341 b 18, ποιοὺς τινὰς τὰ σώματα.  
 Cp. also II. 5. 23, 1264 a 39, where τὸ  
 πολὺς τινὰς εἶναι τούτους=whether they  
 are to be communists or not. The idiom

αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γινόμεθα ποιοί τινες, φανερόν διὰ  
πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἐτέρων, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμ-  
που μελῶν ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς  
ἐνθουσιαστικὰς, ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμός τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔθους  
πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μῆσεων γίνονται  
πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν  
αὐτῶν· ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκε τὴν μουσικὴν εἶναι τῶν ἡδέων,  
τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν,  
<καὶ> δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ μανθάνειν καὶ συνελθίζεσθαι μηδὲν οὔτως ὥς

8 ποιοί...9 δὲ καὶ omitted by P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>4</sup> T<sup>4</sup> Ar. Alk. and P<sup>3,4</sup> (1st hand, supplied in the margin of P<sup>4</sup> and by a later hand in the margin of P<sup>2</sup>, afterwards crossed); φανερόν] δῆλον P<sup>5</sup> || 9 ἐτέρων] ἄλλων P<sup>5</sup> || 12 ἐτι δὲ] ἐπειδὴ Susem. who transposes 12 ἐπειδὴ...14 αὐτῶν to follow 23 τοιοῦτων, a transposition approved by Spengel: see *Introd.* p. 90 || 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐτι δὲ with a change in the punctuation (a series of separate clauses replacing the one long protasis); or if the punctuation be retained, ἐτι δὲ <ἐπεὶ>? Susem. || τὴν μουσικὴν after εἶναι P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk. || 16 καὶ added by Susem. || δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ P<sup>5</sup>, δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι Bk., δεῖ δεῖλαι P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Ar. and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), δηλοῦν P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand)

is used to include two alternatives, e.g. πότερον πρῶοι ἢ ὀργίλοι, ἀνδρείοι ἢ δειλοί (Newman).

9 διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν] On this exciting ecstatic music, see Excursus II. p. 621 and c. 7 § 4, 1342 a 8, n. SUSEM. (1042)

10 ταῦτα γὰρ κτλ] "It is undeniable that they rouse the soul to ecstasy, but ecstasy is an emotional state of the moral nature." On ecstasy and ungovernable excitement generally as wrought by Greek music, see Excursus III. p. 622 ff. SUSEM. (1043)

§ 17 The clause ἐτι δὲ...αὐτῶν is not a further reason for inferring τῶσι τινεσὶ διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς γίνεσθαι; it gives the ground for the reason already alleged in § 16. If the melodies of Olympus inspire ecstasy, that is because they express ecstasy: quod rhythmis et modulationibus eundem animi affectum exprimebant. And why does such an effect follow upon such a cause? "Quia eundem omnino sensum in auditoribus omnibus excitant affectus, qui eis exprimentur, rhythmi atque modulationes": *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 476. Hence ἐτι requires emendation, and the whole clause finds a better place below. There is no difficulty in taking γὰρ as an adverb: apart from the words, when the performance is instrumental solely (ψαλῶ). SUSEM. There is possibly a tacit correction of Plato who in *Laos* II. 609 E condemns instrumental music

without words: ἐν οἷς δὲ παγγέλωται ἄνευ λόγων γυγνίσκονται ῥυθμοὶ τε καὶ ἁρμονία γυγνίσκονται, ὅ τί τε βούλεται καὶ θεωρεῖται τῶν ἀξιολόγων μουσικῶν.

14 ἐπεὶ δὲ...b 13 νέους] This is all one portentous period (*monstruous period*), perhaps the most extended in Aristotle, employed to formulate the second reason for the inference τῶσι τινεσὶ διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς γίνεσθαι.

The first clause ἐπεὶ τῶν ἡδέων finds an echo § 25, 1340 b 15—17. The connecting clauses are continually interrupted by parenthetical remarks: still the logical connexion, if harder to detect in a 14—18, is plain for the remaining links of the chain. *Music can give most realistic imitation: (imitation) of certain feelings, love, hatred, courage, temperance, § 18: habituation to feel pleasure in the imitations tends to create sympathy with the emotions, § 19: it is peculiar to the sense of hearing that it can thus be the channel of a moral imitation (forms and colours are not imitations but only symbols, § 20, 21: melodies are imitative expressions of character, § 22: hence, there is a definite affection of the soul produced by music, and if the music is rightly chosen it can be used to cultivate the moral nature, § 24.*

15 τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν μισεῖν] What this and what follows compare or contrast. Observe that moral, not intellectual, virtue is here intended. SUSEM. (1044)

16 δεῖ μανθάνειν κτλ] "and clearly

μυσικήν: nearly identical with  
μουσικήν καὶ ψαλμῶν καὶ ῥυθμῶν

τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἡθεσι καὶ  
 § 18 ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν, ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ  
 τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς  
 20 καὶ πραότητος ἔτι δ' ἀνδρίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων  
 τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡθικῶν (δῆλον δ' ἐκ  
 22 τῶν ἔργων· μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι  
 τοιούτων, 12 <ἐπειδὴ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται  
 13 <πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν  
 § 19 <αὐτῶν>), 23[ὁ δ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις] ἐθισμὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ

12 ἐπειδὴ Susem., ἔτι δὲ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text. See *Comm. crit. coll.* p. 419 f. || ἀκροώμενοι untranslated by William, ρώμενοι omitted by the 1st hand of M<sup>s</sup>, leaving a lacuna, supplied by a later hand || 13 τῶν before ῥυθμῶν omitted by Γ and M<sup>s</sup> (1st hand, supplied by a later hand), <τῶν λόγων διὰ> τῶν ? Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, perhaps rightly

no study, no self-discipline is so important as that of rightly judging and rejoicing aright in worthy characters and noble actions." Evidently the term *μανθάνειν* is used in a narrower sense here for the development of the intellect. Although we are only concerned with the education of ἦθος, character, still no ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ, no moral virtue=excellence of character, exists apart from φρόνησις, practical wisdom or insight: and the converse is true, *Nic. Eth.* VI. c. 12 § 8—c. 13 § 6, 1144 a 20—b 32. Also there is no true pleasure apart from a right moral and aesthetic judgment. But judging is a function of the intellect and not of the will. Comp. also c. 5 § 7, *n.* (1026), c. 6 §§ 1—4, *nn.* (1061, 1066), and Excursus I. SUSEM. (1045)

17 τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς] Cp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 9. 20, 1181 a 17 ff.: ὥσπερ οὐδὲ...τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικὴν. οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα (results: in music, the performances).

χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν κτλ.] Comp. *n.* (1101); i.e. Excursus v. SUSEM. (1046)

§ 18 However true it is that melody has an emotional import, a comparison of popular airs soon reveals a wide diversity in the means employed for its expression. Even in the rendering of joy and melancholy different races may be altogether opposed. Some prefer minor keys for joyous airs.

19 τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις] The real things, objects. As in 1256 b 14, γάλακτος φύσιν (see *n.*), the content of φύσις is greatly reduced.

21 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡθικῶν] Music can

give the fullest expression to all the moral virtues and vices, and to all the emotions without exception, e.g. fear and pity. Such is Aristotle's view (Liepert). Cp. Excursus III. and *n.* (1089). SUSEM. (1047)

§ 19 Aristotle fully believes, as Plato had done before him, that an educated ear and correct musical taste are no inconsiderable aids to a right discipline of the emotions. On the other hand, the Epicurean Philodemus maintains a negative attitude to all the fundamental propositions of the Peripatetics and Stoics respecting Music. He appears to be controverting in his *De Musica* the arguments of Theophrastus and Diogenes of Babylon. He denies that Music is μίμησις and musical strains ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἡθῶν. He further denies that music can effect any change in character; fr. 55 Kemke τὰς δὲ μιμήσεις...αὐτὸ πῶς ἄγειν καὶ κ[ε]ν[ε]ῖν τὸ πάθος. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μιμεῖσθαι τὰ λελεγεμένα τ[ῆν] μουσικὴν καὶ τὸ μιμοῦ[με]να ὑπ' αὐτῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν [ἐπ]ωφελεῖν τι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ [με]τὰ τῶν μυρίω μιμητικῶ[τέ]ρων, διεψευσμένον ἐδείκνυμεν, also B. IV. col. III. 23 ff. οὐδὲ γὰρ μιμητικὸν ἢ μουσικὴ, καθάπερ τινὲς ὀνειρώττουσιν, οὐδ' ὡς... οὗτος [Diogenes, the Stoic] ὁμοιότηας ἡθῶν οὐ μιμητικὰς μὲν ἔχει, πάντως δὲ πάσας τῶν ἡθῶν ποιότητας ἐπιφαίνεται τοιαύτας ἐν αἷς ἐστὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ταπεινὸν καὶ ἀνδρώδες καὶ ἀνανδρὸν καὶ κόσμιον καὶ θρασύ, μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ ἡ μαγειρικῆς (Kemke's restoration *De Musica* p. 65). Though we too have the saying, 'Let me make the songs of a country, and I care not who makes its laws,' the belief in a peculiar ethical influence of music is quite

χαίρειν ἔγγυς ἐστὶ τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν τὴν  
 τρόπον [(οἶον εἴ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεάμενος μὴ  
 δι' ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφήν αὐτήν, ἀναγκαῖον  
 τούτῳ καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν θεωρίαν, οὗ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ,  
 ἥδεϊαν εἶναι), | συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς  
 ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἡθεσιν, οἶον ἐν τοῖς  
 ἀπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γευστοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἑρμά  
 (σχήματα γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πάντες τῶν τοιούτων αἰσθη-  
 σεως κοινωνοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν, ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ ταῦτα  
 ὁμοιώματα [τῶν ἡθῶν], ἀλλὰ σημεία μᾶλλον τὰ γινόμενα

27 καὶ] κατ' M' P<sup>1</sup>, καθ' Γ | αὐτὴν Γ, αὐτοῦ Ar. Lambin Scaliger Bk.<sup>2</sup>, perhaps  
 rightly | ἐκείνου Lambin Scaliger Bk.<sup>2</sup>, perhaps rightly | αὐτὸς after τὴν εἰκόνα M'  
 P<sup>1</sup> (thus causing hiatus). William translates 27 καὶ αὐτὴν. 28 εἶναι in this order:  
*illam visionem, cuius videt imaginem iocundum se esse delectabilem* | 31 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ  
 μικρόν after 31 τοιαῦτα Γ II Ar. Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup>, transposed to follow 32 κοινωνοῦσιν by  
 Spengel, Sussem.<sup>2-3</sup>. Ed. Müller (pp. 348—353) discovered the error, but conjectured  
 <οὐ>: πάντες without any transposition. Wellman transposes 31 καὶ πάντες  
 32 κοινωνοῦσιν to precede 28 συμβέβηκε, wrongly | ἐπὶ δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Sussem.<sup>1</sup>,  
 ἐπεὶ Heidenhain *op. cit.*, ἐπειδὴ Sussem.<sup>2</sup>, see Comm. v. (1050) | 33 [τῶν ἡθῶν]  
 Flach Sussem.<sup>3</sup>

foreign to the modern world. In fact, we suspect it to be based on an exaggerated estimate of the influence music has in its own sphere.

27 τὴν θεωρίαν (ἐκείνου) οὗ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ: the contemplation of the original must also give him delight.

§ 20 This is maintained even more strongly in the *Problems*: XIX. 29. 920 a 3. *ἂν τι οἱ μὲν καὶ τὰ μέγα φυσικὰ εἶδη ἡθεσιν δοκεῖν; ἢ ὅτι κινήσεις εἶναι ἄντικρ' καὶ αὐτὰ πρᾶξαι; ἥδη δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐνέργεια ἡθεσιν καὶ ποιεῖ ἡθος: so XIX. 27. 919 b 26 ff., sup. b 35 αὐτὰ δὲ κινήσεις αὐταὶ πρακτικὰ εἶναι, αὐτὰ δὲ πρᾶξαι ἡθος σημασία ἐστίν.* This points to an exaggeration of the rhythmical element: see Heitsch *op. cit.* p. 271 ff. Ordered movements reproduce the moral life which is itself an activity, i.e. a movement.

29 τοῖς ἡθεσιν] For the meaning see Luc. III. p. 625 ff. Comp. also generally v. (1094). SUSSEM. (1048)

30 ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς] We may translate "The objects of sight do indeed, in a slight degree, [present us with] of moral importances—since forms have this moral suggestiveness, and the perception of it is universal, though it does not go far. Besides, these forms are not images [of moral character]: forms and colours are rather symbols of the characters in

which they usually attend." It is not a little surprising to be told that the strongest impressions are not conveyed through the eye, but through the ear.

31—32] The words ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν are a poor qualification of τοιαῦτα, which they follow in the MSS. Moreover the next sentence needs some limitation, which fact led E. Müller to alter to αὐτὰ πάντες. The slight transposition makes all right.

31 σχήματα] There is no word which denotes all that is signified by σχήματα, viz. forms, postures, bodily motions generally, including figures and attitudes in dancing (cp. σχηματίζω). Statuary, if it should be remembered, imitates by forms only; painting by forms and colours. *Phil. c. 1 § 4. 1447 a 18 ff.* with v. (14) of my edition. Cp. also Athen. XIV. 629 b. *ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων σχηματισμὸς ἀγάλματα τῶν παλαιῶν ἄρχοντων Λόρανα.* SUSSEM. (1040)

31 ἐπὶ 32] To make this a second point of dissimilarity is awkward. The slight alteration to ἐπεὶ makes it the explanation of the preceding sentence. SUSSEM. (1050)

οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁμοιώματα, ἀλλὰ σημεία] "Painting and sculpture working as an inert material cannot indeed reproduce the life of the soul in all its variety and successive manifestations. In their forms

§ 21 σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἡθῶν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ (V)  
 35 σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ  
 περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς  
 νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γρα-

34 σχήματα omitted by S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand, added in the margin) || ταῦτ'  
 Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk., ταῦτ' Döring (*Kunstlehre des Aristot.* p. 151) wrongly || ἀπὸ ἐπὶ Π<sup>2</sup>  
 P<sup>5</sup> Bk. and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 36 πάσωνος P<sup>2,3,5,6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand)

and arrested movement they fix eternally the feeling they pourtray... Still shape and line and colour even here retain something of their significance; and their meaning is helped out by symmetry, which in the arts of repose answers to rhythm." Butcher, *Some Aspects* p. 274 ff. The element lacking in painting and sculpture, but present in music, has been called "ideal motion." Plato, *Phaedrus* 250 A ff. makes the most lustrous copies of the ideas to be apprehended by sight: Thompson *ad loc.*, "by ὅσα τίμια ψυχαῖς he seems to mean *moral* ideas, among which he proceeds to show that beauty alone has its clear antitype on earth."

34 χρώματα] Blushing and paleness would serve for examples, *Nic. Eth.* IV. 9. 2, 1128 b 11 ff. (E. Müller). SUSEM. (1051)

καὶ τοῦτ'... 35 πάθεσιν] I.e. in a state of emotion a man reveals his inner self by his outward appearance. These words are incorrectly explained by Döring *op. c.* p. 150 f. and the text is slightly altered by him to suit the meaning. But he does well in calling attention to the fact that, whilst Aristotle rightly enough makes music and the creative arts excite in the spectator the same states and processes of feeling as are represented, on the other hand the emotions evoked by tragedy and epic poetry are fear and pity, the object for representation in both kinds of poetry being that which excites fear or pity (*Poet.* c. 11 § 4, c. 14 § 1), just as in comedy it is that which excites laughter (*γελοῖον*, *Poet.* c. 5 § 1). Yet Aristotle nowhere expressly adds:—"and not fear or pity itself," or "and not that emotion itself which finds expression in laughter;" he nowhere expressly speaks of a difference in this respect between Tragedy, Epic Poetry, and Comedy on the one hand, and Sculpture, Painting, and Music on the other. It is therefore very doubtful whether he was ever conscious of this contrast, and Döring seems to have been the first to follow up this idea, suggested by Aristotle. However,

both Aristotle, in assigning to tragic and epic poetry as their only result the excitement of pity and fear, and Döring in insisting upon the difference between poetry and the imitative arts, have overlooked their similarity. Do we not, apart from fear and pity, take pleasure in the noble and high-minded characters brought before us? Does not the overpowering pathos of the emotions they exhibit take us out of ourselves, inspiring us with a faint measure of similar feelings? Take the charming scenes between Odysseus and Nausicaa, which form an essential part of the plot: what have they to do with fear and pity? Their charm consists rather in the vividness with which they call up before us the noble disposition of the maiden in all its shrewdness and naïveté, its natural innocence and sprightliness, and the hero's feelings under this severest test of his constancy, with the manly spirit, at once firm and tender, which he displays on this occasion. SUSEM. (1052)

36 δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος... ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου] Polygnotus of Thasos, the creator of the 'art' of Greek painting, flourished after the Persian wars. Cimon brought him to Athens, and he became an Athenian citizen. Thus his work falls in that stirring period so full of the rapidly unfolding promise of Attic art. Pausan was rather younger, as he is often ridiculed by Aristophanes, *Ach.* 854, *Thesm.* 949, *Plut.* 606. See *Poet.* c. 2 § 1, 1448 a 5 f. Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσων δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἵκαζεν: the one was a master of ideal representation, the other of caricature. In *Poet.* c. 6 § 15, 1450 a 26 ff. οἶον καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεύξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Π. ἀγαθὸς ἡθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφή οὐδὲν ἔχει ἥθος, Polygnotus is held up for praise in contrast to Zeuxis. It would seem his strength lay in the portraiture of character and that he drew noble characters. We see then that a 38 ἡθικὸς must be understood in the sense proposed Exc. III.

φέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστὶν ἠθικός), ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέ-  
 2 λουσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν (καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φαν-  
 0 ρόν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἢ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσει, ὥστε ἀκούον-  
 τας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον

41 ἔχειν after *τρόπον* P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps Γ, *ἔχει* Γ<sup>4</sup>

u. (1043) p. 624. As the originator of that 'ethical' style, pure and self-contained, of which the Parthenon frieze is the highest embodiment, Polygnotus, "the Raphael of antiquity," takes the same rank among painters as Pheidias among sculptors. Pausan however was not precisely a caricaturist, but he delighted in comic scenes of deformity and crime, or satirical pictures of low and vulgar subjects. As regards both painters, see Bruun *Gesch. der griech. Künstler* III pp. 14—46, 49—51; Vahlen *Aristoteles Lehre der Rängefolge der Theile Tragödie in Symb. Philol. Bonn*, p. 159 ff. Comp. also (V) (VII). 17. 10 with u. (953) and *Introd.* p. 52. SUSEM. (1053)

38 ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλουσιν αὐτοῖς κατὰ)  
 "Melodies on the other hand contain in themselves imitations of character." Prof. Butcher has written an able commentary on this *op. c.* p. 267 ff. Premising that upon the Aristotelian conception of fine art as *μίμησις* "a work of art is a copy or likeness of an original, and not a symbolic representation of it," he shows that "the various arts reflect the image from without by different means, and with more or less clearness and directness. Music in most of its forms was, by Aristotle, as by the Greeks generally, regarded as the most 'imitative' of the arts. It is a direct image, a copy, a reflection, of character. Not only states of feeling but also strictly ethical qualities and dispositions of mind are reproduced by musical imitation, and on the close correspondence between the copy and the original depends the importance of music in the formation of character." He forcibly contrasts the exactly opposite modern view. "We generally think of music quite otherwise. The emotion it suggests, the message it conveys, corresponds but little with a reality outside itself. It is capable of expressing general and elementary moods of feeling, which will be variously interpreted by different hearers. It cannot render the finer shades of extra-musical emotion with any degree of certainty and precision. Its expressive power, its capacity to reproduce independent realities, is weak in proportion

as the impression it produces is vivid and definite."

§ 22 40 ἢ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν φύσει) Besides its general meaning of 'music,' 'musical sounds' (for which see § 22 below; the word assumed to be a 'harmony') *ἄρμος* has a special musical signification: scale, octave, definite succession of notes. Unfortunately 'harmony' in modern music has totally different associations; as a technical term in music it denotes the 'combination of simultaneous sounds' or parts—in fact, part-writing, something almost (not quite) unknown to Greek musicians, for which their word is *εὐφωμία*. The best rendering for the technical term *ἄρμος* is not 'key' or 'scale', but *Mode*, a term which still survives in musical treatises where Major or Minor scales are more correctly designated scales 'in the Major or Minor mode.' Comp. the Miltonic description of the Dorian Mode, *Paradise Lost* l. 550 ff. 'to the Dorian mood / Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised / To highth of noblest temper heroes old / Arming to battle, and instead of rage / Deliberate valour breatheth, firm and unmoved / With dread of death to flight or foul retreat; / Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage, / With solemn touches, troubled thoughts, and close / Anguish and dole, and fear and sorrow and pain.' See further FACHNER IV on Greek Music generally, p. 624 ff. SUSEM. (1054)

Trans. "So essentially distinct in nature are the several musical modes that they produce a corresponding variety of mood and do not affect the hearers alike. Some, like the *melololian*, cast us into grief and gloom; others, the relaxed modes, soften the spirit; another will produce a sober and sedate frame of mind, an effect which seems peculiar to the Dorian mode; while the Phrygian excites to merriment." For the non-musical reader we may sum up thus: the Dorian was the old national minor scale of Greece; the Lydian and Phrygian two foreign major scales (from a modern standpoint abnormal), borrowed from their neighbours by the Greeks of Asia.

πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως (V  
 1340 b καὶ συνεστηκώτως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλου-  
 μένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς  
 τὰς ἀνειμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκώτως μάλιστα πρὸς  
 + ἑτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ δωριστὶ μόνη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν, ἐνθου-  
 § 23 σιαστικούς δ' ἢ φρυγιστί—ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ  
 τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ  
 μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων—, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ  
 τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἔχου-  
 9 σιν ἥθος στασιμώτερον οὐ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οὐ μὲν

1340 b i συνεστηκώτως P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand), συντετηκώτως Madvig, συννεοφώτως Schmidt  
 || μιξολυδιστὴ M<sup>s</sup> and perhaps Γ. Similarly b 4 δωριστὴ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and perhaps  
 Γ || 5 φρυγιστὴ S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> M<sup>s</sup> (1st hand) and perhaps Γ || 6 παιδείαν Ar., παιδιὰν Γ Π  
 || 7 δὲ Π<sup>1</sup> Paris. 2042, γὰρ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., untranslated by Ar. || 8 τὰ omitted by Π<sup>3</sup> P<sup>5</sup>  
 and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup>), untranslated by Ar., [τὰ] Bk.<sup>2</sup> || ἔχουσι after  
 9 ἥθος Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

1340 b i συνεστηκώτως] Affect the spirit with restraint, 'oppressively'. For this effect of the mixo-Lydia mode Plato vouches and accordingly banishes it, *Rep.* 398 D f. *τινες οὖν θρηνῶδεις ἁρμονίαι; Μιξολυδιστί, ἔφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστὶ καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες. Οὐκοῦν αὗται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀφαιρεταί· ἄχρηστοι γὰρ καὶ γυναιξίν, ὥς δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσιν.*

2 τὴν διάνοιαν] Not the subject of the infinitive (ἔχειν or διατίθεσθαι) but the adverbial acc. after it.

3 τὰς ἀνειμένας] The modes called here "relaxed" are obviously those which Plato calls χαλαραί, *Rep.* 398 E: *τινες οὖν μαλακαί τε καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν; Ἰαστί, ἦν δ' ὅς, καὶ λυδιστί, αἵτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται.* The terms refer to pitch: ἀνειμένη (χαλαρά) = low, low-pitched, σύντονος = high, high-strung. See Pratinas *Frag.* 5: *μήτε σύντονον δίωκε, μήτε τὰν ἀνειμένην Ἰαστὶ μούσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰν μέσαν... νεῶν ἄρουραν αἰόλιζε τῷ μέλει... πρέπει τοι πᾶσιν αἰοῖδ' ἀλαβράκταις Αἰολίς ἁρμονία* (Athen. XIV. 624 F). Plainly the Aeolian mode or 'key' is described as intermediate to 'high-pitched Ionian,' and 'low Ionian.'

§ 23 5 οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην π.] Amongst others, no doubt, Aristotle refers to Damon mentioned in *n.* (1054), i.e. Exc. IV p. 630, whose inquiry into the different effects (ἥθος and πάθος) of the various modes and rhythms, probably a special work on the subject, is quoted as an authority by Plato *Rep.* III.

400 B (cp. IV. 424 C). Also to the author of that arrangement of the Modes which he has adopted c. 7 § 3, (?) Aristoxenus, see *n.* (1083); probably also to his fellow-pupil Heracleides of Heracleia in the Pontus Athen. XIV. 624 C, who preferred to call the three chief Modes by Greek names, Dorian, Aeolian, Ionian. Damon was also a politician, an associate of Pericles: most probably it was he who started the idea of providing pay for the Dicasts and Bouleutae (μισθὸς δικαστικός, μ. βουλευτικός), as Wilamowitz *Hermès* XIII. 1880. p. 318 ff. has shown. Cp. II. 12. 4, *n.* (408). See 'Ath. Pol. c. 27 § 4, p. 76, 5 ed. Kenyon: πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὴν χορηγίαν (sc. τὴν Κίμωνος) ἀπολειπόμενος τῇ οὐσίᾳ, συμβουλευόντος αὐτῷ Δαμωνίδου τοῦ Οἰήθεν (ὃς ἐδόκει τῶν πολιτικῶν εἰσηγητῆς εἶναι τῷ Περικλεῖ, διδὼν καὶ ὥστράκισαν αὐτὸν ὕστερον), ἐπεὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἡττάτο διδόναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τὰ αὐτῶν, κατεσκεύασε μισθοφορὰν τοῖς δικασταῖς: also *Frag.* 364, 365 Rose in *Plut. Per.* c. 4, c. 9 and *Plut. l.c.* c. 4, Steph. Byz. *s.v.* "Θα. SUSEM. (1055)

Plutarch however may have confused Damon the musician with a Damonides, the politician (Gomperz).

7 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κτλ.] "As with the different Modes, so is it with the different times or measures. Some measures have rather a grave character, some a brisk one: of the latter, again, the movements are sometimes less, sometimes more refined." On Rhythms in Greek Music, see Exc. IV. p. 632. SUSEM. (1056)



ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν. καὶ τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις (καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι (διὸ πολλοὶ φασὶ τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, οἱ δ' ἔχειν ἀρμονίαν).

- 6 πότερον δὲ δεῖ μαθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἄδοντάς τε καὶ χειρου-  
 21 γούντας ἢ μὴ, καθάπερ ἡπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον.  
 οὐκ ἄδηλον δὲ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γίνε-  
 σθαι ποιούς τινας, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνῇ τῶν ἔργων· ἐν  
 24 γάρ τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστὶ μὴ κοινωνήσαντας.  
 § 2 τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους. ἅμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς  
 παῖδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβήν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτα πλαταγὴν.

17 ἡδυσμάτων ? Bywater || 20 τοὺς inserted before αὐτοὺς by Π<sup>1</sup> || χειραγω-  
 γούντας S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ald., χρηραγωγούντας P<sup>4</sup> || 22 δὴ P<sup>1-2+3</sup> perhaps rightly ||  
 24 τοὺς inserted before μὴ by Susem.<sup>1</sup>, and perhaps by Γ || 26 ἀρχύτου Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.  
 and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>)

has this sweet seasoning in its nature." Nevertheless we were told, § 4, that the actual process of learning even music is troublesome and painful. SUSEM. (1059)

c. 6 *Practical instruction in music is indispensable: §§ 1, 2. Nor is some measure of skill in execution unsuitable or degrading: §§ 3—8, provided wind-instruments and technical subtleties be excluded from the educational course: §§ 9—16. Cp. Anal. p. 119.*

§ 1 20 **χειρουγούντας**] Apparently only here and c. 7 § 3, 1342 a 3, in the sense of 'playing on a musical instrument,' 'becoming performers,' and so 23 *κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων*, where *ἔργα*=musical performances, as below b 36 f. and in *Nic. Eth.* X. 9, 20, 1181 a 20.

21 **πρότερον**] C. 5 §§ 4—8. Comp. 5 §§ 9, 10 with *n.* (1030). SUSEM. (1060)

22 **πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν**] See c. 2 § 6. Here 'it makes a great difference' = it is a great advantage: *multum prae-stat*.

23 **ἐν γάρ τι κτλ**] This is directly opposed to the Spartans' boast, c. 5 § 7, 1339 b 2 ff. cp. *nn.* (1026, 1045). SUSEM. (1061)

25 **κριτὰς**] Amplified below, § 4, 1340 b 38 f. Cp. c. 5 § 17.

§ 2 26 **διατριβήν**] Occupation; somewhat analogous to a pastime for recreation, and still more like the highest intellectual pursuits of the adults: though in the case of boys neither the one nor the other is yet possible, c. 5 § 4, *n.* (1024): cp. Döring p. 137. SUSEM. (1062)

**Ἀρχύτα**] A famous Pythagorean phi-

losopher of Tarentum.—For the foundation of Tarentum, see VIII (V). 7. 2 *n.* (1592), for its fortunes *ib.* 3 § 7 *n.* (1517), for its constitution VII(VI). 5. 10 *n.* (1441): also *n.* (141).—Archytas was a friend and contemporary of Plato, and also renowned as a mathematician, general, and statesman. He was seven times *στρατηγός*, the highest political and military office in his native city, an honour not usually conferred more than once upon the same citizen; he led the army to victory in several wars (Diog. Laert. VIII. 79, 82) and was for a long time the leading statesman of Tarentum (Strab. VI. 280). Plato made his acquaintance on his first voyage to Sicily, and it was through his diplomatic mediation that Dionysius the younger at last allowed Plato to depart in safety on his third journey (Diog. Laert. VIII. 79, III. 22). Archytas was a man of excellent character, and his interest in education as well as his kindness towards his slaves is shown by the story that he delighted to get their children about him and teach them himself (Athenodor. in Athen. XII. 519 b). The rattle which he invented became proverbial (Athenodor. *l. c.*), cp. Aelian *Var. Hist.* XII. 15, Suidas s. v. *Ἀρχύτας*, Poll. IX. 127). No very definite opinion can be pronounced upon his merits as a man of science, since the writings bearing his name were for the most part forgeries. Fragments of several of them are extant: of these the fragments from the beginning of a work upon Mathematics can hardly be assailed, whilst the work upon Acoustics was cer-



39 χαίρειν ὀρθῶς διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι· (V  
 § 5 περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιτιμῆσεως ἣν τινες ἐπιτιμῶσιν ὡς ποιούσης 3  
 τῆς μουσικῆς βαναύσους, οὐ χαλεπὸν λῦσαι σκεψαμένους  
 μέχρι τε πόσου τῶν ἔργων κοινωνητέον τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν  
 1341 a παιδευομένοις πολιτικὴν, καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυ-  
 θμῶν κοινωνητέον, ἔτι δὲ ἐν ποίοις ὀργάνοις τὴν μάθησιν  
 § 6 ποιητέον, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρειν εἰκός. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἡ  
 λύσις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιτιμῆσεως· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τρόπους τινὰς  
 5 τῆς μουσικῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθέν.

φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς μήτε ἐμποδί- 4  
 ζειν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον πράξεις, μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάνανσον  
 καὶ ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν  
 § 7 τὰς μαθήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρήσεις ὕστερον. συμβαίνοι δ'  
 10 ἂν περὶ τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ μήτε τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς τεχνι-  
 κοὺς συντείνοντα διαπονοῖεν, μήτε τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ  
 τῶν ἔργων, ἃ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν  
 § 8 ἀγώνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέχρι περ  
 ἂν δύνωνται χαίρειν τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς, καὶ  
 15 μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
 ἔνια ζώων ἔτι δὲ καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων.

39 γινομένην M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

1341 a i παιδευομένοις] πολιτευομένοις Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 9 μαθήσεις—χρήσεις Bojesen, χρή-  
 σεῖς—μαθήσεις Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text. But Spengel transposed ἤδη and  
 ὕστερον, which is also possible. Schneider, who discovered the error, proposed to  
 transpose 8 πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις and 9 χρήσεις; [χρήσεις] and [μαθήσεις]  
 Götting || 13 παιδίαν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || καὶ inserted after ἄλλα by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., “probably  
 right, though hard to interpret” Newman, ἀλλὰ <κατὰ> Madvig || 15 κοινωνῶ M<sup>s</sup>  
 P<sup>5</sup> II<sup>2</sup> (corrected by p<sup>2</sup>)

§ 5 The censure passed on music im-  
 plies that the pursuit of excellence as a  
 performer degrades the youthful citizen  
 into a professional. It is remarked in  
 Exc. I. p. 620, that the feeling of the  
 Greeks in the fourth century towards  
 artistic specialists seems to have varied  
 with the eminence of the artist much  
 more than it does amongst us. While the  
 artists of genius were recognised as great  
 men, the ordinary artist was a mechanic,  
 who had left the true political life for a  
 bread-and-butter study.

§§ 6, 7 There must be no practising  
 upon instruments which unfit the citizen  
 for taking his part in war and in athletic  
 exercises. Musical training must not be  
 such as to fit the learner for contests of  
 artists.

1341 a ii τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττά]  
 “Brilliant pieces of extraordinary dif-  
 ficulty.” Even in the present day it  
 would be sound advice to leave these out  
 of the musical education designed for the  
 young. SUSEM. (1068)

12 ἃ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας  
 κτλ] Comp. Athen. XIV. 629 b, καὶ τὰ  
 σχήματα μετέφερον ἐντεῦθεν (sc. ἐκ τῆς  
 χειρονομίας) εἰς τοὺς χορούς, ἐκ δὲ τῶν χορῶν  
 εἰς τὰς παλαίστρας.

§ 8 13 τὰ τοιαῦτα] I.e. the practice  
 of pieces not thus excluded, on instruments  
 (such as the lyre) which are not prohibited  
 μέχρι περ=only until.

14 Comp. with this stock phrase c. 5  
 §§ 17—19. This tends to form character.

15 τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς] Cp. c. 5  
 § 15, 1340 a 4 with n. (1040) on τὴν

δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίοις ὀργάνοις χρῆστέον. οὔτε γὰρ αὐλοὺς εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλο τι τεχνικὸν ὄργανον, οἷον κιθάραν κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅσα ποιήσῃ αὐτῶν ἀκροατὰς ἀγαθοὺς ἢ τῆς μουσικῆς παι-

18 τι omitted by P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. 19 ἄλλο ἐστίν P<sup>1</sup>, ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἐστίν P<sup>5</sup> (interl.), ἐπερὶν ἐστίν with all other authorities Bk. 20 παιδείᾳ Γ Μ'

ἡσθε φυσικῶς. Aristotle means that sensuous charm, that tickling of the ears, produced by every kind of music, good or bad, simply as music by its native means of expression, harmony, melody, rhythm. A feeling for rhythm is, to a greater or less extent, innate in all men: *Psych.* v. 2 § 7, 1448 b 20 f. Comp. Döring p. 114 f. SUSSEX (1069). See *Psych.* 218. 3<sup>8</sup>, 910 b 20—25. It will be seen, c. 2 § 6, that some scope is allowed to this inferior pleasure. Plato indeed, *Laos.* ii 633 c, shrinks from adopting the standard of pleasure: καὶτοι λέγουσι γὰρ οἱ πλείους μουσικῶς ἀρμόγια εἶναι τὴν ἡδυσὶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παρέχουσαν δόξαναι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὐκ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθάνειαν τῶν παρὰ τὴν φύσιν αἰσθάναι.

τῶν ἄλλων ἔνια ζῶν] The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined *Ench. Eth.* iii. 2. 8, 1331 a 2 ff.: αὐτοὶ γὰρ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνὴρ λόγῳ, φαίνεται πάχυνται [sc. τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων] αὐτῶν τῶ ἀκούειν τῶν εὐαριστημάτων, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις συνάβηται τετρα- ταῖσι.

§ 9 18 αὐλοὺς] Usually translated by 'flute.' But in reality the instrument had a mouth-piece (φεῦγος), with a vibrating reed (γλῶσσα) fitted in it, so that it more closely resembled our 'clarinet.' The σύμφεξ μονοκάλαμος may have represented the modern flute. Hom. *Il.* 8. 13 mentions both, αὐλῶν συμφέγων τ' ἑοσπῆν. The αὐλός was always played in pairs (Latin *tibiae*, cp. § 13, 1341 b 4, αὐλαί), the two instruments being connected by a leathern strap, φορέτω, worn round the mouth. SUSSEX (1070). Consult further L. v. Jan Art. 'Floten' in Baumeister's *Denkmalen* and A. A. Howard in *Harvard Studies* IV. 1893, p. 1 ff.

οὔτ' ἄλλο τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδλ] By these words Aristotle excludes every instrument except the κιθάρα, or lyre, also called φάρμαξ in Homer (cp. L. van Jan conjectured to be the case before Westphal, though on insufficient grounds, as appears to me, he afterwards withdrew the conjecture, and pronounced κιθάρα and φάρμαξ to be the same as κιθάρα but distinct

from λύρα). The lyre was the most ancient and the most easily handled of Greek stringed instruments: beside those here represented Jan gives (p. 45) other shapes of the lyre and κιθάρα.



Krepion a small lyre of Terpander, Plat. *De musica* v. 8, 1123 c, invented the κιθάρα about 700 B.C. This was the ordinary instrument used by professional players and solo-singers. It possessed greater resonances, being of the shape here shown.



See Westphal *Gloss. de athen. Mus.* p. 86 ff.; cp. L. van Jan *De athen. Musicorum* p. 3 ff. Plato *Rep.* iv. 399 b permits both Lyre and κιθάρα to be used in teaching: on the other hand, he restricts the instruction to be given to a yet greater extent than Aristotle. Comp. *Laos.* vii. 812 c ff., and *apud* c. 2 § 9. n. (1069). SUSSEX (1071).

20 αὐτῶν ἀρμόγια. The *apud* τῶν

δείας ἢ τῆς ἄλλης· ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἡθικὸν ἀλλὰ  
 μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς  
 χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἢ μά-  
 § 10 θησιν. προσθῶμεν δὲ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ ἐναντίον πρὸς  
 25 παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κωλύειν τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι τὴν αὐλησιν.  
 διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρῆσιν ἐκ  
 τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶ-  
 § 11 τον αὐτῷ. σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γενόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας  
 καὶ μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν, ἔτι τε πρότερον,

21 ἢ καὶ P<sup>1</sup> || ἔτι δὲ Γ Π Ar. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, ἔτι δ' Bk., ἐπειδὴ Susem.<sup>2</sup> ||  
 ὁ αὐτὸς M<sup>s</sup>, *id ipsūm* William || 23. δύναται before κάθαρσιν Γ, after μᾶλλον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup>  
 Bk., thus allowing hiatus || 24 αὐτῷ after ἐναντίον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., avoiding hiatus ||  
 28 γενόμενοι Schneider, γινόμενοι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, γιγνόμενοι Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 29 τὴν omitted by  
 P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk.

*deias* must depend on ἀγαθούς: 'such only as will improve the hearers of them in respect of their musical or general education.'

21 The change of ἔτι δὲ to ἐπειδὴ is thus defended *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421: Aristoteles dixit quidem v. 17 sqq. δῆλον δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίοις ὀργάνοις κτλ, sed nondum docuit cur hoc sit δῆλον ἐκ τούτων. Secuntur demum hae causae. Ergo hoc quoque loco non ἔτι δὲ scripsit, sed ἐπειδὴ. SUSEM.

22 ὀργιαστικόν] I.e. it produces an ecstatic frame of mind, it intoxicates with excitement and elevation of the feelings. This appears plainly from c. 7 §§ 3, 4, 8, 9. Cp. also c. 5 §§ 22, 23, Excursus IV. p. 628 *nn.* (1054, 1092), and especially n. (1107). SUSEM. (1072)

Since ἡθικόν = expressing character, ὀργιαστικόν should mean expressing orgies or fanatical excitement. It is because this wild, excited music interprets the excesses of religious frenzy, that it also accompanies and stimulates them. See n. on c. 5 § 17.

ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους κτλ] "Hence the flute should be used at such times when the effect of the concert is to purge the emotions and not to instruct."

23 κάθαρσιν] Here occurs for the first time the idea of purging or curing emotion by means of emotion. How is this effect of music related to the three already discussed (1339 a 16 ff., b 13 πρότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδίαν ἢ διαγωγὴν sc. δύναται)? For the present we are only told that it differs from παιδεία, that pleasurable enjoyment which goes to form character. But we receive no informa-

tion as to its relation to the recreation which music affords (παιδιά, ἀνάπαισις), or the full aesthetic enjoyment which belongs to διαγωγή, the highest intellectual gratification. See p. 638, Excursus v. n. (1101). SUSEM. (1073)

Besides its literal meaning *cleansing* (καθαίρειν) which is necessarily vague, *κάθαρσις* has two definite metaphorical senses: (1) religious, or rather liturgical, *purifying*=lustratio, expiatio; (2) medical (or rather pathological) *purging*. The latter metaphor is prominent in Aristotle: but his usage of the term constitutes a distinct application (3) in a psychological sense, *emotional relief* followed by *refinement* of the emotions. See the passages cited in the 'Note on κάθαρσις' p. 641 ff.

24 αὐτῷ is αὐλῷ. "Besides, it happens to tell against the educational use of the flute, that playing upon it hinders singing." Here λόγος approximates to the meaning of φωνή, cp. n. (26).

26 Probably ἐκ implies that they not only 'disallowed its use' but excluded it or withdrew it from the hands of the young. So 1336 b 7, 1321 a 25.

§ 11 28 σχολαστικώτεροι] More fitted for leisure, qualified to use it intelligently: cp. VIII(v). 11. 5 συλλόγους σχολαστικούς. 'Better fitted by their increased resources for leisure, fired with loftier aspirations after excellence, even earlier as well as in the full flush of their achievements after the Persian wars they began to lay hold on every form of learning without distinction, pushing their research onward.' "To this stirring generation, active in striking out new paths, belonged Hippodamus" (Newman).

καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθίντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, ἐν πάσῃς ἤπτοντο μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλ' ἐπιζητοῦντες. διὸ καὶ τὴν αὐλητικὴν ἡγάγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ τις χορηγὸς αὐτὸς ἠύλησε τῷ χορῷ, καὶ περὶ Ἀθήνας οὕτως ἐπεχωρίασεν ὥστε σχιδόν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μετείχον αὐτῆς· δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πίνακος ὃν ἀνέθηκε Θράσιππος Ἐκφαντίδῃ χορηγίσεας. ὕστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμίσθη διὰ τῆς πείρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον

31 ἤποντο M' and apparently Γ, ἤπτοντο S<sup>1</sup> | 33 αὐτὸς omitted by H<sup>1</sup> (omitted in the margin by p<sup>1</sup>), [αὐτὸς] Sussem.<sup>1</sup> | 35 ἐλευθέρων Schneider, perhaps rightly | 36 ἐκφαντίδῃ p<sup>25</sup>, ἐκφαντίδῃ L<sup>1</sup>

§ 12 33 The χορηγὸς was a rich citizen, selected to defray the expenses incurred in the training and equipment of a chorus, whether for lyric poetry, or for comedy or tragedy. So a 36 χορηγίσεας. SUSSEM. (1074)

τῷ χορῷ] This was undoubtedly a lyric chorus. For dramas proper do not appear to have been performed at Sparta. SUSSEM. (1076)

34 ἐπεχωρίασεν] As in 1335 a 16 η. The flute was more at home in Boeotia, where it is recorded of Epromionides, as something exceptional, that he had learnt to accompany his singing on the lyre.

35 δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πίνακος] There can be no question this appeal to the 'tablet' resembles that in 'A.P. vol. c. 7 § 4 to the statue of Hippolitus.

36 πίνακος ὃν ἀνέθηκε κτλ] The most ancient Attic comic poets of note were Chionides and Magnes, *Plut.* 3 § 5, 1448 a 24 (cp. s. 2, 1449 b 3), the next in order Ekphantides and Cratinus, of whose poetry fragments were extant, the oldest of them being from the pen of Ekphantides, who on this account is erroneously described by the anonymous commentator upon Book IV of the *Nu. Est.* (iv. 4. 10, 1113 a 23 f.) as the earliest poet of the Old Comedy. We only possess a few insignificant fragments of his, principally quoted by this scholiast, but we know the title of one of his works 'The Satyr' (*Athen.* i. 96 c). See *Meincke Fragm. com. Gr.* i. p. 35 ff., ii. p. 12 ff. At the time when Thrasippus was his choregus, Ekphantides won the first prize. The word *πῖναξ* refers to the chorus which compelled the victorious choragus to dedicate in honour of himself and his title a wooden tripod, with an inscription upon the pedestal, either at the temple of Apollo near the theatre or at one of the

temples situated in the street leading to the theatre, which from this fact received the name of (τρίποδος) the street of tripod. The tripod was then as a rule erected upon the temple, but sometimes placed inside it. See Paus. i. 10. 1 f., cp. *Plut. Them.* 5, Demosth. xxi. 6. We possess a considerable number of inscriptions of this kind, which for the most part relate to dithyrambic (cyclic) choruses, and in these the names of the flute-player, the poet or chorus master, the archon, and sometimes the principal actors are mentioned, as well as the name of the tribe to which the choregus belonged and the species of drama represented. SUSSEM. (1076)

See however Haigh *Attic Tragedy* p. 42 f. "The memorials of victory erected by the choregi to the dramatic choruses appear to have taken the form of tablets (πίνακες). For instance, Themistocles after his victory with a tragic chorus erected a 'tablet' in honour of the event. It is a trait in the character of the great man in Thucydides, that when he has been successful with a tragic chorus, he erects merely a wooden wall (κλῆμα, 21 τείχος [κλῆμα]) in commemoration of his victory."

37 ὕστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμίσθη] *Plutarch*, *Vita Alcib.* c. 2, tells the story that Alcibiades threw away the flute in disgust, with the words ἀλκίβιας αὐτὸς ὀφθαλμοπαθεῖν αὐτὸ γὰρ ζῆλον ἀνέδειξετο. He adds that both by poet and chorus Alcibiades tried to stop the practice of honouring the flute: ὅπως ἔπειτα μὴ οὐκ ἀποθῶκεν ἀρχαίῃς καὶ τραγικοῖς χοροῖς τὰς τῶν αὐτῶν. The cessation of name and effort can hardly be accepted. Still, no doubt the famous αὐτῶν who were applauded at Athens were as a rule strangers, and two of the greatest, Alcibiades and Timotheus, were Boeotians.

δυναμένων κρίνειν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν  
 § 13 συντείνον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν ἀρχαίων,  
 40 οἷον πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συντείνοντα  
 τοῖς ἀκούουσι τῶν χρωμένων, ἐπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ  
 1341 b σαμβύκαι, καὶ πάντα τὰ δεόμενα χειρουργικῆς ἐπιστήμης.  
 εὐλόγως δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων  
 μεμυθολογημένον. φασὶ γὰρ δὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν εὐροῦσαν ἀπο-  
 § 14 βαλεῖν τοὺς αὐλοὺς. οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει φάναι καὶ διὰ  
 5 τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην τοῦ προσώπου τοῦτο ποιῆσαι δυσχεράνασαν  
 τὴν θεόν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν

38 καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν omitted by M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand) || 40 πηκτίδες P<sup>2</sup>, ποικτίδες P<sup>4</sup>, ποιητίδες P<sup>5</sup>, πηκτάδες Thomas Ar.

1341 b 1 σαμβύκαι Götting, ἱαμβοι II<sup>1</sup>, σαμβύκαι II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, ἱαμβύκαι Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 2 αὐλῶν] ἄλλων Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 3 δὴ omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, [δὴ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 4 μὲν οὖν] enim William, οὖν omitted, a lacuna being left, in M<sup>s</sup> (1st hand, supplied by a later hand) || 6 θεάν P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>

§ 13 39 πολλὰ...ἀρχαίων, sc. ἀπεδο-  
 κιμάσθη.

40 οἷον πηκτίδες κτλ] All foreign  
 stringed instruments, on which consult  
 Excursus IV. p. 632 ff. SUSEM. (1077)

1341 b 3 μεμυθολογημένον] Comp. the  
 similar reference to legend II. 9. 8, 1269  
 b 28, n. (288).

εὐροῦσαν ἀποβαλεῖν] The Satyr Mar-  
 syas is said to have picked up the flute  
 which Athene threw away, and to have  
 played upon it: and for this the goddess  
 punished him. The earliest extant allu-  
 sion to this legend is in a dithyramb  
 'Marsyas' by Melanippides *Frag.* 2. ἃ  
 μὲν Ἀθᾶνα | τῶργαν' ἔρριψεν θ' ἱερᾶς ἀπὸ  
 χειρὸς | εἰπέ τ' ἔρρετ' αἶσχα, σώματι λύμα:  
 to which the contemporary poet Telestes  
 replied in his 'Argo' *Frag.* 1, ὃν σοφὸν  
 σοφὰν λαβοῦσαν οὐκ ἐπέλπομαι νόῳ δρυμοῖς  
 ὀρείοις ὄργανον | δῖαν Ἀθᾶναν δυσόφθαλμον  
 αἰσχος ἐκφοβηθεῖσαν αἰθῖς ἐκ χερῶν βα-  
 λεῖν, | νυμφαγενεῖ χειροκτύπῳ φηρὶ Μαρσύα  
 κλέος. | τί γάρ νιν εὐνῆρατοιο κάλλεος ὄξυς  
 ἔρως ἔτειρεν, | ᾧ παρθενίαν ἄγαμον καὶ  
 ἄπαιδ' ἀπένειμε Κλωθῷ; see *Athen.* XIV.  
 616 e, f. (J. G. Schneider). In other  
 legends the Phrygian Marsyas is himself  
 the inventor of the flute; an enthusiastic  
 singer and flute-player in the service of  
 Cybele, he is, like all Satyrs and Sileni in  
 Asiatic myths, one of the deities of rivers  
 and fountains in the train of the Phrygian  
 Dionysus. In this character he encounters  
 Apollo, the representative of the music

of the κιθάρα, by whom he is defeated  
 and punished. In Lydian legend Pan re-  
 places Marsyas as the rival of Apollo and  
 the teacher of Olympus. See Preller  
*Griech. Mythol.* I. p. 176 f., 508, 510,  
 576 ff., 585. Hyagnis also, a Phrygian,  
 or Mysian, the supposed father of Mar-  
 syas, was sometimes called the inventor  
 of the flute: and Olympus himself, who  
 was believed to be the pupil of Marsyas,  
 is at one time called a Phrygian and at  
 another a Mysian, pointing to the origin  
 of this kind of music in Asia Minor,  
 whether in Phrygia, Mysia, or Lydia (see  
 Exc. II and IV). The authorities to con-  
 sult for the above are Plut. *De musica* 14,  
 1135 E, Alex. Polyhist. *Fr.* 52 apud Plut.  
*ib.* 5, 1132 F, Heracleid. *ib.* 7, 1133 E,  
 Strabo X. 324, Schol. in *Aesch. Persas*  
 933, Suidas s. v. "Ολυμπος. Comp. Pl.  
*Lazus* III. 677 D, *Symp.* 215 C, Ps-Pl.  
*Minos* 318 B: and for the whole section  
 III. (288, 297). SUSEM. (1078)

§ 14 6 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κτλ] "Not but  
 what a more likely reason is the fact, that  
 instruction in the flute contributes nothing  
 to the culture of the intelligence. For  
 to Athene we ascribe science and art."  
 SUSEM. (1079)

For διάνοια cp. n. (1023) on φρόνησις:  
 it has been opposed to ἥθος c. 2 § 1, and  
 in III. II. 2, 1281 b 7. With περιθεῖναι  
 in this sense Bonitz joins *Rhet.* I. 9. 40,  
 1368 a 29, μέγεθος περιθεῖναι (ταῖς πράξεσι)  
 'to invest exploits with importance.'

οὐδέν ἐστιν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐλήσεως. τῇ γὰρ Ἀθηναίᾳ τὴν ἐπι-  
στήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὀργάνων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζο-  
μεν τὴν τεχνικὴν παιδείαν (τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοῖς  
ἀγῶνας· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πρᾶττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται  
χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουσίτων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορ-  
τικῆς, διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν,  
ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν, καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι  
πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τίλος· ὁ γὰρ  
θεατῆς φορτικὸς ὢν μεταβάλλειν εἴωθε τὴν μουσικὴν, ὥσπερ  
καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτοὺς  
τε ποιοῦς, ταῦτα ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις·  
σκεπτέον [δ'] ἔτι περὶ τε τὰς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς,  
[καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] πότερον ταῖς ἁρμονίαις πάσαις χρηστέον

7 γὰρ Susem., δὲ Γ II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, *cum* Ar. || 10 παιδῶν II<sup>1</sup> (emended  
with γρ. prefixed by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || 11 τῆς] τῆς P<sup>45</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Abl. || αὐτοῦ Γ,  
αὐτοῦ II || 13 ἐλευθέρων ? Susem. || 14 βαναύσους Kotates, omitting the comma  
before καὶ || 18 ποιοῦς] ποιοῖς Lindau (a very rare word), *ἐἶναι* *καθ'* Ar. as if he  
had read τοιοῦτους for ποιοῦς τινας, τοιοῦτους? or φορτικαῖς ? Susem. || αὐτοῖς τε  
ποιοῦς τινας] *ἐαυτῶ* *δοικῶτας* Flach || 19 δ' omitted by P<sup>45</sup>, [δ'] Schneider Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>,  
δὲ M<sup>1</sup> Reiz, δὲ P<sup>3</sup>, δὴ ? Susem. But it is a repetition of δὲ in the protasis || *τῶν* *τε*  
P<sup>3</sup>, τὰ Reiz || 20 [καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] Bonitz, παιδῶν ? Orelli *Armat. Philolog.* pp.  
110—116 || ταῖς ἁρμονίαις after χρηστέον II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk.

§§ 15, 16 With these two sections cp.  
*nu.* (103, 982, 1065): also c. 7 §§ 6, 7 *u.*  
(1097), and *mu.* III. 11 a f., 1281 b 5 *u.*  
(165 b). SUSEM. (1080)

12 φορτικῆς] Because the spectator  
is φορτικός, b 16. Comp. *Plat.* c. 26 § 1,  
1461 b 27 ff. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἥτις φορτικός (sc.  
μικροῦ) βελτίων, τοιαῦτη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίων  
θεωρία; also *Lucret.* II. 622 ff (quoted in *u.*  
III. 1341 a 15).

14 θητικωτέραν] *Supra* 1337 b 21 *u.*

§ 16 14 συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι] Cp. οὐδὲν  
γὰρ ἐκλείει κτλ c. 6 § 6, 1341 a 4 l.

17 αὐτοῖς τε] This is rightly opposed  
to τὰ σώματα. But whether ταῖς ταῖς  
'of a certain character' should be emended  
to τοιοῦτοις τινῶς· φορτικαῖς is altogether  
unsatisfactory. See *Quint. crit. coll.* p. 421.  
SUSEM.

2-2 Which musical mode and mea-  
sure are to be accepted, (1) in general  
III. 2—7, (2) for education, III. 8—19.  
Which is more important for educational  
purposes, melody or rhythm (*u.*). The  
latter question is considered. Cp. *Armat.*

p. 120. The subject is discussed by Plato  
at *Leg.* III. 397—399.

§ 1 19 With excellent commentaries  
the apostrophe corresponding to a protasis  
*ἐπεὶ* *δε*... *καθάρσει*, b 9—15; so that unless  
*δε* is changed to *ἐπεὶ*, it had better (with  
Schneider and Bonitz) be omitted; (sc.  
*et. coll.* p. 421. The difficulties of this  
long period are discussed by Bonitz *Armat.*  
*Stud.* III. pp. 92—99 (61—64). SUSEM.

Bonitz suggests b 20 the exclusion of *καὶ*  
*πρὸς παιδείαν*, (1) because no satisfactory  
sense can be given to *καὶ*, (2) because the  
questions are distinguished, and it is the  
second one, beginning at *ἐπεὶ* *δε*, which  
has to do with education. Further he is  
inclined to extend the period as far as  
b 32 *πρὸς αὐτοῖς*, reading *ἐπεὶ* *δε* at 22,  
and making *καθάρσει* and *αὐτοῖς* large the  
apostrophe to this (main) protasis b 22  
*ἐπεὶ* *δε*... 15 *καθάρσει*, on the ground that  
it is impossible for *ἐπεὶ* *δε* to introduce a  
second protasis referring to the preceding  
apostrophe *καθάρσει*. *Armat.*

- 21 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς ἢ διαιρετέον, ἔπειτα τοῖς πρὸς παι-  
δείαν διαπονοῦσι πότερον τὸν αὐτὸν διορισμὸν θήσομεν ἢ  
τινα ἕτερον, τρίτον δέ, ἐπειδὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ  
*composed of*  
*(m. lines)* 25 μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν, τούτων δ' ἐκάτερον οὐ δεῖ λε-  
γθῆναι τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον  
προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελὴ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὐρυθμον.  
§ 2 νομίσαντες οὖν πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τε νῦν  
μουσικῶν ἐνίους καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν  
ἐμπείρως ἔχοντες τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν μὲν  
30 καθ' ἑαστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδώσομεν ζητεῖν τοῖς βουλο-  
μένοις παρ' ἐκείνων, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλωμεν, τοὺς τύπους

21 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς omitted by P<sup>4.5.6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> || 23 τρίτον δεῖ (δὲ P<sup>5</sup> L<sup>s</sup>)  
before *τινα ἕτερον* Γ Π Bk., *τρίτον* δὲ with the transposition Susem. δεῖ untranslated  
by Ar., [δεῖ] Koraes; Bonitz (*Arist. Stud.* III. p. 95 ff.) showed the passage to be  
corrupt || 25 δύναμιν after ἔχει P<sup>3.5</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> Bk., cp. 1339 a 15 || [καὶ] ? Susem. ||  
31 νομικῶς] *in genere* Ar., γενικῶς Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin, λογικῶς Koraes, συντόμως  
Flach || διέλωμεν P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and M<sup>s</sup> (1st hand), διέλωμεν or διείλωμεν apparently Γ

21 τοῖς... διαπονοῦσι] The *dativus commodi*, not the dative after τὸν αὐτόν.  
“Whether for those whose work is edu-  
cational we shall make the same division.”  
After this ἢ τρίτον δεῖ τίνα ἕτερον Γ Π seems  
hopeless. What, asks Bonitz, is to be un-  
derstood by τρίτον? Not to speak of the  
harshness, if not impossibility, of sup-  
plying an infinitive for δεῖ from θήσομεν.

22 ἢ τίνα ἕτερον, τρίτον δέ] Veram  
mihi emendandi rationem inventam esse  
spero, cum ea coniecerim. Si haec spes  
me non fefellit, v. 25 καὶ significat “etiam,”  
et sic quidem ferri forsitan, sed vel sic  
eicere malim: *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421.  
SUSEM.

25 καὶ πότερον κτλ] In the *Introd.*  
p. 49 (cp. n. 2) it is pointed out that the  
discussion of this question is no longer ex-  
tant in our present treatise. SUSEM. (1081)

The whole passage may be rendered:  
We have still to consider the question of  
musical modes and rhythms: whether  
all the modes and all the rhythms should  
be employed or a distinction made be-  
tween them: secondly, whether the same  
distinction will serve for those whose work  
is teaching, or whether we shall make a  
new one: thirdly, as we find Music to  
consist of melody and rhythm, and the  
influence which each of them has upon  
education ought not to be overlooked,  
[also] whether the preference must be  
given to goodness of melody or of rhythm.

§ 2 27 Vahlen rightly calls attention

to the close similarity of phrase between  
this passage and IV(VII). 1. 2, 1323 a 22.

28 τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας κτλ] See *nn.*  
(1055, 1083, 1103). Perhaps intended to  
intimate that Plato passed judgment on  
these matters without sufficient musical  
knowledge. See § 9. SUSEM. (1082)

31 νομικῶς] ‘Formally.’ Idem fere  
significat atque νόμου χάριν *Meta.* XIII(M).  
1. 4, 1076 a 27: *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421.  
SUSEM.

The passage from the *Metaphysics* runs  
thus: ἔπειτα μετὰ ταῦτα χωρὶς περὶ τῶν  
ιδεῶν αὐτῶν ἀπλῶς καὶ ὅσον νόμου χάριν.  
Here ἀπλῶς seems to mean ‘in general  
terms,’ much as καθόλου (so Eudemus  
*συντόμως* in the parallel passage *E. E.* 1. 8,  
1217 b 19), and not with Bonitz=simply  
(a sense nearly akin to χωρὶς: quaes-  
tionem de numeris et de principiis cum  
hac de ideis quaestione nondum vult con-  
iungi). The precise reference in νόμος too  
is disputed. Bonitz refers it to Aristotle’s  
own practice of criticizing his predeces-  
sors: Bernays rendered νόμου χάριν by  
*dicis causa*: Diels disapproving of this  
remarks that νόμιμον is not ὅσιον, nor does  
the phrase=ὁσίας χάριν, and prefers to  
render it “to comply with the prevailing  
custom, the fashion.” It seems best to  
modify Bernays’ interpretation a little.  
The original meaning is “only so far as  
to avoid a conflict with the law,” i.e.  
‘under compulsion and reluctantly.’ Other  
authors use the phrase thus, of what is

μόνον εἰπόντες περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἔπειτα  
 χόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιρουσί τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ.  
 τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ ταῖντες.  
 καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων οἰκίαν

done grudgingly, only because it is expected of one, and so may be hastily despatched: e.g. Diphilus Ζωγράφου Fr. 2. 113 apud Athen. VII. 292 A: οὐδὲν ἡδέως πᾶσι γὰρ οἶτος, ἀλλ' ὅσον νόμον χάρην, said of a stingy shipowner who has vowed a sacrifice in a storm, is reluctant to pay his vow, and certain to behave shabbily about it. See Bernays *Die Dichtg.* p. 150. Friedländer *Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden* p. 51 f., Diels *Monatsh. der Berl. Akad.* 1883, p. 488. Susemihl in *Nine Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXIV. (1894), p. 172. τοὺς τύπους] With the plural comp. Nic. Eth. X. 9. 1. 1179 a 34. ἱκανῶς εἶρηται τοῖς τύποις instead of the more usual τῷ τῷ, 1276 b 19 n. "Contenting ourselves with a formal discussion in outline only."

§ 3. The translation is *Dei. M. Ar.* δεχόμεθα ... ὡς διαιροῦσι ... καὶ ... ταῖντες, φανερὸν δ' οὐ μᾶς ... χάρην (καὶ γὰρ ... ἀνάπαυαν) all of which is the protasis, the podosis beginning with φανερόν. Translate: "We accept the classification of melodies made by certain philosophers into ethical, scenic, ecstatic [literally, according as they represent (1) character, (2) action, and (3) ecstasy], as well as their statement that each class of melodies has a musical mode which is naturally appropriate to it. But we hold that there is more than one advantage in the use of music, its object being both educational and purgative—what we mean by *purification* will here be stated in general terms, a clearer explanation to be given hereafter in our treatise on Poetry:—while, finally, it is a means to aesthetic enjoyment, to relaxation and recreation after exertion. This makes it evident that all the musical modes must be employed, though not all in the same manner. For educational purposes, only those with the most character; but those significant of action, and the ecstatic modes as well, when we listen to the performance of others."

§ 4. τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] Bergk *Edict. Mus.* XIX. p. 603 plausibly suggests that the reference is to Aristotle's own pupils Aristoxenus. Cp. also § 8 n. (1104). SUSEM. (1883)

§ 5. τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ κτλ.] This division

is based upon the threefold nature of the subject-matter of all imitative art, viz. ἦθος, πράξις, πάθος: character, action, emotions (c. § 18 18—22, IV[VIII] 17. 10, cp. n. (963), *Poet.* c. I § 5, 1447 a 27 f.). For ecstatic modes and melodies do not merely give expression to enthusiasm pure and simple, but also to other painful emotions, see §§ 4—6, § 8 with nn. (1096, 1101), cp. nn. (1047, 1034). It may be questionable, to say the least of it, whether music can represent actions as such, as well as the feelings which produce and accompany action (e.g. the martial spirit), still the Greeks have, as a matter of fact, made attempts to represent the process of an action by the sequence of feelings excited by purely instrumental music, as in the case of the famous Pythian dance (see Hiller 'Sakalas the flute-player' *Rhein. Mus.* XXXI. 1876, p. 79 ff., Guhrner *Der pythische tanzen Jahrb. f. Philol. Suppl.* N. S. VIII. p. 309 ff.). This, one of the earliest instances of 'programme music,' depicted the sequence of incidents in the conflict between Apollo and the Python. In any case no doubt we must hold that the *πρακτικὰ ἀρμονία* express emotions, but they are of an energetic character, stimulating to vigorous action, and not of an enervating character such as those produced by the ecstatic Modes. Nor must we forget that *πάθος* includes the idea of 'scene' as well as 'action,' and at times, e.g. IV(VII) 17. 10, 1336 b 16 is most correctly rendered by the former expression. SUSEM. (1884)

The second of the three classes (*παρρητικὰ μέλη, παρρητικὰ ἀρμονία*) has no direct English equivalent: we must be content to designate them 'modes and melodies of action.' Clearly the first is like ecclesiastical music now, calm and serious; the third the wild excited air, of once significant of, and fitted to stimulate the orgies of Dionysus or Cybele. But the second depicted some stirring action, as in the Pythian dance, or among the fray, as in a lost tragedy: *Thal.* XIX. 48, ἦσαν δὲ τρεῖς ἡ μὲν ἐνθεσιαστικὴ, καὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ Πυθίῳ [cp. Nessel's *Poet.* p. 762] ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ κυβητικῷ ἐν τῷ κυβητικῷ.

the nature of the harmonies is  
 appropriate to its own melody,  
 one to sorrow, another to mirth

ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο μέλος τιθέασι, φάμεν δ' οὐ μιᾶς ἕνεκεν ὠφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειόνων χάριν (καὶ γὰρ ἡ παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν καθάρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον—, τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν, πρὸς ἀνεσί τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπausιν). φανερόν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων ἡμι-

36 μέλος Tyrwhitt (on *Poet.* c. 6), μέρος Γ Π Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text; Koraes suspects τιθέασι || 38 καὶ inserted before παιδείας by P<sup>1.2.4</sup> || παιδιᾶς Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup>, παιδίας apparently P<sup>5</sup> (corr.) || 40 τρίτον δὲ] καὶ ταῦτα Liepert (*Arist. u. d. Zweck der Kunst*, Passau 1862 p. 13, n. 3), ταύτης δ' ἢ, or at least ταύτης δὲ, Susem. See Comm. n. (1101). Spengel would transpose τρίτον δὲ to follow διαγωγὴν, wrongly || διαγωγὴν <καὶ> Liepert and Susemihl, διαγωγὴν <ἢ> Susem.<sup>2</sup>, which is better, and absolutely necessary if ταύτης δ' ἢ just before is right. See n. (1101). [πρὸς διαγωγὴν] Welldon, wrongly || 41 [πρὸς] τὴν ? Susem.

1342 a 1 οὐ...2 χρηστέον omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 3 ἀκρόασιν] καθάρσιν Paris. 2043 and Twining *Poet.* p. 243 (ed. 1), II. p. 7 (ed. 2), decidedly right: see Comm.

39 πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς] Unfortunately this fuller exposition in the *Poetics* is no longer extant. Vahlen gives good reasons for believing that it came after the discussion of Comedy now lost: see *Arist. Aufsätze* III. p. 13 s.f. (*Wiener Sitzungsber.* LXXVII. p. 293 ff.) SUSEM. (1085)

40 τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν] At first sight there is a difficulty, if καθάρσις and διαγωγὴ constitute separate ends. What else than διαγωγὴ, as described above, see n. (1000), could express the aim of the concerts and musical exhibitions which are productive of καθάρσις more than μάθησις (c. 6 § 9)? Not to mention that it is strange to find, in the received text, διαγωγὴ apparently explained by ἀνάπαυσις with which it is so often contrasted. Nor is it possible to reconcile the three advantages attendant on the use of music here with the three ends of musical education enumerated c. 5 §§ 2—4 and easily recognisable c. 8 § 9. Comp. Bernays *Rhein. Mus.* XIV. 1889 p. 371 f., *Ueber die tragische Katharsis* (ed. 2) p. 125 f. See however Exc. V. p. 638. If the two passages in c. 5 refer exclusively to music as a means of education, all the three ends there given (διαγωγὴ, παιδεία = ἀρετή, ἀνεσις = ἀνάπαυσις) are summed up under the single phrase παιδείας ἕνεκα of our context. That is, though preparatory to

διαγωγὴ (since those who have not learnt when young can never fully enjoy music), the educational use must be conceived as distinct. Then there is further the emotional or pathological use (καθάρσις) now introduced for the first time. Plainly, that does not attend on the music employed in education. It should be noted that Zeller (*op. c.* p. 771 n. 1) insists on a fourfold use here: he would separate from (3) πρὸς διαγωγὴν, the following clause (4) πρὸς ἀνεσί τε καὶ...ἀνάπαυσιν.

1342 a 3 ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις] In this class the Dorian Mode stands first, as Aristotle says himself § 8. But from Excurs. IV n. (1054) it seems strange he should speak of more than one ἠθικωτάτῃ ἀρμονία, since only the Aeolian and perhaps the antiquated Locrian and Boeotian can go with the Dorian; indeed even the Aeolian forms a transition to the ἀρμονίαί πρακτικάι: cp. n. (1103). From Excurs. IV it would appear that Lydian, Hypo-phrygian (Ionian), and possibly Hypo-lydian constitute the next group of πρακτικάι: while the ecstatic are the Phrygian, Mixolydian, high-pitched Lydian and high-pitched Ionian (unless this was identical with the Mixolydian): see pp. 630, 631. SUSEM. (1086)

πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐπ. χ.] "But for listening to while other people play." ἀκρόασις is a conveniently general term

πουργούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχᾶς ἰσχυρᾶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἥττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δ' ἐνθουσιασμός. καὶ γὰρ ἵπ

4 After ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς Reinkens (*Arist. ab. Kunst* pp. 145, 156) supposes that a definition of κάθαρσις has been lost and the words following mutilated; wrongly.

under which κάθαρσις and διαγωγή can be included.

4 καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς] Here καὶ = 'as well as.' For Aristotle would not separate from πρακτικαῖς and ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς ἀρμ. such others as, though ἠθικαῖ, do not possess that character in the highest degree and so form the transition to one of the other two species. From Exc. IV these would seem to be the low-pitched Ionian and low-pitched Lydian, since every painful emotion, though not of course every trace of emotion, is foreign to them, the ἠθικώταται would be exceptions; yet this is not expressly stated; much less is there any express statement that only 'ecstatic modes,' as Döring thinks, exert a cathartic influence, see *n.* (1101) p. 638 ff. (That this is my view and was maintained by me in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* XXXV. 1862, p. 416 is admitted by Döring *Philologus* XXVII. p. 724, though I regret that in *Kunstlehre des Arist.* p. 183 he reprints unaltered an incorrect statement about it which appeared *Philol.* XXI. p. 501.) Not to mention others, the Dorian melodies, apparently the most numerous of all, do not exert any cathartic influence. Further, the plural form in the mention of πρακτικαὶ ἀρμονίαι should be noticed. Comp. Exc. IV. *n.* (1054). and § 5, τὰ μὲν with *n.* (1096). SUSKM. 1087, 1088)

The important point to seize is that the ecstatic music had no direct ethical, but only a pathological, effect. In fact, the absence of a direct ethical effect prevents it from being used in education. Keller, p. 774, *n.* (2).

§ 4.5 The link of connexion with the preceding seems to be that the public performance of music in the ecstatic modes 'calls for justification. Döring differently (p. 286): "Every species of music has its special province, the 'ethical' music in τὰ ἠθικά, the 'ecstatic' in κάθαρσις [see however *n.* 1007], the 'practical' perhaps as military music. Hence this, every species of music may be used for enjoyment. This last proposition needs no further proof, so far as the first two

species ἠθικά and πρακτικά are concerned; in respect of ecstatic music it would be a little startling. In order therefore to explain it, and the term κάθαρσις as well, Aristotle proceeds with § 4. 5. This enables him to give the explanation of κάθαρσις in general terms (ἀρχαῖς) as the effect of certain melodies upon a form of religious frenzy, *καρμῶνταινία*." The fact last stated is partially corroborated by a passage from Aristides Quintilianus II. p. 157 Meib.; Döring p. 352. Translate: "For the emotion which violently affects some souls is present in all though in a greater or less degree. This is true of pity and terror, true also of ecstasy. Some persons are liable to seizure by this form of morbid excitement. Now as the effect of the sacred melodies we see that such persons, under the treatment of the melodies which excite frenzy in the soul, fall back into the normal state, as if they had undergone a medical cure or purgation." It is also possible to take ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν μελῶν with ἐκείναι: 'we see from the sacred melodies etc.' Cp. Hagfors, p. 135.

7 οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος] From the whole context it is more than probable that fear and pity are here adduced not with reference to their influence in Tragedy (see my *Introd.* to the *Poetics* pp. 56—67), but like ecstasy, with reference merely to the cathartic effect of music, so that the beneficial excitement of fear and pity by music expressing these emotions is here given by way of illustration. See e. g. § 18 *n.* (1047), 7 § 3 (1084), § 5 (1096), § 8 (1101). SUSKM. (1089)

With this view Mr Newman appears to concur: *Introd.* p. 366 "for though it might be thought that harmonies which arouse feelings of enthusiasm or fear or pity, and purge these emotions, are useful only to a few over-fraught spirits, this is not really so: all are more or less in need of music of this kind and relieved by it. The melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure."

Bernays in his usual manner completes the sentence thus: 'e.g. pity and terror

8 ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχιμοί τινες εἰσίν· ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρώμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιά-  
 10 ζουσιν τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ιατρείας τυ-  
 § 5 χόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν

8 δ'] δὲ before τῶν P<sup>4.6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. Bk., after 9 ἱερῶν P<sup>5</sup> || 9 [ὅταν...10 μέλεσι] Susem.<sup>3</sup>, see p. 640 || 10 καθισταμένους Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> (corrected by p<sup>1</sup>) || τύχοντα M<sup>1</sup> τυχούσας possibly Γ || 11 [καὶ] Spengel, τῆς ? Ueberweg formerly, <τῆς> [καὶ] Susem., see Comm. n. (1094) || δὴ] δὲ Γ, perhaps rightly

(are violently present in those liable to pity and terror, but in a less degree in all men').

8 κατακώχιμοί] 'Liable to be possessed, attacked.' So also with ecstasy. Any one may be seized by slight frenzy, but in some it amounts to a disease, *κορυβαντισμός*. Plato uses *κατοκωχή* for inspiration, *Phaedr.* 245 A, *Ion* 536 C. Cp. Zeller p. 777 n. 1. (Note that all the MSS. agree here and 1269 b 30 in an irrational form. But in *Nic. Eth.* x. 9. 3, 1179 b 9 K<sup>b</sup> gives *κατοκώχιμον*.)

ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν] Join with *καθισταμένους*, not with ὀρώμεν. See Bursian's *Jahresber.* LVII. p. 174 [and Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 356 a 41]. These are assumed to be the same as the melodies of Olympus, mentioned c. 5 § 16. See Exc. II. p. 621.

SUSEM. (1090)

9 ὅταν χρήσωνται] "When they have used the melodies" in the same sense in which we speak of using remedies. Cp. n. (1095), and p. 641 f. SUSEM. (1091)

Like *κίνησις*, *καθίστασθαι*, *κονφίζεσθαι*, this is a medical term. Cp. Hippocr. III. 712 K. τῇσι φαρμακίῃσι χρέεσθαι, III. 859 κλυσμοῖσι χρέεσθαι, I. 82 τὴν αὐτὴν χρῆσιν (remedy, treatment) ἀεὶ προσδέχεσθαι (Döring). And this, notwithstanding the more general sense of τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι above, 1341 b 37. It might seem doubtful, from the context alone, whether the patient only listened to, or sang, the maddening strains. Aristides Quintil. implies that both were practised; *l.c.* κατασταλτέαν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) φασὶν εἶναι τῇ μελωδίᾳ, ἥτοι καὶ αὐτοὺς μιμήσει τινὶ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄλογον ἀπομειλιττομένους, ... ἢ καὶ δι' ἀκοῆς [ὀψews] φόβον τὸν τοιόνδε ἀποτρεπομένους, "the soul must, they say, be soothed by melody, either the patients themselves must appease its irrational state by a certain (musical) imitation (of the frenzy), or they must divert such terror from themselves by listening."

ἐξοργιάζουσιν] See ὀργιαστικόν, 1341 a 22, n. (1072), and ὀργιαστικά, 1342 b 3, n. (1107). SUSEM. (1092)

10 καθισταμένους] The expression pro-

perly means 'are cured,' 'recover' = return to themselves, as Döring has shown [see Steph. s. v. L. and S. quote only ἐς ἱήσιν καθ. Hippocr. 97, add I. 206, 208]. These terms however are not used of temporary, or palliative, restoration (such as is referred to here), but only of a permanent cure. In other passages of Aristotle *καθίστασθαι* simply means 'to calm oneself,' to settle down after excitement, with no suggestion of a medical sense: e.g. *De Memor.* c. 2 § 29, 453 a 271, διὸ καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ φόβοι, ὅταν τι κινήσωσιν, ἀντικινούντων πάλιν τούτων οὐ καθίστανται, *De Somn.* c. 3 § 25, 461 a 25, ἢ δὲ τρόφιμος καὶ μὴ νοσώδης (ἀναθυμίασις) καταφέρεται συνισταμένη. Even here this sense would be very appropriate. Cp. *κατάστασις Rhet.* I. II. 1, 1369 b 34. See also n. (1095), p. 640. SUSEM. (1093)

ὥσπερ ἱατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως] The ὥσπερ marks the introduction of a metaphor: both *ιατρεία* and *κάθαρσις* then are metaphorical, the latter the more specific term (Bernays).

This does not hold in the case of those who are sound in mind and possess exactly the right measure of emotional excitability, nor of those who are naturally too little disposed to emotion. As regards the former the medical analogy is only applicable in a precautionary sense, as when for instance a man of sound body must take bodily exercise to prevent illness, and in any case is refreshed and invigorated by a walk and finds pleasure and recreation in it. The latter are less susceptible to the power of music, and in so far as they are susceptible, it will be the excitable and not the purgative side of this homoeopathy of the feelings which will be most prominent, that is to say the really homoeopathic element will be least represented. SUSEM. (1094)

Comp. II. 7. 11, 1267 a 7 f., διὰ τὴν ταύτης (sc. ἐπιθυμίας) ἀδικήσουσιν ἱατρείαν.

§ 5 "So too of necessity with those who are liable to pity and fear, and persons of emotional temperament in

καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς καὶ τοὺς ὅλως πα- (VII)  
θητικούς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν ποιούτων  
ἐκάστω, καὶ πᾶσι γίνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κομφιῆσθαι  
μεθ' ἡδονῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ †καθαρκτικά† παρί-

12 τοὺς ὅλως ΑΓ., τοὺς < ὅλως > ὅλως? SUSSEM., ὅλως τῶν ΑΓ. not badly; but perhaps no change is needed. Döring (*Philologus* XLVII. p. 713) once conjectured [καὶ] τοὺς ὅλως: now (*Kunstlehre des Arist.* p. 257 n.) he prefers to accept the suggestion of Reiz II 15 καθαρκτικά Γ II ΑΓ. Bk. SUSSEM.<sup>1</sup> in the text and Thoms, who assumed a lacuna before ὁμοίως needlessly, see Comm.; *πρακτικά* Sauppe.

general, and with the rest of men in such measure as they are susceptible of this or that emotion; they have a like experience; they all undergo a purgation of some sort and feel a pleasurable relief." Under the former case (Corybantism) come only morbid patients: here the world at large are included. However slight the degree in which they are subject to pity and fear, still, so far as those passions have a hold upon them, they participate, in every-day life, in the same beneficial effect which frees the 'over-fraught heart' from its accumulation of emotion in critical moments. This is the normal effect of music and upon it attends the constant concomitant of normal activity, pleasure *μεθ' ἡδονῆς*).

13 καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει] In proportion to their susceptibility to such emotions. See 1360 a 19, 1361 b 32 n. Bernays p. 38 (188) shows that the *primitivité* of the cure of bacchic delirium (Corybantism) was observed by Plato (*Lysis* VII. 790 f.), though he never applied it to anything but the nursing of infants. "Aristotle," observes Butler, "with his generalising faculty and his love of discovering unity in different domains of life, extended the principle to tragedy and hints at even a wider application." However, on the whole the two are violently opposed as to the treatment of emotion. Bernays p. 46 (164) ff.

14 τινα κάθαρσιν] This implies that the *catharsis* is not in all cases precisely of the same kind. The *catharsis* of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, that of 'enthusiasm' or morbid ecstasy. See the note on 1360-α p. 641. SUSSEM. (1895)

κομφιῆσθαι] For the medical sense see *Quodl.* III. 17, 873 b 22 (of the disease); II. 22, 868 a 36, b 6; IV. 30, 880 a 33 (of the patient). Cp. Hippocr. I. 177, III. 712 K. (Döring).

15 τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρκτικά] Thus

the authorities. Sauppe's emendation εὐπρακτικά was adopted in SUSSEM.<sup>2</sup>. See Excursus V. p. 638 f. especially p. 640 n. 1, and generally n. (1888). See also (1896)

In handling a *lexis* *clausulae* like this, excessive caution is no sin. Yet it must be allowed that the reading of the *μολυ* leaves the sentence enigmatical. (1) Does it merely emphasize τὰ μέλη as opposed to ἁρμονία, a 4? This can hardly be, though apparently Mr Newman thus takes the passage (see the quotation given above after n. 1089). For *μολυ* are mentioned a 9 f., not to urge with Thoms *Didask.* p. 103 that Aristotle so little distinguishes between ἁρμονία and *μολυ* as a technical critic between the keys in which music is written and the compositions themselves, passing naturally from the one to the other, and contrasting them indifferently with *μεθροί*; see e.g. 6 f 5, 1341 a 1, 7 f 10, 1342 b 5 f. (2) Does it introduce a new species of airs? But surely, those treated in a 4—13 must be excluded. The *new* species should be transcribed of which nothing has been said. Unless indeed any one maintains, as against n. (1089), that the effect of tragedy is allied to f 5, a 11—15, and thus apparently meaningless clause returns to the consideration of music. (3) Or does it introduce a new effect (ἡδονή ἀπὸ κατάρσεως) of the music whose cathartic effect has been described in 4—13? If so, the 'charming delight' would be contrasted with the cathartic effect in which pleasure is blended with, and follows, painful emotions. Zeller p. 774 n. (1) says that music purges the *καθαρτικά*, and affords enjoyment to all. Döring p. 250 finds a contrast between (1) the extraordinary, curative effect, *καθαίρει ἀπλῶς*, of morbid passions (whether suffering from the intensity of bacchic frenzy, or hyperaesthesia through excessive pity and terror), and (2) the normal cathartic effect of poetic music heard at concerts under ordinary circumstances.

§ 6 χει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύ-  
 ταις ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι \* \* θετέον τοὺς τὴν  
 [θεατρικὴν] μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνιστάς (ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ  
 θεατὴς διττός, ὃ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὃ δὲ  
 20 φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγ-  
 § 7 κείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις  
 πρὸς ἀνάπαισιν· εἰσὶ δὲ ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρε-  
 στραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν

16 χώραν Π<sup>1</sup> (emended in P<sup>1</sup> by corr.<sup>1</sup>) and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 17 θεατέον P<sup>3.5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ar.  
 Ald. and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>) P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand, emended in the margin with γρ. prefixed), <χρη-  
 σθαι> ἐατέον Ed. Müller II. p. 63, <χρησθαι> θετέον Spengel, both plausible: Koraes  
 detected the error: παιδευτέον Jebb || τοὺς P<sup>3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (in the margin, with  
 γρ. prefixed): omitted by M<sup>s</sup> || 18 θεατρικὴν written above the line as a gloss by  
 p<sup>2</sup>, omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> Ar. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), added by Bk. with all other authorities ||  
 19 ἐλευθέριος ? Susem. || 22 εἰσὶ ἐστὶ Bk.<sup>2</sup>

stances. Bernays translated (from Bekker's text): "now in the same manner as other means of *catharsis* the cathartic melodies procure for men innocent delight. Therefore it must be laid down by law that those who perform the music for the theatre" which is intended to provide innocent delight "should come forward with such modes and melodies." The objection to this is the forced meaning of *ὁμοίως*. The means of catharsis just mentioned are melodies: where is there a distinct suggestion of any other? Certainly not in *ταὐτὸ τοῦτο πάσχειν*. Busse moreover *op. c.* p. 49 accepts the correction *πρακτικά*.

§ 6 "Hence it is such modes and such melodies that we must prescribe for the virtuosi, who take up music professionally, to employ in their performances. But as there are two types of audience, the one of birth and education, the other the vulgar audience of mechanics and day-labourers and the like, entertainments and competitions must be found to provide even these latter with recreation."

16 τοιαύταις] Namely, *καθαρτικαῖς*: see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421 f.

17 θετέον] The construction with the dative would follow more smoothly if *χρησθαι* were supplied, or *ἀγωνίζεσθαι* in place of *ἀγωνιστάς*. Still the meaning is clear. In *τοὺς...μεταχειριζομένους* it is not hard to discover *τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην* of c. 5 § 6, 1339 a 37. The care shown for the amusements of the lower class of citizens is worthy of Plato and the *Republic*,

20 ἐκ βαναύσων...συγκείμενος] As an attribute of *θεατὴς* this is curious. Perhaps we may cite as parallel Cic. *De Finibus* II. 44, cum Epicuro autem hoc plus negotii est, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, or *ad Att.* IV. 15. 1, ut est ex me et ex te iunctus Dionysius M. Pomponius.

21 ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας] These musical contests and competitions seem to have excited the keenest interest, and to have led to brilliant pieces of extraordinary difficulty being practised even at school; c. 6 § 7, § 16.

§ 7 "Just as their souls are distorted from their natural state, so too amongst the musical modes there are some perverse forms and amongst melodies the high-strung and falsely coloured, but as its own natural affinity gives every class pleasure, we must allow the artists who perform before such an audience to use the corresponding style of music."

22 ὥσπερ αὐτῶν...23 ἕξεως] Comp. *n.* (103), and above c. 6 §§ 15, 16, *n.* (1080). But on the other hand see the praise of the great public as a critic in art III. II. 2, *n.* (565 b). SUSEM. (1097)

23 καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις] It is not easy to determine with certainty which modes are meant. Perhaps he was thinking of the 'wailing and mournful' music of the mixo-Lydian and high-pitched Lydian principally: it may have been of the 'lax and effeminate' low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian. See c. 5 § 22, also Exc. IV. *n.* (1054). SUSEM. (1098)



καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστί, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας (V  
 1342 b τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν αὐλόν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἢ  
 φρυγιστὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἥνπερ αὐλὸς ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις·  
 § 10 ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικά καὶ παθητικά. δηλοῖ δ' ἡ ποίη- 9  
 σις. πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις (V  
 5 μάλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς, τῶν δ' ἁρμο-  
 νιῶν ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεσι λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὸ πρέπον.  
 οἶον ὁ διθύραμβος ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι δοκεῖ Φρύγιον.  
 § 11 καὶ τούτου πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν σύννε-  
 σιν ταύτην ἄλλα τε, καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν

1342 b 2 φρυγιστὴ Γ || 8 δείγματα P<sup>4.6</sup> L<sup>s</sup>

ἐν εἰρηνικῇ τε καὶ μὴ βιαίῳ ἄλλ' ἐν ἐκουσίῳ  
 πράξει ὄντος, ἢ τινὰ τι πείθοντός τε καὶ  
 δεομένου, ἢ εὐχῇ θεὸν ἢ διδασχῇ καὶ νοουθε-  
 τήσει ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τοῦναντίον ἄλλω δεομένῳ  
 ἢ διδάσκοντι ἢ μεταπείθοντι ἑαυτὸν ἐπέχον-  
 τα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ  
 μὴ ὑπερῆφάνως ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ σωφρόνως τε  
 καὶ μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πράττοντά τε  
 καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα. ταύτας δύο  
 ἁρμονίας βίαιον, ἐκούσιον, δυστυχοῦντων,  
 εὐτυχοῦντων, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων αἵτινες  
 φθόγγους μιμήσονται μάλιστα, ταύτας  
 λέει. As with the musical instruments,  
 n. (1071), so in the case of the modes  
 Aristotle is stricter than Plato, since in  
 truth—see *iii.* (1086, 1102, 1104, 1109)—  
 the Dorian Mode is the only one which  
 he retains for the purpose of moral  
 education. SUSEM. (1105)

34 ἀποδοκιμάσας.....τὸν αὐλόν] Pl.  
*Rerp.* III. 399 D: τί δέ; αὐλοποιούς ἢ αὐλη-  
 τὰς παραδέξει εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο  
 πολυχорδόντατον καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια  
 αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μίμημα; The osten-  
 sible ground for its rejection is the com-  
 plexity of its music. SUSEM. (1106)

1342 b 3 ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικά κτλ]  
 We were told this before of the flute, c. 6  
 § 9, 1341 a 22 ff., οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἡθικὸν  
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν; it has an in-  
 toxicating effect, tending not to form, but  
 to purge, character. The Phrygian Mode  
 again was described as relatively the  
 most maddening and ecstatic, c. 5 § 22.  
 The addition of the more general term  
 παθητικά = 'passionate' here is a fresh and  
 striking proof that the ecstatic modes, αἱ  
 ἐνθουσιαστικαὶ ἁρμονίαι, are not restricted  
 to the expression or impression upon  
 others of Ecstasy pure and simple. On  
 the contrary, like the flute amongst musi-  
 cal instruments, they are adapted gene-  
 rally to portray and call up all emotions,

or at least all painful emotions:—in the  
 words of the text, 'all Bacchic frenzy and  
 similar mental excitement.' Comp. Exc.  
 IV. p. 628 and notes (1089, 1047), also  
 n. (1096) p. 643. SUSEM. (1107)

§ 10 *Poetry shows this.* When the  
 subject is wild and delirious, as in a  
 dithyramb, the music is set for the flute  
 and the airs are in the Phrygian Mode.  
 The cogency of this illustration depends  
 on the fact, which must always be borne  
 in mind, that the Greek poet set his own  
 words to music (precisely as in the Wag-  
 nerian opera): he also chose his own  
 dance measures.

5 τῶν δ' ἁρμονιῶν ἐν τοῖς...μέλεσι]  
 See Thurot p. 103 (cited above p. 611  
 upon § 6, 1342 a 15).

6 ταῦτα=βακχεία καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνη-  
 σις (subject).

§ 11 8 οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνεσιν ταύτην]  
 An extraordinary phrase where we should  
 expect οἱ περὶ ταῦτα συνετοὶ ὄντες: i.e.  
 musical critics or connoisseurs. In Bonitz'  
 words, σύνεσις is used 'objective' = ἡ μου-  
 σικὴ τέχνη.

9 Φιλόξενος] Of Cythera, born 459  
 B.C., one of the most famous of the dithy-  
 rambic poets. He lived for some time at  
 the court of the elder Dionysius, who  
 imprisoned him in the stone quarries of  
 Syracuse, where (according to one ac-  
 count) he wrote his most noted dithyramb  
 Κύκλωψ. When brought out to listen to  
 Dionysius' own compositions, he is said  
 to have addressed the attendants in the  
 words *Εἰς λατομίας*, "Take me back to  
 the quarries." See further respecting  
 him Bernhardt *Gesch. d. griech. Litteratur*  
 II<sup>2</sup>. p. 669 ff. (ed. 2), SUSEM. (1108)  
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his criti-  
 cism of the later dithyrambic poets, in-  
 cluding Philoxenus, specially mentions

τῇ δωριστὶ ποιῆσαι διθύραμβον τοὺς μύθους οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔν, (V II)  
 ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὶ τῆς  
 προσήκουσαν ἁρμονίαν πάλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες οὐ  
 ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστα ἦθος ἐχούσης  
 ἀνδρείον. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἵπαι  
 νοῦμεν καὶ χρῆναι διώκειν φαμέν, ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτην ἔχει  
 τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἁρμονίας, φανερόν ὅτι τὰ Δω-  
 ρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. [εἰσι  
 δὲ δύο σκοποί, τό τε δυνατόν καὶ τὸ πρέπον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ  
 δυνατόν δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ πρέποντα ἐκά-  
 στοις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὠρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, οἷον τοῖς  
 ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνου οὐ ῥάδιον ἄδειν τὰς συντόνους ἁρμο-

10 διθύραμβον τοῖς] διθύραμβικοῖς Ramus | Muscōt Schneidler Bk.<sup>2</sup>, μούσους  
 ? Schmidt, [τοῖς μύθοις] Sauppe | 11 τὴν προσήκουσαν... 12 δωριστὶ omitted by P<sup>2</sup>  
 | 13 δωριστὶ Γ, δωριστιῇ Ald. | 17 τοῖς νεωτέροις Cantab., possibly Γ, rightly  
 | [εἰσι... 34 πρέπον] Sussem.<sup>2-3</sup>; see Comm. n. (1113) | 19 ἐπέειπε Γ<sup>2</sup>, ἐπέειπε  
 II<sup>2-3</sup> | 21 χρῶν Μ', χρόνον P<sup>2-5</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk., avoiding hiatus

their intermixture of styles and license in  
 (lylthia): οἱ δὲ γε διθύραμβοι καὶ τοῖς  
 τριστοῖς μετέβαλλον, Δωρίους τε καὶ Φρυ-  
 γίους καὶ Λυδίους ἐν τῷ ἁρματι συνίστην  
 καὶ τὰς μελοδίας ἐθέλλαντες καὶ τοῖς  
 ὁμοῖς ἐνὶ πολλῇ ἁρμῇ συνίσταντες  
 διενέλκον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐνὶ Φυλῶντος καὶ  
 Τιμόθεου καὶ Τελειππῆ· ἐνὶ παρὰ γὰρ τοῖς  
 ἀρχαίοις τεταγμένοις ἦν ὁ διθύραμβος, *The*  
*ancient*, 1897, 19, p. 131, 14 ff., cf. *Antiqua*

11 ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς] See § 13,  
 1342 b 27, ἡ φύσις υποβάλλει: also *Mosa*.  
 1. 3. 14, 984 b 9 f., ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀφ-  
 ῥάσεως ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἐξήγησαν, and *P'yl.*  
 1. 6, 188 b 29 f.

12 13 ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς οὔσης] See  
 1261 b 12 n. Comp. vi(IV). 9. 7, 1294  
 b 10. The best explanation and parallels  
 in *Ludwick* and *Soph. Anac.* 281. Frequent  
 in *Plaut.* e.g. *P'yl.* 16 c, *Lauti* 624 a. n.

στασιμωτάτης] That the Dorian is  
 the only mode which produces a sober and  
 sedate frame of mind was said c. §  
 22, 1340 b 3. Comp. *notes* (1102, 1103).  
 SUSSEM. (1109)

14 ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον κτλ] See vi  
 (IV). 11. 4, 1295 b 3 f., ὁμολογοῦνται τὸ  
 αὐτὸν ἁρμονίαν καὶ τὸ μέσον, n. (1290 b).  
 SUSSEM. (1110)

15 ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ κτλ] I.e. the Dorian  
 melodies are principally of a middle com-  
 position. In contrast to this, melodies com-  
 posed in the 'high-strung' (εὐστρώς) and  
 low-pitched (ἀναστρώς, χαλαρὰ) modes  
 diverge from this middle composition in the

higher and lower parts of the register  
 respectively. This is explained in *Ex-*  
*curtus* III. n. (1024) p. 625. SUSSEM. (1111)

§ 13 18 σκοποί] τὰς αἰτίας πρὸς ταῖς ἐν-  
 ῥάσεσιν, 1341 b 15. That the choice of melodies  
 must be regulated by what is practicable  
 and what is becoming (i.e. for the age  
 and voice of the performers) is a truism,  
 whoever enunciates it, see c. 6 § 3, n.

20 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα κτλ] "But these  
 conditions (viz. what is practicable and  
 what is becoming) are defined by the age  
 of the performers. For instance, it is not  
 easy for those who are old and feeble to  
 sing in the high-strung modes: nature  
 suggests the low-pitched modes at their  
 age."

21 διὰ χρόνου] διὰ ε. gen. *tempus* (1)  
 "after the lapse of some time" as in III.  
 4. 6, 1275 a 25, and vi(IV). 11. 4, 1295  
 a 6, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκπαρέουσι, cf. III b. *Quintus*  
*trouit* τὰς ἀρχαί. So in *Plaut.* 1. 11. 20,  
 1371 a 19 f., *trouit* τὰς ἀρχαί, a thing  
 seen after an interval, an occasional en-  
 joyment. Hence the distributive sense  
 of διὰ χρόνου from 1345 b 10, διὰ χρόνον  
 (ἐκπαρέουσι) 1294 b 21. (2) In διὰ χρόνον  
 cp. διὰ χρόνον γὰρ. 1274 b 12) of any long  
 duration. With the accumulative (see P<sup>2</sup> II<sup>2</sup>  
 see *Crat.* n.) the sense is roughly: those  
 who fail by reason of age. This reading  
 avoids the hiatus, which is in its favour.  
 But the causal sense with gen. is admitted  
 by *Lincken* p. 38. *Hagfater* p. 48; cp.  
 1337 a 35 (V), 1336 b 14 (*trouit* διὰ χρόνον)

νίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνειμένας ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλι-  
 § 14 κούτοις. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο <τῷ> Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ 1  
 τὴν μουσικὴν τινες, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἀρμονίας ἀποδοκι-  
 25 μάσειεν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτάς,  
 οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν (βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἢ γε  
 μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον) ἀλλ' ἀπειρηκυίας. ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν  
 ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεῖ καὶ τῶν τοιού-  
 § 15 των ἀρμονιῶν ἄπτεσθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων. ἔτι  
 30 δ' εἴ τίς ἐστι τοιαύτη τῶν ἀρμονιῶν ἣ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παί-  
 δων ἡλικίᾳ διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ' ἔχειν ἅμα καὶ  
 παιδείαν, οἶον ἢ λυδιστὶ φαίνεται πεπονθέναι μάλιστα τῶν

23 τῷ added by Wilson || 27 ὥστε <εἰ> Spengel || καὶ untranslated by Wil-  
 liam, perhaps rightly: but 29 ἔτι δὲ may answer to this καὶ || 28 καὶ untranslated  
 by William and Ar., [καὶ] Koraes || 30 ἢ Γ. Ald. || 32 παιδιὰν C. E. Ch.  
 Schneider (on Pl. *Rep.* III. 399 A) || παιδείαν οἶαν P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, corrected by later  
 hands), διάνοιαν IP<sup>1</sup> (οἶον added in the text and γρ. παιδείαν by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin of  
 P<sup>1</sup>) and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>)

§ 14 23 <τῷ> Σωκράτει] I.e. in  
 Plato *Rep.* III. 398 E: τίνες οὖν μαλακαὶ  
 καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν; Ἰαστί, ἣ δ'  
 ὅς, καὶ λυδιστὶ, αἵτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται.  
 Ταύταις οὖν, ὃ φίλε, ἐπὶ πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν  
 ἔσθ' ὅτι χρήσει; SUSEM. (1112)

25 ὡς μεθυστικὰς κτλ] "On the  
 assumption that this is drunken music,  
 not in the sense of intoxication—indeed  
 intoxication rather tends to excite mad  
 revelry—but as being enervated." Bonitz  
 is probably right in making 27 ἀπειρηκυίας  
 acc. plur. *Ind. Ar.* 71 b 47, comparing  
 24 τὰς ἀνειμένας ἀρμονίας: and so 'enerv-  
 ated,' languid, exhausted. Schneider  
 preferred to regard it as gen. sing., but if  
 that were so, surely we should expect  
 αὐτῆς τῆς μέθης or some equivalent as  
 the antithesis of τῆς μέθης ἀπειρηκυίας.

§§ 13—15 17 εἰσὶ δὲ...34 πρέπον] That this close of the chapter is a foreign  
 addition is indicated by the square  
 brackets, and must be admitted unless  
 we choose to believe that Aristotle would  
 again partially introduce by a side-wind  
 the musical modes which he has already  
 openly banished from education. Aris-  
 totle recommends Dorian melodies for  
 the instruction of the young on account  
 of their middle compass: all other modes,  
 'the most ethical' alone excepted, are  
 excluded: also, he expressly warns us  
 against any education for amusement, c. 5  
 § 4. He distinctly forbids adults to sing

or play, c. 6 § 4, and consequently re-  
 stricts the introduction of 'practical'  
 (πρακτικαί) or 'ecstatic' Modes, as well  
 as the less 'ethical' Modes, see *n.* (1087),  
 to performances at which the citizens are  
 auditors. The author of this addition,  
 on the other hand, is anxious that the  
 youth should also learn to sing in modes  
 which, from the low compass of the melo-  
 dies, are least suited to them and best  
 adapted to be actually sung in riper age.  
 Now it is no doubt true that these low-  
 pitched modes do not belong either to  
 the 'practical' (πρακτικαί) or to the  
 'ecstatic' but to the 'ethical' class and  
 appear to constitute the less ethical; see  
*nn.* (1054, 1087). It is further true that  
 Aristotle allows the citizens of his ideal  
 state an occasional banquet for relaxation  
 and recreation, IV(VII). 17. 11, cp. *n.*  
 (966), and at such times probably also  
 permits them the exceptional privilege of  
 singing (see c. 5 § 8 with *nn.* 1028, 1067).  
 It is true that the description of the low-  
 pitched keys here given (ἀπειρηκυίας)  
 points, like Plato's *Rep.* 398 E, see *n.*  
 (1112), to the appositeness of their em-  
 ployment on such occasions. Finally it  
 cannot be denied that the idea of learning  
 something in youth, which may afford  
 amusement in later life, is not wrong in  
 itself (c. 4 §§ 5—7), though in the present  
 instance inadmissible, because for mere  
 amusement it is not necessary to learn to

ἁρμονιῶν, ἡ \* \* δῆλον ὅτι τρεῖς τούτους ὄρους ποιητὶον εἰς τὴν (VII) παιδείαν, τό τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τὸ πρέπον \* \*]

33 ἡ after ἁρμονιῶν added by P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (cont.<sup>1</sup>), omitted by all other authorities. Ar. Bk. | \* \* δῆλον Conring, δῆλον <ὅτι> <δὲ> Schneider | great other lacuna M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2.5</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. | ταύτας P | οὗς ὄρους omitted by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), the lacuna left being filled in with another ink, ὄρους omitted by P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> | 34 ταύτας P<sup>2</sup>, ταύτας P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, corrected by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) | πρέπον \* \* Williams (*nominae huius operis in greco nondum inveni*)

sing and play yourself, when you can get others to perform to you, c. § 8: cp. *uv.* (1024, 1025, 1036). However, this is quite enough to condemn the proposed instruction of boys in melodies to be hereafter sung at drinking parties. Aristotle would have been much more concerned to practise the young in the 'practical' (πρακτικά) and ecstatic melodies, in order to educate their taste for the end of the highest intellectual enjoyment. But he obviously thought: teach a boy to sing and play minor tunes, and amid the mirth and gaiety of a banquet he will surely, if so inclined, be able to sing melodies in the major modes, and appreciate them at musical performances intended for true aesthetic enjoyment.

And now let us consider for one moment the illogical sequence of the whole passage. The introduction: "but in musical instruction, as in all else, we should keep in view what is practicable and what is fitting" stands in no conceivable logical connexion with what precedes. Has the previous restriction of musical teaching to the Dorian and the related Modes any other object except to secure for the young what is practicable and fitting, because suited to their capacity? Even the casual remark at the close, 1342 b 14 ff., that just on account of its middle compass the Dorian Mode is specially adapted to induce moral virtue, which is a mean between two extremes (see *u.* 1111), is directed simply to what is fitting. Thus the interpolator has failed to recognize, for he brings in the Mean as a third aim, different from the possible and the fitting. He has not then perceived that the medium compass of the Dorian Mode is only a secondary reason and not the sole reason for preferring it. Starting from the strangely perverted notion that this was the only reason, he felt bound to assign some part to propriety and the possible, and so he goes on to remark that not only the possible but also the fitting is determined by grade:

tions of age, a mere truism as regards the latter point, since the interpolator has expressly stated that by what is fitting for youth he understands (*ἐκείνους δὲ οὗς ταύτας*) grace (*δυσκράσια*) and moral culture. Then, first, a word as to possibility or capacity. It might have been thought that according to this standard boys should be taught to sing in the modes best adapted to their age from the compass of the melodies. Instead of this exactly the opposite inference is drawn, that they require further instruction in those modes which are better adapted, or only adapted, to older people. Secondly, from the point of view of what is becoming for boys the Lydian Mode is especially recommended:—just as though Aristotle had not himself prescribed the Dorian Mode from the same point of view as almost the only one permissible. Had he intended to assign to the Lydian Mode a special place beside or next to the Dorian, he would have found an opportunity in § 8, 1342 a 30, instead of merely referring to the decision of professional musicians, who are at the same time philosophers, the question what modes, other than the Dorian, may be employed in the education of the young. As we shall see in Exc. IV, Aristotle himself probably did not reckon the Lydian among the ethical modes at all, but among the *ὑποκράσια*. The distinction made by the interpolator between outward decorum and inner moral culture, *εὐκράσια* *ἐξωτερικὴ* and *ὑποκράσια*, cannot appear genuinely Aristotelian to any reader of the *Ἠθικά*, for in Aristotle's view the mean of moral virtue and he alone believes with outward propriety, and the habit of behaving thus even counts among the moral virtues: see *N. Ἠθ.* IV. ch. 8—8 (11—14 Bekker). And is not decorum just as fitting for adults as for children? Or has *εὐκράσια* a different meaning from *δυσκράσια*? A further error of the writer is apparent from a lacuna in the text where even the sense cannot be supplied. The 4 par-

served in two MSS. would seem to indicate (*a*) that he had discovered something else besides propriety and moral culture, which is more suitable to children than to adults, and had smuggled in a new mode to serve this purpose: or else (*b*) this  $\eta$  marks the transition from the possible and fitting to the Mean, τὸ μέσον, which, as well as τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ πρέπον, is the subject of the last sentence with its mutilated commencement. In short, though in this book Aristotle has often been inconsistent and obscure, has

fallen into apparent or perhaps actual contradictions, as may be seen from *notes* (993, 1000, 1003, 1015, 1024, 1027, 1038, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1045, 1059, 1062, 1067, 1079, 1094, 1096, 1098, 1101, 1102, 1104, 1105, 1109), yet all this goes beyond anything we can attribute to Aristotle himself. Indeed it would be paying the writer too high a compliment to look for him in the ranks of Aristotle's immediate pupils. He would seem to have been a Peripatetic of a later date. SUSEM. (1113)

1 - 6	Mythology, legends, tales	Early games - somewhat like those
7 - 14	Elements of gymnastics	1 - 14 - light gymnastics
15 - 17	Reading, writing, arithmetic	14 - 17 - drawing, writing, arithmetic
18 - 21	Musical instruction	17 - 21 - stricter military drill
22 - 24	Higher gymnastics & dancing	21 - 24 - 5 x 24 = 1200
25 - 27	Elements of natural science, geometry, astronomy	
28 - 30	Military training	EXCURSUS I
31 - 34	Higher scientific training	
35 - 38	Philosophy	ARISTOTLE'S SCHEME OF EDUCATION.
39 - 41	Philosophy	

ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστότεον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστότεον, ὁμολογούμενον ἔστιν (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἤβης ταυτέστιμα γυμνάσια προαιρούμενα). ὅταν δ' ἄφ' ἡβῆς ἐκείνη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γίνονται, τότε ἀρρόσται καὶ τοῖς πόλεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀστυνομασίαις καταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν. V(VIII). c. 4 § 7-9, 1338 b 39-41, 1339 a 4-7.

This passage furnishes most of the scanty information we gain respecting the education of the citizens as a whole. Aristotle distinctly states that gymnastic training must come first, c. 3 § 13, 1338 b 5 f. n. (1003). He makes the first easy course of gymnastics to extend from the seventh year, IV(VII). 17. 15, to the age of puberty; gives the next three years, from 14 to 17, to the remaining subjects of education, and then appoints a stricter course of military drill lasting to the twenty-first year, to fit the youth for service in the army. This arrangement differs materially from that of Plato, n. 329, in the longer period assigned to gymnastics as compared with the other subjects to be learnt. On the other hand, it has been shown in the *Introd.* p. 51, from a comparison of c. 3 § 10, 1338 a 31-34, with c. 5 § 4, 1339 a 29 f., n. (1024) that a higher scientific training was intended to follow, as in Plato's scheme, after the twenty-first year, especially in the principal subjects, most probably in pure and applied mathematics and finally in philosophy (παιδεία ἐλευθέριος καὶ καλῇ). These are the higher sciences (τὰ περὶ τοῦ νοῦ) mentioned c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 42, n. (979), of which it is not true, as it is of other studies (or at any rate, most other studies, including even proficiency in gymnastics and music; see c. 2 § 5, n. 982) that, while not in themselves derogatory to a free man, they cannot be carried beyond a certain point without risk of βαρβαρία.

Aristotle's ideal state is not therefore, like Plato's Republic, in the last resort a preparation for another world, for he ignores individual immortality. It is quite as much a school of intellectual study as of morality: it is in the former aspect that its highest end is attained, cp. *Introd.* p. 48 f. But in the sequel wherever the word παιδεία is employed, c. 5 § 9, 1339 b 12, c. 6 § 3, 1341 a 13, § 9, 1341 a 18, c. 7 § 1 ff., 1341 b 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, it almost always denotes the early training, in the narrower sense of the term, before the twenty-first year (even μάθησις is so used c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23), and hence that development of character of which the young are susceptible as they grow up, viz. the acquisition of moral habits, rather than that development of reason and the understanding which is only attainable

at a ripe age by instruction, experience, or personal reflection and inquiry. Nevertheless a certain tendency in this direction is clearly inseparable from the formation of character in the young, since without it even moral habits could not be acquired: see *n.* (1045). But Aristotle distinctly regards the speculative enjoyment, the aesthetic contemplation of the beautiful creations of imitative art as one factor in that highest intellectual gratification which in his judgment constitutes the true end of life and the height of human happiness. The question arises then: Would he have prohibited the citizens of his ideal state from engaging in the creation of such works of art? That instrumental performers and solo-singers living by the practice of their art, indeed all professional musicians, would have been classed with *τεχνῖται* or paid professionals would be quite certain even if we had not his repeated assurances to this effect, c. 5 § 8, c. 6 §§ 4—8, 15, 16. Actors he would doubtless have treated in the same way, especially as in Greece they were all trained to dance and sing on the stage in solo parts. Nor would he have been likely to show more consideration to the rhapsodists. Even for the purposes of singing and dancing in the dramatic, as in most of the lyric choruses, some sort of professional training was required; while the leader of the chorus was certainly obliged to be a skilful solo singer. The prohibition to practise music in later life c. 6 § 4, 1340 b 37 ff., *n.* (1067) sounds so uncompromising that even the equally precise statement, “no well-bred gentleman ever sings or plays, unless it be over his wine or for a jest” (*καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος*, c. 5 § 8, 1339 b 9, *n.* 1029), barely justifies the inference that on exceptional festive occasions this prohibition ceases to apply. Of any further concession, permitting the citizens to sing in the lighter lyric choruses, no trace can be found. For all these arts, then, only strangers, aliens, and freedmen are available in the ideal state. Even creative artists, who live by their art, and similarly, no doubt, writers of comedies, farces, and the like, cannot be conceived as occupying a different position. But we need not hence infer that Aristotle would have objected to see amongst his citizens such masters of sculpture and painting as Polygnotus (c. 5 § 7), Pheidias and Polycletus (*Nic. Eth.* VI. 7. 1, 1141 a 10 ff.); or such tragic poets as Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Theodectes. Very possibly he may have hoped that his educational course would prove exactly fitted to produce just such men in his state, men who like the rest of his citizens are of course in easy circumstances, obliged, and at the same time competent, to renounce all thought of a return for their art in money or money's worth. “It is inconceivable,” remarks Bradley, *Hellenica* p. 214 *n.*, “that Aristotle, with his high view of art, should have considered his account of *βαναυσία* applicable to Phidias; but probably the following typically antique passage would not have sounded so strange to him as it does to modern ears: ‘If a man applies himself to servile or mechanical employments his industry in these things is a proof of his inattention to nobler studies’: *καὶ οὐδεὶς εὐφυῆς νέος ἢ τὸν ἐν Πίσῃ θεασάμενος Δία γενέσθαι Φειδίας ἐπεθύμησεν ἢ τὴν Ἥραν τὴν ἐν Ἀργεὶ Πολύκλειτος, οὐδ’ Ἀνακρέων ἢ Φιλητᾶς ἢ Ἀρχίλοχος ἢ σθεῖς αὐτῶν τοῖς ποιήμασιν*: Plutarch, *Vita Periclis* c. 2, p. 153 A.” SUSEM. (1015)

## EXCURSUS II.

## THE COMPOSITIONS OF OLYMPUS.

τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιῆ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικὰς, V(VIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 9 f. Cp. ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν ὁρᾶμεν τοίτους ὅταν χρῆσονται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλῃσι, καθισταμένους ὡς περ ἱερμίας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως, c. 7 § 4, 1342 a 8—11.

Olympus, like Musaeus *n.* (1034), is not an historical character, but personifies in legend the earliest development amongst the Greeks, principally under Phrygian influence, of instrumental music for the flute: see Exc. IV. *n.* (1078). For apparently all the pieces ascribed to him which were preserved until Aristotle's times and later were purely instrumental compositions for the flute (see Bergk *Poet. Lyr.*<sup>1</sup> p. 809 f.) or nothing but αἰλητικοὶ νόμοι, as they were called; cp. *n.* (17) to my edition of the *Poet. Lyr.* Some of them were older than any other pieces of music, instrumental or vocal, then extant (Glaucus apud Plutarch. *De Musica* 5, 1132 f, 9<sup>2</sup>, and on this account Olympus was regarded among the Greeks as the originator of artistic music: Plut. *op. c.* 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. *op. c.* 11, 1135 B; cp. Glauc. *l. c.* But others were of later date than Terpander, and even than Thaletas<sup>2</sup>, see *nn.* (419, 788). Musical connoisseurs in antiquity, such as the tragic poet Pratinas, who easily recognized the difference, made an attempt to distinguish an older from a younger Olympus, the latter a descendant of the former, and to ascribe to the younger those νόμοι of Olympus which exhibited a more advanced artistic development, for example, a νόμος πολυκέφαλος, so called from the number of its preludes. Others went further and invented a pupil of this younger Olympus, Crates by name, to whom they assigned the authorship of the πολυκέφαλοι. Another of these airs (νόμοι), called ἁρμόσιος, of far older date, was admitted by all the critics to be the work of the earlier Olympus: see Plut. *l. c.* 7, 1133 D E. Besides these we know of an air composed in the Phrygian Mode (see Exc. IV) in honour of Athene, called ὄρθιος, the prelude to which was in different time from the body of the air (Dio Chrys. I. ad init., Aristox. apud Plutarch. *op. c.* 33, 1143 B; cp. Plat. *Crat.* 417 E), another in honour of Ares (Plut. *op. c.* 29, 1141 B), a dirge upon Python, the earliest composition in the Lydian Mode (Aristox. apud Plutarch. 15, 1136 C), also compositions in honour of Cybele called μητρώοι (Plut. *l. c.* 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. *op. c.* 15, 1137 D).

<sup>1</sup> The reference to the oldest flute-players can only apply to Olympus and his school. There can be no doubt that, as Bergk and Westphal agree, αἰλητικῶς and αἰλητικῶν should be read in this passage, instead of αἰλητικῶν and αἰλη-

τικῶν.

<sup>2</sup> For the introduction of the phrygian or cretic rhythm into artistic music is rightly ascribed to Thaletas, and in the prelude to the air in honour of Athene ascribed to Olympus this rhythm occurs.

As to the strange effect of these musical compositions, Plato says much the same thing, that they possessed a specially overpowering and extravagantly exciting character, and discovered such as feel a longing desire for the gods and their worship<sup>1</sup>. Undoubtedly such airs and, in particular, those of them composed in the ecstatic Phrygian Mode (see Exc. IV. p. 628 and *n.* 1107), are the 'sacred melodies' from which Aristotle c. 7 § 4, *n.* (1090), demonstrates the purifying effect of music in its most original form, since through the ecstasy which these airs awaken morbid ecstasy is expelled. This homoeopathic purgation from excitement is present to Aristotle's mind here, though all he alludes to is the arousing of the ecstasy by which it is effected. All the more noteworthy, then, is the inference here from this well known purgative (cathartic) effect of music to the possibility of a moral effect. However carefully they are distinguished (c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 21 f., c. 7 § 3 ff.), these two kinds of influence must have much in common. SUSEM. (1042)

### EXCURSUS III.

#### ETHOS OR CHARACTER.

ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμός τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθους πάθος ἐστίν, V(VIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 11 f.

Döring *Kunstlehre des Aristoteles* p. 335 ff. (*Philologus* XXVII. p. 705 ff.) has proved that in this passage, as well as in c. 2 § 1, 1337 a 39, *n.* (977), and elsewhere, the expression 'character of the soul,' τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς (or τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν) ἥθος, or 'character' only, must be taken to mean *not* the more or less fixed special state of a man in regard to moral virtue and vice generally, or to this or that virtue and vice in particular, and hence in regard to his relation to the emotions, but the moral nature<sup>2</sup> itself, the seat of desire and mental emotion, as the subject of the particular state in question: cp. *nn.* (40, 641, 786, 935, 790). But two things make it impossible to accept this explanation without modification. In the first place, if we look more closely, *n.* (1022), it appears that this 'orectic' soul is also that within us by which we feel every kind of pain or pleasure, so that the influence of music upon the character in this sense might equally be said to consist in the recreative pleasure with which music tickles the ear. In the second place, the inference that "because music undoubtedly calls forth the primary emotion of ecstasy, it must therefore affect that part of the soul which is the seat of the emotions as well as of the moral virtues and vices" is quite sound, but does not in the least prove what Aristotle is anxious here to prove, namely, that music can

<sup>1</sup> Plato *Sympos.* 215 C: Socrates is like Marsyas; ὁ μὲν γε δι' ὀργάνων ἐκλήλει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δυνάμει, καὶ ἔτι νυνὶ ὅς ἂν τὰ ἐκείνου αὐλῇ. ἃ γὰρ Ὀλυμπος ἡὔλει, Μαρσύου λέγω, τοῦ διδάξ-

αντος. τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου ἔάν τε ἀγαθὸς αὐλητῆς αὐλῇ ἔάν τε φαύλη αὐλητρίς, μόνον κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι.

<sup>2</sup> τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, the 'orectic' soul.

be employed in the acquisition of the aptitudes or formed states (ἡθῆ) called moral virtues. 'Influence upon the character' means here nothing more than the process of acquiring—or more correctly, assistance in the process of acquiring—those formed states, as is plain from the whole context, while it is also expressly laid down in the explanation that this influence makes us 'attain this or that distinctive state in respect of character'<sup>1</sup> through the intervention of music (cp. *Poet.* 6 § 12 f., 1450 a 19 f.)<sup>2</sup>. Thus the phrase 'character,' or 'character of the soul,' cannot mean that part of the soul *in itself* but only (1) in so far as it already possesses those excellences or their opposites in the form of natural aptitudes, or favourable dispositions towards this or that virtue, or emotion, or their opposites, — *φυσικὰ ἔθνη, φυσικὰ ἡθῆ* (καὶ κακία) as Aristotle calls them, *N.E.* vi. 13. 1 f., 1144 a 1—14 (cp. above *Poet.* iv[vii]. 13. 11, *n.* 888), and (2) in so far as it already is gradually acquiring this or that moral virtue or its opposite, as they are concerned not simply with actions, *πράξεις*, but with emotional excitements or feelings (*πάθη*, *N.E.* ii. 6. 10, 1106 b 16 ff.). From this it is apparent that the growth of moral 'habit' may be fostered by excitement of the feelings, and hence that the real inference to draw is this: "because music can undoubtedly call forth feelings, at least in the case of ecstasy, it must probably, if not necessarily, be capable of being employed to foster moral habits." Thus, according to Aristotle, emotion as a passive excitement belongs to the irrational soul just so far as the soul is capable of receiving, and does receive, a character, and can itself be called 'character' precisely as a man of bad, or strong, or brave, or just, or temperate character is said to be himself such a character. Even love and hatred are but emotions, and yet, as Aristotle immediately says, cp. *nn.* (1022, 1044), all moral action is based upon love of good and hatred of evil. Take such a passage as Döring quotes from *Rhet.* ii. 9. 1, 1386 b 12 ff., § 5, b 33 ff., to the effect that certain emotions belong only to a good, and others only to a bad character<sup>3</sup>: the simple consideration that courage is an emotion of the brave man and fear of the coward shows most plainly that Döring's explanation requires to be modified. It is only in this way that we can understand why Aristotle c. 5 § 18, cp. *n.* (1047), ranks the emotions, e.g. anger, among peculiarities of character (*ἡθικά*) side by side with the moral virtues, e.g. meekness, courage, temperance, and even proceeds to call these peculiarities of character §§ 20—22, cp. *n.* (1048) themselves characters (*ἡθῆ*), whilst in other places, such as c. 7 §§ 3—11, *Poet.* i. 6, 1447 a 27 f., cp. *n.* (1084), he holds fast by the difference so commonly recognized among the Greeks between emotion (*πάθη*),

<sup>1</sup> ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἡθῆ γινόμεθα, 1340 a 7.

<sup>2</sup> ἐστὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἡθῆ ποιοὶ τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τωδαιμονοῦντες οὕτως ὅπως τὰ ἡθῆ μνησθέντες πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἡθῆ συμπαράλληλα εἰσι τοῖς πράξεσι.

<sup>3</sup> καὶ ἀμφὺ τὰ πάθη (sc. ἐλευθ. καὶ νεμεσίου) ἡθους χημεροῦ. [Döring argues that πάθη are in this and other passages ascribed to ἡθός, but *N.E.* ii.

§. 1, 1105 b 30, πάθη are said to be in τῷ ψυχῇ, while from *Rhet.* ii. 13. 1, 1386 b 30, we gather that ἡθῆ (ἢ ἡθῆ) includes more under it than πάθη only. Hence he considers himself justified in equating ἡθῆ with ψυχῆ ἀνθρώπου, and would explain *Poet.* vi[iv]. §. 10, 1447 a 6, as a case where the more special term ἡθῆ is conflated with the more general term ψυχῆ.]

in the sense of a passing burst of feeling, and character (*ἥθος*) in the sense of a permanent moral state, which is the fixed and standing temperament of each man, composed of the various moral virtues and vices specially belonging to that particular individual. Döring p. 156 f. from his own line of thought finds this strange and cannot refrain from attempting to whittle away the meaning by forced ingenuity. Even at the end of § 21, cp. *n.* (1052), an artist 'full of character' (*ἡθικός*) does not mean a sculptor or painter who depicts emotions, but one who depicts characters in this narrower sense, who indeed, to speak still more accurately, represents noble characters, no matter whether in a state of emotion or free from emotion. Even the separate moral virtues are called 'characters' *Nic. Eth.* VI. 13. 1, 1144 b 4, or as we should say 'qualities of character.' The expression τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθους πάθος 'an emotion of the character of the soul' = ὁ πάσχει τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθος, suggests the radical meaning of πάθος 'suffering.' SUSEM. (1043)

## EXCURSUS IV.

ANCIENT GREEK MUSIC: MODES, RHYTHMS,  
MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS, SCALES:  
NOTES 1054, 1056, 1078, 1099.

## MODES.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν (καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φανερόν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ᾧ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς ἑτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ δωριστὶ μόνῃ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν, ἐνθουσιαστικοὺς δ' ἢ φρυγιστὶ . . . . .) c. 5 §§ 21, 22, 1340 a 38—b 5.

"Melodies, on the other hand, give us substantive *imitations* of character. This is manifest. The temper of the several musical modes is so essentially distinct that the hearers are affected with a corresponding variety of mood. Some, such as the semi-Lybian, tend to wrap the spirit in grief and gloom; others, the luxurious relaxed modes, touch it to a softer ease; the Dorian seems alone in producing a sober and sedate frame of mind; the Phrygian kindles enthusiasm."<sup>1</sup>

We feel a similar difference in the impression made upon us by the major and minor keys, the only two species of keys we possess, which differ from each other in having a major and minor third respectively. In the scale without signature we take as key-notes only A (la) and C (ut)<sup>2</sup>, and

[<sup>1</sup> This version is largely indebted to Prof. Jebb: see *Translations* p. 121.]

[<sup>2</sup> *Do* is often used instead of *ut*.]

so obtain A minor and C major scales. But the Greeks must have taken every other note of the octave in turn for key-note; so that they obtained seven Modes, i.e. 'Harmonies' (*ἁρμονίαι*), or 'Species of Octaves' (*εἰδὲς τῶν οὐκ ἄν παρῶν*)<sup>1</sup>, as they were called by the school of Aristoxenus and by Ptolemy:—

- (1) BC D EF G a b<sup>2</sup>, Mixolydian;
- (2) C D EF G a bc<sup>3</sup>, Lydian;
- (3) D EF G a bc d , Phrygian;
- (4) EF G a bc d e , Dorian;
- (5) F G a bc d ef , Hypolydian;
- (6) G a bc d ef g , Ionian;
- (7) A BC D EF G a, Aeolian.

The Aeolian Mode was by later writers on the theory of music called Hypodorian (Heracleid. apud Ath. XIV. 624 E), and what they called Hypophrygian was to all appearance the same as Ionian. In this way there only remain three distinct names of Modes, Dorian, Lydian, Phrygian, and the Modes similarly designated Hypodorian, Hypolydian, Hypophrygian stand in exactly the same relation to the former three; the Hypodorian and the Dorian, the Hypolydian and the Lydian, the Hypophrygian and the Phrygian Modes are respectively the same, only with this difference that in each case a melody in the first named mode ends on the key-note (tonic) whilst in the last named it ends on the fifth (dominant). The first way of ending is usual with us, the latter an unusual exception, but among the Greeks on the contrary the latter was the normal ending, the former being considered subsidiary as is shown by the "hypo-," and it is therefore clear that the Lydian Mode, though it closely resembles our Major, yet by no means coincides with it. Lastly, the Mixolydian Mode according to Westphal<sup>4</sup> and Gevaert<sup>5</sup> was a Phrygian or Ionian ending on the third, and corresponding to it there was also a 'high-strung' Lydian, a second mode in A besides the Aeolian. We are not told whether the Dorian or Aeolian Mode was also modified in this way, which would have given rise to a second mode in C; Westphal thinks it possible that a Boeotian Mode mentioned in the scholia on Aristoph. *Eq.* 985 may be the one in question. Compositions of this kind must at any rate have been produced very seldom. The terms high-strung (*ὀρεράου*) and low-pitched (*ἀρεμίσου*) are only applied to the Lydian and Ionian, and if this is all correct, neither Hypolydian nor Mixolydian can have been the original designations for the modes of those names,

<sup>1</sup> Also called *τῶναι*, but improperly so, because that is the word used for transposition-scales. [The word *species* itself is used in Dict. of Antiquities, Art. 'MUSIC,' for *ἁρμονία* or *εἶδος τῶν οὐκ ἄν παρῶν*: for *τῶναι* the writer uses 'key.' As to 'key-note' see n. p. 637 l.]

<sup>2</sup> Where the interval is a full tone, the letters have been placed further apart;

for an interval of a semitone they are closer together.

<sup>3</sup> ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si.

<sup>4</sup> *Gr. Musical Notation* II. i. p. 347 E., second edition i. p. 286 E., *Greek notation and musical notation* (London 1863) p. 21 E., 167 E.

<sup>5</sup> *Histoire de l'harmonie de la musique de l'antiquité* (Gent 1873) i. p. 145.

but the first must have been called low-pitched Lydian, the second high-pitched Ionian, and as contrasted with the latter that which is known as the Ionic Mode would be low-pitched Ionian, although according to the analogy of the Lydian the names high Phrygian and low Phrygian would be expected to be applied to these two modes. The number of modes will thus be raised from seven to eight at least, and a further one must be added, a third mode in A, the Locrian (Pseudo-Eucl. *Harm.* p. 18, Bacch. p. 19, Gaudent. p. 20 Meib.), which was invented by Xenocritus of Locri (Callim. in Schol. Pind. *Ol.* XI. 117) about the time of Thaletas (see *n.* 419), commonly employed in the time of Simonides and Pindar, but afterwards fell out of use (Heracleid. in Ath. XIV. 625 E). As Gaudentius expressly states that the seventh species of octave admitted of a twofold division, according as either the fifth (as is the case with the Aeolian or Hypodorian Mode) or the fourth is to be taken for the closing note, no doubt this second case represents the Locrian Mode. To the question, why the Mixolydian received that name, though it is a species of the Phrygian, Gevaert replies p. 188 ff., that, as the ancients observed (Plut. *De Mus.* 16, 1136 E), it was the counterpart of the low-pitched Lydian, since the sequence of intervals in the one is exactly contrary to that in the other, the Mixolydian scale having a sequence of a half tone, two whole tones, a half tone and three whole tones descending, the Hypolydian the same sequence in ascending :

BC D EF G A b, Mixolydian (ascending)  
 b A G FE D CB, Mixolydian (descending)  
 F G a bc d ef, Hypolydian (ascending),

and moreover, because in these two modes alone only a single division into the fourth and fifth is possible in the ascending scale, viz., in the Mixolydian into the fourth and fifth, in the Hypolydian reversely into the fifth and fourth, because in the former the first fifth, ascending B to F, is diminished, and in the latter the first fourth, F to b, is augmented :

Fourth                  Fifth  
 { BC D EF G A b, Mixolydian ;  
 diminished Fifth  
                 Fifth          Fourth  
 { F G a bc d ef, Hypolydian ;  
 augmented Fourth

To this must be added the fact that the Mixolydian Mode ends the melody with the third, in common (not indeed with the low-pitched Lydian, but) with the 'highly strung' Lydian, and this, says Gevaert, appears to have been the really decisive analogy in the eyes of the ancients, for Plato (*Rep.* III. 398 E) says both these keys convey an impression of wailing and lamentation. Lastly in regard to the terms *σύντονοι* 'highly strung' and *ἀνευμέναι* 'relaxed,' which in strictness can only mean raised and lowered in pitch (since the tightening of the string produces a higher note), Gevaert (p. 175) proposes to

explain them by saying that the high-pitched Lydian and the high-pitched Ionian or Mixolydian melodies seem to have principally employed the higher part of their compass and to have gone in this direction beyond their proper octave. In the case of the low-pitched modes, the Hypolydian and Ionian, the opposite would have to be proved, and Gevaert might have supported his theory by the statement made in c. 7 § 13 L, though not by Aristotle (see *n.* 1113), that men advanced in life could not manage the high-sounding keys, but found the low-pitched ones naturally more suitable to them. But putting aside the Locrian Mode and the points in this explanation most liable to be disputed, viz.—whether the Hypolydian and low-pitched Lydian Modes, the Hypophrygian or Ionian and the low-pitched Ionian<sup>1</sup>, the Mixolydian and the high-pitched Ionian are in each case one and the same, and whether the last together with the high-pitched Lydian Mode really differed

<sup>1</sup> That this cannot have been the case will be seen below. Still less can I agree in the views of another expert who has investigated this subject, C. v. Jan *Die Tonarten bei Platon im dritten Buch der Republik. Jahrb. für Philol.* xcv. 1867, p. 518 sqq. According to him the high-string and low-pitched Lydian are considered to be the two subdivisions of the Lydian as distinguished from the Hypolydian, just as the high-string and low-pitched Ionian are subdivisions of the Ionian. Jan thinks that to obtain an Aeolian octave from the fundamental Dorian octave, of *g a b c d e*, all that was necessary was to tune the second string (*παρὰν*) half a tone higher (*f♯*); to obtain a Phrygian it would be necessary also to tune the sixth half a tone higher (*e♯*); for a Lydian you might either raise four strings (*f♯, g♯, a♯, b♯*) or lower three (*e♭, a♭, b♭*); and for an Ionian

there was a similar choice between raising three (*f♯, g♯, a♯*) or lowering four strings (*e♭, a♭, b♭, c♭*). A double method was similarly possible for obtaining a Mixolydian scale, either by raising six notes (*f♯, f♯, g♯, a♯, a♯, a♯*) or lowering 1 (*παρὰν*) to *b♭*, but only the first was called Mixolydian, and it cannot be decided how this came about. The Hypolydian, he thinks, could be derived in both ways, but had originally no special name, because it was not really capable of practical employment owing to the augmented fourth *f b*. In this section Jan has omitted to consider the fact that this mode occurs frequently in the ecclesiastical music of the middle ages, also in a Swedish national air still current at the present day, indeed Beethoven has composed a *Commedia in this mode*, see Gevaert, pp. 137 L. 172. 174.)

Mixolydian	E♯	F♯	G♯	A♯	B	C	D	E
[Low Hypolydian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
High-pitched Lydian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
High-pitched Ionian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
Phrygian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
Aeolian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
Dorian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
[High Mixolydian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
[High Hypolydian	E♯	F	G	A♯	B	C	D	E
Low-pitched Lydian	F	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
Low-pitched Ionian	E♭	F	G	A	B	C	D	E

The reason why I have not been convinced by this explanation, which has been carefully thought out, may be gathered from my exposition generally and the more detailed account of Gevaert, the main outlines of which I have repro-

duced, with the necessary reservations where I could not concur. Still in view of the difficulty of the subject I did not wish to withhold Jan's opinion from the reader. [See further Jan's article 'Musik' in *Baumgarten's Jahreshefte* 11. 274—284.]

from the rest by ending on the third<sup>1</sup>, this much is certain that there are only three main distinctive names, applied in the nomenclature of the Greek Modes, Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian, and that we must consequently assume only three fundamental Modes corresponding to them, the difference between them and the Hypodorian, Hypophrygian, and Hypolydian respectively being no doubt that discovered by Westphal and stated above. With this explanation best agrees the fact that originally Hypodorian was called 'Aeolian' and Hypophrygian 'Ionian.' For we must credit Plato's statement (*Lach.* 188 D), that the Dorian Mode was the only original and national one, if we include under this name the Aeolian Mode, which Plato *Repub.* l.c. omits to enumerate among the modes, because no doubt he regards it as forming one and the same mode with the Dorian. It is very characteristic that, on this supposition, the original key of the Greeks was a sort of Minor differing from our Minor in not having the sixth and seventh sharpened in the ascending scale :

A BC D EF G a=Aeolian;

A BC D E F# G#a=our A minor;

whilst in the descending scale the modern Minor agrees entirely with the Aeolian. This is in accordance with the description given by the ancients of the simple, calm, and manly character (*ἡθως*) of the Dorian Mode which, ending as it does on the fifth, would be least suitable for modern polyphonous music though it really furnishes the clearest and most distinctive harmonic relations, whilst the Aeolian as a Minor and the Lydian as a Major approach most closely to the spirit of modern music. This is also shown in the attempts of the ancients to describe the different impressions conveyed by the Aeolian and the Dorian. The Locrian too was of course a Minor. In addition to the original Dorian and Aeolian Modes of the Greeks two new ones were introduced from Asia Minor, the Phrygian or Ionian and the Lydian, in company with the wind instruments which had their origin there (see *mn.* 1042, 1078)<sup>2</sup>. It can be easily understood that the Phrygian was also called the Ionian after the Ionians of Asia Minor who first adopted it, and that then the two names were used to distinguish the principal Mode and the subordinate Mode. These two new *ἀρμονίαι*, the Phrygian and Lydian, were of the nature of our Major Keys, the latter an augmented Major, so to speak, the former an undeveloped Major: the latter had a flat too few or a sharp too many, the former exactly the opposite; the Lydian had an augmented or tritone fourth, the Phrygian a diminished seventh :

F G a bc d ef =Hypolydian;

F G ab<sup>b</sup> c d ef =F Major;

G a bc d ef g=Ionian (Hypophrygian);


G a bc d e f#g =G Major.

<sup>1</sup> [See *note* on p. 637 f.]


<sup>2</sup> We hear even of a Phrygian tetrachord, d ef g, and a Lydian tetrachord, c d ef, side by side with the Dorian tetra-

chord ef g a. See Helmholtz *Lehre der Tonempfindungen* p. 405 [Eng. tr. by A. J. Ellis].


## DORIAN GROUP (minor with no leading-note).




## Modern A minor.




## PHRYGIAN GROUP (major with diminished seventh).




## Modern G major.



## LYDIAN GROUP (major with tritone fourth).



## Modern F major.



There is a great contrast between the impressions which these groups convey. Moreover the Lydian melodies conform to the natural or *anaktoria* order, in which the final note is the lowest, the Phrygian to the so-called oblique or *plagal* order, in which the melody rises about as high above its final note as it descends below it, so that the final note is about in the middle of its compass. This explains the ecstatic and rapturous feeling (for which *πάθος* is a more correct expression than *ἡδονή*) which the Phrygian melodies inspired in the ancients. Our 'major mode' is a development out of these two ancient modes as the proper mean between them. The Mixolydian Mode was first invented by Sappho, about 600 B.C. (Aristox. in *Phil. de*

*Musica* 16, 1136 C sq.) and was theoretically developed much later by Pythocleides of Ceos, a musician living at Athens (Aristox. *ibid.*), or according to another more detailed account (Lysis *ibid.*) by another musician of somewhat later date Lamproclus of Athens, who like Pindar was a pupil of Agathocles (Schol. Plat. *Alcib.* I. 118 C). The invention of the low-pitched Lydian was ascribed to the Athenian Damon, a contemporary of Pericles and Socrates, see *n.* (1055) (Plut. *ibid.* 1136 E). Aristotle designates the low-pitched modes as relaxed and effeminate, similarly Plato *Rep.* I. c. speaks of them as effeminate and intoxicating, which no doubt is rightly explained c. 7 § 11 (see *n.* 1113) to refer, not to the exciting, but to the soothing and weakening effects of intoxication. In c. 7 § 4 Aristotle mentions with approval a division of all the musical Modes into ἠθικαί, ethical, πρακτικαί (Modes of action=scenic?) and ἐνθουσιαστικαί, ecstatic; and allows the young for educational purposes to be instructed in those only of the first class. Here Gevaert has made a great mistake in assigning all those which end on the dominant, i.e. Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, to the first class 'ethical'; all those which end on the tonic, i.e. Hypodorian (Aeolian), Hypolydian (low-pitched Lydian) and Hypophrygian (Ionian or low-pitched Ionian), to the second class (πρακτικαί); and all those ending on the third, i.e. the two mournful and high-pitched modes, Mixolydian (highly strung Ionian) and highly strung Lydian, to the third class 'ecstatic.' He is only right as regards the third class. But if the Boeotian was a Dorian Mode ending on a third, they might belong to the same class, and the same would hold good of the Locrian. Gevaert has been misled by the fact that Plato assigns a prominent place to the Phrygian only along with the Dorian, and yet according to his description of the Phrygian (*Rep.* 399 A ff.) as impetuous and warlike, it ought to be reckoned among the second class. But Gevaert strangely forgets that Aristotle c. 7 § 9 f. (see *n.* 1107) strongly disputes Plato's assertion, and designates the Phrygian Mode as ecstatic above all others, putting it at the head of the third class. There would then be joined to it the two other 'high-strung' modes of a mournful character, inasmuch as all painful emotions imply something ecstatic, something carrying men out of themselves (cp. *nn.* 1047, 1072, 1084, 1089, 1095, 1096, 1101). In *Problems* XIX. 48 no doubt the Hypophrygian has the same adjective πρακτικός applied to it which is used of the second class of Modes here, but not so the Hypodorian; on the contrary it is called majestic and calm (ἡθους ἔχει μεγαλοπρεπές καὶ στάσιμον). It is simply an afterthought to class both together as πρακτικά, but even then only in opposition to the Phrygian Mode which is there also said to be ecstatic and full of Bacchic frenzy as the expression of passive emotions<sup>1</sup>. The Hypodorian or Aeolian Mode must undoubtedly be assigned to the first class, although it forms a sort of transition to the second, and the Hypophrygian ought certainly to be put

<sup>1</sup> ἡ [ὑπο]φρυγιστί (ἐνθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βακχικὴ). κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πάσχομεν τι...κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποδωριστί καὶ ὑποφρυγιστί πράττομεν. The insertion of μάλιστα δὲ

ἡ μίξολυδιστί (from Gaza) before κατὰ μὲν οὖν, as recommended by Gevaert, appears to me quite a mistake. Cp. p. 607.

with the second, were it not for the statement both of Aristotle and Plato that the low-pitched keys are relaxed, effeminate and drowsy. There are only two possible solutions of this difficulty: either the author of this problem had a different idea of the character of the Hypophrygian from that of Plato and Aristotle, or else the Hypophrygian and low-pitched Ionian are not the same Mode. It is quite evident that drowsy and effeminate modes cannot be classed with those which inspire a bacchic frenzy. They can only come among those representative of character, *ῥητοί*, not in the position of the highest of those modes such as the Dorian and Aeolian, but as constituting a transition to the ecstatic. In this way the Lydian only would remain in the second class, but c. 2 § 15 it is curiously distinguished from all other modes, and would appear from the description given to belong to the first class. Still this passage, which cannot have proceeded from Aristotle's pen, is so strange in other respects that it need not be taken into account, see *n.* (1113). Much more weight attaches to the circumstance that Aristotle evidently (see *nn.* 1088, 1096) assumes more than one mode of the second class, and this compels us to decide that the Hypophrygian or Ionian must really be a different mode from the low-pitched Ionian, and consequently that the low-pitched Lydian is unlikely to have been the same as the Hypolydian, so that this point remains quite obscure<sup>1</sup>. Of course the Lydian Mode was also employed for mournful instrumental pieces upon the flute (see *n.* 1042), and in Tragedy was frequently adopted in the *σπουδαί*, dialogues of lamentation between the leader of the chorus and actors (Cratin. in Ath. XIV. 638 f.); for the latter purpose however the Dorian Mode was used in older times (Plut. *De Musica* 17, 1136 f.), and it is very characteristic that Pindar in his odes appears to have employed only the Lydian Mode besides the Dorian and Aeolian. It is very interesting to notice the fact shown by VI(IV). 3. 4 (cp. *n.* 1159) that even among the ancients some theoretical musicians rightly perceived that the three fundamental modes might be reduced to two, which we call Major and Minor. For those who, as is stated in that passage, only recognized the Dorian and Phrygian as fundamental *ἀπὸρροία*, like the moderns, put all other differences into the background, and rested the main distinction entirely upon the minor or major third. In this way they might just as well have put Lydian for Phrygian, or better might have combined the words into Lydo-Phrygian. It is well known that the Greek modes passed to the Romans, and to the ecclesiastical and secular music of all European nations until after the Reformation: they are still well represented in the older protestant hymn tunes and survive in Celtic, Swedish, Slavonic, and Flemish national airs. Even in the older periods of modern music we continue to find an excess of the Minor over the Major, followed later on by a balance between them. SUSEM. (1054)

<sup>1</sup> The explanations given by Susmühl (*Jahrb. f. Phil.* XCV. 1867, p. 231) require considerable modification in accordance with the foregoing.

## MUSICAL RHYTHMS.

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἦθος στασιμώτερον οἳ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἳ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἳ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας. V(VIII) c. 5 § 23, 1340 b 7—10.

The Greeks had three kinds of time or metre : (1) even or dactylic time, in which the two parts of the metre are of even length, (2) double or iambic time, in which the prominent beat, arsis, is twice as long as the secondary, thesis, and (3) one-and-a-half or paeonian time, in which the arsis as compared with the thesis is in the proportion of  $1\frac{1}{2} : 1$ . The dactylic time, corresponding to our common time, conveys a quiet settled feeling; the iambic corresponding to our triple time, and still more the paeonian, a time of five beats which seldom occurs in our modern music, give an impression of unrest. The Ionic measure ~ ~ —, — ~ ~ was considered specially wanting in nobility, loose and effeminate (Arist. Quint. p. 37 Meib., Demetr. *De eloc.* § 189, *Metr. Ambros.* p. 9 Keil, p. 262 Nauck, Mar. Vict. II. 8. 7, p. 122 Gaisf. p. 90, 19 sq. Keil, Schol. A Heph. p. 190 Westph., Dionys. Halic. *De Demosth. vi admirabili* p. 1093). The Ionic monopody, dipody, and tripod correspond to our  $\frac{3}{4}$ ,  $\frac{6}{4}$ ,  $\frac{9}{4}$  time. Cp. Westphal *Metrik* 2 ed. I. p. 534 ff. SUSEM. (1056) See now the third edition of Westphal's work, *Griechische Rhythmik* (1885), p. 99 ff. esp. p. 156, *Aristoxenus* I. p. 35 ff. An example of (3) is the Delphian hymn to Apollo in  $\frac{5}{8}$  time.

## MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS : HARPS, ETC.

οἷον πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συντείνοντα τοῖς ἀκούουσι τῶν χρωμένων, ἐπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ σαμβῦκαι. V(VIII). c. 6 § 13, 1341 a 40—b 1.


None of these stringed instruments were of Greek origin, and Aristoxenus (in Athen. IV. 182 F) speaks of the φοίνικες, πηκτίδες, μαγάδιδες, σαμβῦκαι, τρίγωνα, κλεψιάμβοι, σκινδαψοί, and ἐννεάχορδαι as uncommon (ἐκφυλα). The πηκτίς was a Lydian harp (Hdt. I. 17, Pind. *Fr.* 102 in Athen. XIV. 635 D, Soph. *Fr.* 375, *ibid.* 635 C and IV. 183 E, Telestes *Fr.* 5, *ibid.* XIV. 625 F) of high register (Telest. *l.c.*, cp. Pind. *l.c.*). The first notice of it occurs in Sappho *Fr.* 122; then it is mentioned by Anacreon *Fr.* 17, 22, by Plato *Repub.* III. 399 C as being many-stringed, but apparently by Sopater, the composer of parodies, in Ath. IV. 183 B as a two-stringed instrument. Like

the *magadis*, it was played with the fingers without a plectrum (*Asiatas*, in Athen. XIV. 635 B). Menaechmus asserts in Ath. 635 B, & that Sappho was the first to use<sup>1</sup> the instrument, stating that he follows Aristaeus in regarding it as the same as the *magadis*, whilst others rightly make a distinction between the *μάγadis* and the *πηκρίς* (Ath. 636 A ff.). In all probability the explanation of this inconsistency must be sought with Jan in the fact that the *μάγadis* seems to have been a modification of the *πηκρίς*. At any rate the *μάγadis* also is termed Lydian by Didymus in Ath. 634 F and perhaps before him by Anacreon (*ibid.* Fr. 18), and the latter calls the *πηκρίς* (Fr. 17) and the *μάγadis* (Fr. 18 in Ath. 634 C, 635 C) his instrument, assigning to it twenty strings, a round number, as Posidonius thinks (*ibid.* 634 C, D), instead of twenty-one. But from the account of Aristomenes (*ibid.* 635 B), who quotes Pindar *l.c.* in his favour, it appears that one-half of the strings gave the same notes as the other half, but in a higher octave, and that the instrument was used in accompanying antiphonal singing of men and boys, requiring therefore that it should be played with both hands, the one striking the higher, the other the deeper notes. When Telestes (Fr. 4 in Ath. 637 A) apparently describes the *μάγadis* as five-stringed, we must probably assume with Jan that he really means five tetrachords, that is to say twenty strings, and in the same way in the case of Sopater *l.c.* we must suppose that the *πηκρίς* had, not two strings, but two separate tetrachords, and therefore eight strings or a full octave. Phyllis however (*ibid.* 636 F) says the *πηκρίς* and *μάγadis* (which he distinguishes from one another), the *σαμβύκη*, *ὑμβύκη*, *τρίγωνον* and *ελεψύμβου*, had all of them nine strings. According to Euphorion (in Ath. IV. 182 F, XIV. 435 A) the *μάγadis*—or rather the *σαμβύκη*, a modification of it (see below),—was most frequently used in Mitylene; and on the assumption of its development from the *πηκρίς* this fact entirely coincides with the mention of the latter and its employment by Sappho, the poetess of Lesbos. Yet the Spartan poet and composer Aleman, himself a Lydian by birth, had at a somewhat earlier date sung of putting aside the *μάγadis* (Fr. 91 in Ath. *l.c.*) and must no doubt have used the instrument.

Similarly the *βάμβιον* (neuter), also *βάμβιον* (masc. or fem.), was of foreign or rather Lydian origin. For Strabo X. 471 says that all the names *σαμβύκη*, *βάμβιον*, *πηκρίς*, are foreign, and Pindar *l.c.* designates the *βάμβιον* as an adaptation of the Lydian *πηκρίς*. Like this, it was a leading instrument in Lesbos much used by the lyric poets there. Pindar *l.c.* ascribes its invention, or more correctly its introduction, to Terpander. Horace (*Carm.* I. 1. 34) calls it 'Lesbian' and assigns its use to Alcaeus (*Carm.* I. 32. 3 ff.). Sappho also mentions it and must have used it in her songs; so too afterwards the Ionian Anacreon, a follower of Alcaeus and Sappho (Euphorion in Athen. 182 F = Sapph. Fr. 154, Anacr. Fr. 143). Critias calls the *βάμβιον* Sappho's favourite instrument (in Ath. XIII. 600 c); Neandrus (Fr. 3 in

<sup>1</sup> So also Suidas *s.v.* Σαπφώ, where the mention of the plectrum in the original text is due to corruption.

Athen. 175 c) erroneously ascribes its invention to Anacreon<sup>1</sup>. Jan (p. 15 f.) is then no doubt right in recognizing the instrument, with which Alcaeus and Sappho are represented, as the Barbiton :



The only particular difference between this instrument and the *λύρα* consists in the greater length of the strings and of its entire structure. This is in agreement with the fact that it was an octave lower than the *πηκτίς*, as appears from Pindar *l.c.* Thus it continued down to about the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*R. A.* VII. 72) to be comparatively the commonest stringed instrument in Greece after the *κιθάρα* and *λύρα*, as may be gathered from the mention of them together Athen. 182 E and Pollux IV. 8. 59, from the fact that Aristoxenus (see p. 632) does not place it among the uncommon instruments, and also from the numerous representations of it. It would seem to have been played by means of the plectrum, if we are to rely upon No. 59 of the so-called Anacreontea. Anaxilas apud Ath. 183 B mentions only three strings, Plutarch *De Monarch.* 4. 827 A, and Theocritus XVI. 45, speak of many strings, and Teuffel correctly observes (Pauly's *Realencycl.* IV. p. 1289 n.) that the number of strings may have varied very much, since we find on vases figures of *βάρβιτοι* with three, four, and six strings. The contrast which Aristotle here makes between *βάρβιτοι* and *πηκτίδες* on the one hand, and the other instruments mentioned by him on the other, shows that the latter were less in fashion than the *βάρβιτος* and even than the *πηκτίς* and *μάγαδισ*. In vase paintings there often occurs the annexed triangular instrument, which represents no doubt either a triangle or a *σαμβύκη*:—

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Pseudo-Simonides *Fr.* 184, Anacreontea 2, 14, 23, 40, 41, 59.



The *τρίγωνον* or triangle is called by *juba* (*Fr.* 73 in *Ath.* 173 10) an invention of the Syrians, that is probably of the Assyrians<sup>1</sup>; by Ptolemy *Harmon.* iii. 7, p. 248 an invention of the Egyptians. Sophocles *l.c.* gives it the epithet Phrygian, and according to another tragic poet, Demetrius (in *Ath.* 636 A, see *Nauck Trag. Gr. Fragm.* p. 602 sq. ed. 23, it was common among the Lydians, and in Suidas (*s.v.* Σίβυλλα) its origin was traced to the Sibyl. It was triangular in form, as its name implies, and had a number of strings of unequal length, the shorter ones at the elbow, the longer at the base (Adrian apud Porphyry on Ptolem. p. 216 sq.) and it was therefore of some considerable size (Diog. *l.c.*, Arist. *Probl.* xix. 23). The *σαμβίκη* was likewise triangular (Athen. 634 A, Suidas *s.v.* Ἰβύκος) and, the strings being short, had a very high register (Aristid. Quintil. p. 101, Athen. 633 F). Euphron represents the instrument as being an adaptation of the *λύρα* (in *Ath.* 635 A); the same writer (in *Ath.* 633 F on the authority of a work of Pythagoras upon the Red Sea) states that it had four strings among the Parthians and Troglodytes, whilst among the Greeks it was many-stringed, according to Plato *l.c.* The statement of Skamion in Athen. 637 B that it was invented by Sambyx and first used by the Sibyl does not help us. Neanthes *l.c.* says either of the *τρίγωνον* or more probably (agreeing with Suidas *l.c.* and Schol. in Aristoph. *Thesm.* 168) of the *σαμβίκη*—which instrument is meant, is not clear—that it was invented by Ibykus, who probably was in fact the first to introduce it into Greek music; but *Juba* (*l.c.*) attributed the (f) *Σαραβινίξ σαμβίκη*<sup>2</sup>, as well as the triangle, to the Syrians. Practically all the ancients, agreeing with Aristotle, were of opinion that the *τρίγωνον*, and more especially the *σαμβίκη*<sup>3</sup>, were only suitable for loose songs and melodies and persons of light character, and this would be in accord with the first adoption of the *σαμβίκη* by Ibykus. Compare the comic verses in Athen. 638 E<sup>4</sup> and the phrases "ballet girl and player on the triangle," *τῆς ποδωτοῦσας καὶ τοῦ*

<sup>1</sup> Helladius *Act.* iv. 17 speaks of Phoenicians, who after playing the *πνεῦμα* indulge in wild Assyrian dances.

<sup>2</sup> In Kaibel's edition of Athenaeus an hiatus is assumed at this place, 173 B, between *Σαραβινίξ* and *σαμβίκη*.

<sup>3</sup> Both were introduced into Rome.

Demetrius Hal. *E. A. L.* 33, *Ath.* 173 F, Liv. xxxix. 6.

<sup>4</sup> ὁ δὲ Γεφειστὴς τῶν ἀνδρῶν  
ἐν γυναικὶν εἶπε ἀναγὰς ἀναγὰς ἐν-  
καλεῖσθαι.  
γυναικὶς εἶχετο καὶ ἀμφότεραι καὶ τῶν  
γυναικῶν.

τριγωνίστριαν (Lucian *Lexiph.* 8), χαμαιτύπαις καὶ σαμβυκιστρίαις (Plut. *Anton.* 9), ἄγοντα σαμβυκιστρίας καὶ κιναίδους (Plut. *Cleom.* 35), κιναίδους ἄγειν καὶ σαμβύκας (Polyb. v. 37. 10) and others (Tib. Gracch. in Macrobi. *Sat.* II. 10, Arnob. II. 42). This explains what Eupolis meant by mentioning triangle-playing (*Fr.* 1 in Ath. 183 C, F) in his comedy of the *βάπται*, directed against Alcibiades and his companions, who are represented in the play as celebrating indecent orgies in honour of the Thracian goddess Cotytto. Presumably such instruments were introduced simultaneously with the wild rites of foreign deities. The right reading is therefore undoubtedly *σαμβύκαι*<sup>1</sup> and not *ιαμβύκαι*, which I had adopted in my larger edition from the indications of the better family of manuscripts. The *ιαμβύκη* was the instrument used by Archilochus and other older iambic poets in declaiming their verses when sung, the *κλεψίαμβος* being used when they were melodramatically<sup>2</sup> recited (Phillis *l.c.*, cp. Hesych. and Suidas *s.v.* *ιαμβύκη*). Aristoxenus, as has been mentioned, gives the *κλεψίαμβος* among the unusual instruments. Upon the whole question consult Böckh *De metr. Pind.* p. 260 ff., Lobeck, *Aglaophamus* p. 1014 ff., L. v. Jan, *De fidibus Graecorum* pp. 15 sq., 26 ff., Baumeister *Denkmäler* III. p. 1444 ff. SUSEM. (1077)

#### SCALES.

τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, c. 7 § 7, 1342 a 24 f.

The "colour" of notes (*χρῶμα*) denotes the distinction between the three varieties of scale, or 'genera' of octaves, one of which is itself called the chromatic, the two others being the diatonic and enharmonic, and their subdivisions. The most simple form of the diatonic scale embraced all the notes of the octave in their usual order ef g a bc d e. Terpander omitted c, whilst the oldest instrumental composers for the flute included under the name of Olympus (see Exc. II.) omitted d and probably g (Aristot. *Probl.* XIX. 32, Aristox. apud Plut. *De Mus.* II, 33). The latter arrangement would give the following succession of intervals:

e f                      a      b c                      e

semitone, major third, tone, semitone, major third; and this was the older form of the enharmonic scale. Later on the interval of a semitone was split up into two quarter tones (*δίεσις*):

e f\* g\*                      a      b c\* d\*                      e

so that the intervals became: quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third, whole tone, quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third; and this was the second kind of enharmonic scale. The diatonic scale on the other hand even in its irregular forms had no intervals either so large or so small. Its two regular varieties correspond to our so-called natural scale and scale of even temperament.

<sup>1</sup> The suggestion, which D. Volkmann *De Suidae biogr.* p. 14 makes à propos of this passage, that Aristotle was the first (perhaps in the *Dialogue On Poets*) to attribute the original employment of the

*πηκτίς*, *τρίγωνον*, and *σαμβύκη* to Sappho, Ibycus, and the Sibyl, is based upon very slight evidence, as he himself in part admits.

<sup>2</sup> See n. 10 on the *Poetics* (ed. Susem.).

In the case of the former there is between *f* and *g* rather more than a whole tone ( $\frac{1}{2}$ ), and between *g* and *a* rather less than a whole tone ( $\frac{1}{3}$ ), whilst in the case of the latter, as on our tempered pianoforte, the intervals of a whole tone are all equal. Besides these the Greeks also had two irregular forms, (3) one with an excessive whole tone ( $\frac{1}{2}$ ) and a diminished whole tone ( $\frac{1}{3}$ ), a tone being inserted in the minor third B D in the place of the C omitted by Terpander, which was separated from D by the first, and from B by the latter interval, whilst at the same time in the other minor third E G the intermediate tone F was likewise exchanged for a corresponding inserted tone; the other (4) with an excessive and a diminished whole tone, the latter being inserted in the major third in the place of the notes G and D, omitted in the older Enharmonic, that is to say an excessive F $\sharp$  and C $\sharp$ . Finally the chromatic scale shares with the irregular forms of the diatonic the omission of C, and with the enharmonic the omission of G, and with both the compensation for these tones by an insertion, but differs from both in making the greatest interval always more than an excessive whole tone, and the two other intervals more than a quarter of a tone. The regular form of this class, which is also employed in our present chromatic and was older than the enharmonic (Plut. *De Mus.* 11, 1134 F, 20, 1137 E), has only the usual whole tones and semitones:

e f g $\flat$  a b $\flat$  b d e

semitone, semitone, minor third, semitone, semitone, minor third, whole tone. The irregular forms have quarter tones and excessive minor thirds or excessive quarter tones and half tones or diminished minor thirds etc. These subdivisions of the three scales were called their shades or *swarms* (*tyndes*) of sound. It appears therefore from what has been said that what we call chromatic and enharmonic in our music is something quite different from the chromatic and enharmonic scales of the Greeks. The quarter tones are something quite strange to us, but the augmented whole tones we can reproduce, and even the occasional attempts to work with them in composition have, since Beethoven, succeeded. The later enharmonic scale had gone out of use even as early as the time of Aristoxenus, but he defends it with great spirit (Plut. *De Musica* §§ 37–39). On the other hand the chromatic and the irregular diatonic were in Ptolemy's time still extensively used by soloists in vocal and instrumental music. But for church-singing even among the ancients only the regular diatonic scale was employed. The scales may be defined generally to be the different methods of arranging the intervals between the four tones of a tetrachord or the eight of an octave. See Westphal *Met.*<sup>2</sup> i. p. 412 ff., Gevaert p. 269 ff., also Heimbach p. 403 ff. By unnatural 'colouring' Aristotle probably means all the kinds of irregular diatonic and chromatic scales and also, differing in this respect from Aristoxenus, the later enharmonic scale. SUMER, [1099]

NOTE.—The assumption of Modes in which the melody ended on the third, i.e. the third above the key-note, is beset with peculiar difficulties, p. 628 *q.* 1. For if only the melody ended on the third, while the accom-

paniment ended on the key-note, how can we account for the fact that the chord of the third was held by the ancients to be semi-dissonant, *παράφωνον*, like the tritone? While if Gevaert is right in supposing accompaniment and melody alike to end on the third, then the assumed key-note is *not* the final note: what data then are left for determining the key-note of an ancient composition? On p. 625 this is taken to be the *ὑπάτη*; compare now Th. Reinach in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* XVII. 1893, p. 597 ff. In the article MUSIC in the *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 3) Mr D. B. Monro pertinently remarks, "the chief difficulty is the want of any direct statement regarding the tonality of the ancient modes, or the note in which the melody ended." The hypothesis, that the *μέση* of each mode was its key-note (Grundton, Tonica), based upon Ar. *Probl.* XIX. 20 (cp. Dio Chrys. 68, 7) and doubtfully accepted by Helmholtz, *Lehre der Tonempfindungen* p. 367 ff. (cp. p. 412), is only true, as explained above p. 625, of the Dorian, Phrygian, and Lydian Modes.

A protest against Westphal's assumption of 'Modes ending on the third' appeared in *Allg. Musik. Ztg* for 1878 p. 737. Ultimately Westphal withdrew his assumption in the preface, dated 1890, of the posthumously issued second volume of his *Aristoxenos' Melik und Rhythmik* (Leipzig 1893). C. v. Jan, to whom the concession is due, treats it in his review (*Berliner philolog. Wochenschrift* XIII. 1893. 1285) as terminating a controversy which has lasted since 1863.

## EXCURSUS V.

### SUGGESTIONS ON THE TEXT AND INTERPRETATION OF V(VIII). C. 7

§§ 3—8, 1341 b 32—1342 a 29.

With a view to answering the question, whether all the musical modes are to be used, Aristotle first (§ 3, b 32) gives the threefold division of them into the *ethical* (ἠθικαί), those relating to *action* (πρακτικάί), and the *ecstatic* (ἐνθουσιαστικάί). Next, in so far as the answer must vary with the various ends of Music, he goes on to enumerate these various ends. At this point recurs the distinction between the end of *catharsis* and that of the moral training of the young, a distinction already mentioned c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23 f. (ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἢ μάθησιν). But now the question there left unsettled (see n. 1073) has to be considered: the relation, namely, of *catharsis* to the two other ends previously recognised, recreation (ἀνάπαυσις) and the highest rational enjoyment (διαγωγή). According to the *textus receptus* both are distinct from the end of purgation, and are combined together to form a third end<sup>1</sup>. But it is a conclusion reached independently by Liepert and Susemihl that this last cannot be the case, for several reasons. (1) In the preceding chapters διαγωγή and ἀνάπαυσις have always

<sup>1</sup> See the translation of the *textus receptus* p. 607.

been opposed to each other; and (2) they really have nothing in common, except the element of enjoyment: but this they undoubtedly share with the other ends of 'moral training' (*παιδεία*) and 'purgation' (*κάθαρσις*): consequently this does not justify their being combined together in contradistinction to these other ends<sup>1</sup>, even if an attempt be made to keep them apart as two opposed members within the same combination by the insertion of the necessary disjunctive particle (b 40, *πρὸς διαγωγὴν <ἐ> πρὸς ἀνταίψιν τε καὶ*). But (3) in addition to this, it is just as impossible, as Liepert has seen, to exclude from purgation (*κάθαρσις*) the elements of *διαγωγὴ* and *ἀντίπαισις*: and (4) grammatically the change from *ἑνὶ* with the two first ends to *πρὸς* with this alleged third (*πρῶτον δὲ πρὸς*) throws suspicion upon *ἑνὶ* as also. For in reality, whether it has a moral or a *cathartic* effect, music can only influence either the character or the emotions: and further how is it conceivable that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction? In any case then we require in the original text a statement that, regarded as an end of music, *catharsis* is only a means to one or other of these two ends; to *διαγωγὴ*, or to *ἀντίπαισις*. Such a statement is furnished by my conjectural restoration *ταύτης δ' ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ἢ πρὸς ἀνταίψιν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀντίπαισιν*.

This is plainly confirmed by the subsequent course of the exposition. The next step is the division of the three classes of Modes (again according to the *textus receptus*) between the moral training of the young and the other ends of music, the most ethical being assigned to the former, those relating to action (*πρακτικαί*) and the ecstatic (together with the less ethical) to the latter. But the explanation of *κάθαρσις* § 4 l., which had been previously promised (§ 3, b 38 *τί δὲ λέγομεν καὶ* and is now added in the form of a reason (*ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας καὶ α 4 l.*), proves by the very form in which it is cast that *catharsis* is to take the place of the other ends, or at least that by 'listening to the performances of others' (*ἀκούειν ἑτέρων χειροπραγμάτων*) merely this is meant<sup>2</sup>. It is the ecstatic modes and those of action which are said to be specially appropriate for *catharsis*, and it is to the ecstatic melodies that the explanation as given applies: the otherwise meaningless final remark *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικὰ παρέχει χάρις ἄλλα*, a 15, can

<sup>1</sup> Zeller is so sensible of this that, as mentioned in n. on § 3 b 41, he would separate *δραμαὶ* and *δράματα* as a *fourth* end from *διαγωγὴ*, which he makes the third.

<sup>2</sup> Even this suggested solution, which leaves the main question unaffected, appears untenable. For even if we understand *ἀκούειν ἑτέρων χειροπραγμάτων* to mean *ἐκθάσειν*, yet the very term *ἀκούειν* implies the absurdity that the Greeks heard only melodies of action and ecstatic melodies (together with the less

ethical) played and sung by others: that they never intended in this way to the most ethical, i.e. to the Dorian. When this is implied, it would seem necessary to admit the correction *ἀκούειν* for *ἀκούειν*. But then arises the question whether *ἑτέρων* & *καὶ τὰς ὑποκρίσεις καὶ τὰς ὑποκρίσεις* should not simply be translated 'both those of action and the dramatic,' especially as, when afterwards *ἐκθάσειν* comes to be discussed and explained, those two classes of musical modes and melodies are almost taken into account.

only be set straight by substituting, with Sauppe, the word *πρακτικά* 'melodies of action' for *καθαρικά* 'melodies of purgation'.<sup>1</sup> In passing, there is the further suggestion to record that § 4, 1342 a 8 ff., the words *ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσιν τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι* may be a gloss upon *ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν* which precedes<sup>2</sup>.

From this investigation into the nature of *catharsis* it is inferred that the proposition<sup>3</sup> it was adduced to prove is really correct (*διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις κτλ* §§ 6—8, a 16—29). The previous directions for the moral training of the young are simply repeated § 8 (see *n.* 1100), in a less strict form, *τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τῶν μελῶν καὶ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις* a 28 f., i.e. *ethical* modes replacing the 'most ethical,' *ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις*, of § 3, a 3. The further instructions relative to *ἀκρόασις ἐτέρων χειρουργούντων*, i.e. to *catharsis*, are developed into a more precise statement that all the remaining Modes together are only appropriate and necessary for the recreation of the populace (the great mass of artizans, day-labourers, &c., who are not citizens in the best state), because this populace with its depraved taste takes most pleasure in artificial and complicated musical modes and "chromatic" scales. The more refined and cultivated public, consisting of the citizens in the ideal state, is distinguished from this populace, and obviously only the nobler musical modes are selected to afford this public the highest intellectual gratification. It is quite certain Aristotle cannot mean that this public is never to listen to *ethical*, and more especially to Dorian melodies. Such melodies, if they no longer serve for moral education, must surely contribute to that moral enjoyment which in this case is the basis for the intellectual element in the highest mental satisfaction (*διαγωγή*). And on the other hand, are we to suppose that Aristotle meant wholly to exclude adults from the moral enjoyment of melodies of action and ecstatic melodies? Yet in c. 5 §§ 17, 18, 1340 a 12—23, he speaks (cp. *n.* 1046) not only of the pleasure awakened by the noble characters which music represents, but also of the worthy actions for which it finds expression. SUSEM. (1101)

<sup>1</sup> With this change the words will mean: "so also the melodies that impel to action afford an innocent delight." It is much to be regretted that Aristotle has not more fully explained how this is. For the 'ecstatic' (*ἐνθουσιαστικά*) modes and melodies include such as produce and express not only ecstasy, but painful emotions of all kinds, as was remarked *n.* (1084), with which *notes* (1054, 1089) should be compared: hence it is not immediately clear how a similar cathartic i.e. homoeopathic effect is to remain over for modes and compositions "of action." Manifestly, it is the more joyous and energetic emotions, love and courage, to which these latter correspond. Yet no doubt the expression of some painful emotions, e.g. anger, cannot be excluded.

SUSEM. (1096) Cp. *Rhet.* II. 5. 21, 1383 b 7, *θαρραλέον γὰρ ἡ ὀργή*. If Heraclides is rightly reported Athen. XIV. 625 E, *δεῖ δὲ τὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶδος ἔχειν ἡθους ἢ πάθους*, he confined music to the expression of character and emotion. He may have found the difficulties presented by *πρακτικά μέλη* insuperable. Cp. however *n.* (1084).

<sup>2</sup> See Bursian's *Jahresbr.* LVII. p. 174. Both expressions *ἱερὰ μέλη* and *τὰ ἐξοργιάζοντα τὴν ψυχὴν* must refer to the melodies of Olympus: cp. Pl. *Symp.* 215 c quoted p. 622 *n.* 1.

<sup>3</sup> The proposition *φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον ἀλλὰ κτλ* § 3, 1342 a 1—4.

## NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ.

καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἐνικεν καὶ καθάρσεως [sc. φαμὶν τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι διὰ]—  
τί δὲ λέγεται τὴν κάθαρσιν. νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ποικιλίαν ἀνθρώπων  
σαφές τιτον. V(VIII). 7. 3, 1341 b 38—41.

ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐκ πάσης ἐκείνης, τῇ  
δὲ ἥττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον θλίψις καὶ φόβος. ἐπὶ δ' ἐκθουσιασμός. καὶ  
γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχιοι τινες εἰσὶν· ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν ἀρῶμεν  
τούτους, ὅταν χρῆσινται τοῖς ἱερογιάζουσιν τὴν ψυχὴν μέλει, καθαρμένους ὡς αὖ  
ἰατρίας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσει. ἡ ταύτῃ δὲ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον πάσχον καὶ τοῖς  
ἐλπίμονας καὶ τοῖς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοῖς ἑλας παθητικοῖς τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις καὶ ὅταν  
ἐπιβάλλει τῶν παύσεων ἐκάστῳ, καὶ πᾶσι γίνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κομφίζεσθαι  
μεθ' ἑδονῆς. c. 7 § 4, 5, 1342 a 4—15. ὡς αὖτε πρὶς τοῖς ταύτοις ἀπὸ  
[sc. τῷ αὐτῷ] καιροῖς χρηστῶν ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ μέθρσιν.  
c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 22 f.

Underlying this whole argument is the analogy of the homoeopathic  
treatment for bodily ailments in vogue amongst Greek physicians of the  
time and usually called by them *κάθαρσις*; in regard to this it is sufficient to  
refer to the Introduction of Susemihl's edition of the *Poetics* p. 44 f. and to  
the fuller investigations of Döring<sup>1</sup>. Two points have been properly empha-  
sized by Döring: in the first place he has brought out the strong medical  
colouring which a number of Aristotle's expressions bear<sup>2</sup>; and secondly,  
that with the single exception of sufferers from the madly known as  
*κορυβαυτισμός*, Corybantian or Bacchic frenzy, who are really insane with  
fanatical excitement (§ 4), Aristotle is not thinking of the cases where excess  
of emotion has actually reached the pitch of madness, but only of emotional  
subjects with a strong tendency to ecstasy, fear, pity, etc. while on the other  
hand the subject of treatment by the musical *κάθαρσις* is not compared  
to a patient with a strong tendency to bodily disease but to one who is  
actually suffering from it. Even the term *κατακώχιοι* (§ 4, a 8), though it  
reminds us of 'possession' and kindred ideas, does not mean anything more,  
as Döring points out, than 'liable to be attacked' by a certain form of excite-  
ment. So too the phrase *ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς ἰσχυρῶς*, a 4,  
"the emotion which occurs with especial violence in some minds," is itself  
ambiguous, denotes in this context the tendency to, but not the actual seizure  
by, a morbid excess of emotion. And this is natural enough: for Aristotle's  
chief concern is not with the insane and the means of their recovery, but  
with convalescents who in time attain to perfect mental health (cp. a. 1334),  
and with their æsthetic enjoyment; and what he has chiefly to deal with  
here is not emotion already actually excited but the matter of emotions lying

<sup>1</sup> *Aristotelische Kunsttheorie* p. 319 ff.  
(*Philologus* XXI. p. 524 ff., XXVII. p.  
714 ff. cp. p. 712 ff.).

<sup>2</sup> See 1342 a 8 *κατακώχιοι* and the note on  
*κατακώχιοι*, a 9 *χρήσασθαι*, a 12 *καθα-  
μένους*, a 14 *κομφίζεσθαι*.

dormant in their minds. The cure of morbid insanity is only of importance to him as a starting-point, as the foundation for his theory of the æsthetic catharsis, though it also gives him the right to make a new application of the medical technical term to this species of æsthetic effect.

This affords a further indication, as against Döring and others, within what narrow limits the medical, or pathological, analogy is confined. But at all events the term *πάθος* itself recalls *τὸ πάσχειν*, suffering or ailment<sup>1</sup>, a suggestion quite lost in the usual rendering "emotion"; see Excursus III. *n.* (1043), p. 624. Aristotle no doubt distinguishes pleasurable and painful "emotions," but if the form of his remarks would oblige us to assume that all "emotions" without exception are included, this is, as Döring rightly saw, only an inaccuracy of expression. In the case of the pleasurable *πάθη* (e.g. *φιλία Rhet.* II. 4. 1, 1380 b 33 ff., *θάρος*, II. 5. 16, 1383 a 12 ff.) what analogy can there possibly be with bodily healing? And consequently how can there be cathartic, i.e. æsthetic, enjoyment, which is plainly described as a pleasure springing from pain? Pleasurable states (*πάθη*), on the contrary, are taken up with the moral feeling of pleasure at the successful musical imitations of noble characters and their emotions. To be quite accurate, Aristotle should have restricted his remarks here to painful emotions. Even the 'violent occurrence' (*συμβαίνει ἰσχυρῶς*) of the emotion reminds us, what has been said notwithstanding, of bodily disease: the 'employment' of melodies by those suffering from corybantism (§ 4) recalls the employment of remedies for bodily disorders, as was pointed out in *n.* (1093): it is to patients suffering from such disorders that the medical terms *καθίστασθαι* = recover (but see *n.* 1093) and *ιατρεία* = regular course of treatment, are applied. Lastly, the mental relief (*κουφίζεσθαι* 1342 a 14) in the one case has its counterpart in the bodily 'relief' which is spoken of by the Greek physicians. With this exception however the medical terms are mainly used with exclusive reference to patients really delirious or insane. To render *κάθαρσις* by 'homœopathic purgation of emotions' (and thereby preserve the ambiguity of *κάθαρσις παθημάτων Poetics* 6. 2, 1449 b 27) does not imply that the emotions are purged, but that they are purged away: the emotion which music æsthetically awakens expels the every-day emotion of kindred name. The reader is referred to the Introduction to my edition of the *Poetics* p. 54 for further explanation why this view must be taken, and why of the two terms I prefer "cleansing" to "purgation." There also, p. 44, I have argued that in all probability long before Aristotle's time the treatment here described, whereby the priests employed the so-called melodies of Olympus to exert a soothing influence upon the minds of patients suffering from Corybantian frenzy, received the name of *κάθαρσις* "cleansing" in a religious (or lustral) as well as in a medical sense, because from a religious point of view such patients were considered to be defiled. SUSEM. (1095).

<sup>1</sup> Bonitz *Aris. Stud.* v. p. 44: mental emotion has the term *πάθος* applied to it as being the counterpart of bodily ailment or disorder (*πάθος = νόσημα*).

## Καθάρσις as simple cleansing.

The etymology of the term, its literal meaning and the connection of its manifold applications, cannot be better explained than is done by Plato in the *Sophist* 236 D—231 E. The Eleate strangles *μακρά* with the every-day operations of sifting, straining, winnowing as contrasted with such other processes as carding, spinning, weaving, and he infers that their object is to separate, not like from like, but better from worse. Cleansing (*καθαρίσις*) is the general name for any such process<sup>1</sup>. Having thus determined the genus he goes on to divide it into its several species. When applied to animate bodies, such cleansing includes not only (*a*) the *internal* purge effected by gymnastic or medicine—here we approach the well established medical usage of the term, see below—but also (*b*) the merely *external* washing effected by the aid of sponge or bath; while inanimate objects undergo a similar treatment at the hands of the fuller or 'dress-reviver<sup>2</sup>.' With these literal corporeal cleansings the Eleate is less concerned than with the intellectual process, (*c*) the riddance of false opinions, whereby he is ultimately enabled to define the Sophist as *καθαροίης*, and the clenches as a purge:—an application of the term to which we shall recur later on (p. 647).

## The liturgical or religious sense: illustration.

It is generally admitted that as a technical term *καθάρσις* was earlier and more widely used in this than in its medical application<sup>3</sup>. Amongst the Greeks the conception of impurity and ceremonial purification was elaborated from very simple and humble beginnings, as we see in Homer, where prayer and sacrifice are preceded by corporeal ablution and Achilles rinses carefully a goblet that is to be used for libations. At all times indeed the cultus of Greek religion laid special stress upon external, ceremonial purity: there must be running water near a temple and *περὶπαυρίδες* for worshippers. The opening scene of Euripides' *Ion*, 101 ff., reminds us of the importance attached to keeping the temple itself pure and clean. All the contingencies of individual life—birth, marriage, death—were attended by casual impurity which lustrations were needed to remove. The *Ecclesiaz* was cleansed before a debate: upon one occasion, when news arrived of a horrible massacre, it was cleansed afresh. A whole community might become defiled and require the intervention of some prophet like *Ἐγμεινίδης*, to prescribe by what ceremonies the taint could be removed or absorbed.

<sup>1</sup> πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη διδασκαίη (sc. ἡ καταλείπουσα μὲν τὸ βέλτιον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἀποβάλλουσα) λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθάρσις τις, *Sophist* 236 D. Hence the definition 'Ὅροι 415 D, καθάρσις ἀσκαρσις χειρῶν ἀπὸ βελτιώσεων. In the simple literal sense, there seems no distinction between *καθάρσις* and *καθάρισις*.

<sup>2</sup> τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἶδη καθάρ-

σεων... καὶ τὴν (ἑαυτῶν) αὐτῶν καθάρσιν ἀπὸ γυμναστικῆς ἰατρικῆς καὶ ἄλλης ἀσκαρῆς καὶ καθάρσεως, καὶ (β) περὶ τὰς αἰσθητικὰς καὶ ψυχικὰς, ἀπὸ βλαβερῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν ἀφύχων εὐνοῶν, διὰ τροφῆς καὶ καὶ βλαβερῶν νοσημάτων τὴν ἀσκαρτικὴν καθάρσιν, πολλὰ βέλτερον ἔχει, *Sophist* 236 D E.

<sup>3</sup> During *Antiquities* p. 131.

The crude materialism at the basis of these usages is shown by the very nature of the rites; the detergents (*περιψήματα*) used to 'suck up' the pollution<sup>1</sup>, the care taken to bury or cast into the sea, or a river, all these *καθάρματα* (*καθάρσια*), i.e. objects loaded with the taint. Gradually however higher conceptions were introduced. The need of moral purity was emphasized in the words graven in the court of at least one temple<sup>2</sup>. In nothing is the elevation of idea more striking than in the treatment of homicide. It is well known that in the Homeric age the taint of blood-guiltiness was unknown: Theoclymenus, a homicide, is even present at a sacrifice, *Odys.* XV. 222 ff., 256 ff. The notion of guilt being wholly absent, the only atonement for murder is the price paid to the kin of the murdered man. Traces of a new order of thought can be discerned in the later epics. In the *Aethiopis* of Arctinus, Achilles, having slain Thersites, goes to Lesbos, and there, after sacrifice, is cleansed by Odysseus. This earliest instance presents all the essential features of the remarkable beliefs so familiar to us in the story of Orestes and his trial on the Areopagus: the temporary exile, because the land is defiled by bloodshed, the ceremony of purification, the return when the angry gods and the manes of the dead are presumed to have been appeased. Precisely similar ideas and ceremonies are attributed to the Lydian king Croesus when he purifies the Phrygian Adrastus, Herod. I. 35.

#### Lustration as a cure for madness.

But along with instances in abundance of lustration for the removal of casual impurity and the taint of blood, there is some not inconsiderable evidence that *κάθαρσις*, in this ceremonial sense, was extended to the healing of disease, more especially of mental disorders, an application which serves as a transition to the well-defined medical use of the term. We need not dwell on the perfect congruity of this application with the beliefs of a time when the 'medicine man' is also a soothsayer, and cures are wrought by charms and spells<sup>3</sup>. The complete parallelism between the mental and the bodily treatment, which is involved in the application of the terms *κάθαρσις* and *καθαρμός* indifferently to both, is asserted in the strongest terms in Plato's

<sup>1</sup> Compare also *Διὸς κώδιον*· οὗ τὸ ἱερεῖον Διὶ τέθνται...*χρῶνται δ' αὐτοῖς...πρὸς τοὺς καθαρμούς ὑποστρωννύντες αὐτὰ τοῖς ποσὶ τῶν ἐναγῶν* (Suidas), ἐφ' οὗ οἱ καθαιρόμενοι ἐστήκεσαν τῷ ἀριστερῷ ποδί (Hesychius).

<sup>2</sup> Porphyry. *De Abstinencia* II. 19: δεῖ τοίνυν καθηραμένους τὸ ἦθος ἰέναι θύσοντας...*ἐν γοῦν Ἐπιδαύρῳ προεγγράπτο*

*ἄγνων χρῆ ναιοῖο θυώδεος ἐντὸς ἰόντα ἔμμεναι*· ἀγγελῇ δ' ἐστὶ φρονεῖν ὅσια.

The quotation from Bernays *Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit* p. 67 f.

<sup>3</sup> *θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν* (Ζάμολξις) *ἔφη ἐπωδαῖς τισι*, Pl. *Charm.* 157 A. Not only *ἐνθουσιασμός* but lumbago and epi-

lepsy were said to be cured by music: Theophrastus *περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμοῦ*, *Fr.* 87: *ὅτι δὲ καὶ νόσους ἰᾶται μουσικὴ Θεόφραστος ἰστόρησεν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμοῦ, ἰσχιακοὺς φάσκων ἀνόσους διατελεῖν εἰ καταυλήσοι τις τοῦ τόπου τῇ φρυγιστὶ ἁρμονίᾳ* (*Ath.* XIV. 624 B), *Fr.* 88 Θ. *ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμῶν...φησὶ...τὴν μουσικὴν πολλὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα γιγνομένων παθῶν ἰατρεῖν καθάπερ λιποθυμίαν φόβους καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ μακρὸν γιγνομένας τῆς διανοίας ἐκστάσεις. ἰᾶται γάρ, φησὶν, ἡ καταύλλησις καὶ ἰσχιάδα καὶ ἐπιληψίαν* (an instance is appended, Apollon. *Hist. Mirab.* c. 49).

*Cratylus*. There Socrates, speaking of the attributes of Apollo, whose name he connects with ἀπολούω, ἀπολύω, says: "the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with things magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul." The strange nature of primitive remedies is what we might expect; 'the hair of the dog that bit you' is but one instance of crude homoeopathy, which might be indefinitely illustrated. The fact that to cure madness the Greeks resorted to noisy excitement is beyond all doubt. In Plato, madness itself is said to suggest this remedy to the clairvoyant patient, the 'lustrations and religious rites' which for his malady are alone of avail<sup>2</sup>. In the legends we naturally find this method of treatment (ἡ διὰ φαρμάκων καὶ καθάρων θεραπεία) referred to an individual inventor: Melampus, a well known seer, is represented as healing the madness of the daughters of Proetus by such lustral rites<sup>3</sup>. Dionysus himself was the subject of another legendary cure<sup>4</sup>. The case of Orestes, Paus. II. 31. 4, is less clear seeing that he was 'cleansed' of matricide as well as madness<sup>5</sup>. On the other hand, in a picture of real life from the *Wasps* of Aristophanes, Bdelycleon in all seriousness endeavours to cure his father's madness by initiating him in the Corybantian dance<sup>6</sup>. Not less sober is the statement of the phenomenon as an acknowledged fact—the frenzy that music is supposed to excite and to cure—in the questions put by Porphyry and answered, in the person of Abammon, by Iamblichus<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ καθάρσις καὶ αἱ καθάρματα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ αἱ τῶν ἱερατικῶν φαρμάκων καὶ τῶν μαγικῶν περιποιήσεις τε καὶ τὰ λουτρὰ τὰ ἐν τοῖς τοιαῖσι καὶ αἱ περιμήσεις, πάντα ἐν τι ταῦτα δύναιτ' εἶναι, καθάρων παρέχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, 405 A, B. The translation is Jowett's.

<sup>2</sup> ἄλλα μὲν νόσους γὰρ καὶ νόσους τῶν μελῶν, ἃ δὲ πάλαιον δὲ ἀναιδέως ποιεῖν ἐν τοῖς τοῖς γυνώσκει, ἢ μανία ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ προσηγορία αἱ οἱ ἀπαλλοτρίωσι νόσους, καταφυγόντες πρὸς θεῶν οὐχὶ καὶ καὶ λατρείας, ὅθεν δὲ καθάρσις τε καὶ τελετὰν τεχοῖσα εἰδότες ὄντες τὸν θεῶν ἔχοντες, *Phaedr.* 244 D, E. In view of this and the other Platonic passages it seems impossible to endorse the objection of Reiz, *op. cit.* p. 104, "expiari et lustrari dicuntur si dumtaxat, qui polluti sunt aliquo scelere, tum qui mysteria initiandi, aut qui rem sacram facturi sunt: non etiam si quorum animus ab aliqua perturbatione tanquam morbo purgatur et liberatur."

<sup>3</sup> ἐν ταύτῃ δευτέρῳ τὸ σέβασμα τῶν θυγατέρων τῶν Προέτων παρέσθαι λέγουσιν ἐν ὃ Μελάμπος θούσις τε ἀπαρτίσας καὶ καθάρματι καθάρσας ἐν πρώτῃ καλῶνται Λουτρὰ... καὶ θεῖον τὴν μανίαν ἐν Ἀπρί-

μιδοι ἱερῷ, *Pausan.* VIII. 18. 5. The account of Apollodorus (III. 2. 5 ff.) makes the cure depend on omens—ενεργημάτων. Μελάμπος δὲ, πᾶσι τοῖς καὶ τοῖς φαρμάκων καὶ καθάρων ἱερατικῶν πρώτοις ἐμμελῶς, παραλαβὼν τὰς θυγατέρας τῶν πενιχῶν μετ' ἀλλήλων καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς χορείας ἐν τῶν ἱερῶν αὐτῶν ἐν Σαλαμῇ συνεβάζε. κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐπεσφύρατο μετ' Ἀλκίονος τὰς δὲ Λαοῖας τεχοῖσας καθάρων σφραγίσας ἐν αὐτῇ.

<sup>4</sup> Πρὸς μανίαν αὐτῷ ἐκβαλόντες αὐτὸς δ' εἰς Κόβηλα τὴν Φρυγίαν ἀφαιέσας, εὐκαὶ καθάρσας ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ καὶ καὶ τελετῇ ἐκκαθάσας..., Apollodorus III. 5. 1. This is alluded to by Plato *Laos.* 672 B.

<sup>5</sup> The same remark applies to the cleansing of Alcmæon, Apollodorus III. 7. 5. 2-4.

<sup>6</sup> εἰς αὐτὴν ἀπείλῃ ἐκβάλλουσιν... ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ (μετὰ τῶν) καθάρματι (1100). In schol. *deci. vol.* τὰ τῶν Καθημένων ἱερῶν αὐτῷ μετῴμα, ἐν καθάρματι τῶν μανίας; and to the same effect Henschel's v. v. Καθημένων αὐτῷ καθάρματι μανίας.

<sup>7</sup> ἐν τῇ ἐπεσφύρατι ἱερῇ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναιδέως ἢ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἢ τελετῶν ἢ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναιδέως, ὡς αἱ τε καθάρματα καὶ αἱ τῷ Σαλαμῇ ἐκκαθαίρουσιν καὶ αἱ τῷ Πόντῳ ἐκκαθαίρουσιν... with the ordinary explanation (which Alcmæon of Naucratis mentions

The main features of this celebrated form of worship, at once a revel and a mystery, are vividly presented by the authorities whom Lobeck has collected with all his learning and acumen in *Aglaophamus*, p. 1150 ff. To the Platonic dialogues we are indebted for some of the most graphic touches, portraying various accompaniments of the weird scene of music and dance which was apparently far better adapted to produce madness than to take it away. First and foremost, the incessant piercing melody of the pipe<sup>1</sup>, which haunted the patient until he had ears for no other sounds<sup>2</sup>: then the wild frenzied dances<sup>3</sup>, the music meanwhile drowning the cries of the patient<sup>4</sup>, causing palpitation of the heart, while the tears started from his eyes<sup>5</sup>. To other writers we are indebted for hints and allusions which fill in some details<sup>6</sup>, but the philosophic reflexions in which Plato himself sums up the total effect, *Laus* 790 C—791 B, leave little more to be said: “this is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion—rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music. The reason is obvious. The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent

τὸ μὲν οὖν κινήτικόν τι καὶ παθητικὸν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν, καὶ τὸ τῶν αὐλῶν ἐμποιεῖν ἢ ἰατρεῦειν τὰ πάθη τῆς παρατροπῆς, καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι τὰς τοῦ σώματος κράσεις ἢ διαθέσεις τὴν μουσικὴν, καὶ τὸ ἄλλοις μὲν μέλεσιν ἀναβακχεύεσθαι, ἄλλοις δὲ ἀποπαύεσθαι τῆς βακχείας, καὶ πῶς αἱ τούτων διαφοραὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκστάς διαθέσεις προσαρμόττουσι, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἄστατον καὶ ἀκατάστατον μέλος πρὸς τὰς ἐκστάσεις οἰκείον, οἷα δὴ ἐστὶ τὰ Ὀλύμπου, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα λέγεται, πάντα ἁλλοτρίως μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἐνθουσιασμόν Iamblich. *de Mysteriis*, 3, 9.

<sup>1</sup> *Ion* 536 C, οἱ Κορύβαντες ἐκείνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους ὁξέως ὃ ἂν ᾗ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσι.

<sup>2</sup> *Crito* 54 D, ταῦτα εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκοῦειν ὥσπερ οἱ Κορυβαντιῶνες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκοῦειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκοῦειν.

<sup>3</sup> *Ion* 533 E, οἱ Κορύβαντες οὐκ ἐμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται.

<sup>4</sup> *Laus* 790 E, αἱ μητέρες.....ἀτεχνῶς καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδιῶν, καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βαγγειῶν ἰάσεις ταύτη τῇ τῆς

κινήσεως ἅμα χορεῖα καὶ μούση χρώμεναι. From the expression βαγγειῶν ἰάσεις Döring *op. c.* 252 strangely infers that the religious or liturgical signification of the phenomena must be rejected. Quite the contrary: in the same context 790 C we find αἱ τὰ τῶν Κορυβάντων ἰάματα τελοῦσθαι; τελεῖται are joined to καθαρμοὶ in *Phaedr.* 244 E (cited above, p. 645 n. 2); and Dionysus in the legend is not only ‘cleansed’ but instructed in the Bacchic rites (καθαρθεὶς ὑπὸ Ῥέας καὶ τὰς τελετὰς ἐκμαθὼν p. 645 n. 4). The common belief attributed Bacchic frenzy to the fact that the god had himself been driven mad by his step-mother: *Laus* 672, λόγος τις ἅμα καὶ φήμη ὑπορρεῖ πως, ὥς ὁ θεὸς οὗτος ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς Ἡρας διεφορήθη τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν γνώμην, διὸ τὰς τε βαγγείας καὶ πάσαν τὴν μανικὴν ἐμβάλλει χορείαν τιμωρούμενος, i.e. in retribution.

<sup>5</sup> *Symp.* 215 E: πολὺ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν Κορυβαντῶντων ἢ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχέεται.

<sup>6</sup> Lucian *Deor. Dial.* XII. 37, *De Salt.* c. 79, p. 167, *Plut. Amat.* XVI. 7, p. 758 E, 12, 759 A, *Strabo* X. 21, p. 473, all cited by Lobeck p. 1152 ff.

**Kátharsis** as purification or purging of impurity.

The nymphs of *Aphis aceris* de Bon. feeding and reproducing on seedlings from 1950 to 1951. The aphid is light greenish yellow, with dark antennae (Fig. 2). [The change in the medical treatment is brought out fully in Fig. 3].

which fully explains in what sense *κάθαρσις* was a technical term<sup>1</sup>. It denoted in fact practical virtue, moral activity generally, regarded as one stage in the ascent of the soul, which must be purged from everything corporeal in order to attain to the divine likeness. Between this ethical and ascetic application, on the one hand, and Aristotle's pathological application, on the other, there is nothing in common: they are totally opposed, a fact which gives peculiar value to the evidence of Iamblichus and Proclus to be hereafter considered.

**The usage of the medical writers : purgation, discharge.**

It remains to consider the most important extension of the meaning riddance or removal. In Hippocrates and Galen *κάθαρσις* as a technical term denotes 'purgation,' i.e. expulsion of diseased humours from the system. Foesius has well defined it: *κάθαρσις* purgatio absolute dicitur Hippocrati, cum humores prava qualitate affecti et noxii vacuantur, sive id natura molitur, sive sponte fiat, aut medicamento. To understand this definition fully, a slight acquaintance is required with the pathological theory of the father of medicine. The school of Hippocrates base their treatment upon the assumption of the four 'humours,' blood, phlegm, black bile, yellow bile<sup>2</sup>. Health depends upon the due proportion of these vital fluids: disease is caused by their undue excess or defect, especially by their morbid accumulation in the frame<sup>3</sup>. If they are disordered, the more they accumulate the worse the disease becomes. In such a case the task of the physician is to aid nature to discharge from the system the accumulation of peccant humour, lest it become corrupt: preparatory to a discharge it must however be

<sup>1</sup> Πλωτίνος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀπόθεσιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν μορφωτικῶν διαγνώσεων, δόξης τε πάσης ὑπεροψίαν [τε] καὶ τῶν ἐνύλων διανοήσεων ἀπόστασιν, πλήρωσιν τε ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ἀφομοιώσιν τε τοῦ κατανοουμένου πρὸς τὸ κατανοοῦν τὴν τελειωτάτην κάθαρσιν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν p. 454, 10 ed. W. He goes on to distinguish κρίσις, δίκη, κάθαρσις, and on the authority of οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι assigns as the end of the last ἀφαίρεσις τῶν ἀλλοτριῶν, ἀπόδοσις τῆς οἰκείας οὐσίας, τελειότης, ἀποπλήρωσις, αὐτάρκεια, ἀνοδος ἐπὶ τὴν γεννησαμένην αἰτίαν: whereas others confine it to the humbler functions of λύσις ἀπὸ σώματος καὶ ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν καταδέσμων καὶ φθορᾶς ἐλευθέρωσις καὶ γενέσεως ἄφεσις. Plotinus discusses the relation of *κάθαρσις* to the virtues in *Enn.* I. 2 *περὶ ἀρετῶν*, and decides (I. 6. 6) that *κάθαρσις* is not a means to virtue, but identical with virtue. Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Hierocles, and Ammonius agree in placing the cathartic virtues above the civic (πολιτικαί) and below the intellectual (θεωρητικαί ἀρεταί): see Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* III. ii.

661, 711, 757, 819 n. 4. It is only in this neoplatonic sense that the word admits of the rendering "purification," so common hitherto and so unhappily ambiguous.

<sup>2</sup> τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴν ξανθὴν τε καὶ μέλαιναν, καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι αὐτῷ ἡ φύσις τοῦ σώματος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀλγέει καὶ ὑγιαίνει, Hipp. *De natura hominis* II. 3 p. 83 (I. p. 352 K.).

<sup>3</sup> I.e. ὑγιαίνει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὁκόταν μετρίως ἔχη ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἄλλα κρήσις τε καὶ δυνάμις καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, καὶ μάλιστα μεμιγμένα ἢ ἀλγέει δέ, ὁκόταν τι τούτων ἐλασσον ἢ πλεον ἢ ἡ χωρισθῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκραμένον ἢ τοῖσι ξύμπτει. Plato has a similar theory in his *Timaeus* cc. 39, 40, 82 A ff. except that he has transferred the 'unnatural excess and defect' and the 'displacement' in the last resort to his four elements (air, earth, fire, water) rather than to their secondary formations, the four humours. Still he follows the Hippocrateans in referring fevers to the bile and catarrhs to phlegm (*Tim.* 85 B).

reduced and softened. Three stages may therefore be distinguished: (1) presence of crude humours, τὰ μὴ καθαρὰ τῶν σωματίων, (2) their reduction, πέψις, itself a species of transformation, or μεταβολή, (3) their expulsion, κρίσις. Of these stages, (2) and (3) are promoted by artificial means, as explained by Plutarch in the case of hellebore: an insufficient dose, he says, excites disturbance (ταράττει) without however effecting a purge<sup>1</sup>. The inducement of excitement (ταραχή) is somewhat of a parallel to homeopathic remedies in modern medicine, while the stimulated ἐκδιαιρέσις in the Corybantian worship corresponds to it in so far as in both cases the remedy adds fuel to the flame<sup>2</sup>. The medical process (ταραχή) goes on until the reduction (πέψις) is complete. Thereupon it remains to rid the body of the disturbing alien matters.

Here it is important to insist upon the distinction which Galen emphasises between the sense of καθαρσις and of κένωσις in the Hippocratican corpus: the latter a depletion or total evacuation of humours,—it may be of healthy but surplus humours—the former the partial removal of morbid elements, whose presence causes active annoyance: κένωσιν ἀπλῶς εὐθεὶς λέγειν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ὅταν ἅπαντες οἱ χυμοὶ<sup>3</sup> ὁμοτίμως κενῶνται, καθαρσιν δὲ ὅταν οἱ μολύβητοι κατὰ ποιότητα. This distinction is rendered prominent in such phrases as καθαρσις χολῆς, κ. αἵματος, where the result is not merely the loss of blood, etc. but, as what is removed is bad, what remains is absolutely clarified and refined; it is purged but not altogether purged away.

From the medical writers this usage found its way into the language of every-day life. Thucydides treats it as a technical term in his description of the plague<sup>4</sup>: Demosthenes allows a singularly naïve and unsophisticated client to employ the word<sup>5</sup>. Aristotle appears to have generally adopted the medical terminology as well as the theory of humours from the Hippocraticans<sup>6</sup>: but in the biological works he has specialised this word in a slightly different sense<sup>7</sup>. Nor can it be said that the distinction enforced by

<sup>1</sup> ὁ γοῦν ἐκλύβορος ἀρχὴν τοῦ καθάρειν ἔχει τὸ ταράττειν τὸν ὄγκον, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐλάττωσαι τὸν σπέρματι δυνάμει, ταράττει, ἀπὸ αὐτῆς δὲ καθάρει. Plut. *Quaest. conv.* III. 8. 8, p. 646 F.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Plato's reflexions on the Corybantic rites, *Latos* II. 790 c ff. as quoted above p. 646 n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Galen *Comm. in Hippocr. De Humor.* V. 12 (XVI. 105 K.). Compare also καθαρσις δὲ ὅταν ἢ τῶν λευκῶν κατὰ ποιότητα κένωσις Galen *Comm. ad aphor.* 2. 1. 1 (XVII. B. 118 K.); καθαρσιν γὰρ εἰσὶν [sc. οἱ Ἱπποκράτης] ἀναφάνειν οἱ μύθοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν φανόμενων γενομένης, ἀλλὰ οὐ τὰς ἐκ τῶν φανόμενων *In Epidem.* (XVII. B. 167 K.); ἀναφάνει δὲ κένωσιν μὲν τῶν αἰσίων, ὅταν ἐπερὶ τῶν τοῦ πνεύματος καθαρσιν δὲ τῶν τῶν ἄλλοτριων κατὰ ποιότητα *Comm. in pragm.* (XVIII. B. 134 f. K.). Here Galen is speaking in his own

person. Other passages are cited by Siebeck *Zur Katharsisfrage in Jahn's J. Phil.* CXXV. 1881, p. 213 B.

<sup>4</sup> ἀποκαθάρσει χολῆς πένος, *Deo* ἐκ τῆς τῆς ἀποκαθάρσεως εἰσε, II. 49.

<sup>5</sup> *J. Comm.* § 12, et ut καθαρσιν λέγουσι ἀναφάνειν καὶ ἀναφάνειν, p. 110, 11.

<sup>6</sup> *Lattre* ed. of Hippocr. I. 215 plus on examine comparativement les écrits Hippocratiques, ceux de Platon et d'Aristote, plus on trouve de concordances entre eux et de points de comparaison. *Études* 2<sup>e</sup> s. p. 319 ff. collect a few instances of κένωσις, κένωσις, καθάρσις, ταραχή—e.g. 110 b 11, 70 b 9 ff., 110 b 24, 110 c 11, 110 c 12, 110 c 13, 863 a 6, 8 13 ff., 864 a 1, 872 b 21 ff. Add *Probl.* I. 40, 864 a 24 (quoted below p. 650 n. 8).

<sup>7</sup> See *Rosini* *Jah.* 2<sup>e</sup> s. v. 12, 6 18 'αὐτὰ τὰ σωματικά'. The substance added takes up rather more than a volume

Galen between κένωσις and κάθαρσις is much observed by unprofessional writers<sup>1</sup>.

### Κάθαρσις as an æsthetic term.

The foregoing survey will serve as an introduction to the usage of κάθαρσις in reference to Music in the *Politics*, and in the famous definition of Tragedy in the *Poetics*<sup>2</sup>. All are agreed that Aristotle is employing the term in a metaphorical sense of his own, at once novel and calling for elucidation<sup>3</sup>. Whether this æsthetic sense was derived from the liturgical or the medical usage of the term is not absolutely demonstrated<sup>4</sup>: whichever it was, we may acquiesce in Zeller's opinion<sup>5</sup> that the new application is a wide departure from the original intention. On the one hand there is no doubt that the theory which Aristotle puts forward rests upon the facts to which he himself appeals—facts which, however remote from our experience, were less uncommon in Greece and in the East—the cure of the Corybantian frenzy in the manner above described<sup>6</sup>. On the other hand the occurrence of medical terms in the context<sup>7</sup>, certain points in the process of relief<sup>8</sup>, and the consideration urged by Bernays<sup>9</sup> that a pathological effect on the mind would be more naturally elucidated by reference to the effect of medicine on the body, all make in favour of regarding the medical metaphor as prominent.

"Are we to imagine," it has been asked, "that when writing upon art, Aristotle was primarily thinking not of Plato's 'psychiatry' in the *Laws*, but

(64 lines), and those for all other meanings less than 20 lines (one of these latter is *De gen. anim.* II. 4. 11, 738 a 28 K. τῶν περιπτωμάτων). Bernays *op. c.* p. 91 (191) is able to adduce the parallels ἀπόκρισις τῶν καταμηνίων, ἐκκρισις.

<sup>1</sup> E.g. Pl. *Phædo* 69 c κάθαρσις = total removal.

<sup>2</sup> μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἐκαστοῦ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν *Poet.* 6 § 2, 1449 b 27.

<sup>3</sup> *Pol.* V(VIII). 7. 3, 1341 b 38. We have lost the fuller exposition of the *Poetics* (ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον, cp. n. 1085).

<sup>4</sup> Very few authorities now support the former view. Ed. Müller argues for it *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CI. 1870, p. 404 ff. The view taken in the text follows Susemihl *Intr. to Poetics* p. 44.

<sup>5</sup> *Phil. d. Griech.* II<sup>3</sup>. ii. 775.

<sup>6</sup> P. 642. Ed. Müller *l.c.* p. 406 n. (190) insists that the similarity in means employed, subjects treated, effects produced in the cases mentioned by Plato *Laws* 790 D ff., and Aristotle *Pol.* V(VIII). is so great as to be unmistakeable (τῶν

ἐκφρόνων βακχείων λάσεις in Plato, ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχεῖν καὶ καθάρσεως in Aristotle; ἔξις ἐμφρονος ἔχειν in the former, καθίστασθαι in the latter). That the priestly cure was actually called κάθαρσις is, however, an inference resting on slender evidence (see above p. 644 f.) and only eked out by general considerations of the primitive identity between drugs and charms, cleansing from ceremonial impurity and healing of mental disorders, which, as Susemihl remarks *Jahrb. f. Phil.* xcv. 1867, p. 234, attached a taint to the patient.

<sup>7</sup> See the notes *ad loc.* p. 610 f.

<sup>8</sup> The operation of drugs is the subject of *Probl.* I. 42, διὰ τί τὰ φάρμακα καθαίρει; The illustration conveyed in the words οὐ πεφθέντα δὲ ἀλλὰ κρατήσαντα ἐκπίπτει φέροντα τὰ ἐμπόδια αὐτοῖς· καὶ καλεῖται τοῦτο κάθαρσις 864 a 32—34, is very apposite. Cp. Pl. *Soph.* 230 c νομίζοντες γὰρ οἱ καθάροντες αὐτούς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νενομίκασιν μὴ πρότερον ἢ τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σώμα, πρὶν ἢ τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τις ἐκβάλῃ... The relief follows upon excitation which is temporarily an aggravation of the disorder.

<sup>9</sup> *Zwei Abhandlungen* p. 13 (143).

The treatment to which the priest subjected those suffering from Cerebrian frenzy may be loosely said to have been of a homœopathic nature<sup>1</sup>; that is, under the stimulus of the music, with all its exciting accompaniments (p. 646), the frenzy was accelerated and heightened until it had worked itself out. It is this excess or outburst of quasi-religious fervour, and the subsequent exhaustion, of which Catullus presents so astonishing a picture in the *Attila*. A fragment of Theophrastus practically endorses this view of the power of music<sup>2</sup>. Plutarch too describes the effect of the flute, the instrument on which the melodies of Olympus were played, in language which shows a striking agreement with the cathartic method of the *Politika*<sup>3</sup>. Lastly, there is the passage from Aristides Quintilianus already cited (p. 610).

<sup>1</sup> Comp. above p. 645. The assertion that homoeopathic treatment is intended by Aristotle was made, as Bernays points out p. 98 (193), by Millin in the preface to his *Sermon Apomites: " (Tragedy) and by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of these and such-like passions; that is, to temper or reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight stirred up by reading or seeing those passages well imitated. Nor is Nature herself wanting in her own efforts to make good his assertion, for so, in physick, things of melancholick hue and quality are used against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humours."*

[illegible]

discussing the effect of wine; 13.12, 626 ff. what he says and thinks are not so dependent on *ἡμεῖς* as *ἡμεῖς* is. *ἡμεῖς* is used in 13.12, 626 ff. and 13.13, 631 ff. and 13.14, 636 ff. and 13.15, 641 ff. and 13.16, 646 ff. and 13.17, 651 ff. and 13.18, 656 ff. and 13.19, 661 ff. and 13.20, 666 ff. and 13.21, 671 ff. and 13.22, 676 ff. and 13.23, 681 ff. and 13.24, 686 ff. and 13.25, 691 ff. and 13.26, 696 ff. and 13.27, 701 ff. and 13.28, 706 ff. and 13.29, 711 ff. and 13.30, 716 ff. and 13.31, 721 ff. and 13.32, 726 ff. and 13.33, 731 ff. and 13.34, 736 ff. and 13.35, 741 ff. and 13.36, 746 ff. and 13.37, 751 ff. and 13.38, 756 ff. and 13.39, 761 ff. and 13.40, 766 ff. and 13.41, 771 ff. and 13.42, 776 ff. and 13.43, 781 ff. and 13.44, 786 ff. and 13.45, 791 ff. and 13.46, 796 ff. and 13.47, 801 ff. and 13.48, 806 ff. and 13.49, 811 ff. and 13.50, 816 ff. and 13.51, 821 ff. and 13.52, 826 ff. and 13.53, 831 ff. and 13.54, 836 ff. and 13.55, 841 ff. and 13.56, 846 ff. and 13.57, 851 ff. and 13.58, 856 ff. and 13.59, 861 ff. and 13.60, 866 ff. and 13.61, 871 ff. and 13.62, 876 ff. and 13.63, 881 ff. and 13.64, 886 ff. and 13.65, 891 ff. and 13.66, 896 ff. and 13.67, 901 ff. and 13.68, 906 ff. and 13.69, 911 ff. and 13.70, 916 ff. and 13.71, 921 ff. and 13.72, 926 ff. and 13.73, 931 ff. and 13.74, 936 ff. and 13.75, 941 ff. and 13.76, 946 ff. and 13.77, 951 ff. and 13.78, 956 ff. and 13.79, 961 ff. and 13.80, 966 ff. and 13.81, 971 ff. and 13.82, 976 ff. and 13.83, 981 ff. and 13.84, 986 ff. and 13.85, 991 ff. and 13.86, 996 ff. and 13.87, 1001 ff. and 13.88, 1006 ff. and 13.89, 1011 ff. and 13.90, 1016 ff. and 13.91, 1021 ff. and 13.92, 1026 ff. and 13.93, 1031 ff. and 13.94, 1036 ff. and 13.95, 1041 ff. and 13.96, 1046 ff. and 13.97, 1051 ff. and 13.98, 1056 ff. and 13.99, 1061 ff. and 13.100, 1066 ff. and 13.101, 1071 ff. and 13.102, 1076 ff. and 13.103, 1081 ff. and 13.104, 1086 ff. and 13.105, 1091 ff. and 13.106, 1096 ff. and 13.107, 1101 ff. and 13.108, 1106 ff. and 13.109, 1111 ff. and 13.110, 1116 ff. and 13.111, 1121 ff. and 13.112, 1126 ff. and 13.113, 1131 ff. and 13.114, 1136 ff. and 13.115, 1141 ff. and 13.116, 1146 ff. and 13.117, 1151 ff. and 13.118, 1156 ff. and 13.119, 1161 ff. and 13.120, 1166 ff. and 13.121, 1171 ff. and 13.122, 1176 ff. and 13.123, 1181 ff. and 13.124, 1186 ff. and 13.125, 1191 ff. and 13.126, 1196 ff. and 13.127, 1201 ff. and 13.128, 1206 ff. and 13.129, 1211 ff. and 13.130, 1216 ff. and 13.131, 1221 ff. and 13.132, 1226 ff. and 13.133, 1231 ff. and 13.134, 1236 ff. and 13.135, 1241 ff. and 13.136, 1246 ff. and 13.137, 1251 ff. and 13.138, 1256 ff. and 13.139, 1261 ff. and 13.140, 1266 ff. and 13.141, 1271 ff. and 13.142, 1276 ff. and 13.143, 1281 ff. and 13.144, 1286 ff. and 13.145, 1291 ff. and 13.146, 1296 ff. and 13.147, 1301 ff. and 13.148, 1306 ff. and 13.149, 1311 ff. and 13.150, 1316 ff. and 13.151, 1321 ff. and 13.152, 1326 ff. and 13.153, 1331 ff. and 13.154, 1336 ff. and 13.155, 1341 ff. and 13.156, 1346 ff. and 13.157, 1351 ff. and 13.158, 1356 ff. and 13.159, 1361 ff. and 13.160, 1366 ff. and 13.161, 1371 ff. and 13.162, 1376 ff. and 13.163, 1381 ff. and 13.164, 1386 ff. and 13.165, 1391 ff. and 13.166, 1396 ff. and 13.167, 1401 ff. and 13.168, 1406 ff. and 13.169, 1411 ff. and 13.170, 1416 ff. and 13.171, 1421 ff. and 13.172, 1426 ff. and 13.173, 1431 ff. and 13.174, 1436 ff. and 13.175, 1441 ff. and 13.176, 1446 ff. and 13.177, 1451 ff. and 13.178, 1456 ff. and 13.179, 1461 ff. and 13.180, 1466 ff. and 13.181, 1471 ff. and 13.182, 1476 ff. and 13.183, 1481 ff. and 13.184, 1486 ff. and 13.185, 1491 ff. and 13.186, 1496 ff. and 13.187, 1501 ff. and 13.188, 1506 ff. and 13.189, 1511 ff. and 13.190, 1516 ff. and 13.191, 1521 ff. and 13.192, 1526 ff. and 13.193, 1531 ff. and 13.194, 1536 ff. and 13.195, 1541 ff. and 13.196, 1546 ff. and 13.197, 1551 ff. and 13.198, 1556 ff. and 13.199, 1561 ff. and 13.200, 1566 ff. and 13.201, 1571 ff. and 13.202, 1576 ff. and 13.203, 1581 ff. and 13.204, 1586 ff. and 13.205, 1591 ff. and 13.206, 1596 ff. and 13.207, 1601 ff. and 13.208, 1606 ff. and 13.209, 1611 ff. and 13.210, 1616 ff. and 13.211, 1621 ff. and 13.212, 1626 ff. and 13.213, 1631 ff. and 13.214, 1636 ff. and 13.215, 1641 ff. and 13.216, 1646 ff. and 13.217, 1651 ff. and 13.218, 1656 ff. and 13.219, 1661 ff. and 13.220, 1666 ff. and 13.221, 1671 ff. and 13.222, 1676 ff. and 13.223, 1681 ff. and 13.224, 1686 ff. and 13.225, 1691 ff. and 13.226, 1696 ff. and 13.227, 1701 ff. and 13.228, 1706 ff. and 13.229, 1711 ff. and 13.230, 1716 ff. and 13.231, 1721 ff. and 13.232, 1726 ff. and 13.233, 1731 ff. and 13.234, 1736 ff. and 13.235, 1741 ff. and 13.236, 1746 ff. and 13.237, 1751 ff. and 13.238, 1756 ff. and 13.239, 1761 ff. and 13.240, 1766 ff. and 13.241, 1771 ff. and 13.242, 1776 ff. and 13.243, 1781 ff. and 13.244, 1786 ff. and 13.245, 1791 ff. and 13.246, 1796 ff. and 13.247, 1801 ff. and 13.248, 1806 ff. and 13.249, 1811 ff. and 13.250, 1816 ff. and 13.251, 1821 ff. and 13.252, 1826 ff. and 13.253, 1831 ff. and 13.254, 1836 ff. and 13.255, 1841 ff. and 13.256, 1846 ff. and 13.257, 1851 ff. and 13.258, 1856 ff. and 13.259, 1861 ff. and 13.260, 1866 ff. and 13.261, 1871 ff. and 13.262, 1876 ff. and 13.263, 1881 ff. and 13.264, 1886 ff. and 13.265, 1891 ff. and 13.266, 1896 ff. and 13.267, 1901 ff. and 13.268, 1906 ff. and 13.269, 1911 ff. and 13.270, 1916 ff. and 13.271, 1921 ff. and 13.272, 1926 ff. and 1

<sup>4</sup> Prof. Butcher's translation, *et. c.* p. 347. The Greek is given p. 346.

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tional influence we learn nothing. Such good effect as the drama exerts must, on the Aristotelian theory, be indirect. But so soon as the attempt is made to define more precisely the nature of this purgation, of the emotions that are purged, and the pity and fear through which their purgation is effected, there arise difficulties which have not yet been wholly surmounted. For there may be a total or a partial removal, a 'purging away' i.e. expulsion, or 'purging' i.e. refinement (by release of painful elements)<sup>1</sup>: further, it is possible to ask whether the emotions purged are those already existing in the spectator, or such as are excited in him by the action of the piece. Nor is it inconceivable that Aristotle has unduly pressed the medical analogy. How can the emotions correspond to the *materia peccans*? They are never expelled, and to speak of them as 'secreted' is an outrage on language. We more properly regard them as either suppressed or indulged, and in the latter case as running their course, culminating in the thrill of pity, the shudder of horror, the transports of enthusiasm, until sated with over indulgence they at length subside. While fully sensible then that every one of the following positions has been a matter of protracted controversy, we incline (1) to interpret the *purgation* of the emotions to mean their gratification, their relief by indulgence<sup>2</sup> (though perhaps the outlet thus afforded for emotional excess necessarily involves a qualitative change, viz. the loss of an impure element, what is painful and oppressive either in the emotion itself or in its manifestation in actual experience): (2) to discriminate<sup>3</sup> between the emotions relieved, i.e. the pity and fear of real life, and the emotions which effect this relief, viz. those artificially excited by the action of the drama<sup>4</sup>: (3) to

δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγωδίας, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν..., 26 § 15, 1462 b 13: δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς [sc. τὴν τραγωδίαν καὶ τὴν ἐποποιίαν] ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην.

<sup>1</sup> Siebeck in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1882, p. 225 ff., Baumgart *Poetik* p. 435 f.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Plut. *De inim. util.* 10, 91 F: τῶν παθῶν τούτων ποιούμενος εἰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀποκαθάρσεις "indulging [lit. venting] these feelings upon his enemies." Bernays thought he could distinguish πάθημα, the disposition or permanent tendency (παθητικὴ ποιότης), from the πάθος its transient manifestation. It is impossible to follow him here, for Bonitz, *Arist. Studien* v, has shown that the two terms are absolutely convertible in Aristotelian usage. While if we say that the 'painful emotion' of fear and pity is removed, we are reminded that the definitions in the *Rhetoric* (II. c. 5, c. 8) make each of these—fear itself and pity itself—'a sort of pain' (λύπη τις), although the emotions generally are defined as οἷς ἔπειται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή *Rhet.* II. 1. 8, 1378 a 21, *Nic. Eth.* II. 5. 2, 1105 b 23.

<sup>3</sup> The distinction between tragic fear and pity and these emotions in real life was first drawn by Ed. Müller *Gesch. der Kunstth.* II. p. 63 ff. Unless this distinction be drawn it is impossible to avoid the difficulties which those followers of Bernays encounter who interpret τὴν τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν in the definition of tragedy as the "expulsion," i.e. purging away, of the emotions in question. Bernays himself escaped this difficulty only by distinguishing πάθος = emotion, from πάθημα = disposition, tendency to emotion:—a distinction which in view of Bonitz' careful investigation (*Arist. Studien* v) cannot be maintained. See n. (2). But there is no reason why the phrase should not mean the *purgation* of the emotions, i.e. the freeing them from what is superfluous, the diminution of the whole by the expulsion of what is noxious, and consequent clarifying or refinement of what is left.

<sup>4</sup> The best proof that they are distinct (which has often been denied) is that in real life fear of imminent ill is incompatible with pity, i.e. sympathy with others: *Rhet.* II. 8. 6, 1385 b 33, οὐ γὰρ

associate the cure of the overburdened heart with that universalising element of the drama in virtue of which Aristotle regards it as an idealisation of experience<sup>1</sup>.

These are the general outlines of the pathological interpretation of *κάθαρσις*. The erudition of Bernays discovered some slight confirmation for it in subsequent writers. Iamblichus (or whoever was the author of *De Mysteriis*), defending the least decorous of ancient rites, after adducing the now familiar argument that "suppression of the passions serves only to strengthen them, whereas judicious gratification quiets them" proceeds as follows: "hence it is that in comedy and tragedy by the spectacle of others' emotions we still and moderate and purge our own: and similarly by seeing and hearing things unseemly in the temples we are freed from the harm which actual contact with them would bring<sup>2</sup>." If this is too vague, we learn a little more from Proclus, who in his dissertation on the tenth book of the *Republic*—presumably expounding the Peripatetic view as the opposite of Plato's—speaks of Tragedy and Comedy as enabling us to compound with the emotions (*συντελούσαι πρὸς ἀφροσύαν τῶν παθῶν*) which need to be excited just so much as will secure us from future annoyance. Again he says "it is possible to afford the passions a moderate satisfaction, and when they are thus treated to find in them effective aids towards education, when once the inconvenience they cause has been remedied<sup>3</sup>." From the Platonic standpoint Proclus then proceeds to refute the defence of poetry he has sketched<sup>4</sup>, and in a final sentence contrasts his own neoplatonic ascent with the compromise proffered by Aristotle<sup>5</sup>. But while the dim outlines of the

ἀκούουσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς  
τῷ οὐκ αἰεὶ πάθει: § 12, 1386 a 22 f., τὸ γὰρ  
δεινὸν ἕτερον τοῦ ἐλκεῖν καὶ ἐκροιστῶν  
τοῦ ἐλκεῖν. Whereas the drama evokes  
both pity and fear: *Theet.* 14 § 2, 1453 b 3,  
ὥστε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλκεῖν  
ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἅπερ ἂν πάθει τὴν  
ἀκούον τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίποδος μῦθον, § 5 τὴν  
ἀπὸ ἐλίου καὶ φέβου. Cp. c. 13 § 4, 1453  
a 2 ff.

This distinction affords the best possible explanation of the *variae* in the definition (Reinkens *op. cit.* p. 161): *variae* would have postulated the complete identity of the two. Compare Ed. Müller *Gesch. d. Kunsttheorie* II, p. 63 ff.

<sup>1</sup> Bernays *Zwei Abb.* p. 73 (181) ff. with whom E. Muller, Brandis, Zeller, Summihl, and Reinkens substantially agree. See Butcher *Nom. Apert.* p. 388 ff.

<sup>2</sup> ἐν τε κυμαθία καὶ τραγηθία ἄλλοι οὐ  
πάθη θεωροῦντες ἴστανται τὰ αἰεὶα παρὰ  
καὶ μετρωτέρη ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκα-  
ταίρουμεν ἐν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς θεάμασι τοῖσι καὶ  
ἀκατοῖσιν τῶν αἰσχυρῶν [e.g. τῶν φαλλῶν]  
ἀπεικονιζόμεθα ἤδη ἐκ τῶν ἑργῶν αὐτῶν  
συνεπαινεσθαι βλάβησι. 1. 11. p. 403 Par-  
they. Again in 3. 9. p. 119, 14 ἀποκαταίρουμεν

Đó và được người học tập nghiên cứu  
[sc. từ từ hiểu (trầm) lắng]. Như vậy, mỗi  
vật có thể được từ 2 trường hợp ở trạng  
thức trước và sau khi nghiên cứu. Vì vậy  
có thể nói rằng: không có gì nghi ngờ là  
các thuật ngữ kỹ thuật này là những thuật ngữ  
kỹ thuật mà chúng ta đang nghiên cứu.

[illegible]

1. *Вопросы, связанные с...*

[illegible]

theory can be recognised, and here and there an obviously genuine phrase or two (*ἀπέρασις, ἀφοσίωσις, ἐμμέτρως ἀποπιμπλάναι τὰ πάθη*), the rest is so coloured in passing through this unsympathetic medium that there is considerable uncertainty whether it does not reflect the neoplatonic, rather than the Peripatetic, meaning of *κάθαρσις*.

It remains to pass under review another possible source of information: the utterances and indications of Plato's own æsthetic views in his dialogues<sup>1</sup>. Plato, too, held pity and fear to be the effect of tragedy<sup>2</sup>. His reason for banishing the drama is that, like poetry in general, it feeds that emotional nature which ought rather to be starved<sup>3</sup>. In a celebrated passage the indulgence of sentimental pity in the theatre is thus condemned as mischievous: "If you consider that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's... Few persons ever reflect that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gained strength at the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own<sup>4</sup>." Here unquestionably is the view from which that of Aristotle is a reaction. That the passions are sources of possible danger, both philosophers agree: but granting this, Aristotle provides, while Plato sternly refuses, the means for their relief. Even Proclus is sensible of the antagonism of principle which has deduced from common bases of ethical belief so divergent a practical treatment. It would be a rash, but not exactly inadmissible proposal, to equate 'the feeling kept under control in our own calamities' with the pity of real life, and that which is 'satisfied and delighted by the poets' with the pity which (in Aristotle's definition) is the means of its purgation.

To Poetry and Art generally Plato allowed two and only two functions:

τὰς ποιήσεις... πολλοῦ δεῖν εἰς ἀφοσίωσιν εἶναι χρησίμους· αἱ γὰρ ἀφοσιώσεις οὐκ ἐν ὑπερβολαῖς εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν συνεσταλμέναις ἐνεργείαις [the neoplatonic view], σμικρὰν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἔχουσαι ὧν εἰσιν ἀφοσιώσεις (*ibid.*). In this and the previous citations from Proclus the corrections of Bernays (*op. c.* pp. 46—50) are given.

<sup>1</sup> See C. Belger *De Aristotele etiam in arte poetica componenda Platonis discipulo* (Berlin 1872), esp. p. 58 ff., Siebeck *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXXV. 1882, p. 226 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Phædr.* 268 C, ῥήσεις ποιεῖν... οἰκτρὰς καὶ τούναντιον αὐτῷ φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικὰς, *Rep.* X. 606 A.

<sup>3</sup> τρέφει γὰρ ταῦτα [τὰ ἐπιθυμητικά τε καὶ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ] ἄρδουσα, δέον αὐχμεῖν, καὶ ἄρχοντα ἡμῖν καθίστησι

δέον ἄρχεσθαι αὐτά, 606 D. Cp. *Lawes* 790 E.

<sup>4</sup> 606 A, B: εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο, ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις ξυμφοραῖς καὶ πεπινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαι τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει δὲ τοιοῦτον οἶον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότε ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαίρον· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνίησι τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνηώδους τούτου, ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν... λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ὀλίγοις τισὶ μέτεστιν, ὅτι ἀπολαβεῖν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρῶν εἰς τὰ οἰκεία· θρέψοντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεεινὸν οὐ ῥάδιον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πάθεσι κατέχειν. The translation is Dr Jowett's. The last remark is endorsed by Aristotle *Pol.* V(VIII). 5. 19, 1340 a 23.

(1) to convey truth 'in a glass darkly,' as he himself does in his myths, and (2) to conduce to moral edification by presenting fair models and inculcating by force of sympathy proper sentiments. The latter is Aristotle's *maieutic* habituation to feel pleasure and pain at the proper objects. Now the Aristotelian *κάθαρσις* is something wholly distinct from this. It might be defended as producing a harmonizing and elevating effect on feeling and on transporting the audience into a state where they are more susceptible to sympathy with men as men, and to admiration for virtue. But this is only an indirect result. Or again we may regard it as a preventative: it might be urged that we are thus inoculated against the temptation which Plato has specially in view and regards as so formidable, the abuse of emotion and maudlin sentimentality. In any case this is one more hint which Aristotle has borrowed from his master. He has developed in a special direction the principle of 'that indispensable minimum' of gratification which even Plato does not refuse to the lower nature of man. The temperate sage of the *Republic*, who would fain stimulate and quicken the activity of the reason before he betakes himself to rest, is well aware that if he is to pursue, without let or hindrance, his aspirations after higher knowledge, his passions must be allayed and his appetitive nature indulged neither too much nor too little but just enough to send it to sleep<sup>1</sup>.

In an Eudemian book of the *Ethics* an even more advanced position is taken up: the pursuit of pleasure to excess is exonerated from blame; where the pleasures pursued are harmless (cp. 1342 a 16 *χρηστέα ἀπολαύειν*), even artificial means of stimulating them to excess are not condemned, such 'intense' pleasures being natural remedies for pains<sup>2</sup>. But that Aristotle was not blind to the danger of excessive sentimentality is shewn e.g. by his care for the education of the feelings in youth<sup>3</sup>.

Besides this insight into the main motive and genesis of the pathological theory which Aristotle put forward in defence of the drama we gain from the Platonic writings many indications which serve to clear up particular points in the exposition. In the *Philebus* (47 E ff.) there is an interesting and valuable analysis of the mixed states, partly pleasurable and partly painful, which attend the spectators of comedy. From this analysis Aristotle would seem to have borrowed not a little where he traces the pleasurable concomitants of various phases of emotion<sup>4</sup>. We have every reason then to

<sup>1</sup> *Rep.* IX. 581 E f.: *τὴ δὲ συνθεστικῇ δὲ μήτε ἐνδεῖα δοῦν μήτε πλεονάζειν, ὅπως ἀναισθητὴ καὶ μὴ παρέχῃ θόρυβον τῷ ψεύδει. τῷ καίρῳ δὲ λυσιτέμενον, ἀλλ' οὐ αὐτὸ [αὐτὸ τὸ πένθος] καθ' αὐτὸ πόθος καθάρσις σκοπεῖν καὶ ἀρέσασθαι τοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι δ' αὖ οὐδεν... ἀναστρεφὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ θυμῷ δὲ παύσει καὶ μὴ τισιν εἰς ἀργίαν ἐλθεῖν ἀναστρεφὲς τῷ θυμῷ καθάρσις, ἀλλ' ἡσυχάζει μὲν τὸ διονείδης, τὸ τριτὸν δὲ λυγρὸν... αὐτὸν ἀναστρεφόντα.* It seems then that while *ἀναστρεφόντα* is prohibited as immoral, *ἡσυχάζειν* is a condition essential to the efficient

working of the rational soul. Of course the two philosophies differ wholly as to the application of this principle.

<sup>2</sup> *N. E.* VII. 14. 3. 1342 b 31. *αὐτὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἑαῖα τῶν ἐκφυσιολογικῶν... τῶν μὲν αὖτε ἀπολαύειν ἀναστρεφόντα... ὡς δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ αὐτῶν ἄλλοις δ' ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ἡ τρυφή, καὶ ἡ λυγρία.*

<sup>3</sup> See V (VI) 13. 5. 17. 18. 1340 a 11 ff. (cp. 1341 a 13 f.).

<sup>4</sup> See Bernays op. cit. p. 142 f. For cp. 1378 b 1 (*τῶν δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν*) with *τῶν*, 48 a and the Homeric canon

conclude that the facts had already been collected and the psychological problem not only stated but approximately solved before Aristotle, who did not share his master's condemnation of the drama on grounds of morality, came to formulate his own theory of its effect.

common to the two: also *Pol.* v(VIII). 5. 12, 1339 b 25 ff. with *Phil.* 51 A ff. But the detailed analysis in respect of comedy appears inadequate, and of tragedy little

is said beyond the remark *τὰς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἅμα χαίροντες κλάωσι, μέμνησται*, *Phil.* 48 A. Cp. 50 B.

## ADDENDA.



## INTRODUCTION.

**Page 1, line 3.** The statement that there are no manuscripts earlier than the fourteenth century has been falsified by the discovery of the Vatican fragments of the tenth century. See p. 454.

**P. 2, note 1.** After *θεωλαί* add: and 1371 a 37 (1372 a 3, b 34) *φύλλον* II *quidam* II<sup>2</sup>.

**P. 7, l. 17.** As Plutarch *Περὶ Εὐρυεσίας* is a fabrication of the renascence, of which a Latin translation was first published in 1556 (Lugduni apud Seb. Grypphian), the citations from the *Politics* would not in any case have carried us far back: although, if at the time the forger himself used a manuscript, or even emended the text on his own conjecture, his readings deserve mention. But they are not even entitled to such authority as they would have possessed in the case assumed, for though the Latin translation gives those citations in full, the manuscript from which in the year 1724 J. Christophorus Wulf edited the tract in Greek exhibited blanks where the citations should have stood; and Wulf himself is responsible for the text of the passages which he copied out, probably from the first edition of Victorinus. In his preface to Vol. IV of *Antiqua Graeca* (Hamburgi 1724) Wulf says of the manuscript of the *Περὶ Εὐρυεσίας* which he obtained from Joh. Gramm, Professor at Copenhagen, "membranae illae non alterove ante inventam typographiam saeculo, meo indolis, luculente quidem, sed non sine frequentibus oscitantis librarii indicibus exaratae. Veterum scriptorum loca, a Plutarcho allata, omissa in his penitus erant, asterisco vicem eorum supplemte. Eleganter et erudite illa (Latina Arnoldi Ferromi interpretatio) contexta est, atque veterum testimonia integra Latine, sed sine additis, ubi existerent, locis exhibet. Atque hanc ipsam...cum Graecis in lucem profert, additis si parva casu perierat, veterum testimoniis, quae non sine cura aliqua ex monumentis eorum adhuc extantibus acquisivi." Compare his footnote p. 196 [it should be 296]: "Aristoteles lib. 1. c. vi. Politicor. p. 37 edit. Victorii. In hoc loco vertendo liberrime versatur Interpres." i.e. Ferrom "nisi in opusculo Plutarchi cum alia quodam legione emendat, quae quidem hodie apud Aristotelem exstant. In MS. hic loc<sup>us</sup> desunt."

**P. 9, l. 29.** Add: *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* 1. 163 ff. (Berlin 1883).

**P. 9, l. 3 from end.** Add: *De Politicis Aristotelis Quattuordecim testium Lipsiae* 1886 (reprinted from the Supplement to *Zeitsch. f. Philol.* Vol. XV, pp. 149—170, often hereafter cited as *Quatt. crit. collatae*). *Quattuordecim Aristotelis testium et conjecturarum Pars I* Gryphiswaldiae 1892; *Pars II* ib. 1893; *Pars III* ib. 1894; and *Prolegomena II* pp. XXVIII—XLIII of the 'nova impressio correctior' of the third edition in Teubner's series (Lipsiae 1894). Articles in *Zeitsch. f. Philol.* 1887, 1893, 1894, pp. 817—824; Bursian's *Zeitschrift*, lte 1. 392 l. III. 372 ff., V. 178 ff., 18. 224 ff., XVII. 379 ff., XXX. 66 ff., 97 l., XXXIV. 40 ff., XLII. 36, 233 ff., 1. 12, 147 ff., 122 ff., LXXV. 102 ff.

- P. 10, last line.** Add: *Zu Arist. Pol.* *ibid.* CXXIX. 1885. 544.  
**Jowett.** Translation with Introduction and notes; Oxford, 1885.  
**Gomperz.** *Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung griech. Schriftsteller*; Wien, 1890.  
**Diels.** Article in *Archiv f. Gesch. der Philos.* IV. 1891. 484.  
**Häberlin.** Article on *Arist. Pol.* II. 9 in *Rhein. Mus.* XLV. 1890. 311 ff.  
**Maehly.** Article in *Philologus* LI. 1892. 197.  
**Zeller.** In *Archiv f. Gesch. der Philos.* VI. 1893. 153 n. 1.  
**Stoehr, Engel, Widemann, Schmidinger, Vogel.** *Curae criticae in Ar. Pol.* in *Commentationes philologicae Monacenses*, 97—114: Munich, 1891.  
**Niemeyer.** Article in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXLIII. 1891. 412 ff.  
**v. Wilamowitz.** *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 64—71, 187 f. n. (3).
- P. 11, n. 1.** Add references to Zeller in *Hermes* XV. 1880. 547—556, Dümmler in *Rhein. Mus.* XLII. 1887. 179 ff., Shute *History of the Aristotelian writings*, Oxford, 1888, esp. c. 8, Newman *Introduction* to edition of the *Politics* I. 478—492, II. pp. xxx—xl, v. Wilamowitz *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 355 ff. The discovery of the *Constitution of Athens* has called special attention to the connexion between the *Politics* and the *Polities*.
- P. 14, n. 3.** Add a reference to Birt *Das antike Buchwesen* p. 459. The safest inference to draw from the absence of correspondence between the opening of one book and the close of the preceding is that the two were independently elaborated. Notice the δὲ inserted after περὶ by P<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>5</sup> (corr.) at 1323 a 14. Compare Newman *op. c.* II. p. xxi ff. xxvi f.
- P. 15, n. 2.** At the end of this note add (on p. 16): The total would now (1894) be slightly increased by the athetesis of the last clause of B. I. c. 13 § 16, 1260 b 24 f. [καὶ πρῶτον...πολιτείας], II. c. 6 § 13, 1265 b 12—17 [Φείδων...ὑστερον], § 22, 1266 a 22—25 [ὡς...σκέψις], V (VIII). 7. 4, 1342 a 9 f. [ὅταν...μέλεσι], although these passages are not, in this edition, enclosed in square brackets, and Mr Hicks is not convinced: further, by VII (VI). 2 § 5, 1317 b 23 [ἢ ὀλιγάκις], 8 § 24, 1323 a 6—9 [τριῶν...δημοτικόν]. As regards II. c. 6 § 15, 1265 b 21—23 [ἐπεὶ...τινός;], with which must go c. 7 § 4, 1266 b 5—8 [Πλάτων...πρότερον], Prof. Susemihl is not altogether convinced: while he is inclined to spare II. 6. 15, 1265 b 24—26 [καὶ...οικεῖν]—the discrepancy between this passage and IV (VII). 10. 11, 1330 a 9—23 may be accounted for by a change in Aristotle's opinions, if he wrote B. II. after B. IV (VII)—as well as II. 7. 16 f., 1267 a 28—37 [δεῖ...πολιορκίας] in spite of note (246). On most of these passages see Susemihl *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* Pars III, p. iii. Possibly even VIII (V). 12 §§ 1—6, 1315 b 11—39, is genuine as Diels contends *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos.* IV. 1891, p. 483 f.
- P. 16, n. 3.** Had Aristotle completed the work, there is a balance of probability that he would have arranged the books in this order: A. Γ. B. H. Θ. Δ. Ζ. E. Of these H. Θ. (and probably A. Γ.) were written earlier than the *Constitution of Athens*, the other four almost certainly later.
- P. 16, n. 4.** Add that Newman declines to accept the second transposition, suggesting a merely mechanical cause for the first: II. p. xxxix f. It is much to be regretted that he has increased the existing confusion by a new nomenclature, Book 7 (5)=VIII (v) and B. 8 (6)=VII (vi) of St Hilaire and Bk.<sup>2</sup>.
- P. 18, n. 3.** Cicero's acquaintance with the *Politics* has come up for discussion in several recent works, especially Schmekel's *Die mittlere Stoa* (Berlin 1892) pp. 47—85. The investigations of Schmekel enable us to dispense with the assumption that Tyrannion provided Cicero with extracts from Aristotle: for a comparison of Cicero

*De Republica* with Polybius vi. cc. 3—10 shows that both used a common authority, doubtless a political work by Panaetius. The suggestion was first made in a thesis appended to the dissertation published by P. Voigt *Sorani Epist. ad. Cicero* (1882). See Susemihl's edition of Aris. *Oeconomica* p. 14 n. 16, *Griechische Literaturgesch. in der Alexandrinerzeit* (Leipzig 1892) Vol. II. p. 75 n. (27), p. 120 n. (184). Direct acquaintance with the *Politics* is thus established for Panætius whose life (circa 185—110) nearly covers the century between Hermippus and Apollonius of Teos: a result confirming the line of argument adopted on p. 18.

As for Polybius, see also v. Scala *Die Studien des Polybios* 1. Stuttgart 1891 p. 102 ff., 222 ff. who endeavours (pp. 128—151) to prove that Polybius had himself read Aristotle's *Politics*. This hypothesis is combated by Susemihl *Literaturgesch.* II. p. 81 n. (4), p. 106 n. (97 b), p. 127 n. (147).

**P. 18, n. 7.** The definite quotations contained in this list require to be distinguished from the more numerous traces of acquaintance with Peripatetic political theories which may or may not imply actual use of the treatise. The former may be slightly extended as regards the commentators on the *Ethics*: see now the academic edition Michael Ephesius ed. Heylbut 504. 8 ff., 520. 31 ff., 521. 5 ff., 610. 7 ff., 16 ff., 511. 10 ff., 615. 20 ff., 616. 6 f., 619. 14 ff., 18 ff., 620. 10 ff., Ann. p. 190. 4 f., p. 214. 25 ff.

The latter must commence with the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia*, the parallels being fully given in the footnotes to Susemihl's editions (Leipzig, 1887, 1894). Similarly with the *Oeconomica*: see again Susemihl's ed. (ib. 1887) p. v n. (1) for Book I and p. x n. (25) on the expansion in Book II of the idea suggested, and partly worked out, in the *Politics* I. II §§ 7—13, 1249 a 3—26. The beginning of this passage is clearly referred to at 1346 a 27—29: but this again has a bearing on the genuineness of *Politics* I. c. 11. See below.

Mr Newman has compiled in Vol. II. p. x—xix, a list of similar parallels from *Rhetorica ad Alex.* 3. 1424 a 12 ff., b 3 ff., *De animal. vocib.* 7. 701 b 24 ff., [Plato] *Erastae* 135 c, 138 c, Aristoxenus *Fr.* 19, 20, Philodemus *De Musica* ed. Kunkle besides B. 3, *Fr.* 24, 52, 53, 54, 65, 66 noticed by Kunkle and Gumpert, B. 1, *Fr.* 16, 17: B. 3, *Fr.* 45, 55: B. 4, col. 3, 23 ff.; 15, 24; 16, 17 ff. Plutarch *Vita Crassi* c. 2, p. 544 A (esp. the words *τῶν γὰρ ἀνθρώπων πολιτικὴν γυμνασίαν ἔχουσιν, οὐδ' αὖτε ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτικὴν γυμνασίαν ἔχουσιν*, though this is nowhere said by Aristotle), *Moralia* 9 C, 527 A, 787 C—D, 812 B, D E., 815 A—C. The *Chrysostomus*, 3. 115, 7. 267, 14. 439, 36. 83 R. All of these include the possibility of indirect use of the treatise. Prof. Susemihl holds that Plutarch was certainly acquainted with the *Politics*, but hardly with the *Politica*. Even his direct acquaintance with the 'Ad. Hel.' is denied by some: e.g. v. Wilamowitz *Aristoteles u. Athen* (Berlin 1892) 1. pp. 290—303.

**P. 20, n. 1.** Add references to Blass *De Antiphonae scriptis* (Kiel 1884), Dümmler *Prolegomena zu Platons Staat* (Basel 1891), Wilamowitz *op. l. c.* 1. 120 ff., esp. 169—183.

**P. 35, n. 3.** Gilbert's hypothesis, that Ephorus used the *Philosophy of Aristotle*, is rendered untenable by the discovery of the 'Athenian Hevæda', which contains very precise indications of having been compiled between 319 and 323 B.C. The same treatise slightly strengthens the probability that Aristotle may have made use of Ephorus (or his authorities) in part of his works. At any rate he is in the 'Ad. Hel.' under considerable obligations to another of Isocrates' pupils, Antisthenes. See A. Bauer *Forschungen zu Arist. 'Ad. Hel.'* (Munich 1891) p. 123. v. Wilamowitz is again sceptical *op. l. c.* 1. p. 306.

P. 37, n. 1. The opinion here expressed, that the first part of B. II. c. 12 is genuine, the latter part a spurious addition, seems to have been strengthened rather than weakened by the discovery of the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία. See Diels in *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* IV. 1891, p. 485. P. Meyer has indeed argued in *Des Aris. Politik u. d. Ἀθ. Πολ.* (Bonn 1891) p. 13 ff. that the athetesis should be confined to 1274 b 9—15, with perhaps the addition of 1274 a 32—b 5 ἡν...κλήρων, and 1274 b 23—26 ἐγένετο...ἄν. Against this view see Susemihl *Quaest. crit. et exeg.* I. p. xvi f.

P. 66, IX. The date of the *Politics* has recently been discussed with much vivacity. Since the publication of the *Constitution of Athens*, the appearance of general agreement combined with occasional discrepancy which the two works present, has not unnaturally stimulated inquiry into its cause. The first suggestion made, on the assumption that Aristotle wrote both works, was that the *Constitution*, which can confidently be dated circa 329—325, is separated by an interval of years from the *Politics*. Thus Mr Newman notes (in *Class. Rev.* v. 162) that in the first part of the *Constitution of Athens* “we are sometimes inclined to ask whether the *Politics* is not already in existence and known to the writer. Has not the writer” of Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 41 § 2 “*Pol.* 4. 4, 1292 a 4—37 before him?” Similarly Bruno Keil in *Die Solonische Verfassung* (Berlin 1892) confidently assigns the *Politics* to the period 350—335 B.C. long before the completion, at any rate, of the *Constitution*. Tempting as such conjectures are, in the absence of positive evidence it is still necessary soberly to restate the grounds before us for dating the larger treatise; and this is what Prof. Susemihl has done *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* II. p. x—xii, III. p. iii ff. His conclusion is that the *Ethics* and *Politics* were undoubtedly written later than the *Physica*, *De Caelo*, *Meteorologica*: that though they may conceivably have preceded the psychological, physiological and zoological works (and would then fall, say, about 332—330), it is far more likely that they were the latest sections of the Encyclopaedia with the exception of the *Poetics*, *Rhetoric* and *Metaphysics*. If this latter alternative be accepted, we may suppose the *Ethics* to have been finished before 327 B.C. About the *Politics* we cannot be so certain: for unquestionably the treatise consists of different component parts, written at different times with different aims, though ultimately incorporated in a single scheme. Of the portions anterior to the *Constitution of Athens*, i.e. say, to 327 B.C., we can point with confidence to Books IV (VII), V (VIII): possibly also to Books I, III. The rest of the treatise, B. II, no less than Books IV—VI of the old order, may with a balance of probability be assigned to the years 325, 324, 323, when Aristotle was also at work upon the *Poetics*, *Rhetoric*, *Metaphysics*, while under his editorship the Peripatetic school was issuing the remaining *Politics* (other than that of Athens), the Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά, the διδασκαλῆαι, and other similar works.

v. Wilamowitz assumes that from the earliest times when he lectured at all, Aristotle repeatedly gave courses of lectures on *Politics*. While admitting that the present condition of the treatise does not permit a sharp separation of the different layers, or a general application of the indications which certain passages afford as to the date, he finds it hard to believe that Books HΘ were composed after “the comprehensive historical studies on which ΔΕΖ are based.” I.e. he thinks that ΔΕΖ are later, or at least not earlier, than the *Politics*, which according to him they presume: *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 355 ff.

P. 68, n. 3. Add a reference to Newman II. p. xxxi: Aristotle “had evidently cast aside the programme which we find at the close of the Nicomachean *Ethics*, and

yet he framed no fresh one to take its place: "a most important admission. Compare Birt *op. c.* p. 459 f. If the transition from B. 1 is an editor's addition, and if an insertion of the family II<sup>2</sup> in 1260 b 27, the place of B. 11 itself becomes doubtful, as Sussemlil remarks Prolegomena II to the revised impression of the Teubner text: "nisi tamen admodum fallor, Aristoteles totum opus si ita, ut voluit, perficeret, aliam illius II. III. VII sic retractasset, ut II<sup>2</sup> locum magis idoneum inter II<sup>1</sup> et novum ordinis IV<sup>2</sup> (veteris VII<sup>2</sup>) inveniret." (This view is further developed in *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* III. p. lii ff., as explained above.) v. Wilamowitz *op. c.* l. p. 2. who defends the genuineness of 1181 b 12—15, *κατακτείνω* *ἐκείνου* as quite indispensable, and is not disinclined to accept the rest.

P. 71, n. 4. Mr Newman examines the *Vetus Versio op. l. II.* pp. lxi—lxx. With the whole of section x compare below p. 454 ff., Sussemlil in *Tabell. f. Philol. Class.* 1887. 801—5, CXLVII. 1893. 817—824, *Quaest. crit. et exeg.* I. II., and for the other side Newman *op. c.* II. xli ff. and in *Class. Rev.* VII. 304 ff.

P. 74, n. 4. line 5. After *ἀντοκρίτωρ* insert 1287 a 39 *παύθηται*. See Carey and *Addenda to Critical Notes ad loc.*

P. 90, n. 4. Mr Newman admits that VI (IV) cc. 1—4 "are little better than a chaos." See his appendix, Vol. I. p. 565 ff. and compare Vol. II. p. xxvi, xxviii, lxx, lxxvi.

P. 96, n. 2. Inexplicable as the subsequent delay may appear, the printing had proceeded thus far (indeed pp. 1—448 had been struck off) before the appearance of Mr Newman's volumes I. and II.

## CRITICAL NOTES.

P. 139, line 1. 1252 a 14 *αὐτὸς* Tyrrell (*op. Eur. Transl.* 1908).

P. 140. 1252 a 22 *Μέγας* and 23 *ἀντοκτείνω* Mackly, not rightly.

P. 141, line 2. 1252 a 33 [*ταῦτα*] and (for *πολλὰ*) *ἀσπασθε* Gomperz.

P. 142. *Add*: No ms. gives the second article 1230 b 1 *τὰ πολέμια* *τροχὸν καὶ πολεμικά*: some omit it 1261 b 25.

P. 143, line 2. 1252 b 14 *ὁ μὲν Καρίδατος* [*Καρίδατος μὲν* II<sup>2</sup> Bk. Newman].

Ib. line 5. *Add*: Shilleto followed Giphanius (p. 27 f.), who however preferred *ἀπασσένον*.

P. 144, line 1. See *Corrigenda*. *κατὰ φύσιν* after *ἐκκε* Γ M<sup>2</sup> Susseml.<sup>1-2</sup>

P. 146, line 3. After 28 insert: *ἄλλο* Γ P<sup>2</sup>.

P. 147, line 5. 1253 a 2 Stohr *Comm. phil. Monac.* p. 97 f. comparing 1251 b 2, a 5, 1278 b 20, *Eth. Nic.* 1097 b 11, 1162 a 17, 1169 b 18, *Eth. Eud.* 1247 a 21 would read *ἀσπαστος*. See Dem. *Olynth.* I. 3, *In Mideum* § 198 f.

Ib. line 6. See *Corrigenda*. 1253 a 3 *ἐστὶ* after *ἵψα* added by Γ M<sup>2</sup> Susseml.<sup>1-2</sup>

P. 149, line 1. After Bk. *add*: avoiding hiatus.

P. 153, line 2. 1253 b 15 *πρίτω*... 1254 b 39 *εὐμαρὸς* noticed by Anon. in *Zeit. für N. u. f.* 55<sup>a</sup>, p. 190, 4 f. Heyl.

P. 157, line 9. After *ἀνὸ* *add*: See Hagfors *De praeputum in Aris. Politicis et. nec* (Berlin 1892) p. 5.

P. 160, line 1. See *Corrigenda*. After Bk. *add*: Susseml.<sup>3</sup>

P. 161, line 1. After Bk. *add*: (*ἐστὶ* Bk.<sup>3</sup>).

P. 163, line 1. *Add*: See however *Addenda* to p. 7 above.

**P. 176, line 1.** *After* Ar. *add*: (but two Oxford MSS. of Aretinus have *genitis*: Newman II. p. 71).

**P. 180, line 7.** *After* Susem. *add*: Diebitsch would omit ὦν altogether.

**P. 183, line 1.** 1257 b 12. For οὔτε Newman cites 1293 a 8, 1297 b 7.

**P. 190, line 2.** c. 11, 1258 b 9—1259 a 36, is considered by a friend of Mr Newman a later addition.

**P. 194, line 3.** 1259 a 31 δρᾶμα Campbell, but see Dem. *Prooem.* 55, p. 1460, 26: ὄραμα τοῦτο ἐποιεῖτο ὁ δῆμος, *In Aristocr.* XXIII. § 19 (ὀρᾶτε), etc.

**P. 197, line 2.** 1259 b 32. See *Corrigenda*. *After* Γ M<sup>s</sup> *add*: bracketed by Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

**Ib. line 3.** 1260 a 4. Cod. Oxoniensis (Coll. Corp. Chr. 112) had in the margin ἀρχόντων καὶ, afterwards erased ||

**P. 203, line 4.** 1260 b 20—24 [ὥστ'...πολιτείας] bracketed by Birt, as an addition of the publisher. Cp. Susem.<sup>3</sup> *Prolegomena* p. xli: Neque tamen ipsi Aristoteli hac ratione succurro, sed compositor, qui perperam ultima libri I<sup>i</sup> verba 1260 b 23 sq. καὶ πρῶτον κτλ adiecit.

**P. 232.** 1263 a 2. The change in punctuation (ἔχει πᾶσι, τὰς, see *Corrigenda*) is due to Mr Newman ||

**P. 252.** 1265 a 40 *Add to line* 12: δὴ for ἂν Mr H. Richards *Class. Rev.* VI. p. 339.

**P. 261.** 1266 a 31 [φιλοσόφων] Zeller (*Archiv f. d. Ges. d. Philos.* VI. 153 n.): i.e. he would read αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτικῶν.

**P. 269, last line.** On the genuineness of 1267 b 20—28 see now Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXLVII. 1893, p. 192.

**P. 270.** 1267 b 26 εὐτελοῦς] εὐσταλοῦς O. Apelt.

**P. 274.** 1268 b 1 γεωργήσει] γεωργ<ὸς οἰκ>ήσει Mr A. G. Peskett (1891).

**P. 289, line 2.** *Add*: Comp. *Crit. Notes* on 1329 a 34.

**P. 290, line 2.** 1270 b 8 M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> omit ἐστίν ||

**P. 294.** 1271 a 7 [τὸ] δῶρον, or τι δῶρον C. Häberlin ||

**P. 295.** 1271 a 20. Comp. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ γε 1276 b 18, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινέται γε 1277 a 25 (Newman).

**P. 305.** See *Corrigenda* to 1272 b 9. δυναστών Π<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> ||

**P. 312.** See *Corrigenda* to 1273 b 6. ἀπορίαν Γ M<sup>s</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> ||

**P. 314, line 2.** *After* Götting *add*: Bernays (*Ges. Abh.* I. 172), Böckh (*Staatshaush. d. Ath.*<sup>3</sup> I. p. 295, 580 d).

**P. 316, line 3.** *Dele* probably rightly. καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς Diels, rashly (in *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* IV. p. 484 n. 1).

**P. 317, line 3.** 1274 a 18—20 *After* Diels *add*: But comp. Susemihl *Jahresber.* XLII. p. 255 n. 36.

**Ib. last line.** 1274 a 20. Wilamowitz defends τρίτου τέλους, but hardly with success, *op. c.* I. p. 69 n. 41.

**P. 320, line 1.** 1274 b 9—15 [Φαλέου...ἄχρηστον] Newman followed by P. Meyer and v. Wilamowitz. See however *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* I. p. xvi f.

**P. 354.** V<sup>m</sup> is Prof. Susemihl's notation for the Vatican fragments in the Teubner text of the *Politics* (Susem.<sup>3</sup> nova impressio correctior 1894), so that our fr. = V<sup>m</sup>.

**P. 356.** 1275 a 23 κρῖσεως καὶ defended by Wilamowitz *op. c.* I. p. 205 n. 32.

**P. 362.** See *Corrigenda*. 1276 a 10—13 (τότε...συμφέρον) εἶπερ the parenthesis and punctuation Niemeyer (in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXLIH. 1891, p. 412 ff.).

**P. 363.** 1276 a 14 [καὶ] Niemeyer || τινες κατὰ and comma after τρόπον Niemeyer ||

- P. 363. 1276 a 15 τὰς (before τὰς) defended by Nicomper.  
 Ib. 1276 a 16 τραπεζοί; (with interrogation) Nicomper, partly following Kierulff.  
 P. 364. 1276 a 26. See *Corrigenda*.  
 P. 366. B. III. c. 4 is vaguely referred to by Anon. in *Etik. Nal.* v. p. 114. cf. K. ed. Heylb.  
 P. 369. 1276 b 39—40 [ἐπεὶ δὲ...πολίται] Wilemann.  
 P. 371. 1277 a 30 [καὶ] Spengel.  
 P. 372. 1277 a 32 τοῦτον<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.  
 P. 374. 1277 b 17—25 noticed by Anon. in *Etik. Nal.* v. p. 121, cf. K. Heylb.  
 P. 379. 1278 a 34 ἀστὴν Codd. Berol. Hamiltonianus 41 (mostly in conjecture; the MS., of the xv century, is one of the worse species of II<sup>2</sup>. Possibly even in fr. the reading is conjectural).  
 P. 380. 1278 b 8. See *Corrigenda*. καὶ εἰ Γ P<sup>1</sup> Saum.<sup>1,2</sup> omitted by M<sup>9</sup>.  
 P. 381. 1278 b 10—15 noticed (amongst other passages) by Mich. Ephes. in *Act. Nic.* ix. f. 157<sup>a</sup> 504, 8 ff. ed. Heylb.  
 P. 383. 1279 a 8—16 [δὲ...ἀρχαί] Stohr (hardly right).  
 P. 397. 1281 a 41 ἐχα (with colon after λέσσαι) Wellsh (hardly adequate).  
 P. 401, last line. Add: But see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 139 b 18 K.  
 P. 402. 1282 a 27. Mr Wyse prefers μέγιστος as avoiding hiatus. It is however in *parva*.  
 P. 411, line 1. 1283 b 15 Insert: δόξαν P<sup>1</sup>.  
 P. 412, line 3. Delete Plutarch.  
 P. 431, line 10. See *Corrigenda*. That 1287 a 39 πνεύματα is right (pneumata William) was seen by Schneider and has recently been demonstrated by Engel in *Comm. phil. Monach.* p. 103.  
 P. 442. 1287 b 30 f. [τοῖς...συνάρχουσιν] Wilemann (not rightly).  
 P. 442, line 5. 1288 a 13. If Heylbut's conjecture be accepted, the punctuation will be changed: ἦτοι πολεμικοῖς, δυνάμεσιν.  
 P. 473, line 3. 1323 b 8. Vahlen's conjecture requires εἰ τε. See Hagfors *op.* p. 43.  
 P. 475. See *Corrigenda*. 1323 b 18 καὶ added by Γ M<sup>9</sup> Saum.<sup>1,2</sup>  
 P. 481. 1324 b 4 f. The order of Γ M<sup>9</sup> is retained because neither the order of Γ nor that of II<sup>2</sup> will stand without Congreve's emendation. Besides it is best suited by the context.  
 P. 489. 1325 b 34 [καὶ περ...πρόσωπον] would be bracketed even if the preceding chapter were allowed to be by Aristotle.  
 P. 490. 1326 a 9—b 24 noticed by Mich. Ephes. in *Etik. Nal.* ix. f. 151<sup>a</sup>, p. 306, 31 ff. (cp. 521, 5 ff.) Heylb.  
 P. 493. 1326 a 40 οὐ...41 σφαῖρα noticed by Mich. Ephes. *ad notam* p. 110, 11.  
 P. 495. 1326 b 39 f. The punctuation (καὶ...ἐπεί) is due to Mr Wyse.  
 P. 497. 1327 a 23 [πρὸς] Argynriades, rightly, in *Amphoteris* cit. ad 'Apostolatus II. Atraxid. A' (Athens 1893).  
 P. 503, line 5. 1328 a 16. See *Corrigenda*. πρὸς...πρὸς Nauck, perhaps rightly; cf. Gomperz, of δὲ with all other authorities Bk. Saum.<sup>1,2</sup>  
 P. 521. 1330 b 30. See *Corrigenda*. καὶ πρὸς after πρὸς Γ M<sup>9</sup> Saum.<sup>1,2</sup>  
 P. 529. 1332 a 13. See *Corrigenda*. καὶ inserted before ἀργυρίων Γ M<sup>9</sup> Saum.<sup>1,2</sup>  
 P. 535. 1332 b 31. See *Corrigenda*. τὰς...52 τὰς Γ M<sup>9</sup> Saum.<sup>1,2</sup>  
 P. 537. 1333 a 26. See *Corrigenda*. ἀργυρίων after αὐτῶν Γ M<sup>9</sup> Saum.<sup>1,2</sup>

- P. 541. 1334 a 8. See *Corrigenda*. ἀνιᾶσιν Γ M<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1.2</sup>  
 P. 546. 1334 b 24. See *Corrigenda*. ἐγγίνεσθαι after 25 πέφυκεν Γ M<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1.2</sup>  
 P. 549. 1335 a 27. See *Corrigenda*. ὠρισμένος after χρόνος Γ M<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1.2</sup>  
 P. 559. 1336 b 34. See *Corrigenda*. αὐτῶν after ὅσα Γ M<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1.2</sup>

## COMMENTARY.

P. 139. 1252 a 8. Add after *note* (2): The identity of βασιλική with πολιτική is asserted Pl. *Euthyd.* 291 C and *Politicus* 259 D. The question, What is the object of this science, which in *Euthyd.* is left open, is answered in *Politicus*. That στρατηγική is subordinated to it, is asserted *Polit.* 305 A as in *Euthyd.* 290 C, D (Bonitz).

P. 140. 1252 a 17 τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. Mr Newman is inclined to take this participle against Bonitz here and c. 8 § 1, 1256 a 2, in a middle sense: 'the method which has led the way.' Mr Wyse has independently proposed this same sense.

ib. 1252 a 18. This method implies the examination of the ultimate species *separately*, cp. *De part. anim.* I. 4 § 4, 644 a 29, ἥ μὲν γὰρ οὐσία τὸ τῷ εἶδει ἄτομον, κράτιστον, εἴ τις δύνατο περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑαστον καὶ ἀτόμων τῷ εἶδει θεωρεῖν χωρὶς, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω καὶ περὶ ὄρνιθος (Newman).

P. 141 f. 1252 b 2. Mr Newman suggests that the Delphic knife may well have served "not only for killing the victim (σφαγίς Eur. *El.* 811) but also for flaying it and cutting it up (κοπὴς *ibid.* 837)."

P. 143. 1252 b 8. Add after *note* (12): Eur. *Hel.* 246 τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ἐνός.

P. 143 f. 1252 b 15. Add after *note* (17): Mr Newman, like Dittenberger, defends ὁμοκάπους, meeting the objection respecting the quantity with the suggestion that the term may have occurred in a prose treatise. But the letter of Epimenides to Solon on the Cretan constitution, Diog. Laert. I. 112, was undoubtedly a forgery later than Aristotle's time: see Hiller in *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIII. p. 527 f.

P. 144. 1252 b 16. See again *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 332. As in b 10, so here πρώτη must be predicative, =as the first, primarily: συνεστηκῦα being understood from b 13. "From these two relationships the family is first formed.... From a number of families the society first formed with a view to something beyond the needs of every day is the village." Both passages should be omitted from the examples given by Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 652 b 53 ff.

P. 145. 1252 b 18. The literature bearing upon ὁμογάλακτες and ὀργεῶνες is continually increasing: see the authorities cited in Busolt *Gr. Gesch.* I<sup>1</sup>. p. 390 ff. esp. pp. 394—398 with *notes*, K. F. Hermann *Lehrbuch d. gr. Alt.* Vol. I. *Staatsaltertümer* ed. V. Thumser § 58 [98] pp. 313—324, Töpffer *Attische Genealogie* p. 20 ff. For the later organization consult *C.I.A.* II. 596, 597, 605, 'Εφ. ἀρχ. 1883. 83.

Mr W. R. Paton, *Class. Rev.* v. p. 222, thinks that ὁμογάλακτες=those whom it was possible for two generations to suckle, i.e. two generations.

Many years ago Mr Wyse asked "What of the *present* tense (οὓς καλοῦσί τινας ὁμογάλακτας)? For from Philochorus *Fr.* 94 (Suid. s.v. ὀργεῶνες)...τοὺς ὁμ. οὓς γεννήτας καλοῦμεν we see the older term was extinct in his time. Was it current in Aristotle's time? I have my doubts. It seems at any rate possible that, if the passage cited by Suidas occurred in the account of the διαψήφισις ἐπὶ Ἀρχίου ἄρχοντος 346/5 B.C.,

Philochorus cited and explained in this context the ancient laws which as we know from Lysias needed interpretation even early in the fourth century. May Aristotle refer then either to the authors of ancient Athenian statutes or to lawyers? I do not think the word occurs in the *Orators*, having been expelled by γένεσις. It manifestly assists Aristotle's argument if the word is a relic from old times, not in use among the Athenians of his day (and Pollux vi. 156 remarks *θυσίαι Ἀρχαῖαι*). As to the remark," p. 145 Comm. left col., l. 25, "that no place in the development is found for 'associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals,' was not this just the aspect under which the γένος presented itself to an Athenian of the fourth century? The γένος implied κοινωμία τελεῶν."

P. 145, right col. To the note on δῖο add: Aristotle follows Plato in arguing that the primitive form of government must have been monarchy, because the primitive family, supposed independent anterior to the rise of any government, is accustomed to the rule of its senior member. The Cyclopes are adduced as evidence of this earlier state of society (σποράδες) without any king, patriarchal or other, not of course 'to justify a general statement respecting the household of all times,' but rather to justify the particular statement made 1252 b 19 (*ἐκ παλαιότατων*).

P. 146. 1252 b 19. The place of εὐνοία illustrating Dr Jackson's remark that by normal Aristotelian usage part of a complex epithet may be placed after article and substantiva (hyperbaton).

P. 148. 1253 a 7. Add to note (25): comp. Becq de Fouquieres *Jeux des Asiatiques* p. 372 ff.

P. 150. 1253 a 22. Add to note (28) a reference to the note on p. 212, and to *Quaest. crit. coll.* pp. 334—336, 449 f.

Ib. 1253 a 26. Add to note on χωρηθεῖς: Possibly Aristotle has in mind Soph. *Phil.* 1018 ἀμυλον ἐρημον ἀπολιν ἐν ζῶσιν νεκρῶν (Newman).

P. 151. 1253 a 34. This note has suffered from undue compression. A fuller discussion appears in *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 336 f. The main points are: (1) the weapons are not prudence and [virtue], or else they would have been expressed by the accusative, φρόνησιν καὶ ἀρετῇ. (2) Prudence and [virtue] are the qualities at whose disposal the weapons are placed. (3) The weapons are the various safeguards and aids necessary if any action, whether just or unjust, is to be performed with safety: prudence and perseverance (on Susemihl's conjecture), prudence and skill (on Fennel's)<sup>1</sup>.

Against those who, with Jowett, by φρονησὶν understand *knowledge* (*N. E.* 1144 a 23 ff.) and by ἀρετῇ *justice* ἀρετῇ ἢ θν (*N. E.* 1144 b 1 ff.) it is urged 1. that (1) such a use of ἀρετῇ is unexampled and (2) that the natural germ of virtue is not peculiar to man but is found in the lower animals: *N. E.* 1144 b 8, *Hist. an.* i. 1 § 22 ff. 488 b 12 ff., viii. 1, ix. 1.

Spengel, who understands by ἀρετῇ *intellectual* virtue, is met not only by the invariable usage of the phrase φρονησὶν καὶ ἀρετῇ, but also by the fact that φρονησὶν is probably the only intellectual virtue which has to do with conduct. There is also the improbability that the term ἀρετῇ would be used of a quality liable to abuse when

<sup>1</sup> Quamvis recte monuerit Montecattinus, si Aristoteles prudentiam homini et virtutem tanquam arma data esse dicere voluisset, scribendum ei potius fuisse φρονησιν καὶ ἀρετῇ, quid impedit, ne prudentia et id quod sub corrupto vocabulo

ἀρετῇ latet non ipsa armis sed omnia, quibus arma adferuntur, armis armis praesidia illa vixi generis arripere adferuntur significantur uniusque necessaria, prudentiamque opus vel iustitiam vel integritate perpetuare videt? *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 337.

Aristotle himself says *Rhet.* I. I. 12, 1355 b 4: τοῦτό γε (i.e. abuse) κοινὸν ἐστὶ κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς.

Bernays again *Zwei Abhh. iib. d. aristot. Theorie* (Berlin 1880) p. 113 f. who adopts Montecatino's explanation (*arma homini data sunt ad prudentiam et virtutem*), quotes Seneca *De ira* I. 17: Aristoteles ait adfectus quosdam, si quis illis bene utatur, pro armis esse, quod verum foret, si, velut bellica instrumenta, sumi deponique possent induentis arbitrio. haec arma, quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non exspectant manum, et habent, non habentur. But the passions are not peculiar to man: and surely they are not more dangerous in man because, as Bernays interprets the words, they are 'arms for insight and virtue.' Not to mention the objection, stated on p. 151, that ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὄπλα shows the arms must be used by φρόνησις and ἀρετή, not in order to procure them.

[Mr Newman suggests 'language' as one of these weapons, and admits that if 'certain emotions, anger especially' are included, Aristotle must then have regarded these emotions as peculiar to man.]

**P. 151.** 1253 a 37. Add after *note* (28 c): Perhaps Aristotle had a saying of Pindar in mind: cp. Plut. *Praec. reip. ger.* c. 13, p. 807 c: ὁ δὲ πολιτικός, ἀριστοτέχνας τις ὢν κατὰ Πίνδαρον, καὶ δημιουργὸς εὐνομίας καὶ δικῆς (Newman).

**P. 152.** 1253 b 3. The laxity here noted may be particularized as the omission not only of ἐστὶ but of ἐκείνων the antecedent to ὅσα. But in Greek idiom the genitive case is appropriated to related terms, so that in the sentence 'The parts of Economic are of the constituents of the Household' the meaning of the words supplied *are of* is 'correspond to,' or 'relate to,' and not 'treat of.' Mr Newman compares 1258 b 27 (but this is doubtful), and refers to Bonitz *Index Ar.* 533 b 6—13, with Waitz on *Anal. Pr.* I. 46, 52 a 29 there quoted.

**1b.** 1253 b 9. It would have been sufficient to say that the ordinary sense of γαμικός is 'nuptial' and not 'conjugal': cp. *n.* on 1334 b 32, p. 547.

**P. 153.** 1253 b 20. Lest the expression 'speech delivered' in *note* (31) should be misunderstood we add that the Μεσσηνιακός was a pamphlet cast in the form of a speech, like the 'Archidamus' of Isocrates, treating the same theme from the opposite side, and advising the Spartans to make peace with Messene (1397 a 11 ff.): cp. Blass *Attische Beredsamkeit* II.<sup>2</sup> pp. 350, 289.

**1b.** 1253 b 21. Zeller *Pre-Socratics* Eng. tr. II. p. 477 n. (3) observes that νόμῳ γὰρ ὃς μὲν δοῦλος ὃς δ' ἐλεύθερος forms a trimeter, so that under τοῖς δέ, b 20, a poet may be included.

**P. 153 f.** 1253 b 23 ἐπεὶ οὖν...33 ὑπηρέτης. The commentary may again be supplemented from *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 339 f. Various critics have treated this whole passage as one loosely constructed sentence, but without agreeing how much of it is apodosis to the string of protases which they suppose to be introduced by ἐπεὶ. As οὕτω introduces the apodosis to ἐπεὶ in I. 10. 3, 1258 a 31—34, so in the present passage, according to Eucken *De Aristotelis dicendi ratione* I. p. 29 f. (Gotting. 1866), the apodosis begins at b 30 οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. Spengel *Ar. Stud.* III. p. 5 (57) f. and Thurot *Études* p. 5 ff. proposed that it should begin two lines lower down with b 32 καὶ ὁ δοῦλος (to which Spengel by his punctuation ὀργάνων· ἔστι καὶ ὁ δοῦλος would add the preceding word ἐστὶ). Eucken's punctuation is as follows: ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας (ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν), ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὠρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μελλοῖ ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ<sup>1</sup>, τῶν δ' ὀργάνων τὰ

<sup>1</sup> sc. ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα presumably.

ἔστι καὶ ὁ δούλος... ὑπηρέτης is the

**P. 174.** 1256 a 36. To *note* (71) add, that Aristotle is speaking of Etruscan piracy (Bywater). See *Journal of Philol.* II. p. 60 ff., *Frag.* 60 in Rose's last edition (partly given 1480 b 31 ff.).

**P. 175.** 1256 b 13. Mr Newman aptly compares Plato *Menex.* 237 E, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τεκὸν τροφήν ἔχει ἐπιτηδείαν ᾧ ἂν τέκη· ᾧ καὶ γυνὴ δῆλη τεκοῦσά τε ἀληθῶς καὶ μὴ, ἀλλ' ὑποβαλλομένη, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ πηγὰς τροφῆς τῷ γεννωμένῳ.

**P. 176.** 1256 b 19. τῆς τροφῆς] Mr Newman thinks it possible that Theophrastus apud Porphyrium *De Abstinencia* II. c. 12 had this statement in view and intended to controvert it.

**Ib.** 1256 b 23. Add a reference to the fuller discussion *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 346 ff.

**P. 179.** 1257 a 3 ἐκείνης] "This last," comp. VIII(V). 6. 10, 1306 a 10: σημείον δ' ἢ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ πολιτεία· ἐκείνοι γὰρ ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν κύριοι εἰσι (Busse).

**P. 180.** 1257 a 18 ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀλλαγάς. There is another way of taking this sentence: ἀναγκαῖον = ἀναγκαῖον ἂν, "For *otherwise* exchange would have been necessarily confined to the satisfaction of the ex-changers' own wants": and so Bernays and Jowett translate. Thus retail trade is proved not natural because, if it were, an absurdity would follow. The historical explanation of the imperfect given in the note appears the simpler and deserving of preference (1) because of the historical tendency throughout the context, and (2) because the direct proof is much more natural than the indirect and apagogic.

**P. 182.** 1257 b 7 ff. On various changes proposed in order to avoid the vicious circle in the reasoning of § 10 see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 353 f. As it stands, 1257 b 5 διὸ = διὰ τὸ καπηλικὸν γενέσθαι; "owing to the growth of Retail Trade Chrematistic is (erroneously) supposed to be concerned with money, because (really) productive of wealth: for wealth is often defined as a stock of money *because Chrematistic and Retail Trade are concerned therewith.*" At the best, the words in italics are a clumsy and inexact restatement of the fact contained in διὸ.

**P. 185.** 1257 b 37. Add to note: comp. IV(VII). 5 § 2, 1326 b 36, where see *note*. Mr Newman, to whom this reference is due, also adduces Plutarch *De cupid. divit.* 8, a fragment of a dialogue preserved in a slightly fuller form in Plutarch *Vita Pelopid.* 3, 279 B: τῶν γὰρ πολλῶν οἱ μὲν οὐ χρῶνται τῷ πλούτῳ διὰ μικρολογίαν, οἱ δὲ παραχρῶνται δι' ἀσωτίαν κτλ. See *Frag.* 56 ed. Rose (Teubner 1886).

**P. 186.** 1258 a 10. Comp. *Magna Moralia* I. c. 25, 1192 a 16 ff. (c. xxiv § 2 ed. Susem.).

**Ib.** 1258 a 11—13. Athenian generals in the fourth century were obliged to make their 'art' a means of gain, for the state was rarely in a position to find pay. Hence the author of *Oeconomica* B. II. cc. 23, 25, 26 records the devices of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates for obtaining money 1350 a 23 ff., 1350 b 33 ff. Chares is another instance given by Mr Newman: Theopompus apud *Athen.* 532 B, *F. H. G.* I. 297.

**P. 187.** 1258 a 21 f. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ...οὔτω καὶ] So c. 2 § 15, 1253 a 31 f., II. 8 § 22, 1269 a 9, c. 9 § 25, 1270 b 40 ff. Similarly καθάπερ καὶ...οὔτω καὶ VIII(V). 9 § 4, 1309 b 12 ff.

**P. 188.** 1258 a 24. Mr Newman takes ἐκ τούτων = starting with this food.

**P. 190.** As explained in the Addenda to Critical Notes, Mr Newman has examined with some care, Vol. II. pp. 196—198, the doubts thrown on the genuineness of c. 11 by a friend of his. Comp. p. 468.

**Ib.** 1258 b 10. Add to *n.* (99) that others, as Jowett and Newman, take the

meaning to be that philosophers may speculate on these occupations, but to embark upon them is servile. In any case compare V(III). 2. 4. 1327 b 15—17.

P. 190. 1258 b 11. Prof. Tyrrell holds that in every case where *ἐλευθερία* is of two terminations, the adjective = *liberalis*.

Ib. 1258 b 12. In the island of Carpathos mules are called *εἰρηφάνες* (quoted by Newman from J. T. Bent *Journal of Hell. Studies* vi. p. 241).

Ib. 1258 b 12—20. Mr Newman thinks that Plato *Laos* 841 c. 2 may have suggested this passage.

P. 191. 1258 b 21. On the subdivisions of *μεταφυσική* see *Philosophische Studien* u. *Ernterb* p. 455 ff., who supports Cope's view respecting *φυσική*. Prof. Susemihl is not convinced.

Ib. 1258 b 27—29. Mr Newman takes this differently, supposing the same ellipse as in 1253 b 3: *τῶν εἰδῶν χρηματιστικῆς < ὁρίσας ἑαυτὸν > ὅσα εἶναι*.

P. 193. 1259 a 5 *δεῖ συλλέγειν*. This has been done by the author of *Demosthenes* E. 11: see Susemihl's ed. (Leipzig 1887) Preface p. 12 ff. n. (15), and for the age of the writer (*circa* 260—200 B.C.) p. XII.

P. 194. 16 f. The same construction (*ἐνδεῖται ἐν*) is found 1251 a 19. *Idem* 1251 a 22.

P. 197. 1260 a 3. Prof. Susemihl, defending the reading *ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν φρονήσεων* which Mr Newman rejects as nothing more than a mathematical compensation, writes as follows: As the principal family of manuscripts of *Vet. Transl.* has *quemadmodum et natura principantium et subsistentium* (and so on. 14), this is what William of Moerbeke must have written. Whether he took the reading *ἀρχόντων καὶ* from the text or the margin of his Greek manuscript, we cannot know for certain: but the question is superfluous, for the reading is even in the latter case older, in fact considerably older, than all extant manuscripts. Those who, like Dittenberger and Newman, set down all that is of value in *Vet. Transl.* to mere conjecture, will attach no importance to this: but then they should not appeal to the Vatican Fragments or in consistency should pass the same judgment on the two correct readings which they present. Further they should remember that the seventy odd right readings of K<sup>b</sup> in the *Neumanian Ethics* might with just as good reason be entitled 'conjectures.' If the oldest authorities are thus impugned how are we to come to a decision as to the goodness of any old manuscript? And do the good readings of the *Vet. Transl.* look at all like Byzantine corrections of the eleventh or twelfth centuries? Had this been the procedure of Byzantine grammarians in those times we should have found more of their interpolations (say rather *emendations*) in the text. There seems therefore no reason for rejecting this reading, which least suits the sense, in favour of exegetical subtleties. Moreover, of what avail are those lectures? If we do translate *ἄσπερ* by "corresponding," we obtain no real correspondence: for the differences between those who are naturally ruled do not correspond to the differences between the virtue of the rulers and the virtue of the ruled: it is at the most the differences between the *virtues* of the different persons ruled that correspond, in so far as the wife is nearer to the ruler, the slave in complete opposition to him and the child in an intermediate position. This would lead to the conjecture *καὶ < τῶν > τῶν*. Why not then follow the more suitable reading of the *Vet. Transl.*? Had he intended the other sense Aristotle would more naturally have written: *ἐν ἀρετῇ καὶ ἐν φρονήσει ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων*.

P. 201. 1260 a 33. With *ὁ ἡγεμὼν* leader, chief, qui principat, *ἡγεμὼν* distinct, comp. *Dem. c. Aristocr.* XXIII. § 113 *ὁμοῖα ἡγεμὼν καὶ πῶς ἡγεμὼν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων*, Plato *Laos* IX, 875 B, *τὸ πῶς καὶ ὁμοῖα ἡγεμὼν τῶν πῶς ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐν τῇ*

ἐπόμενον τῷ κοινῷ, Xen. Cyr. IV. 1. 8 τὸ ἡγούμενον τῆς στρατιᾶς φύλον = the leading corps of the whole army.

**P. 202.** 1260 b 4. Mr Newman opposes the insertion of τὸν: the concluding part of the sentence would, according to him, apparently run τελέαν ἔχοντα τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικὴν, "it is from the master *quia* master, and not from the master as possessing the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη, that the slave must derive the kind of moral virtue which he ought to possess." But (1) if so, ἀλλ' οὐχ <ῆ> would be required. (2) It should be remembered that c. 7 § 2, 1252 b 22 ff., teaching slaves their duties (διδασκαλική) is called δουλικὴ ἐπιστήμη as opposed to issuing the requisite commands which is δεσποτικὴ s.c. διδασκαλική (ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν). It is no part of a master's business to teach slaves their duties, but merely to educate them to the moral virtue indispensable if their duties are to be rightly performed.

**Ib.** 1260 b 5. Against the view adopted by Mr Newman, following Bonitz, that λόγον here = reason, it would be superfluous to urge that (1) Plato does not propose to withhold reason from the slave, and that (2) while reason forms no proper antithesis to ἐπιτάξει 'rational conversation' does.

**P. 205.** Το Excursus 1 on Epimenides *add.*: Niese's conclusions can no longer be accepted. Compare now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 1 s. f. 'Επιμενίδης δ' ὁ Κρής ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐκάθηρε τὴν πόλιν, which is also decisive evidence for the *earlier* of the two dates assigned to him (*circa* 600 B.C., not *circa* 500 B.C.). See H. Diels *Sitzungsber. der Berl. Akademie* 1891 p. 387, Busolt *Gr. Alt.*<sup>2</sup> p. 136 n. 1.

**P. 209.** Addenda to Exc. II. Mr Newman's view of c. 6 is given Vol. II. p. 150 f. (1) He distinguishes the objectors to slavery here mentioned (1255 a 8 πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις) from the Abolitionists of 1253 b 20, who hold all slavery to be conventional and contrary to nature, thinking that the former probably did not object to the enslavement of barbarians in war by Greeks. In fact he restricts the dispute to the validity of the law or convention actually in force at the time, by which captives of war become slaves of the victors. (2) At 1255 a 20 he (like Dr Jackson) explains ἄτεροι λόγοι as a true plural: "the other line of argument on which (A) and (B) must then fall back, supposing they gave up their common standing-ground"—the principle that 'Force is not without virtue.' "Those who connect the right to enslave with superior force and those who connect it with mutual good-will between master and slave, are regarded as having two lines of argument open to them: either they may derive the claims of force and good-will to be the justifying ground of slavery from the claims of virtue, and thus shelter themselves under the latter, or they may impugn the claims of virtue: but if they impugn them, their own contentions lose all weight and cease to produce any serious debate." (3) At 1255 a 21, Mr Newman takes ὅλως with δικαίαν. The connexion of 1255 a 21—b 3 with the foregoing he makes out as follows. "We shall arrive at exactly the same result"—that what is solid in the contending views is the principle, that superiority in virtue confers on the master the right to rule—"if we examine another view. We have hitherto had to do with those who discuss the law in question on its merits; but there are those who support slavery arising through war on the broad ground that it is authorized by a law and that that which is so authorized is *ipso facto* just."

Prof. R. Y. Tyrrell has published remarks of his own and of the late Dr Maguire on the Slavery passage in a review of Mr Newman's edition published in *Hermathena* Vol. VI., No. 14 pp. 342—345.

**P. 212.** The suggestion in the second paragraph of the note on 1253 a 20 ff., made

independently several years ago, does not greatly differ from Mr Newman's explanation, except that he makes *ταυτήν* = probably *ἀσθενή*, not *ἀσθενέστερον* *ἀσθενέστερα*. He translates: 'for a hand when destroyed' (by being severed from the soul, which is its *αἵμα*) 'will be no better than a stone hand.'

P. 213. 1260 b 30. After 'Nic. Eth. 1. 13. 3' add '1101 a 10 ff., Plato *Rep.* 344 c, *Protag.* 342 A.'

P. 215. 1261 a 12 οὐ φαίνεται συμβαίνει. To be rendered with Mr Newman 'evidently does not result' (not, as in the note on a 11, does not appear to result). Comp. 1266 a 5, 1270 a 33 η.

Ib. 1261 a 13. The adverbial *πρὸς* is found in Aristophanes e.g. *Peace* 411 *ἐκγώγε πρὸς*, 611 *κλέπτοντα πρὸς τὰλλορρία*, 697 *πρὸς δέ, ταύτας εἰς ἐκὲς παρῶναι*. *Ach.* 1229, *Knights* 578, *Pax* 19, *Lysistr.* 663 *ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅπως ἐκαστὸν ἐκαστὸν ἐκαστὸν*. Also in Demosthenes *Adv. Lept.* 88. § 112 s.f. p. 491, 2 *ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ δίκαιον*, *Adv. Leocratem* § 13, p. 1084, 12 *πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἐν γυναικί.*

P. 216. 1261 a 17. Mr Newman prefers to render *ποῖα πολλὰ* by 'many and many of a unity.'

P. 219. 1261 a 31. *ἄσπερ ἄν* According to Mr Newman the allusion is then to be supplied: "as (all would be shoemakers, i.e. in turn) if shoemakers and carpenters interchanged occupations."

P. 220. 1261 b 2. Comp. *Quant. crit. coll.* p. 360 f.

Ib. 1261 b 7. On *πέφκε* Vahlen observes that the meaning is given by the Platonic equivalent, *φύσει ἔχει*. Thus *Rep.* 473 A *ἡ φύσει ἔχει πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος ἐννοεῖται ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι*; 489 η *οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσει κυβερνήτης ταυρῶν ἀλφειῶν ἢ αἰῶντος*. Comp. Demosth. XIV. 30 *ταῖς κρήναις καὶ τὰ φέρεται ἐκαστὸν πέφυκεν*, and *Ar. Politics* VI(IV). 12. 3, 1296 b 26 *ἐνταῦθα πέφκεται εἶναι θρασυταῖαν*.

P. 222. 1261 b 18. Mr Newman translates *κατὰ τοῦ λόγου* in connection with the '16') the expression i.e. *τὸ λέγειν πάντα ἅμα τὸ ἐρεῖν καὶ τὸ πρ.* Perhaps however it is more nearly parallel to § 4, b 32, *τὸ λεγόμενον* the scheme in question. For plainly *τὸ λεγόμενον*, *de quo sermo est*, i.e. *τὸ πάντα τὸ αἰεὶ λέγειν*, is not 'the proposition' itself but 'the general adoption of the same expression': and so too with *κατὰ τοῦ λόγου*.

Ib. 1261 b 24. Complete the reference to Plato *Rep.* 462 κ by adding the words *ἐνταῦθα δὲ, οἶμαι, πύρχοντες τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτιον ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ταυτὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς το φέρεται εἶναι τὸ πᾶσιν, καὶ ἡ ξυνηθῆσθαι ἡ ξιλλισθῆσθαι*.

Ib. 1261 b 26. Besides 1281 b 2 and 1191 a 11 f. (quoted in the note) the ambiguity of *πάντες* is prominent also in IV(VII). 13. 10, 1341 a 36 ff.

P. 224. 1261 a 1 ff. Add a reference to the fuller discussion in *Quant. crit. coll.* p. 361 ff.

P. 225. 1261 a 7. After (Thurot) add: Or this may be another instance of *πρὸς* without *δὲ* following; see 1270 a 34 and Susemihl's Critical Edition (Susemihl) Index grammaticus 2.2.

P. 226. 1261 a 19. *Ἦν περὶ αὐτῶν* had been written by Herodotus and others before Herodotus: the allusion may be to one of them (Bywater).

Ib. 1261 a 21 f. καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων *ἴσως*. Probably *γυναικὶ* = 'homines' both here and in the passage from *Hist. Anim.* 586 a 12, quoted in n. 1142. καὶ καὶ γυναικὶ ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν γινώσκον, αἱ δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ, ὡς τῇ ἢ ἐν βασιλείᾳ τῶν ἢ ἐν αἰσθητικῇ. Mr Newman prefers to take καὶ καὶ = both and. He also prefers to derive the name of this famous mare from her special quality, comparing Xen. *Cyrop.* VIII. 3. 38.

P. 227. 1261 a 31. For obvious reasons, the last sentence but one of the note on *λέξεις* should run "are not mentioned by Homer."

P. 230. 1261 b 13. The connexion between the two meanings of ἀγαπήναι is given by Plato *Euthyd.* 304 B τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὃ ἐθέλειται, τίμιον.

P. 232. 1263 a 1. For the clause τὰ περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 365 f. Mr Newman is quite right in taking τὰς with ἔχει in the next line.

P. 235. 1263 a 26—28. The subject of a 28 ἐπιδίδουσι is not, as Bonitz and Mr Newman think, αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι, but as all other commentators and translators have seen οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὡς αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι εἰσι διηρημέναι: for the increased trouble and attention which private ownership brings with it (1261 b 33 ff.) have this compensating advantage that they are merely means to the owner's increased advantage. The reading ἐκείτω προσεδρεύοντες suits this construction alone, the other reading ἐκείτου προσεδρεύοντος (adopted in the reprint of Susem.<sup>3</sup> 1894, see *Corrigenda*) would agree with either: but it may have arisen from erroneously taking αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι as the subject to ἐπιδίδουσι.

To. 1263 a 31. Add from Aristotle himself the exx. in the *Index*, 181 a 2, 431 a 10.

To. 1263 a 36 f. The difficulty in the text as it stands, which appears to have escaped some critics, is that καὶ δεηθῶσι ἐφοδῶν = καὶ τοὺς ἐφοδῶς, ὡς ταύτων δεηθῶσι, sc. χρῶνται κοινῶς. 'In case they need provisions on a journey' implying that they have none of their own 'they share them in common.' Whose? we may ask with Sydney Smith.

P. 239. 1264 a 2. Comp. Dem. 36 § 64, p. 960, 24 ἐστὶ καὶ χεῖρας ὕστερον. For Bernays' ingenious correction ἐδνται, which has Mr Bywater's approval, see now *Ges. Abhandlungen* I. p. 177.

P. 240. 1264 a 10. καὶ νῦν. "In his verbis νῦν male de tempore intellegunt, quo factum est, ut Spengelius interrogaret, nonne semper Helotae id fecerint, Victorius novum non vetus institutum civitatis Laconicae hoc μὴ γενησθαι τοὺς πολίτας fuisse Aristotelem affirmare crederet; Schneider contra ea Giphanium secutus diceret a philosopho etiam sui temporis Lacedaemoniis retinendi illius instituti studium tribui, sed studium tantum (ἐπιχειροῦσι), iam enim eos coepisse a vetere more desciscere, sed si hoc Aristoteles voluisset, dicendum ei fuit non καὶ νῦν verum ἔτι καὶ νῦν. Quae cum ita sint, alia explicanda ratio probanda neque nimis longe ea quaerenda est. Nῦν enim saepissime id significat quod revera extat"; *even as it is, even as things are, actually*. "Fictae igitur Platonis civitati haec opponuntur. Sed quid sibi vult illud ποιῆν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, pro quo expectas ποιῶσιν? Ni fallor, ποιῶν ἐπιχειροῦν non de eis dumtaxat, qui aliquid facturi sunt, sed de eis quoque dici potest, qui reapse aliquid faciunt, si ea ipsa actione dubiae rei experimentum instituunt et quam bene ipsis haec res procedat ei sibi et vel nolentes simul aliorum in usum experiuntur": 'make the experiment.' "Quae loquendi ratio hoc loco eo aptior est, quo magis Aristoteles rei, de qua loquitur, institutionem, qualis apud Lacedaemonios invenitur, minime optimam esse ipse postea demonstravit, c. 9. 1296 a 34—b 10." *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 367. Comp. the limiting expression Isaeus VIII. § 1: ὅπερ καὶ νῦν οἱ τοὺς ἐγχειροῦσι 'which is just what my opponents are doing in the present case.'

P. 241. 1264 a 15. With ἢ καὶ 'or again' cp. *De Gen. Anim.* I. 18, 713 a 29, 714 b 5 (Newman).

P. 242. 1264 a 27. Ἀφ' ὧν πολίτας is predicate *add.*: as ἀρχοντας in § 25, 1264 b 7, αἱ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀρχοντας.

P. 243. 1264 a 33. ἀποφάειν. Add the ref.: Plutarch *Lyc.* 8, *Inst. Lac.* 40.

P. 246. 1264 b 33. *ἐκ τούτων*. Mr Newman aptly compares *De Part. Anim.* ii. 1 § 4. 646 a 20 *δεύτερα δὲ εἰσάγει ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ὃ τῶν ἡμετέρων φέρεται*, and *Plato Philebus* 27 a *πρώτον μὲν ταῖς αἰσῶσι λέγειν, δεύτερον δὲ τῶν αἰσῶν θεωρεῖν ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μὲν καὶ γεγενημένων αἰσῶν*.

P. 249. 1265 a 13. *πᾶσι*]. Mr Newman has here an admirable observation. "In the criticisms on constitutions contained in the Second Book Aristotle commonly notices first, or at any rate before he has gone very far, their arrangements with respect to what he terms in the Fourth Book the *leaders* of the State—the number of citizens and the extent of the territory, cp. 1215 b 38." On the relation between criticism in B. II. and construction in B. IV(VI). see *Introd.* p. 31 n. (2), p. 22 n. (9).

P. 250. 1265 a 18. To n. (103) add the reference: *Isocr.* 623 i (Newman).

P. 251. 1265 a 28 ff. Comp. *Quæst. Crit. coll.* p. 168 f.

P. 252. 1265 a 40. On *ἐκ* with future participle see Goodwin *Moods and Tenses* § 107, 208, 216. He concludes: "The possibility of such a construction is open to a certain doubt and suspicion." See also Mr H. Richards in *Class. Rev.* vi. p. 122.

P. 253. 1265 b 7. Add to note (105): Aristotle's suggestion in b 7—as much resembles that of Plato *Rep.* 460 A, *τὸ δὲ πᾶσι τῶν πόλεων ἐκ τοῦ εἰσπράγματος, ὃ ὡς μέγιστα διασφύζει τὸν αἶφρον ἀφελὲν τὸν ἀφελόν, τῶν πάλαιον τε καὶ νέον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποκοινοῦντες* (Newman).

P. 255. 1265 b 29. After "adopted" insert "of all constitutions." With this meaning of *κακοτάτη* = most suited to, within the reach of, cp. 1265 a 2.

P. 258. 1266 a 5. *οἷδ' ἔχουσα φαινεταί*—obviously presents no morphological element either. Cp. *Addenda* to 1261 a 12.

Ib. 1266 a 7. After VIII(V). 7. 7 add: 1307 a 21 (cp. II. 11. 3. 1312 a 3 *ἀδελφῶν*). In *'Aθ. πολ.* c. 41 § 2 occurs the compound *παρ-αδελφῶν*.

Ib. 1266 a 8. To the references at the end of n. (101) add: *Isocr.* 243 n. As is now clear from the *Constitution of Athens*, c. 8 § 1, Plato in the *Laws* is merely reviving an old feature of Solon's constitution. Dr Sandys *ad loc.* has collected corroboratory evidence from *Isocr. Areop.* 12, *Pinarth.* 43, [Dem.] i. *Nicomach.* 144, § 73.

Ib. 1266 a 11. After 2 § 6 add: 1261 b 2 (cp. 1219 a 9—11).

P. 259. 1266 a 14—20. Comp. *Quæst. Crit. coll.* p. 170 ff.

P. 263. 1266 b 17. Add a reference to *Bosch Gr. Aeschylus* p. 117 n. 3.

P. 265. 1267 a 3 ff. "Aristippus had apparently anticipated a part of what Aristotle says in the passage which follows: see *Plutarch De cupid. diviti.* p. 314 A" (Newman).

P. 268. 1267 b 2. Add to n. (145): As to the form, although *δωδελία* occurs in the papyrus of *'Aθ. πολ.* c. 28, yet *Meisterhans* p. 18 shows that the proper form is *δωδελία*. On Attic inscriptions *δωδελία* itself occurs only once with *ε* for an inscription of date before 444 B.C.): but the derived forms preserve the older *α*, unless the ending (*-δελίαν*) includes an *ο*. Hence *δωδελίαν*, *δωδελον*, *δωδελία*: on the other hand *δωδελόν*, *περὶδωδελον*, *δωδελών*.

As to the introduction of the *δωδεκά*, cp. now the passage referred to above *'Aθ. πολ.* c. 28 § 3, where it is ascribed to Cleophon (ὁ ἡγεμὼν δὲ καὶ τῶν δωδεκῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ τῶν), not (as *Plat. P. Phaed.* 9 might lead us to conjecture) to Pericles. The innovation in the grants must be due to the increased number of *δωδεκά*, for *Dem. De Corone* § 28, *ἐκ τούτων δωδεκά δωδελία*, shows the price to have been only two *δωδεκά* in 330 B.C. First mentioned on an inscription of the year 410 (C. I. A. i. 108 where the Treasurers of Athens pay *δωδελία* from the funds in hand, *ἐνδοχῶς*), just about

the time when Cleophon was a prominent politician. Cp. Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 10 of Archedemos, 406 B.C., ὁ τοῦ δήμου τότε προειστηκώς καὶ τῆς διωβελίας ἐπιμελούμενος.

P. 270. 1267 b 28. λόγιος=πολύστωρ] ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ λέγειν καὶ ὑψηλοῦ οὐ τιθέασιν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τὰ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἔθνει ἐπιχώρια ἐξηγουμένου ἐμπείρως: Phrynichus p. 198 Lobeck, p. 284 Rutherford.

P. 272. 1268 a 9. Add to the note on οὕτω: Comp. Pl. *Symp.* 222 c, ὡς οὐ πάντα τούτου ἔνεκα εἰρηκώς.

Ib. 1268 a 10. Add to n. (259): The regulation in force at Athens, which Diog. Laer. i. 54 ascribes to Solon, is thus alluded to in the *Constitution of Athens* c. 24 § 3 καὶ ὀρφανοὶ...ἄσασιν γὰρ τούτοις ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοίκησις ἦν. Mr Wyse refers to *C. I. A.* i. 1, *C. I. A.* iv. p. 3, 4 an inscription not later than 460 B.C.

Ib. 1268 a 12. "δήμου δ' ἐποίει τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως is added because the word is often used of the poor only as in 1265 b 39, 1270 b 25" (Newman).

P. 274. 1268 b 5. Here ἀπλῶς ought to have been rendered "couched in absolute terms," and similarly in b 19 (275) ἀπλῶς δικαίως="duly framed in an unqualified form."

P. 275. 1268 b 19 f. Mr Newman observes: "It is possible that Hippodamos had in view cases in which the issue put to the jury included more charges than one. The indictment of Socrates was of this nature... There is much force in Aristotle's plea that the fault lay in the question put to the jury, not in expecting the jury to give an absolute answer."

P. 276. 1268 b 24 f. Add the case of Theramenes as given in Lysias XII. 68, 70.

P. 277. 1268 b 41. Add to note (271) the reference: Plato *Laws* 841 D (Newman).

P. 278. 1269 a 2. παρασχέσθαι is technical of witnesses: see Antiphon 5 §§ 20, 22, 24, 28, 30.

P. 279. 1269 a 21. Comp. Plato *Laws* 798 A, B οἷς γὰρ ἂν ἐντραφῶσι νόμοις σέβεται καὶ φοβεῖται πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ τό τι κινεῖν τῶν τότε καθεστώτων. Prof. Sidgwick has observed that this discussion shows what difference there is between Aristotle's political ideas and ours. In the modern European view the Constitution fills the place which the Laws (νόμος, νόμοι) hold for him.

P. 282. 1269 b 20. This use of κατὰ is not uncommon: e.g. Dem. xxiv. § 109 κατὰ πάντ' ἀδικεῖ.

Ib. 1269 b 21. With τοιοῦτος comp. c. 5 § 8, 1263 a 39, ὅπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιοῦτοι.

P. 284. 1269 b 38. The view of Bernays [and Newman] is quite possible. In fact it may be said that Aristotle would otherwise have written <καὶ> ἐν ἐτέραις. See 1094 b 13, 14 οὐχ ὁμοίως...ὥσπερ οὐδ'. But Mr Newman's reference to b 34 πρὸς οὐδέν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων is by no means decisive. Here the question is of utility not πρὸς τὰ ἐγκύκλια, but πρὸς πόλεμον. It is true that the 110 baking-women were of service at Plataea, but Thucydides' judgment on the Spartans is implicitly contained in III. 74, where he says of the Corcyraeans: τολμηρῶς ξυνεπελάβοντο...παρὰ φύσιν ὑπομένουσαι τὸν θόρυβον.

P. 285. 1270 a 8. Note that § 12 is strikingly like the language of 'Ath. πολ. c. 9 s.f. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐκ τῶν νῦν γιγνομένων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας θεωρεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν.

P. 287. 1270 a 34. Add to note (300) a reference to C. v. Holzinger in *Philologus* LII. p. 86.

P. 291. 1270 b 11. Add to note (317): Mr Newman suggests, with great

plausibility, that the events of 333 B.C. are referred to, "In that year the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus and Autophradates advanced from Chios first to Andros and then to Siphnos (nearer to Laconia), with the object of bringing about a rising in Greece against Macedon. We have no record of any negotiations while the fleet was at Andros; but at Siphnos King Agis made his appearance in a single trireme, and commenced negotiations for a subsidy and for the despatch of a fleet and an army to his aid. The news of Isaur, however, arrived in the midst of these communications and nipped the project in the bud. If, as is probable, the embassy went Agis on this errand, Aristotle may well have thought that they came near to raising their country." See A. Schäfer *Demosthenes* 3. i. 163 who refers to Arrian 2. 12 479 = Curt. 4. 1. 37. If this is correct, not only would this show that the passage was added to *V* long written, subsequently to 333 (as Mr Newman points out) but also that its date is earlier than 330 B.C., when more complete ruin overtook the Spartans at the 'battle of nine' in Aradisa.

P. 294. 1271 a 8. With *οὐ τοῦτον* comp. 1267 a 15 *οὐ ἀλλ' αὖτε* *ἄλλῃ* *τίμῃ*.

P. 295. 1271 a 9. Add to note (333) a reference to the election of the *Gerontes* of the Ninety at Elis VIII(V). 6. 11. 1306 a 15 ff. *τῆς δ' αἰσῆς ἀναστροφῆς ἀπὸ καὶ ἡμῶν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ γερόντων.*

P. 296. 1271 a 22. Add to note (339) a reference to Basilic Gr. *Abh.* p. 113 n. 31.

P. 298. 1271 b 8. Add to note (346) a reference to *Rhet.* 1. 5. 23. 1261 a 3 ff. *τὸ περιμάχητον φαινόμενον* (sc. *ἀγαθὸν ἔστι*). *οὐ γὰρ εἰσὶν ἐπιεικεῖς τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἔτι.*

P. 300. 1271 b 24. Add to note (352) a reference to *F. H. G.* 1. 249.

Ib. 1271 b 30—40. See also *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 377. Add to note (203) a reference to C. v. Holzinger in *Philologus* 141. p. 38 ff. He thinks (p. 39) *ἀπὸ καὶ πῶς* κτλ a marginal note of date later than 220 B.C., comparing Polyb. iv. 33. See however against his assumption Susemihl *Quaest. cr. coll. coll. p. 7 f.*

P. 301. 1271 b 35—39. This is Ephorus again (*Fr.* 61) as quoted in the geographical poem of Scymnus Chius, *F. H. G.* 1. 249; *τῶν δὲ Κερκῆς ποταμοῦ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς | ἀρξαι θαλάττης, ἃς τε νησιωτίδας | πόλεις ἐκαστῶν, ἃς τε καὶ πόλιν αὐτῶν Ἐφωρος εἰρηκεν, εἶναι φησὶ τε | ἐπώνυμον τῆς πόλεως ἀπὸ Κερκῆς ποταμοῦ, | τοῦ δὲ γενομένου βασιλέως αὐτόχρονος | πολλὰς ἡμέρας ἀπέχετο δὲ τῆς Λακωνικῆς.* Mr Newman, to whom the discovery is due, adds: "The statements of Diodorus 3. 78. 3—4 seem to be based on the same passage of Ephorus."

P. 303. 1272 a 18. *φάρμα* *οὐκ* *φάρμακον*] "The word *φάρμα* need not have political associations. It can mean *rent for land* and nothing more; here probably 'rent paid to the owners of private lots by the serfs who cultivate them.' See the inscriptions in *Bull. Corr. Hell.* v. (1881), p. 108 ff. and for the fact *Dionysius apud Athen.* iv. 142" (Wyse).

Ib. 1272 a 22. Supplement (and in part correct) this note by a reference to Plato *Lysis* 677 E, where Epimenides' device (*παχέμενος*)—apparently *ἀμύμων*, i.e. *permmican*—is mentioned (see Stallbaum *ad loc.*), and to *F. H. G.* iv. 30. 175. 48 (Newman). To the next note (367) add a reference to Plato's strong comment *Lysis* 835 b—841.

P. 307. 1272 b 30. Mr Newman keeps *ἐχέμενος* sc. *the value paid for the allies* appeals to 1266 b 1, 2, where however it presents no such intelligible hindrance.

P. 308. 1272 b 37. The meaning of *ἀμύμων* here is clear from the antithesis to *ἐκ τῶν τευχόντων*: 'to this office they elect for merit.' Writers on Greek Antiquities have favoured a different view, that *ἀμύμων* *ἀμύμων*—election from privileged families. But while fully recognising the close connexion between good birth and

'merit' or 'capacity,' as shown by such passages as Isocr. *Areop.* § 37 οἱ καλῶς γεγονότες καὶ πολλὴν ἀρετὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐνδεδειγμένοι, Philochorus *F. H. G.* i. 394 πρωτεύοντες ἔν τε γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ βίῳ χρηστῷ (where πρωτεύοντες echoes ἀριστίνδην) we surely have no right to give the Aristotelian technical term any other meaning than that attested by Timaeus, κατ' ἀνδραγαθίαν αἰρετόν.

P. 309. 1273 a 9. The text presents τούτων καὶ ὁ δῆμος where all the authorities give καὶ τούτων ὁ δ., and the change was defended by Prof. Tyrrell in *Hermathena* Vol. vi., No. 12 p. 31 f. (cp. No. 14 p. 334). Though the grounds for the change seemed imperative, it would perhaps have been more consistent to leave καὶ τούτων in the text and print the conjecture in spaced type in the critical notes. For Mr Newman has shown that it is not impossible to give a sense to καὶ τούτων: "over the measure which is the subject of that difference of opinion" (between Shofetes and Senate), "as well as over matters voluntarily referred to the assembly in cases of unanimity." But would the writer have left all this for his readers to supply from conjecture? In any case, even this suggestion is not inevitable: Mr Newman has an alternative assumption that ὁμογνωμονοῦσι = are unanimous as to bringing or not bringing a given question before the popular assembly.

P. 313. 1273 b 12—15. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 380 f.

1273 b 13. κοινότερόν τε κτλ] Mr Newman, retaining the manuscript order, would render "for it is not only fairer to all, as we said" sc. 1261 b 1.

P. 314. Add to the references for c. 12 and the Solonian Constitution: the *Constitution of Athens* cc. 5—12 (cp. c. 41) to which historical commentaries will be found in Mr Kenyon's and Dr Sandys' editions. Amongst the numerous publications which deal with the relations of this treatise to the *Politics* may be specially mentioned Mr Newman's review in *Class. Rev.* v. 155—164, Mr R. W. Macan's in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* xii. 17—40, P. Meyer *Des Aristoteles Politik u. die 'Aθ. πολ.* (Bonn 1891), B. Keil *Die Solonische Verfassung nach Aristoteles* (Berlin 1892), U. v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf *Aristoteles u. Athen* (Berlin 1893). See also the second editions of the *Griechische Alterthümer* of Busolt and Gilbert, the *Gr. Gesch.* of Busolt, and the 6th edition of K. F. Hermann *Lehrbuch d. griech. Alterthümer* Bd. 1. Theil II. *Der athenische Staat u. seine Geschichte* edited by Thumser (Freiburg 1892).

It is worth noting that while the recent discovery largely supplements the commentary on B. II. c. 12 there is nothing in it to cancel, except the incautious mention of Aristides p. 317 for which Mr Hicks is alone responsible.

Ib. 1273 b 36. ἐνιοι μὲν οἴονται... b 41 ἔοικε δὲ... 1274 a 3 διὸ καὶ μέμφονται τινες... a 11 φαίνεται δὲ...] In general structure this whole account may instructively be compared with two criticisms in 'Aθ. πολ. (1) c. 9 § 2, οἴονται μὲν οὖν τινες... οὐ μὴν εἰκός (cp. ἔοικε above)... οὐ γὰρ... (2) c. 6 §§ 1—4, ἐν οἷς πειρῶνται τινες διαβάλλειν... οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πιθανώτερος ὁ τῶν δημοτικῶν λόγος· οὐ γὰρ εἰκός... ταύτην μὲν οὖν χρὴ νομίζειν ψευδῇ τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι. Provisionally we may identify the ἐνιοι of 1273 b 36 with οἱ δημοτικοί of 'Aθ. πολ. c. 6. F. Dümmler in *Hermes* xxvii. p. 267 ff. would refer μέμφονται τινες to Critias who, he thinks, wrote on the constitution of Athens.

P. 315. To note (400) add a reference to the summary of Solon's constitution in 'Aθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2: τρίτη δ' ἡ μετὰ τὴν στάσιν (cp. 'Aθ. πολ. c. 2 ad init.) sc. μεταβολή, ἡ ἐπὶ Σόλωνος, ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο: and to c. 2 § 3, πρῶτος ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου προστάτης sc. Solon.

Ib. 1273 b 37. λίαν ἄκρατον κτλ] Compare 'Aθ. πολ. c. 2 of the times preceding Draco and Solon: ἦν γὰρ [τότε] ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ὀλιγαρχικῇ πᾶσι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐδούλευον οἱ πένητες τοῖς πλουσίοις... ἡ δὲ πᾶσα γῆ δι' ὀλίγων ἦν κτλ: c. 4 s.f.,

c. 3 § 1 τῶν πολλῶν διακρίσας τοὺς λόγους, c. 6 § 1 οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐκαστὸς, and (what were undoubtedly the writer's intentions for his story) Solon's name occurs again in c. 17 § 4.

**Ib.** 1273 b 38. δημοκρατίαν τὴν πατρῴαν] Compare the use in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 19 § 2 of οἱ πατέροι νόμοι οὗτοι Κλεισθένη ἐθέσαν with the comment explained in c. 19 § 2 ἀλλὰ παραπλησίαν εἶσαι τὴν Κλεισθέους πολιτείαν τῇ Σόλων; also c. 24 § 2 τὴν πατρῴον πολιτείαν (his). Unquestionably πατέροι had become at the end of the 5th century a synonym for *Solonian*.

**Ib.** 1273 b 41. δικαστήριον] Fully explained by 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2, which for its importance we subjoin in full, though strictly only the third of the three democratic elements is here in point: δοκεῖ δὲ τῇ Σόλωνι πολιτείᾳ τοῖς τοῖς εἰς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μέγιστον τὸ μὴ δαρίζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίμασι, ἵνα οὐκ εἴδωσι οὐ φιλομένῳ (τιμωρεῖν) ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικουμένων, τρίτον δὲ, - εἴς τὴν πόλιν μὴ ἀφαιρῆσαι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐφεσσι: κρίμα γὰρ οὐδ' ὅστις τῇ πόλει, εἰς τὴν γίγνεται τῆς πολιτείας.

**Ib.** ζοικε] This, like εἰδὼς 'Αθ. πολ. c. 6, c. 9 cited above, indicates a mode of argument common with the writer of the *Constitution of Athens* and not unknown in the *Politics*. In default of direct testimony, in restoring current tradition or antiquarian evidence, the method of reconstruction is employed, by which from the present we infer the past, and from a given state of institutions reason back to their origin or a previous state. See Mr R. W. Macan in *J. H. S.* xii. p. 37 f., who calls attention to the 'signals of this method' in style.

**Ib.** 1274 a 1. τὴν βουλὴν] That this was a pre-existing institution in Solon's time is placed beyond all reasonable doubt by the *Constitution of Athens*. It confronts us in the sketch of the ἀρχαία πολιτεία c. 3 § 6: ὃ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βουλὴ τὴν μὲν τάξιν εἶχε τοῦ διατηρεῖν τοὺς νόμους, κρίνει δὲ τὰ πλείστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κολᾷδουσα καὶ δρῶσα πάντα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτελεῖ. It was then filled up from ex-Archons (*ib.*). Under Draco's constitution it was made *πάλαι τῶν νόμων* and received complaints of their violation (c. 4 § 4). Solon (the statement is vague as to time) it appointed the magistrates, c. 8 § 1. Solon confirmed its censorship, its powers of general superintendence, of inflicting fines, and holding trials for treason by the *νόμος εἰσαγγεῖας*, c. 9 § 4.

**Ib.** 1274 a 2. τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσιν] According to 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4 § 1 the mode of choice enacted by Solon was a combination of selection with election, οὗτοι δ' ἀρχαὶ ἐπαύρει κληρωτὰς ἐκ προκρίτων, a statement which sets in a proper light the hitherto current (but hitherto neglected) conceptions of the Solonian practice found in *Isocrus Arist.* §§ 22, 23, *Panath.* § 145, and [Dem.] i. *Nicomach.* lxx. § 71. Since the lot was limited by the previous selection (or nomination by election) Aristotle can perfectly well speak of the people, here and in 1281 b 33, as *κρίνοντες*.

Thus Aristotle's own qualifications of the democratic passages passed upon Solon's constitution amount to this: "Solon did not found the Areopagus Council, though he confirmed it in its censorial prerogatives, and he did not introduce the election of magistrates." The exact sense in which the last comment is to be taken is not quite clear. The little we know of the mode of appointment prior to Solon's reforms comes from 'Αθ. πολ. In c. 4 § 2 it is implied that under Draco the *πρῶτοι* (which at the time consisted of those able to provide themselves with heavy armour) used to elect the nine archons: ἀπελθέτω (not ἀεὶ δὲ ἐπὶ ἀρχαίοντες) οἱ δὲ πλείονες τοῖς ὅπλοις παρεχόμενοι: ἥμενοι δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀρχαῖς ἀρχονται. But the authority of this chapter is doubtful and in c. 8 § 2 it is said vaguely that in addition to the Areopagus

used to summon and appoint fit persons to the various annual offices: τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον ἢ ἐν' Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ ἀνακαλεσαμένη καὶ κρίνασα καθ' αὐτὴν τὸν ἐπιτήδειον ἐφ' ἐκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπ' ἐνιαυτὸν διατάξασα ἀπέστελλεν.

**Ib.** τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι κτλ] The importance of the appeal to the law court where the people interpreted the laws is emphasized 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 ἔτι δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ γεγράφθαι τοὺς νόμους ἀπλῶς μηδὲ σαφῶς...ἀνάγκη πολλὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις γίγνεσθαι καὶ πάντα βραβεύειν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τὸ δικαστήριον. So also Plutarch *V. Sol.* 18 (τὸ συνεκκλησιάζειν καὶ δικάζειν) κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐδὲν ὕστερον δὲ παμμέγεθες ἐφάνη· τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστα τῶν διαφόρων ἐνέπιπτεν εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς (namely through appeals from the sentences of the magistrates). Comp. Busolt *Gr. Alt.*<sup>2</sup> p. 150 n. (5).

**P. 316.** 1274 a 3. μέφονται τινες] These critics are probably the same as those mentioned in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 6 §§ 1, 2 (πειρῶνται τινες διαβάλλειν αὐτόν...οἱ βουλόμενοι βλασφημεῖν). Aristotle's acquaintance with them is probably due to an oligarchical pamphlet, perhaps of the time of the Four Hundred or the Thirty: see Wilamowitz *or.* c. I. p. 74, p. 165 ff.

**Ib.** 1274 a 8. Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς] The most remarkable novelty contained in 'Αθ. πολ. is the circumstantial account of the plot of Ephialtes and Themistocles to overthrow the usurped powers of the Areopagus: c. 25. The part ascribed to Themistocles seems unhistorical, for as the usurpation of the Areopagus lasted 17 years after Salamis (c. 25 § 1) this story would place Themistocles in Athens *circa* 462 B.C., whereas various lines of evidence converge in making him escape to Persia *circa* 466 B.C. See Mr E. M. Walker in *Class. Rev.* vi. 95 ff. Few at any rate will approve the suggestion to erase Pericles' name in order to insert that of Themistocles.

In dealing with the statement in the *Politics* we have to decide whether *one* or *two* attacks on the Areopagus are intended. Dr Sandys *Constitution* p. 100 prefers to identify Pericles' action with the later occasion ('Αθ. πολ. c. 27 § 1, τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν ἐνια παρείλετο) when some of its remaining privileges were taken from the Council. In this way the statements of *Politics* and *Constitution* would be reconciled. Prof. Susemihl however is inclined to adopt what is certainly the more natural interpretation, that in the *Politics* Pericles (not Themistocles) is associated with Ephialtes in the famous attack: *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* III. p. IV. He goes on to infer (1) that it is more likely the correct account is later than the incorrect, and therefore B. II. of *Politics* later than the *Constitution of Athens* (comp. above *Addenda* to p. 66), and (2) meets the possible objection from the silence observed in the genuine part of B. II. as to Draco's constitution by reminding us that B. II. only professes to deal with εὐδοκίμοῦσαι πολιτεῖαι, 1260 b 29, 1272 b 24, 1273 b 25. These inferences apart, the conjunction of Ephialtes and Pericles in the attack of 462 B.C. will remain, in spite of the romancing of the *Constitution of Athens*, a plausible hypothesis in view of the facts (1) that Ephialtes atoned for his share in it with his life, and (2) that Pericles succeeded Ephialtes in the leadership of the party of reform.

**Ib.** 1274 a 9. *Add to note* (408): See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 27 §§ 3, 4 with the story of Damonides' advice (the source apparently of Plutarch *V. Cim.* 10, *V. Pericl.* 9), Busolt *Gr. Alt.*<sup>2</sup> p. 168 n. (4). The whole tone of § 4 and particular expressions can be paralleled from 'Αθ. πολ. cc. 27, 28 §§ 1—4, c. 41 § 2 (the 7th and the 11th μεταβολαί): while the exclusion from Solon's intention of merely accidental results (1274 a 11 φαίνεται δὲ κτλ) agrees with the defence of Solon in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 s. f.

**P. 317.** 1274 a 14. *Add to note* (410): Compare 'Αθ. πολ. c. 26 § 1; μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβαινε ἀνίσθαι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοὺς προθύμως δημαγωγοῦντας. The

mention of Aristides as a leader of the Moderates is particularly unfortunate: for in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 2 he finds a place on the list of *πορρισταὶ καὶ ἄλλοι*: (1) Solon, (2) Peisistratus, (3) Cleisthenes, (4) Xanthippus, (5) Themistocles and Aristides, (6) Ephialtes, (7) Pericles, (8) Cleon, (9) Cleophanes; and in c. 32 § 1 ff. c. 34 a greater share of activity is assigned to Aristides than to his colleague Themistocles in the transformation of Athens into an imperial city. According to c. 31 § 1 the Moderates had no leader in the period just before Cimon.

*Frag.* 369 mentioned in this note is of course Plutarch's famous paraphrase of the eulogy of Theramenes in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5.

Ib. 1274 a 15. *To* note (411) *add*: This is supported by 'Αθ. πολ. c. 7 § 3. *καὶ δὲ τὸ θητικὸν τελοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαστήριας μετὰ τὸν αἶμα*. Under the old oligarchy the Thetes had no civic rights at all: 'Αθ. πολ. 4 § 2, 5 § 1. The second of the two alternatives presented in n. (411) is nearer the truth; neither is exactly right.

Ib. 1274 a 17. No notice is taken of *εὐθύναι* in 'Αθ. πολ. Nor a *εὐθύναι* from *εὐχάρις* technical where it occurs in Solon's fragments. It is tempting to regard 1274 a 15—19 as neither more nor less than a plain prose paraphrase of the famous lines *ἄλλω μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα κτλ* *Fragg.* 5 and 6 Bergk.

Ib. 1274 a 19. *To* note (414) *add*: From 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4 § 3, c. 7 § 3 it would appear that these four classes are earlier than Solon: for even if c. 4 be regarded as an interpolation, there is the clause *καθάπερ ἀήμετο τὸ γένος* when Solon's reforms are first discussed. Comp. Busolt in *Philologus* l. 393 ff.

P. 318. 1274 a 21. Note even the verbal similarity to 'Αθ. πολ. c. 7 a f. *καὶ ἑλλοι* [sc. *ἔδει τελεῖν*] *θητικόν, οἰκιστὰς μετέχουσιν ἀρχῆς*. See p. 315 note on 1272 b 21.

Ib. 1274 a 22. *Add to* note (415): In *Fragg.* 505, 1561 a 3, Zaleucus is called a shepherd and slave. This is hardly to be reconciled with *τελευτῶντες ἀνδρ.* § 11, 1273 b 31.

Ib. 1274 a 23. *Add*: The laws of Chairondas (probably another form of the same name) were in force in Cos, see Herondas 2. 48: from Strabo xiv. 139 we know that they were in force in Mazaka, in Cappadocia. In a decree found near Teos, Dittenberger *Syllage* n. 126 lines 61, 65, 121, 123, Antigonus permits the people of Lelendos and Teos to introduce the laws of Cos for the projected union of the two cities. Hence v. Wilamowitz (l. 65 n.) conjectures that the laws of Chairondas, introduced deliberately when in 366 B.C. the state of Cos was re-founded, had spread from that place as a centre.

Ib. 1274 a 25. *τινέ*] Mr Newman adduces reasons why Ephorus cannot be intended. (1) Ephorus (Strabo vi. 260) states that Zaleucus borrowed his laws from Crete, Lacedaemon, and the Areopagus. He could not therefore have made Zaleucus and Lycurgus contemporaries. (2) We should expect him to trace laws to a Cretan origin, to Rhadamanthus or Minos. (3) He would hardly have committed such an anachronism in regard to the Locrian Onomacritus, if indeed he be the same as the oracle-monger of Peisistratid times. Mr Newman inclines to assign the tradition to a Locrian origin, cp. Scymnus Chius v. 314 ff.

Ib. 1274 a 30. *To* note (419 b) *add*: Comp. the similar exposure of a chronological error in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 17 § 2: *παρὰ τὸν Νηλεῖον αἱ γένεσται. καὶ γὰρ διέβηεν καὶ Ὀδυσσεύς, ἔδω τις ἀναλογίζεσθαι τὸς δευτέρους πλοῦ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἔκλειπεν Ἀχαιοί.* Comp. Mr Newman's remarks in Dr Sandys' edition of the *Constitution* p. 16.

P. 319. 1274 b 7. Add a reference to Dr Sandys' note in his *Demosthenes Private Orations* Vol. II. p. 115, and the *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 3) s. v.

**P. 320.** 1274 b 14. ταῖν] In *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* II. 504 Prof. Bywater remarks that τοῖν is the only form recognised by the Attic inscriptions. Undoubtedly the preponderance of masculine forms of the dual is very great, τοῖν θεοῖν at least 30 times in inscr.: yet ταῖν θεαῖν does occur, see *C. I. A.* II. 3, n. 1559. In the dramatists there is no instance of τοῖν, τοῦτοι as feminine; but Menander *Fr.* 520 K. gives ταῖν ἀδελφαῖν ταῖν δυοῖν ταύταιν. On the other hand τῷ, τοῦτω, τῷδε, αὐτῷ, ᾧ, ᾧτινε, are found as feminine, although τή, αὐτή, ταῦτα, τῷδε, with substantives of the first declension, do occur. In the prose writers the results so far differ that τή, ταῦτα, are nowhere attested, while τοῖν is found more often than ταῖν, e.g. in Plato τοῖν six times, ταῖν four times. The Scholiast on Aristoph. *Thesm.* 566 has τῷ θεῷ ὡς τῷ χεῖρε, οὐκέτι δὲ τοῖν θεοῖν ἀλλὰ ταῖν θεαῖν. In Isaeus ταῖν occurs six times, in Aristophanes six times, in Sophocles, Xenophon, Lysias, Andocides, Hyperides once each.

See Röper *De dualismo Platonico* (Danzig 1878) and E. Haasse *Ueber den Dual bei Xenophon u. Thucyd.* (Bartenstein 1889), *Ueb. den Dual bei den attischen Dramatikern* (Bartenstein 1891), also in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXLIII. 1891 p. 416 ff.; S. Keck *Ueb. d. Dual bei den gr. Rednern* (Würzburg 1882).

**P. 321.** 1274 b 15 f. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσὶ, πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρχούσῃ τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν. *Add to note* (427): Possibly the writer felt it incumbent upon him to account for Aristotle's omission of Draco (the real reason being, as explained above, that Draco's was not one of the εὐδοκιμοῦσαι πολιτεῖαι), especially in view of 1273 b 34 οὔτοι γὰρ (Λυκοῦργος καὶ Σόλων) καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν. Presuming that the sentence is a spurious addition it is not surprising that it is irreconcilable with 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4. Those recent authorities who do not reject it as spurious (and they include Newman and v. Wilamowitz) have to account for a glaring discrepancy with the detailed account of the Draconian constitution given in that chapter: which v. Wilamowitz considers to have been a hasty insertion in 'Αθ. πολ. at the last moment. See again *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* I. p. XVI, III. p. III ff.

**Ib.** *Add to note* (428): See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4 with the increasing literature upon the Draconian constitution, beginning with the doubts of Mr J. W. Headlam and Mr E. S. Thompson in *Class. Rev.* v. 161 ff., 336, and M. Th. Reinach in *Revue Critique* 1891 p. 143 ff., to whose attacks replies have been made, amongst others by P. Meyer *op. c.* p. 31 ff. and Busolt in *Philologus* L. p. 393 ff. In the opinion of v. Wilamowitz the Constitution of Draco first appeared in Theramenes' oligarchical pamphlet, 404 B.C.: it was reconstructed from the θεσμοὶ of Draco, upon inferences to which Theramenes was led in the course of his inquiries into old and obsolete laws for the purpose of the revision of the laws and constitution instituted by the Thirty.

As to the absence of evidence for any such constitution, Busolt argues that since Draco's laws, with the exception of those relating to homicide, were abolished ('Αθ. πολ. c. 7) and only the laws on homicide remained in force, people easily came to the conclusion that the latter comprised the whole of Draco's work. For a possible reminiscence he points to Pseudo-Plato *Axiochus* 365 E: ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ Δράκοντος ἢ Κλεισθένης πολιτείας οὐδὲν περὶ σε κακὸν ἦν.

**P. 324, line 18.** *Add:* Mr Barclay Head *Hist. Num.* p. 372 states plainly that a federal coinage implies other federal institutions, and that in spite of continual dissensions something more than a mere tradition of political unity was kept up in Arcadia during the period of the coinage 550—400 B.C.

**P. 330.** *To note* (8) of p. 329 *add after σύνητες:* This evidence is disputed by Mr F. B. Jevons *Kin and Custom* in *Journal of Philol.* XVI. 1887 p. 104 n. 1. According to him Polybius and Caesar were mistaken in attributing polyandry to

Spartans and Celts respectively, the 'Joint Undivided Family' having given rise to the misapprehension.

P. 334, line 6. To note (250) add: O. Apelt *Antiquiæ sue pr. Philologicae* (Leipzig 1891) p. 382 ff. suggests that Hippias of Elis was a pupil of Hippodamios [Hippodamios apud Suidam].

P. 336, note 1. Add a reference to the excellent article by C. v. Holmeyer *Archiv für die Kunde des Alterthums u. der Naturgeschichte in Philologus* lxx. p. 26 ff.

P. 337, line 18. See *Addenda* to p. 303 above.

P. 339, note 1. 'Oxen' would appear to be meant by *καταστάς, ταύτης* ('chance').

P. 340. Excursus IV. The detailed account of the Carthaginian constitution implies a later date than the researches necessary for the Greek Hierarchy and the *Νόμιμα διατάγματα*. The bearing of this fact upon the date of B. II. (at least in its final form) is pointed out by Prof. Susenmühl *Quæst. Ar. ex. et cogn.* III. p. 111.

P. 352. To note (403) add: Since the publication of the *Constitution of Athens* the Solonian origin of the popular law courts is placed beyond question: see 'Ad. πολ. c. 7 § 4, c. 9.

P. 356. 1275 a 10. To note (435) add: See now 'Ad. πολ. c. 59 § 6, καὶ τὰ ἐνδόξα τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πόλεις οὗτοι κυροῦσι, καὶ τοὺς δέουσι τοὺς ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς αἰετήσαντες, where οὗτοι = οἱ θεομοθέται.

P. 356. Comm. left col. line 17 add: Meier u. Schömann *Attische Feste* ed. Lipsius pp. 994—1006, *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 2) II. 734 ff. Also *Kuhn's Inst. in Griech. Epigraphy* I. p. 355. In the absence of *ἐνδόξα* the only right was the right of reprisals, *συλῆν*; cp. *σύλην διδόναι κατὰ τινας*, Dem. *adv. Leptineum* CXXV § 16 p. 951, 21.

Ib. 1275 a 15. *ἐγγεγραμμένους*. Comp. 'Ad. πολ. c. 41 § 1.

P. 357. 1275 a 25. *οὐκ ἔστιν*] The rule at Athens in the fourth century is thus laid down 'Ad. πολ. c. 62 a. f. *ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὰς μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀρχαὶ ἔσονται πλειονέων, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδεμίαν πλὴν βουλευτῶν δέ.* Comp. c. 31 § 3, and *Politics* 1299 a 10, 1317 b 24.

P. 359. 1275 b 8. At Acragas and Melite *ἀρχαὶ* was the name for the Council as opposed to the popular Assembly: *Swoboda Die griechischen Volksverfassungen* p. 307.

P. 360. 1275 b 22. *πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν*] See below, *Addenda* to p. 179. That this was the practice at Athens in the fourth century can be seen from 'Ad. πολ. c. 46. *μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἄνθρωποι.*

P. 361. 1275 b 30. *ἀπλοῶν*] Comp. Plato *Politi.* 306 c. *πῶς οὖν αἰεὶς ἀπλοῶν ἐστί τοῦτο, ἢ πάντες μᾶλλον ἔχει διαφορὰν.*

P. 362. 1276 a 8—16. See the discussion of this passage in *Quæst. Ar. cogn.* I. p. XVII, following Niemeyer in *Zeitsch. f. Phil.* CXIII. 1891, p. 471 ff. With the changes indicated in the *Addenda* to *Central Notes* the passage runs thus: *ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες πότε ἢ πόλις ἐκράξῃ καὶ πότε οὐχ ἡ πόλις, αἷα δὲ αἷα ἀναρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία (τῶν γὰρ αἷα τὰ συμβαλλόντων ἐκείνων διαλόγῃ, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τῶν τυράννων λαμβάνεται, αἷα ἔλλα πάλαι τῶν τυράννων, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ αἷα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν τυράννων ἀπὸ αἷα [καὶ] δημοκρατίας τῆς αἷα τῶν τυράννων, αἷα τῆς αἷα δημοκρατίας [ταύτης] τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς αἷα τῶν ἀναρχίας καὶ τῶν τυραννίδων.* "Some raise the question when the state is, and when it is not, responsible for public acts, for instance after the establishment of a democracy upon a previous oligarchy or tyranny: some under such circumstances would repudiate obligations, holding that they were not constituted by the state but by

the tyrant, and would decline many other such responsibilities on the ground that the basis of certain forms of government is superior strength and not the public interest: suppose now men to be somewhere living under a democracy of this origin, is the state just as responsible for the acts of this government as for those of its predecessor, the oligarchy or tyranny?" In a 14 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον is explained by a 9 ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. The question should more properly have been put in the reverse way: is the state as responsible for the acts of the deposed oligarchy or tyranny as it is for the acts of the democracy which succeeds them? But Aristotle's inexactness in such matters is notorious. Niemeyer retains the ταύτης bracketed above, as if the question concerned the *identity* of the state: more probably the alternative is, are the acts of the preceding tyranny to be attributed to the city or to the tyrant?

P. 364 f. 1276 a 36—38. On the divergent spellings αλεῖ αἰεῖ see Meisterhans *Grammatik d. a. Insch.*<sup>2</sup> p. 25 n. 2; Christ preface to ed. of *Metaphysica* (Teubner series) p. xv, who cites the variants in the MSS. at 986 b 17, 1016 a 15, 1026 a 21. The whole question of orthography is complicated by the discrepancy between (1) the best manuscripts and (2) the inscriptions. Prof. Susemihl, who has hitherto been content to reproduce faithfully the best manuscript evidence, now writes: "in rebus orthographicis sequi fontes optimos...non pergerem fortasse in nova editione, sed suadente Stapfero ad Meisterhansi grammaticam inscriptionum me accommodarem semperque scriberem non solum, id quod nunc feci, μικρός, μικρότης, verum etiam μέχρι, γίγνεσθαι, γιγνώσκειν, πλέον et forsitan etiam δυοῖν, αὔξειν, breviores comparativorum species in ους et ω desinentes semper reciperem." See Stapfer *Krit. Studien zu Aris. v. d. Seele* (Landshut 1890) p. 7 ff. On the same rational principles Mr Hicks is inclined wholly to disregard the manuscript evidence on such points as the avoidance of hiatus by elision, and the retention of obsolete or incorrect spelling (θαλάσση 1271 b 34, 35, 37, 1327 a 16, πράσων 1337 b 20, Μιτυληναῖοι 1285 a 35). v. Wilamowitz, *op. c.* I. 319, sees in Aristotle's Greek traces of Ionicism.

P. 366. Το note (467)—comp. n. (455) p. 363—add: See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 39 s. f. (τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἃ ἐδανείσαντο εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἐκατέρους ἀποδοῦναι χωρὶς) and c. 40 § 3 (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χρήματα Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἃ οἱ τριάκοντα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἔλαβον, ἀπέδοσαν κοινῇ, κελευουσῶν τῶν συνθηκῶν ἐκατέρους ἀποδιδόναι χωρὶς) which now informs us that there was a special clause about the loan in the terms of reconciliation (διαλύσεις) agreed upon between the two factions in 403 B.C. It is with justice that in the 'Αθ. πολ. the notice of the repayment is followed by the comment ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οὐχ ὅτι προστιθέασιν τῶν οἰκείων οἱ δῆμοι κρατήσαντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀνάδαστον ποιοῦσιν.

P. 368. 1276 b 33. Το note (470) add: Mr Newman (I. p. 363) understands ἀγαθὸν as the predicate with εἶναι.

P. 369. 1277 a 6. For εὐθὺς cp. Aristoph. *Clouds* 878 εὐθύς γέ τοι παιδάριον ὃν τυννουτονὶ ἔπλαττεν ἔνδον οἰκίας.

P. 370. 1277 a 11. From Dem. c. *Mid.* p. 533 it appears that there were several κορυφαῖοι and a ἡγεμὼν κορυφαίων.

P. 373. 1277 b 12. Το note (490) add: A trace of it is retained in M. Antoninus XI. 29 ἐν τῷ γράφειν καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν οὐ πρότερον ἄρξεις πρὶν ἀρχθῆς. The excellence of the Spartan military system is thus brought out by Thucydides v. 66 s. f. σχεδὸν γὰρ...ἄρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσί.

P. 375. 1277 b 34. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ sc. ἀπορεῖται.

P. 377. 1278 a 14. With φανέν cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 22 ὡς ἐφάνη τὰ μέταλλα.

P. 379. 1278 a 30. We owe to Mr Wyse the proper translation to γένεσις παλίνης, viz. νόθος πολίτης: see *Scholia in Euripidem* ed. Schaubert i. (1891) 102 καὶ τῷ λέγειν δὲ Ἀργεῖος οὐκ Ἀργεῖος ἦν [see the line] εἰς τοὺς πολίτας [sc. Κλειομένους]. ὁ δὲ γὰρ εἰπεῖν Ἀθηναῖος εἰς Ἀργεῖον εἰς ἀντι-2004 αὐτὸς τοῦτον καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο ἦν ὁ Κλειομένης. Again in *Schol. on L. 904*.

Ib. 1278 a 31. Mr Wyse suggests an alternative meaning for χρίσται = *to apply* the law.

Ib. 1278 a 32. παραιροῦνται = (virtually) *disfranchise*: so 1285 a 16, 1311 b 8.

Ib. 1278 a 34. Add to note (516): By *Ad. p. 2*, c. 26 § 4 this famous law of Pericles is assigned to the year 451/0 *ἐπὶ Ἀντιθέτῳ* διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ πολέμου. *Περικλέους εἰπόντος, ἔγνωσαν μὴ μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας διὰ τὸν πόλεμον* ὁ δὲ καὶ εἰ ἀποφασίσαι ὅτι γέγονε. An error in the date is not so serious as to have maintained (with Thiersch, Schenk, Buermann and at one time Busolt) that no such law could have been proposed by Pericles. For the practice at Athens in the fourth century see e. g. 1 cited in *Addenda* to p. 360. Cp. 1275 b 21. Add a reference to the common practice at Byzantium according to *Oecon.* II. 2 § 3, 1346 b 26 ff. *ὁμοῦ δὲ νόμος ἀπὸ τοῦ καὶ εἶναι παλίνης διὰ τὸν πόλεμον μὴ εἶς ἀποφασίσαι ἀποφασίσαι τοῦ δὲ ἐνδὲς οὐκ ἀποφασίσαι καταβαλόντα μὴ εἶς τρέφοντα εἶναι παλίνης.*

P. 381. 1278 b 20. Comp. *End. Eth.* 1242 a 6, and note in *Scholia* i. 10.

Ib. 1278 b 22. See p. 457 n. (4). Add to the note on 1278 b 23: *Didalos*. Not that the personal use is not sufficiently attested: cp. *Demosth. De Corone* § 454, p. 312, 2 τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἐφ' ἡμῶν μέγας: but it may well be that *deus* agrees with μέγας, the order being changed to avoid hiatus. See however *Didalos End. Ad. 1275 b 9 ff.* who apparently favours the personal usage of the verb by arranging the personal passage with *Phil. IV* (VII). 1. 10, 1323 b 21 and after adding *τοῦτο ἐπιβάλλοντα νόμος* 1260 a 41 proceeds to the unmistakable usage *ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ* — ὅς ἐστιν 1260 a 23.

P. 382. 1278 b 27. *ἂν μὴ κτλ.* = unless existence is outweighed with [*ταῦτα* = too much in'] the evils of life.

P. 385. 1279 a 26. Add a reference to n. (523).

P. 386. Comm. left col. line 32. For "409 (or 408)" it would perhaps be better to read "410": payment for public services seems to have been national custom after the battle of Cyzicus.

P. 389. c. 9. Many of the fine thoughts here are borrowed from the myth in Plato's *Protagoras* (Spengel).

P. 391. 1280 a 24. *λευθερίῳ* Free birth; the abstract noun answering to *λευθεροί* = free born. See Newman i. p. 248 n. 1. Compare 1281 a 5 — *λευθεροὶ καὶ γένος*, 1283 a 33 *οἱ δ' ἐλευθεροὶ καὶ εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐγγυῖ ἀλλήλων*, 1290 b 3 ff. *ὁ δὲ ἐλευθεροὶ δαίμοι οὐκ ἐκείνων* [καὶ μὴ ἐλευθερῶν] ἀρχαί; lastly, the same meaning which establishes this meaning, 1291 b 26 τὸ μὴ εἶς ἀποφασίσαι τοῦτο ἐλευθεροί = the freeborn who have only one parent of citizen birth. He further quotes *Plato Comicus Hyperbolicus* 3, 4 for *ἐλευθεροί* (ὁ ἐλευθερὸς), and refers to *Dem. Lacr.* vi. 1 and vi. 4 for *Antisthenes*.

P. 396. 1281 a 17. Mr Newman (II. 145) understands this differently, "taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty" like *ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*.

P. 400. 1281 b 31. With *βουλεύεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν* cf. 1274 a 13 ff. and note there.

P. 402. 1282 a 21. Mr Newman cites *Phil.* II. 2. 9, 1294 a 31 *ὅτι ἐπὶ καὶ ἀρχεῖν τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ αἱ γνωρίζονται τῶν καὶ, ὅς τε χρεώτης καὶ τοῦ πτωχοῦ ὁ ἀρχιτετατοκίης*. The ship-captain, representing ὁ χρεώτης, πτωχὸς τὸν πτωχὸν καὶ πηδάλιον γνωρίζει καὶ ἐπειράττει.

**Ib.** 1282 a 22. Mr Wyse calls attention to the poetic colour of the words *δαιτυμῶν* (1338 a 30) and *θόλην* (1324 b 39) in this line; with which may go *τιμαλφεῖν*, 1336 b 19.

**Ib.** 1282 a 28. The plural *δῆμοι* in 1294 a 13, 1310 b 21, 1320 a 4, 1321 a 19, 'Αθ. πολ. c. 40 § 3, Thuc. III. 82. 1, VIII. 65. 1.

**Ib.** 1282 a 31. *ταμειύουσι* *Add to note* (576): Cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4 § 2 (Draconian constitution), c. 8 § 1 (Solon's): *σημείον δ' ὅτι κληρωτὰς ἐποίησεν ἐκ τῶν τιμημάτων ὁ περὶ τῶν ταμιῶν νόμος, ᾧ χρώμενοι διατελοῦσιν ἔτι καὶ νῦν· κελεύει γὰρ κληροῦν τοὺς ταμίας ἐκ πεντηκοσιομεδίμων, c. 47 § 1 ἐκ πεντηκοσιομεδίμων κατὰ τὸν Σόλωνος νόμον* (ἔτι γὰρ i.e. *circa* 329 B.C. ὁ νόμος κύριος).

**P. 410.** 1283 b 5. *ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις*] Cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 35 § 2 *ποιούντες ἀναμφισβήτητον τὴν πολιτείαν*.

**Ib.** 1283 b 14. Mr Wyse compares 1281 a 9, *οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντες*.

**P. 415.** Comm. left col. line 24. *Add*: The recent additions to our knowledge enable us to arrive at the following provisional results respecting Aristotle's judgment upon Ostracism. Having been wholly disused in the fourth century the institution had become the subject of antiquarian research. Two theories about its origin could appeal, with something like confidence, to facts in their favour: (1) the view of the text, 1284 a 17 ff. and of VIII(V). 3. 3, 1302 b 15—18, which agrees with Diod. XI. 55, Plut. *V. Themist.* c. 22, *Arist.* 7, *Nic.* 11, *Alcib.* 13 (cp. *Nepos Them.* 8, *Cimon* 3), evidently the view of Ephorus and Theopompus, i.e. of the school of Isocrates: (2) the view expressed by Philochorus, *Fr.* 79 b (cited in n. 603), which is also found in Androtion, *Fr.* 5 (quoted by Harpocration s.v. *Hipparchus*). Both explanations appear in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 22, the writer showing himself here as elsewhere well acquainted with the latest researches of historians and Attidographi.

**Ib. line 39.** The extract is preceded by an account of the procedure in cases of ostracism: *προχειροτονεῖ μὲν ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἡ' πρυτανείας, εἰ δοκεῖ τὸ ὄστρακον εἰσφέρειν· ὅτε δὲ δοκεῖ, ἐφράσseto σανίσιν ἡ ἀγορὰ καὶ κατελείποντο εἰσοδοὶ δέκα, δι' ὧν εἰσιόντες κατὰ φυλὰς ἐτίθεσαν τὰ ὄστρακα, στρέφοντες τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν. ἐπεστάτου δὲ οἱ τε ἐννέα ἄρχοντες καὶ ἡ βουλὴ· διαριθμηθέντων δὲ ὅτ'w πλείστα γένοιτο καὶ μὴ ἐλάττω ἑξακισχιλίων, τοῦτον ἔδει τὰ δίκαια δόντα καὶ λαβόντα ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις μεταστῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἔτη δέκα (ὑστερον δὲ ἐγένοντο πέντε) καρπούμενον τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐπιβαλόντα ἐντὸς Γεραιστοῦ Εὐβοίας ἀκρωτηρίου· μόνος δὲ κτλ.*

**Ib.** *After note* (603) *add*: Compare now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 22 § 1 *ἐν οἷς* [sc. νόμοις] *ἐτέθη καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὄστρακισμοῦ νόμος* seemingly about 507 B.C., § 3 *διαλιπόντες ἔτη μετὰ τὴν νίκην* [Marathon], *θαρροῦντος ἤδη τοῦ δήμου, τότε πρῶτον ἐχρήσαντο τῷ νόμῳ τῷ περὶ τὸν ὄστρακισμόν, ὃς ἐτέθη διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν, ὅτι Πεισίστρατος δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς ὢν τύραννος κατέστη· § 4 καὶ πρῶτος ὡστρακίσθη τῶν ἐκείνου συγγενῶν* "Ιππαρχος Χάρμου Κολλυτεύς, δι' ὃν καὶ μάλιστα τὸν νόμον ἔθηκεν ὁ Κλεισθένης, ἐξελάσαι βουλόμενος αὐτόν. εὐθὺς δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει [i.e. 487/6 B.C.]...ὡστρακίσθη Μεγακλῆς 'Ιπποκράτους 'Αλωπεκῆθεν [a nephew of Cleisthenes]. *ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ἔτη τρία τοὺς τῶν τυράννων φίλους ὡστράκιζον, ὧν χάριν ὁ νόμος ἐτέθη, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει* [probably 485/4 B.C.] *καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τις δοκοίη μείζων εἶναι μελίστατο· καὶ πρῶτος ὡστρακίσθη τῶν ἀπωθεν τῆς τυραννίδος Ξάνθιππος ὁ 'Αρίφρωνος*. Unquestionably the motives assigned, (1) jealousy of preeminence (Eph. Theopomp.) and (2) fear of a restoration of Hippias (Androt.), are inferences from the persons ostracized. The fragment of Androtion in Harpocration runs thus: *ἄλλος δὲ ἐστὶν 'Ιππαρχος ὁ Χάρμου, ὃς φησι Λυκούργος ἐν τῷ κατὰ*

Λοιμάρων· περί δὲ τοῦτου Ἀνδροτίων ἐν τῷ β' ἀφείλεται ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαίας καὶ οὗ Πρωτοκρίτου τοῦ τιμωμένου καὶ πρῶτος ἐξωστρακίσθη τοῦ περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας αὐτοῦ τότε πρῶτον τοῦτον διὰ τὴν ὑπόψιν τῶν περὶ Πρωτοκρίτου, οἱ δὲ μαθητὰί αὐτοῦ καὶ παραγγέλονται ἀποβάνησεν. The coincidence of language is remarkable, cp. *ibid.* p. 6, 130f. & 7.

P. 417. To note (609) *add*: A more correct account of the earlier position of these three islands is given in 'Aθ. πολ. c. 24 § 2: τὰς παρακείρας ἀποστρατεύσας ἑλόντα πλεονέκτων καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ Σαμίων· τοῖσιν δὲ φιλοῦσι εἶχε τὴν ἀρχήν, ὡς αὐτοὶ τοῖς καὶ βασιλείας παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀρχὴν ὡς εἶχε ἀρχαίται. From this privileged position the Samians and Lesbians were not dislodged until they revolted. Comp. Mr Newman in *Class. Rev.* v. 162.

P. 423. 1285 a 16. *Add*: Busolt *Die Lakedaimonier* p. 141 ff. compares the Tagela in Thessaly, the βασιλεία of Arcadia (which is also a *στρατοπύλη*), and the 'Hertogthum' of the ancient Germans.

P. 424. 1285 a 35 et al. Note that according to Meisterhans *Grammatica* p. 23 ff. (133) the true spelling is Μυτιληναῖοι.

P. 426. 1285 b 14. Cp. 'Aθ. πολ. c. 24 § 3 ἀρχαί δ' ἑλόντων μὲν ἀποβάνον δὲ.

*ib.* 1285 b 15. παραόντων] In 'Aθ. πολ. c. 3 § 3 the word is παρακείμεναι.

*ib.* 1285 b 16. *Add to note* (629): For βασιλεία at Athens cp. 'Aθ. πολ. c. 3 § 2 ἐπικρατία ἢ πολεμαρχία διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τοῦτο τῶν βασιλέων ἀλλοτρίων. But as to the 'shadowy kingship' see now J. G. Frazer *Golden Bough* i. 44 ff., 118 ff., 136—137, 217—235, an epoch-making work which is calculated to shatter many fond beliefs.

P. 428. 1286 a 3. *Add*: This is the distinction between τάξις and στρατὸς in Dion. Halicar. *Ant. Rom.* v. 167 A.

P. 431. 1287 a 38. In 'Aθ. πολ. c. 35 § 3 πρὸς χάριν happens to occur.

P. 434. 1286 a 30 f. The sentiment perfectly agrees with that of 'Aθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2; after mentioning the absolute personal sway of Demos (ἀνδρῶν γὰρ αὐτοῖς αὐτῶν ποταίνας ὁ δῆμος κύριος καὶ πάντα διακρίνει φησὶν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναστρέφει, ἐν αἷσι δ' ὅμοιοι εἶναι ὁ κρατῶν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῆς βουλῆς ἐγείναι αἱ τῶν ἡμῶν ἀναδιδόναι) the writer continues καὶ τοῦτο δοκοῦσι ποιεῖν ἐφ' ὧν εὐδαίμονέστερον γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἶναι τοῦ πολλοῦ εἶναι καὶ κέρδει καὶ χάρισιν.

P. 438. Comm. left col. line 1. *After* turn out insert *asylum* in.

P. 439. 1287 a 6. Comp. for this sense of διατρέχει, 1311 b 9: also 1330 a 7 ἐν διακρίσει τὴν ἀλλήν οἰκίαν, and 'Aθ. πολ. c. 24 s.f. δῖνος γὰρ τούτων ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἡ διακρίσει (maintenance) § 5.

P. 442. 1287 b 19. παραληφθέναι] In 'Aθ. πολ. c. 9 § 1 παραλαμβάνει.

P. 454. *Add to Excursus* II.: See further remarks on the date of Ptolemy, in reply to Beloch, by Toepffer in *Rhein. Mus.* XLIX. 1894, pp. 230—246.

P. 467, line 8. See *Corrigenda*. *Due the sentence*: Again, one might *probatum*.

P. 464 ff. The statistical results here given have been again and again revised by Prof. Sussehl in *Quaest. crit. et exeg.* II. (1895) and *Zeich. f. Phil.* 1896, p. 417 ff., the latter article a rejoinder to Mr Newman's presentation of the statistics in *Classical Review* VII. 1893, pp. 304—309. In such enumerations mistakes are apt to creep in, and an editor's judgment will from time to time be modified by the greater or less degree of probability which a combination of assumptions seems to present: hence neither the statistics of the text nor the modified results of the articles published in 1893 can be regarded as final. Both sides have made concessions, either from change of view (as when Prof. Sussehl admits that 1372 b 9 Mr Newman has rightly accounted for the variant διαστρέφει by διαστρέφει in the next line, and accordingly

returns to  $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\omega\upsilon\pi$   $\Pi^2$ , and Mr Newman 1263 a 23 now accepts  $\xi\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota$   $\Pi^1$  in place of  $\eta\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota$   $\Pi^2$ ) or from the laudable desire to do all possible justice to the opposing view (which may account for Prof. Susemihl's surrender of 1256 b 1  $\kappa\omicron\mu\lambda\iota\zeta\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\iota$ , 1258 b 1  $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\beta\omicron\lambda\iota\kappa\eta\varsigma$ , 1258 b 7  $\nu\theta\mu\iota\sigma\mu\alpha$   $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$   $\nu\omicron\mu\lambda\iota\sigma\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$  in *Quaest.* II. p. IV. although he would still regard these three passages as extremely uncertain, and similarly for Mr Newman's omission to count 15 passages on the side of  $\Pi^2$ , for which see *Class. Rev.* VII. p. 306 *n.* 1, p. 308). It only remains to state and compare the competing statistical tables in their latest form.

Let us start with Book I. where " $\Pi^1$  is certainly wrong 15 times" (text p. 464, line 40): deduct *three* of these 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1260 a 26 which fall back into the uncertain class, and add *seven*, viz. 1254 b 14, 1256 a 10, 1257 a 6, 1259 b 31 together with the more properly uncertain cases 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, b 7: this brings the total of errors in  $\Pi^1$  to 19. But again, in B. I. " $\Pi^1$  is right 24 times" (text p. 464, line 3 from below): this should have been 23 for only 23 variants are enumerated. Of these *five* are very slight changes and Prof. Susemihl now refrains from counting them: viz. 1252 b 28 ( $\eta\delta\eta$ ), 1256 b 8 ( $\delta\epsilon\delta\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$ ), 1258 b 40 ( $\chi\alpha\rho\eta\tau\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$ ), 1259 b 28 ( $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ ), 1260 a 37 ( $\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ ), but he adds *five* in their place, viz. 1253 a 32, 1253 b 33, 1254 a 10, 1260 a 26, a 31: the total remaining 23. Thus in B. I. the problem works out in favour of  $\Pi^1$  by 23 : 19.

Mr Newman does not agree with this statement of the case, but instead of a detailed criticism he contents himself with objecting to five of the 23 variants claimed as right readings for  $\Pi^1$  on the ground that words are omitted, and that this is the besetting sin of  $\Pi^1$ : these five omissions are 1252 a 9 ( $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ ), b 20 ( $\sigma\upsilon\nu\eta\lambda\theta\omicron\nu$ ), 1253 b 33 ( $\delta$ ), 1257 b 7 ( $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ ), 1260 a 31 ( $\delta$ ). If these five claims were struck out, the balance in favour of  $\Pi^1$  would be destroyed.

In B. II. the alleged superiority claimed for  $\Pi^1$  is still disputed. Mr Newman accepts its authority in 35 variants and does not definitely pronounce against it in the 13 other readings, while at the same time rejecting it in favour of  $\Pi^2$  in no less than 64 cases.

Prof. Susemihl again has altered his result (p. 465) in favour of  $\Pi^1$  over  $\Pi^2$  from 69 : 40 to 67 : 48. It is clear that while opinions continue thus widely to differ, as to which variants are decisive for the one or the other side, the facts require extremely cautious and delicate manipulation.

The changes in Susemihl's figures for Book II. are thus explained. " $\Pi^1$  has changed the right reading at the most only 40 times" (p. 465 line 32): deduct 9 of these, viz. 1261 a 35, 1265 b 39, 1266 b 39, 1268 a 26, 1270 a 21, a 27, 1272 a 1, 1273 a 9, 1274 a 4, in return add 17 others: 1261 a 22, 1264 a 16, 1265 a 22, 1268 a 6, a 17, a 34, 1269 a 38, b 21, b 28, 1270 a 23, b 12, 1272 a 3, b 9, b 28, b 34, 1274 b 8, b 9, b 14: the new total of the errors of  $\Pi^1$  is 48. Again of the 69 passages claimed as right readings for  $\Pi^1$  (p. 465 line 23) Susemihl is now disposed to omit *nine*, viz. 1263 a 12, 1266 b 31, 1267 a 40, 1270 a 22, b 19, b 32, 1274 a 5, a 21, in place of which he advances 9 others, viz. 1261 b 30, 1263 a 23 ( $\kappa\alpha\iota$ ), b 5, 1264 a 15, b 31, 1265 a 16, 1268 a 6 f., 1269 b 14, 1273 a 35: the total would thus remain at 69, but on reflexion he counts the variations of one passage, 1261 b 2 f., not (as on p. 465) as *five*, but only *two* (or three at most). This brings out the final result for B. II.:  $\Pi^1=67$  (or 68 at most),  $\Pi^2=48$ .

Mr Newman's divergent results are thus obtained. Of the 67 he accepts 35, but transfers *nine* others to the opposite side and reckons them to the credit of  $\Pi^2$  (viz. 1260 b 27, 1261 b 4, 1263 b 7, 1268 a 3 all cases of omission by  $\Pi^1$ , together with

1265 b 11, 1267 a 35, b 26, 1269 b 6, 1271 a 20: the remaining 11 he leaves doubtful, though strongly of opinion that they also should be treated for  $H^2$ . Thus  $H^2$  rises with him from 67 to 35; and  $H^2$  rises by the addition to the 48 which Süssmilch finally admits) of seven other variants, which Süssmilch regards as doubtful: viz. 1264 a 31, 1265 a 12, 1268 b 17, 1267 a 40, 1273 b 21, 1274 a 4, b 6. This makes the total for  $H^2=55$ . Add the 9 variants above enumerated which Süssmilch counts for  $H^1$  and Newman for  $H^2$  and we get the result,  $H^1=64$ ,  $H^2=54$ .

On the question of the text generally we quote with pleasure Prof. Tyrrell's opinion as expressed in 1888, *Hermione's* Vol. vi. No. 14, p. 215. "The manner taken by recent criticism illustrates one of Aristotle's rules for attaining the mean, *προσπερὶ τοῦ μέλλουσαν*. Bokker having completely neglected D<sup>h</sup> and T, Eusemihl's recoil carried him perhaps too far from Bokker's method, and now Dittenberger" — may we not add Newman? — seems to be dragging him too near it again. Without free emendation and transposition we can have no readable text."

[illegible][illegible]

P. 520. 1330 b 11. For the manuscript see now 'As. tal. p. 1331' and the manuscript in the library of the University of Cambridge.

P. 522. 1331 a 3. After 1269 a 6 add: and 1311. 3. 4. 1376 a 14.

P. 535. 1333 a 2. After other 749. and 1 Comp. No. 224 v. 1. p. 1199 a 10  
 \*\* 749. h edgim and X. 7. 2, 1177 a 31 (where Bywater locusts etc.)

P. 539. 1333 b 12. With *dyerhouse* comp. the passage used is *dyerhouse* in p. 520 above, from 'Ad. roA. c. 28 l. 5.

P. 540. 1333 b 34. To note (915)  $22^2$ : Comp.  $\tau \lambda^2 = \lambda^2$  in 1334

P. 541. 1334 ἂ γ. Compare the parallel phrase of *Menig.* c. 2. 10, *ἡτὰ ἂ γ.*  
*ἀντὶ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ σπονδύλου.*

P. 570. 1337 a 27. Comp. Pl. *Croce* go D. etc. and 1000. *De* *Croce* & *ing* (sig)  
 παρὰ καὶ τῶ παρὰ ἀνά καὶ τῶ παρὰ).

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